



# House of Commons

## Committees on Arms Exports Controls

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**Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Controls (2015):  
Scrutiny of the Government's Strategic Export  
Controls Annual Report 2013, the Government's  
Quarterly Reports from October 2013 to June 2014,  
and the Government's policies on arms exports and  
international arms control issues**

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### **Second Joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees of Session 2014–15**

Tenth Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee of Session 2014-15

Ninth Report of the Defence Committee of Session 2014-15

Eleventh Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Session 2014-15

Eleventh Report of the International Development Committee of Session 2014-15

### ***Volume II***

Memorandum from the Chair of the Committees

Oral and Written Evidence is contained in Volume III, available on the Committees' website at [www.parliament.uk/caeccomm](http://www.parliament.uk/caeccomm)

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## The Committees on Arms Export Controls

The four House of Commons Select Committees that comprise the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) are: the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, the Defence Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee and the International Development Committee. The CAEC's task is to scrutinise the UK Government's arms export control procedures and legislation, individual arms export licence decisions, arms export policies, and the UK's role in international arms control agreements.

### Current membership

**BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS:** Mr Adrian Bailey\*§, William Bain, Mr Brian Binley, Paul Blomfield, Katy Clark, Mike Crockart\*, Caroline Dinenage, Rebecca Harris, Ann McKechnin\*, Mr Robin Walker, Nadhim Zahawi

**DEFENCE:** Rory Stewart§, Richard Benyon\*, Rt Hon Jeffrey M. Donaldson, Mr James Gray\*, Mr Dai Havard, Dr Julian Lewis\*, Mrs Madeleine Moon, Sir Bob Russell, Bob Stewart, Ms Gisela Stuart, Derek Twigg, John Woodcock

**FOREIGN AFFAIRS:** Rt Hon Sir John Stanley\* (Chair of the Committees' concurrent meetings), Rt Hon Sir Richard Ottaway§, Mr John Baron, Rt Hon Sir Menzies Campbell, Rt Hon Ann Clwyd\*, Mike Gapes\*, Mark Hendrick, Sandra Osborne, Andrew Rosindell, Mr Frank Roy, Nadhim Zahawi

**INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT:** Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Bruce\*§, Hugh Bayley, Fiona Bruce, Sir Tony Cunningham, Fabian Hamilton\*, Pauline Latham, Jeremy Lefroy, Sir Peter Luff\*, Mr Michael McCann, Fiona O'Donnell, Chris White\*

\* Member who participated in the inquiry leading to this Report  
§ Chair of a participating Committee

### Powers

The Committees are departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in Standing Order No 152. The powers of the Committees to work together and agree joint reports are set out in Standing Order No. 137A. These Standing Orders are available on the Internet via [www.parliament.uk](http://www.parliament.uk).

### Publication

The Reports and evidence of the Committees are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including news items) are on the internet at [www.parliament.uk/parliament.uk/caeccomm](http://www.parliament.uk/parliament.uk/caeccomm).

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## Glossary of Acronyms

ATAS	Academic Technology Approval Scheme
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
BIS	Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
BTWC	Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention
CAAT	Campaign Against Arms Trade
CAEC	Committees on Arms Export Controls
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CBW	Chemical and Biological Weapons
CCM	Convention on Cluster Munitions
CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
COARM	EU Council of Ministers Working Group on Conventional Weapons
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DFID	Department for International Development
DSEi	Defence and Security Equipment International (Trade Exhibition)
DTCT	UK/US Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty
ECO	Export Control Organisation (within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills)
EGAD	Export Group for Aerospace and Defence
EU	European Union
FAC	Foreign Affairs Committee
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FMCT	Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
GTRP	Global Threat Reduction Programme
ICT	Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU
ITAR	(US) International Traffic in Arms Regulations
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
OGEL	Open General Export Licence
OGTCL	Open General Trade Control Licence
OIEL	Open Individual Export Licence
OITCL	Open Individual Trade Control Licence
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPTs	Occupied Palestinian Territories
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSJA	Overseas Security and Justice Assistance
PMSC	Private Maritime and Security Company
PQ	Parliamentary Question
PSC	Private Security Company
P5	The 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SIEL	Standard Individual Export Licence
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SITCL	Standard Individual Trade Control Licence
SITL	Standard Individual Transshipment Licence
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UKTI DSO	United Kingdom Trade & Investment Defence & Security Organisation
UKWG	United Kingdom Working Group on Arms
UNROCA	United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
WA	Wassenaar Arrangement
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMDfz	Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone
WMS	Written Ministerial Statement

## Definition of Export Control Organisation licences

### **SIEL**—Standard Individual Export Licence

SIELs generally allow shipments of specified items to a specific consignee up to the quantity specified by the licence. Licences permitting permanent export are generally valid for two years from the date of issue. Where the export is temporary, for example for the purposes of demonstration, trial or evaluation, the licence is generally valid for one year only and the items must be returned before the licence expires.<sup>1</sup> The Government supplies the value of SIELs.

### **OIEL**—Open Individual Export Licence

OIELs are specific to an individual exporter and cover multiple shipments of specified items to specified destinations and/or, in some cases specified consignees. Licences permitting permanent export are generally valid for up to 5 years from the date of issue. However, OIELs covering the export to EU Member States of items entered on the Military List and Dealer to Dealer OIELs are generally valid for 3 years.<sup>2</sup> The Government does not supply the value of OIEL licences.

### **SITCL**—Standard Individual Trade Control Licence

A Standard Individual Trade Control Licence is specific to a named trader and covers involvement in trading of a set quantity of specific goods between a specific source and destination country with a specified consignor, consignee and end-user. SITCLs will normally be valid for two years.<sup>3</sup>

### **OITCL**—Open Individual Trade Control Licence

An OITCL is specific to a named trader and covers involvement in trading or specific goods between specific source and destination countries and/or specified consignors, consignees and end-users. OITCLs are generally valid for two years.<sup>4</sup>

### **OGTL**—Open General Transshipment Licence

This licence allows, subject to conditions, any goods to be imported for transshipment and subsequently exported within 30 days of entering the UK.<sup>5</sup>

### **OGEL** – Open General Export licence

Open General Licences (OGLs) are pre-published export, trade or transshipment licences in the public domain.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1st April 2014–30th June 2014, p 4

<sup>2</sup> Ev w459 – Letter from Vince Cable to The Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 4 February 2015

<sup>3</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1st April 2014–30th June 2014, p 5

<sup>4</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1st April 2014–30th June 2014, p 5

<sup>5</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Transshipment licences, <https://www.gov.uk/transshipment-licences>



**SITL**—Standard Individual Transhipment Licence

A SITL is specific to a named transit/transhipment provider, and covers a set quantity of specific goods between a specific source and destination country with a specified consignor, consignee and end-user. SITLs are normally valid for 2 years.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *Open General Licences: an overview*, <https://www.gov.uk/open-general-licences-an-overview>

<sup>7</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *Transhipment licences*, <https://www.gov.uk/transhipment-licences>

# 1 Introduction

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1. The four House of Commons Select Committees that comprise the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC)<sup>8</sup> are: the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, the Defence Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee and the International Development Committee. All members of the four Select Committees are entitled to attend Committee meetings of the CAEC, although for practical purposes each of the four Committees usually nominates four members to serve on the CAEC.

2. The Committees' task is to scrutinise the UK Government's arms export control procedures and legislation, individual arms export licence decisions, arms export policies and performance, and policies and performance on international arms control agreements. To achieve this, the Committees have scrutinised in detail the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)<sup>9</sup> presented to the House of Commons on 17 July 2014 by the four Secretaries of State. The Committees' questions on the Government's Annual Report and the Government's answers are reproduced in full in Annex 2. The Committees have also scrutinised in detail the Government's information placed quarterly on the website of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) on individual arms export licence decisions; the Committees' questions on those decisions and the Government's answers for the period Q4 2013 to Q2 2014 are reproduced in full in Annex 1. The Committees were, in addition, able to scrutinise the Government's policies and performance on arms export controls as a result of information received in the Committees' informal meetings and from a range of other sources and reports. The Committees were grateful to those who submitted formal Written Evidence to our latest inquiry; these memoranda are reproduced in full in Volume III of the Report at Ev w56–163. A significant amount Written Evidence was submitted by Ministers in the course of the inquiry, mostly in response to questions from the Committees. This is listed at Annex 3 and reproduced in full in Volume III of the Report at Ev w164–460. A debate on the CAEC's last Report was held in the House of Commons on 30 October 2014 during which a number of key issues were raised, including the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, exports to authoritarian regimes, UK arms exports to Russia, Hong Kong, Israel and other countries of concern, the DSEi exhibition and the arms export suspension and revocation mechanism.<sup>10</sup>

3. On 20 October 2014 the Committees visited the Export Control Organisation at the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills to view the process of assessing licence applications and to ask detailed questions of officials. The Committees would like to thank BIS officials for organising and hosting the visit of the Committees.

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<sup>8</sup> From April 1999 to March 2008 the Committees were known as the "Quadripartite Committee".

<sup>9</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013*, HC 480, 17 July 2014

<sup>10</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, cols 403–430WH

4. The Committees' scrutiny for this inquiry included two Oral Evidence sessions held first with the UK Working Group on Arms (UKWG)<sup>11</sup> and the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD)<sup>12</sup> on 10 November 2014; second, with the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Philip Hammond, on 1 December 2014. The complete texts of the Committees' questions and the witnesses' answers in the Oral Evidence sessions can be found in Volume III of the Report at Ev w1–55.

5. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation in the Introduction to their 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Government's Response (Cm8395) were as follows:

**The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees continue to conclude that the giving of Oral Evidence to the Committees by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Foreign Secretary at the last two annual Oral Evidence sessions of the Committees reflects the importance that the Government rightly attaches to arms export and arms control policies.<sup>13</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees' conclusion.<sup>14</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees continue to recommend that given the far-reaching significance of arms export and arms control decisions for the Government's foreign, trade, defence and international development policies, Oral Evidence should continue to be given to the Committees on Arms Export Controls by both Secretaries of State.<sup>15</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government will continue to make Ministers and senior officials available for Oral Evidence Sessions. A decision on whether the Ministers giving evidence will be the Secretaries of State will be taken nearer the time of the next Oral Evidence Sessions.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> The UK Working Group on Arms comprises Action on Armed Violence, Amnesty UK, Article 36, Omega Research Foundation, Oxfam and Saferworld.

<sup>12</sup> The Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) comprise representatives from defence and aerospace industries.

<sup>13</sup> Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees of Session 2014-15, *Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Controls (2014): Scrutiny of the Government's UK Strategic Exports Controls Annual Report 2013, the Government's Quarterly reports from October 2012 to September 2013, and the Government's policies on arms exports and international arms control issues*, HC 186, para 4

<sup>14</sup> Government Response to the Report of the First joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees of Session 2014-15, *Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Controls (2014): Scrutiny of the Government's UK Strategic Exports Controls Annual Report 2013, the Government's Quarterly reports from October 2012 to September 2013, and the Government's policies on arms exports and international arms control issues* (HC 186), Cm8935, 13 October 2014, p 5

<sup>15</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 5

<sup>16</sup> Cm8935, p 5

6. I propose that the Committees conclude that the decision in each of the last three years of the present Parliament of the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills to give Oral Evidence themselves to the Committees is welcome. The Committees continue to conclude that the giving of Oral Evidence to the Committees by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Foreign Secretary at the last three annual Oral Evidence sessions of the Committees reflects the importance that the Government's Committees on Arms Export Control (2015): Scrutiny of the Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013, the Government's Quarterly Reports from October 2013 to June 2014, and the Government's policies on arms exports and international arms control issue (2015): Scrutiny of the Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013, the Government's Quarterly Reports from October 2013 to June 2014, and the Government's policies on arms exports and international arms control issue HC 60 assessment rightly attaches to arms export and arms control policies.

7. I propose that the Committees continue to recommend that given the far-reaching significance of arms export and arms control decisions for the Government's foreign, trade, defence and international development policies, Oral Evidence should continue to be given to the Committees on Arms Export Controls by both Secretaries of State.

## 2 The Government's "United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013" (HC 480)

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8. The Committees put a series of questions to the Government relating to its United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report for 2013 published in July 2014.<sup>17</sup> The questions and the Government's answers can be found at Annex 2. Specific issues raised by the Committees appear in the relevant subject sections.

9. The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendations on the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 in the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations:**

The Committees conclude that all international arms control measures raise proliferation issues either directly or indirectly and require parliamentary scrutiny alongside the Government's national strategic export controls policies as is done by the Committees themselves in their own Reports to Parliament. The Committees, therefore, recommend that the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Control Annual Report should include the Government's policies on all international arms control measures including:

- The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
- The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
- The Chemical Weapons Convention
- The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
- The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
- The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
- Sub-Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Weapons
- A Middle-East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone
- The National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012-2015.

The Committees further recommend that the title of the Government's Annual Report should be widened accordingly.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Export Control: United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013*, HC 480

<sup>18</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 6

**The Government's Response:**

The Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Control Annual Report will continue to cover strategic exports from the UK, and in particular the UK's implementation of international and domestic regulation of strategic exports.

The Government does not agree that it should change the title or broaden the scope of its Annual Report.<sup>19</sup>

**10. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government has produced no reason for refusing to accept the Committees' Recommendation in their last Report that the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report should include the Government's policies on all, rather than just some, international arms control measures, all of which raise strategic export or proliferation issues, either directly or indirectly, and require parliamentary scrutiny.**

**11. I propose that the Committees therefore recommend that the Government's Report should include the Government's policies and performance on the following international arms control measures, references to all of which were omitted from the Government's last Annual Report (HC 480):**

- **The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty;**
- **The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction;**
- **The Chemical Weapons Convention;**
- **The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention;**
- **The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;**
- **The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;**
- **Sub-Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Weapons;**
- **A Middle-East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone; and**
- **The National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012-2015.**

**12. I propose that the Committees further conclude that, regardless of the Government's Response to the Committees' Recommendation in their last Report, in view of the importance of the international arms control measures listed immediately above, the Committees will continue to scrutinize the Government's policies and performance in relation to each of them.**

**13. I propose that the Committees continue to recommend that the title of the Government's Annual Report should be widened accordingly.**

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<sup>19</sup> Cm8935, p 6

## 3 The Committees' Report of 2013–14 (HC 186)

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### The Committees' Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935)

14. The Committees' last Report (HC 186), published on 23 July 2014, was in 3 volumes. Volume I (which was printed) contained a summary and the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendations; Volume II, which was published on the internet, took the form of evidence from the Chairman to the Committees and presented the reasoning behind the Report's Conclusions and Recommendations; and Volume III, which was also published on the internet, contained both oral and written evidence.<sup>20</sup> The Government's Response (Cm8935) to the Committees' last Report was published in October 2014.

15. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on the timeliness of the Government's previous Response (Cm8707) to the Committees' 2013 Report (HC 205) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:**

The Committees conclude that as its 2013 Report (HC 205) was published on 17 July 2013 and as the Government's Response (Cm8707) was published in October 2013 and only had three deferred responses to the Committees' Recommendations, the Government has broadly maintained the improvement made in the previous year in the timeliness of its responses to the Committees Report. The Committees recommend that this improvement is maintained.<sup>21</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees' conclusion and will, as always, endeavour to provide timely and detailed responses.<sup>22</sup>

**16. I propose that the Committees conclude that the fact that the Government's Response (Cm8935) to the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186) contained no deferred responses is welcome.**

**17. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government continues to provide timely and detailed responses to the Committees' Report.**

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<sup>20</sup> See the Committees' website at <http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/other-committees/committee-on-arms-export-controls/publications/>

<sup>21</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 7

<sup>22</sup> Cm8935, p 6

## 4 The Committees' questions on the Government's quarterly information on arms export licences

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18. The Export Control Organisation (ECO), within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, publishes details of the arms export licences that have been granted, refused or appealed for each Quarter. These are known as the Pivot reports. The information in these reports is of great importance, and the Quarterly reports are subject to detailed scrutiny by the Committees. This invariably results in the Committees putting a series of detailed questions to the Government, to which the Government provides answers to the CAEC.

19. Continuing the Committees' policy of publishing their unclassified questions on the Government's quarterly arms export licences reports and the Government's unclassified answers, the Committees' questions and the Government's answers for Quarter 4 of 2013 and Quarters 1 and 2 of 2014 are contained in Annex 1. Key information from the Government's answers to the Committees' questions on the quarterly Pivot reports is included in the various country headings in section 10 of this Report.

20. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on the Committees' questions on the Government's quarterly information on arms export licences in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:**

The Committees conclude that the Government's acceptance of the Committees' previous Recommendation that the Government's answers to the Committees' questions on the Government's published quarterly reports of arms export licences granted, refused or appealed should provide the maximum disclosure of information on a non-classified basis consistent with safeguarding the UK's security and trade interests is welcome and recommend that the Government continues this practice.<sup>23</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government accepts the Committees' conclusion which reflects current practice.<sup>24</sup>

**21. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government's acceptance of the Committees' conclusion that the Government's answers to the Committees' questions on the Government's published quarterly reports of arms export licences granted, refused or appealed should provide the maximum disclosure of information on a non-classified basis consistent with safeguarding the UK's security and trade interests is welcome. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government continues to do so.**

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<sup>23</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 8

<sup>24</sup> Cm8935, p 6



## 5 Arms export control legislation and procedures

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### Extra-territoriality

22. The Committees' previous scrutiny of extra-territoriality is described at paragraphs 20–30 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations are at paragraphs 9–12 of Volume I of that Report.

23. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations on extra-territoriality in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees continue to recommend that it is not justifiable to enable a UK person to escape UK criminal jurisdiction by engaging in arms export or arms brokering activity overseas which would be a criminal offence if carried out from the UK.<sup>25</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government's position on extra-territoriality remains as set out in previous responses to the Committees. In particular, it is very difficult to enforce UK law against persons outside the UK. That is why extra-territorial jurisdiction is generally reserved only for the most serious crimes or situations where we have an international obligation to act. Brokering of Category C goods between non-embargoed destinations falls into neither of these categories.<sup>26</sup>

#### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees further conclude that the fact that the Government has now been obliged, in order to achieve compliance with the terms of the Arms Trade Treaty, to extend extra-territoriality to the brokering by UK persons worldwide of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, certain warships, and certain missiles and their launchers is welcome.<sup>27</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government agrees with the Committees' conclusion.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 9

<sup>26</sup> Cm8935, p 7

<sup>27</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 10

<sup>28</sup> Cm8935, p 7

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees continue to recommend that extra-territoriality is extended to the remaining military goods in Category C.29

**The Government's Response:**

The Government does not accept the Committees' recommendations. The Government's position on extra-territoriality remains as set out in previous responses to the Committees. In particular, it is very difficult to enforce UK law against persons outside the UK. That is why extra-territorial jurisdiction is generally reserved only for the most serious crimes or situations where we have an international obligation to act. Brokering of Category C goods between non-embargoed destinations falls into neither of these categories.<sup>30</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether in order to achieve full UK compliance with the terms of the Arms Trade Treaty the Government is obliged to extend extra-territoriality not only to UK persons engaged in arms brokering activities worldwide, but also to UK persons engaged in direct arms export activities worldwide, and, if so, when it will be introducing the relevant legislation.<sup>31</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The changes to the trade controls introduced by the Export Control (Amendment) Order 2014 completed the legislative changes necessary to achieve compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). No further legislative changes are necessary.<sup>32</sup>

24. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary on 2 December 2014 asking the following question relating to extra-territoriality:

Are there any plans for the Government to extend the range of goods licensed for arms exports covered by extra-territorial legislation?<sup>33</sup>

25. The Business Secretary replied on 15 December as follows:

The Government currently has no further plans to extend the extra-territorial scope of the controls on arms brokering beyond those additional items covered by the Arms Trade Treaty, namely main battle tanks and armoured fighting vehicles,

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<sup>29</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 11

<sup>30</sup> Cm8935, p 7

<sup>31</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 12

<sup>32</sup> Cm8935, p 7

<sup>33</sup> Ev w218 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 2 December 2014

combat aircraft and attack helicopters, large calibre artillery, certain missile systems and warships.<sup>34</sup>

**26. I propose that the Committees continue to conclude that it is not justifiable to enable a UK person to escape UK criminal jurisdiction by engaging in arms export or arms brokering activity overseas which would be a criminal offence if carried out from the UK.**

**27. I propose that though the Government has now been obliged, in order to achieve compliance with the terms of the Arms Trade Treaty, to extend extra-territoriality to brokering by UK persons worldwide of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, and certain missiles and their launchers, the Committees continue to recommend that extra-territoriality is extended to the remaining military and dual-use goods in Category C.**

**28. I also propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government in its Response lists the goods in the Military List and the Dual-Use List which remain in Category C and therefore outside the ambit of extra-territorial legal proceedings.**

### **“Brass Plate” companies**

29. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of “Brass Plate” companies is described at paragraphs 31–36 of the Chairman’s Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees’ 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees’ Conclusion and Recommendations are at paragraphs 13–15 of Volume I of that Report.

30. The Committees’ Conclusion and Recommendations on brass plate companies in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government’s Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees’ Conclusion:**

The Committees continue to conclude that it is most regrettable that the Government have still to take any action against “Brass Plate” arms exporting companies who have the benefit of UK company registration but carry out arms exporting and arms brokering activities overseas in contravention of UK Government policies.<sup>35</sup>

#### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees again recommend that the Government sets out in its Response to this Report what steps it will take to discontinue the UK registration of such companies.<sup>36</sup>

#### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

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<sup>34</sup> Ev w220 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 15 December 2014

<sup>35</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 13

<sup>36</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 14

The Committees further recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states the number of such companies whose UK registration the Government has discontinued on public interest, or on any other grounds, in the present Parliament, and also states the names of the companies so de-registered.<sup>37</sup>

**The Government's Response (to above Conclusion and two Recommendations):**

The Government reiterates that existing legislation would enable action to be taken against brass plate companies that are acting in breach of UK law or where their continued registration is against the public interest, subject to the availability of sufficient evidence that could be disclosed in any legal proceedings. No such companies have been de-registered on these grounds in the present Parliament.<sup>38</sup>

**31. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it is aware of any UK registered "Brass Plate" companies with no or minimal staff permanently based in the UK and which are, or have been, carrying out arms exporting and arms brokering activities overseas in contravention of UK Government policies, and, if so, what action it will take.**

## Arms brokers

32. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms brokers is described at paragraphs 37–45 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation are at paragraphs 16 and 17 of Volume I of that Report.

33. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on arms broker in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the Government's acceptance of the Committees' repeated Recommendation that it carries out a full review of the case for a pre-licence register of arms brokers is welcome.<sup>39</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees' conclusion. The Government intends to publish the results of the Call for Evidence as soon as possible. However, this is most likely to be towards the end of the year (2014).<sup>40</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

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<sup>37</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 15

<sup>38</sup> Cm8935, p 8

<sup>39</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 16

<sup>40</sup> Cm8935, p 8

The Committees recommend that the Government both completes its public consultation and announces its policy conclusion before the end of October 2014 at the latest.<sup>41</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees' conclusion. The Government intends to publish the results of the Call for Evidence as soon as possible. However, this is most likely to be towards the end of the year (2014).<sup>42</sup>

34. In its Written Submission for this Report, the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) stated that its concerns regarding a pre-licensing register of arms brokers being implemented by the UK Government had been exacerbated by two recent events. It said:

First, as an alleged consequence of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), Category B (ie where extraterritorial controls apply) has been extended to the full range of platforms listed in the ATT. We do not agree that this action is a necessary consequence of the Treaty, which merely says (Article 16) "*Each state shall take measures, pursuant to its national laws, to regulate brokering taking place under its jurisdiction for conventional arms covered under Article 2(1).*" Nor was this raised as a consequence of the Treaty during the negotiations, at which UK Industry was represented.

Secondly, the BIS issued in April a consultative document on the pre-licensing of arms brokers, an idea which HMG has considered in the past and rejected, for what seem to us to be extremely cogent reasons.<sup>43</sup>

EGAD continued by stating that it had previously indicated that it was not "implacably opposed" either to further extension of extraterritorial controls, or to a requirement for pre-registration, provided that they formed part of a system for exempting *bona fide* and legitimate companies, and British expatriate employees of *bona fide* overseas companies, from the trade regulations. It said that it would "continue to be ready to work with HMG to achieve that objective, if it is felt that this would be desirable." It stated:

Meanwhile, EGAD has been receiving a number of queries over recent months from enquirers around the World seeking information and assistance on whether they are impacted by the UK's extraterritorial trade controls or not, as they have looked at the ECO's published guidance on this, and found it wanting, not clearly, authoritatively and definitely covering their particular commercial circumstances. As a result, we believe that this guidance needs to be reviewed and updated.<sup>44</sup>

35. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary on 2 December 2014 asking the following question relating to arms brokers:

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<sup>41</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 17

<sup>42</sup> Cm8935, p 8

<sup>43</sup> Ev w59-60

<sup>44</sup> Ev w60

When will the results of the consultation on the pre-licence registration of arms brokers be published?<sup>45</sup>

The Business Secretary replied on 15 December as follows:

We are now concluding the process of analysing the results of our ‘call for evidence’ on the idea of introducing a pre-licensing register of arm brokers and are discussing them with colleagues across Government. I hope to be in a position to publish the results with a Government response by the end of 2014 or, at the latest, in January 2015.<sup>46</sup>

36. On 19 January 2015 the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, tabled a Written Parliamentary Question as follows:

To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, whether he plans to publish the results of his call for evidence on the introduction of a pre-licensing register of arms brokers together with the Government’s response in January 2015 at the latest.

The Government responded on 27 January as follows:

The results of the Call for Evidence are still subject to internal discussion across Government. The Government will publish a response as soon as feasibly possible, however this is unlikely to be before the end of January 2015.<sup>47</sup>

**37. I propose that the Committees conclude it is regrettable that by the time of the Committees’ approval of this Report on 9 March 2015 the Government had still not published the results of its ‘call for evidence’ on the introduction of a pre-licensing register of arms brokers with the Government’s response which was expected by the end of 2014 or, at the latest, in January 2015. I also propose that the Committees recommend that the Government does so as soon as possible and in any event no later than in its Response to this Report.**

## EU dual-use controls

38. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of EU dual-use controls is described at paragraphs 46–49 of the Chairman’s Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees’ 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees’ Recommendation is at paragraph 18 of Volume I of that Report.

39. The Committees’ Recommendation on EU dual-use controls in their 2014 Report (HC 18605) and the Government’s Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

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<sup>45</sup> Ev w218 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 2 December 2014

<sup>46</sup> Ev w220 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 15 December 2014

<sup>47</sup> HC Deb, 27 January 2015, 221258 WPO

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report:

- a) whether the EU Commission's Report on Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 (the so-called "Dual-Use Regulation") has now been published, and
- b) whether the Government has made, or will be making, a response to that Report.<sup>48</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

- a) The EU Commission's Report to the Council and European Parliament was published on 16 October 2013 and is available on the Commission's website: [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/october/tradoc\\_151857.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/october/tradoc_151857.pdf)
- b) The Government has not made, and will not be making, a formal response to this Report.<sup>49</sup>

40. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)* the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about EU dual-use controls. The question and answer were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

In respect of the EU Commission's proposals for amendments to the EU system of exports controls for dual-use items, will the Government state for each proposal whether it wishes to amend it and, if so, in what way, or whether it opposes it and, if so, why?

**The Government's answer:**

The European Commission's Communication—available here: [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/april/tradoc\\_152446.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/april/tradoc_152446.pdf)—does not contain concrete proposals to amend export controls for dual-use items.<sup>50</sup>

41. In a follow-up to the Westminster Hall Debate on the Committees' last Report (HC 186) held on 30 October 2014 the responding Minister, Tobias Ellwood, wrote to Ann McKechin MP on 13 November 2014 as follows:

I can confirm that the agreed changes will be implemented through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the Dual-Use regulation.

As per standard EU procedures, the EU Commission adopted the Commission Delegated Regulation amending Annex 1 on 22 October. The regulation is now subject to a two month silence procedure, during which either the EU Council or the European Parliament can raise any objections. In the absence of objections from either organisation during this timeframe, the regulation is expected to be published

<sup>48</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 18

<sup>49</sup> Cm8935, p 9

<sup>50</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

in the Official Journal of the European Union on 30 December and to come into force the next day.

A draft copy of the updated Regulation and Control List is published on the EU Commission website at: <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/import-and-export-rules/export-from-eu/dual-use-controls/>.<sup>51</sup>

**42. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response why it has not made, and will not be making, a formal response to the EU Commission's report on Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 (the so-called "Dual-Use Regulation").**

**43. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response whether the amended Annex 1 of the EU Dual-Use Regulation has now come into force, and, if so, on what date, and whether any amendments to Annex 1 of the EU Dual-Use Regulation will require amendments to either the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List, or amendments to either UK primary or secondary legislation, in order to achieve UK compliance.**

**44. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government keeps the Committees closely informed of amendments or changes of policy it wishes to see to the EU Dual-Use Regulation.**

### **EU end-use control of exported military goods**

45. The Committees' previous scrutiny of EU end-use control of exported military goods is described at paragraphs 50–52 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendations are at paragraph 19 of Volume I of that Report.

46. The Committees' Recommendations on EU end-use control of exported military goods in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendations:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report whether it remains concerned about the current limitations of EU end-use control of exported military goods with particular reference to ensuring that military end-use controls:

- a) can be applied to the export of complete items which are to be used as complete items; and
- b) will permit preventing the export of unlisted items that are to be modified for military purposes, either in the destination country or in an intermediate destination.

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<sup>51</sup> Ev w213 – Letter from Tobias Ellwood to Ann McKeichin dated 13 November 2014



If so, the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what action it is taking with the EU to remove the above limitations of EU end–use control of exported military goods.<sup>52</sup>

### **The Government’s Response:**

The Government’s position remains as set out in the response to the Committees’ 2013 Report. We continue to engage constructively in the ongoing review of the EU export control system for dual–use items.<sup>53</sup>

**47. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking to rectify the particular limitations of EU end–use control of exported military goods set out in Articles 4(2) and 4(4) of EU Council Regulation 428/2009 (the so–called “Dual–Use Regulation”) which it highlighted in its Response to the Committees’ 2013 Report, namely the need to ensure that military end–use controls:**

- a) can be applied to the export of complete items which are to be used as complete items; and
- b) will permit preventing the export of unlisted items that are to be modified for military purposes, either in the destination country or in an intermediate destination.

### **Torture end–use control and end–use control of goods used for capital punishment**

48. In 2006, the EU introduced the world’s first multilateral trade controls to prohibit the international trade in equipment which has no practical use other than for the purposes of capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and to control the trade in a range of policing and security equipment misused for such violations of human rights. *Council Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005 of 27 June 2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment*<sup>54</sup> fills a major gap in human–rights–based export controls. It introduced unprecedented, binding trade controls on a range of equipment which is often used in capital punishment, torture and other ill treatment, but which has not usually been included on EU Member States’ military, dual–use or strategic transfer control lists.

49. In July 2014, following a comprehensive review, the European Commission introduced *Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 775/2014*<sup>55</sup> which significantly expanded

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<sup>52</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 19

<sup>53</sup> Cm8935, p 9

<sup>54</sup> ‘Council Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005 of 27 June 2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, Official Journal of the EU, L 200/1, 30 June 2005, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:200:0001:0019:EN:PDF>.

<sup>55</sup> Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 775/2014 of 16 July 2014 amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, Official Journal of the EU, 17 July 2014, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L\\_.2014.210.01.0001.01.ENG](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.210.01.0001.01.ENG).

the lists of prohibited and controlled goods covered by Council Regulation 1236/2005. These changes are legally binding and directly applicable now in all 28 EU Member States. This expansion of scope was an important first step in an ongoing comprehensive overhaul of Council Regulation 1236/2005.

50. The European Commission, Council and Parliament are now engaged in a substantive review of the operation of Council Regulation 1236/2005. In January 2014 the Commission presented proposals for strengthening the operative mechanisms, including the annexes of controlled items.<sup>56</sup> The Commission's proposals are being considered by the Council of the EU within its Working Party of Trade Questions (WPTQ). The European Parliament will also start discussions this year on the Commission's proposals.

51. The Committees on Arms Export Controls' previous scrutiny of torture end-use control and end-use control of goods used for capital punishment is described at paragraphs 53–58 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 20 of Volume I of that Report.

52. The Committees' Recommendation on Torture end-use control and end-use control of goods for capital punishment in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report:

- a) whether the British Government is represented on the informal Experts Group being consulted by the EU Commission in its review of the EU Torture Regulation and, if so, by whom;
- b) whether the EU Commission's intended meeting last year with Member States for formal discussion on its proposals for the EU Torture Regulation took place, and whether the UK Government was present at the meeting;
- c) whether the Commission's proposals for the EU Torture Regulation have now been published and, if so, what the UK Government's response to them has been; and
- d) whether it will reconsider its policy of not legislating at national level for end-use controls on torture and death penalty goods.<sup>57</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

- a) The EU Commission's informal consultation with an 'Experts Group' drawn from civil society concluded in 2013. The Government was not represented in this group.

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<sup>56</sup> 'European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005 concerning the trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, COM (2014) 1 final', 2014/0005 (COD), 14 January 2014.

<sup>57</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 20

b) and c) The EU Commission held a meeting to discuss amendments to the Annexes to Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 on 30 October 2013, which the UK attended. The consequent amendments to the Annexes were published on 17 July 2014 and are publicly available at the following link: [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:JOL\\_2014\\_210\\_R\\_0001&qid=1405666721643&form=EN](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:JOL_2014_210_R_0001&qid=1405666721643&form=EN).

Separately, the Commission's proposals for a broad amendment to Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 are publicly available at the following link, alongside an Explanatory Memorandum issued by the Government:

<http://europeanmemoranda.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/memorandum/proposal-for-regulation-of-the-european-parliament-of-the-council-amending-council-regulation-ec-no-1394109635>.

These proposals are subject to ongoing discussions at the EU Council. The UK will continue to engage constructively in those discussions.

d) We have no current plans to legislate at national level for end-use controls on torture and death-penalty goods. Experience has shown that list-based controls are more likely to be effective than horizontal end-use controls. The Business Secretary has shown that he is prepared to introduce list-based controls where necessary, as when banning the export of certain drugs used in execution by lethal injection. However, list-based and end-use controls are not mutually exclusive and we remain ready to engage positively with the Commission should they be minded to consider an EU-wide torture end-use control.<sup>58</sup>

53. UK Working Group (UKWG), in its Written Evidence, called for the UK Government to ensure that effective measures are introduced to fully implement Commission Implementing Regulation EU No. 775/2014 and that adequate outreach measures are put in place to ensure that UK companies are informed of the extended scope of goods whose trade is either controlled or prohibited. It has also recommended that the UK Government plays an active and constructive role to strengthen the Commission proposals.<sup>59</sup>

54. In Oral Evidence on 10 November 2014 Oliver Sprague, Amnesty International, stated:

I think one of the most important things the Government could do here is reinvigorate or re-establish its commitment to establish the torture end-use control. Those who have been on this Committee for a long time will remember that it was a Government priority to introduce, as part of the review of the legislation in 2008, a new provision on torture to bring things into line with what currently exists for arms embargos and in relation to weapons of mass destruction. In cases in which it is known what the equipment is going to be used for, there is an obligation to deny the transfer, or stop the transfer, even if it is not on the annexed control list. The Government argued that it would not take this as a unilateral step, but it would be far

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<sup>58</sup> Cm8935, pp 9–10

<sup>59</sup> Ev w86

more effective to do it at an EU-wide level. Subsequently, it cautiously and carefully dropped that initiative.<sup>60</sup>

He continued by saying that NGOs were very concerned that the Government had decided not to push the torture end-use control. He said:

Now is the time for them to push it, because now is the time that the EU instrument is under formal review. It is under review now, and it is going to go on for all of next year. The Commission are drawing up proposals, and both the Parliament and member states are looking at a load of areas, including brokering provisions and advertising and promotion provisions, to close those loopholes. I think the one thing that the UK Government can do—because now is the time: if ever there was the time, it is now—is to push the EU to agree to the torture catch-all clause.<sup>61</sup>

55. In Oral Evidence on 1 December 2014 the Committees asked the Business Secretary about the reported loopholes in the Torture End-Use Controls. He replied:

I am familiar in broad terms with the regulations and how they can and cannot be applied, because I utilised them [...] to stop the export of chemicals to the United States in respect of executions. That had a significant impact on the debate on capital punishment in the United States. So we are aware of the potential for working with those regulations. I was not aware of the loopholes that you describe, but you raise a legitimate issue that we have to investigate. [...]. Certainly, if there are holes that are unplugged we need to see how we could plug them.<sup>62</sup>

Chris Chew, Head of Policy, Export Control Organisation, added:

Discussions are continuing in Brussels about possible reform of the so-called torture regulation. There is no proposal on the table for an end-use control but we continue to discuss with the other member states and the European Commission what this amended regulation should look like. We are engaging constructively but there is no specific proposal on the table at the moment.<sup>63</sup>

Edward Bell, Head, Export Control Organisation, added further: “On the whole we have favoured list-based controls as a better approach to controlling goods, but we are not closed to the idea of end-use controls, in principle, at all.”<sup>64</sup>

56. Following the Oral Evidence session the Business Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees as follows:

### **EU Torture Regulation**

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<sup>60</sup> Q 37

<sup>61</sup> Q 37

<sup>62</sup> Q126 [Vince Cable]

<sup>63</sup> Q 126 [Chris Chew]

<sup>64</sup> Q 126 [Edward Bell]

The Government is supportive of measures that strengthen EU-wide controls in the trade in equipment that could be used for capital punishment or to abuse human rights, while not impeding legitimate trade.

