Annex 8: UK national report to the 2014
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Commission
On 29 April 2014, Hugh Robertson, Minister of State
at the FCO, wrote to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export
Controls providing details of the UK national report to the 2014
Nuclear Non-Proliferations Treaty Preparatory Commission.[541]
The text of the report follows:
The United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's National Report
Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21
of the NPT Review Conference Final Document
As provided in the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) Review Conference Action Plan, the Governments of
the five NPT nuclear-weapon states, or "P5", are working
to implement Action 5 to "further enhance transparency and
increase mutual confidence" and to make national reports
on our Action 5 and other undertakings to the 2014 NPT Preparatory
Committee under a common framework, consistent with Actions 20
and 21.
Action 21 states "As a confidence-building measure,
all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon
as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate
reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard
information without prejudice to national security." The
framework we use for our national reports includes common categories
of topics under which relevant information is reported, and it
addresses all three pillars of the NPT: disarmament, non-proliferation,
and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
We encourage all States Parties, consistent with
Action 20, to make similar reports.
Section I: Reporting on National Measures Relating
to Disarmament
The UK considers the NPT to be the cornerstone of
global efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and
we are committed to the step-by-step process agreed by consensus
at the 2000 RevCon and reaffirmed at the 2010 RevCon.
i. National Security Policies, Doctrine, and
Activities Associated with Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear Doctrine
The 2006 white paper "The Future of the United
Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent",[542]
as amended by the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR),[543]
provides our current policy on nuclear deterrence, our capability
and force structure. It makes clear that we will maintain only
the minimum credible nuclear deterrent, under full political control,
in the form of continuous-at-sea patrols of a Vanguard-class submarine
carrying Trident ballistic missiles with the fewest warheads since
the introduction of our SSBN capability in the 1960s.
We believe we already have the smallest stockpile
of nuclear warheads among the recognised nuclear weapons states,
and are the only one to have reduced to a single deterrent system
since the withdrawal of our air component in the late 1990s.
Operational Policy
The UK has long been clear that we would only consider
using our nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self defence,
including the defence of our NATO Allies. While we remain deliberately
ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would
contemplate their use, we have provided some parameters.
In the 2010 SDSR, the UK strengthened its negative
security assurance to state that the UK will not use or threaten
to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states party
to the NPT. In giving this assurance, we emphasised the need
for universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT, and noted
that this assurance would not apply to any state in material breach
of those non-proliferation obligations. We also noted that while
there is currently no direct threat to the UK or its vital interests
from states developing capabilities in other weapons of mass destruction,
for example chemical and biological, we reserve the right to review
this assurance if the future threat, development and proliferation
of these weapons make it necessary.
In the interests of international security and stability,
the UK has taken steps to lower the operational status of our
deterrent system. UK nuclear weapons are not on high alert, nor
are they on "launch on warning" status. The patrol
submarine operates routinely at a "notice to fire" measured
in days rather than minutes as it did throughout the Cold War.
The missiles are no longer targeted at any country (they have
been de-targeted since 1994). This position was considered and
re-affirmed during the work in the 2006 White Paper. We believe
that a nuclear attack on the UK's vital interests is deterred
by demonstrating our capability to respond under any circumstances,
rather than just by an ability for a rapid response. There is
no immediacy of launch in our normal operating posture.
The security and safety of our nuclear weapons is
given the very highest priority and is entirely consistent with
our obligations under non-proliferation agreements. Robust arrangements
are in place for the political control of the UK's strategic nuclear
deterrent. There are a number of technological and procedural
safeguards built into the UK's nuclear deterrent to prevent an
unauthorised launch of its Trident missiles.
