Written Evidence
Written evidence from
Reprieve (AEC001)
Export licensing of components for weaponised
unmanned aerial vehicles ("UAVs")
As you may know, Reprieve is a legal action charity
which works to ensure respect for the human rights of prisoners,
including those whose rights may be infringed by counter-terror
operations effected by the US and other governments. This work
includes investigation and advocacy in relation to the use of
UAVs by the US in non-war zones to carry out its so-called "targeted
killing" programme, which violates international law and
a number of internationally recognised human rights.
As part of this work, Reprieve has been investigating
the adequacy of export licensing procedures in relation to components
that are exported to the US for use in weaponised UAVs, including
the General Atomics MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper. As has been
widely reported, such UAVs are used by the US for military purposes
and to carry out strikes in areas where there is no declared armed
conflict, such as Pakistan and Yemen. From our research and correspondence
with the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS),
we have identified severe shortcomings in the safeguards in place
to ensure that UK-manufactured products are not used in these
unlawful targeted killings. Our concerns are twofold:
(i) Licences granted for export of components
for weaponised US UAVs
Reprieve has identified a number of licenses granted
to UK companies for the export to the US of components which appear
to be used on weaponised UAVS such as the Predator and/or Reaper.
As you know, BIS maintains a "consolidated list of strategic
and dual-use items that require export authorization" (August
2012) (the "Consolidated List"), which is intended to
include all military and dual-use items requiring an export licence,
and incorporates the UK Military List and the UK and EU Dual-Use
Lists, among others. In recent correspondence, BIS has confirmed
that some licences have been granted for the export of goods which
are intended for use by the US government in weaponised UAVs.
As you know, when considering applications for export
licences in respect of controlled goods, BIS has said that it
applies the "Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing
Criteria" (the "Consolidated Criteria"). These
criteria include:
"the respect of human rights";
refraining from issuing export licenses which would
"provoke or prolong armed conflicts" or "aggravate
existing tensions or conflicts" in the country of final destination;
and
refraining from issuing export licenses where there
is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed
export "aggressively against another country";
the behaviour of the buyer country with regard to
… respect for international law.
Furthermore, pursuant to the Export Control Act 2002,
controls may be imposed for military equipment and technology
if their exportation or use is "capable of having a relevant
consequence". "Relevant consequences" include "the
carrying out anywhere in the world of (or of acts which facilitate)
(a) acts threatening international peace and security; (b) acts
contravening the international law of armed conflict; ... (d)
breaches of human rights".
The US's use of drones in non-war zones, such as
Pakistan and Yemen, is inconsistent with these criteria. In particular,
it is in breach of the international law of armed conflict.
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of
force by one state against another, other than in certain very
limited circumstances. The US's use of drones in areas where
there is no armed conflict, including Pakistan and Yemen, fall
so far short of the international humanitarian and human rights
law requirements for legality, that none of those exceptions -
such as arguments of 'state consent' or 'self-defence' - could
render them lawful.
Where there is no declared armed conflict, only international
human rights law applies to determine whether specific killings
are lawful. International human rights law permits the intentional
use of lethal force when strictly necessary and proportionate.
Thus, "targeted killings" as typically understood (intentional
and premeditated killings) cannot be lawful under international
human rights law, because this allows intentional lethal force
only when necessary to protect against a threat to life, and where
there are no other means of preventing that threat to life. There
is little public evidence that the targeted killings carried out
fulfil this strict legal test.
The US is not involved in an "armed conflict"
with either of these states. Moreover, even if there were a declared
armed conflict, such that international humanitarian law applied,
the legality of any drone strike must still then be assessed in
accordance with fundamental principles including distinction,
proportionality, humanity and military necessity. "Living
Under Drones", a study published by Stanford and NYU in September
2012, was based on interviews with more than 60 people in North
Waziristan, Pakistan - many of whom were survivors of strikes,
with others having lost family members.[1]
The report documents substantial evidence to suggest that these
criteria are not met by drone strikes in Pakistan - including
the reported failure to distinguish between "civilian"
and "militant" targets, the large number of people killed
in strikes, and the timing of particular strikes, which do not
appear to be in response to any particular threat. In particular,
an exposé in the New York Times revealed that the Obama
administration considers "all military-age males [killed]
in a strike zone" to be "combatants . . . unless there
is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent."[2]
There is also significant evidence of "double"
tap strikes, whereby the same area is hit by successive missiles,
meaning rescuers have been struck.[3]
The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions, Christof Heyns, has observed, "[I]f civilian
'rescuers' are indeed being intentionally targeted, there is no
doubt about the law: those strikes are a war crime."[4]
The level of concern about the US use of drones is
such that Ben Emmerson, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights
and counterterrorism, is currently investigating the legality
and impact of US targeted killings in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.[5]
In May this year, the Peshawar High Court in Pakistan declared
the strikes in that country to be war crimes, and ordered the
Pakistani government to take a series of steps to stop future
strikes.
Even aside from the legality of specific strikes,
the constant presence of US drones has devastating human rights
impacts on communities living in affected regions due to their
inability to protect themselves and their families from a strike,
which could happen at any time. "Living Under Drones"
reported that communities in North Waziristan are being terrorised
by the constant presence of drones overhead, with as many as six
of these hovering over a village at any one time. Those interviewed
said that the widespread fear of drones has led people to shy
away from social gatherings and inhibited their willingness to
carry out day-to-day activities and important community functions,
including attending school or funerals.
It is quite clear, therefore, that in addition to
violating the right to life, the US's use of drones in non-war
zones infringes numerous human rights of those living in the affected
areas, including the right to freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment, to privacy, family life and a home, to
education and to an adequate standard of health and well-being.
The impact of drones on children's rights, in particular,
was recently highlighted in the Annual Report of the UN Secretary-General
on Children and Armed Conflict.[6]
This report noted an "increasingly worrisome number of reports
of child casualties" in the course of drone strikes. It
further reported that the mixed use of armed and surveillance
drones has "resulted in permanent fear in some communities,
affecting the psychosocial well-being of children and hindering
the ability of such communities to protect their children".
In addition, the Secretary-General highlighted the impact on
access to education, in some cases due to fear among children
of drone strikes.
In light of the use by the US of weaponised drones
in violation of international law and human rights, it is of extremely
concern that BIS, the FCO and MOD consider the grant of export
licences for components to be consistent with the Consolidated
Criteria. Such a policy risks implicating the UK in the harm
carried out by US drones, as well as severely damaging its international
reputation.
(ii) Components for weaponised UAVs not requiring
export licenses
We are also aware of certain components being exported
to the US for use in Predator and Reaper UAVs which do not appear
on the Consolidated List, and as such do not currently require
export licences. This is clearly of great concern, because it
undermines the entire purpose of the export licensing regime,
in that components specifically intended for use on weapons capable
of carrying out great destruction may be exported free from any
governmental scrutiny at all.
We have drawn this situation to BIS's attention,
asking the department to consider adding certain specific components
to the Consolidated List. However, BIS has indicated it does
not intend to add such components to the list because this export
control would operate solely at the national level and therefore
could easily be circumvented and would have no effect on the export
of these products from other parts of the European Union. We
do not accept that properly implemented controls could be easily
circumvented purely because those same controls are not in place
elsewhere in the EU. Furthermore, we certainly do not consider
that because these controls may not be implemented in other countries,
BIS should refrain from doing so. The UK should consider and
put in place its export controls on the basis of its own priorities
and international obligations, rather than adopting a passive
approach which would result in the lowest standard of regulation
being applied across all EU countries.
24 September 2013
Written evidence from
Neil Cooper and Gerald Walther, Peace Studies, University of Bradford
(AEC0002)
Data on Compliance Visits to Companies
and Sites Holding Open Export Licences
Abstract
1. This submission discusses (i) the levels of
non-compliance suggested by the data on HRMC compliance visits
to open license-holders (ii) the fall in the number of such visits
and (iii) our concerns about the apparent drift away from transparency
in this area as evidenced by recent changes in the presentation
of data.
Context
2. After the Export Controls Act received Royal
Assent on 24 July 2002 and came into force on the 1st
of May 2004, the Export Control Organisation (ECO) was reorganized,
resulting in a notable reduction in staff.[7]
It has previously been asked if this reduction in staff would
undermine the performance of the Export Control Organisation (ECO),
to which the reply was that exporters were encouraged to use open
licenses.[8] Despite the
pressure on staff numbers, the most recent (2012) annual report
indicates that the ECO has continued to meet its goal of processing
70% of SIEL applications within 20 days and 90% within 60 days.
However, the head of ECO informed the Committee in 2012 that the
70% target had attained 'almost God-like status in the organisation
to the extent that every other activity that the organisation
undertakes is subordinate to it, and those other activities suffer'.[9]
He also noted:
'we have reached the stage where the organisation
is processing something like 17,000 standard individual export
licences a year with resources adequate to slightly more than
half that figure…if we could move only a small proportion
of these over to open licensing, it would free up resources…to
focus on the more difficult cases'.[10]
3. In other evidence to the committee The Export
Group for European Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) also argued that
the 17,000 SIELs processed every year could be reduced to 10,000
by replacing them with open licences. [11]
At the same time however, EGAD also highlighted the results of
a 2011 survey of its members in which 50% of respondents reported
that they 'had been advised by the ECO to use an OGEL which would
not, in the opinion of the industry's compliance officers, have
been compliant for the export concerned'.[12]
EGAD even cited one case of a company that had originally applied
for a SIEL and had been advised by the ECO to use an OGEL. However,
when the goods covered by the OGEL arrived at a UK port for export
they were seized by the Border Force on the grounds that they
had been presented without an appropriate licence.[13]
4. It would therefore appear that the ECO has
responded to the twin problems of limited staff resources and
pressure to meet the 70% target for SIEL's by encouraging companies
to apply for Open Export Licences. At the same time, the reports
from the defence industry raise concerns about the rigour with
which the Open Licensing System is being policed. Of course, by
definition, open licences are only supposed to be provided to
categories of exports deemed to be relatively uncontentious and
therefore a move to the more frequent use of such licences should
not necessarily be problematic. However, the 2012 report by the
Committee also listed a range of open licences that had recently
been revoked following a review of licensing decisions prompted
by recent events in the Middle East. This included a range of
open licences revoked on the grounds that licences to states such
as Bahrein, Egypt and Libya contravened one or other of the government's
export criteria.
5. The Government has also committed itself to
introducing greater transparency in the export licensing system,
including the provision of more information on open export licences,
a commitment that was praised by the Committee.[14]
However, in the case of data provided by ECO on compliance visits
to companies and sites holding open licences the trend appears
to be in the opposite direction - away from transparency. Moreover,
the data that is available raises some issues of concern about
the levels of compliance on the part of licence-holders, although
because of the increasingly opaque nature of the data provided,
it is difficult to come to any firm conclusions.
Data on License Misuse
6. Starting with the 2010 report, each annual
report has provided a table listing compliance visits by HMRC.
Tables 1.1, 1.2., and 1.3 below summarize the findings.
Table 1.1. Results of HMRC visits to open license
holders
| Number of companies and sites holding open licenses
| Number of visits | Number of misuses (% of visits)
|
Categories of Misuse Found
|
| | |
| Administrative errors | Unlicensed shipments
| General lack of knowledge leading to errors
|
| 2007 | 1600 (approx) | 587
| 220 (37%) | 186 | 34
| 58 |
| 2008 | 1600 (approx) | 675
| 219 (32%) | 179 | 40
| 59 |
| 2009 | 1800 (approx) | 836
| 290 (35%) | 235 | 55
| 39 |
| 2010 | 1900 (approx) | 821
| 273 (33%) | 174 | 27
| 71 |
| Totals | 6900 | 2919
| 1002 (34%) | 774 | 156
| 227 |
.
Table 1.2. Results of HMRC visits to open license holders in
2011.
| Number of visits
| % Compliant | % Not fully compliant
|
| First time visits | 216 |
70 | 30 |
| Routine visits | 445 | 73
| 27 |
| Revisits | 59 | 73
| 27 |
Table 1.3. Results of HMRC visits to open license holders in
2012.
| Number of visits
| % compliant and generally compliant
| % Not fully & non- compliant
|
| First time visits | 100 |
70 | 30 |
| Routine visits | 101 | 74
| 26 |
| Revisits | 99 | 77
| 23 |
7. As can be seen from table 1.1 HMRC visits
uncovered over a thousand examples of misuses of licences in the
period 2007-10, with roughly one in every three visits revealing
some example of misuse. Moreover, whilst most of these examples
were categorised as administrative errors, there were 156 examples
of unlicensed shipments in this period. The 2009 report discusses
unlicensed shipments "where the company had no valid licence
to cover the goods at the time of the shipment, but [this] did
not imply a licence would not have been granted e.g. the company
had sent goods to its parent company in an EU country under a
licence which only allowed sales to Governments." (UK Strategic
Export Controls, 2009). Although worrying in itself, this might
not count as the most serious breach of licensing procedures.
Nevertheless, given the ECOs apparent emphasis on increasing the
use of open licences as a means of dealing with its staffing pressures
and the problems reported by the defence industry the significant
levels of non-compliance - and particularly unlicensed shipments
- recorded are a concern - although without more detail on the
types of non-compliance covered by the data it is difficult to
come to any firm conclusions.
8. More recently the percentage of visits revealing
licence misuse/non-compliance has dropped from a high of 37% in
2007 to 30% for first time visits in 2012 and 23% for revisits.
Nevertheless, it remains the case that a significant proportion
of visits to open licence holders still reveal examples of non-compliance,
particularly for first time visits.
9. In addition, although the number of compliance
visits gradually increased from 587 in 2007 to over 800 in 2009
and 2010, since then, the number of visits has fallen quite significantly
to a low of just 300 in 2012, with a particularly notable drop
recorded for the number of routine visits undertaken. Given the
levels of non-compliance recorded for even routine visits the
rationale for such a drop in the number of visits is unclear and
raises further concerns about the rigour with which the open licencing
system is being policed.
10. As noted above, it is also the case that
this appears to be one area of data provision where the ECOs commitment
to transparency has gone into reverse. In particular, more recent
reports have failed to distinguish between different categories
of misuse and, most notably, have stopped providing data on the
number of unlicensed shipments discovered by compliance visits.
Instead, data is only provided on visits found to be either 'compliant
and generally compliant' or 'not fully and non-compliant' but
it is not clear what the distinction is, if any, between, 'not
fully' and 'non-compliant'.
11. This data therefore raises a number of questions:
-Does the ECO consider the current levels of non-compliance
recorded by HMRC visits as acceptable?
-What is the ECO doing to ensure better compliance
levels on the part of licence holders?
-How does the ECO define (i) 'compliant (ii) generally
compliant' (iii) 'not fully compliant' and (iv) non-compliant?
-Can the ECO provide examples of the most serious
cases of (i) unlicensed shipments uncovered by visits in the 2007-10
period and (ii) non-compliance uncovered by visits in 2011 and
2012?
-Will the ECO provide data on the number of unlicensed
shipments discovered as a result of compliance visits in 2011
and 2012 respectively?
-Will the ECO commit to provide such data in future
reports, in line with its more general commitment to transparency?
-Why has there been such a significant drop in (i)
the number of overall compliance visits since 2009 and (ii) the
number of first time and routine visits in particular?
Written evidence from
Campaign Against Arms Trade (AEC003)
1. The Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) in the
UK, which was established in 1974, works to end the international
arms trade, which has a devastating impact on human rights and
security, and damages economic development. CAAT believes that
large scale military procurement and arms exports only reinforce
a militaristic approach to international problems.
2. This submission looks at Government priorities
and arms export promotion; export licensing transparency; the
arms trade treaty; and the work of your Committees.
Arms sales put before human rights
3. CAAT is pleased that, in your July 2013 report,
your Committees reiterated the point made in 2012, namely that
"the Government would do well to acknowledge that there is
an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms exports to
authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising their lack of
human rights at the same time rather than claiming, as the Government
continues to do, that these two policies 'are mutually reinforcing'."
Such an acknowledgement is vital for public discussion about arms
exports.
4. It is also essential, for an informed debate about
military exports, that the Government acknowledges your Committees'
point "that it is fundamentally anomalous, not least in terms
of public perceptions, for countries listed by the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office as being of human rights concerns, such as
Libya and Saudi Arabia, then to be listed by the United Kingdom
Trade and Investment Organisation within the Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills as Priority Markets for arms exports."
5. UK military exports have aircraft at their heart.
Leaving aside the use of UK-supplied aircraft by Saudi Arabia
in Yemen, it has been argued that aircraft do not violate human
rights. However, the very sale of such top-of-the-range military
equipment gives support and prestige to authoritarian regimes.
The aircraft often form part of a package which necessitates a
long-term relationship between that regime, the supplying company
and the UK government. This makes it difficult for the latter
to raise issues regarding human rights or to refuse export licences
for other equipment.
6. Through their actions, successive UK governments
have made it clear that arms sales take precedence and that human
rights advocacy is muted. The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy
Index for 2012 ranks Saudi Arabia at 163 out of 167, meaning that
there are only four more authoritarian regimes in the world. However,
the quest for arms deals leaves the UK government reluctant to
do anything to upset the Saudi authorities. Far from giving the
UK influence over human rights in Saudi Arabia, arms deals give
the power to the prospective purchaser.
7. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) said
the UK Embassy in Riyadh had been informed on 13th March 2011
that UK-made armoured vehicles would be going into Bahrain and
the Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud had called the UK Foreign
Secretary William Hague on the same day (FCO FoI response, 28.6.13).
The next day the Saudi forces entered Bahrain to guard the infrastructure,
freeing the Bahraini security forces to suppress pro-democracy
protesters. There is no indication that William Hague remonstrated
with Prince Saudi about this; indeed, an export licence for Tacttica
components was issued on 10th June 2011, while Saudi forces remained
in Bahrain (BIS FoI response, 12.9.12).
8. The exception to this general rule is that, to
Saudi displeasure, the UK government has not armed the Syrian
rebels, nor has it taken military action against the Syrian government.
However, in both cases it was the UK Parliament that prevented
the UK government from acting in the way the Saudi authorities
would have wished. This did not prevent former UK Ambassador to
Saudi Arabia, Sir William Patey, warning of the possible impact
on future trade: "It's difficult to pin it on a particular
contract but from a Saudi point of view, our unwillingness to
live up to our brave words would cause them to maybe doubt our
reliability as an ally ...". (Daily Telegraph, 2.9.13)
Prime Ministerial sales effort
9. The Government claims to have tough export criteria,
but many people are, rightly, sceptical when they see Prime Ministerial
arms sales trips to some of the world's most repressive regimes.
David Cameron's November 2012 visit to Saudi Arabia, Oman and
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to promote the Eurofighter Typhoon
is an example of this.
10. That promotional trip was remarkable as the media
consensus in favour of arms sales, at least to human rights violators,
appeared to break down. In contrast to the times when Margaret
Thatcher and Tony Blair made similar visits, this trip was questioned.
On 5th November 2012 The Guardian editorial said the Prime
Minister should admit that the interests of the military-industrial
complex were taking precedence over human rights, while the Daily
Telegraph headlined its article: "David Cameron defends
arms deals with Gulf states".
11. In yet another demonstration of his eagerness
to promote the Eurofighter Typhoon, David Cameron welcomed Bahrain's
autocratic ruler King Hamad to Downing Street on 7th August 2013.
The King expressed his thanks for the UK's "supportive stances"
towards Bahrain and indicated his eagerness to buy a fleet of
Eurofighter Typhoon jets. In turn, David Cameron pledged continued
support for "ongoing political reform in Bahrain". On
the same day, the King issued new decrees banning protests.
