Annex 15: National Counter Proliferation
Strategy 2012-2015
The text of the letter and the attachment from the
FCO Minister Alistair Burt to the Chairman of the Committees'
dated 21 March 2012 relating to the National Counter Proliferation
Strategy for 2012-2015 was as follows:
I write to inform you that the Government has
agreed a National Counter Proliferation Strategy for 2012-2015.
It flows from key risks identified in the National Security Strategy
and formulates three overarching objectives:
· To
deny access to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
(CBRN) materials and expertise to terrorists;
· To
prevent acquisition by states of capabilities and their means
of delivery (whether conventional or CBRN) which would threaten
stability and UK vital interests, including our armed forces overseas;
and
· To
support, strengthen and extend the rules-based international system
of counter proliferation treaties, regimes and organizations that
underpins global security and prosperity.
It describes the actors on whom we focus our
activities, the tools and resources we deploy, and our internal
governance arrangements under the National Security Council. I
attach to this letter the public version of the strategy, which
will be released in the next few days.
We are already using it to drive forward more
coherent and focused work across government departments and with
our international partners. In the last few months, we have:
· continued
work alongside the United States in Libya to locate and secure
stockpiles of advanced conventional weapons, including MANPADs;
· played
a key role in the final preparatory conference on an Arms Trade
Treaty held in February, which achieved consensus on the process
for the negotiations in July, and the adoption of the Chairman's
paper as a basis for these negotiations;
· as part
of implementation of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
review Conference outcomes, and along with the US and Russia,
supported closely the Finnish facilitator for the Middle East
WMD Free Zone, as he prepares his strategy for a conference;
· kept
up the pressure on Iran over its nuclear programme by securing
a strong EU sanctions package at January's Foreign Affairs Council,
and a good E3+3 statement at the March meeting of the IAEA Board
of Governors.
The next key event will be the Nuclear Security
Summit in Seoul on 26-27 March, at which the deputy prime Minister
will be leading the UK delegation. President Obama convened the
first such summit in Washington in 2010, as part of his drive
to secure vulnerable fissile material around the world within
four years. The second summit will assemble 53 countries, and
the UN, the EU, the IAEA and Interpol, to assess progress and
reinvigorate commitment.
The Deputy Prime Minister will be able to report
significant achievements against our commitments from Washington,
including helping to secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet
Union (not least, 775 bombs' worth in Kazakhstan); hosting a successful
IAEA security advisory mission to Sellafield and Barrow; and leading
efforts to secure last year's renewal of the G8-based Global partnership
against the spread of WMD.
I expect him to make new commitments for the
two years up to the next summit in 2014, including further close
partnership with the IAEA, the US, the EU and others on risk reduction
programmes overseas; further development of plans for the future
management of our inventory of separated civil plutonium; and
implementation of the new UK/France framework for cooperation
on civil nuclear security and emergency response.
Our key contribution, and the summit's most innovative
element, will be our ground-breaking work on the security of nuclear
information. Over the past year we have built consensus on the
need for greater focus on protecting not just nuclear material
but also the information that a terrorist would need to obtain
the material, build it in to an improvised explosive device, and
mount an attack. Such information ranges from maps of nuclear
installations, to how to construct a bomb, to how to beat border
security and emergency response plans. At the summit, I expect
our work to be reflected in a dedicated paragraph in the communiqué,
and an additional UK-led statement, in which at least 20 countries
will join us, committing to specific national actions to improve
the practice of information security.
I look forward to engaging with you and your
committee further on these and other matters in due course.
NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION STRATEGY 2012-2015
WHY DO WE NEED A NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION
STRATEGY?
1. The proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological
and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and their delivery systems is a huge
challenge which poses several serious risks to the UK's national
security. These include a CBRN attack on the UK by terrorists
or a threatening state, or an international military crisis. Conventional
weapon systems also present the clearest threat to the UK's Armed
Forces deployed on operations. Reducing these risks requires a
comprehensive approach to counter proliferation.
2. The National Counter Proliferation Strategy sets
the framework for this activity. Much of our approach is internationally
focussed; in priority countries, with partners, or through the
rules-based international system. Ensuring that we have the right
controls and security in place domestically is also a key element.
A risk-based approach
3. The National Security Strategy takes a risk-based
approach to prioritise the Government's national security response.
Counter proliferation work is critical to reducing several of
the most serious national security risks identified:
RISK 1: A terrorist chemical, biological, radiological
or nuclear (CBRN) attack on the UK or its interests, including
UK Armed Forces.
4. Al Qaeda has a long-held desire to obtain and
use CBRN devices. Without continued global efforts to reduce vulnerabilities
in the security of material and information, there is a significant
likelihood that terrorists will at some point acquire CBRN capability.
RISK 2: An international military crisis
5. The proliferation of CBRN and conventional military
technologies to countries, and the enhancement by countries of
their existing capabilities, have the potential to increase instability
and precipitate an international military crisis, or exacerbate
the consequences of such a crisis, including for UK deployed forces.
RISK 3: A state (or proxy) CBRN attack on the
UK or its overseas territories
6. While there is currently a low threat of CBRN
attack on the UK, it is still important that we retain our ability
to monitor—and where possible prevent—CBRN weapons
advancements by other countries, maintain our defences against
attack, and lead global efforts to strengthen the rules-based
international system that has helped to limit the number of CBRN
possessor states thus far.