Finally, the UK has maintained a voluntary moratorium
on nuclear weapon test explosions since 1991.
ii. Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Arms Control
(including Nuclear Disarmament) and Verification
Stockpile Size
The UK has achieved substantial reductions in its
nuclear weapon stockpile. In the late 1970s, when the UK's stockpile
was at its highest, the UK had more than 400 warheads in-service
across 5 types. Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference the UK has
unilaterally decided to cut our stockpile of nuclear warheads,
as outlined in the SDSR. Today we have fewer than 225 warheads,
all of a single type. We have committed to reducing this maximum
stockpile to no more than 180 by the mid 2020s, with the requirement
for operationally available warheads at no more than 120, a target
that the UK is steadily working towards. All nuclear material
no longer deemed necessary for military purposes has been placed
under international safeguards. We have also committed to reduce
the number of deployed warheads from 48 down to 40 per SSBN.
In conjunction, each submarine will then field eight operational
Trident ballistic missiles.
Verification
Developing and agreeing effective measures for verifying
the dismantlement of nuclear warheads will be an important precondition
for fulfilling the goals of Article VI of the NPT. The UK-Norway
Initiative (UKNI) is an example of the world-leading research
the UK is undertaking to address some of the technical and procedural
challenges posed by effective verification of warhead dismantlement.
In 2012, the UK hosted a P5 expert-level meeting on verification
to discuss lessons learned from UKNI to date.
We are in our second decade of an active partnership
with the United States in monitoring and verification research.
Our joint technical cooperation programme allows us to apply
policy, technology and programme expertise to develop and evaluate
targeted approaches for transparent reductions and monitoring
of nuclear warheads, fissile material and associated facilities
for potential disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives. Technical
experts conduct activities and share information to explore and
address essential and difficult monitoring and verification challenges,
working to integrate potential approaches for arms control monitoring
and transparency. Additionally, the UK and China have conducted
two technical exchange visits and will continue to explore collaborative
exchanges into arms control and verification research.
iii. Transparency and Confidence-Building
Measures
Through the SDSR and other documents, the UK has
voluntarily declared its maximum warhead stockpile numbers and
operational warhead numbers.
We have also expressed our unconditional support
for the 2010 Action Plan at numerous fora. In line with this
support, the UK actively participates in regular working level
meetings of the P5 Nuclear-Weapon States that advance our collective
dialogue on disarmament and review progress towards fulfilling
the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The UK
held the first P5 Conference in 2009, and looks forward to starting
the second cycle of Conferences before the NPT Review Conference
in 2015.
The UK actively promotes its work on UKNI to non-nuclear
weapon states. This has included hosting a joint UK-Norway workshop
for 12 non-nuclear weapon states in December 2011 and side events
at the 2010 NPT Review Conferences and the 2012 and 2013 Preparatory
Committees. Another side event will be held at the 2014 Preparatory
Committee.
Nuclear Glossary
The P5 are, under China's leadership, developing
a glossary of nuclear terms to aid understanding between states
in discussing related matters. The UK has strongly supported
the authoring of this glossary and looks forward to using this
multilingual handbook in future work.
iv. Other Related Issues
Comprehensive nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The UK recognises the CTBT as a key element of the
global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, and provides
extensive technical and political support to the CTBT Organisation's
(CTBTO) Preparatory Commission. The UK maintains the UK National
Data Centre, Eskdalemuir Seismometer Array, a number of other
International Monitoring Systems (IMS) stations throughout UK
territories and one of 16 global radionuclide laboratories that
provide analytical support to the IMS. These facilities are backed
up by enduring research in a number of areas, notably through
the Atomic Weapons Establishment's Forensic Seismology Team.
In addition, the UK is heavily involved in preparations for Integrated
Field Exercise 2014 which will evaluate the CTBTO's On-Site Inspection
capability.
The UK is active in the CTBTO's Working Groups in
Vienna and provides funding for Sir Michael Weston to chair the
finance-focused Advisory Group. Our work ensures that the CTBTO
has the necessary funding and working time to build and maintain
an effective monitoring regime.
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
Since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference,
the UK has upheld a moratorium on the production of fissile material
for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Since then, all enrichment and reprocessing in the UK has been
conducted under international safeguards. We are committed to
the pursuit of an international treaty that would put an end to
the future production of fissile material for such purposes.
