Annex 2: The Committees' questions on
the Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual Report (HC 561)
published in July 2013 and the Government's answers
The text of the letter from the Foreign Secretary
to the Chairman of the Committees dated 29 October 2013 reproducing
the Committees' questions on the Government's United Kingdom
Strategic Export Controls Report 2011 (HC 337) and providing
the Government's answers was as follows:
Thank you for your letter of 12 September enclosing
questions on the Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual
Report 2012. It is my pleasure to forward to the Committees
the attached response, agreed with other relevant Departments,
which addresses the questions in the Annex to your letter.
The Government remains committed to addressing
the Committees' concerns in a transparent and timely fashion.
We welcome the rigorous scrutiny by the Committees and their
vital work on strategic export controls. I look forward to giving
Oral Evidence before the Committees again in January.
Note: The Committees' questions are in normal type
and the Government's answers are in bold italic type.
The paragraph numbers follow those in the Government's
Report
Ministerial Foreword
a) What were each of the six occasions in 2012
when the use of the export licence suspension mechanism was considered,
and why in each case was it decided not to invoke it?
The use of the suspension mechanism
was readied on several occasions in response to a change in circumstances
in Mali, Ethiopia, Syria, Maldives, Egypt and Israel. However
in each case it was not necessary to use the suspension mechanism
as, within a short time of the initial crisis, the Government
was able to gather sufficient information to make valid risk assessments
against the Consolidated Criteria.
b) Please provide the Committees with the country
risk categorisations used in assessing export licence applications.
The Government's position remains
as stated in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 12 November, that
it would not be in the national interest for the Government to
provide the information requested by the Committees. Officials
would however be available to brief the Committees orally on the
risk categorisation process.
c) Please state, on a classified basis if necessary,
which countries are placed in each risk category.
The Government's position remains
as stated in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 12 November 2012,
that it would not be in the national interest for the Government
to provide the information requested by the Committees.
d) How many open licence applications were processed
in 2012?
A full breakdown of applications
processed for both Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) and
Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs) is provided in
Tables 4.3 (OIELs) and Table 4.5 (OITCLs) of the 2012 Annual Report.
318 OIELs were processed and 25 OITCLs.
e) How many MoD Form 680 applications were processed
in 2012?
The Government processed 3098 MOD
Form 680 applications in 2012.
f) Do the Secretaries of State accept that though
their statement: "There was no evidence of any UK-supplied
equipment being used for internal repression" may be factually
correct, it is also profoundly misleading given that for many
of the goods for which Government export licence approval has
been given and which could be used for internal repression it
is totally or virtually impossible to obtain evidence about their
use once exported — even in the unlikely case there are
independent personnel on the ground in a position to provide such
evidence? Such exported goods, non-identifiable as British once
exported, that could be used for internal repression include components
for military equipment, software for military use, military technology,
cryptographic equipment, components and technology, dual-use chemicals,
ammunition and most sniper rifles and automatic weapons?
The Government has acknowledged
in previous correspondence that we cannot prove conclusively that
UK exports have not been diverted from the legitimate end use
stated in the licence application and been used for internal repression.
But we do not accept that it is misleading to state that there
is no evidence of such misuse. Exports of all UK controlled goods
are only permitted if, after a thorough assessment, there is no
clear risk that they might be used for internal repression. Any
evidence of the misuse of similar non-UK supplied goods in the
end user destination is factored into this assessment. The
UK does not implement a US-style system of end-use monitoring
since we do not claim the same extra-territorial rights and we
focus on rigorous pre-licence checks and, for open licences, compliance
audits carried out at the exporters' premises in the UK.
g) At the end of the Secretaries of State's statement
that: "There was no evidence of any UK-supplied equipment
being used for internal repression or in any other way which would
contravene the export licensing Criteria" why were the words
"or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"
omitted, in accordance with the Foreign Secretary's policy statement
to the Committees on 7 February 2012?
Please refer to the Foreign Secretary's
letter of 6 October which clarifies this point.
h) How is the Secretaries of State's statement
that "43 licences for Argentina were subsequently revoked
but the licensing of exports for purely commercial or private
use has continued" to be reconciled with the Government's
approval after the 43 licence revocations in 2012 of export licences
to Argentina for SIELs for small arms ammunition, equipment employing
cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and
OIELs for cryptographic equipment.