The European Commission's proposals to amend Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 (Which is known as the "EU Torture Regulation") were published in January 2014 and are publically available at the following link, alongside an Explanatory memorandum issued by the UK Government: <http://european-memoranda.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/memorandum/proposal-for-regulation-of-the-european-parliament-of-the-council-amending-ec-no-1394109635>.

The Committees asked for information on the UK's input to the review. The Explanatory memorandum accurately summarises the Government's position on the Commission's proposals; the UK has so far submitted written comments on the proposals to introduce controls on brokering and technical assistance related to items listed in Annex III and Annex IIIa. The discussions at the EU Council are ongoing. Please be assured that, as I indicated at the evidence session, the UK will continue to engage positively in this process.

The Committees specifically raised the idea of a torture and capital punishment end-use control. The Committees continue to believe that list-based controls are more likely to be effective than end-use controls, which can be problematic to enforce. However, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. It is important to reiterate that the Commission has the lead role in this area and it has not included an end-use control in its wide-ranging package of proposed amendments. We intend to raise the issue as discussions progress and we remain ready to engage positively with the Commission should they seek to consider a potential torture and capital punishment end-use control.<sup>65</sup>

**57. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what is the latest position on:**

- a) **the EU's consideration and implementation of the European Commission's proposals to amend Council Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005 (known as the "EU Torture Regulation"); and**
- b) **the EU's consideration of a torture and capital punishment end-use control.**

## **Re-export controls and undertakings**

58. The Committees' previous scrutiny of re-export controls and undertakings is described at paragraphs 59–61 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 21 of Volume I of that Report.

59. The Committees' Recommendation on re-export controls and undertakings in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

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<sup>65</sup> Ev w220 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 15 December 2014

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states whether, in addition to the sniper rifles to France case in 2012, it has any information about controlled goods with export licence approval from the Government having subsequently been re-exported for undesirable uses or to undesirable destinations contrary to the Government's re-export controls and undertakings which became compulsory from July 2010 and, if so, provides the Committees with details in its Response.<sup>66</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government is not aware of any other such cases.<sup>67</sup>

**60. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether, apart from the sniper rifles to France case in 2012, it remains unaware of controlled goods with export licence approval from the UK Government having subsequently been re-exported for undesirable uses or to undesirable destinations contrary to the Government's re-export controls and undertakings which became compulsory from July 2010.**

### Licensed production overseas

61. The Committees' previous scrutiny of licensed production overseas is described at paragraphs 62–64 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 22 of Volume I of that Report.

62. The Committees' Recommendations on licensed production overseas in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendations:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states whether it is still the case that the Government has no evidence that, during the lifetime of the present Government, breaches of UK arms control policies may have occurred as a result of the export of UK-designed goods, including components, from licensed production facilities overseas. If this is no longer the case, the Committees further recommend that the Government provides details of such breaches in its Response to this Report.<sup>68</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government is not aware of any such cases.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 21

<sup>67</sup> Cm8935, p 11

<sup>68</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 22

<sup>69</sup> Cm8935, p 11

**63. I propose that the Committees once again recommend that the Government states whether it is still the case that the Government has no evidence that, during the lifetime of the present Government, breaches of UK arms control policies may have occurred as a result of the export of UK-designed goods, including components, from licensed production facilities overseas. If this is no longer the case, I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government provides details of such breaches in its Response to this Report.**

### **Use of UK subsidiaries to export arms**

64. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the use of UK subsidiaries to export arms is described at paragraphs 65–68 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 23 of Volume I of that Report.

65. The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation on the use of UK subsidiaries to export arms in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation:**

The Committees conclude that it is a significant loophole in UK arms export controls that a UK company can circumvent those controls by exporting military and dual-use goods using an overseas subsidiary. The Committees recommend that the Government states whether it will close this loophole, and, if so, by what means and in what timescale.<sup>70</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government does not accept the Committees' recommendation. Overseas subsidiaries are not UK companies and they are subject to the law of the countries in which they operate. Trying to extend UK law to foreign companies raises difficult legal and practical questions. In particular, we cannot enforce UK law against a foreign company operating outside the UK.

The Government is committed to promoting the highest standards of conduct by UK companies operating overseas. That is why we launched the Business and Human Rights Action Plan in September 2014, and have updated the Business and Human Rights Toolkit. We want all companies, wherever they are based and wherever they operate, to take account of the human rights' impacts of their activities. However, we have no plans to extend UK export control law to foreign subsidiaries.<sup>71</sup>

**66. I propose that the Committees continue to conclude that it is a significant loophole in UK arms export controls that a UK company can circumvent those controls by exporting military and dual-use goods using an overseas subsidiary.**

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<sup>70</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 23

<sup>71</sup> Cm8935, p 11

**67. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government considers how it could deter a UK parent company from utilising an overseas subsidiary in this way.**

### **The Consolidated Criteria and EU Council Common Position**

68. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position is described at paragraphs 69–83 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendations are at paragraphs 24–29 of Volume I of that Report.

69. The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendations on the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:**

The Committees conclude that it is misleading for the Government to have entitled its new Criteria the "Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria" when the text:

- a) has substantial differences from the EU Council's Common Position on arms exports;
- b) is not an EU document;
- c) includes the policy statement that "The Government will thus continue when considering licence applications to give full weight to the UK's national interest, including:
  - i. The potential effect on the UK's economic, financial and commercial interests, including our long-term interests in having stable, democratic trading partners;
  - ii. The potential effect on the UK's international relations;
  - iii. The potential effect on any collaborative defence production or procurement project with allies or EU partners;
  - iv. The protection of the UK's essential strategic industrial base"; and
- d) is clearly the UK Government's national variant of the EU Common Position on arms exports.

The Committees therefore recommend that the Government should clearly differentiate between the UK's Consolidated Criteria on arms exports and the EU's Common Position on arms exports.<sup>72</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

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<sup>72</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 24



The Government does not accept the Committees' conclusions. As the Business Secretary explained in his letter to the Chairman of 14 May 2014, the "new" Criteria represent an update of the Consolidated Criteria announced to Parliament in October 2000 to take account of developments in the past 14 years, including the adoption by the EU of the Common Position on arms exports and the adoption by the UN of the ATT. It does not purport to be an "EU document"; it is intended to set out how the UK will apply the eight Criteria. In addition, the update did not represent a substantive change in policy in any way and retaining the name of the "old" Criteria is intended to reflect this continuity in policy. The Government will continue to refer to the "Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria" (known as the "Consolidated Criteria") when we mean the Statement made to Parliament by the Business Secretary on 25 March 2014 or its predecessor, and to the "EU Common Position" when we mean Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.<sup>73</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response when it will be providing the Committees with its update on the EU User's Guide following the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty.<sup>74</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

[There was no Government Response to the Committees' Recommendation. However the present position on the update of the EU User Guide is as paragraph 75 below.]

**The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees further conclude that the fact that Government was obliged by provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty to introduce the risk of gender-based violence, in addition to violence against children, into the Criteria for the first time is welcome.<sup>75</sup>

**The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the Government's insertion into the Criteria that it will "not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international law" is welcome.<sup>76</sup>

**The Committees' Conclusion:**

However, the Committees also conclude that the Government's deletion of the policy in the October 2000 UK Consolidated Criteria that: "An export licence will not be

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<sup>73</sup> Cm8935, p 12

<sup>74</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 25

<sup>75</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 26

<sup>76</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 27

issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed.... by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression” represents a substantive weakening of the UK’s arms export controls and recommend that this wording is re-instated.<sup>77</sup>

**The Government’s Response to the above 3 Conclusions:**

The Government does not accept the Committees’ conclusions. As the Business Secretary explained in his letter to the Chairman of 14 May 2014:

“The statement you refer to was a general statement that formed part of the introductory text, it did not form part of the Consolidated Criteria itself. Licence applications have always been assessed against the eight Criteria and not against general statements contained in the introductory text.” There has been no substantive change in policy.<sup>78</sup>

**The Committees’ Conclusion:**

The Committees finally conclude that the Government’s assertion in relation to the new Arms Export Criteria announced on 25 March 2014 that: “None of these amendments should be taken to mean that there has been any substantive change in policy” is not sustainable.<sup>79</sup>

**The Government’s Response:**

The Government does not accept the Committees’ conclusions. As the Business Secretary explained in his letter to the Chairman of 14 May 2014:

“The statement you refer to was a general statement that formed part of the introductory text, it did not form part of the Consolidated Criteria itself. Licence applications have always been assessed against the eight Criteria and not against general statements contained in the introductory text.” There has been no substantive change in policy.<sup>80</sup>

70. Following publication of the Government’s *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)* the Committees wrote to the Government three questions about the Consolidated Criteria. The questions and answers were as follows:

**The Committees’ question:**

Ministerial Foreword

In his Written Ministerial Statement of 25 March 2014 the Business Secretary announced the Government’s revised Consolidated Criteria for arms exports from which the previous Government’s broad test of refusing arms exports “which might be used for internal repression” was dropped, leaving only the very much narrower test of refusing arms exports “if there is a clear risk that items might be used for

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<sup>77</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 28

<sup>78</sup> Cm8935, p 13

<sup>79</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 29

<sup>80</sup> Cm8935, p 13

internal repression.” How does the Government justify applying only the narrow clear risk test to the generality of UK arms exports whilst continuing, rightly, to apply the broad test of refusing arms exports “which might be used for internal repression” when suspending existing licences, for example to Egypt as set out in the Case Study on Egypt on page 16 of the Government’s Report?

**The Government’s answer:**

Criterion 2a of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria (known as the Consolidated Criteria) announced to Parliament in October 2000 states clearly that “[the Government will] not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression.” This commitment is repeated in the updated version of the Consolidated Criteria announced by the Business Secretary on 25 March 2014. As the Government has pointed out on a number of occasions, there has been no change in policy in respect of the application of Criterion 2a.

Egypt is a special case. At the EU Foreign Affairs Council on 21 August 2013 the “Member States agreed to suspend export licences on equipment which might be used for internal repression and reassess export licences for equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.” This is a lower threshold than that set out in the Consolidated Criteria (“might be used” rather than “clear risk”) and that is the basis on which licences for Egypt were suspended.

**The Committees’ questions:**

A.4 Assessment of Export Licence Applications

- a) Why has the Government misleadingly described the text that preceded the listing of the 8 Criteria for arms exports in the Written Statement made on 26 October 2000 by the then Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Rt Hon Peter Hain MP, as the “preamble” when that description was never used by the then Minister and the text in question contains a substantive statement of policy?
- b) Will the Government discontinue using the word “preamble” in this context?

**The Government’s answer:**

The text that preceded the listing of the 8 Criteria for arms exports in the Written Statement made on 26 October 2000 served as a preliminary or introductory statement, explaining in general terms the object and purpose of the Criteria. That is why it was referred to as a “preamble.” The text in question did not contain any substantive statement of policy – the policy was set out in the statement of the 8 Criteria themselves.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

71. In its Written Evidence UK Working Group (UKWG) said that a number of issues remained outstanding that merited further explanation from the Government. For example, it would be helpful if the Government could give an assurance that there was no substantive difference between the instructions in the Consolidated Criteria to ‘not grant a licence’ and in the Common Position to ‘deny a licence’ in the event that a transfer would breach the criteria. The *act of denial* required under the Common Position created a follow-on obligation on the part of the denying state to circulate information to other EU Member States and to consult in the event that a similar licence application was then received by another Member State; by contrast a failure to grant a licence, which could involve a passive lack of action, could be interpreted as involving no such obligation.<sup>82</sup>

72. In the Westminster Hall Debate on the Committees’ last Report (HC 186) on 30 October 2014 the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley set out the principal difference between the Committees and the Government on the revised Consolidated Criteria of 25 March 2014 as follows:

The previous Government’s arms export control policy was set out in a ministerial written answer on 26 October 2000 by the then Minister of State at the Foreign Office, the right hon. Member for Neath (Mr Hain). It included a key statement of policy, which remained unchanged throughout the life of that Government:

“An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed...by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression.”

We spent two years during this Parliament going hither and thither with Ministers on whether they adhered to that policy, had changed it, or were seeking to change it. That was brought to a conclusion this year when the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills announced the present Government’s arms export control policy in a written ministerial statement on 25 March. When that statement appeared, the previous Government’s policy wording, which I have just quoted, was dropped. Notwithstanding that fact, the Business Secretary said in his statement:

“None of these amendments should be taken to mean that there has been any substantive change in policy.”

Since March, when the Business Secretary gave his written ministerial answer, the Government have made various attempts to downgrade or outright dismiss the key policy wording on arms exports and internal repression in the original ministerial written answer of October 2000. First, in their latest annual report on United Kingdom strategic export controls, which was published in July, the Government chose to describe the wording in question as “the preamble”, even though the word “preamble” does not appear anywhere in the answer given by the right hon. Member for Neath.

Then, in a letter to me on 6 October, the Foreign Secretary tried to maintain that that key wording did not represent a statement of policy at all, saying:

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<sup>82</sup> Ev w98

“The text in question did not contain any substantive statement of policy.”

I leave it to hon. Members to judge whether that is the case:

“An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed...by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression”.

That was the statement in the written ministerial answer recorded in *Hansard*.

I stress to the House that it was the unanimous view of all four Select Committees comprising the Committees on Arms Export Controls that that wording did represent a substantive statement of policy. It was also the view of the right hon. Member for Neath, who came before the Committees to give oral evidence on that very point. When we asked him specifically whether he thought that policy on arms exports and internal repression had changed, he said:

“So I do think the policy has changed. It is a more relaxed approach to arms exports.”

In the light of those facts, as far as the Committees are concerned—we made this clear in our report—only one, regrettable conclusion can be drawn from those important exchanges on arms exports and internal repression: the Government have made a significant change in policy, but have not been prepared to acknowledge that such a change has taken place. I put it formally to the Government that they should consider most carefully whether they should now offer an apology to the Committees and the House for making a change in policy without being prepared to acknowledge that to the Committees.<sup>83</sup>

73. In the debate Ian Murray MP, the frontbench spokesman for the opposition, said:

It remains the strategic approach of the Opposition that arms must not be sold to nations that will use them for external aggression or internal repression, and that they should be used for defence. [...] It was made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Neath (Mr Hain) in 2000. It is still the approach that we champion in opposition. We would not deviate from that. We recognise that nations have the right to defend their sovereign lands, but they do not have the right to oppress their people and use weaponry sold to them by this country to stamp on legitimate demonstrations, as we have seen on our television screens in the past few months.<sup>84</sup>

He continued by stating in reference to the changes made to the Consolidated criteria that:

Despite taking such positive steps with the arms trade treaty last year, we have now gone backwards in terms of the clarity that was required from the Government in that sentence. There has been justification from the Government for the removal of those criteria [...] but it significantly weakens the test for arms exports. We are concerned about its removal and urge the Government and the Minister to reflect on that.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> HC Deb, 30 October 2014, Cols 115–116WH

<sup>84</sup> HC Deb, 30 October 2014, Col 133WH

<sup>85</sup> HC Deb, 30 October 2014, Col 133WH

74. In the Oral Evidence session on 1 December 2014 the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, asked the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, if he wished to make an apology to the Committees and the House for his statement that there had been no material change of policy in the UK's Consolidated Criteria, notwithstanding the fact that, in the view of the Committees and the former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs [Peter Hain] the policy statement that was dropped was a significant one.<sup>86</sup> In response the Business Secretary said:

I have not come to offer an apology, because I am quite clear that we have not changed the policy. What you are referring to, I think, is the language in criterion 2, which is in relation to domestic repression and makes it clear that there should be a "clear risk". That is the criterion that we have adopted in arms licensing. I know that you make a distinction between the narrow and the broad test—the broad test being in the preamble. But we have operated the narrow test, as I think you called it, that there should be a clear risk consistently. There has certainly been no conscious effort by me or my colleagues to change policy.

I am assured that, under the previous Administration, exactly the same set of principles were applied. There is one exception which we have formalised, which is in the case where risk is not clear and when there is rapid movement and uncertainty. That is why we brought in the suspension system, which was applied in the case of Egypt and, I think, elsewhere. That is where we stand. To answer your question directly: we are quite categorical that there has not been a change of policy.<sup>87</sup>

In replying to Vince Cable's comments Sir John Stanley said:

Secretary of State, the words will have to rest as they are. In the Committees, we are quite clear that the wording of the broad test is separate from the wording of the clear risk test. It is much more widely drawn, and in the Committees' view it represents a statement of policy as endorsed by the Minister responsible for the previous consolidated criteria. Once again, I point out to the Secretary of State that although he has used the word "preamble", that word does not appear anywhere in the previous consolidated criteria of October 2000. However, you have given your response, and it will be for the House and those outside the House to draw their own conclusions.<sup>88</sup>

75. As recorded above in paragraph 69 the Government omitted to respond to one of the Committees' Recommendations in its last Report. The Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, therefore wrote to the Business Secretary on 8 January 2015 as follows:

In the Government's Response (Cm8935) to the Committee's 2014 Report (HC 186) on page 12 there was no response provided to the Committees' recommendation that the Government states in its Response when it will be providing the Committees

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<sup>86</sup> Q 75

<sup>87</sup> Q 75

<sup>88</sup> Q 76

with its update on the EU User's Guide following the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty.<sup>89</sup>

The Foreign Secretary replied on 16 January 2015 as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 8 January to the Secretary of State for BIS, about the updating of the EU User's Guide following the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty.

The EU User's Guide is being updated in the EU working group COARM. Efforts have been underway for some months now and will continue. The EU User's Guide will be updated in line with the Arms Trade Treaty, an essential component given its recent Entry into Force on 24 December 2014.