We made a commitment in the 2010 NPT Action Plan to begin negotiation
within the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production
of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices.
The UK supported the resolution at the UN General
Assembly First Committee in 2012 to create an FMCT Group of Government
Experts (GGE). We hope that the FMCT GGE, in which we are pleased
to have a UK Expert participating, will complement existing efforts
to find a positive way forward on the treaty in the Conference
on Disarmament. We believe that the first session of the GGE,
held 31 March-11 April, made a strong and constructive start to
the process.
Section II: Reporting on National Measures Relating
to Non-proliferation
i. Safeguards
All civil nuclear material in the UK is subject to
Euratom safeguards and to the terms of the UK/Euratom/IAEA tripartite
safeguards agreement under the NPT. Euratom safeguards obligations
stem from Chapter VII (Articles 77-85) of the Treaty establishing
the European Atomic Energy Community, which requires the European
Commission, inter alia, to satisfy itself that nuclear materials
are not diverted from their intended uses as declared by users.
This is achieved through:
· a requirement
that all operators of nuclear installations provide the Commission
with Basic Technical Characteristics (BTCs) describing the location
and intended activities of their installation;
· a requirement
that operators keep and report nuclear material accountancy records;
· provision
for the Commission to inspect installations and records;
· provision
for the imposition of sanctions by the Commission in the event
of infringement of the Treaty safeguards obligations. These
sanctions can range from a published written warning to withdrawal
of the nuclear material concerned.
The various reporting requirements are amplified
in Commission Regulation (Euratom) 302/05. Euratom safeguards
do not apply to nuclear material intended to meet defence requirements.
Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement
The UK Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement with
the IAEA and Euratom came into force in 1978. The agreement allows
for the application of safeguards on all source or special fissionable
material in facilities or parts thereof within the UK, subject
to exclusions for national security reasons only. Nuclear materials
accountancy reports on all civil nuclear material in facilities
is provided to the IAEA by Euratom, and the IAEA may "designate"
any facility, or part thereof, for inspection. Currently, some
of the plutonium stores at Sellafield and the gas centrifuge enrichment
facilities at Capenhurst are designated for IAEA inspection.
The agreement gives the UK the right to remove facilities and/or
withdraw nuclear material from the scope of the agreement for
reasons of national security. However, as part of the 1998 Strategic
Defence Review, the UK agreed that any future withdrawals from
safeguards would "be limited to small quantities of nuclear
materials not suitable for explosive purposes" and undertook
to publish information on any such withdrawals.[544]
Additional Protocol
The UK Additional Protocol to the voluntary offer
safeguards agreement is based on the model agreement (INFCIRC/540
corr.), and contains measures aimed at the primary objectives
of Additional Protocols - to increase the IAEA's capability to
detect any undeclared nuclear material and activities in Non-Nuclear
Weapon States (NNWS) or to increase the efficiency of IAEA safeguards.
Information, and associated access, is therefore provided on
all Protocol-relevant activities that are done in collaboration
with or are otherwise relevant to a NNWS, or where the information
would improve the effectiveness or efficiency of IAEA safeguards
in the UK.
ii. Export Controls
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
1540
The UK has worked hard to fully implement UNSCR 1540
since its unanimous adoption in 2004. As one of the vice-chairs
of the 1540 Committee, the UK works with UN Member States to strengthen
efforts to promote universal implementation of the resolution.
We work with and through International Organisations and initiatives,
including the IAEA and the G8 Global Partnership, to provide technical
and financial support to deliver concrete improvements in the
security of materials, knowledge and know-how in partner countries;
facilitate debate and deliver training to help build partners'
engagement and capacities; and maintain domestic technical and
scientific expertise in counter proliferation, arms control and
chemical, biological and nuclear security. UK export controls
and enforcement capability enable us to maintain a robust
and effective national export control regime, and to strengthen
international export controls.