All licences for Argentina issued
after 26 April 2012 took into account the policy announced by
the Business Secretary on that date as well as the Consolidated
Criteria. This is addressed in detail on pages 7 and 17 of the
Annual Report. Licences for the equipment quoted above were for
commercial and private end use.
i) Please list each new set of EU sanctions on
Iran being referred to, and the specific licensing changes made
by the present Government, or its predecessor, following each
new set of sanctions.
A list of the amendments to EU sanctions
on Iran that were implemented in 2012 is given below. More details
of the specifics of these amendments can be found at http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf.
The relevant UK legislation is the The Export Control (Iran Sanctions)
Order 2012 as referred to in the Annual Report
(http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2012/1243/article/4/made).
Detailed information on how export licensing applications are
assessed is provided in Annex A of the Annual Report. Our international
obligations under EU sanctions regimes are considered as part
of the assessment under Criterion 1 of the Consolidated Criteria.
COUNCIL REGULATION (EU)
No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 amended by:
Council Implementing Regulation
(EU) No 350/2012 of 23 April 2012
Council Regulation (EU) No
708/2012 of 2 August 2012
Council Implementing Regulation
(EU) No 709/2012 of 2 August 2012
Council Implementing Regulation
(EU) No 945/2012 of 15 October 2012
Council Implementing Regulation
(EU) No 1016/2012 of 6 November 2012
Council Regulation (EU) No
1067/2012 of 14 November 2012
Council Regulation (EU) No
1263/2012 of 21 December 2012
Council Implementing Regulation
(EU) No 1264/2012 of 21 December 2012
COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP
of 26 July 2010 amended by:
Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP
of 23 January 2012
Council Decision 2012/152/CFSP
of 15 March 2012
Council Decision 2012/169/CFSP
of 23 March 2012
Council Decision 2012/205/CFSP
of 23 April 2012
Council Decision 2012/457/CFSP
of 2 August 2012
Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP
of 15 October 2012
Council Decision 2012/687/CFSP
of 6 November 2012
Section 1 UK and EU Policy Developments in
2012
Paragraph 1.1 Legislation
a) What UK and/or EU export controls are currently
in place over the export of pancuronium bromide to the USA for
the use in executions by lethal injection?
As stated in both the Government's
response to the Committees' questions on the Government's Annual
Report for 2011 (Section 1, paragraph 1.3 (a)), and in the Annual
Report for 2012, the UK control on the export to the United States
of the drug pancuronium bromide was made permanent on 16 April
2012. There are no EU controls on the export of this drug to the
USA.
b) Has the EU's analysis of the responses to
the consultation on the EU Commission's Green Paper, "The
dual-use export control system of the European Union: ensuring
security and competiveness in a changing world", been published?
If so, please provide the link to the analysis and inform the
Committees of any responses the Government made to it.
A link was provided in the Government's
response to the Committees' Annual Report for 2012 (Cm 8707).
The Government does not intend to make any formal response to
this document.
c) When does the Government now expect the EU
Commission's Report on Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 (the so-called
"Dual-use Regulation) to be made to the EU Council and the
European Parliament? Please inform the Committees of any response
the Government makes to that Report when published.
We expect the report to be submitted
before the end of the year. Should we make a formal response
to that report we will of course provide a copy to the Committees.
d) Has the EU Commission now commenced its review
of Council Regulation (EC) 1236/2005 (the so-called "Torture
Regulation)? Please inform the Committees of any response the
Government makes to this review.
Please see the Government's response
to Recommendation 43 of the Committees' Annual Report for 2012
(Cm 8707).
Paragraph 1.2 Policy Developments
a) Why is the Department for International Development,
unlike the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of
Defence, not asked for its advice before the final decision to
suspend export licences is taken by the Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills?
The Department for International
Development is asked for its advice when the suspension mechanism
is being considered and should have been referred to in the Annual
Report.
b) What current risks, in addition to "WMD,
political, security and human rights", are included in the
Government's new risk categorisation of countries to whom military
goods may be exported?
The Government considers all relevant
risks in particular those highlighted in the Consolidated Criteria.
c) Please provide the Committees with a copy
of the revised Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA)
Human Rights Guidance as soon as this is published.