12. Arms sales are put before regional peace.
Defence Secretary Philip Hammond thinks increased military expenditure
in Asia is "worrying": "(It) has the potential
to escalate and become at best a prolonged source for instability
and at worst, a driver for conflict," he said. (AFP, 2.6.13)
However, these worries did not prevent a business delegation to
India in February 2013, led by David Cameron and including representatives
of arms companies, among them BAE, EADS UK, Thales UK, Cobham
and Ultra Electronics.
Royal assistance
13. The Gulf royal families like to be associated
with UK royalty, so the latter are used to support the arms sales
effort. The Prince of Wales and the Duchess of Cornwall visited
Saudi Arabia in March 2013 with military and commercial links
high on the agenda. Later, from 30th April to 1st May 2013, the
ruler of the UAE, Sheikh Khalifa, was welcomed by the Queen on
a state visit to the UK. BAE's Chief Executive Ian King was a
guest at the lunch for the Sheikh at Windsor Castle. In September
2013, Prince Andrew met with King Hamad of Bahrain in London.
Poor human rights record no bar to arms fair invites
14. The UK's biggest arms fair, Defence & Security
Equipment international (DSEi) took place in London's Docklands
from 10th to 14th September 2013. DSEi is organised by Clarion
Events, a private company, but the UK government, through the
United Kingdom Trade and Investment Defence and Security Organisation
(UKTI DSO), co-ordinates the presence of Ministry of Defence (MoD)
and military representatives as well as inviting international
delegations.
15. Nine of the UK government invitees to DSEi 2013
are also on the FCO list of countries with the most serious wide-ranging
human rights concerns. These are Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq,
Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.
Two others, Israel and Russia, had pavilions to display their
wares. The invitation list also included Algeria,
Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Afghanistan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan were
new to the list in 2013
while Libya was
back, having been
omitted from the 2011 invitations. As the UK government condemned
the terrible violence in Syria, it invited other brutal dictators
to an arms fair.
16. The
1,400 companies exhibiting at DSEi came from around the world,
including Rostec (Russian Technology State Corporation). Rostec
owns 100% of Rosoboronexport, the Russian state agency which supplies
the equipment to Syria's President Assad. The 30,000 DSEi visitors
from around the globe could trade freely, begin discussions on
new deals or seal those mooted beforehand. In many cases, the
equipment involved in the deals done or discussed at DSEi does
not enter the UK, so even UK export regulations do not apply.
17. CAAT is also concerned about the late publication
of the DSEi invitation list. Business Minister Michael Fallon
said the list would be placed on the UKTI website "when the
exhibition opens." (Hansard, 20.5.13, col 619w)
18. Although there had been no consistent pattern
regarding the date of the release of DSEi invitation lists, previously
it has usually been before the start of the exhibition. In 2009
the list was released two months in advance and included many
delegates' names. In 2011, although the full list was not available
until the start of DSEi, a partial list of those not from the
volatile (and potentially embarassing to the UK government) countries
was published at the beginning of June.
19. Disappointed the 2009 timetable had not been
followed this time, CAAT wrote to the Business Secretary, Vince
Cable, on 13th June 2013. In his response on 13th August 2013,
he said that the invitations were not all issued at the same time:
"Publishing details of countries invited in a piecemeal fashion
risks causing offence to those countries who have not been invited
at a particular point in time, and who may in fact be due to receive
an invitation. It also risk offending countries that we may have
planned to invite, but subsequently decide not to." CAAT
wonders if the real reason for the delay is that the Government
is an attempt to avoid the outcry the invitation list has caused
previously.
20. To allow an informed debate about the delegations
invited, it is essential that the UK government shows a commitment
to greater transparency by making the invitation lists available
at least one, and preferably two, months in advance of all
military and security exhibitions where delegations are invited
by UKTI DSO.
Ongoing support from the UKTI Defence and Security
Organisation
21. UKTI DSO's 150 civil servants promote military
and security equipment sales around the world, working on behalf
of private arms companies, but paid for by the UK taxpayer. Reflecting
the huge and disproportionate support given to arms companies,
UKTI employs more civil servants to sell military and security
equipment than it provides for sector specific support for every
other industry sector combined. Since 2012, companies
have also received assistance from the MoD's Defence Export Support
Group.
22. While Prime Ministerial visits and the major
arms fairs are in the public eye, much of UKTI DSO's work takes
behind the scenes, arranging contacts and smaller scale visits.
For instance, despite continuing security problems in Libya, on
3rd April 2013 UKTI DSO organised a "Defence and Security
Industry Day" in Tripoli aboard the Royal Navy frigate HMS
Kent. Eleven companies were there including Babcock International,
BAE, General Dynamics, Thales and Ultra (Hansard, 19.3.13 plus
update).
23. There are very many meetings. One example was
on 29th April 2013, when UKTI DSO Head Richard Paniguian
and UK Defence Attaché Commodore Christopher Murray met
with the Bahrain Minister for Defence Affairs, in Manama to discuss
"bilateral military cooperation". (Bahrain News Agency,
29.4.13)
24. There is no economic justification for such support:
arms sales account for just 1.2 % of UK exports and sustain just
0.2% of the national labour force. As the International Economy
Editor of the Financial Times said in August 2010: "You can
have as many arms export jobs as you are prepared to waste public
money subsidising."
Institutionalised support for sales to Saudi Arabia
25. Large contracts between UK companies and Saudi
Arabia are overseen by the UK MoD. The Ministry of Defence Saudi
Armed Forces Project (MODSAP) covers the Saudi British Defence
Co-operation Programme, formerly known as Al Yamamah (sale of
Tornado, Hawk and PC-9 aircraft to the Royal Saudi Air Force)
and the Al Salam programme (sale of Eurofighter Typhoons to the
Royal Saudi Air Force). The Saudi Arabia National Guard Communications
Project (SANGCOM) looks after the eponymous project.
26. Although its approximately 200 staff are UK civil
servants and military personnel Saudi Arabia pays for MODSAP,
£36.72 million in 2012/3.
27. It is only in recent months that CAAT has fully
understand that the costs of SANGCOM are met in the same way,
being paid for by the UK MoD in the first instance and then recouped
from the Saudi Arabian government. CAAT has been told that
a clause in the Memorandum of Understanding covering this
deal, unlike that for MODSAP, prevents the disclosure of the costs.
However, as at 1st April 2012, one MoD civil servant based in
the UK worked on SANGCOM as did 20 UK military personnel and 50
UK MoD civil servants in Saudi Arabia. (Hansard, 19.12.12 col
837w)
28. The arrangements give a country that the FCO
considers to be of human rights concern, and BAE, a private company,
a centre of influence within the UK MoD establishment.
Suspension of export licensing process
29. In July 2013, following the ousting of President
Morsi and the establishment of military rule in Egypt, CAAT contacted
the Export Control Organisation (ECO) to ask if the new mechanism
announced in 2012 suspending the export licence process had been
used. In reply, the ECO said it had not been, but that it had
been considered in 2012 in relation to Mali, Ethiopia, Syria,
the Maldives, Egypt and Israel and, earlier in 2013, Egypt. It
was said that any use of the mechanism would be announced to parliament.
30. On 21st August 2013 the mechanism was used with
respect to Egypt, but only for equipment which might be used for
internal repression. Since it should be expected that any such
goods would have, in any event, have been refused an export licence,
this does not appear to reflect any change in export control policy.
31. There
is a need to clarify the purpose of the suspension mechanism,
one of the main responses of the Government to the failings in
the export licensing system exposed by what was then known as
the "Arab Spring". If the suspension mechanism just
means that the processing of individual licence applications is
suspended on a case-by-case basis, this would be a retrograde
step from the refusal of export licence applications on a case-by-case
basis.
About turn on export licensing transparency
32. CAAT welcomed much in the July 2012 Government
Response to the BIS Transparency in Export Licensing Consultation,
but said at that time that a lot depended on how the changes were
implemented.
33. It was with considerable dismay, therefore, that
CAAT read the Notice to Exporters 2013/18 issued on 31st July
2013 with regard to Open Licences. This represented a major step
back from the greater transparency promised by Vince Cable, and
is not in line with the July 2012 Response. If the published information
is not to include ratings / goods description nor, it appears,
the value, it is almost meaningless, especially as Open Licences
often cover an extremely wide range of equipment.
34. It is unclear what prompted the about turn. In
answer to a parliamentary question Michael Fallon said it was
the "need to strike a proper balance between increased transparency
and the need to minimise administrative burdens on business."
(Hansard, 6.9.13, col 533w) However, the Export Group for Aerospace
and Defence (EGAD), in its submission to the Committees' last
report, quoted a company responding to the Consultation: "If
summary information for goods comprising destination/ rating and
the number of shipments and total value was provided this could
probably be achieved within current resources." EGAD appeared
to have no problem with the provision of the data as long as it
could be provided simply. Indeed, the companies must collect and
retain the data as a condition of the Open Licences.
35. The speed of the about turn on transparency was
also strange, as was the way it was slipped out. On 1st July 2013
the Notice to Exporters 2013/15 indicated that the Open Licence
transparency measures would be going ahead, albeit slightly later
than planned. Yet just over two weeks later, it seems that major
changes had been made. CAAT had not understood Vince Cable's answer
to Sir Bob Russell MP's question (Hansard, 18.7.13, col 1295)
as being an announcement to Parliament on the open licensing generally.
It seems highly likely that many MPs would not have realised this
was an announcement either.
36. If BIS undertook further consultations with industry,
or received representations from companies, it should, in fairness,
have contacted all those who responded to the original Consultation
so that their views might be taken into account before the Government
made a decision contrary to its previous announcement.
37. It is also unclear what is happening with regards
to the provision of additional and disaggregated information on
the Single Licences. There was correspondence between CAAT and
Michael Fallon earlier in 2013 regarding CAAT concerns that less,
rather than more, information might be provided than at present.
38. The export licence browser on CAAT's website
uses the ECO data, but is comprehensively searchable and provides
itemised licences with ratings, values and the precise date on
which the licence was approved, refused or revoked. The full raw
data is also available from the CAAT website as .csv files for
download. BIS had appeared reluctant to acknowledge that in a
large proportion of cases, disaggregating the data to the daily
level, equates to providing information about individual licences.
The data should be available to all and not depend on CAAT producing
a usable browser.
39. On
6th August 2013 CAAT wrote to Michael Fallon about this, urging
him to think again about the Open Licences and asking what is
happening regarding the Single Licence information. At the time
of writing this submission, a reply to the letter is still awaited.
An Arms Trade Treaty, but it makes no difference
40. CAAT has always been sceptical about an arms
trade treaty. These doubts appeared justified when William Hague
told the Foreign Affairs Committee on 16th July 2013 that, even
if it became a signatory to the arms trade treaty, Russia would
argue that it would be within its rights to supply the Assad regime
with weapons and that would not change. Despite the treaty, it
seems the UK will continue to enthusiastically arm Saudi
Arabia's authoritarian rulers while Russia's weapons supplies
to Syria will continue unabated.
Work of your Committees
41. CAAT believes that the work of your Committees
has had an immensely beneficial effect on the parliamentary, media
and public discussion of arms trade issues. The Committees' detailed
questioning, through letters and evidence sessions, of the Government
has done much to hold it to account for its export policy and
practice, as well as to illuminate the issue more generally.
42. CAAT believes your Committees' work could be
further enhanced by varying the civil society organisations
and industry representatives invited to give oral evidence each
year, so that a wider range of views and perspectives might be
heard. It appears that the UK Working Group on Arms may be perceived
to reflect the whole civil society sector working on these issues
when it does not. CAAT, which has made a written submission to
the Committees every year, has never been asked to give oral evidence.
There are others working on arms export issues too.
43. Likewise, on the industry side, oral evidence
is usually given by representatives of the EGAD
plus a consultant or two. While they do not submit written evidence,
CAAT would suggest that staff from the export licensing departments
of some of the bigger exporters of military goods, such as BAE
Systems or Chemring, might provide a useful additional perspective
if they were asked to appear before your Committees for the industry
session in some years.
September 2013
Written Evidence from
Privacy International (AEC004)
1. Founded in 1990, Privacy International (PI) is
a registered UK charity that campaigns on the right to privacy
at an international level. Our work aims to fight against
unlawful surveillance and other intrusions into private life by
governments and corporations and seeks to ensure that technological
developments strengthen rather than undermine every individual's
right to a private life. PI has developed particular expertise
in the trade of surveillance systems given the devastating impact
this unregulated trade has had on the basic right to privacy as
well as fundamental political and civil freedoms across the world.
PI has been at the forefront of international efforts to introduce
oversight to the surveillance industry and to put to an end the
current situation that allows US, British and other European companies
to sell surveillance systems to repressive regimes where it is
used to maintain a stranglehold over free expression, smother
political dissent and target individuals for arrest, torture and
execution.
2. This submission covers: Background Information,
General Policy, the Wassenaar Arrangement, Transparency &
Cryptographic Exports to Countries of Human Rights Concern, The
UK's Approach to Exports of Cyber Security, End-Use Controls,
and Embargoes.
3. The systems, technology and software necessary
for monitoring, communications interception and surveillance encompass
a wide range of items. 'Surveillance equipment' in this submission
includes, but is not limited to, items listed within Annex V (A)
of Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012.[15]
Background Information
4. Ten years ago, the value of the global surveillance
industry was negligible; today, industry experts value it at around
$5 billion a year. PI has documented how surveillance equipment
has been used to track the activities of dissidents, human rights
activists, journalists and others living under authoritarian governments.
New technologies allow the financial transactions, communications
activity and geographic movements of millions of people to be
captured, analysed and stored both cheaply and efficiently. The
emerging information and communications infrastructures of developing
countries are being hijacked for surveillance purposes, and the
information thereby collected is facilitating unlawful interrogation
practices, torture and extrajudicial executions.
5. PI has identified 77 companies operating in the
UK that sell the surveillance equipment necessary for this. The
industry reasons that such equipment is necessary for law enforcement
purposes, but fails to acknowledge the fact that there is usually
no legal framework in place that would allow a clear lawful basis
for the operation of these systems. In the wrong hands, these
can be just as dangerous as guns or bombs, but there are currently
no licensing requirements for the export of the wide range of
surveillance equipment in place in the UK. Regulatory oversight
in the form of export controls is urgently required if the UK
wants to meet its human rights commitments and foreign policy
objectives.
General Policy
1. PI welcomes the committees' focus on this crucial
issue and its scrutiny of Government policy regarding the topic.
Companies producing surveillance equipment are, by their very
nature, extremely secretive and extremely little has been known
about the industry's reach and operations until very recently.
As more details have emerged regarding the functions and capabilities
of these products, it has become clear that they can be used to
significantly bolster the military and security capabilities of
a state as well as for internal repression and widescale abuses
of human rights. It is necessary therefore that they be considered
as strategic exports and that Government policy on this is scrutinized.
We therefore strongly urge the committee to continue its focus
on this topic.
2. Privacy International welcomes the recognition
by the British Government that "the existence of software
designed to penetrate the defences of computers and communications
devices and to record, modify and/or relay data without the user's
knowledge poses a threat to national security, industry, and commerce,
as well as to human rights."[16]
The UK Government has made clear its intention to pursue international
agreement to expand the scope of export control to include surveillance
equipment. It has also outlined its decision not to pursue unilateral
restrictions because it considers unilaterally imposed restrictions
to be ineffective given that they "could be more easily circumvented
given the likelihood that many of the companies which manufacture
such equipment will have offices in other EU and third countries."[17]
3. While agreeing that for enforcement purposes international
action is more effective than unilateral controls, PI does not
share the UK Government's view that unilaterally imposed restrictions
should not also be applied. Given the acknowledged threat that
such equipment poses, it makes little sense to wait for international
agreement on the issue while the UK at present has the legislative
authority and the enforcement capacity to control its own exports
prior to reaching international agreement on the issue. The USA,
for example, already has controls on 'Surreptitious Listening'
equipment aimed at denying such equipment to terrorist-designated
entities and individuals as part of its foreign policy-based export
controls.
4. PI is of the opinion that if the Government is
serious about the threat posed by the unregulated trade in surveillance
equipment, which public statements suggest it is, it should impose
unilateral controls without delay and not avoid taking action
merely because it believes that other states have failed to do
so.
Wassenaar Arrangement
5. This 2012 Strategic Exports Annual Report states
that the Government has initiated discussions within the Wassenaaar
Arrangement (WA) on the issue of surveillance equipment and that
it intends to make a formal technical proposal to the forum. A
further commitment to pursue agreement among Wassenaar participants
was made in response to the Committees on Arms Exports Controls
and published in its Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control
First Report (2013).
6. Privacy International welcomes the Government's
intention to pursue agreement within the Wassenaar Arrangement
and agrees that it is an appropriate forum given the scope of
its control lists and participating states. Wassenaar already
contains controls on passive telecommunications interception equipment
and specific items that are used to identify mobile phone details.
However, this list needs to be urgently expanded. The surveillance
industry is heavily based in developed economies with developed
ICT sectors that are major arms exporters. The WA is thereby particularly
useful in this regard given that it includes 5 out of the world's
6 biggest arms exporters and that its control lists also serves
as the basis for the control lists of numerous other states.
7. Given the secretive nature of negotiations at
Wassenaar however, it is unclear at this stage what the UK technical
proposal will be. In order for any international agreements on
surveillance equipment to have an impact, they are required to
include as wide a scope of specific equipment as possible. There
is a real risk however that products used by human rights activists,
journalists and others to evade government surveillance and censorship
in repressive regimes could also fall within control lists - having
a detrimental impact on their access to communications technology.
We are concerned by the lack of engagement the Government has
shown towards civil society on this topic, and have so far not
been consulted on any substantive issues to be put forward by
the UK delegation.
8. We therefore recommend that the committees' suggest
that the Government pursue outreach activities with civil society
on this important issue and that stakeholders with a demonstrable
interest in and knowledge of the issues be consulted.
9. We further recommend that the committees make
Government policy accountable by reviewing the UK technical proposal
and ensuring that the Government meets its commitment to pursue
meaningful negotiations on this topic within the Wassenaar Arrangement.
10. PI is also concerned about the length of time
that this approach takes given the complexity of negotiations
and how long it takes to incorporate the updated Wassenaar list
into the national consolidated list. While we understand that
the delay is largely down to the length of time it has taken to
update the EU Dual-Use Regulation since the Lisbon Treaty, it
does not change the fact that this entire process including negotiations
takes several years to produce tangible results. It suggests that
the Government has not fully recognised the seriousness of the
situation and its implications for victims of surveillance equipment.
11. Although it is an appropriate forum, PI believes
that it is not the only avenue through which to achieve tangible
results. We recommend that the committees' ensure that the Government
explores all avenues available to pursue controls, including across
the EU level. Various parliamentarians and officials within the
EU have expressed their strong support for updating the EU Dual-Use
regulation to cover surveillance equipment, while the Parliament
itself endorsed amendments proposed by Dutch Member of European
Parliament Marietje Schaake calling for EU export control regulation
to include additional binding export controls for surveillance
equipment.[18] PI also
recommends the use of interim measures within the UK, such as
the powers contained within the Export Control Act that previously
allowed the control of sodium thiopental on an emergency basis.
Transparency & Cryptographic Exports to Countries
of Human Rights Concern
12. Data on what exports have taken place is not
accessible given that a large amount of surveillance equipment
is not currently on the consolidated list.
13. Some surveillance equipment and software does
fall within the scope of controls because of the strength of cryptography
used. This particularly relates to products that fall within categories
5A002 and 5D002. Such controls are inappropriate. Cryptography
is a key security measure to protect the confidentiality of communications,
and to also ensure trust and confidence in digital interactions.