Nuclear Suppliers Group
By fulfilling its obligations under the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee (ZC), the UK contributes
to minimizing nuclear proliferation while ensuring that eligible
states are able to access nuclear technology for peaceful uses.
The UK implements effective strategic export controls in regards
to its nuclear transfers in line with the NSG and ZC control
lists. Relevant exports are assessed against the Consolidated
EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria and stated UK Government
export control policies. A robust enforcement system, underpinned
by the Export Control Order 2008, operates to deter attempts to
breach the controls and help facilitate legitimate transfers.
The UK also actively supports the work of the NSG
and ZC. The UK contributed extensive technical expertise to the
NSG's recent three-years-long fundamental review of its control
lists, and continues this through the newly established Technical
Experts Group, ensuring that the NSG's control lists reflect changing
proliferation threats. We also share licensing and enforcement
information with fellow Participating Governments, both ad hoc
and at the Licensing and Enforcement and Information Exchange
Meetings.
In 2013 the UK authored a paper entitled "Good
practices for corporate standards to support the efforts of the
International Community in the non-proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction". It was agreed at the 31st
Consultative Group meeting and posted on the NSG public website
shortly thereafter. The paper recognises the important role that
the diverse commercial sector can play in assisting multilateral
efforts in non-proliferation of WMD. The UK has supported NSG
outreach activities with emerging technology holders.
iii. Nuclear Security
The UK's security regime for the civil nuclear industry
is robust and effective and fully meets international standards.
Security arrangements are based on the principles of the graded
approach and defence in depth and are kept under constant review.
In 2010 the UK deposited its instruments of ratification
of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material. Although the 2005 amendment has not yet
entered into force the UK has in place legislation which implements
it.
In 2013 the UK extended the scope of its security
regulation to cover civil nuclear sites under construction in
order to take account of the UK's new nuclear build programme.
The legislation had previously regulated operating civil nuclear
sites. Revised guidance was issued to the industry by the UK's
nuclear regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation, in October
2012, which is a key step towards an increasingly more outcome-focused
regulatory regime for security in the Civil Nuclear Industry.
By the end of January 2014 all nuclear premises regulated by
ONR Civil Nuclear Security now have National Objectives Requirements
Model Standards (NORMS) compliant approved Nuclear Site Security
Plans.
Nuclear Information Security
The UK has promoted the need to secure sensitive
nuclear information within the framework of the Nuclear Security
Summit, the Global Partnership and the IAEA.
Key Attributes of an Excellent Nuclear Security
Culture
In 2012 a tripartite sub-group was established (with
representatives from the regulator, industry and government) to
develop a better understanding of the attributes of an excellent
security culture, and for this to be captured and codified. The
output of this work is a guidance document[545]
which was published in June 2013. The guide sets out key attributes
deemed necessary for an excellent security culture and then sets
out for each one what is required to achieve this. The implementation
of the recommendations in the guide is not compulsory, but is
intended to inform and enhance understanding of how all parties
(regulator, industry and government) can deliver to meet the objective.
International Physical Protection Advisory Service
The UK was the first Nuclear-Weapon State to welcome
an International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS)
mission. A Mission Team visited the Sellafield civil nuclear
site and Barrow port in October 2011, and concluded that the state
of civil nuclear security is robust. The team identified many
examples of good practice within the civil nuclear security regime
and made a number of valuable recommendations. In March 2014
the UK Government invited the IAEA to send a follow up IPPAS Mission
to the UK. The UK provides security experts who participate in
a number of outward IPPAS Missions.
iv. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
The United Kingdom continues to support the principle
of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. As previously stated in 1995 and
2010, we recognise the role that negative security assurances
can play in strengthening the non-proliferation regime and enhancing
regional and international security.