The Government will do so when the
revised Guidance is finalised, as stated in Cm 8707, its Response
to the Committees' Annual Report.
d) The Government's Report states that all proposals
from Government sponsors to gift controlled goods are assessed
against the Consolidated Criteria in the same way as commercial
applications and to the same degree of rigour. Please confirm
therefore that all proposals to gift controlled goods are assessed
not only against the UK's Consolidated Criteria but also against
the Foreign Secretary's policy statement to the Committees on
7 February 2012 that the export would not be permitted of controlled
goods "which might be used to facilitate internal repression".
Please refer to the Foreign Secretary's
letter of 6 October. The statement in the Annual Report is correct.
e) Why are companies who are being assessed for
counter-piracy Open General Trade Licences or Individual Trade
Control Licences not being assessed against the Foreign Secretary's
policy statement to the Committees on 7 February 2012 that the
export would not be permitted of controlled goods "which
might be used to facilitate internal repression", as well
as against the UK's Consolidated Criteria?
Please refer to the Foreign Secretary's
letter of 6 October, which confirms that our policy is to assess
against the Consolidated Criteria.
Paragraph 1.3 Transparency and Accountability
a) The Government's Report, published on 12 July
2013, states: "It is intended that the first reports of open
licence usage would be published, in line with standard practice,
3 months after the end of the Quarter to which they relate, i.e.,
October 2013." However, on 18 July the Secretary of State
for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, stated in the
House: "I have none the less established that we should dispense
with some procedures relating to quarterly reporting, and we will
do so." This was followed by a Notice to Exporters issued
by ECO on 31 July 2013 stating that: "the Secretary of State
announced to Parliament on Thursday 18 July 2013 that reporting
requirements on the use of Open Licences under the Transparency
Initiative would be scaled back significantly". Why did the
Government announce in the House of Commons on 18 July a less
transparent policy on open licence usage than that set out in
its Annual Report published 6 days previously?
Plans are reviewed regularly
to ensure that we have the right balance between the benefits
of greater transparency and minimising the burdens on business.
In making the final preparations for the launch of the Transparency
Initiative we reviewed its scope and the potential for it to impose
unacceptable burdens on business. The original proposals did not
strike that balance and, as soon as this was established, a statement
was made in the House on 18 July. This statement superseded any
previous statements made.
Although the annual report was published
in July 2013 it is intended to be a report of the Government's
strategic export control policy and practice during the 2012 calendar
year. Occasionally it will be appropriate to make reference to
events in 2013, such as the adoption by the UN of the Arms Trade
Treaty; however these references will always be the exception
rather than the rule. The statements in the 2012 Annual Report
regarding the Transparency Initiative are a true reflection of
the Government's actions and intent during 2012. In any event,
the final version of the annual report was cleared by Ministers
at the end of June and submitted to the publishers on 4 July 2013.
This was the cut off point for making changes to the report and
still ensuring we laid it in Parliament before summer recess.
a) Will the Government make public the same information
relating to standard licence usage as it now going to do for open
licence usage?
We have no plans at this time to
extend reporting to actual usage of standard licences.
Paragraph 1.4 Awareness
a) Will the Government be publishing on the Export
Control Organisation's website entities of potential WMD concern
in countries in addition to Iran, for instance Syria?
The Government has no immediate
plans to publish any additional information about entities of
potential WMD concern in countries in addition to Iran.
We will continue to publish the information for Iran.
b) With regard to the Government's updated website,
what are the specific usability improvements that have been put
in place, what are the ones in the pipeline in addition to better
navigation, and when will the additional facility to identify
which Open General Trade Control Licences may be applicable be
in place?
The Government Digital Service (GDS)
within the Cabinet Office is responsible for transforming government
digital services including the design and development of GOV.UK.
Further information about the projects involved is available on
the Cabinet Office website http://digital.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/projects/
The Export Control Organisation
(ECO) is working closely with GDS to refine and condense the amount
of export control policy and licence application information to
further improve search results. ECO has recently launched:
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/export-control-organisation
to enable exporters to readily establish whether a licence
is required and how to apply. This ECO Landing Page web
address will feature on all future ECO promotional material.