Our objectives
7. We are working to reduce proliferation risks by:
1. Denying access to CBRN materials and expertise
by terrorists;
2. Preventing acquisition by states of capabilities
and their means of delivery (whether conventional or CBRN) which
would threaten stability and UK vital interests, including our
armed forces overseas; and
3. Supporting, strengthening and extending the rules-based
international system of counter proliferation treaties, regimes
and organisations that underpins global security and prosperity.
WHERE WE SEEK TO FOCUS
8. We are focusing activity on four broad groups
of actors:
· states
which may have vulnerabilities in the security of their
CBRN information and materials;
· states
which may have the capability or intent to develop CBRN
or advanced conventional weapons;
· states
which may actively or inadvertently supply or transit CBRN
weapons, delivery systems and conventional weapons, or related
technologies, to actors of concern; and
· partners
and multilateral organisations with whom we can effect change,
including the UN, G8, NATO and the EU.
States with CBRN security vulnerabilities
9. Many countries possess significant quantities
of CBRN material or expertise, or have a significant CBRN technological
base; some countries have CBRN weapons. In several of these we
assess that security weaknesses could make such capabilities easier
for non-state groups to acquire or exploit for malicious purposes.
States with the capability or intent to develop
CBRN or advanced conventional weapons
10. A number of states have active CBRN and advanced
conventional weapons and delivery system programmes—either
to acquire a new capability or to improve an existing one. The
existence of either can be destabilising for a region and can
lead to an arms race or a military response by a regional or global
power. This would increase the risk of a state threat to the UK
and its overseas interests.
11. Despite Iran's claims that its nuclear programme
is peaceful, serious concerns about a military dimension remain
as a result of Iran's actions over recent years. We continue to
follow the dual track strategy of engagement and sanctions. We
also have continuing concerns about North Korea's proliferation
activities. We continue to urge North Korea to refrain from further
provocative actions and to re-engage in dialogue with the international
community.
12. Alongside our commitment to prevent the spread
of such weapons, we are promoting the peaceful use of nuclear
energy, the right to which is enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
States which may supply or transit material and
technologies which threaten security
13. Where states admit to, or are judged to, have
a nuclear weapons capability, or chemical or biological technologies
and materials, controls are essential to prevent more states from
acquiring CBRN weapons. We want all states with these dual use
technologies to have the will and ability to prevent leakage.
14. Globalisation has increased the flow of trade
and knowledge making it harder to identify cargoes and technologies
destined for weapons programmes of concern. We cannot stop this
trade on our own, so we need to work with trading hubs to improve
policing.
Partners and multilateral organisations with whom
we can effect change
15. We are working with our closest international
partners and in the multilateral environment, including in the
UN, G8, NATO and the EU, to effect change in both specific countries
and the rules-based international system.
WHAT WE SEEK TO CHANGE
16. The rules-based international system is a network
of organisations, ad hoc groups, treaties and regimes that has
been built up over the last 80 years and has over that period
successfully limited, and even helped to reduce, the number of
states with—or looking to acquire—WMD or their delivery
systems, or advanced conventional capabilities. In developing
the rules-based international system, we seek to:
· Strengthen
international commitments to non-proliferation treaties such as
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
· Lead
in groups such as the Nuclear Security Summit or G8 Global Partnership
which are delivering CBRN security improvements on the ground;
· Provide
financial, technical and diplomatic support to the international
bodies that monitor and verify compliance against these commitments,
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;
· Strengthen
enforcement of existing obligations and export control regimes,
and adoption of non-obligatory guidelines, while developing and
implementing new ones such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
an Arms Trade Treaty, and a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty;
· Lead
by example internationally in terms of our own domestic security
practices and export controls;
· Identify,
and seek consensus to mitigate, any gaps in the international
architecture.
17. To complement this, we are:
· Working
to encourage states to improve nuclear and biological security,
and ensure that sensitive science is not misused for hostile
intent;
· Aiming
to disrupt proliferation networks, through helping others
to enforce sanctions and export regimes more rigorously;
· Supporting
the international community in tackling proliferation finance
by working with banks to identify front companies and freeze
assets;
· Tackling
the supply of delivery systems;
· Promoting
the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
HOW WE ARE EFFECTING CHANGE
18. We are using the diplomatic network to
increase our understanding of and influence on the drivers of
policy in priority countries including government, industry and
civil society.
Our missions to international institutions and organisations—especially
in Vienna, New
York, Geneva and the Hague—are playing a crucial
role in developing, strengthening and upholding the rules-based
international system.
19. Our export controls and enforcement capability
enable us to reduce the risks of material getting into the
wrong hands. We are acting to maintain a robust and effective
national export control regime, and to improve international export
controls. We are at the forefront of efforts to gather international
support for a legally binding Arms Trade Treaty to regulate the
global trade in conventional weapons.
20. We have prioritised our objectives to ensure
that we make best use of available resources. We are providing
technical and financial support to deliver concrete improvements
in the security of materials and know-how in partner countries;
facilitating debate and delivering training to help build
partners' engagement and capacities; and maintaining our own
technical and scientific expertise in counter proliferation,
arms control and CBRN security.
21. The National Security Council, chaired by the
Prime Minister, ultimately oversees implementation of this strategy.
We will measure, evaluate and report progress on its delivery
at regular intervals, including through reports to Parliament
on implementation of the Strategic Defence and Security Review.[552]
552 "National Counter Proliferation Strategy 2012-2015",
Foreign and Commonwealth Office website, http://www.fco.gov.uk/ Back
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