Existing Zones
To date, the United Kingdom has signed and ratified
Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean),
the Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific), and the Treaty of Pelindaba
(Africa): 74 states, therefore, already have in place protocols
that provide legally-binding negative security assurances from
the United Kingdom. We also support the parallel political declarations
adopted by the Nuclear Weapon States and Mongolia concerning that
country's nuclear weapon free status.
Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
We will continue to pursue signing protocols to existing
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones as a practical way of strengthening
our existing negative security assurances. The United Kingdom
therefore welcomes the forthcoming signature by the Nuclear Weapon
States of a Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
in Central Asia (CANWFZ). Under this Protocol, the Nuclear Weapon
States will extend legally binding assurances not to use or threaten
to use nuclear weapons against any CANWFZ Treaty Party and not
to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the CANWFZ
Treaty or its Protocol. The United Kingdom hopes to ratify the
Protocol by the end of 2014.
South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
In conjunction with other Nuclear-Weapon States,
the United Kingdom will continue to engage with the State Parties
to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty
in order to allow signature of a Protocol to that Treaty in the
near future.
MEWMDFZ
The United Kingdom remains committed to the implementation
of the 1995 NPT Resolution on the Middle East and, as one of the
co-sponsors of that Resolution, is working hard to deliver against
the practical steps agreed in 2010. We look forward to convening
an inclusive conference on the establishment of a Middle East
zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction
(MEWMDFZ) as soon as the practical arrangements for that conference
are agreed by the states of the region. We will continue to work
with all the states of the region, our fellow Co-conveners and
the Facilitator, Ambassador Laajava, to encourage progress towards
this common goal.
v. Compliance and Other Related Issues/Concerns
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
The UK has been fully supportive of all UN Security
Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) relating to the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea and of the Presidential Statement of 16 April
2012, made in the wake of the satellite launch of 13 April 2012.
We continue to support the UN DPRK Panel of Experts in their
work, and have reported violations of DPRK sanctions to the Panel.
Our work to raise awareness of existing DPRK sanctions and to
encourage implementation is ongoing. The UK has funded the International
Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) to run workshops in partnership
with the Panel of Experts to raise awareness of DPRK sanctions
and encourage implementation in both the public and private sector.
In 2013 workshops were held in Sub Saharan Africa, the Middle
East and Hong Kong. We plan to continue this work.
The UK is not a member of the Six Party Talks, nor
are we seeking involvement in discussions. However, given the
risk of the DPRK's nuclear programme to international security,
we are maintaining close contact with all sides. We have made
clear to the DPRK that if it carries out any further provocations
the international community will respond robustly. However, we
have also been clear that if the DPRK takes concrete steps to
resolve the nuclear issue there will be a positive response.
vi. Other contributions to Nuclear Weapons
Nonproliferation
Iran
The UK remains concerned about the nature of Iran's
nuclear programme. However, we are committed to finding a diplomatic
solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The UK has adopted a dual
track strategy of pressure and engagement. We have supported
six UNSCRs which prohibit Iran from all reprocessing, heavy water
and enrichment related activity, most recently UNSCR 1929, adopted
in June 2010. We continue to call on Iran to fully comply with
its obligations under UNSCRs, and to call on all UN member states
to implement UNSCRs fully. We actively support the work of the
UN Iran Panel of Experts. We have also implemented EU sanctions
on Iran which go beyond these measures. In addition, the UK has
played an active role in P5+1 negotiations with Iran and we welcome
the agreement of the Joint Plan of Action between the E3+3 and
Iran in November 2013, as well as Iran's substantive engagement
in talks to reach a Comprehensive Agreement.
The UK shares the IAEA's "serious concerns" about the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme due to the credible information available to it which indicates that Iran had carried out activities "relevant to the development of a nuclear device." As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, the UK has supported two IAEA Board Resolutions in 2011 and 2012 which stress that it is essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue to resolve all outstanding substantive issues. We continue to support the IAEA in its tireless efforts to address these issues. We welcome the agreement of a Joint Statement on a Framework for cooperation between Iran and the Agency in November 2013, in which Iran has agreed to resolve all outstanding issues with the Agency. We continue to call on Iran to address fully the substance of all of the Agency's outstanding concerns including by granting access to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested.