ECO plans to make further improvements
to the OGEL Checker tool to better enable exporters to identify
appropriate OGTLs and OGELs. Technical and budget issues have
prevented further work at this time but we will revisit this in
the New Year.
Section 2 International Policy in 2012
Why are there no sub-sections on:
1. The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
2. The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread
of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
3. The Chemical Weapons Convention
4. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
5. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
6. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
7. Sub-Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Weapons
8. A Middle-East Weapons of Mass Destruction
Free Zone
9. The National Counter-Proliferation Strategy
for 2012-2015
all of which raise proliferation issues?
Will the Government include its policies on all the
above in their 2013 Annual Report?
The Annual Report is intended to highlight
the Government's work on export controls, not the whole range
of its work on proliferation issues. The Government does not
intend to include contributions on all these issues in its 2013
Annual Report although it may do so on a case-by-case basis where
there have been significant developments relevant to export controls.
The Government regularly provides public information on proliferation
issues. The subjects listed above have been covered in some depth
in the Government's Response to the Committees' Annual Report
published on 8 October and most, if not all, of these issues have
been the subject of previous correspondence with the Committees
which is readily (and freely) available in the public domain to
parliamentarians, media and other interested parties.
Paragraph
2.2 Small Arms and Light Weapons
a) What progress has been made in enhancing the
implementation of the International Tracing Instrument to promote
international co-operation in marking and tracing illicit Small
Arms and Light Weapons?
The UN Programme of Action Review
Conference held in August 2012 agreed an Implementation Plan for
the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) for the period 2012-2018.
At the Review Conference, States resolved to increase their efforts
to achieve full and effective implementation of the ITI. More
details about the Implementation Plan can be found at http://www.poa-iss.org/RevCon2/Documents/RevCon-DOC/CRP3-ITI-IP.pdf
b) Has a voluntary sponsorship fund to boost
assistance to less developed states in dealing with illicit Small
Arms and Light Weapons been established? If so, what is the size
of the fund and what amount has the British Government contributed
to it?
A voluntary fund to boost assistance
to less developed states in dealing with illicit small arms and
light weapons has been established. The UK has pledged to
donate £100,000 to the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting
Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) and has allocated a further
£250,000 to fund projects devoted to supporting ATT implementation.
The EU will also provide considerable funding to support ATT implementation.
Paragraph 2.3 Cluster Munitions
Is the UK Government still on track to destroy the
remainder of its cluster munitions by the end of 2013?
Yes, as stated at the Fourth Meeting of States
Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Lusaka in September.
Paragraph 2.4 Ottawa Treaty/Landmines
What is the area of land in the Falkland Islands
that is still to be cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance and
then released?
There are around 20,000 landmines remaining,
covering an area of approximately 20km2.
Paragraph 2.6 Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons
What were the Government's policy objectives at the
meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons held in November 2012 and how far have these
objectives been achieved? Does the Government consider that any
additions should be made to the existing five protocols which
are as follows:
- Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments
- Protocol II on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps
and Other Devices
- Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Incendiary Weapons
- Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons
- Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War
The UK's main objective at the November
2012 meeting was to support Australia in maintaining dialogue
on practical measures to combat the unlawful manufacture and use
of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) under Protocol II. The
UK delivered an expert presentation on its Counter-IED approach
at the conference. Our work with Australia is continuing in advance
of this year's meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the
Convention in November.
More broadly, the UK's main objective
remains to encourage the universalisation of the Convention and
to achieve adherence to the existing protocols. The Government
is not currently considering any additions to these protocols.
Paragraph 2.10 The Wassenaar Arrangement
What are the specific issues relating to the future
membership of the Wassenaar Arrangement at which participating
states will be looking at in 2013?
The Government's Response to the Committees'
Annual Report (Cm 8707) and the Foreign Secretary's letter of
8 April provided an update on membership issues. The General
Working Group is being held on 21-24 October and the Plenary will
be held in December. We will update the Committees in 2014.
Section 3 Export Licensing Case Studies
Argentina
Why was the value of arms export licences to Argentina
in 2012 nearly 5 times greater than it was in 2011, notwithstanding
the fact that in April 2012 the Business Secretary announced that
the Government would no longer grant licences for any military
or dual-use goods and technology for military end-users in Argentina,
other than in exceptional circumstances?