The UK will be maintaining its participation as part of the process and will continue to support efforts by the Member States and the EEAS [European External Action Service]. However, as work is still underway I cannot divulge further details.<sup>90</sup>

**76. I propose that the Committees continue to conclude that, notwithstanding the Government's statement to the contrary, the Government's dropping from its revised Consolidated Criteria of March 2014 for arms exports of the statement in the previous Government's Consolidated Criteria of October 2000 that: "An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed...by concerns that the goods might be use for internal repression" represented a substantive change of policy.**

**77. I propose that the Committees recommend that this wording is re-instated into its current Consolidated Criteria.**

**78. I propose that the Committees further conclude that as the Government attaches no policy significance to this wording, it can have no objection to accepting the Committees' recommendation on policy grounds.**

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<sup>89</sup> Ev w433 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 8 January 2015

<sup>90</sup> Ev w434 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 16 January 2015

## 6 Organisational and operational issues

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### Export Control Organisation (ECO)

#### *Remit, responsibilities, structure and staffing*

79. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Export Control Organisation – remit and responsibilities is described at paragraphs 84–86 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 30 of Volume I of that Report.

80. The Committees' Recommendation on the Export Control Organisation – remit and responsibilities in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report whether it remains satisfied that the present remit, responsibilities, structure and staffing of the Export Control Organisation fully meet the Government's policy objectives, whether it has any plans to make changes, and, if so, what those changes are.<sup>91</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

There are no plans to change the current remit of the Export Control Organisation (ECO). Staffing levels in the ECO have been reduced in common with all parts of Government and are kept under review as part of the Department for Business, Innovations and Skills (BIS) business planning cycle. Current staffing levels are adequate and the Government is meeting its export licensing targets.<sup>92</sup>

**81. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) **whether it remains satisfied that staffing levels at the Export Control Organisation (ECO) remain adequate; and**
- b) **whether the Government is continuing to meet its export licensing targets, and, if not, to specify which targets are not now being met.**

#### *Charging for processing arms export licences*

82. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Export Control Organisation – charging for processing arms export licences is described at paragraphs 87–89 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014

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<sup>91</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 30

<sup>92</sup> Cm8935, pp 13–14



Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusion is at paragraph 31 of Volume I of that Report.

83. The Committees' Conclusion on the Export Control Organisation – charging for processing arms export licences in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees continue to conclude that it would be undesirable to make the Export Control Organisation financially dependent on fee income from arms exporters, and recommends that the Government states in its Response to this Report whether it remains the Government's policy not to introduce a charging regime for arms export licences.<sup>93</sup>

**Government Response:**

The Government has no plans to charge for export licensing services in this Parliament, although it does not rule out considering options for chargeable services in the future.<sup>94</sup>

**84. I propose that the Committees continue to conclude that it would be undesirable to make the Export Control Organisation financially dependent on fee income from arms exporters.**

**85. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it has given any consideration to options for chargeable export licensing services since the publication of its previous Response (Cm8935).**

### **Performance**

86. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Export Control Organisation – performance is described at paragraphs 90–103 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations are at paragraphs 32–35 of Volume I of that Report.

87. The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendations on the Export Control Organisation – performance in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the substantial increase in scrutiny by FCO Ministers of arms export licence applications — up from 39 in 2010 to over 300 in 2013 — is welcome.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 31

<sup>94</sup> Cm8935, p 14

<sup>95</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 32

**The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees' conclusion.<sup>96</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reason for the serious deterioration of the Export Control Organisation's performance on appeals in 2013 and the specific steps the Government is taking to ensure that ECO meets its target of processing 60% of appeals within 20 working days from receipt of all relevant information from the appellant and 95% in 60 working days.<sup>97</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

Performance on appeals was affected by a high proportion of cases involving complex policy issues. 16 appeals submitted in 2012 were not determined until March 2013 due to discussions about the UK's application of the military end use control.

An additional factor followed the departure of the previous Head of ECO. During the recruitment period for a replacement, appeals against refusals based on classified material were determined at director level, a higher ranking official. This continued while the new ECO Head was undergoing security clearance to read classified information. This process was completed in June 2013.<sup>98</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government states what specific steps it has taken to improve the Export Control Organisation's performance on appeals and what have been the actual results.<sup>99</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

A more robust system is now in place with regular updates circulated to individual officials dealing with appeals.

As at 28 August 2014, appeals performance for the current calendar year is 43% finalised within 20 working days and 70% in 60 working days. This is still below target, but is nonetheless a marked improvement on the figures for all of 2013.

The target may need to be adjusted to take account of the complexity of appeal cases and manage the expectations of exporters. Although the overall number of appeals is very small they are necessarily "hard cases" requiring careful consideration.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Cm8935, p 14

<sup>97</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 33

<sup>98</sup> Cm8935, p 14

<sup>99</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 34

<sup>100</sup> Cm8935, p15

88. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)* the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about Export Control Organisation's performance. The question and answer were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

4.1 Information on licences processed during 2013

Please provide the information for Open General Export Licences (OGELs), Open General Trade Control Licences (OGTCLs) and Open General Transshipment Licences (OGTLs) as has been provided in Table 4.I for Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs), in Table 4.II for Standard Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCLs), in Table 4.III for Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs), in Table 4.IV for Standard Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCLs), and Table 4.V for Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs).

**The Government's answer**

<b>Number of businesses registering for Open Licences:</b>	
Applying for the first time*	227

<b>Number of OGEL registrations</b>	
Issued	1172
Deregistrations	23
Revoked	1

<b>Number of OGTCLs registrations</b>	
Issued	91
Surrendered	9
Revoked	0

<b>Number of Transshipments registrations</b>	
Issued	5
Surrendered	1
Revoked	0

\*businesses which have no record of having been previously registered on SPIRE<sup>101</sup>

89. The Export Control Organisation's (ECO) performance target for the processing of SIELs is to finalise 70% of applications within 20 working days and 99% within 60 working days.<sup>102</sup> ECO's performance in relation to this target is shown in table 1 below.

<sup>101</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

<sup>102</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013, HC 480*, p 23.

**Table 1: Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) and Standard Individual Trade Control Licence (SITCL) Processing Performance**

	2013	2012	2011
Number finalised	17,610	17,045	16,376
Finalised within 20 working days	79%	71%	65%
Finalised within 60 working days	98%	95%	95%

Source: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013*, HC 480, p 23.

90. ECO also has a target of processing 70% of appeals within 20 working days from receipt of all relevant information from the appellant and 99% in 60 working days.<sup>103</sup> ECO's performance in relation to this target is shown in table 2 below.

**Table 2: Appeals Performance**

	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006
Appeals finalised within 20 working days	7%	23%	26%	51%	68%	69%	61%	58%
Appeals finalised within 60 working days	39%	60%	71%	93%	91%	90%	100%	83%

Source: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013*, HC 480, p 21, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012*, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011*, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010*, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009*, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2007*, HC Deb 11 June 2014, col 214W.

91. EGAD's Written Evidence stated that it had become "increasingly concerned" that cost pressures had inadvertently resulted in the Export Control Organisation and its advisory departments (especially the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence) experiencing a "totally counter-productive shortage of skilled and experienced staff". EGAD said that the impact of the lack of ECO resourcing had the following effects:

- withdrawal of the ECO's rating advisory service, and the subsequent decision in June of this year to suspend (hopefully temporarily rather than permanently) the replacement Control List Classification Advice Service, which allowed exporters to obtain a Government view of the export control status of their goods before attempting to export them, which is the fundamental bedrock of any effective export control system;

<sup>103</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013*, HC 480, p 23

- long delays in responding to technical queries and appeals against apparently-illogical rating decisions (there are no metrics or targets for responding to appeals of this nature, so it appears that they take a low priority); and
- an apparent perceived increase in the number of “requests for information” being raised by ECO licensing staff that a little technical understanding would have made unnecessary, but which the companies concerned readily perceive as being incomprehensible and possibly due to pressure on Government officials to meet licensing response time targets.<sup>104</sup>

92. EGAD stated in its Written Evidence that a “very high proportion” of export licences applications had been returned to applicants with requests for corrections or further information. It pointed out that the Export Control Organisation’s online export licensing system stated: “the ECO has to return roughly half of all export license applications to the exporter, either for more information or because the application has been completed wrongly. These incomplete or incorrect applications cause delays in processing.” EGAD stated that the delay in processing applications had caused instances where shipments had been delayed, “impacting on customer confidence and their perceptions of the UK as a reliable supplier”. EGAD also said that it was aware of instances that had been reported to it where the requests for further information appeared to have been “extremely trivial” or where the requested information was actually already contained within the actual export licence application. This had caused “much bewilderment”.<sup>105</sup> EGAD also said that it was continuing to work to improve informing exporters on how to complete licence applications more thoroughly and to ensure all necessary data was provided at the initial stage, in order to reduce delays in the process and prevent the current unacceptably high level of returned applications and delayed shipments. EGAD noted the Export Control Organisation continued to run “How to Make Better Licensing Applications” courses. However, it had no visibility as to how much effect either of these efforts were having on the rate of rejection, or their impact on the ECO’s efficiency and responsiveness in a time of acute manpower pressure.<sup>106</sup>

93. When the Committees questioned the Business Secretary on 1 December 2014 about EGAD’s concerns, he said: “I do come across some of these examples because MPs write to me about them, but the question is whether they are proportionately very large in relation to the thousands of licences that are issued.”<sup>107</sup> Edward Bell, Head, Export Control Organisation, added:

The two main reasons why we would go back to an exporter during the licensing application process for further information are, first, because there are insufficient end-user details—in other words, the exporter has not told us clearly about the end user for their products—and secondly, if they have provided insufficient technical information for a proper assessment to be made. This is an historic issue. [...] I go to their [EGAD’s] conferences and speak with them frequently—some of the things

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<sup>104</sup> Ev w59

<sup>105</sup> Ev w57

<sup>106</sup> Ev w58

<sup>107</sup> Q 123 [Vince Cable]

that they were saying to you were based on very old anecdotes. Certainly in the last year we have focused on how we can reduce the number of requests for further information. A lot of our training effort is put in to these very points of technical information and how to make better licence applications. We focus clearly on how we can reduce the numbers but I do remain concerned that EGAD are basing some of the statements they have made on some quite historical anecdotes. I don't believe that represents the position today.<sup>108</sup>

94. When questioned on ECO's performance in the Oral Evidence session on 10 November 2014 Paul Everitt, Chief Executive, ADS, said that while he recognised "the squeeze on public sector resources" he identified problems due to staff having a lack of experience. He said:

It is not just a matter of people being there; it is necessary that those people have the requisite knowledge and experience of what can be quite a complex set of systems to operate and a complex industry to understand. It is more the expertise that is missing.<sup>109</sup>

Bernadette Peers, Compliance Manager, Strategic Shipping Company Ltd., stated in the same Oral Evidence session that her company had "seen a string of completely nonsensical questions come back to us on a licence application, which resulted in us losing the business".<sup>110</sup>

95. When we asked ECO about EGAD's perception of lack of experience within ECO, Edward Bell stated:

I think there is more we can do to ensure that staff are properly trained, and I am sure there are staff who require more training input than others. I believe that the situation described by EGAD is an historical one. We have worked with EGAD closely in the last year to move on from that. I am not saying it is a perfect position but I think we have moved on from the one that EGAD described.<sup>111</sup>

96. David Wilson, Chairman of EGAD, informed the Committees in the Oral Evidence session on 10 November 2014 that UK companies were trading at a disadvantage to companies from other countries due to the UK Government having "decided to take a uniquely strong line on what bits of computer equipment should be subject to export control and which bits should not be." He went on to say:

We have found since the end of last year that, with pieces of computer equipment, other Governments have said, "No, you don't need a licence for that." Particularly the US—that is where most computer equipment comes from—has said, "No, you don't need a licence for that." We have checked with the French, and the French have said "No, you don't need a licence for that."

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<sup>108</sup> Q 123 [Edward Bell]

<sup>109</sup> Q 55

<sup>110</sup> Q 59 [Bernadette Peers]

<sup>111</sup> Q 125

So the company puts out advice to all its clients to say, “This piece of kit is rated as ‘no licence required’. You don’t need a licence for it.” Then it gets stopped at customs because the Export Control Organisation has said, “Oh! We think this does need an export licence.” Then you apply for a rating, and they come back and say, “Some of it is, some of it isn’t.” “OK—how do we know which?” “Ah! Well, you have to apply for a licence.” It is Catch-22, and it goes very slowly.

He continued by informing the Committee that there had been no response from ECO when the decision had been appealed. He said that the result was “huge damage [...] to the UK balance of payments” because multinational companies are selling the equipment from other countries where a licence is not required instead of from the UK.<sup>112</sup>

97. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary on 2 December 2014 on this issue as follows:

**Uniformity of arms export licensing between countries**

The Committees have been told that UK companies are losing sales because the UK is applying stricter rules about whether goods require a licence than other countries, especially for computer equipment. Are you aware of this problem and are you planning to harmonise the application of the rules?<sup>113</sup>

The Business Secretary replied on 15 December 2014 as follows:

**Uniformity in export licensing systems**

We maintain a regular dialogue with other EU Member States through the relevant EU working groups, and we maintain a wider dialogue through the international export control regimes that underpin our system of export controls. If there are differences of interpretation concerning the wording of the text in either the EU Common Position or the EU Dual-Use List, we use the EU working groups to seek agreement on a common understanding. Where the differences arise because the control text is ambiguous we seek to amend the text through the appropriate international regime. We are not aware of a widespread or significant problem but there are always likely to be occasional differences in interpretation of the control texts, or in making individual licensing decisions, whilst strategic export licensing remains under the competence of individual Member States.<sup>114</sup>

**98. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) **what specific steps it will take to achieve its target of processing 70% of export licence appeals within 20 working days from receipt of all relevant information from the appellant and 99% in 60 working days;**

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<sup>112</sup> Q 49

<sup>113</sup> Ev w218 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 2 December 2014

<sup>114</sup> Ev 220 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 15 December 2014

- b) **whether it has decided to adjust its appeals target, and, if so, what that adjusted target now is; and**
- c) **whether it will engage in detailed and constructive discussions with EGAD to establish whether EGAD's frustrations in dealing with ECO, as recounted to the Committees, are historic or current, and, if the latter, whether it will take the earliest possible steps to try to resolve them.**

### **Export Control Organisation's computer system (SPIRE)**

99. In June 2014 the Export Control Organisation (ECO) issued a Notice to Exporters stating that it had recently migrated to a new desktop computer system. It announced that the migration had had a “significant short term impact on the performance and availability of the ECO SPIRE system” (used to process arms export licence applications). The Notice continued:

[...] we are currently experiencing a backlog in processing licence applications and delivering other advisory services. This means that regrettably, in order to prioritise licence applications, we will not be able to accept new applications for advice about Control List Classifications until further notice.

The Notice acknowledged that the problems could result in some companies losing export business because of the problems.<sup>115</sup> A further Notice to Exporters, issued on 30 June 2014, announced that the IT issues had “very largely been resolved, and that it would take three weeks to return to normal performance levels.”<sup>116</sup>

100. On 19 June the Business Minister Michael Fallon wrote to the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, stating that there had been “some temporary performance problems with the online export system” while the new desktop system was being migrated. He said that applications were taking four days longer than in the period before migration.<sup>117</sup> Michael Fallon wrote again on 27 June stating that “the technical fixes we have introduced appear to have fully resolved the IT problems we faced as our new computer system bedded in.” He stated that staff resourcing had been increased, including weekend working. The Minister said that “there remains no evidence that exporters have lost business due to the slower processing times.”<sup>118</sup>

101. However, when the Committees questioned EGAD in the Oral Evidence session on 10 November 2014 about the impact of the installation of the new computer system David Wilson, Chairman of EGAD, said that the impact on his members had been “quite a lot”.<sup>119</sup> He stated that the withdrawal of the control classification service had been unexpected. The control classification service enabled exporters to determine whether a licence would be

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<sup>115</sup> Export Control Organisation, Notice to Exporters 2014/16, *impact of new computer system on SPIRE licensing service*, 11 June 2014

<sup>116</sup> Export Control Organisation, Notice to Exporters 2014/19, *Impact of new computer system on SPIRE licensing service*, 30 June 2014

<sup>117</sup> See HC (2014-15) 186 Ev w506: Letter from Michael Fallon to the CAEC Chairman dated 19 June 2014

<sup>118</sup> See HC (2014-15) 186 Ev w507: Letter from Michael Fallon to the CAEC Chairman dated 27 June 2014

<sup>119</sup> Q 43



required for an item or not. David Wilson said: “The lack of that ability was hurting.”<sup>120</sup> Now exporters were being told to “apply for an export licence, and we will tell you whether it needs one.” Mr Wilson said that this was waste of ECO’s resources and was a “huge waste of industry’s resources”.<sup>121</sup> Bernadette Peters, Compliance Manager, Strategic Shipping Ltd, told the Committees that the removal of the control classification service had “had quite large ramifications for SMEs, because they don’t have the technical expertise in-house”. She continued by stating that: “With its removal, being told to apply for licences now is not a good solution for industry or for ECO.”<sup>122</sup>

102. When the Business Secretary was questioned in the Oral Evidence session on 1 December 2014 about the problems with ECO’s computer system and its impact on users he said:

I think there were several different issues. One is that there was a problem with the subcontractor or contractor which we used to install new software earlier in the year. That affected BIS, DECC and UKTI, and it affected the export control operation. There was some disruption, but as I understand it this did not affect in any radical way the ability of the organisation to meet its basic targets. I think that 99% are met within 60 working days, and we expect that target to be met and the performance standards to be improved overall. I think there is a separate point, [...] about the degree of staffing and therefore the ability to provide wider services to the exporting community. There are legitimate issues to be raised there, but there was a specific computer IT issue which caused quite serious disruption, which I think has now been remedied and caught up.<sup>123</sup>

Edward Bell, Head, Export Control Organisation, added: “[...] the SPIRE system was not the issue. The Department, along with several other Departments, cut over to a new departmental computer system, and the export licensing staff accessed the SPIRE system through that portal. That is what was causing the problems.”<sup>124</sup> When asked whether the problems could have been foreseen or tested beforehand Mr Bell responded:

The degree of impact was certainly not expected. What I would say about the specific export control response is that we did move very quickly to put contingency measures in place. We communicated with exporters. We alerted them to the problem. We gave them access to a helpline so that they could tell us if they might lose exports because of delays to licensing. I am pleased to say that as a consequence, during the high summer months when we experienced problems, the problems were really ironed out by September-time.<sup>125</sup>

103. When Edward Bell was asked why the control classification system had been withdrawn, without notice or consultation he replied:

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<sup>120</sup> Q 43

<sup>121</sup> Q 44

<sup>122</sup> Q 45

<sup>123</sup> Q 119 [Vince Cable]

<sup>124</sup> Q 119 [Edward Bell]

<sup>125</sup> Q 120

[...] I took the decision and certainly informed Ministers that, as part of our response to the problems that we experienced with IT in the summer, we should suspend one of our advisory services in order to divert resources to protecting the core licensing service. Now that we have come through that period, I have reviewed the resources available and I remain concerned that we do not have sufficient resources to provide the kind of service that exporters are looking for. In fact, that service has changed over several years and the number of users of it has declined considerably over the last three or four years—it has gone from over 1,000 to more like 300 in the last year—but we have committed to work with industry, in the context of budget plans for 2015–16, to see whether a service could be established.<sup>126</sup>

When asked if there were any plans to replace the control classification system Mr Bell informed the Committees that: “we want to replace it but within the current resource that we have available, it is just not practical.”<sup>127</sup>

**104. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) **how it reconciles its assertion in its Response (Cm8935) that Government staffing levels [within the Export Control Organisation] are adequate with the statement made to the Committees by Edward Bell, Head of ECO, on 1 December “we want to replace it [the control classification system] but within the current resource that we have available, it is just not practical”; and**
- b) **what specific lessons , with particular reference to ECO, have the Business, Innovation and Skills Department learnt from the faulty introduction of the new departmental computer system in June 2014.**

***Export Control Organisation’s website***

105. In its Written Submission the Export Group for Aerospace & Defence (EGAD) stated that it had created a dedicated website at the request of the Group’s Executive Committee and with guidance from its Awareness Outreach Activities Sub-Committee. The website was intended to be “the first port of call for companies as the source of user-friendly basic, initial guidance on all aspects of export and trade controls, created by like-minded people to help compliance staff within companies. EGAD stated that the website sought to identify potential sources of help, and ideas for problem solving, and presents easy steps to “bite-sized compliance.” According to EGAD the website had:

been kept simple, and, in addition to providing information on EGAD, itself, seeks to present a practical and simple step-by-step guide on understanding export and trade controls, and addressing the fundamental questions which companies ask: when do I need an export licence and how do I go about trying to obtain and use one?<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> Q 121

<sup>127</sup> Q 122

<sup>128</sup> Ev w56

106. When asked in the Oral Evidence session on 10 November why it was necessary for EGAD to have developed guidance on their website rather than the information being on the Export Control Organisation’s website, Bernadette Peers, Compliance Manager, Strategic Shipping Company Ltd., said that while ECO was providing lots of information ADS and EGAD “just supplement” the Government’s information. She continued by stating that “in certain areas of UK industry, it is not ECO’s role to give advice on US export controls, in particular”, therefore ADS and EGAD “fill the gap, because UK industry needs to understand not just UK export controls but global export controls.”<sup>129</sup> Paul Everitt, Chief Executive, ADS Group, added:

We would like to think it is complementary. Fortunately, in our team in the individual businesses are people who have that understanding and expertise. The very nature of our kind of organisation is that by sharing that expertise, we can promote good practice, and sometimes make it easier for people to get the point of understanding than it is when they approach a governmental website.