Global Partnership
The UK makes a major contribution to the G8 Global
Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Materials and Weapons of
Mass Destruction and, as part of the UK's G8 Presidency in 2013,
held the Chair of the GP. Under the UK Presidency, the GP established
mechanisms to better match GP partners' funds and expertise with
specific security requirements, and improve project coordination
and implementation. We also held an outreach event with 1540
Committee experts to encourage universal reporting by States (in
line with resolution obligations). From 2002-2012, the UK committed
over £350m of funding to GP projects.
The UK's largest contribution to the GP is through
the Global Threat Reduction Programme (GTRP). We are working
on GTRP programmes that aim to:
· improve
the security of fissile materials;
· reduce
the number of sites containing sensitive nuclear and radiological
material and improve security of remaining sites;
· reduce
the risks in the proliferation of biological expertise and materials;
and
· prevent
terrorists acquiring proliferation-relevant information and expertise.
Academic Technology Approval Scheme
In the UK the Academic Technology Approval Scheme
(ATAS) is responsible for stopping the spread of knowledge and
skills from academic programmes that could be used in the proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery.
Academic institutions have a mandatory obligation
to comply with UK visa requirements. Obtaining a certificate
under the scheme is a requirement for all students applying for
student visas and intending to enter or remain in the UK for more
than six months to undertake post-graduate studies or research
in certain designated subjects.
Section III: Reporting on National Measures Relating
to the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
i. Promoting Peaceful Uses
The UK fully supports the inalienable right of all
state parties to the peaceful uses of civil nuclear energy under
the NPT in a culture of openness, transparency and confidence
and believes in the responsible, safe and secure access to civil
nuclear energy worldwide, subject to the State being in conformity
with the non-proliferation requirements of the NPT.
We note the increasing demand for civil nuclear energy
and stress its potential in addressing climate change and in providing
energy security. Furthermore, we support the work of the IAEA
in facilitating achievement of the Millennium Development Goals
and sustainable development and in addressing vital non-power
applications such as nuclear medicine, agriculture and industry.
Developments in Civil Nuclear Energy
The UK recognises the importance of civil nuclear
energy, not least as civil nuclear power facilities need to sit
alongside other low carbon forms of electricity generation. The
UK has been clear that civil nuclear energy will be a key part
of our future low carbon energy mix. It also offers us a cost-effective
pathway to meet our legally binding carbon targets. The UK's
commitment to civil nuclear power is evident in the steps which
have been taken in the last year in relation to the new build
programme in the UK. This is being done without subsidy from
the Government, but work is being done to secure the long-term
commercial investment needed.
Nuclear Industrial Strategy
The UK has taken several steps over the past year
to continue our efforts in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear
energy. We published the Nuclear Industrial Strategy in March
2013, which identified priorities for Government and industry
to work together in a long-term partnership. It aims to provide
more opportunities for economic growth and create jobs through
an increased share of all aspects of the civil nuclear market.
One of the main points in the strategy was the creation of the
Nuclear Industry Council, which brings together all the key players
across the civil nuclear supply chain. The Council will be looking
at a number of issues essential to the success of our civil nuclear
sector in the future: skills, trade & investment, business
capability and how the public perceives the civil nuclear industry.
The Energy Act
The UK Government also recognises the importance
of an independent and robust regulatory regime and is committed
to creating the highest standards of civil nuclear regulation.
To that end, it has embarked on steps to enhance the UK's civil
nuclear regulatory framework, to ensure it remains world class
and has the flexibility to be able to address future challenges.
The Energy Act, which gained Royal Assent in December 2013, includes
provisions to establish the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR,
created in 2011) as a statutory, independent regulator. The ONR
brings together the functions of civil nuclear safety, security,
safeguards implementation, radioactive materials transport, and
health and safety on civil nuclear sites. The ONR began operating
as a statutory body on 1 April 2014.