Despite strict controls up until the 1990s, governments realised
that in order to increase confidence in the then-emerging Internet
economy, greater security was required. Encryption was becoming
an essential safeguard for electronic commerce and global communications.
The ready availability of strong cryptography (made available
for use by human rights activists) over the Internet made export
controls a competitive disadvantage for companies in controlled
countries. To meet the interests of the US controls, the US National
Security Agency worked with companies to introduce technologies
that contained backdoors or reduced security obstacles for the
NSA, which hindered US companies' abilities to sell their products
to governments and companies overseas. As increased risks of surveillance
by states and criminals increased, cryptography export controls
became untenable and were eventually liberalised.
14. The depth in detail reported on exports of cryptographic
equipment is not sufficient to make a reliable judgment on what
the product being exported actually is. 5A002a1a can, for example,
include a wide range of products employing cryptography to secure
communication in addition to extremely pervasive surveillance
systems. It is therefore difficult to assess the risk posed by
extant Government approved licenses for cryptographic goods exported
to the 27 Countries listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
as being of the greatest human rights concern.
15. Nevertheless, given that PI has identified at
least 77 companies in the UK producing surveillance equipment,
the amount of licenses approved to these 27 countries is clearly
concerning - especially given the high prevalence of licenses
for equipment employing cryptography within the approvals. Equipment
employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography,
or software for equipment employing cryptography was approved
for 20 of the 27 countries on the list from 1 January to 30 September
alone, while equipment employing cryptography makes up by far
the largest proportion of approved licenses.
16. We therefore highly recommend that CAEC determine
which of these licenses was for surveillance products and that
it recommend to the Government that more detailed reporting within
this category is made accessible for both the committees' and
public scrutiny.
The UK's Approach to Exports of Cyber Security
17. PI has several concerns regarding the Government's
approach to exports of 'cyber security', as outlined by the UKTI.[19]
It is clear that the UK has historically had a high level of competence
in this sector because of its security services. According to
figures cited by UKTI, cyber security exports now total some 33%
of UK security exports and a third of all sales coming out of
the UK security sector. Considering these figures, and the fact
that UKTI believes there to be an estimated 2,380 companies working
on cyber security in the UK, it is understandable that the Government
will be keen to promote the industry.
18. However, as the UKTI report itself makes clear,
export controls within this section of the security sector do
not always apply. This is particularly worrying because of the
nature of some of the technology. Deep-packet inspection equipment,
for example, has a legitimate use in network management and the
detection of malware and Trojans. However, the same equipment
can also be used to monitor packets of data for surveillance purposes
and for censoring particular websites and services from general
access. UKTI has identified several countries considered to be
'priority markets' for cyber security exports. PI is concerned
that these 'priority markets' include authoritarian governments
in the Gulf where access to the Internet is widely censored and
that appear in the FCO's list of countries of human rights concern.
End-Use Controls
19. Emphasis on list-based controls is limited in
its efficacy for surveillance systems given the speed at which
technology and software and their technical specifications develop.
There is a real risk that by the time list based controls on surveillance
equipment are implemented they will already be out of date. Consequently,
there needs to be robust end-use controls contained in any solution
that will be able to catch non-listed goods. PI recommends that
the Government review the options available for such a control,
given that it believes the catch-all principles within the EU
Dual-Use Regulation and the Wassenaar Arrangement are too narrow
for these purposes and only allow it to control non-listed items
if there is a risk they will be used as part of a WMD programme,
be exported to a destination under embargo or incorporated into
items on the military list. In Flanders, for example, a military
end-use catch-all clause allows for control of any unlisted goods
if they are intended for use in military actions.
Embargoes
20. Privacy International welcomed the Council's
decision to include surveillance equipment within EU restrictive
measures imposed on Iran and Syria in light of evidence that European
companies had sold surveillance equipment to the authorities there.
PI considers this as recognition of the fact that such equipment
significantly bolsters the security and military capabilities
of a government and that it can be used for internal repression.
We therefore recommend that the Government pursue action to ensure
that all of the equipment listed within these measures are controlled
in all restrictive measures in place and in the UK's consolidated
list.
21. Annex II of the Export Control (Syria Sanctions)
Order, 2013 should also be expanded to recognise that surveillance
systems can also be used to facilitate internal repression. By
virtue of such recognition, the logical extension is that they
would also be incorporated into the UK consolidated list. Items
already on this list should also be incorporated into the UK consolidated
list.
27 September 2013
Written evidence from
Export Group for Aerospace Defence (EGAD)
(AEC005)
1. Introduction:
1.1 The Export Group for Aerospace & Defence
(EGAD) is a UK-based not-for-profit-making special interest industry
group, founded in September 2004, focusing exclusively on all
aspects of export and trade control matters. EGAD is the only
dedicated national industrial body in the UK dealing exclusively
with export control issues. EGAD operates under the joint auspices
of ADS Group Ltd, the British Naval Equipment Association (BNEA),
INTELLECT and the Society of Maritime Industries (SMI).
1.2 A dedicated website (www.egad.org.uk) has been
created at the request of the group's Executive Committee and
with guidance from its Awareness Outreach Activities Sub-Committee,
that is intended to become the first port of call for companies
as the source of user-friendly basic, initial guidance on all
aspects of export and trade controls, created by like-minded people
to help compliance staff within companies. It seeks to identify
potential sources of help, and ideas for problem solving, and
presents easy steps to "bite-sized compliance".
1.3 The website has been kept simple, and, in addition
to providing information on EGAD, itself, seeks to present a practical
and simple step-by-step guide on understanding export and trade
controls, and addressing the fundamental questions which companies
ask: when do I need an export licence and how do I go about trying
to obtain and use one?
1.4 EGAD has also created, with Cranfield University,
a series of externally-accredited training courses in export control
compliance, at four levels, running from very basic awareness
(appropriate for all company staff) up to a Master's equivalent
course (for senior export control compliance managers within companies).
For further information, details on these are available at: www.strategicexportcontrols.org/index.cfm.
1.5 EGAD welcomes this opportunity to contribute
to the open consultation around Strategic Export Controls; the
CAEC invited comment on several specific areas, the response of
EGAD to those areas, is detailed below:
2. General Comment:
2.1 From the viewpoint of responsible and law-abiding
UK companies, it is clear that we support the continuation of
the current UK export licensing system, which operates on a strict
"case-by-case" basis. It is our strongly-held contention
that the continued retention of the current "case-by-case"
basis is the most logical and rational way in which an export
control system can function, offering, as it does, the flexibility
to permit responsible, whilst preventing undesirable exports,
sometimes to the same destinations.
2.3 This principle is enshrined in the current UK
Open licensing system, that allows the Government to identify
categories of "low-risk" goods which can be exported
to certain destinations, with minimal intervention from the export
licensing authorities and a minimal administrative burden on UK
businesses.
2.4 Concerns raised by the Committee regarding two
recent export licenses granted for the export of two dual-use
chemicals, sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride, to Syria reinforces
the need for a well-informed, evidence-based discussion on Export
Controls. Sodium fluoride has a multitude of uses, most notably
in dental hygiene products such as toothpaste and mouthwash. In
this case, the chemicals in question were for civilian use in
the finishing of aluminium profiles used to make aluminium showers
and aluminium window frames, as demonstrated by the exporter and
company due to receive the chemicals in Syria. The export licenses
themselves were only granted once the Government was satisfied
that the chemicals were indeed for this use and not for use in
the manufacturing of chemical weapons.
2.5 The reasons export licence applications of this
nature often take so long to process is due to the scrutiny with
which they are assessed and time taken to determine their clear
end-use are.
2.6 Responsibility, therefore, lies with UK industry
to disclose all relevant information required in the full assessment
of export license applications in a timely manner, not only to
help speed up the application process but also to create as transparent
an audit trail as possible for any subsequent enquiries that may
take place. By requesting this information, UK Government officials
are doing all they possibly can to try to ensure that the UK acts
responsibly in its export activities. UK companies are advised
to apply as early as possible and provide as much supporting information
as possible to assist UK Government officials in assessing their
applications.
2.7 As SPIRE , the ECO's online export licensing
system, itself says "the ECO has to return roughly half
of all export license applications to the exporter, either for
more information or because the application has been completed
wrongly. These incomplete or incorrect applications cause delays
in processing." The delay in applications has caused
instances were shipments have been delayed, impacting on customer
confidence and their perceptions of the UK as a supplier.
2.8 EGAD is working to inform exporters better on
how to complete licence applications more thoroughly and to ensure
all necessary data is provided at the initial stage, in order
to reduce delays in the process and prevent the current unacceptably
high level of returned application and delayed shipments.
3. Exhibitions:
3.1 EGAD does not believe that any useful purpose
would be served by a successful campaign to abolish DSEI (Defence
and Security Equipment International). Held in the UK, in conjunction
with the UK Government, DSEI is regulated by tighter controls
and higher standards than might be than would be the case should
the event take place elsewhere in the world. The event also enables
UK SMEs to promote their business, network and meet potential
customers that they might otherwise not come into contact with;
contributing to the success of the UK's supply chain.
4. US Export Control Amendments:
4.1 We are aware that UK Government officials are
endeavouring to keep abreast of developments in the US on Export
Control Reform, which could have considerable commercial and bureaucratic
consequences for UK businesses trading with companies in the US.
It is important that the UK Government takes an active role in
discussing the implications in the context of the Wassenaar Arrangement
and considers ways in which it can seek to amend our own national
legislation to ensure that UK Defence Industry is not at a competitive
disadvantage in the increasingly crucial global marketplace.
5. Extraterritorial Regulations:
5.1 EGAD believes that an extension of extraterritorial
trade controls will fail to achieve the desired results from such
measures and will in practice be easily evaded by illegal arms
brokers, whilst subjecting companies to two different jurisdictions
for the same transaction Extra-territorial jurisdiction should
only be exerted in extreme circumstances that warrant it in order
to avoid conflicts arising from multiple laws. Both the
EU and the UK have already manifested their opposition to extra-territorial
laws through adopting (i) Council
Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against
the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation
adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting
therefrom; (ii) The Extraterritorial
US Legislation (Sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Libya) (Protection
of Trading Interests) Order 1996; and (iii) The Protection of
Trading Interests Act 1980.
5.2 Seeking to improve the level of control on the
export of defence materiel by encouraging states to sign and ratify
the Arms Trade Treaty is, in our view, a much more productive
approach in the longer term. We assume that CAEC members are primarily
concerned about undesirable exports of defence equipment from
third countries, which may fuel conflict and human rights abuses
rather than those cases of responsible 3rd country
exports which tangentially involve a "UK person" because
they may be employed by a company established in a third country.
5.3 The Arms Trade Treaty seeks to address the problem
and HMG should be encouraged to provide outreach and assistance
to those countries that request it to bring their export control
systems up to a comparable level. In the interim, we understand
the desire for some measure of enhanced trade controls, but would
request that it should expressly exclude legitimate trade from
its scope.
6. Transparency:
6.1 Industry is initially positive about the new
proposed shape and scope of the information, the ECO will seek
from companies in an effort to enhance the existing high-level
of transparency that we feel more effectively tries to achieve
a practical and pragmatic balance, without imposing an unrealistic
and disproportionate bureaucratic burden on UK companies. We
remain unhappy, however, that industry should be required to pay
the cost in terms of overheads and diversion of resources due
to the Government's inability to modify and interrogate effectively
the information that it already has on its own IT systems.
Written submission from
Bahrain Watch (AEC006)
SUMMARY OF SUBMISSION
1. The Bahrain government is committing serious violations
as part of a crackdown against its opposition, human rights defenders
and free expression. It is failing in its pledges to enact reforms
and has failed to hold perpetrators of violations responsible
for their acts.
2. British manufactured arms and repressive technology
have been used to suppress Bahraini citizens.
3. The British government has regarded Bahrain as
a key export destination since 2010. It has consistently supported
arms exports to Bahrain, despite continued human rights abuses.
4. The British government has given legitimacy to
Bahraini officials and agencies accused of serious human rights
abuses by inviting them to arms fairs.
5. The British government has increased its defence
relations with Bahrain and is presently leading negotiations to
sell arms worth a reported £1 billion.
INTRODUCTION
6. Bahrain Watch is an independent
research and advocacy group that seeks to promote effective, transparent
and accountable governance in Bahrain. It is led by independent
researchers inside and outside Bahrain and focuses on evidence-based
advocacy in the areas of political reform, economic development,
and security.
FACTUAL INFORMATION
CURRENT SUMMARY AND BRITISH EXPORTS
7. Bahrain has been in a state
of crisis since February 2011 when a popular uprising was brutally
suppressed, with activists killed, maimed, tortured, and imprisoned.
No senior official has been held accountable for these ongoing
violations. There is little evidence of any substantial reform
in Bahrain.[20] In September
2013, 47 countries signed a joint statement describing Bahrain's
human rights situation as "an issue of serious concern".
While the European Parliament also passed a resolution raising
similar concerns,[21]
to date the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has failed to
name Bahrain as a "country of concern".
8. British made arms have been
used to suppress Bahraini citizens since 2011. Saudi troops used
Tactica armoured vehicles manufactured by BAE Systems when they
entered Bahrain in March 2011. Bahrain police armed with shotguns
use birdshot against protesters, which has resulted in several
deaths and serious injuries. Birdshot cartridges manufactured
by UK firms Gamebore, Eley Hawk and Hull Cartridge have been identified
in photographs taken by activists reportedly following the suppression
of protests. Bahrain security forces have used tear gas manufactured
by US firm Federal Laboratories, owned by Armor Holdings.[22]
Until July 2012, Armor Holdings was owned by BAE Systems. Surveillance
technology sold by a British based company has been used by Bahrain
to target activists.[23]
9. Whilst some UK export licences
were revoked in February 2011, the British government has largely
maintained close relations with the Bahraini authorities and consistently
encouraged arms sales. The Commander-in-Chief of the Bahrain Defence
Force has claimed that he successfully pressured the British government
into lifting the freeze on arms exports. Interviewed in February
2012, he recounted a conversation with "a senior British
officer": "I told him that we would impose a ban
on dealing with British planes, ships and military personnel in
Bahrain if the ban on Bahrain was not lifted within two weeks.
We do not need to import anything from them, but it is a matter
of principle. The British ban was lifted after one month."[24]
10. Some of the worst human rights
abuses were committed during the three-month state of emergency
announced by the King on 15th March 2011. Several export licenses
to Bahrain were approved during this period. In April 2011, export
licenses for "body armor", "civil body armor"
and "training hand grenades" were approved. In May,
licenses were approved for "small arms ammunition",
as well as components and technology for "military support
vehicles" and "all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic
protection". The Ministry of Interior, Bahrain Defence Force,
Bahrain National Guard and National Security Agency were responsible
for implementing the state of emergency. British exports to -
and relations with - these government bodies are therefore of
particular concern.
11. There has been a steady trade
with Bahrain since 2010. In 2010, the UK approved export licenses
worth at least £8,776,392.[25]
In February 2011, licenses for goods worth at least £5,249,516
were revoked. Approved arms exports in 2010 include small arms
and ammunition, "CS hand grenades", "tear gas/riot
control ammunition" and "stun grenades".
12. In 2011, export licences worth
at least £13,310,376 were approved, a significant increase
from the previous year. Several of these, worth at least £893,397,
were revoked in February 2011. In 2012, export licenses worth
at least £7,968,437 were approved. This included the export
of 400 machine guns and components worth £4,100,000 for "naval
end use", and "secure communications equipment"
to the Bahrain military to improve their "command and control".[26]
The figures reveal a significant increase in exports from previous
years. In 2008, export licences worth £5,167,508 were approved
and in 2009 that figure was only £2,873,044. These figures
may be dwarfed if the UK Government succeeds in selling Bahrain
12 Eurofighter Typhoon jets worth a reported £1billion.[27]
PROMOTING DEFENCE EXPORTS
13. Promoting British business
interests in Bahrain has been a consistent thrust of the current
government. Writing for the UKTI sponsored "Doing Business
in Bahrain" website, the British Ambassador notes: "In
meetings with the British Prime Minister, HM The King has declared
that he looks to Britain to be Bahrain's 'partner of choice' (...).
David Cameron said this was 'music to his ears'."[28]
The events of 2011 did not impact British business. In 2012, exports
of goods to Bahrain increased by 21.4%.[29]
14. The FCO is increasingly engaged
in promoting defence exports. One of the actions in the FCO's
2012 Business Plan is: "Use defence engagement to help maintain
the UK share of the global defence export market and to increase
the UK's share of the global security export market, including
supporting export campaigns for Typhoon."[30]
15. Prior to 2011, Bahrain was
named as a "key market" for UKTI Defence and Security
Organisation (UKTI DSO). In a UKTI DSO case study, Praetorian
International's co-founder reports that UKTI "helped us immensely
when we were trying to make worthwhile contacts. The [UKTI] desk
officer for Bahrain arranged valuable meetings for us with people
such as the UK Defence Attaché in Manama".[31]
Bahrain is one of 72 countries which has a UK Defence Attaché.[32]
16. UKTI DSO officials had meetings
with the Bahrain Defence Force (BDF) and Ministry of Interior
in the months before February 2011. On 5th-10th October 2010,
representatives demonstrated a "Ballistic Toolkit" to
the BDF. On 19th January 2011, two UKTI DSO officials met with
the MOI to discuss "possible sharing of info between UK and
Bahrain on Security and Policing best practice".[33]
17. On 11th May 2010, the first
day of the new Coalition Government, the FCO published "A
Charter for Business", pledging that "FCO Ministers
and officials will lobby tirelessly on behalf of UK business interests
overseas".[34] As
noted by the Foreign Affairs Committee, this new FCO Charter "made
no mention of the FCO's role in helping businesses address the
potential human rights implications of their overseas operations".[35]
On the same day, UKTI launched a five-year strategy titled "Britain
Open for Business" aimed at expanding inward investment and
overseas exports through "building strategic relationships
at the highest levels".[36]
Arms formed a central part of this renewed export drive. Speaking
at a UKTI DSO event in November 2010, Defence Minister Gerald
Howarth described "the biggest defence exports drive in decades".[37]
UKTI has four staff members based in Bahrain.[38]
18. Several Ministers in the new
government had begun forging relations with Bahraini officials
whilst in opposition. On 13th-16th March 2009, Alan Duncan MP
(currently Minister of State for International Development) and
Keith Simpson MP (currently Private Parliamentary Secretary to
the Foreign Secretary) visited Bahrain, with "accommodation
and flights paid for by the Government of Bahrain". The Bahrain
government paid for Liam Fox MP (Defence Secretary from May 2010
to October 2011) to visit Bahrain on 21th-23th July 2009 to "meet
with the King". William Hague MP (current Foreign Secretary)
visited Bahrain on 9th-11th January 2009 to meet the Foreign Minister.
His trip was funded by the Bahrain government.[39]
19. After coming to office, Defence
Secretary Liam Fox and Foreign Secretary William Hague visited
Bahrain on May 24th 2010. They had meetings with the King and
Foreign Affairs Minister respectively.[40]
In June 2010, Foreign Secretary William Hague launched the "Gulf
Initiative" which sought "to improve commercial, economic,
cultural and educational ties" with Bahrain and other GCC
countries.[41] The following
month, King Hamad met with Prime Minister David Cameron at Downing
Street. They discussed "furthering economic bilateral ties".[42]
20. Defence Secretary Liam Fox
and Defence Minister Lord Astor visited Bahrain in December 2010.