For those who are comfortable and use the system often, the Government site is absolutely fine. For those who are perhaps new, or for whom it is a relatively new experience, the kind of help and information we provide helps them through the process.<sup>130</sup>

When asked whether export users who accessed the ECO website would be directed to ADS’s and EGAD’s website to get this additional information the Committees were informed by David Wilson, Chairman of EGAD that this was not the case.<sup>131</sup> He said that it was the other way round and that EGAD’s website pointed to relevant information on the Government’s system. When asked if he considered the ECO system to be deficient in not directing users to the information on EGAD’s site, Mr Wilson replied: “We would obviously welcome that sort of recognition and we would welcome the ECO pointing people towards us.”<sup>132</sup>

**107. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) **what specific steps it will take to make the Export Control Organisation’s website more user-friendly for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in particular; and**
- b) **whether it will include a reference on ECO’s website to the Export Group for Defence and Aerospace’s website.**

### ***Transparency of arms export licensing***

108. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of the transparency of arms export licensing is described at paragraphs 111–124 of the Chairman’s Memorandum to the Committees,

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<sup>129</sup> Q 50

<sup>130</sup> Q 51

<sup>131</sup> Q 52 [David Wilson]

<sup>132</sup> Qq 52–53

published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation are at paragraphs 37 and 38 of Volume I of that Report.

109. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on the transparency of arms export licensing in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the Government failed to discharge its consultation obligations satisfactorily before making a significant change of policy on the transparency of arms export licensing with the Business Secretary's decision in 2013 that the users of Open General and Open Individual Licences would be required to report on their usage of those licences only on an annual, rather than on an annual and quarterly, basis as previously stated on 13 July 2012.<sup>133</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government does not accept the Committees' conclusion. The results of the consultation were announced to Parliament by the Business Secretary in a Written Statement on 18 July 2013. The Statement made clear that the intention was to minimise the administrative burden on exporters. In finalising the implementation of the transparency initiative we concluded that the administrative burden would be too high. The Business Secretary therefore made a further announcement in Parliament amending the scope of the reporting requirement.<sup>134</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Business Secretary provides his promised update of his review of the reporting requirements under the Government's Transparency Initiative before his next evidence session with the Committees, which the Committees plan to have this coming Autumn.<sup>135</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government does not accept the Committees' recommendation. In order to conduct a proper review it will be necessary to analyse a full year's-worth of data returns which means that the review cannot commence until early 2015. The Government committed to this timetable when the Business Secretary appeared before the Committees in December 2013.<sup>136</sup>

110. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)* the Committees wrote to the Government asking six questions about transparency and accountability. The questions and answers were as follows:

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<sup>133</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 37

<sup>134</sup> Cm8935, p 16

<sup>135</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 38

<sup>136</sup> Cm8935, p 16

**The Committees' question:**1.3 Transparency and Accountability

Will the Government in the data it publishes quarterly on the Strategic Export Controls: Reports and Statistics website on individual export and trade licences granted, refused and revoked add the end-user stated for each licence as the Government has already done for the licences for the export of dual-use chemicals to Syria between 2004 and 2012 and for Gifted Equipment?

**The Government's answer:**

The Government is actively considering ways in which we can make available more information about types of end-users. However, for reasons of confidentiality and commercial sensitivity, we currently have no plans to routinely identify actual end-users.<sup>137</sup>

**The Committees' question:**4.2 Information on SIELs, SITLs, OIELs, SITCLs and OITCLs

In furtherance of its policy of Transparency will the Government ask licence applicants for SITLs, OIELs, SITCLs and OITCLs to provide an estimate of the value of the goods they propose to ship, tranship or trade, and will the Government include the estimated value for each licence in its Quarterly Reports?

**The Government's answer:**

Exporters already provide an estimate of the value of the goods they propose to ship against SITL licences and these are available in the published quarterly and annual reports. The Government will consider the feasibility of seeking and reporting on estimates for SITCLs.

The Government has asked exporters to provide usage returns for OIELs and OITCLs on an annual basis from 2015. There are no plans to seek usage returns from exporters on SIELs, SITLs and SITCLs.

**The Committees' question:**4.3 Technical Assistance Licences

Will the Government provide details in its Quarterly Reports of licence applications required under Article 19 of the Export Control Order 2008, as amended, for the provision of technical assistance for anything with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) purposes, and the Government's decision on each such application?

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<sup>137</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

**The Government's answer:**

The Government can provide numbers of WMD technical assistance licences issued and refused each quarter, subject to an upgrade being implemented to enable the information to be made available via the online searchable database. Due to the small numbers of such licences, providing any details other than numbers might compromise confidentiality.

**The Committees' question:**4.4 Refusals and revocations

Will the Government provide in two separate Tables for the 168 refusals or revocations of SIELs in 2013 the following information for each refusal or revocation:

- i) End User Country;
- ii) Annual Report Summary  
(Description of goods);
- iii) Rating; and
- iv) Reasons for refusal or revocation

**The Government's answer:**

Please find this information in the spreadsheet below.

## 4.4 Refusals and revocations (Spreadsheet)

**4.4 Refusals and revocations**

Application Type	Country Name	Case Summary List	Rating List	Outcome	Reason for Refusal [See note at foot of this Table]
PERMANENT	Argentina	components for military training aircraft	ML10	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Argentina	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	1,7
PERMANENT	Argentina	space qualified solar devices	3A001	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Armenia	sporting guns (1), weapon sights	ML1	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Azerbaijan	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	ML6	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Azerbaijan	weapon sights	ML1	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Bahrain	general military vehicle components	ML6	REFUSAL	2,3
TEMPORARY	Bahrain	weapon night sights	ML1	REFUSAL	2,3
PERMANENT	Chad	anti-riot/ballistic shields	PL5001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	China	civil body armour	1A005	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	China	components for radar equipment	6A008	REFUSAL	5,7
PERMANENT	China	components for radar equipment, software for the use of radar equipment, technology for the use of radar equipment	6A008, 6D002, 6E101	REVOKE	5,7

PERMANENT	China	focal plane arrays	6A002	REFUSAL	5,7
PERMANENT	China	focal plane arrays	6A002	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	China	focal plane arrays	6A002	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	China	general industrial production equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	China	general military vehicle components	ML6	REFUSAL	1,2
PERMANENT	China	general purpose integrated circuits, microwave components	3A001	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	China	imaging cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	China	imaging cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	1,2,7
PERMANENT	China	imaging cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	2,7
PERMANENT	China	imaging cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	5,7
PERMANENT	China	imaging cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	China	machine tools	2B001	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	China	radio jamming equipment, telecommunications software	5A001, 5D001	REFUSAL	1,2
PERMANENT	China	Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating weapon systems, technology for Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating weapon systems	ML21, ML22	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	China	software for optimising equipment design	ML21	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	China	technology for general military vehicle components	ML22	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	China	technology for weapon cleaning equipment, weapon cleaning equipment	ML22, PL5017	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	China	test equipment for global positioning satellite receivers	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	China	test equipment for pressure monitoring equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Congo, Democratic Republic of	anti-riot/ballistic shields	PL5001	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Congo, Democratic Republic of	military construction equipment	ML17	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Egypt	components for machine guns	ML1	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Egypt	components for machine guns	ML1	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Egypt	components for military combat vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Egypt	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002, 5D002	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Egypt	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Egypt	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Ethiopia	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	5A001, 5D001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Ethiopia	software for radio jamming equipment	5D001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	France	components for military training aircraft	ML10	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Germany	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6	REVOKE	2

PERMANENT	Germany	components for military training aircraft	ML10	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region	technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22	REFUSAL	5,7
PERMANENT	India	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, technology for accelerometers	7A001, 7E001	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	India	accessories for instrumentation cameras, instrumentation cameras	6A003, End Use	REFUSAL	1,7
PERMANENT	India	instrumentation cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	India	instrumentation cameras	6A203	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	India	materials analysis equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	India	materials analysis equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	accessories for power supplies	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	ML6	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	components for biotechnology equipment, components for filtration equipment	2B352, End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	components for flow forming machines	2B109	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	components for general industrial production equipment, electric motors	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	components for industrial gas turbines	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	gaskets	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	gaskets	IRN	REFUSAL	IRAN
PERMANENT	Iran	non-ferrous alloys	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	non-ferrous alloys	IRN	REFUSAL	1, IRAN
PERMANENT	Iran	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1, IRAN
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1, IRAN
PERMANENT	Iran	toxic gas monitoring equipment	IRN	REFUSAL	IRAN
PERMANENT	Iraq	accessories for materials analysis equipment, materials analysis equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iraq	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Iraq	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Iraq	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Iraq	software for equipment employing cryptography	5D002	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Iraq	spectrophotometers	End Use	REFUSAL	1



PERMANENT	Israel	bismuth	1C229	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Israel	bismuth	1C229	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Israel	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	1C450	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Israel	components for military aero-engines	ML10	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Israel	components for military radars	ML5	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Israel	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Israel	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Israel	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment, technology for radio jamming equipment	5A001, 5D001, 5E001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Kenya	pistols (20)	ML1	REFUSAL	7
TEMPORARY	Korea, North	luxury goods	PRK	REFUSAL	1
TEMPORARY	Korea, North	luxury goods, magnetometers	6A006, PRK	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Liberia	military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Libya	anti-riot helmets, body armour, civil body armour, civil unmanned air vehicles, components for body armour, military helmets, military image intensifier equipment, projectile launchers, unmanned air vehicles	1A005, 9A012, LBY, ML2, ML10, ML13, ML15	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Libya	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	ML13	REFUSAL	3,7
PERMANENT	Libya	body armour, military helmets	ML13	REFUSAL	2,3,7
PERMANENT	Libya	imaging cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Maldives	body armour, components for body armour, components for sniper rifles, imaging cameras, military helmets, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (5), weapon sights	6A003, ML1, ML3, ML13	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Mauritius	assault rifles (175), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	6A002, ML1, ML3, ML13	REVOKE	7
PERMANENT	Mozambique	rifles (2), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (3)	ML1, ML3	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Namibia	components for sniper rifles, weapon sight mounts	ML1, PL5017	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Nigeria	components for tanks	ML6	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Nigeria	military field generators, military support vehicles	ML6, ML17	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Nigeria	radio jamming equipment	5A001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Nigeria	radio jamming equipment	5A001	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Nigeria	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	5A001, 5D001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Nigeria	radio jamming equipment, software replicating controlled telecommunications equipment	5A001, 5D001	REVOKE	2

PERMANENT	Oman	assault rifles (175), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	6A002, ML1, ML3, ML13	REVOKE	7
PERMANENT	Oman	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	6A002, ML1, ML3, ML13	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Oman	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	6A002, ML1, ML3, ML13	REVOKE	7
PERMANENT	Pakistan	accessories for pumps, components for pumps, electric motors, pumps, seals	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Pakistan	anti-friction bearings	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Pakistan	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2B350	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Pakistan	drilling/mining equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Pakistan	equipment for the use of general industrial production equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Pakistan	military electronic equipment, software for military electronic equipment	ML11, ML21	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	Pakistan	non-ferrous alloys	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Pakistan	process control equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Romania	valves	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Russia	components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters	ML10, PL5017	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Russia	fibrous/filamentary materials	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Russia	focal plane arrays	6A002	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	Russia	machine tools	2B001	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	Senegal	military patrol/assault craft	ML9	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Singapore	components for fire location equipment	ML5	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Singapore	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, NBC protective/defensive equipment	ML7	REFUSAL	5
TEMPORARY	Somalia	components for military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1
TEMPORARY	Somalia	military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1
TEMPORARY	Somalia	military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1
TEMPORARY	Somalia	military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	South Africa	aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, military communications equipment	ML10, ML11	REFUSAL	7

PERMANENT	South Africa	assault rifles (175), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	6A002, ML1, ML3, ML13	REVOKE	7
PERMANENT	South Africa	body armour	ML13	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	South Africa	general military aircraft components	ML10	REFUSAL	1,7
PERMANENT	South Africa	small arms ammunition	ML3	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Sri Lanka	components for military patrol/assault craft	ML9	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Sudan, South	body armour	ML13	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Syria	accessories for inspection equipment, equipment for the use of inspection equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Syria	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, NBC protective/defensive equipment	ML7	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Syria	inspection equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Taiwan	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, NBC protective/defensive equipment	ML7	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	Turkey	armoured plate	ML13	REFUSAL	2,3
PERMANENT	Turkey	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	ML13	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Turkey	components for military combat vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	2,3
PERMANENT	Turkey	components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML15	REFUSAL	5,7
PERMANENT	Turkey	CS hand grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition	ML3, ML4	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Turkey	spectrometers	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Turkmenistan	components for rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, sniper rifles (2), weapon sight mounts	ML1, PL5017	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	United Arab Emirates	accessories for electron microscopes, components for electron microscopes, electron microscopes	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	United Arab Emirates	accessories for valves	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	United Arab Emirates	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	1C350	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	United Arab Emirates	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	1C350	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	United Arab Emirates	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	1C450	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	United Arab Emirates	components for surface coating equipment, pumps, surface coating equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	United States of America	components for combat helicopters	ML10	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	United States of America	components for combat helicopters	ML10	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	United States of America	components for military training aircraft	ML10	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	United States of America	small arms ammunition	ML3	REFUSAL	2

PERMANENT	Vietnam	military communications equipment	ML11	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Vietnam	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	5A001, 5D001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Zambia	military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1,7
PERMANENT	Zimbabwe	military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1

[Note: The number or numbers in the “Reason for Refusal” column are those in the Government’s 8 numbered Criteria in its Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria which it judges would be breached if the export licence in question was not refused or revoked. The Government’s 8 Arms Export Licensing Criteria are set out in full in Annex 5. Where a country is named it is because the licence has been refused or revoked because of an international arms embargo applying to that country.]

**The Committees’ question:**

4.6 Open General Export Licences (OGELs)

Rather than OGELs remaining in force until they are revoked, will the Government introduce a time limit for such licences?

**The Government’s answer:**

The Government has no plans to introduce a fixed validity period for OGELs.

**The Committees’ question:**

A.6 Types of Licences

What is the period during which Open General Trade Control Licences (OGTCLs) remain in force?

**The Government’s answer:**

OGTCLs remain in force until they are revoked.<sup>138</sup>

111. EGAD informed the Committees in its Written Evidence that “considerable effort” had been expended over the course of the last two years on the Government’s Transparency Initiative. EGAD stated that ECO had sought to minimise the administrative effort required to meet the political imperatives of BIS’ Transparency Initiative which initially had called for a much more onerous reporting regime than had actually been implemented. EGAD pointed out that there was a not inconsiderable cost to Industry in the administrative effort required to meet the new reporting requirements and in amending IT systems to meet them, even though, as EGAD had already pointed out, the information required was already held on the ECO’s own IT systems or collected at the ECO’s routine audits or has been submitted to HM Revenue and Customs.<sup>139</sup> In Supplementary evidence EGAD pointed out that the resource cost to UK exporters of

<sup>138</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

<sup>139</sup> Ev w60

duplicate reporting would be approximately £20 per entry – with an estimate of 100,000 submissions per annum, the annual cost to UK industry would be £2 million.<sup>140</sup>

112. In its Written Evidence UK Working Group (UKWG) stated that it remained deeply concerned that the Government's decision to scale back on its commitment to improve reporting on open licences had significantly compromised any meaningful improvements in transparency over these types of licences. It stated that this had worrying implications for the ability of Parliament and civil society to scrutinise Government decision-making and whether it was meeting its obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) or national arms transfer licensing criteria.<sup>141</sup>

113. In its Written Evidence, the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) stated that events of the past year had shown that the transparency agenda needed to be extended, not curtailed and that there may need to be some adjustments to the process and/or extra time taken to implement an effective solution, but such a rapid, ragged retreat indicated a weakness of political will.<sup>142</sup>

114. Stressing the importance to transparency of end-use information the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, said in the Westminster Hall Debate on 30 October 2014:

[...] I wrote to the Business Secretary to ask him for the stated end user of each of the 285 extant arms export licences to Russia. Disappointingly, he refused to give the Committees that information unless we agreed not to make it public. I see no justification for imposing that condition on the Committees. It is hardly in accordance with the Government's supposed commitment to transparency on arms exports, and it raises a significant issue of policy for the Committees and, therefore, the House. The Government already make public the countries to which approved UK arms exports are going, but in many cases we need to know not just the names of the countries, but the end users in those countries. For example, will the end user be a Government body, a Government security authority or a civilian user? That is key information, but at the moment, the Government simply pick and choose when they will disclose the end users. They gave the Committees the end users when we wanted to know who they were in relation to the export of dual-use chemicals to Syria. They told us the end users when we wanted to know who they were for sniper rifles exported to Ukraine. However, they have refused to give us that information for Russia on the basis that it may be made public, and the Committee will want to address that policy issue further.<sup>143</sup>

115. In the Oral Evidence session on 10 November 2014 Oliver Sprague, Amnesty International, told the Committees that:

essentially I think it is fair to say that the improvements in transparency are now only marginal at best. The fact that now only annually we will get very vague information on how many times a licence was used—we will not get any information on the

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<sup>140</sup> Ev w57

<sup>141</sup> Ev w93

<sup>142</sup> Ev w72-73

<sup>143</sup> HC Deb, 30 October 2014, Cols 118–119WH

amount of equipment supplied or even the types of equipment within the licence that was supplied—is a problem.