The value of export licences issued for military
list goods was several times smaller in 2012 than in 2011 as a
result of the policy specifically directed at military end users.
The export of dual-use and military list goods to civil and commercial
end users was unaffected by the policy.
Libya
In deciding whether or not to approve arms export
licence applications to Libya what account is the Government taking
of the Report of Experts to the UN on 9 March 2013 of what has
happened to the Gaddafi arms stockpiles, to which the UK was a
contributor? The Experts' Report stated: "The proliferation
of weapons from Libya has continued at a worrying rate and has
spread into new territory: West Africa, the Levant and, potentially,
even the Horn of Africa. Since the uprising and the resulting
collapse of the security apparatus, including the loss of national
control over weapons stockpiles and the absence of any border
controls, Libya has over the past two years become a significant
and attractive source of weaponry in the region. Illicit flows
from the country are fuelling existing conflicts in Africa and
the Levant and enriching the arsenals of a range of non-State
actors, including terrorist groups."
The Government takes into account reports from
a wide variety of sources including the UN when assessing export
licensing applications. Criterion 7 of the Consolidated Criteria
requires the Government to assess the risk of diversion and this
is something we take account of for Libya, as with all destinations
worldwide.
Section 4 Export Licensing Data and Performance
Against Targets During 2012
Paragraph 4.6 Open General Export Licences (OGELs)
If a UK exporter's application satisfies the terms
of an EU General Export Authorisation, is it the Government's
policy that it must also satisfy the terms of the UK's Consolidated
Criteria and the Foreign Secretary's arms export policy statement
to the Committees on Arms Export Controls on 7 February 2012 before
being approved?
The EU General Export Authorisations (EU GEA)
are the EU equivalent of UK OGELs and are available for use by
any exporter in the EU provided they can meet the terms of that
Authorisation. UK exporters do not make an "application"
for an EU GEA and we do not "approve" their use of it.
Instead, any UK exporter wishing to use an EU GEA must register
with the Export Control Organisation and will be subject to our
compliance procedures. The scope of the EU GEAs was agreed by
all Member States including the UK: EU GEAs do not cover any export
that the Government would not have been content to cover under
an OGEL. Please also refer to the
Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 October.
Table 4.7 List of Open General Export Licences
Which is the country or countries of export destination
for the OGELs named:
- Chemicals
- Cryptographic Development
- International Non-Proliferation Regime De-controls:
Dual-Use Items
- Low Value Shipments
- Technology for Dual-Use Items
- Specified Dual-Use Items (X) (and what is the
meaning of (X)?)
- Access Overseas to Software and Technology
for Military Goods: Individual Use Only
- Military Components
- Military Goods
- Software and Source Code for Military Goods
- Military Surplus Vehicles
- Technology for Military Goods
- Open General Transhipment Licence
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Trade and
Transportation: Small Arms and Light Weapons)
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Maritime
Anti-Piracy)
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Certified
Companies)
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Exports
Under The US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty)
All Open General Licences, including the permitted
destination lists, are available to view and download on the gov.uk
website (https://www.gov.uk/dual-use-open-general-export-licences-explained,
https://www.gov.uk/military-goods-ogels, https://www.gov.uk/open-general-trade-control-licences
and https://www.gov.uk/transhipment-licences). In
reviewing these licences it is important that each Open General
Licence is considered in its entirety taking into account the
items that may be exported and the specific terms and conditions
of that licence, including any limitations on end-use or end-user,
rather than looking at the permitted country lists in isolation.
The Committees may also wish to note that the
Open Licence for Certified Companies is an OGEL, not an OGTCL
as stated.
The title of the 12th OGEL in Table 4.7 is
'OGEL (X)'. The additional description 'specified dual-use
items' is intended to be self-explanatory. This particular OGEL
was introduced to allow the export of the least sensitive dual-use
items.
Paragraph 4.7 Performance in processing
licence applications
a) Why do performance targets not apply to applications
for licences to export goods that are subject to control solely
because of United Nations Sanctions or to appeals in relation
to such applications?
Licence applications and appeals
relating to sanctions are often particularly complex and therefore
difficult to assess, especially where it is necessary to determine
whether the proposed export is subject to an exemption in the
sanctions. In addition, in many cases it is necessary to seek
prior approval from the relevant UN sanctions committee before
granting the licence and this adds to the time required to process
the licence application or appeal.
b) In Table 4.10 what are the reasons for the
deterioration of appeals finalised within both 20 working days
and 60 working days over the period 2010-2012?