They had meetings with the King and Crown Prince, who are also
respectively the Supreme Commander and Deputy Supreme Commander
of the Bahrain Defence Force.[43]
Fox had also met with the Crown Prince in London the previous
week[44]. Fox's associate
Adam Werritty was also in Bahrain during the period of this trip
to attend the Manama Dialogue.[45]
It has been reported that Werrity's company Pargav Limited funded
his overseas trips. One of Pargav's donors was G3 (Good Governance
Group). G3 is a private intelligence firm whose clients include
British arms firm BAE Systems. It held meetings with Fox during
his time in opposition and government.[46]
In July 2011, G3 received a £1.5million contract with the
Bahrain government to develop a "media campaign to support
Bahrain's position in the international community".[47]
Liam Fox resigned as Defence Secretary in October 2011, following
a scandal involving his ties to Werrity and the Atlantic Bridge
charity which he founded. Lord Astor was a trustee of Atlantic
Bridge.[48]
DEEPENING UK-BAHRAIN ENGAGEMENT
21. Shortly after the state of
emergency had ended in Bahrain, the British government began to
expand its drive for arms exports. On 8th September 2011, the
UKTI DSO Senior Management Team hosted a lunch in London to give
members of the AeroSpace, Defence, Security (A|D|S) trade association
an opportunity to meet "meet newly appointed UK Defence Attachés",
including the official who was due to start work in Bahrain.[49]
On the same day, two officials from UKTI DSO, including the Country
Manager for Bahrain, spoke at an event organised by the London
Chamber of Commerce and Industry titled: Middle East: A Vast Market
For UK Defence and Security Companies. Bahrain was named as a
"top destination" for the UK defence industry.[50]
22. The following week, London
hosted the DSEi international arms fair. A delegation from Bahrain
National Guard attended "as guests of the UK Government".[51]
The Bahrain National Guard supported other agencies in the March
16th 2011 assault on Pearl Roundabout and security operations
at Salminaya Medical Complex and the Financial Harbour.[52]
23. According to emails obtained
by Private Eye, the UK Government had originally decided not to
invite Bahrain, however it changed its mind after determining
that the human rights situation had "improved considerably".[53]
A delegate from the Bahrain National Guard was escorted around
the arms fair by Gerald Howard MP, then Parliamentary Under Secretary
of State for International Security Strategy at the Ministry of
Defence, as well as two officials from UKTI DSO.[54]
According to Private Eye: "The government also arranged
dinner dates and "stand visits" with arms firms, and
the two Bahraini National Guard reps attended a BAE Systems reception
on 13 September. There were also meetings with defence ministers
Gerald Howarth and Lord Astor, a "lunch hosted by Air Vice
Marshal Nigel Maddox" in the "VIP Dining Area"
and a 45-minute presentation on unmanned drones".[55]
24. The Bahrain International Airshow
was held on 19th-21st January 2012. The event is organised by
UK firm Farnborough International, a subsidiary company of A|D|S.
Two days before the start of the airshow, A|D|S held a lobbying
event in Parliament to announce their new "Flying Forward"
campaign and a "newly established All Party Parliamentary
Group Aerospace".[56]
A spokesperson for Farnborough said of British involvement in
the airshow: "government-to-government relations are still
good and invitations have been extended to the UK defence and
aerospace community as well as the UK government."[57]
UKTI DSO had intended "to organise a joint chalet" with
A|D|S at the airshow, however this didn't happen.[58]
A Government Minister subsequently claimed that whilst UKTI DSO
"deployed a small team to support the airshow", they
did not purchase a chalet as "the expense could not be justified".[59]
Defence Minister Lord Astor attended the Airshow and held meetings
with Bahrain's Prime Minister, Crown Prince, Foreign Minister
and BDF Commander-in-Chief. General Simon Mayall, the MoD's Defence
Advisor for the Middle East, also attended the meeting with the
BDF Commander-in-Chief.[60]
25. On 30th January 2012, the UK
government approved an export for 2 assault rifles worth £6,620
to "a member of the Bahrain Royal family".[61]
Although the monetary value is small, the export carries great
symbolic weight.
26. In July 2012, a delegation
from the Bahrain military attended the Farnborough Airshow, following
an invitation from UKTI DSO.[62]
Prime Minister David Cameron opened the airshow which was attended
by 16 government ministers.[63]
Then Defence Minister Gerald Howarth MP "had 15 meetings
with overseas delegations".[64]
27. King Hamad visited London on
23rd August and met with the Prime Minister. They "discussed
opportunities for British businesses in" Bahrain.[65]
Two week later, Defence Secretary Philip Hammond visited Bahrain
and held several meetings, including with the King, Crown Prince
and Defence Minister. General Simon Mayall attended some meetings
"in his role as defence senior adviser middle east".
General Mayall also met with the Interior Minister.[66]
General Mayall returned to Bahrain on 7th October and met with
the BDF Commander-in-Chief.[67]
28. On 11th October, Defence Secretary
Philip Hammond and the Bahrain Foreign Secretary signed a new
UK-Bahrain Defence Cooperation Accord in the presence of the Crown
Prince.[68] The Ministry
of Defence did not publicise this accord and have not released
a copy of the text. Defence Minister Dr Andrew Murrison told the
Foreign Affairs Select Committee in 2013 that he "will not
discuss the content of that particular document". At the
same hearing, Foreign Minister Alistair Burt described the accord
as "evidence of [the] strong relationship" between the
UK and Bahrain.[69]
29. Three days after the accord
was signed, the Crown Prince attended a banquet held in his honour
at Sandhurst Military Academy.[70]
General Mayall met with the Crown Prince during the event.[71]
Sandhurst has close links to the Bahrain Royal Family. In January
2012, it received a £3million donation from King Hamad, following
"negotiations [...] about the donation throughout 2011".[72]
Following the donation, Sandhurst renamed "Mons Hall"
to "King Hamad Hall". King Hamad's son Sheikh Nasser
represented his father at the opening of the hall on 13th May
2013.[73] King Hamad
and Sheikh Nasser are both graduates from Sandhurst. The Crown
Prince's son Sheikh Mohammed graduated from Sandhurst in April
2011.[74] In 2012, he
began an "exchange programme with the British Army".[75]
39 Bahraini officers have been trained at Sandhurst since 2002,
5 of whom were training in 2011. The UK Government subsidises
their training by £29,600.[76]
30. Defence Minister Lord Astor
visited Bahrain in early December 2012 "to attend high level
talks with leaders".[77]
Later that month, Lord Astor accompanied several British officials
to a reception at the Bahrain Embassy in London. Former Defence
Secretary Geoff Hoon was also present.[78]
Hoon works for AgustaWestland, which is owned by Italian firm
Finmeccanica, one of the manufacturers of the Eurofighter Typhoon.
31. Lord Astor returned to Bahrain
on 10th January 2013 to brief a Defence Minister on British made
Typhoon warplanes which had arrived in Bahrain that day.[79]
In August 2013, it was revealed that the UK government is leading
negotiations to sell Bahrain a reported 12 Eurofighter Typhoons
worth around £1billion. Lord Astor's trip was followed by
a series of high-level meetings. General Mayall visited Bahrain
on 14th February and met with the Crown Prince, Foreign Minister,
BDF Commander-in-Chief and Sheikh Nasser, Royal Guards Commander.[80]
On 9th March, the outgoing Chief of Staff of the British Army
met with the BDF Commander-in-Chief.[81]
On 19th March, UKTI DSO's Senior Military Advisor met with the
BDF Commander-in-Chief and a Defence Minister.[82]
On April 29th the Head of UKTI DSO was in Bahrain to meet the
Minister for Defence Affairs.[83]
On May 12th, a UK Defence Minister, the British Chief-of-Staff
and Prince Andrew attended a reception held by King Hamad in London.[84]
32. During this period, Bahraini
delegations were invited to two British trade expos. In March,
a Bahraini delegation attended the Home Office run "Security
and Policing" expo. BAE Systems were introduced to the delegation
and the firm "outlined its cyber defence capabilities".[85]
In April, Sheikh Nasser was amongst the delegates at the Counter
Terror Expo.[86] Sheikh
Nasser is accused of having "personally engaged" in
torture in 2011 and heading "a punitive campaign to repress
Bahraini athletes who had demonstrated their support [for] the
peaceful pro-democracy movement".[87]
His attendance at the arms fair and high-level meetings with British
defence officials are therefore a cause of concern.
33. King Hamad met with the Prime
Minister in Downing Street on 6th August. Bahrain state media
revealed that the King expressed "Bahrain's keenness to purchase
the British Typhoon warplanes". King Hamad returned to London
in September, the week before the DSEi arms fair. Defence Secretary
Philip Hammond met him at his private residence. They reportedly
discussed the Typhoon deal. King Hamad also made Defence Minister
Lord Astor and former UKTI Special Representative Prince Andrew.[88]
34. A delegation from Bahrain attended
DSEi as guests of UKTI DSO.[89]
DSEi hosted several arms companies whose tear gas has been used
in Bahrain since 2011, including Non-Lethal Technologies, Condor
Technologies and Rheinmetall. Benelli, whose shotguns are used
by the Bahrain police, and Less Lethal Africa, who have reportedly
supplied Bahrain with rubber bullets, also exhibited at DSEi.[90]
During DSEI, UK firm BMT revealed that it has entered a partnership
with Turkish shipyard Ares to supply boats to Bahrain's Coast
Guard.[91]
35. UKTI are currently actively
promoting their presence at the 2014 Bahrain International Airshow
in January, where they will have their own chalet. UKTI is also
offering to help British firms "win business in this market".[92]
The 2014 airshow is being organised by UK firm Farnborough International
and includes a "Security and Surveillance Pavillion".[93]
Written evidence from
the UK Working Group on Arms (UKWG) (AEC0007)
Introduction
1. On 2 April 2013 the UN General Assembly adopted
the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). This was a major achievement, the
culmination of many years hard work, and the UK is to be congratulated
for the leadership it has shown throughout the ATT process. Since
the ATT opened for signature on 3 June, progress has been remarkable.
In four months, 113 states have signed and seven have ratified
the Treaty. If this momentum can be maintained, the UK Working
Group on Arms (UKWG)[94]
estimates that the Treaty could enter into force by the end of
2014.
2. This momentum is far from guaranteed, however,
and the UK still has an important leadership role to play in terms
of both encouraging other States to sign and ratify and assisting
effective Treaty implementation by countries with less resources
and/or less-developed arms transfer control systems. The second
of these roles will be relatively resource-intensive and we urge
the Government to prioritise funding for this work. We also encourage
the Government to consider the ATT with regard to other policy
decisions that are related to arms transfer; for example invitations
to Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEi) arms fairs
should not be extended to States or exhibitors from States that
do not support the ATT.
3. With regard to UK Government policy or practice
at the national level, there have been several areas of concern
over the last year. These include:
· The
role played by the UK in the changes to the EU arms embargo on
Syria, and the subsequent ambiguous approach to arming Syrian
groups opposed to the Assad Government;
· The
apparent lack of lessons-learned by the UK following the 2011
Arab Spring, in particular, but not exclusively, with regard to
arms exports to Egypt;
· The
weaknesses in the new licence-suspension mechanism;
· A
U-turn on plans to improve transparency on arms exported under
open licences, in spite of the defence industry appearing comfortable
with the proposed regime;
· An
ongoing and longstanding failure to prevent exhibitors at DSEi
from breaking export control law;
· A
failure to follow-through on previous commitments relating to
indirect financial support for cluster munitions and to end-user
controls on equipment for use in torture or for use in carrying
out the death penalty.
4. This memorandum also examines problems at the
EU level, such as:
· Confusing
messages from the EU (and consequently from the UK) about the
supply to Egypt of items that could be used for internal repression;
· A
lack of transparency with regard to the EU Common Position review
and a possible failure to honour all the commitments expressed
in EU Council conclusions regarding the scope of the review.
Recommendations
Syria
5. The UKWG urges the UK Government to prevent and
avoid any action which would contribute to the escalation of the
continuing conflict in Syria.
6. In keeping with the relevant arms transfer control
statutes of both the UK and the EU - particularly Export Control
Act 2002 and the EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP - the UK should
continue its current stance of not providing lethal equipment
to any warring party in Syria, especially explosive weapons, which
have been used by all parties to the conflict in densely populated
areas with horrific effects upon non-combatants.
7. The Government should provide complete and transparent
answers to Sir John Stanley's queries regarding the provision
of export licences for dual-use chemicals to Syria.
The Arab Spring and the UK policy review
8. The UK Government should demonstrably shift the
balance of export licensing risk assessment from a reactive to
a proactive process.
9. The UK Government should ensure that any rhetorical
or substantive support for the UK defence industry is located
unambiguously within a restrictive approach to arms transfers.
10. The UK Government should identify which licences
for exports to Egypt it has revoked/suspended and explain the
rationale for those revocations/suspensions; list extant licences
and explain why it saw fit to issue the since-revoked/suspended
licences in the first place.
11. The UK Government should explain in detail its
licensing policy for exports to Egypt before the recent increase
in violence and how it has since changed.
12. The UK Government should clarify in detail the
difference between the current policy for licensing arms transfers
to Egypt and the standard application of the Consolidated Criteria.
13. The UK Government should expand the UK Military
List, and push for changes to the EU Military List, so as to ensure
that any military or security equipment which might be used for
internal repression is specified as such and fully controlled.
14. The UK Government should establish unilaterally
in the first instance, and then with EU partners a comprehensive
list of equipment currently included in the Military List categorised
as most at risk of being used for internal repression, so as to
thereby giving greater substantive meaning to any future EU decision
to suspend or revoke licences for items that might be used for
internal repression.
Export policy toward the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA)
15. The Government should explain whether and how
its arms transfer licensing policy for the MENA region has changed
since the beginning of the Arab Spring and how it is consistent
with its assessments of conflict risk and with its Building Stability
Overseas Strategy.
Export licence suspension mechanism
16. To be effective, the Government must significantly
enhance and expand its license suspension process to capture all
stages of the arms transfer process. As well as current licence
applications, the suspension must also apply to all extant licences
and deliveries pending.
17. The Government should outline its criteria and
the threshold for invoking the suspension process. This should
include information about the sources and types of information
used in making an assessment and how a judgement is made as to
whether a particular country is experiencing a sharp deterioration
in security or stability.
18. The CAEC should ask the Government to explain
how relevant Government departments are co-ordinated when a decision
is taken to invoke the suspension mechanism, and in particular
what systems are in place to co-ordinate export licensing with
HMRC who remain responsible for oversight of all physical exports
leaving UK territory.
19. The CAEC should investigate why, despite serious
deteriorations in security in Mali in March 2012, the Government
has so far only used the suspension mechanism once (in August
2013) in response to the current security crisis in Egypt.
Transparency initiative reversal
20. The Government should reinstate its original
plans to provide substantive information on transfers made under
open licences, in line with the Conclusions that arose from the
Review of Transparency in Export Licensing of July 2012.
21. The Government should also give a full explanation
of how, why and when it made the decision to renege on its undertaking
to provide substantive information on transfers made under open
licences. It should give a full account of why this decision was
taken in light of previous statements made by the Secretary of
State concerning the need for, and benefits of, greater transparency
in export licensing, along with a generally supportive defence
industry.
22. The Government should explain why each of the
21 separate OGELs listed in Notice to Exporters 2013/18
have been exempted from the new reporting requirements.
23. The Government should set out a timetable for
providing additional information in relation to SIELs - including
specific information on the nature of the end-user - in the Quarterly
and Annual Reports. The Government should confirm that this information
will be such as to provide a meaningful level of information and
that it will go well beyond generic descriptions such as "government",
"military" or "industry".
24. The Government should also give an account of
its further deliberations on the matter of the proposed Independent
Reviewer to look into the operation of the licensing system and
should further consult with parliament, the public and industry
on this important issue.
EU Common Position review
25. The UK Government should persuade EU Member States
to publish the provisional result of the reviews of Criteria 7
and 8 without further delay or, if that is not possible, to publish
the new guidance unilaterally.
26. The UK Government should insist that, as required
by the November 2012 Council Conclusions on the review of Council
Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, all other criteria are reviewed,
preferably starting with Criteria 2, 3 and 4.
27. The UK Government should encourage Member States
to consult externally on the development of further guidance in
the application and interpretation of the Common Position Criteria,
including through publication of interim findings. If this is
not possible then the UK Government should itself hold consultations
at the national level and incorporate the substance of these consultations
into its discussions with other Member States.
28. The UK Government should treat the development
and introduction of the online information-sharing EU database
as a matter of urgency; ensure that its design allows for amendment
into the future; and promote greater information sharing on specific
licences approved.
The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
29. The UK should make the strongest possible interpretative
statement upon ratifying the Treaty, for example, making it clear
that the UK will continue to regulate a comprehensive list of
arms, equipment and munitions beyond the minimum scope allowed
by the Treaty and calling on other States Parties to do likewise.
30. The Government should work proactively to ensure
that as many States as possible are able to quickly sign, ratify
and begin to properly implement the Treaty by providing assistance
bilaterally, and through regional and global organisations, and
by offering technical and legal assistance to all state signatories
that may need it. In addition, the UK should be a significant
donor for ATT implementation purposes, and should encourage other
States to be likewise.
31. The Government should ensure that participation
at DSEi or in co-production agreements with UK companies is dependent
on whether the State concerned has signed the ATT; a country's
ATT-status should be one of the most important factors making
up assessments under criteria 1 ('international obligations')
of the National Consolidated Criteria, and for a country's inclusion
in OGELs.
32. The UKWG encourages the CAEC, and indeed all
UK Parliamentarians, to use every opportunity to raise the ATT
with counterparts in other countries, to make offers of assistance
to other Parliaments regarding the role of Parliamentarians in
the ratification process, in preparing any necessary implementing
legislation and in scrutinising national implementation of the
Treaty once it enters into force.
DSEi attendance and trade promotion
33. The UK Government should ensure that companies
based in countries that have not signed the ATT are not able to
exhibit at a UK arms fair nor should they be invited as an official
delegation.
34. All open general licences issues to allow companies
to automatically participate at future DSEi exhibitions should
be amended to explicitly exclude those companies originating from
non ATT signatory states.
35. The Government should not officially invite delegations
from any country named as a country of most serious Human Rights
concern in the FCO's Human Rights and Democracy Report.
Trade fairs and advertising activities
36. The UK Government should investigate, with a
view to prosecuting, all companies involved in potential breaches
of UK trade control regulations at trade fairs, and publish without
delay the results of any investigations.
37. Given repeated breaches of UK trade control regulations
at UK trade events, the UK Government should put in place more
robust procedures to prevent further breaches, including a compulsory
ban on any future activity (incl. trade fair attendance) in the
UK for a company found to be promoting prohibited equipment.
38. Given the clear and repeated failure of Clarion
to enforce the contractual obligations of exhibitors at the DSEi
trade events, the Memorandum of Understanding between Clarion
and the Export Control Organisation should be scrutinised by the
CAEC.
39. Given the clear and repeated failure of Clarion
and HM Revenue and Customs to adequately manage the compliance
of companies attending the DSEi trade event, all companies should
in future be required to submit all of their promotional literature
to organisers/HMG for approval in advance of the fair.
40. Any state that has not signed and ratified the
Cluster Munitions Convention, and any company that has not signed
a written guarantee that they (or any subsidiary or partner) do
not produce cluster munitions or their components, should be prohibited
from attending any trade event in the UK.
Cluster munitions and financing
41. We urge the Government to honour commitments
made to end indirect financial support for cluster munitions and
initiate a thorough and inclusive consultation process aimed at
providing guidance to financial institutions on disinvesting from
cluster munitions. As a first step, we urge the UK Government
to set up a multi-stakeholder meeting between relevant industry,
NGOs and Government representatives to initiate work on this area.