We also think that the very generic level of end user information they are going to give is actually going to throw up many more questions than it answers, because, for example, just by flagging an end user as a Government—it could be many shades of government. It could be a police force, it could be an internal security force, and, importantly, it could actually be a foreign Government.<sup>144</sup>

116. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary on 2 December 2014 asking the following question:

### **The Transparency Initiative**

There was widespread disappointment when the Government announced a reduction from the original terms for reporting Open Individual Export Licences under the Transparency Initiative last year. The Committees have been told that improvements in transparency are now “only marginal at best” and that the generic level of end-user information is “going to throw up many more questions than it answers”.

Are there any plans to have a review to further increase transparency of Open Individual Export Licences in the future under the Transparency Initiative?

If so, what are they and when will they be implemented, and if not, why not?<sup>145</sup>

The Business Secretary replied on 15 December. The relevant section of the Business Secretary’s letter was as follows:

### **Transparency Initiative**

The Government remains committed to greater openness and the Transparency Initiative will make more information available than is currently the case. We will be publishing new information about the use of open export licences alongside the Government’s annual report on strategic export controls in 2015. For the first time the public will have information about the number of times these licences are being used and about the countries and types of end user to which goods are being exported.

However, as I have said previously to the Committees, when the final arrangements were being made to launch the initiative I became concerned that we had not struck the right balance between increasing transparency and avoiding heavy bureaucratic burdens on business. I decided to revise the scope of the initiative – by moving to annual rather than quarterly reporting and not insisting on descriptions of the specific goods in each shipment – following representations by business. Trade associations raised similar concerns with my officials.

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<sup>144</sup> Q 33

<sup>145</sup> Ev w218 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 2 December 2014

It is important that we allow any initiative like this to bed in before considering changes. We will review the Transparency Initiative in the first quarter of 2015 to consider whether changes are necessary or justified. Again, we will need to ensure a proper balance between a desire for greater openness and ensuring the bureaucratic burden does not put UK exporters at a disadvantage over those based overseas.<sup>146</sup>

117. In the Oral Evidence session on 1 December 2014 the Committees asked why the Government would only agree to supply the end-users of extant arms export licences to Russia on a confidential basis, when it had previously supplied this information for exports licences for dual-use chemicals to Syria. The Business Secretary replied: “[...] there is no problem with releasing the licence data, as regards the material. However, when you start naming companies, you are in somewhat different territory.”<sup>147</sup> Edward Bell, Head, Export Control Organisation added:

[...] we are concerned that we would be laid open to challenge for breach of confidentiality by the exporters if we were simply to reveal those details. That would be different from revealing, in broad terms, what was covered by export licences. In fact, for Israel, in the 12 August statement about the Government’s policy, we gave an indication of the types of equipment that are covered by the 12 licences. There is a distinction between information about what the licences contain and details about the names of end users, exporters and so on, which for extant licences may lay us open to challenge on grounds of breach of confidentiality. That is the concern.<sup>148</sup>

When asked why the Government had supplied the names of the end-users for the dual-use chemical licences to Syria, Edward Bell, Head, Export Control Organisation, responded that the Syrian licences were no longer extant and that the majority of the extant licences to Russia were not for sanctioned goods.<sup>149</sup> Chris Chew, Head of Policy, Export Control Organisation, added:

it could reveal commercially sensitive information, because there is already information about what the licences cover, which we have published. If you then match that with information about the end user, that could reveal sensitive information about specific contracts, because you know who the customer is and you know details of the licence. It would be the companies’ concern that it may then be possible to infer who the supplier is, or what the commercial terms of the contract are. We need to take account of the concerns of exporters that each little bit of information we release adds up to a bigger picture that could itself be sensitive.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> Ev w220 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 15 December 2014

<sup>147</sup> Q 107 [Vince Cable]

<sup>148</sup> Q 107 [Edward Bell]

<sup>149</sup> Q 108

<sup>150</sup> Q 110

The Chairman of the Committees pointed out that the Government had supplied the names of the end-users for sniper rifles licensed for export to Ukraine in May 2014.<sup>151</sup> The Chairman continued by stating:

You have clearly been willing to disclose the end users in certain circumstances. I put it to you that this is critically important information, in terms of transparency and accountability to Parliament. I believe that it overrides the commercial sensitivities to which you have referred. What is critically important to put into the public domain is whether the export within a particular country has been approved to go to, say, a private sector company or to a state security organisation. That is particularly relevant for a country of human rights concern. I therefore put it to you for serious consideration that the Government should move its policy on and, as a matter of course, should be disclosing both the end users within countries and the country of destination.<sup>152</sup>

The Business Secretary replied: “we will obviously reflect on your thought. The obvious point is that when we are talking about exports to Russia, for example, the distinction between a commercial and a state operation may be a little bit blurred.”<sup>153</sup>

**118. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) whether it has concluded from its review of the Transparency Initiative that took place in the first quarter of 2015 that changes are necessary or justified, and, if so, what those changes are and when they will be implemented;
- b) what was the outcome of its consideration of the feasibility of seeking and reporting on estimates of the value of goods exporters propose to ship against Standard Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCLs); and
- c) whether it has now decided to make public the number of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) technical assistance licences issued and refused each quarter.

**119. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government’s argument that it cannot provide details of end-users of arms exports from the UK because the Government would be laid open to challenge for breach of confidentiality by the exporters does not have validity because it is open to the Government to advise exporters in advance what information on their licence applications will be made public.**

**120. I propose that the Committees recommend that on both transparency and human rights grounds the Government makes public the end-use, as well as the country of destination, of UK Government approved export licences for both military and dual-use goods.**

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<sup>151</sup> See: HC (2014–15) 186, Ev w474, Annex 3

<sup>152</sup> Q 111 [Chair]

<sup>153</sup> Q 111



## Powers to create new categories of export licences

121. The Committees' previous scrutiny of powers to create new categories of export licence is described at paragraphs 125–128 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation are at paragraph 52 of that Report.

122. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations on powers to create new categories of export licence in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:**

The Committees continue to conclude that Article 26 of the Export Control Order 2008 enabling the Secretary of State to create new types of arms export licences without Parliamentary approval is unsatisfactory and could be used in a way that would significantly diminish the ability of Parliament to scrutinise the Government's arms export policies. The Committees recommend that the Government should amend the Export Control Order 2008 accordingly.<sup>154</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government does not accept the Committees' conclusion. The power to regulate strategic exports and to grant licences was delegated to the Secretary of State by Parliament through the Export Control Act 2002. The Act sets out the Parliamentary procedures to be followed when making an order to regulate the export of goods. No further Parliamentary approval is necessary. Consequently the Government has no plans to amend article 26 of the Export Control Order 2008.<sup>155</sup>

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report lists since the Export Control Order 2008 came into effect the individual licences and the general licences that have been created under Article 26 stating in each case:

- a) the date the licence was created;
- b) the reason for its creation;
- c) to whom it has been granted; and
- d) what goods were authorised to be exported under each licence and to whom.<sup>156</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

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<sup>154</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 39

<sup>155</sup> Cm8935, p 17

<sup>156</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 40

Detailed information on individual licences granted, refused and revoked is given in the Government's Quarterly and Annual Reports on Strategic Export Controls. The table below summarises the total numbers of individual licences granted from the time the Export Control Order 2008 came into force on 6 April 2009 until 31 March 2014. Each of these "types" of individual licence existed before the Order came into force.

Licence	Total Number granted
Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL)	51,593
Standard Individual Trade Control Licence (SITCL)	446
Standard Individual Transshipment Licence (SITL)	44
Open Individual Export Licence (OIEL)	1,153
Open Individual Trade Control Licence (OITCL)	99

Open General Export Licences (OGEL) (both "In force" and "Expired") created since 6 April 2009 can be found attached at Annex A.

### Annex A

#### **"In force" Open General Licences created since 6 April 2009**

Licence Name	Date Created (listed in descending order of date originally published)	Reason for Creation	To Whom Granted	What Goods Authorised
Open General Export Licence (Military Goods: A400M Collaborative Programme)	Dated: 23 April 2014. In force: 23 April 2014.	Developed to support a collaborative programme with seven partner countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey and the UK) and one export customer (Malaysia) for the A400M military transport aircraft. Also permits exports to other destinations where sub-contracting may be taking place, provided that ultimately the export will be for the production or maintenance of A400M.	All general licences are granted to exporters who are registered to use the named licence via SPIRE and who can fulfil all the specified terms and conditions. Registered OGEL holders are subject to regular compliance audits.	Permits, subject to certain conditions, the export or transfer of the majority of goods, software and technology required for the production and maintenance of A400M, for the end-use of all the listed partner nations and agreed export customer.
Open General Export Licence (Export in support of Joint Strike Fighter: F-35 Lightning II)	Dated: 6 January 2014 In force: 6 January 2014	Developed to support a US Government-led collaborative programme with eight partner countries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, UK) for around 3000 aircraft. Also permits exports to range of other destinations where subcontracting may be taking place, provided that ultimately the export will be for the production or maintenance of the JSF.	See above	Permits, subject to certain conditions, the export or transfer of the majority of goods, software and technology (but not weapons or components of weapons) required for the production and maintenance of JSF for the end-use of all the listed partner

				nations and agreed export customers, namely Israel and Japan. Export of weapons for JSF continue to be required on an individual case-by-case licensing basis.
Open General Export Licence (International Non-Proliferation Regime Decontrols: Military Items)	Dated: 8 March 2013 In force: 8 March 2013	This licence is intended as a temporary measure placing certain specified items under a less restricted form of licensing until the EU Common Military List is amended and the UK Military List is updated to reflect changes agreed by the Wassenaar Arrangement.	See above	Permits, subject to certain conditions, the export of specified military items that are due to be decontrolled.
Open General Export Licence (Certified Companies)	Dated: 10 August 2012 In force: 10 August 2012	Licence published to comply with the UK's obligations under the European Union Directive 2009/43/EC of 6 May 2009 (known as the Intra-Community Transfer or 'ICT' Directive).	See above	Permits, subject to certain conditions, the export or transfer of items specified in Schedule 1 of the licence to those companies referred to in Schedule 2.
Open General Export Licence (Exports under the US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty)	Dated: 16 May 2012 In force: 28 May 2012	Licence created in conjunction with the UK's signing of the US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty.	See above	Permits, subject to certain conditions, the export or transfer of military goods or technology under the Treaty from the UK to the US. Permission is only granted to members of the 'Approved Community' and provided that the ultimate end-user of the goods or technology is the US or UK Government.
Open General Trade Control Licence (Maritime Anti-Piracy)	Dated: 22 February 2012 In force: 23 February 2012	Developed to cover licensable trade activity related to the provision of maritime anti-piracy services.	See above	Permits, subject to certain conditions, the provision and approval of certain information, the transfer of common military and paramilitary

				equipment used in maritime security operations for protection against acts of piracy.
Open General Trade Control Licence (Insurance or Re-Insurance)	Dated: 28 November 2011 In force: 28 November 2011	Developed to cover licensable insurance transactions involving the movement of controlled goods in relation to a UN operation in an embargoed destination, as long as the UN mission and operation falls within the eligibility of the licence.	See above	Permits, subject to certain conditions, the Head Insurance Party or any Additional Insurance Party to arrange or provide insurance or re-insurance in Relation to UN mandated or authorised missions or operations involving the movement of goods specified in the goods schedule which are subject to trade controls.
Open General Export Licence (International Non-Proliferation Regime Decontrols: Dual-Use Items)	Dated: 24 February 2011 In force: 7 March 2011	This licence is intended as a temporary measure placing certain specified items under a less restricted form of licensing until the EU Dual-Use Regulation is amended to reflect changes agreed by international non-proliferation regimes.	See above	Permits, subject to certain conditions, the export of specified dual-use items that are due to be decontrolled.
Open General Export Licence (Military Goods, Software and Technology)	Dated: 6 October 2010 In force: 15 October 2010	Permits the export of a wide range of military equipment to low-risk destinations. This licence was developed from the (Government and NATO End-Use) OGEL and applies to those destinations that are considered sufficiently low-risk that the limitation of only permitting exports for Government or NATO end-users was no longer considered necessary.	See above	Permits, subject to certain conditions, the export of a wide range of military equipment to any person or entity in the listed destinations.
Open General Export Licence (Military Goods: Collaborative Project Typhoon)	Dated: 11 August 2010 In force: 27 August 2010	Developed to support a collaborative programme between the Governments of Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK for the development, production and sale of the Typhoon aircraft (Eurofighter).	See above	Permits, subject to certain conditions, the export of listed military goods, software and technology for the production, development or maintenance of

				Typhoon aircraft to the listed destinations.
Open General Export Licence (Historic Military Vehicles and Artillery Pieces)	Dated: 26 May 2009 In force: 26 May 2009	Permits the export of military vehicles and artillery pieces manufactured 50 years or more before the date of export provided they are being exported to EU countries for not more than three months for the purposes of commemorative events, historical re-enactment or recreational purposes.	See above	Permits, subject to certain conditions, the export of vintage military vehicles (listed under ML6 on the UK Military List) and certain historic artillery pieces.

**“Expired” Open General Licences created since 6 April 2009**

Licence Name	Date Created (listed in descending order of date originally published)	Reason for Creation	To Whom Granted	What Goods Authorised
Open General Export Licence (Sporting Weapons – London Olympics 2012)	Dated 22 December 2011 In force: 1 January 2012 Licence expired on 30 September 2012	Developed specifically for use at the Olympics in London 2012.	All general licences are granted to exporters who are registered to use the named licence via SPIRE and who can fulfil all the specified terms and conditions. Registered OGEL holders are subject to regular compliance audits.	This OGEL permitted, subject to certain conditions, the export of sporting firearms and associated equipment as specified in the licence.
Open General Export Licence (Cryptography)	Dated: 14 October 2010 In force: 22 October 2010 Licence expired on 31 December 2011	Interim measure to minimise the licensing burden following removal of some cryptographic items from the control list of the Wassenaar Arrangement, but whose export from the EU was still subject to the EU Dual-Use Regulation. The OGEL was superseded in 2011 by a more comprehensive ‘International Non-Proliferation Regime Decontrol: Dual-Use Items’ at which stage the Cryptography OGEL expired.	See above	This licence permitted the export of items specified in Schedule 1 to be exported from the UK to any destination in Schedule 2.

**123. Given that Article 26 of the Export Control Order 2008 enabling the Secretary of State to create new types of arms export licences without Parliamentary approval could**

be used in a way that would significantly diminish the ability of Parliament to scrutinise the Government's arms export policies, I propose that the Committees continue to recommend that the Government should amend the Export Control Order 2008 to safeguard Parliament against this possibility.

### Priority Markets for UK arms exports

124. The Committees' previous scrutiny of Priority Markets for UK arms exports is described at paragraphs 129–134 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations are at paragraphs 41–43 of Volume I of that Report.

125. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations on Priority Markets for UK arms exports in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that:

- a) the decision of the Business Secretary to write on 17 April 2014 to the Committees with the outcome of the Government's review of Priority Markets for 2014/15 and with an explanation of why each country is included in the list is welcome;
- b) the removal of Libya from the list is welcome; and
- c) the decision to assess individual EU and NATO member countries on their arms export merits rather than as groups is welcome.<sup>157</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

- a) The Government notes the Committees' conclusion.
- b) The Government notes the Committees' conclusion.
- c) The Government notes the Committees' conclusion.<sup>158</sup>

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report why Canada has been deleted from the Priority Markets List.<sup>159</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

Under BIS, UK Trade and Investment's Defence and Security Organisation (UKTI DSO) supports UK industry in markets around the world where there are

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<sup>157</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 41

<sup>158</sup> Cm8935, p 18

<sup>159</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 42

opportunities in the defence and security sectors. The UKTI DSO List of Priority Markets is an administrative tool for use in business and resource planning by UKTI DSO. The planning enables UKTI DSO to focus its efforts to better effect in support of UK companies. The List also provides an indication to industry of the markets where UKTI DSO judges the opportunities to be significant. Whilst there continue to be opportunities for the UK defence and security industry to win business in Canada, the market review in 2013/14 judged these currently not to be significant and consequently removed Canada from the Priority Markets list for 2014/15. Opportunities come and go over different periods around the world and the assessment of which markets are a priority for UKTI DSO planning purposes will therefore vary. In total, 28 markets have appeared in the last six UKTI DSO Priority Market lists; only 12 markets have featured in all six lists, with the 2014/15 list comprising 16. UKTI DSO will continue to consult extensively before any new UKTI DSO List of Priority Markets is submitted for the Business Secretary's approval. Markets will continue to be added to, or removed from, the List depending upon the outcome of the UKTI DSO assessment for the period in question.<sup>160</sup>

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government needs to explain to Parliament and the wider public more fully why Saudi Arabia is listed by the Business Department as a Priority Market for arms exports whilst simultaneously being listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as being a country of major human rights concern, and also why Bahrain has now been added to the Business Department's Priority Markets List notwithstanding the continuing concerns about human rights in that country.<sup>161</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government believes that UKTI DSO activity to focus its efforts to better effect in support of UK companies, producing a List of Priority Markets offering significant opportunities for UK defence and security industries, is not incompatible with the activity of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) regarding human rights and democracy.

The FCO report on its activities: *Human Rights and Democracy Report 2013 (updated 24 June 2014)*, includes a list of 28 countries about which the UK has wide-ranging human rights concerns and in which the UK believes improvements are needed. The Report also includes case studies on other countries which the UK believes show a negative trajectory and where the UK believes improvements are needed.