Appeals performance in 2012 was
affected by the same factors that led to the reduction in performance
from 2010 to 2011 and described in the Government's response to
the Committees' questions on the Government's Annual Report for
2011.
c) What actions are being taken to achieve the
target of processing 60% of appeals within 20 working days (currently
23%) and 95% of appeals within 60 working days (currently 60%)?
We are working to improve response
times to appeals against a backdrop of increasing numbers of export
licence applications and finite resources. We have recently refocused
resources to bring about an improvement.
Section 5 Compliance and Performance
Paragraph 5.1 Compliance
What are the reasons why the number of warning letters
where breaches of licence conditions were found during visits
rose from 45 in 2011 to 101 on 2012?
There are a number of reasons why the number
of warning letters will vary from year to year, not least the
complex nature of compliance audits themselves. It is too
early to tell whether the increase is due to a trend of increasing
non-compliance. We continue to explore ways of improving our compliance
procedures to support businesses that have been found to be non-compliant.
Paragraph 5.2 Enforcement activity undertaken
by HM Revenue and Customs, Border Force and the Crown Prosecution
Service
Is the increase in the number of seizures of strategic
goods in breach of licensing requirements or sanctions and embargoes
from 141 in 2011-12 to 280 in 2012-13 due to increased effectiveness
of the authorities or to increased attempts to breach the licensing
requirements or both?
The Government believes this increase is the
result of a combination of factors.
- The range of goods in scope has increased
steadily over the last few years as a result of the introduction
of new sanctions, for example those directed against Iran and
Syria, and other new strategic export regulations and restrictions.
These developments increase the potential for greater non-compliance
through accident (lack of awareness of the new rules) or design.
This appears to be supported by the general increase in the number
of voluntary disclosures, 'no further action' and warning letters
we have issued in recent years, and also a general increase in
the number of 'technical' offences we have encountered.
- The increase in results has also been achieved by
good strategic analysis by HMRC which has considerably improved
the national picture of the most sensitive commodities and ports
of highest risk. Expanded training and development of Border Force
front line staff has also resulted in heightened awareness
of strategic export control risks and increased front-line
activity.
The Government, in line with previous answers
to the Committees, attributes the majority of seizures to administrative
errors on the part of exporters. The Government has no reason
to believe there has been an increase in wilful non-compliance
by exporters.
Section 6 Gifted Equipment
The Government's Report states: "As a matter
of policy, all proposals to gift controlled military equipment
are assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export
Licensing Criteria by relevant Government departments in the same
way as commercial applications and to the same degree of rigour."
Why are Government gifts of military equipment not also being
assessed against the Foreign Secretary's policy statement to the
Committees on Arms Export Controls on 7 February 2012 that exports
would not be permitted of goods "which might be used to facilitate
internal repression"?
Please refer to the Foreign Secretary's letter
of 6 October which clarifies this point.
Section 7 Government to Government
What is the policy followed in deciding whether or
not to approve UK export licensing coverage for either industry
or the customer in Government to Government exports?
The consideration of Export Licence Applications
for exports under government-to-government arrangements is the
same as for any other application. An Export Licence Application
must be submitted to the Department for Business, Innovation and
Skills, which is assessed in the usual manner against the Consolidated
EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria by advisory Departments,
including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of
Defence.
Annex D UK Return to EU Annual Report 2012
a) In future UK Strategic Export Controls Annual
Reports will the Government include in this Annex a description
of each of the numbered EU Common Military List categories?
The numbered categories of the EU
Common Military List are essentially the same as the categories
of the UK Military List. The current version of the EU Common
Military List can be found here http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:090:0001:0037:EN:PDF
b) Does the government make a UK Return to the
EU Annual Report in respect of items on the EU Dual-Use List?
If so, will the Government include its Return in this Annex?
No such return is required for the
EU Annual Report.
Annex E International Commitments and Sanctions
Regimes
E.1 Export Control Commitments in 2012
Will the Government in its subsequent Strategic Export
Controls Annual Reports include the year in which each Commitment
was concluded?
Yes.
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