Torture and end-use
42. The UK Government should reverse its decision
to abandon the introduction of new end-user controls on equipment
for use in torture or for use in carrying out the death penalty.
3D printing
43. The UKWG is concerned about the advent of 3D
printing technology and its implications for strategic export
controls. We therefore urge the CAEC to raise this issue with
the Government and to ask what action the UK is taking at international
level to develop a clear and concerted response to this issue.
Syria
44. The civil war in Syria continues unabated. Over
100,000 Syrians have died as a result of the war,[95]
while over 7 million have been forced to flee their homes, with
2 million becoming refugees in neighbouring countries.[96]
The number of deaths and of refugees has climbed as the fighting
has intensified and spread. The conflict has been fuelled by transfers
of arms, munitions and ammunition from Russia and Iran to the
Government of Syria, and reportedly by transfers of arms to armed
opposition groups from a number of sources including Croatia,
Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan and Turkey, financed by Qatar and
Saudi Arabia, and supported by several intelligence agencies.[97]
45. The UKWG is pleased that, with effect from 6
September, the Government established national controls on the
export of equipment to Syria which could be used for internal
repression (see paragraph 63 below).[98]
However, the reason this change was necessary was that three months
previously the UK, along with France, changed the terms of the
EU embargo on Syria to allow arms exports to the opposition. The
UKWG is concerned at the UK Government's role in the loosening
of the embargo, and has concluded that the actual supply of arms
to any of the warring parties would be very hard to justify under
existing UK and EU legislation. A Saferworld/Oxfam report entitled
Arms for Syria? concludes:
Ultimately it is for governments to demonstrate that
they can satisfy the demands of national arms transfer control
requirements, of EU law, of UN Security Council resolutions, of
international humanitarian law, and customary international law
before any arms transfers take place.
The balance of available information on the situation
in Syria, when considered alongside Member States' legal responsibility
to apply certain restrictive criteria when deciding whether to
transfer arms to opposition groups in Syria, indicate a number
of serious obstacles which 14 governments would need to overcome
before proceeding with any supply. Serious doubts arise, under
both EU law and international law more generally, as to the legality
of supplying arms to any warring party in Syria. The onus for
showing that safeguards can and will be put in place to allay
the concerns which arise lies very firmly with those who propose
to supply arms. However, given the fluid and evolving situation
on the ground in Syria and the fractured nature of the opposition,
there is reason to doubt the likely efficacy of any safeguards
that might be put in place to prevent misuse or diversion.
[99]
46. Current international concern focuses on the
use of chemical weapons in contravention of the Syrian Government's
obligations under, inter alia, the 1925 Geneva Protocol
and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. However, there are also significant
concerns with regard to the use of conventional arms by all parties
to the conflict in contravention of international humanitarian
law and human rights law, as well as customary international law
and international norms concerning the protection of civilians,
including the use of cluster munitions and incendiary weapons.[100]
47. In the context of the chemical attacks in Syria
in August and the international crisis which followed, the UKWG
notes the exchange between Sir John Stanley and the Government
over the licences granted for the export of items covered by the
Australia Group Common Control Lists to Syria over the last decade.[101]
We understand the Government is compiling a detailed response
to Sir John, which we hope will clarify the nature of these exports.
Given the sensitivities of these exports, we would urge the government
to demonstrate to the CAEC how it applied the Australia Group's
detailed licensing risk assessment guidance in these particular
cases.
Recommendations
48. The UKWG urges the UK Government to prevent
and avoid any action which would contribute to the escalation
of the continuing conflict in Syria.
49. In keeping with the relevant arms transfer
control statutes of both the UK and the EU - particularly Export
Control Act 2002 and the EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP - the
UK should continue its current stance of not providing lethal
equipment to any warring party in Syria, especially explosive
weapons, which have been used by all parties to the conflict in
densely populated areas with horrific effects upon non-combatants.[102]
50. The Government should provide complete and
transparent answers to Sir John Stanley's queries regarding the
provision of export licences for dual-use chemicals to Syria.
The Arab Spring and the UK policy review
51. On 13th October 2012, Foreign Secretary William
Hague announced the outcome of the Government's review of the
UK arms transfer control system in light of events in the Middle
East and North Africa. Despite claims that review has led to more
robust procedures,[103]
the UKWG has seen little evidence of an impact on actual decision-making.
Moreover, there still appears a tendency for the Government to
react to events after they have happened rather than to evaluate
risks ahead of time, while undertakings to improve transparency
in strategic exports have been abandoned (see paragraphs 87-100
below).
52. The Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control
(2013) Report by the Committees on Arms Export Controls[104]
(the 2013 CAEC report[105])
recorded that in 2012 the Government issued over £12 billion
worth of standard individual export licences (SIELs) to the 27
countries identified as of most concern in the Foreign & Commonwealth
Office's (FCO) 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report along with
five other countries that the CAEC identified as problematic on
human rights grounds but which were not referenced in the FCO's
report.[106] Eight
countries from the FCO's list are from the MENA region (Iran,
Iraq, Israel, Libya, the Palestinian controlled territories, Saudi
Arabia, Syria and Yemen); a further three MENA countries (Bahrain,
Egypt and Tunisia) were identified by the CAEC in their 2013 report
as problematic. In addition, many open licences—open general
export licences (OGELs) and open individual export licences (OIELS)
which place no upper limit on quantities/values of arms that can
be delivered — were also issued for transfers to these countries.
53. The UKWG is not arguing that all of these
licences are problematic (e.g. most of the licences, by value,
for transfers to Iran are for components for civilian aircraft),
however this data suggests little has changed in terms of UK licensing
practice as a consequence of the Arab Spring or subsequent transfer
control reviews (see paragraphs 75-78 below).
54. The recent publication and launch of Securing
prosperity: A strategic vision for the UK defence sector[107]
by the Defence Growth Partnership makes it clear that Government,
from the Prime Minister down, sees defence manufacture and export
as a "key sector of the economy … a vital driver of
opportunity and employment all over the country"[108]
and intimately connected to "deliver[ing] a long-term strategic
vision to maintain our position on the leader board".[109]
55. When all of the above is considered in the context
of some of the delegations and exhibitors invited to the Defence
and Security Equipment International (DSEi) arms fair held from
15 to 18 September in London (see paragraphs 126-132 below), the
UKWG is concerned that the Government may be sending the wrong
signals about its priorities, i.e. that perceived economic gain
can take precedence over existing risks including those identified
in the national Consolidated Criteria[110].
Egypt
56. Licensing policy with regard to Egypt provides
an interesting test case.
57. The 2013 CAEC Report recorded that for export
licences to Egypt there were extant at the time the Report was
published 88 SIELs worth £59,073,314 and 47 OIELs.
58. On 19 July, the Government announced that "in
light of recent events which have led to deaths of civilians"
they had revoked five extant SIELs for Egypt.[111]
On 23 August, in accordance with a 21 August decision of the EU
Foreign Affairs Council,[112]
the Government announced it was suspending export licensing for
Egypt of any equipment which might be used for internal repression—equipment
which is not included in the UK Strategic Export Control Lists[113].
One week later, the Government declared that it had suspended
48 licences for Egypt and added Egypt to the list of non-permitted
destinations on four OGELs.[114]
59. The Government has presented this as an appropriate
and timely response to the deteriorating domestic security situation
in Egypt, but we disagree with this assessment.
60. In 2011, the Government argued that it could
not have been expected to anticipate the Arab Spring and that
rather than being criticised it should be commended for responding
rapidly—by revoking over 150 licences for exports to a range
of countries (including approximately 56 licences for exports
to Egypt)—as circumstances changed. Regardless of whether
this defence was valid in 2011—and the CAEC and others,
including the UKWG, took issue with it at the time—it surely
is not in 2013. We hoped that the Arab Spring would have functioned
as a wake-up call on export licensing policy to the region (and
indeed more broadly), yet only two years later the exact same
pattern is being repeated. The UK Government has shown little
capacity to evaluate risk in advance (as required by the Consolidated
Criteria) but instead is once again playing catch-up, firstly
by revoking five licences, and then nine days later by suspending
48 licences, with the Government also "considering whether
further extant licences should be revoked".[115]
[Using the figures in the CAEC report as a base, there are likely
to be approximately 80 still-valid licences for exports to Egypt.]
61. In order to help external stakeholders better
understand it's actions, the Government should identify which
licences it has revoked or suspended, explain why such decisions
were taken for those but not for other licences, list extant licences,
and explain why it saw fit to issue all of the revoked/suspended
licences in the first place.
Equipment for internal repression
62. While the 21 August EU Council conclusions on
Egypt might also be seen as an attempt (this time with EU partners)
to correct previous licensing mistakes, a closer look at the details
of these conclusions raises serious questions about the expected
impact of the instruction to "suspend export licenses to
Egypt of any equipment which might be used for internal repression".
63. For situations where "restrictive measures"
(such as arms embargoes) apply, the EU has developed an additional
list of equipment that might be used for internal repression that
goes beyond the standard EU Common Military List.[116]
Equipment on this additional list includes, for example, bombs
and grenades not controlled by the Common Military List, and vehicles
specifically designed to deploy mobile barriers. Before the EU
embargo on Syria was amended in May (by way of Council Decision
2013/255/CFSP) this additional list was in operation (see Annex
I of Council Regulation 36/2012[117]),
meaning that a licence for export of these items to Syria was
required.[118] Once
the embargo was relaxed, however, the items on this additional
list were no longer subject to licensing control. The UK Government
has since introduced new legislation (Export Control (Syria Sanctions)
Order 2013, entry-into-force 6 September 2013[119])
which includes a list of items that could be used for internal
repression so as to ensure that such goods cannot be exported
to Syria from the UK without first being subject to a licensing
procedure (for more on the Syrian case see paragraphs 44-50 above).
64. In the case of Egypt, since no "restrictive
measures" were in force at the EU level, licences for the
export of items on the EU's additional list of equipment that
might be used for internal repression have never been required
(note that EU Member States could have added such items to their
national control lists, however the UKWG is not aware of any Member
State having done so). With no pre-existing EU requirement for
licences, the Council conclusions instruction to "suspend
export licences to Egypt of any equipment which might be used
for internal repression" is rendered effectively meaningless,
as there would be no licences to suspend.[120]
The conclusions could even be seen as disingenuous, in that they
give an impression of action when the substantive impact is negligible.
With regard to the UK specifically, although the Government has
accepted, in the case of Syria, that non-Military List items could
be used for internal repression and should therefore be subject
to licensing controls, it is notable that a comparable measure
has not been introduce regarding exports to Egypt.
65. The UKWG understands from conversations with
Government officials that for exports to Egypt of items that are
on the Military List, decisions on whether they might be used
for internal repression are based on factors such as the precise
nature of the equipment and the identity of the end-user. Since
these are considerations that routinely apply in standard export
licensing, this suggests that the Government has not adopted any
special provisions with regard to licensing the transfer of arms
to Egypt, even in the wake of the heightened levels of violence
and instability of the past three months.[121]
It would thus be helpful if the Government could clarify in detail
the difference between the current policy for licensing arms transfers
to Egypt and the standard application of the Consolidated Criteria.
The UKWG believes that the Government should apply the same rules
to Egypt regarding non-Military List items which might be used
for internal repression as are currently applied with regard to
Syria.
66. It should be noted that this is an issue that
has wider application than Egypt: the Government having recognised
this equipment as particularly relevant to, and at risk of, being
used for internal repression, the UKWG believes it should be fully
controlled and so added to the UK Military List without delay,
and that the matter should be raised with EU partners with a view
to similarly extending the EU Common Military List. Furthermore,
the Government should set out a specific list of equipment currently
included in the UK Military List which can be categorised as at
risk of being used for internal repression and advocate for a
similar undertaking at the EU level so as to give meaning to any
Council decision that makes reference to this issue in the future.
67. Finally, the UKWG believes that there are additional
items which could be used for internal repression and which should
also be incorporated within the UK and EU lists. This equipment
includes, but is not limited to: handcuffs and other restraints;
law enforcement striking weapons (including saps, police batons,
side-handle batons, tonfas, sjamboks, and whips); protective equipment
such as police helmets and anti-riot suits, and parts thereof;
directed-energy systems including optical devices and laser dazzlers,
microwave and millimetre wave devices; biometric devices used
for border control, security or policing (including iris or retina
recognition, face recognition, voice recognition, gait or body
feature recognition, behaviour recognition); and telecommunications
monitoring equipment. Provision of training in this equipment
should also be subject to control. The UKWG would welcome a discussion
with the UK Government in this regard.
Recommendations
68. The UK Government should demonstrably shift
the balance of export licensing risk assessment from a reactive
to a proactive process.
69. The UK Government should ensure that any rhetorical
or substantive support for the UK defence industry is located
unambiguously within a restrictive approach to arms transfers.
70. The UK Government should identify which licences
for exports to Egypt it has revoked/suspended and explain the
rationale for those revocations/suspensions; list extant licences
and explain why it saw fit to issue the since-revoked/suspended
licences in the first place.
71.
The UK Government should explain in detail its licensing policy
for exports to Egypt before the recent increase in violence and
how it has since changed.
72. The UK Government should clarify in detail
the difference between the current policy for licensing arms transfers
to Egypt and the standard application of the Consolidated Criteria.
73. The UK Government should expand the UK Military
List, and push for changes to the EU Military List, so as to ensure
that any military or security equipment which might be used for
internal repression is specified as such and fully controlled.
74. The UK Government should establish unilaterally
in the first instance, and then with EU partners a comprehensive
list of equipment currently included in the Military List categorised
as most at risk of being used for internal repression, so as to
thereby giving greater substantive meaning to any future EU decision
to suspend or revoke licences for items that might be used for
internal repression.
Export policy toward the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA)
75. As highlighted above, and according to the UK's
most recent reports on Strategic Exports, the Government's export
policy across Middle East and North Africa (MENA) appears to have
undergone little change since the Arab Spring of 2010-11.[122]
Indeed, far from having been disturbed by the turmoil that affected
the entire region, the number and value of UK strategic export
licences granted to countries such as Bahrain, Egypt, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) actually rose
overall between 2008 and 2012: from 615 licences (547 SIELs and
68 OIELs) granted and 5 refused in 2008, to 1076 licences (968
SIELs and 108 OIELs) granted and 22 refused in 2012.[123]
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the UK Government granted 99 SIELs
for arms exports worth £105.8 million in 2008, rising to
206 SIEL applications worth £1,750 billion in 2011, when
regional unrest had reached unprecedented levels. Moreover in
the case of Egypt, after dipping from £23.4 million worth
of SIELs granted in 2008 to £7.7 million in 2011, this increased
again to £18.8 million in 2012. As a proportion of the number
of total UK export licences granted, licences to the MENA region
increased from 9.5 per cent in 2008 to 30 per cent in 2012.[124]
By value, well over half of all UK arms exports for 2012 were
to the Middle East.[125]
76. This would seem problematic for at least two
reasons. Firstly there is the risk of arms being used for internal
repression. This has received considerable attention, to the point
that the Government is now at least more willing to acknowledge
the extent of this risk. Secondly, the overall security environment
of the region has become extremely fraught over the last two years.
Indeed, the conflict in Syria is widely regarded as having pushed
the Middle East considerably closer to a major regional conflict,
with other MENA states and actors seeking to advance their interests
by supporting different parties to the Syrian conflict.[126]
As well as internal Syrian dynamics, the Sunni-Shia divide, the
Arab Israeli conflict and the influence of Al Qaida-affiliated
actors are all relevant here. Given the heightened risk of all-out
regional conflict we would expect the UK Government to have tightened
its approach to exporting arms into the Middle East. However,
as highlighted above, the region continues to be a critical UK
export market, with indications that this is seen in some quarters
as more of a marketing opportunity than a reason for greater restraint
(see, for example, paragraphs 126-132 below).
77. It would be useful if the Government could provide
the CAEC with its assessment of the risk of a broader conflict
in the Middle East and how this has changed over the last two
years, while explaining the impact this broader security situation
in MENA has had on its assessment of risk for prospective arms
supplies to MENA states, including specific examples of licence
applications granted or refused. It would also be helpful if the
Government could explain how its arms transfer policies for the
region are consistent with its objectives with regard to upstream
conflict prevention as set out in its Building Stability Overseas
Strategy.[127]
Recommendation
78. The Government should explain whether and
how its arms transfer licensing policy for the MENA region has
changed since the beginning of the Arab Spring and how it is consistent
with its assessments of conflict risk and with its Building Stability
Overseas Strategy.
Export licence suspension mechanism
79. As part of a package of changes proposed in the
framework of the post-Arab Spring review of the UK defence and
security export policy, the Foreign Secretary announced a new
procedure to:
Allow immediate licensing suspension to countries
experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability. Applications
in the pipeline would be stopped and no further licenses issued,
pending Ministerial or departmental review.[128]
80. The UKWG initially welcomed this initiative,
as it could enhance the UK's export control system's capacity
to respond more quickly to quickly changing circumstances by placing
an immediate freeze on arms transfers that risk exacerbating instability;
this would be especially useful in situations where the rapidly
changing circumstances in the recipient country prevented adequate
risk assessments from taking place.
81. However, in follow up discussions with officials,
it is now clear that in its current form the suspension mechanism
is not fit for purpose and requires radical overhaul. The fundamental
flaw in the system is that it seems only to apply to new and pending
license applications and not to extant export licences. This means
that in situations where the Government has decided that an unfolding
crisis makes it impossible to make a meaningful assessment of
new license applications, existing licences could nevertheless
continue to be honoured. For example, in a situation where the
Government has decided to suspend license applications to a country's
internal security units due to immediate concerns about the use
of equipment in internal repression in a rapidly unfolding crisis,
licences already granted to those same units would still be valid
and transfers could continue. For the suspension mechanism to
be meaningful, it must clearly apply to the whole arms transfer
process and so must place an immediate freeze on all arms transfers,
including all extant licences and any pending shipments due to
take place.
82. The UKWG is also unclear about how the suspension
mechanism is triggered and the thresholds that are used when deciding
to apply it. For example, despite the rapidly unfolding conflict
and deteriorating security situation that took place in Mali in
March 2012, the suspension mechanism appears to have not been
used. In fact, to date, as far as the UKWG understands, it has
only been used in response to the very serious situation in Egypt
in August 2013.[129]
This suggests that the threshold that triggers the suspension
mechanism has been set at a very high level, once armed conflict
and instability have already reached crisis point; it therefore
does not serve as the flexible response to rapidly developing
and unfolding situations that we had expected.
Recommendations:
83. To be effective, the Government must significantly
enhance and expand its license suspension process to capture all
stages of the arms transfer process. As well as current licence
applications, the suspension must also apply to all extant licences
and deliveries pending.
84. The Government should outline its criteria
and the threshold for invoking the suspension process. This should
include information about the sources and types of information
used in making an assessment and how a judgement is made as to
whether a particular country is experiencing a sharp deterioration
in security or stability.
85. The CAEC should ask the Government to explain
how relevant Government departments are co-ordinated when a decision
is taken to invoke the suspension mechanism, and in particular
what systems are in place to co-ordinate export licensing with
HMRC who remain responsible for oversight of all physical exports
leaving UK territory.
86. The CAEC should investigate why, despite serious
deteriorations in security in Mali in March 2012, the Government
has so far only used the suspension mechanism once (in August
2013) in response to the current security crisis in Egypt.