The UK has a thorough and robust export control and licensing system, which distinguishes between exports for legitimate defence and security purposes and those that breach the Criterion 2 threshold: a clear risk that they might be used for internal repression, violation of human rights or gender-based violence. These

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<sup>160</sup> Cm8935, p 18

<sup>161</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 43

considerations are specifically identified in the Government's Consolidated Criteria against which all applications for strategic export control licences for military goods, including arms and dual-use goods, are assessed on a case-by-case basis.

Following UKTI DSO's market review in 2013/14, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is on the UKTI DSO List of Priority Markets 2014/15 because it has significant defence and security opportunities for UK exporters, and a high demand from UK companies for UKTI DSO support. Likewise, Bahrain is also included in the UKTI DSO list of Priority Markets for 2014/15, in particular having one significant defence-related opportunity in the air sector.

The Government requires all controlled defence and security exports, including those opportunities in UKTI DSO Priority Markets, to be subject to the Consolidated Criteria. The identification of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain as Priority Markets does not, therefore, impact on export control decisions. UKTI DSO is not set up to lobby on behalf of exporters in this regard and inclusion on UKTI DSO's Priority Market List does not therefore impact on the licensing process.<sup>162</sup>

**126. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) **what are its priority markets for UK arms exports in 2015/16 with an explanation of why each country is included in the list; and**
- b) **whether it will adopt a policy of explaining to Parliament and the wider public more fully why certain countries, such as Saudi Arabia, are listed by the Business Department as a Priority Market for arms exports whilst simultaneously being listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as being a country of major human rights concern.**

## Trade exhibitions

127. The Committees' previous scrutiny of trade exhibitions is described at paragraphs 135–154 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations are at paragraphs 44–46 of Volume I of that Report.

128. Article 21 of the Export Control Order 2008 states: "no person to whom this article applies shall directly or indirectly ... do any act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of any Category A goods,<sup>163</sup> where that person knows or has reason to believe that such action or actions will, or may, result in the removal of those goods from one third country to another third country."<sup>164</sup>

129. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations on trade exhibitions in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

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<sup>162</sup> Cm8935, p 19

<sup>163</sup> A list of Category A goods can be found in Schedule 1 Part 1 of the Export Control Order 2008 (SI 2008/3231)

<sup>164</sup> Export Control Order 2008 (SI 2008/3231), Section 21 (2)



**The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that though the Government agreed without qualification the Committees' previous Recommendation "that it is of the utmost importance that all defence and security equipment exhibitions licensed or facilitated by UK Government Departments, organisations and bodies do not display, promote or market Category A goods including goods that could be used for torture", the Government failed to achieve this policy once again at the biennial Defence and Security Equipment International exhibition (DSEi) held in London in September 2013.<sup>165</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government agrees that it is unacceptable for promotional material relating to Category A goods to be displayed at trade fairs in the UK. We work closely with the organisers of the Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEi) event to ensure that all exhibitors are aware of UK law in relation to Category A goods. As there were around 1300 exhibitors at DSEi in 2013 it was clearly not possible to check every piece of promotional literature in advance. However, as soon as the literature concerned was brought to the attention of the organisers they acted swiftly to close those stands and to eject the exhibitors from the event.<sup>166</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

In view of the self-evident lack of clarity in the present criminal legislation as shown by the Business Secretary's reply to the Committees of 6 June 2014, the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it will amend the relevant legislation to make it clear beyond doubt that a breach of the Government's policy "that it is of the utmost importance that all defence and security equipment exhibitions licensed or facilitated by UK Government Departments, organisations or bodies do not display, promote or market Category A goods, including goods that could be used for torture" constitutes a criminal offence.<sup>167</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government does not agree that the law is unclear in this area – it is a criminal offence to do "any act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of any Category A goods, where that person knows or has reason to believe that such action or actions will, or may, result in the removal of those goods from one third country to another third country." Where a possible breach of the law has been identified, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the Crown Prosecution Service will decide whether it is appropriate and proportionate to take enforcement action or to bring a prosecution based on the precise circumstances of the case in question.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>165</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 44

<sup>166</sup> Cm8935, p 20

<sup>167</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 45

<sup>168</sup> Cm8935, p 20

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it will ensure that the Committees are informed of the outcome of the Government's review of the Memorandum of Understanding between Clarion Defence and Security Ltd and the Export Control Organisation as early as possible in January 2015.<sup>169</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

During spring 2015 we will review the 2013 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Clarion Events and the ECO and ensure it is updated with legislation that is current at the time of signing. An updated MoU will be signed ahead of the next DSEi exhibition to take place in the UK. We understand that the next DSEi exhibition will not take place until September 2015. A copy of the revised MoU will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses of Parliament.<sup>170</sup>

130. UK Working Group (UKWG) in its Written Evidence expressed concern that following the ejection of two companies from the 2013 DSEi<sup>171</sup> the Government does not appear to have accepted that displaying brochures containing prohibited items at arms fairs breached UK export controls despite Article 21 of the Export Control order 2008.<sup>172</sup> UKWG stated that the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Clarion and the ECO regarding compliance at DSEi stated that "Clarion will ensure that exhibitors are made aware that any material relating to the trade of Category A goods is prohibited unless specifically authorised by a valid Standard Individual Trade Control Licence."<sup>173</sup> According to UKWG this showed that at the time of writing the MoU, ECO had accepted that promotional materials were covered under export control legislation and therefore companies advertising these products in their brochures were breaking the law.<sup>174</sup>

131. UKWG had called for the UK Government to put in place more robust procedures to prevent further breaches, including a requirement for all companies to submit all of their promotional literature to organisers/the Government for approval in advance and a compulsory ban on any future activity in the UK (including trade fair attendance) of a company found to be promoting prohibited equipment.<sup>175</sup>

132. In the Oral Evidence session on 10 November 2014 Oliver Sprague, Amnesty International, informed the Committees that the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government and Clarion Defence (the organisers of the DSEi event) "quite

<sup>169</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 46

<sup>170</sup> Cm8935, p 21

<sup>171</sup> The two companies ejected were MagForce International (France) and Tain Jin MyWay International Trading (China) both of whose brochures were displaying banned Category A Goods, namely leg irons and electric shock batons.

<sup>172</sup> Article 21 states: "no person to whom this article applies shall directly or indirectly ... do any act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of any category A goods, where that person knows or has reason to believe that such action or actions will, or may, result in the removal of those goods from one third country to another third country."

<sup>173</sup> Memorandum of Understanding between Clarion Defence and Security Ltd and the Export Control Organisation on the issue of compliance with UK Export Control Legislation in relation to activities of all UK and international exhibitors at DSEi, 5 September 2013.

<sup>174</sup> Ev w101

<sup>175</sup> Ev w101

categorically states that the advertising and promotion of category A goods without the prerequisite Government licence would be a breach of the law. In all those areas, there are very clear statements, as I read them, saying that this is against the law.” However, he continued by saying:

If, however, we read some of the Government’s more detailed responses to your Committee—this is where I start to get a little worried—I get the feeling that the answer is that the law itself might not be clear enough, and that there is a reason why companies are not being prosecuted. What might be needed here is a re-look at the law, because the intention behind that law was clearly to make these illegal acts. Having been through the whole process, I am sure of that. If there is a reason why companies in breach of that law are not finding themselves prosecuted—I do not mean just being made to leave the building—that points out to me that there is a problem with the way the law is drafted. It needs to be tightened.<sup>176</sup>

133. In the Westminster Hall Debate on the Committees’ last Report (HC 186) the responding Minister, Tobias Ellwood, said in relation to DSEi that the Government was reviewing its response to DSEi 2013 to “consider any improvements to the process that can be made before next year’s event. Officials from across Government will continue to work closely with Clarion Events to ensure that exhibitors comply with export and trade controls and understand their obligations.”<sup>177</sup>

134. When the Committees questioned the Business Secretary and his officials during the Oral Evidence session on 1 December 2014 about companies exhibiting banned goods, the Government’s Memorandum of Understanding with the exhibition’s organisers, Clarion, and whether the existing law should be amended to enable prosecutions to take place, Vince Cable said:

[...] we are concerned when appalling material of that kind is displayed. I think that it is exceedingly infrequent, as your statistics suggest. There were 1,300 exhibitors and two of these examples. As you know, we have a memorandum of understanding with the organisers, Clarion, to make sure that this kind of thing does not happen, but it can. You are right that there have been these two very bad cases.

What happens in these instances is that the police look at it and there is an investigation into whether the offenders can be prosecuted. I think that in these cases and in previous ones, it has not been possible to stand up a criminal case. Whether that was because of weakness of evidence or weaknesses in the legislation in the instances cited I do not know. You have asked a fair question in asking us to look at the legislation in order to make sure that these breaches cannot be tolerated, but maybe the officials can add some detail. I do not know.<sup>178</sup>

Chris Chew, Head of Policy, Export Control Organisation, BIS, added:

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<sup>176</sup> Q 10

<sup>177</sup> HC Deb, 30 October 2014, Col 143WH

<sup>178</sup> Q 77 [Vince Cable]

The law is quite clear. It says that what is prohibited is an act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of Category A goods where the person knows that their actions will result in those goods being moved between two overseas countries. The question that the enforcement authorities and the Crown Prosecution Service have to address is whether the existence of a brochure at a trade fair is sufficient evidence to be able to prove a criminal offence in a court of law. In each case where this has arisen, they have decided that it is not strong enough evidence, and so they have not brought a prosecution.<sup>179</sup>

When asked further on whether the existing law was inadequate, the Business Secretary responded:

Well, obviously, we would consider it, but we did not get advice back from the prosecutors that they were not able to proceed because of the weakness of the law, but if that is the case, the proposition is perfectly reasonable.<sup>180</sup>

135. Following the Oral Evidence session, the Business Secretary, wrote to the Committees to follow-up on the Committees questioning relating to whether the law should be changed with regard to prosecuting exhibitors who display brochures and promotional material containing Category A classed goods as follows:

**Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI)**

The Committees asked whether I would consider amending legislation in the light of the fact that the display of information relating to ‘Category A’ goods at DSEI (or other such exhibitions) may not in itself lead to a criminal prosecution. The Committees have raised this matter with me previously; a copy of my letter to the Committees of 26 March 2012 is attached at Annex A for ease of reference.

I am in principle open to the idea of a law change. But there are two practical considerations: firstly, it is necessary to prove a link between the display of the information, and the eventual movement of the goods between two overseas countries; and secondly, HMRC must act in a way that is proportionate and in the best interests of law enforcement when deciding what, if any, action to take. In all cases of this type that have come to light, HMRC have concluded that closure of the exhibitor’s stand by the event organiser was proportionate and that no further action was appropriate. We could legislate to widen the scope of the controls on advertising and promotion, in order to remove the link between the act of promotion and the movement of goods between overseas countries, but the additional test of whether a criminal prosecution is in the public interest would still need to be met. My view is that legislating could be merited if the problem persists and is a regular occurrence.

So far the problem has been very limited. The Committees noted that there have been five such incidents in nine years. Given that DSEI attracts around 1,300 exhibitors, this is a relatively limited problem. However, as I said in the evidence session, the figure should be zero. That is why officials from the Export Control

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<sup>179</sup> Q 77 [Chris Chew]

<sup>180</sup> Q 78

Organisation (ECO) and other Government departments will be working with the organisers of DSEI (Clarion Events) in the run up to the next exhibition in order to re-double our efforts to maximise the compliance of exhibitors with UK export controls at the next event.

Indeed officials have started preliminary work in preparation for DESI 2015. In the New Year officials will review the 2013 memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Clarion Events and the ECO to see how it might be strengthened. The Committees requested a copy of the MoU in advance of the general Election in 2015. As the next DSEI is scheduled to take place in September next year, we are not likely to finalise the MoU before the General Election but it is our intention that copies of the updated MoU, once agreed and signed, should be placed in the Libraries of both Houses of Parliament. The Committees should review the legislative option in the light of the experience of the 2015 exhibition.<sup>181</sup>

136. In its Written Evidence the UKWG stated that it had welcomed the steps the UK Government had taken to discourage Russian attendance at Farnborough International Airshow at a time when its military activities had drawn widespread condemnation. The UKWG stated that it would encourage the Government to adopt this approach more broadly and consider the international obligations and standing of all states represented at UK arms fairs. It recommended that a company from any state that had not signed the ATT should be prohibited from attending any UK arms fair. At a minimum, any OGELs issued to allow companies to automatically participate at DSEi, Farnborough or any other UK arms fair should exclude companies originating from non-signatory states.<sup>182</sup>

137. In the Oral Evidence session on 10 November Oliver Sprague of the UKWG said that if companies were from a country that had not signed the relevant international treaties, such as the Arms Trade Treaty, they should not be invited to exhibit at events.<sup>183</sup> He continued:

Similarly with cluster bombs, where any country has not signed the cluster bombs convention or any company has not got a categorical statement in writing to say that none of its subsidiaries or partnership companies are involved in the production and promotion of cluster bombs, there should be an outright prohibition on those companies too.<sup>184</sup>

138. When the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, was questioned at the Oral Evidence session on 1 December 2014 on whether countries that had not signed the Arms Trade Treaty, and similar treaties, should be excluded from attending arms trade fairs in the UK he said: “There are very large numbers of countries that have not yet signed the treaty. Obviously, we want them to do so”<sup>185</sup> and “It might be a step too far.”<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>181</sup> Ev w220 – Letter from Vince cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 15 December 2014

<sup>182</sup> Ev w102–103

<sup>183</sup> Q 14

<sup>184</sup> Q 16

<sup>185</sup> Q 81 [Vince Cable]

**139. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what has been the outcome of the Government's review of its 2013 Memorandum of Understanding between Clarion Events and the Export Control Organisation prior to the next DSEi exhibition due to take place in September 2015.**

## **Enforcement**

140. The Committees' previous scrutiny of enforcement is described at paragraphs 155–162 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations are at paragraphs 47–50 of Volume I of that Report.

141. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations on enforcement in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the Government's confirmation that it will continue to publish details of individuals and companies convicted of arms export offences and the sentences imposed by the courts is welcome, but recommends that the Government in its Response to this Report explains why there were just 3 successful prosecutions for strategic export offences in 2012–13 and 1 in 2011–12 compared with 8 in 2010–11.<sup>187</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government does not consider that the variations in numbers of prosecutions between 2010 and 2013 are indicative of any particular trend. Investigations into export control and trafficking and brokering offences vary greatly in complexity, and therefore the time it takes to conclude an investigation and bring it to court also varies. It was unusual to have eight cases come to court in one year, as occurred in 2010–11. The cases were not linked and it was coincidental that these cases were concluded during the same financial year.<sup>188</sup>

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response why HMRC visits to Open Export Licence holders have declined from over 800 in 2009 and in 2010 to 300 in 2012.<sup>189</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The ECO (not HMRC, as the question suggests) continues to review its management information regarding compliance audit visits. We concluded that changes to how

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<sup>186</sup> Q 82

<sup>187</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 47

<sup>188</sup> Cm8935, p 21

<sup>189</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 48

data was presented in 2012 continue to be robust compared to those produced in previous years.

The total number of audits in 2012 was 512. The figure of 300 quoted in the question is incorrect and appears to be the addition of the percentages in the table. As stated in a previous response, the figures from the previous years were ambiguous as we were in fact measuring the workload of compliance inspectors as opposed to the actual number of visits. Audit visits were being counted in the figures when all the preparatory work had been done, but the actual visits, in some instances, had been postponed at the last minute by a business. The participation by a compliance inspector in an ECO awareness seminar or similar event outside London was also being counted as equivalent to a visit.

The figure for the total number of compliance audit visits undertaken up to and including 2010 contains an element of double-counting, but the figure for 2011 does not. We have established that the order of magnitude of this double-counting (e.g. postponed visits and other events) accounted for 123 visits in 2010. Given the scale of the problem, a new process has been introduced whereby companies that postpone an audit meeting at short notice and without a compelling reason receive a warning letter from their inspector. This continues to result in a reduction in the number of cancellations.<sup>190</sup>

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees also recommend that the Government should restore reporting on:

- a) the number of unlicensed shipments discovered during compliance visits; and
- b) the categories of misuse discovered during compliance visits to Open Individual and Open General Licence holders as was done up to and including the Government's Strategic Export Controls 2011 Report.<sup>191</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

In respect of "categories of misuse found," we concluded that the distinction between "administrative errors," "general lack of knowledge leading to errors," and "unlicensed shipments" was not sufficiently clear and was therefore being applied inconsistently.

We have specific criteria to identify the compliance of a business that is quick and precise, ensuring consistency in its application across all sectors for all inspectors. Given the significant number of businesses that need to be audited and the need for the ECO to target businesses with compliance issues, the categories now adopted

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<sup>190</sup> Cm8935, pp 21–22

<sup>191</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 49

help the inspectors to identify more precisely the extent of business non-compliance.<sup>192</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

In its scrutiny of the Government's arms exports for the Quarter July to September 2013, the Committees asked the following question:

“Why was an incorporated SIEL to Brazil [via the United States] for components for military training aircraft refused?”

The Government Response was:

“We refused the SIEL under Criterion 7 because we assessed there was a risk that the goods might be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.” [The further classified information relating to this licence application given to the Committee cannot be published.]

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what is the standard wording it uses in its export licence application forms in which all applicants state in writing that the information in their application is accurate, and what are the penalties in current legislation if a licence applicant knowingly includes false information in their application.<sup>193</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The standard wording on the licence application concerning the accuracy of the information is:

“It is an offence to make any statement or furnish any document or information which to your knowledge is false in a material particular; or recklessly make any statement or furnish any document or information which is false in a material particular”.

The applicant confirms their acceptance of this and other conditions by typing the words ‘I AGREE’ in the relevant box on the application form.

Article 37 of the Export Control Order 2008 sets out the penalties for making misleading licence applications. A person guilty of such an offence shall be liable:

a) on summary conviction:

(i) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, or to both;

(ii) in Scotland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months, or to both; or

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<sup>192</sup> Cm8935, p 22

<sup>193</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 50



(b) on conviction on indictment to a fine or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or to both.

In addition, any licence that has been granted in connection with the application for which the false statement was made or the false document or information was provided is void, effective from the time it was granted.<sup>194</sup>

142. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)* the Committees wrote to the Government asking three questions about enforcement. The questions and answers were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

5.1 Compliance

Following the finding of the compliance review team "that there were unacceptable levels of non-compliance by first time users of open licences", what evidence is there, if any, thus far that the new processes introduced by the Government have resulted in significantly improved compliance by first time users of open licences?

**The Government's answer:**

The new policy has only recently been introduced and therefore there is insufficient data as yet, to undertake analysis of the impact of such changes.

**The Committees' question:**

Has the Government considered introducing a penalty if companies cancel their scheduled compliance audit at the last moment, thus reducing the efficiency of the Export Control Organisation's compliance team?