Memoranda of Understanding
The UK Government is keen to enhance the links between
the UK and other countries around the world with the view of enhancing
civil nuclear energy cooperation. We made several high profile
announcements in this regard last year. These include the signing
of Memoranda of Understanding with various countries focusing
on, inter alia, setting the strategic framework for collaboration
on investment, technology, construction and expertise in civil
nuclear energy, and exploring bilateral cooperation opportunities.
The UK Government has several mechanisms though which
civil nuclear energy cooperation is enabled, including Nuclear
Cooperation Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding. In addition
to bilateral agreements, we are also party to Euratom cooperation
agreements. Our activities in this area indicate a clear intent
for the UK to work with various countries across a range of relevant
civil nuclear energy related activities, and we are in discussion
with several other States regarding how civil nuclear energy cooperation
can be enhanced bilaterally.
Nuclear Fuel Assurance
The UK fully supports moves to create a menu of viable
and credible assurances of fuel supply, which would enable a new
nuclear state to avoid the need to develop expensive and complex
indigenous Enrichment technologies. The United Kingdom's Nuclear
Fuel Assurance proposal, a response to the IAEA's request for
Multilateral Nuclear Approaches (MNAs), was adopted at the IAEA
Board of Governors in March 2011. This is one practical approach
ensures that NPT States Parties have access to the peaceful uses
of civil nuclear energy, while upholding high standards of safety,
security and non-proliferation. The UK views all MNA proposals
as complamentary, and hopes that states are able to select proposals
which contribute best to their energy mix.
ii. Technical Assistance through the IAEA
to its Member States
The UK is committed to supporting the IAEA's Technical
Cooperation (TC) Programme and demonstrates this by paying our
contributions to the TC fund promptly and in full on an annual
basis. We are involved in the ongoing discussions regarding the
TC Programme and are keen to ensure that it continues to improve,
fulfil its potential and provide the vital work that it undertakes.
The UK is very supportive of the contribution that
the TC Programme makes towards the Millennium Development Goals.
The good work that the TC Programme can achieve should not be
underestimated and it has made numerous, positive contributions
to the peaceful uses of nuclear-related technologies in many countries
around the world.
The UK is encouraging the IAEA to continue to ensure
Results-Based Management and "sustainable" outcomes,
accountability, transparency and synergies in the TC Programme.
iii. Nuclear Safety and Civil Nuclear Liability
The UK is a strong supporter of co-ordinated international
efforts towards the continuous improvement of nuclear safety across
the globe. As part of our commitment to achieving high nuclear
safety standards the UK aims to show a leadership role in meeting
its obligations as a Contracting Party to relevant international
nuclear safety instruments such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety
and the Joint Convention on the Safe Management of Spent Fuel
and Radioactive Waste. In particular we are playing a leading
role in proposing possible measures to strengthen the Convention
on Nuclear Safety peer review processes.
Additionally, the UK has been a Contracting Party
to the Paris Convention on nuclear third party liability and the
Brussels Supplementary Convention since the 1960s. The Paris
and Brussels Conventions were revised by amending Protocols in
2004. The UK is committed to implementing the changes and plans
to lay legislation in 2014.
The UK actively encourages all States with civil
nuclear programmes, or those thinking about developing one, to
join a nuclear liability regime and to become Contracting Parties
to the relevant international instruments and in particular the
Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention.
iv. Other Related Issues
No additional material.
ANY OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT AND/OR STRENGTHEN
THE NPT
No additional material.
541 http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom14/national-reports/UK.pdf Back
542 http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-future-of-the-united-kingdoms-nuclear-deterrent-defence-white-paper-2006-cm-6994
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543 http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-and-security-review-securing-britain-in-an-age-of-uncertainty Back
544
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545 https://www.nuclear.nsacademy.co.uk/system/files/0034%20Spooner%20Security%20Culture%20Leaflet.pdf
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