Transparency initiative reversal
87. It was with alarm and dismay that the members
of the UKWG read the 31 July 2013 Notice to Exporters 2013/18:
Important Changes to the Strategic Export Control Transparency
Initiative,[130]
in which the UK Government announced a decision to roll back from
a number of significant commitments it had previously made in
the field of transparency in export licensing in response to the
events in the Middle East and North Africa.[131]
There had been little warning given of this decision other than
Notice to Exporters 2013/14 of 15 May[132]
which announced the postponement by three months - to July 2013
- of the implementation of the proposed changes, and an oblique
reference in Parliament by the Secretary of State for Business,
Innovation and Skills (BIS) to a decision to "dispense with
some procedures relating to quarterly reporting".[133]
Moreover, in a face-to-face meeting between Government officials
and the UKWG on 11 July 2013, officials confirmed that the implementation
of the Conclusions of the Transparency Initiative[134]
was proceeding as planned.
88. In his Written Ministerial Statement to Parliament
of 13 July 2012[135]
the Business Secretary asserted the following:
Public confidence in the workings of the export licensing
system is crucial. These measures will result in a significant
increase in the amount and quality of information that the Government
makes public about controlled exports. This will enable the public
and Parliament to more effectively hold the Government to account
in this important and sensitive area.
89. One year after this statement however, without
warning, the Government announced it was abandoning plans to require
exporters to report quarterly on the volume or value of transactions
under Open General and Open Individual licences, whether according
to Control List classification or by giving a description of the
items exported. Instead, exporters will merely be required to
report, annually, on the number of times they have used an open
licence, giving the country of destination and type of end-user.[136]
This continuing failure to provide information on the volume or
value of UK exports of controlled goods under specific open licences
means that Parliament and the public will continue to be deprived
of access to key information on arms transfers that the UK Government
was, until recently, prepared to collect and disclose. Moreover,
it is difficult to understand why the Government itself no longer
wishes exporters to provide regular information relating to exports
and transfers under open licences when timely access to such information
could assist the Government in making informed decisions on future
licence applications.
90. The Government justifies its decision to significantly
scale back reporting under open licences on the grounds that "[m]any
companies have expressed concerns that this would place an unacceptable
administrative burden on exporters".[137]
However this is at odds with the published feedback from companies,
communicated as follows in the Conclusions following the Review
of Transparency in Export Licensing of July 2012: "Exporters
generally accept the rationale for this initiative and are generally
supportive provided that the administrative burden is kept to
a minimum and that what they consider to be truly sensitive information
is protected".[138]
This gives the clear impression that exporters' concerns could
be handled appropriately and that the majority had accepted the
proposals advanced by BIS. Indeed it is worth noting that exporting
companies are already required to keep records of transfers made
under open licences, so they already have this data available;
the question would be one of packaging and delivery of this information
to BIS.
91. In light of this turnaround, serious questions
must be asked as regards the process that resulted in the decision
to abandon so much of the proposed changes, particularly given
the published responses from the defence industry and that significant
time and resources were clearly expended within Government in
order to deliver greater transparency.
92. Also in the Notice to Exporters 2013/18 the
Government lists 21 separate OGELs that will be exempted from
the new reporting requirements. Given that some of the licences
relate to military and dual-use goods it will be important that
the UK Government explains why the different licences listed have
been exempted from the few additional reporting requirements that
have survived.
93. Beyond the issue of reporting under open licences
there has been little concrete information provided in recent
months concerning the fate of the other proposals set out in the
BIS transparency initiative. Of particular concern is the apparent
lack of progress in providing additional information from SIELs,
such as the nature of the end-user, in the Quarterly and Annual
Reports. In the initial announcement of the BIS transparency review
on 7 February 2012 the Secretary of State made the assertion that
because export licence applications are currently made in confidence
this makes it difficult to make additional information available
in the Quarterly and Annual reports but that the Government was
exploring ways of rectifying this.[139]
Thirteen months later, the notice to exporters of March 2013 refers
only to the possibility of making additional information from
SIELs available "under the Freedom of Information Act (FoIA)
2000" with no mention of the provision of such information
through the Quarterly or Annual reports.[140]
94. The UKWG has long argued that additional licensing
information, such as that identifying the type of end user, is
essential to allowing informed scrutiny of arms transfer policy
and practice on the part of Parliament and the public. It is therefore
to be hoped that the UK Government is not also intending to back-track
on this commitment.
95. In addition, there has been no mention of the
fate of the proposal concerning the possibility to appoint an
Independent Reviewer to look into the operation of the licensing
system since the Written Ministerial Statement of 13 July 2012[141]
that pledged to return to the matter at a later date and the Government's
Conclusions following the Review of Transparency in Export Licensing
of July 2012[142] that
stated it would "conduct further research into the 'Independent
Reviewer' role". As we noted in our 2012 Memorandum to the
CAEC, given the recent experience of the Arab Spring the UKWG
believes that an independent reviewer could play a key role in
assisting in the identification of potential problems within and
lessons learned for the transfer licensing system, thereby enabling
the UK's systems to develop over time in anticipation of, as well
as in response to, external developments.[143]
Recommendations
96. The Government should reinstate its original
plans to provide substantive information on transfers made under
open licences, in line with the Conclusions that arose from the
Review of Transparency in Export Licensing of July 2012.
97. The Government should also give a full explanation
of how, why and when it made the decision to renege on its undertaking
to provide substantive information on transfers made under open
licences. It should give a full account of why this decision was
taken in light of previous statements made by the Secretary of
State concerning the need for, and benefits of, greater transparency
in export licensing, along with a generally supportive defence
industry.
98. The Government should explain why each of
the 21 separate OGELs listed in Notice to Exporters 2013/18
have been exempted from the new reporting requirements.
99. The Government should set out a timetable
for providing additional information in relation to SIELs - including
specific information on the nature of the end-user - in the Quarterly
and Annual Reports. The Government should confirm that this information
will be such as to provide a meaningful level of information and
that it will go well beyond generic descriptions such as "government",
"military" or "industry".
100. The Government should also give an account
of its further deliberations on the matter of the proposed Independent
Reviewer to look into the operation of the licensing system and
should further consult with parliament, the public and industry
on this important issue.
EU Common Position review
101. In our November 2012 memorandum to the CAEC,
the UKWG set out a number of recommendations regarding the review
of the EU Common Position.[144]
These built on the November 2011 collaborative NGO report Lessons
from MENA: Appraising EU Transfers of Military and Security Equipment
to the Middle East and North Africa.[145]
The recommendations included: establishing a regularly-updated
list of 'countries of concern'; operating a policy of 'presumption
of denial' with regard to transfers to those states; and that
licensing decisions should be less dependent on assessing past
behaviour and instead take more account of future risk.
102. While we maintain that such changes should still
be implemented, this memorandum has a tighter focus in that it
looks at only those issues that Member States have themselves
decided should be subject to change, i.e. the review of two of
the criteria and improvements in information-sharing among Member
States.
103. On 19 November 2012 the EU Council adopted Council
conclusions on the review of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.[146]
The central 'conclusion' was that "the provisions of the
Common Position, and the instruments it provides for, continue
to properly serve the objectives set in 2008 and to provide a
solid basis for the co-ordination of Member States' arms export
policies". The Council did however recognise that "further
progress is achievable in the implementation of the Common Position
and in order to maximise convergence among Member States in the
field of exports of conventional arms."
104. On this basis the Council committed itself to
"the development of further guidance in the application and
interpretation of the eight export criteria of the Common Position,
the refinement of the information-exchange mechanism on specific
destinations, the improvement of the denial notification and consultation
mechanism" and noted that "the results of this second
stage of the review process will be reflected, inter alia,
in updates of the User's Guide accompanying the Common Position,
and providing detailed guidance for its implementation".
105. As with the first stage of the review, these
follow-up activities are being conducted behind closed doors,
an issue over which the UKWG has previously expressed its disappointment.
Furthermore, we understand that, contrary to the commitments expressed
in the Council conclusions, not all the Criteria are to be reviewed.
So far only Criteria 7 ('diversion') and 8 ('sustainable development')
are being reviewed, with the possibility that Criterion 2 (human
rights) will be next. The reasons for such a limited approach
are not clear; given the issues thrown up by the Arab Spring the
failure to review Criteria 3 ('internal situation') and 4 ('regional
peace and security') is particularly perplexing.
106. We have been informed that Member States have
provisionally agreed new guidance for Criteria 7 and 8 and that
the EU Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM)
has issued a revised User's Guide incorporating these changes,
with Member States expected to use the new guidance on a trial
basis.[147] It is,
however, open for further revision and no new version of the User's
Guide will be published until this new guidance is finalised.
107. The other main aspect to the second part of
the Common Position review, i.e. refinement of the information
exchange, denial notification and consultation mechanisms, is
apparently proceeding slowly, with Member States having different
ideas of what is desirable or even feasible.
108. The UKWG is frustrated by the pace of review,
but more fundamentally by the fact that civil society has been
unable to engage in any meaningful way with any aspect of the
whole Common Position review process, including the review of
Criteria 7 and 8. While we have been free to give our views, this
has been without a proper understanding of what Member States
have been willing to 'put on the table'; thus the possibility
for constructive discussion has not existed and our capacity to
make relevant contributions has been hampered. Even now the content
of the provisionally-completed Criteria review remains confidential,
though the rationale for this is unclear. Certainly it undermines
EU Member States' claims to a transparent system.
109. With regard to the information-sharing mechanisms,
we are pleased that Member States do seem finally convinced by
the arguments made for several years by the UKWG and other EU
NGOs and that they have decided to establish a real-time online
information-sharing database, though we are once again disappointed
by the time it is taking to complete this project. We understand
that as well as data on denials and consultations, Member States
are considering sharing information regarding specific destinations—though
it will be at the discretion of states as to whether and when
they choose to use the system in this way. Unfortunately, as far
as we know, the system will not provide for sharing information
on specific licence approvals; it has long been our contention
that as much can be learned from 'difficult' licensing decisions
that resulted in an approval as from denials. We thus continue
to encourage Member States to share information of this type and
hope that the system being developed will be able to easily accommodate
such changes in future.
Recommendations
110. The UK Government should persuade EU Member
States to publish the provisional result of the reviews of Criteria
7 and 8 without further delay or, if that is not possible, to
publish the new guidance unilaterally.
111. The UK Government should insist that, as
required by the November 2012 Council Conclusions on the review
of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, all other criteria are
reviewed, preferably starting with Criteria 2, 3 and 4.
112. The UK Government should encourage Member
States to consult externally on the development of further guidance
in the application and interpretation of the Common Position Criteria,
including through publication of interim findings. If this is
not possible then the UK Government should itself hold consultations
at the national level and incorporate the substance of these consultations
into its discussions with other Member States.
113. The UK Government should treat the development
and introduction of the online information-sharing EU database
as a matter of urgency; ensure that its design allows for amendment
into the future; and promote greater information sharing on specific
licences approved.
The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
114. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by overwhelming
vote by the UN General Assembly on 2 April 2013, 155 in favour,
22 abstentions and 3 votes against.[148]
This came after the final Diplomatic (negotiating) Conference
had failed to adopt the draft Treaty when Iran, Syria and North
Korea blocked consensus. However, by utilising a clause in the
Resolution that had mandated the final negotiations, a like-minded
group of supporter States, including the UK, were able to take
the draft Treaty text to the UN General Assembly for adoption
by vote. The UKWG notes that while the UK initially opposed the
relevant clause (OP7) in the Resolution, arguing against the Control
Arms Coalition and more progressive states who had proposed it,
they ultimately recognised the value of this inclusion and helped
to utilise it to secure the vote.
115. The ATT sets an important basis for global action
to control the international trade in conventional arms. It is
the first global legally binding instrument to control the arms
trade, and creates a new global norm against which States' practice
will be measured by other States and by international civil society.
It is not perfect, and civil society will continue to push for
robust interpretation of its provisions, and encourages the UK,
as a leader in this process, to ensure a very strong statement
upon depositing their instrument of ratification.
116. The ATT opened for signature on June 3, 2013,
and at the time of writing has been signed by 113 States including
the UK, and ratified by 7 States. The Treaty will enter into force
ninety days after the 50th ratification. Assuming that
the necessary EU procedural issues will soon be completed, EU
Member States are likely to be able to ratify in late 2013, in
which case entry-into-force could take place before the end of
2014. We welcome the fact that the UK has already commenced ratification
proceedings in anticipation of EU procedures being completed,
and urge the Government to maintain outreach to other States to
sign and ratify as soon as possible.
117. We particularly welcome the recent signature
by Senator John Kerry on behalf of the US, and recognise the contribution
by the UK government, as well as civil society campaigning, in
encouraging the US to sign. US signature is very significant given
their role as world's largest arms exporter, and is likely to
lead to other hesitant countries now joining the treaty.
118. It is now vital that the Government does everything
possible to strengthen the international norms embedded in the
Treaty. The UK should make the strongest possible interpretative
statement upon ratifying the Treaty, for example, making it clear
that the UK will continue to regulate a comprehensive list of
arms, equipment and munitions beyond the minimum scope allowed
by the Treaty and calling on other States Parties to do likewise.
119. It is widely acknowledged that many States will
require technical, legal and financial assistance to be able to
ratify and implement that ATT. For some the level of support required
will be significant. Before the Secretariat, envisaged in the
Treaty, comes into existence, providers of assistance will need
to carefully co-ordinate work between themselves to avoid duplication.
The UKWG urges the UK Government to work proactively to ensure
that as many States as possible are able to quickly sign, ratify
and begin to properly implement the Treaty. This assistance can
be provided bilaterally, and through regional and global organisations.
The UK Government should offer technical and legal assistance
to all States which may need it as they sign the Treaty. In addition,
the UK should be a significant donor for ATT implementation purposes,
and should encourage other States to be generous in this regard.
120. The Government should take other States attitude
toward the ATT into account in a range of arms-transfer related
activities. For example, participation at DSEi or in co-production
agreements with UK companies should be dependent on whether the
State concerned has signed the ATT (see paragraphs 126-132), while
a country's ATT-status should be one of the most important factors
making up assessments under criteria 1 ('international obligations')
of the National Consolidated Criteria. Eligibility for inclusion
among the eligible destinations on OGELs could be similarly dependent.
121. The UKWG also notes that Parliament has a role
to play in raising awareness among parliamentarians worldwide
of the Treaty and of what effective implementation will look like.
We encourage the CAEC, and indeed all UK Parliamentarians, to
use every opportunity to raise the ATT with counterparts in other
countries, to make offers of assistance to other Parliaments regarding
the role of Parliamentarians in the ratification process, in preparing
any necessary implementing legislation and in scrutinising national
implementation of the Treaty once it enters into force.
Recommendations
122. The UK should make the strongest possible
interpretative statement upon ratifying the Treaty, for example,
making it clear that the UK will continue to regulate a comprehensive
list of arms, equipment and munitions beyond the minimum scope
allowed by the Treaty and calling on other States Parties to do
likewise.
123. The Government should work proactively to
ensure that as many States as possible are able to quickly sign,
ratify and begin to properly implement the Treaty by providing
assistance bilaterally, and through regional and global organisations,
and by offering technical and legal assistance to all state signatories
that may need it. In addition, the UK should be a significant
donor for ATT implementation purposes, and should encourage other
States to be likewise.
124. The Government should ensure that participation
at DSEi or in co-production agreements with UK companies is dependent
on whether the State concerned has signed the ATT; a country's
ATT-status should be one of the most important factors making
up assessments under criteria 1 ('international obligations')
of the National Consolidated Criteria, and for a country's inclusion
in OGELs.
125. The UKWG encourages the CAEC, and indeed
all UK Parliamentarians, to use every opportunity to raise the
ATT with counterparts in other countries, to make offers of assistance
to other Parliaments regarding the role of Parliamentarians in
the ratification process, in preparing any necessary implementing
legislation and in scrutinising national implementation of the
Treaty once it enters into force.
DSEi attendance and trade promotion
126. The presence at DSEi 2013 of Rostec, the parent
company of Rosoboronexport—one of the main suppliers of
weapons to the Syrian Government throughout the current crisis—raises
concerns over the message the UK Government is sending about its
commitment to the ATT. The UKWG believes that when deciding who
can exhibit at DSEi, the UK Government should consider the international
obligations and standing of the states in which potential exhibitors
are based. In this regard we recommend that a company from any
state that has not signed the ATT should be prohibited from attending
any UK arms fair. At a minimum, any OGELs issued to allow companies
to automatically participate at DSEi should exclude companies
originating from non ATT signatory states.
127. The UK Government invited official delegations
from 67 countries to DSEi in 2013[149];
of these, eight were from countries that abstained or were absent
from the UN General Assembly vote on adopting the ATT and who
have not yet signed the treaty.[150]
The UKWG believes inviting countries that have not signed the
ATT to such events undermines the UK Government's support for
universal adherence to the Treaty.
128. Furthermore, Secretary of State for Defence,
Phillip Hammond, reiterated at DSEi that selling arms is a Government
priority[151] while
launching Securing prosperity: A strategic vision for the UK
defence sector[152]
which sets out plans for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and BIS
to work with the defence industry to "maximise the UK's competitive
advantage to boost British jobs, trade and growth". That
neither the Securing prosperity document nor Hammond's
speech make reference to the obligation to ensure the protection
of human rights is of significant concern.
129. Moreover, nine countries identified in the FCO's
2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report[153]
received official invitations to attend the 2013 DSEi[154];
these are among the countries regarded as raising the most serious
concerns for human rights. The UKWG is at a loss to understand
how the Government can justify inviting such countries to an exhibition
promoting the sale of a vast array of defence and security equipment
and services. The UKWG is concerned that this demonstrates a serious
lack of joined-up government in this field. Furthermore the UKWG
is also concerned that this could be interpreted as a weakening
of the Government's support for the ATT given that it is effectively
bringing together sellers from states that do not support the
Treaty with buyers from states that by the Government's own calculation
raise significant human rights concerns.
Recommendations
130. The UK Government should ensure that companies
based in countries that have not signed the ATT are not able to
exhibit at a UK arms fair nor should they be invited as an official
delegation.
131. All open general licences issues to allow
companies to automatically participate at future DSEi exhibitions
should be amended to explicitly exclude those companies originating
from non ATT signatory states.
132. The Government should not officially invite
delegations from any country named as a country of most serious
Human Rights concern in the FCO's Human Rights and Democracy Report.
Trade fairs and advertising activities
133. At DSEi 2013, two companies were ejected for
promoting Category A goods—which includes cluster munitions
and certain paramilitary goods that can be used for internal repression
or torture. The DSEi compliance team failed to notice that Tianjin
Myway International Trading Co (China) and Magforce International
(France) were advertising electric shock weapons and leg cuffs
in company brochures available to visitors and it was only after
Caroline Lucas MP alerted organisers to the prohibited activities
that the stalls were closed. These companies should be immediately
investigated for potential breaches of UK Export Control legislation.
134. It is very concerning that these recent events
seem to be following a well-established pattern. In 2011 the UKWG
called for an investigation into three companies that were displaying
prohibited literature at the 2011 DSEi. In fact at every DSEi
since 2005 MPs or NGOs have found companies in breach of regulations
around permitted promotional activity[155].
135. The UKWG are disappointed to note that at no
point to date have any of these companies been prosecuted for
prohibited activities nor, as far as we know, has this even been
seriously considered. This is despite the fact that Article 21
of the Export Control Order 2008 states:
No person to whom this article applies shall directly
or indirectly do any act calculated to promote the supply or delivery
of any category A goods, where that person knows or has reason
to believe that such action or actions will, or may, result in
the removal of those goods from one third country to another third
country.[156]
136. In addition the UK Government's own website
states: "The controls on Category A goods cover any act calculated
to promote the movement of such goods with no exemption for general
advertising or promotion".[157]
137. It is therefore somewhat puzzling that in a
letter to CAEC regarding DSEi 2011 the Secretary of State for
Business Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, stated that "it
is necessary to prove a link between the display of the brochure,
and the eventual movement of the goods between two overseas destinations".[158]
This is at odds with the wording of the 2008 Order which makes
it clear that there is no need for an actual link and that Article
21 applies even if an eventual transaction doesn't take place.
Moreover, the UK Government's own guidance on the promotion of
Category A goods states:
Unlike trading in category C and B goods, there are
no exemptions for those whose sole involvement is in transportation
services, financing or financial services, insurance or reinsurance
services or general advertising and promotion (such as displaying
category A goods at trade fairs or advertising them in periodicals)
(emphasis added). Therefore, anyone involved in the provision
of these services requires a licence.[159]
138. Almost by definition, the display of Category
A goods in promotional literature is calculated to promote supply
of those goods, and so the display of catalogues containing Category
A goods at UK trade exhibitions must surely constitute "general
advertising or promotion". Indeed in the Supplementary Guidance
Note on Trade ("Trafficking and Brokering") in Controlled
Goods the UK Government expressly defines what it means
by the terms "general advertising":
General advertising is where the advertising is not
directed at one individual/company and is not intended to close
a deal i.e. its main objective is to gain people's interest. An
example of general advertising may include a stand at a trade
fair with promotional materials such as posters or brochures;
or an advert in a periodical magazine.[160]
139. It therefore seems clear that the Act is designed
to prohibit such promotional activities in relation to Category
A goods and it is not necessary to wait until an actual transfer
has taken place for a criminal act to have occurred. Such activities
are covered by the Act and we call on the UK Government to fully
investigate them.
140. The UKWG also believes that the repeated discovery
of companies breaching the regulations around permitted promotional
activity shows inadequate compliance checks both before and during
the fair by the exhibition organisers and HM Revenue and Customs;
it should not be the job of civil society or MPs to identify these
breaches.
141. According to Michael Fallon, the Minister of
State for Business and Enterprise, the Export Control Organisation
has agreed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Clarion Events,
the organisers of DSEi, which sets out Clarion's roles and responsibilities.[161]
Given the clear and repeated failure of Clarion to exercise proper
oversight of company compliance at the DSEi trade events and to
enforce the contractual obligations of exhibitors, the MoU between
Clarion and the Government should be scrutinised by the CAEC.
142. While promotional literature pertaining to cluster
munitions was not found at DSEi 2013, companies were found to
be promoting these weapons at DSEi in 2007, 2009 and 2011 and
at Farnborough International Airshow in 2010. To prevent future
promotion of cluster munitions, the Government should prohibit
any state that has not signed and ratified the Cluster Munitions
Convention, and any company that has not signed a written guarantee
that they (or any subsidiary or partner) do not produce cluster
munitions or their components, from attending any military or
defence trade event in the UK.
Recommendations
143. The UK Government should investigate, with
a view to prosecuting, all companies involved in potential breaches
of UK trade control regulations at trade fairs, and publish without
delay the results of any investigations.
144. Given repeated breaches of UK trade control
regulations at UK trade events, the UK Government should put in
place more robust procedures to prevent further breaches, including
a compulsory ban on any future activity (incl. trade fair attendance)
in the UK for a company found to be promoting prohibited equipment.
145. Given the clear and repeated failure of Clarion
to enforce the contractual obligations of exhibitors at the DSEi
trade events, the Memorandum of Understanding between Clarion
and the Export Control Organisation should be scrutinised by the
CAEC.
146. Given the clear and repeated failure of Clarion
and HM Revenue and Customs to adequately manage the compliance
of companies attending the DSEi trade event, all companies should
in future be required to submit all of their promotional literature
to organisers/HMG for approval in advance of the fair.
147. Any state that has not signed and ratified
the Cluster Munitions Convention, and any company that has not
signed a written guarantee that they (or any subsidiary or partner)
do not produce cluster munitions or their components, should be
prohibited from attending any trade event in the UK.
Cluster munitions and financing
148. The UK Government is a State Party to the 2008
Convention on Cluster Munitions following the enactment of the
Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010. In a written Ministerial
Statement dated 7 December 2009, the Government stated that the
direct financing of cluster munitions is prohibited under the
provisions of the Bill. Through this Statement, it also committed
to work with financial institutions, non-governmental organisations
and other interested parties, to undertake a thorough consultation
and establish a working group, and to put in place a voluntary
code of conduct to prevent indirect financing, and if necessary
initiate legislation. No progress has been seen on any of these
areas.
149. It is of concern that the Government appears
to be have rejected its previous commitment to end indirect investments
in cluster-munition producers. In its official response to the
CAEC's 2011-2012 investigations, published on 22 October 2012,
it stated:
Indirect financing - such as the purchase of shares
in or the provision of loans to large multinational conglomerates
that amongst often many other activities may be involved in the
manufacture of cluster munitions - is not captured by the prohibitions
of the Act. We consider this form of indirect financing an issue
for individual institutions to consider under their own investment
charters and social corporate responsibility agendas.[162]
150. An increasing number of UK-based financial institutions
continue to strengthen their policies on investments in companies
involved in the production of cluster munitions including the
Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds, Aviva, Co-operative Financial
Services and HSBC. In discussions between financial institutions
and members of UKWG, all companies have strongly supported the
idea of a jointly-developed, industry-wide Code of Conduct to
end indirect finance and have expressed disappointment that thus
far, the Government appears to have abandoned previous commitments
to help to facilitate its development.
151. It is of importance that the Government engages
with financial institutions and non-governmental organisations
through a multi-stakeholder process to provide guidance. Financial
institutions have indicated that they would benefit from government
guidance and leadership on this issue to harmonise policies and
practice.
152. Furthermore, at least nine UK financial institutions
are understood to continue to invest in companies producing cluster
munitions[163].
Recommendation
153. We urge the Government to honour commitments
made to end indirect financial support for cluster munitions and
initiate a thorough and inclusive consultation process aimed at
providing guidance to financial institutions on disinvesting from
cluster munitions. As a first step, we urge the UK Government
to set up a multi-stakeholder meeting between relevant industry,
NGOs and Government representatives to initiate work on this area.
Torture and end-use
154. The UKWG is disappointed at the decision by
the UK Government to abandon its commitment to introduce new end-user
controls on torture and death-penalty equipment. In a written
response to the CAEC the UK Foreign Minister stated in October
2012:
The Government continues to believe that list-based
controls are more likely to be effective than horizontal end-use
controls, which can have uncertain impacts on legitimate trade
and be problematic to enforce."[164]
155. In the 2008 review of UK export control legislation
the introduction of new end-user controls was deemed a policy
priority and one that received widespread and unanimous support
from NGOs, the CAEC and defence industry representatives. We are
dismayed that the UK Government has dropped this policy without
consultation with the original stakeholders.
156. As previously stated we believe that end-user
controls on torture and death-penalty equipment would both enhance
a system of list-based controls and bring UK export control policy
into line with its international legal obligations to prohibit
torture and ill-treatment. End-user controls in this area were
widely accepted to be an important safety net to allow the UK
Government to take action on areas of trading activity where there
is universal agreement that involvement in such activities is
unacceptable, By scrapping this commitment, the UK Government
is sending a signal to would-be exporters that it will permit
UK involvement in the facilitation of torture, ill-treatment and
capital punishment as long as the equipment is not covered by
an export control list.
157. End-use controls may well have prevented the
export of drugs subsequently involved in lethal injections in
certain US penitentiaries in 2010[165],
without the initial recourse of judicial review of Government
licensing decisions[166],
given it was clear that the exporter was aware that the drugs
were being exported for use in executions[167].
A torture end-use clause would also help by mitigating the danger
of relying purely on list-based controls, which tend to be reactive
in nature and slow to respond to new and emerging technologies
or unforeseen items.
Recommendation
158. The UK Government should reverse its decision
to abandon the introduction of new end-user controls on equipment
for use in torture or for use in carrying out the death penalty.
3D printing
159. One emerging issue for Parliamentary consideration
is the emergence of 3D printed guns. This year has seen a number
of firsts in the field, including the first functional printed
firearm components, the first fully-functional printed pistol
and rifle, and the first functional printed repeating gun. The
technology is still nascent but rapidly advancing, and 3D printed
weapons could potentially circumvent existing means of international
arms control by existing solely as data until the point where
they are created by the end user, who could be anywhere there
is an Internet connection.
160. The U.S. State Department clearly views 3D printed
guns as a threat to existing export controls, having requested
that the designers of a 3D printed pistol remove the weapon's
design files from their website as a potential violation of the
U.S. Arms Export Control Act.[168]
This reflects the distinct lack of clarity around the status of
designs for weapons in national and international law relating
to arms transfers. The UKWG would therefore encourage the CAEC
to raise with the Government how it proposes to approach the potential
availability of 3D printed weapons distributed internationally
via the Internet.
Recommendation
161. The UKWG is concerned about the advent of
3D printing technology and its implications for strategic export
controls. We therefore urge the CAEC to raise this issue with
the Government and to ask what action the UK is taking at international
level to develop a clear and concerted response to this issue.
ANNEX
A. UK licences granted for exports to MENA
region, 2008 - 2012
1. Number/Value of licences granted, refused and
revoked per country from 2008 - 2012[169]
Key:
SIELS: a. Granted; b. Value; c1: Refused (criteria);
c2. Revoked
OIELS: d. Granted; e1. Refused; e2. Revoked
2. Number and value of licences granted per region
and worldwide from 2008 - 2012[170]
Key:
a: number of licences granted
b: value of licences granted
B. History of companies advertising prohibited
equipment
| Fair | Company
| Information |
| DSEi 2013 | Tianjin Myway International Trading Co Ltd, China
| Company literature promoted torture equipment (leg cuffs and electric shock batons)
Company ejected from fair[171]
|
| DSEi 2013 | Magforce International, France
| Company literature promoted torture equipment (leg cuffs and electric shock batons)
Company ejected from fair[172]
|
| DSEi 2011 | Pakistan Ordnance Factory (POF)
| Company literature contained information on the155mm Base Bleed DP-ICM (Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition) which is a cluster munition.
Company ejected from fair[173]
|
| DSEi 2011 | Nammo Talley (Nammo Group),
| Company literature contained information on / promotion of cluster munitions.
The company was contacted after the fair - the product sheet was subsequently amended[174]
|
| DSEi 2011 | Defence Export Promotion Organisation (DEPO), Pakistan
| 155mm M483A1 artillery ammunition containing 88 submunitons, and the 'Programmable SubMunition Dispenser - 1'.
Company ejected from fair [175]
|
| DSEi 2011 | Beechwood International, UK
| Brochure found promoting oversized leg cuffs, waist chains, lead chains and "the enhanced transport restraint system" (which combines waist chains and cuffs with leg cuffs) on behalf of US company CTS-Thompson.
Company ejected from fair[176]
|
| Farnborough 2010 | Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise (FSUE SRPE Bazalt), Russia
| Promoting cluster munitions
Issue raised by UK WG in CAEC submission[177]
|
| DSEi 2009 | Pakistan Ordnance Factory
| Company literature contained information on the155mm Base Bleed DP-ICM (Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition) which is a cluster munition.
Raised by Amnesty International with the exhibition organisers - promised action would be taken.[178]
|
| DSEi 2007 | BCB International (Cardiff), UK
| Company found to be promoting leg cuffs and Taser projectile electric shock gun.
Company ejected from fair[179]
|
| DSEi 2007 | Famous Glory Holdings, China
| Company found to be promoting leg cuffs
Company ejected from fair[180]
|
| IFSEC 2007 | Echo Industrial Co. Ltd, China
| Company found to be displaying electric shock batons.
Mr Xia was deported from the UK, however the CPS decided not to bring charges [181]
|
| DSEi 2005 | Denel, South Africa
| Discussed selling of 155 millimetre artillery shell containing 42 bomblets.[182]
|
| DSEi 2005 | Tar Ideal, Israel
| Brochure found advertising stun guns, stun batons and leg-irons.
Company ejected from fair.[183]
|
| DSEi 2005 | Global Armour, South Africa
| Brochure found advertising stun guns, stun batons.
Company ejected from fair[184]
|
October 2013
Written evidence from Dr. Anna Stavrianakis,
Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of Sussex
(AEC009)
Introduction and Summary
I am a scholar researching the international arms
trade and UK arms export policy. This submission seeks clarification
on three issues discussed in the Government's response (Cm 8707,
October 2013) to the Committees on Arms Export Controls Scrutiny
of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013) report (HC 205, 1 July
2013).
· First,
it asks whether the Government will be consulting publicly on
its updating of the UK's Consolidated Criteria on arms exports.
· Second,
it seeks clarification on the character of the arms export licence
suspension mechanism.
· Third,
it seeks clarification on the suspension of arms export licences
to Egypt.
1. Review of the UK's Consolidated Criteria. The
Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) asked the Government
whether it would consult publicly on its updating of the Consolidated
Criteria (Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013), paragraph
46). In its response, the Government stated that "We are
now studying the impact of the ATT on the EU Common Position and
in light of that will be updating the Criteria". The Government
did not answer the CAEC's question about public consultation.
Is the Government going to consult publicly on its updating of
the UK Consolidated Criteria? If so, what is the timescale and
format for this?
2. Arms export licence suspension mechanism. In
its response to the CAEC Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control
(2013) report, the Government states that the suspension mechanism
"applies only to licence applications that are still being
processed and to any new applications that may subsequently be
submitted. Once an item has left the UK suspending or revoking
the licence will not result in the return of that item. For extant
licences, i.e. those that are wholly or partially unused, we have
the option of revocation or suspension should that be deemed necessary"
(paragraph 124).
3. Three claims about suspension are made in the
above paragraph. First, licence applications that are still being
processed can be suspended. Second, new licence applications can
be suspended. The Government initially claims that suspension
applies "only" to these two scenarios. Later in the
same paragraph, however, it makes a third claim: that extant licences
(licences that have been issued but are wholly or partially unused)
can be revoked or suspended. This mix of claims makes it unclear
whether it is possible to prevent equipment being shipped once
a licence has been granted.
4. Can the Government clarify its policy and practice
in relation to the suspension of: new licence applications; applications
that are still being processed; and licences that have been granted
and are still valid, but are partially or wholly unused.
5. In particular, can the Government confirm whether
extant licences - licences that have been granted and are still
valid, but are wholly or partially unused i.e. the equipment has
not yet been shipped - can be suspended? If so, on how many occasions
have such licences been suspended, of what equipment, to what
end-user?
6. Can
the Government explain what happens in practice if an extant licence
is suspended, and what happens in practice if an extant licence
is revoked?
7. Arms export licence suspensions: Egypt. The
suspension mechanism "has been considered on several occasions
but pursued in only one instance, in respect of Egypt" (Government
response to CAEC report, paragraph 94). EU Member States agreed
to "suspend all export licensing for equipment which might
be used for internal repression." Can the Government clarify
whether, in the UK case, this involved the suspension of acceptance
of new licence applications; the suspension of the processing
licence applications already submitted; and/or the suspension
of extant licences already granted but wholly or partially unused?
8. EU Member States also agreed "to reassess
export licences of equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP"
(Government response to CAEC report, paragraph 94). Can the Government
clarify what this process involved in the UK case? Did this involve
reassessing licences that had already been granted?
9. The Business Secretary announced on 28 August
"that the UK had suspended 48 extant licences as a result
of this agreement" (Government response to CAEC report, paragraph
94). Similarly, in its Notice to Exporters 2013/23 published on
the same date, ECO that "suspension will apply to extant
licences and new licence applications."[185]
This wording suggests that both extant licences that have
been granted but are wholly or partially unused, and licence
applications that are still in process can be suspended. Can the
Government confirm this, and clarify what happened in the case
of extant licences in respect of Egypt that were suspended?
On 25 October 2013, in Notice to Exporters 2013/27,
ECO stated that "24 licences will have the suspension lifted
because we do not judge the goods might be used for internal repression.
7 will be revoked as there is a clear risk that the goods might
be used for internal repression. The balance of 16 will remain
suspended because the goods might be used for internal repression."[186]
Were these extant licences i.e. licences that had been granted
but were partially or wholly unused?
1 http://www.livingunderdrones.org/,
see in particular pages 30-35,
Chapter 3 and 112-117.
Back
2
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
Back
3
See Living Under Drones, pages 74-76. Back
4
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/06/21/un-expert-labels-cia-tactic-exposed-by-bureau-a-war-crime/ Back
5
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/01/24/un-launches-major-investigation-into-civilian-drone-deaths/
Back
6
http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/annual-report-of-the-secretary-general-on-children-and-armed-conflict/
Back
7
House of Commons, 2005, paragraph 71 Back
8
House of Commons, 2005, paragraph 74 Back
9
House of Commons Committees on Arms Export Controls, Scrutiny
of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013): First Report of Sessions
2013-14, Scrutiny of the Government's UK Strategic Export Controls
Annual Report 2011 published in July 2012, the Government's Quarterly
Reports from October 2011 to September 2012, and the Government's
policies on arms exports and international arms control issues,
Vol. II Back
10 Ibid.,
Ev. 60, para. 109. Back
11
Ibid., Ev. 59, para, 106. Back
12
Ibid., Ev, 60, para. 108. Back
13
Ibid., Ev. 59, para.107 Back
14
Ibid., Ev. 66, para. 118 Back
15
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:016:0001:0032:EN:PDF Back
16
Committee on Arms Export Control, Scrutiny of Arms Exports and
Arms Control (2013), Annex 3: The Committees' questions on the
Government's Response (Cm8441), published in October 2012, to
the Committees' Report 2012 (HC 419-I & II) and the Government's
answers <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmquad/205/205ii_04.htm> Back
17
ibid Back
18
See Marietje Schaake, European Parliament endorses stricter European
export control of digital arms <http://www.marietjeschaake.eu/2012/10/ep-steunt-d66-initiatief-controle-europese-export-digitale-wapens/> Back
19
See UKTI, 'Cyber Security: The UK's approach to exports'
????<http://www.gchq.gov.uk/Press/Documents/Cyber_Security-the_UKs_approach_to_exports.pdf> Back
20
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/28/bahrain-no-progress-reform Back
21
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0390&language=EN&ring=B7-2013-0422 Back
22
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmfaff/writev/bahrain/sab51.htm Back
23
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-25/cyber-attacks-on-activists-traced-to-finfisher-spyware-of-gamma.html,
https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/oecd-complaint-against-gamma-international-accepted-for-further-investigation,
https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/privacy-international-files-for-judicial-review-of-hmrc-refusal-to-reveal-the-state Back
24
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-protests-a-coup-plot-defence-chief-says-1.980961 Back
25
These and the following
figures are taken from Campaign Against Arms Trade using data
from the Strategic Export Controls database: http://www.caat.org.uk/resources/export-licences/licence?date_to=2010-12-31&date_from=2010-01-01®ion=Bahrain&n=0 Back
26
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmquad/205/205ii_02.htm#a3 Back
27
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/defence/10233673/Britain-to-sell-Typhoon-jets-to-Bahrain-despite-human-rights-record.html Back
28
http://www.bahrain.doingbusinessguide.co.uk/forewords/ Back
29
http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2013-07-03a.162710.h&s=bahrain+exports#g162710.q0 Back
30
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32853/business-plan-12.pdf Back
31
www.ukti.gov.uk\download\108692_100812\Case%2520study%3A%2520Praetorian%2520International.html Back
32
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm121213/text/121213w0001.htm Back
33
http://www.caat.org.uk/resources/foi-responses/pdf/2012-03-05.ukti-dso.foi-12-0185-ukti-dso-bahrain-meetings.pdf Back
34
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/35438/business-charter.pdf Back
35
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfaff/964/96404.htm Back
36
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/britain-open-for-business Back
37
http://www.caat.org.uk/resources/foi-responses/pdf/2010-12-08.ukti-dso.foi-10-2390-ukti-dso-symposium-2010-gerald-howarth-presentation.pdf Back
38
http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2013-07-03a.162534.h&s=bahrain+lucas#g162534.q0 Back
39
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmregmem/100412/100412.pdf Back
40
http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/441404,
http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/441394 Back
41
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmfaff/writev/fcogov/m12.htm Back
42
http://royaltyinthenews.com/david-cameron-holds-talks-with-bahraini-king Back
43
http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2011-11-14b.78705.h Back
44
http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/444998 Back
45
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/datablog/2011/oct/10/liam-fox-and-adam-werritty-links-liamfox Back
46
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/8843810/Inside-the-corporate-intelligence-company-which-bankrolled-Liam-Fox.html Back
47
https://bahrainwatch.org/pr/g3.php Back
48
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/8843804/Second-Defence-Minister-faces-questions-over-links-with-Liam-Foxs-best-man.html Back
49
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmbis/419/419we03.htm Back
50
http://www.londonchamber.co.uk/DocImages/9245.pdf Back
51
http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/arms-fairs/dsei/delegations/2011-09-13.ukti-dso.dsei-2011-invitation-list.pdf Back
52
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/450034 Back
53
http://www.caat.org.uk/resources/countries/bahrain/uk-arms-sales.php Back
54
http://www.caat.org.uk/resources/foi-responses/pdf/2012-03-05.ukti-dso.foi-12-0185-ukti-dso-bahrain-meetings.pdf Back
55
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/13/syria-hama-massacre-live#block-18
Back
56
https://www.adsgroup.org.uk/articles/27855 Back
57
http://www.flightglobal.com/features/bahrain-special/ Back
58
http://web.archive.org/web/20110523011557/http://www.ukti.gov.uk/download/file/128537.html
Back
59
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201212/ldhansrd/text/120213w0001.htm Back
60
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/490082,
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/490038, http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/490058
Back
61
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmquad/205/205ii_02.htm#a3 Back
62
http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/arms-fairs/farnborough/delegations/2012-08-20.ukti-dso.farnborough-2012-invitation-list.pdf Back
63
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-opens-farnborough-international-air-show-2012,
http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/arms-fairs/farnborough/about.php#note1 Back
64
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm120716/debtext/120716-0001.htm#12071613000595 Back
65
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/aug/24/david-cameron-bahrain-king-talks Back
66
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/524084,
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/524204, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm121015/text/121015w0002.htm#1210166000187,
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/524029 Back
67
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/527927 Back
68
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/528759 Back
69
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmfaff/c88-ii/c8801.htm Back
70
http://www.sandhurstfoundation.org/news/VIP-Dinner-13-October-2012.htm Back
71
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/528952 Back
72
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/blog/2012/09/02/sandhurst-took-3m-bahrain-gift-after-regimes-crackdown-on-demonstrators/ Back
73
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/560627 Back
74
http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=303989 Back
75
http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/News-and-Events/Latest-News/2011/December/30/111230-UKMCC-Prince Back
76
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/blog/2012/09/02/sandhurst-took-3m-bahrain-gift-after-regimes-crackdown-on-demonstrators/,
Back
77
http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=342710 Back
78
http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/537671 Back
79
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/541309 Back
80
http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/546412,
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/546419, http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/546406,
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/546407 Back
81
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/449467?date=2012-09-10 Back
82
http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/552222,
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/558631 Back
83
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/558660 Back
84
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/560364 Back
85
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmfaff/writev/humanrights/hr03.htm Back
86
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/558160 Back
87
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/20/bahrain-olympic-prince-human-rights Back
88
http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/578084,
http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/578248, http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/578220,
http://www.zajilpress.com/britains-opportunities-growing-in-the-arabian-gulf/4748/ Back
89
http://www.ukti.gov.uk/gb_gb/defencesecurity/item/603020.html?null Back
90
http://www.dsei.co.uk/page.cfm/Action=ExhibList/ListID=1/PageNum=1/loadSearch=295843_1592,
http://www.ihs.com/events/exhibitions/dsei-2011/news/day-2/Control-without-loss-of-life.aspx Back
91
http://www.ihs.com/events/exhibitions/dsei-2013/news/day-2/Partnership-with-Turkey-for-Bahrain-programme.aspx Back
92
http://www.ukti.gov.uk/defencesecurity/defence/event/550700.html Back
93
http://www.goshowoff.com/FIL/BIAS2014/files/bias2014_security_surveillance_pavilion_brochure.pdf Back
94
The UK Working Group on Arms comprises Action on Armed Violence,
Amnesty UK, Article 36, Omega Research Foundation, Oxfam and Saferworld. Back
95
BBC News, Syria death toll now above 100,000, says UN chief
Ban, 25 July 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23455760http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23455760 Back
96
The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Number of Syrian refugees tops
2 million mark with more on the way, 3 September 2013 http://www.unhcr.org/522495669.htmlhttp://www.unhcr.org/522495669.html Back
97
There are many different reports of the illicit trade in arms
to Syrian opposition groups, but these are by their very nature
hard to track. This BBC report is a reasonable summary of available
open source information: BBC News, Who is supplying weapons
to the warring sides in Syria, 14 June 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22906965http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22906965 Back
98
See Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Notice
to Exporters 2013/22, http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/uncategorized/notice-to-exporters-201322-changes-to-eu-sanctions-against-syria-and-burma-and-related-uk-legislation/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery
Back
99
See paragraphs 36 and 37 in Saferworld/Oxfam, Arms for Syria?,
June 2013 available at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Arms-to-Syria-briefing.pdf. Back
100
See for example the reports of the UN Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/IndependentInternationalCommission.aspx Back
101
Australia Group Common Control Lists, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/controllists.html
Back
102
Ibidem Back
103
In his statement to parliament on 13 October 2011, Foreign Secretary
William Hague announced a number of changes to UK arms export
policy that were being put in place as a consequence of a review
of UK defence and security export policy in
the light of the Arab Spring. These included measures such as
a mechanism to allow immediate licensing suspension after a sharp
deterioration in security and ministerial scrutiny of open licences.
See https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-review-of-export-policyhttps://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-review-of-export-policy Back
104
See Committee on arms export controls, http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/other-committees/committee-on-arms-export-controls/
Back
105
Committees on Arms Export Control, Scrutiny
of Arms Exports and Arms Control, 2013, http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/other-committees/committee-on-arms-export-controls/news/pn-report/http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/other-committees/committee-on-arms-export-controls/news/pn-report/ Back
106
Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign & Commonwealth
Office Report, April 2013, http://www.hrdreport.fco.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/2012-Human-Rights-and-Democracy.pdf
Back
107
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Defence Growth
Partnership, Securing Prosperity: A Strategic Vision for the
UK Defence Sector, September 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/securing-prosperity-a-strategic-vision-for-the-uk-defence-sectorhttps://www.gov.uk/government/publications/securing-prosperity-a-strategic-vision-for-the-uk-defence-sector Back
108
Gov.uk Press Release, New partnership to equip defence sector
for long-term success, 9 September 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-hails-new-partnership-to-equip-defence-sector-for-long-term-success Back
109
Ibidem, quoting UK Prime Minister David Cameron. Back
110
See Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Consolidated
EU and national arms export licensing criteria, 21 November
2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consolidated-eu-and-national-arms-export-licensing-criteriahttps://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consolidated-eu-and-national-arms-export-licensing-criteria Back
111
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Press Release:
Business Secretary revokes five export licences to Egypt,
19 July 2013, http://news.bis.gov.uk/Press-Releases/Business-Secretary-revokes-five-export-licences-to-Egypt-69029.aspx
Back
112
Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on Egypt,
Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 21 August 2013,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/138599.pdf
Back
113
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, UK Strategic
Export Control Lists, March 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/184049/strategic-export-control-consolidated20130320.pdfhttps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/184049/strategic-export-control-consolidated20130320.pdf Back
114
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Notice to Exporters
2013/24: Suspension of extant licences for Egypt and changes to
OGELs, 28 August 2013, http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/uncategorized/notice-to-exporters-201324-suspension-of-extant-licences-for-egypt-and-changes-to-ogels/
Back
115
Ibidem Back
116
See Annex I of Council Regulation 36/2012 of 18 January 2012
concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria
and repealing Regulation 442/2011, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:016:0001:0032:EN:PDF. Back
117
Ibidem Back
118
Official Journal of the European Union, Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP
of 31 May 2013 concerning restrictive measures against Syria,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:147:0014:0045:EN:PDF
Back
119
The Export Control (Syria Sanctions) Order 2013 No. 2012, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/2012/contents/made
Back
120
Council conclusions on Egypt, Foreign Affairs Council Meeting,
Brussels, 21 August 2013, states: "Member States also
agreed to suspend export licenses to Egypt of any equipment which
might be used for internal repression and to reassess export licences
of equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and review
their security assistance with Egypt." The implication of
this statement is that the suspension imperative applies only
to items that are beyond the EU Common Military List; for items
included on the EU Common Military List the conclusions require
reassessment, not suspension. Back
121
The National Consolidated Criteria state that the Government will
not issue an export licence "if there is a clear risk that
the proposed export might be used for internal repression, see
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Consolidated
EU and national arms export licensing criteria, 21 November
2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consolidated-eu-and-national-arms-export-licensing-criteriahttps://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consolidated-eu-and-national-arms-export-licensing-criteria Back
122
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Strategic
Export Controls: Reports and Statistics, Searchable database,
https://www.exportcontroldb.bis.gov.uk Back
123
Note that in 2011, 1163 export licences were granted (1026 SIELs
and 137 OIELs), 26 were refused and 75 were later revoked. Back
124
For detailed data of the aforementioned export licences, see
Annex A. UK licences granted for exports to MENA region, 2008
- 2012 Back
125
UK Trade & Investment, UK Defence & Security Export
Statistics for 2012, 21 June 2013, http://www.ukti.gov.uk/defencesecurity/item/527180.html
Back
126
See for example The Guardian, Syria: civil war turns regional
crisis, 5 May 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/05/syria-israel-lebanon-air-strikes
or Alain Gresh, Syria's Proxy War, Le Monde Diplomatique
English Edition, 15 June 2013, http://mondediplo.com/2013/07/05syria
Back
127
Department for International Development, the Foreign & Commonwealth
Office and the Ministry of Defence, Building Stability Overseas
Strategy, July 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67475/Building-stability-overseas-strategy.pdf
Back
128
FCO Announcement, Foreign Office review of export policy,
13 October 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-review-of-export-policy
Back
129
Richard Norton-Taylor, UK suspends Egypt military export licences,
The Guardian, 28 August 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/aug/28/uk-suspends-egypt-military-export-licences
Back
130
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Notice to Exporters
2013/18: Important Changes to the Strategic Export Control Transparency
Initiative, 31 July 2013, http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/uncategorized/notice-to-exporters-201318-important-changes-to-the-strategic-export-control-transparency-initiative/
Back
131
For a timeline of the UK Transparency Initiative, see http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/uk-transparency-initiative-timetable.pdf
Back
132
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Notice to
Exporters 2013/14: Progress towards implementing the strategic
export control Transparency Initiative, 15 May 2013, http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/uncategorized/notice-to-exporters-201314-progress-towards-implementing-the-strategic-export-control-transparency-initiative/
Back
133
Oral Answers to Questions: Business, Innovation and Skills, Hansard
18 July 2013: Column 1296 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130718/debtext/130718-0001.htm#13071867000021
Back
134
See Written Ministerial Statement, Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable, Secretary
of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills; Export Controls: Transparency in Export
Licensing, 13 July 2012, http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-vote-office/July_2012/13-07-12/4-BIS-ExportLicensing.pdfhttp://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-vote-office/July_2012/13-07-12/4-BIS-ExportLicensing.pdf Back
135
Ibidem Back
136
Notice to Exporters 2013/18: Important Changes to the Strategic
Export Control Transparency Initiative, op.cit. Back
137
Ibidem Back
138
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Transparency
in Export licensing: Government Response, July 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32009/12-920-transparency-export-licencing-government-response.pdf
Back
139
Written Ministerial Statements, Business, Innovation and Skills,
Hansard, 7 February 2012: Column 7WS, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120207/wmstext/120207m0001.htm#12020767000002
Back
141
See Written Ministerial Statement, Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable, 13 July
2012, op.cit. Back
142
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Transparency
in Export licensing: Government Response, July 2012 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32009/12-920-transparency-export-licencing-government-response.pdf
Back
143
Committees on Arms Exports, Written evidence from the UK Working
Group on Arms (UKWG), November 2012, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmquad/writev/689/m06.htm Back
144
Ibidem Back
145
See An Vranckx, Frank Slijper
and Roy Isbister (eds.), Lessons from MENA: Appraising EU Transfers
of Military and Security Equipment to the Middle East and North
Africa, November 2011, http://www.psw.ugent.be/crg/publications/bb2withhyperlinks.pdf.
Back
146
Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on the review
of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules
governing control of exports of military technology and equipment,
3199th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 19
November 2012, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133569.pdf Back
147
The current version of the Council of the EU, User's Guide
to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules
governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment,
29 April 2009, is available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st09/st09241.en09.pdf Back
148
The full text of the ATT and other Treaty associated document
can be found at http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/ Back
149
UK Trade and Investment, Defence and Security, Countries invited
to DSEi 2013, 12 September 2013, http://www.ukti.gov.uk/defencesecurity/item/603020.html Back
150
The eight countries were
Bahrain, India, Indonesia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan
and Vietnam. Back
151
Richard Norton-Taylor, Defence Secretary: selling weapons abroad
is priority for Britain, The Guardian, 10 September 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/10/defence-secretary-weapons-priority-britain Back
152
Department for Business,
Innovation & Skills, Securing prosperity: a strategic vision
for the UK defence sector, 9 September 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/237314/bis-13-1154-defence-growth-partnership.pdf. Back
153
See Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign & Commonwealth
Office Report, April 2013, op.cit. http://www.hrdreport.fco.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/2012-Human-Rights-and-Democracy.pdf Back
154
The nine countries were Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Back
155
For a full list, see Annex B. History of companies advertising
prohibited equipment Back
156
The Export Control Order 2008, Article 21, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/3231/article/21/made?view=plainhttp://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/3231/article/21/made?view=plain Back
157
See Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Trade
controls on military goods for trade fairs and exhibitions,
https://www.gov.uk/trade-controls-military-goods-on-trade-fairs-and-exhibitionshttps://www.gov.uk/trade-controls-military-goods-on-trade-fairs-and-exhibitions Back
158
Committees on Arms Exports, Letter to the Chair of the Committees
from the Rt Hon. Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State for Business
Innovation and Skills, Further Follow Up To Oral Evidence to the
Committees on Arms Export Controls, 26 March 2012, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/419/419we51.htmhttp://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/419/419we51.htm Back
159
Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, Export
Control Act 2002, Review of Export Control Legislation (2007)
Supplementary Guidance Note on Trade ("Trafficking and Brokering")
in Controlled Goods (in effect from 6 April 2009), January
2009, p. 5, http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file49827.pdfhttp://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file49827.pdf Back
160
Ibid., p. 17 Back
161
House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 13 September 2013, c869W, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130913/text/130913w0001.htm#130913w0001.htm_wqn1http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130913/text/130913w0001.htm - 130913w0001.htm_wqn1 Back
162
Reports from the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign
Affairs and International Development Committees, Strategic
Export Control: Her Majesty's Government's Annual Report for 2010,
Quarterly Reports for 2010 and 2011, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary
Scrutiny, Session 2012-2013, http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm84/8441/8441.pdfhttp://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm84/8441/8441.pdf Back
163
A list of UK financial institutions with current indirect financial
investments in producers of cluster munitions can be found in
the following report by IKV Pax Christi/FairFin, Worldwide
investments in cluster munitions a shared responsibility,
June 2012, http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/media/files/worldwide-investments-in-clustermunitions-a-shared-responsibility-juni-2012_0.pdf
http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/media/files/worldwide-investments-in-clustermunitions-a-shared-responsibility-juni-2012_0.pdf Back
164
CAEC, Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013), Annex
3: The Committees' questions on the Government's Response (Cm8441),
published in October 2012, to the Committees' Report 2012 (HC
419-I & II) and the Government's answers, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmquad/205/205ii_04.htm Back
165
Reprieve, Death Penalty: Stop Lethal Injection Project timeline,
18 June 2013, http://www.reprieve.org.uk/publiceducation/executiondrugstimeline/ Back
166
Reprieve, Judicial Review Application for urgent consideration,
5 November 2010, http://www.reprieve.org.uk/downloads/2010_11_02_PUB_Zagorski_Judicial_Review_Application.pdf Back
167
Reprieve, Georgia FDA Release proof Mr Alavi knew of use for
capital punishment, 19 January 2011, http://www.reprieve.org.uk/static/downloads/2011_01_19_FDA_release_-_proof_Mr_Alavi_knew_of_use_for_capital_punishment.pdf
Back
168
Todd Sperry, U.S. requires group to remove 3-D gun instructions
from its website, CNN.com, 13 May 2013, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/09/politics/3-d-guns/index.html Back
169
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Strategic Export
Controls: Reports and Statistics, Searchable database, https://www.exportcontroldb.bis.gov.uk
Back
170
UK submissions to the EU Annual Reports According to Article 8(2)
of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules
governing control of exports of military technology and equipment,
see http://www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/arms-export-control/index_en.htm
Back
172
Ibidem Back
173
DSEi 2011, Official Statement, (undated), http://www.dsei.co.uk/page.cfm/T=m/Action=Press/PressID=161 Back
175
DSEi 2011, Official Statement, op.cit.http://www.dsei.co.uk/page.cfm/T=m/Action=Press/PressID=161 Back
176
Exhibition News, DSEi ejects exhibitors for compliance breaches,
22 September 2011, http://www.exhibitionnews.co.uk/newsdetails/1688/dsei-ejects-exhibitors-for-compliance-breaches Back
178
House of Commons, Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign
Affairs, and International Development Committees, Scrutiny of
Arms Export Controls (2010): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual
Report 2008, Quarterly Reports for 2009, licensing policy and
review of export control legislation, First Joint Report of Session
2009-10, Written evidence submitted by the UK Working Group on
Arms 16 March 2010, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmquad/202/202.pdf
Back
179
The Guardian, Leg irons
row sees two companies thrown out of London arms fair, 12
September 2007, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/sep/12/arms
Back
180
Ibidem Back
181
House of Commons Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development
and Trade and Industry Committees Strategic Export Controls: 2007
Review First Joint Report of Session 2006-07, Memorandum from
Mark Thomas, 23 July 2007, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmfaff/117/117.pdf
Back
182
The Independent, Cluster bombs on offer at arms fair despite
sales ban, Wednesday 14 September 2005 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/cluster-bombs-on-offer-at-arms-fair-despite-sales-ban-506739.html
Back
183
House of Commons Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development
and Trade and Industry Committees Strategic Export Controls: Annual
Report for 2004, Quarterly Reports for 2005, Licensing Policy
and Parliamentary Scrutiny First Joint Report of Session 2005-06:
Further memorandum from Mark Thomas, 19 July 2006, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmquad/873/873.pdf
Back
184
Ibidem Back
185
http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/uncategorized/notice-to-exporters-201324-suspension-of-extant-licences-for-egypt-and-changes-to-ogels/ Back
186
http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/uncategorized/notice-to-exporters-201327-egypt-results-of-the-review-of-licences/ Back
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