**The Government's answer:**

Proportionally, the late cancellation of audits although not ideal, is relatively small, less than 3% of all audits undertaken. Systems that were introduced two years ago have significantly reduced the number of audits being cancelled at short notice, with the majority of the remaining cancellations being outside the control of the companies. In these instances it would not be appropriate for a penalty to be incurred. We have, however, issued warning letters to companies in instances where no substantive reason has been given as to why an audit cannot take place.

**The Committees' question:**

5.2 Enforcement activity undertaken by HMRC, Border Force and the Crown Prosecution Service

What is the Government's explanation for the very significant rise in Strategic Export and Sanctions Seizures – up from 141 in 2011–12, to 280 in 2012–13, and to 450 in 2013–14?

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<sup>194</sup> CM8935, p 23

**The Government's answer:**

The increase in seizures is partly due to a large increase in seizures of portable devices designed for the purpose of riot control or self-protection (for example, pepper sprays, CS gas sprays, electric shock devices and stun guns.) These items are controlled under EU Regulation No 1236/2005 "The Torture Regulation." Prior to entry into force of the Torture Regulation, these items were controlled under PL5001 on the UK Military List.

There were 30 seizures of such items in 2011–12, compared with 78 seizures in 2012–13 and 186 seizures in 2013–14. Invariably, these were individual portable devices being carried for the personal protection of the owner. These seizures have had a disproportionate impact on the seizure statistics.

The EU export controls on these goods are primarily intended to prevent misuse of such devices by police, paramilitary or law enforcement bodies, or to prevent their use in torture. Whilst individual devices will still be seized under UK national legislation (since they are considered to be offensive weapons in the UK), HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) believes that it might present a misleading picture of export control compliance to continue to report these seizures in the strategic export control statistics. Therefore, in future, HMRC will not include seizures of individual self-protection devices in the statistics when the devices are in the possession of their user for the user's own personal protection.

However, HMRC will continue to include commercial seizures of portable riot control or self-protection devices in the statistics. This is consistent with the EU Regulation, which includes an exemption for individual devices carried for the user's personal protection.

In addition to that, in financial years 2013–14 and 2012–13 there were significant increases in the number of seizures of controlled computer equipment, communications and information technology systems, and equipment employing cryptography. There were 78 seizures of such equipment in 2013–14, and 69 seizures in 2012–13, compared to only 11 seizures in 2011–12.

Another factor that has led to an increase in seizures is an overall increase in defence and dual-use exports. The majority of customs export seizures are the result of mistakes on the part of UK exporters, rather than deliberate attempts to evade export controls or sanctions. The volume of trade in military and dual-use goods has increased significantly over the last few years, as evidenced by corresponding increases in export licence applications. The rapid increase in the volume of trade increases the likelihood and frequency of unlicensed exports being seized.

Analysis of the seizure statistics does not reveal any other significant trends, or point towards any particular cause that might underlie the general increase in seizure totals.<sup>195</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

143. The Committees noted the Notice to Exporters 2014/19 issued on 8 December 2014 which announced that a director of a company who had ignored trade sanctions and had exported over £3 million worth of banned goods had been ordered to pay £68,000 within in six months or serve an additional 15 months in jail. His company, Delta Pacific Manufacturing Limited, was also ordered to pay £1,072,000.<sup>196</sup>

**144. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) **whether it is satisfied that it has eliminated completely its double-counting of compliance audit visits resulting in the scale of effort being put into this aspect of enforcement being inadvertently exaggerated to Parliament and the public;**
- b) **what are the categories now adopted to help inspectors to identify more precisely the extent of business non-compliance; and**
- c) **whether, following the finding of the Government’s compliance review team “that there were unacceptable levels of non-compliance by first time users of open licences”, the new processes introduced by the Government have resulted in significantly improved compliance by first time users of open licences.**

### Compound penalties

145. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of compound penalties is described at paragraphs 163–166 of the Chairman’s Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees’ 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees’ Recommendation is at paragraph 51 of Volume I of that Report.

146. A Compound Penalty is the term used by HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) to describe the means by which HMRC can offer an exporter the chance to settle a case which would justify being referred to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) for prosecution by means of paying a financial penalty, therefore saving the taxpayer and company time and legal fees.<sup>197</sup>

147. The Committees’ Recommendation on compound penalties in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government’s Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report:

- a) whether there is any authority independent of the Government, such as the Crown Prosecution Service, authorising in the case of each breach of the criminal law on arms export controls the use of a compound penalty instead

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<sup>196</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Export Control Organisation, *Notice to Exporters 2014/29*, 8 December 2014D

<sup>197</sup> Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Compound Penalty Cases, <http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/prosecution/compound-penalty-cases/>

of a criminal prosecution and, if not, whether the Government will establish one;

- b) for what specific breaches of the criminal law on arms export controls HMRC currently allows a compound penalty to be offered;
- c) whether refusal of an offer of a compound penalty automatically results in a criminal prosecution, and, if not, why not; and
- d) the number of compound penalties offered by HMRC and the total sum paid to HMRC in compound penalties in the latest year for which figures are available.<sup>198</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

- a) Decisions to offer compound penalties are made by HMRC and there is no requirement for such decisions to be authorised by any other authority. The Government believes that the compound penalty regime plays an important role in the enforcement of export controls, providing an effective and efficient method of dealing with less serious breaches of those controls. There are no plans to introduce a third party into the compounding process.
- b) The practice of Compounding can be applied to all Customs and Excise offences, including offences involving unlicensed exports of military and dual-use goods and trade (trafficking and brokering) offences relating to such goods. Specifically, compound penalties can be offered for breaches under Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 37, 38 and 39 of the Export Control Order 2008.
- c) An offer of a compound penalty is made in lieu of criminal prosecution. If HMRC offers a compound penalty, the exporter is under no obligation to accept it. If an offer is declined, the case will automatically be referred to the Crown Prosecution Service for a decision on prosecution.
- d) During the financial year 2013–14, HMRC issued eight compound penalties for breaches of strategic export controls and strategic trade controls, which resulted in a total amount paid of £447,000.<sup>199</sup>

**148. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what are the internal guidelines used by HMRC for determining whether exporters making breaches of strategic export controls or strategic trade controls can be offered a compound penalty rather than having their case referred to the Crown Prosecution Service for a decision on prosecution.**

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<sup>198</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 51

<sup>199</sup> Cm8935, pp 23–24

## Crown Dependencies and Dependent Territories

149. The Committees' previous scrutiny of Crown Dependencies is described at paragraphs 167–169 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation are at paragraph 52 of Volume I of that Report.

150. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on the Crown Dependencies in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:**

The Committees conclude that they do not accept the Government's view that it would not be appropriate for it to report to a UK Parliamentary Committee any breaches of the UK Government's arms export controls and policies by a Crown Dependency on the grounds that any such breaches fall within the Crown Dependencies' domestic competences because:

- a) successive UK Governments have submitted evidence to UK Parliamentary Committees, such as the Foreign Affairs Committee, on matters relating to a Crown Dependency's domestic competence; and
- b) the financing of arms export transactions and arms export controls have overseas as well as domestic ramifications.

The Committees therefore repeat their previous Recommendation that the Government monitors enforcement by Crown Dependencies of the UK Government's arms export controls and policies and notifies the Committees of any breaches.<sup>200</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government maintains its position that, for the reasons previously stated, it would not be appropriate for it to report to a UK Parliamentary Committee on matters within the Crown Dependencies' domestic competence.

The example cited by the Committees of evidence given to the Foreign Affairs Committee is different, in that international relations is a matter on which the Government has competence in respect of the Crown Dependencies.<sup>201</sup>

151. The arms export-related issues that the Committees have raised with regard to the UK Crown Dependencies apply equally to the UK Dependent Territories.<sup>202</sup>

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<sup>200</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 52

<sup>201</sup> Cm8935, p 25

<sup>202</sup> The UK Crown Dependencies are the Isle of Man and the Bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey. UK Dependent Territories are: Anguilla; Bermuda; British Antarctic Territory; British Indian Ocean Territory; Cayman Islands; Falkland Islands & Dependencies; Gibraltar; Hong Kong; Montserrat; Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie & Oeno Islands; St Christopher & Nevis; St Helena & Dependencies; The Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri & Dhekelia; Turks & Caicos Islands; and Virgin Islands.

**152. I propose that the Committees conclude that all aspects of strategic exports have an international relations dimension, whether in relation to their financing, transit or export.**

**153. I propose that the Committees therefore recommend that any such activities being carried out in the UK Crown Dependencies or in the UK Dependent Territories should be monitored by the Government and any breaches of the Government's arms export controls and policies be notified to the Committees on Arms Export Controls and to Parliament.**

## **Combating bribery and corruption**

154. The Committees' previous scrutiny of combating bribery and corruption is described at paragraphs 170–172 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 53 of Volume I of that Report.

155. The Committees' Recommendation on the combating of bribery and corruption in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states, since its last Response in Cm8707, the names of any individuals and any companies against whom it has taken action under the provision of the Bribery Act 2010 in relation to their arms export dealings or financing.<sup>203</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

There have been no cases.<sup>204</sup>

**156. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states, since its last Response in Cm8935, the names of any individuals and any companies against whom it has taken action under the provisions of the Bribery Act 2010 in relation to their arms export dealings or financing.**

## **International Development**

157. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports and international development is described at paragraphs 173–179 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation are at paragraphs 54–57 of Volume I of that Report.

158. The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation on arms exports and international development in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

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<sup>203</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 53

<sup>204</sup> Cm8935, p 25

**The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that it is regrettable that though the Government stated in its previous Response that the Department for International Development (DFID) was in the process of assessing its role in the Arms Export Control Process and that officials would be submitting advice to Ministers in the Autumn of 2013, and would update the Committees as soon as possible thereafter, the Committees did not receive the promised update until 6 June 2014.<sup>205</sup>

**The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the decision of the Department for International Development (DFID) to strengthen its application of Criterion 8 ("whether the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country") is welcome.<sup>206</sup>

**The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees further conclude that DFID's undertaking to make a full report in 2015 on the effectiveness of its revised methodology for assessing arms export licence applications against Criterion 8 is also welcome.<sup>207</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government should state in its Response whether it agrees that DFID, whilst making Criterion 8 its prime focus of involvement in the arms export controls process, should also keep under review being involved formally in the assessments under other Criteria such as Criterion 3 (Internal Situation in the country of final destination) and Criterion 4 (Prevention of regional peace, security and stability) given that in a number of countries DFID has more staff present than any other British Government Department.<sup>208</sup>

**The Government's Response to the Conclusions and Recommendation above:**

The formal involvement of the Department for International Development (DFID) in the assessment of Criteria other than Criterion 8 has recently been reviewed. This noted that the expertise required for assessment of these other Criteria already sits within other departments. DFID officials work closely with colleagues from other departments both in London and overseas, and their knowledge is therefore already available informally for these assessments. While there are no plans for a more formal role, the Government will continue to consider the question periodically and will update the Committees if the assessment changes.<sup>209</sup>

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<sup>205</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 54

<sup>206</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 55

<sup>207</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 56

<sup>208</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 57

<sup>209</sup> Cm8935, p 26

159. On 19 February 2015 the International Development Minister, Desmond Swayne MP, wrote to the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, as follows:

I am writing to update you on progress in DFID's scrutiny of the UK's arms export licencing process, in particular Criterion 8 (C8). My predecessor, the Rt Hon Alan Duncan MP wrote to you on 4<sup>th</sup> June 2014 indicating that a methodology for strengthening the application of Criterion 8 was to be implemented with immediate effect. In particular, he said that DFID would strengthen its application of Criterion 8 by:

1. Improving the data and indicators used to calculate the C8 thresholds;
2. Focusing our analysis on the least developed countries and those where C8 is most relevant;
3. Ensuring the cumulative value of licences to each country is included in our assessment;
4. Involving DFID country offices more closely in C8 decisions regarding open licences.

DFID has implemented points 1 and 2 since the beginning of August 2014. Points 3 and 4 have been implemented since the beginning of February 2015. This delay was due to technical challenges in calculating the cumulative value and agreeing the point at which DFID should apply extra scrutiny of open licences with other Government departments involved.

My predecessor committed to updating the Committee on the effectiveness of the revised approach after 12 months of implementation. Given the delay in implementation of the two points above, I suggest that DFID provides you with the full update in December 2015.<sup>210</sup>

**160. I propose that the Committees conclude that they welcome the Government's commitment to consider periodically whether the Department for International Development (DFID) should be involved formally in arms export licence assessments in addition to those under Criterion 8 ("whether the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country") for example those under Criterion 3 ("Internal situation in the country of final destination") and Criterion 4 ("Prevention of regional peace, security and stability"). The Committees also conclude that they welcome the Government's commitment to update the Committees if the assessments change.**

**161. The Committees further conclude that the Government's policy decision to strengthen the application of Criteria 8, as set out in the letter of the International Development Minister Desmond Swayne to the Chairman of the Committees of 19 February 2015, is welcome.**

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<sup>210</sup> Ev w459 – Letter from Desmond Swayne to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 19 February 2015



## 7 Arms Exports Agreements

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### UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty

162. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty is described at paragraphs 180–184 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 58 of Volume I of that Report.

163. The Committees' Recommendation on the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report:

- a) the names of the companies and facilities of the UK members of the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty (DTCT) additional to the 14 members listed in the Government's previous Response (Cm8707);
- b) the names of the companies and facilities amongst the original 14 members who are now no longer members and why they have withdrawn in each case;
- c) whether any narrowing of the Exempt Technologies List (ETL) has been achieved, and, if so, in what specific ways;
- d) each specific UK Industry-to-US Government transaction that has now taken place, if any, under the DTCT;
- e) its response to the view of the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) about the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty the "we have ended up with something that has little operational relevance or use to industry. That is why the uptake is so low."; and
- f) what specific steps it will be taking to achieve its objective to move the US–UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty to the mainstream of the UK–US defence and security relationship.<sup>211</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

- a)
  - Stirling Dynamics
  - Boeing Defence UK Ltd (nine facilities)
  - AgustaWestland
  - David Brown Gear Systems Ltd

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<sup>211</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 58

- TMS Support Solutions Ltd
  - Kongsberg Maritime Ltd
  - Altran UK
  - Raytheon UK Ltd (five facilities)
  - TMD Technologies Ltd
  - Centanex Ltd
  - Computerised Training Systems Ltd
  - Malvern Optical Ltd (two facilities)
  - HITEK Electronic Materials Ltd
  - CTS GB Ltd
  - Phoenix Optical Technologies Ltd (three facilities)
  - L-3 Communications ASA Ltd
  - OPTIMA Defence & Security Group Ltd
  - Rockwell Collins UK
  - Plus BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd and BAE Systems Global Combat Systems Ltd facilities
- b) The Government is not aware of any withdrawals among these 14 members.
- c) The Exempted Technologies List (ETL) was clarified to coincide with the coming into force of the equivalent US bilateral treaty with Australia, which amounted to narrowing in the sense of clarity on certain items being permitted (e.g. fewer exclusions on armoured vehicles). Further, there have been removals from the ETL as a result of US Export Control Reform (ECR) changes where items have transitioned from the US Munitions List (USML – administered by the US State Department) to the Commerce Control List (CCL – administered by the US Commerce Department) when they were previously on the ETL. This process is ongoing and will mirror the wider US ECR effort. See also answers to questions (e) and (f) below.
- d) No such transactions involving UK industry have yet taken place.
- e) The Treaty has been used successfully for operational purposes on a number of occasions, although other mechanisms also continue to be used. While membership of the Approved Community continues to grow at a steady rate (as evidenced by the answer at (a)), both the UK Government and US Government (USG) wish to encourage greater uptake. However, both Governments recognise that the extensive scope of the ETL does reduce the Treaty's utility. Further, the US Export Control Reform (ECR) initiative, designed to better protect America's most sensitive defence technologies while reducing unnecessary restrictions on exports of less sensitive items, is beginning to move items out of the Treaty's ambit. The USG is conducting a study to assess the impact of ECR on the Treaty to determine whether its exclusivity has been diminished. Initial indications are that this is the case. The USG has therefore agreed to carry out a comprehensive cross-Government ETL review in 2015 once the USML category review to determine what remains International Traffic in Arms (ITAR)-controlled has been completed. Our priority is therefore to focus on ETL changes.

- f) In the near term the key strands of activity can be summarised as follows:
- Raise greater awareness among the US companies already eligible to use the Treaty through a major outreach awareness seminar in Washington, D.C. in October 2014;
  - Remain in dialogue with the US Departments of State and Defense (DE&S) regarding scheduling and staffing an ETL review in 2015, building on the consultation work the UK Government has already undertaken with DE&S Project Teams and UK industry over priority items/areas for change;
  - Establish the appropriate mechanisms for making ETL changes, prioritising those which require US Congressional notification as opposed to approval;
  - Continue government-to-government dialogue on promoting Treaty use among US Department of Defense personnel for exports to the US, and in the continued service of joint operations.<sup>212</sup>

**164. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) **the reasons, in the Government's view, as to why as at the time of the Government's Response (Cm8935) no UK Industry-to-US Government transactions had taken place under the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty; and**
- b) **the specific changes in the Exempted Technologies List (ETL) that the UK Government wants to be made.**

## **US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)**

165. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) is described at paragraphs 185–192 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendations are at paragraphs 59 and 60 of Volume I of that Report.

166. The Committees' Recommendations on the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response to this Report the specific ways, if any, the recent US defence export control reforms have

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<sup>212</sup> Cm8935, pp26–28

put the UK defence industry at a competitive disadvantage to the US defence industry in making exports to third countries.<sup>213</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

This issue was addressed in the Business Secretary's reply to the Chair's letter of 17 April 2014:

The ECR [Export Control Reform] process is not yet complete and we are therefore only able to draw interim conclusions about the impact on UK defence exports. The UK Government welcomes the continuing efforts by the US Administration to reform export controls and expects the movement of certain items from the USML to the Commerce Control List will eventually help to simplify and enhance trade between our two nations, resulting in a net benefit to UK exports.

However, it is important to acknowledge that one of the motivations for the ECR initiative was to enhance the international competitiveness of US defence exporters. This could make it harder for UK firms to win business against their US competitors. But we recognise that a more efficient system for processing and granting US export licences could be a huge boon for our industries where they are regularly sending goods back and forth to the US or working regularly with US affiliates or subsidiaries. We will carefully assess the impact on wider UK national interests.<sup>214</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking to ensure that there is a level playing field for the UK defence industry when competing with the US defence industry for export controls to third countries whilst maintaining adherence to UK national arms export policies.<sup>215</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The UK works closely with the US on export control issues, both through international arrangements such as the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and on a bilateral basis, and we have taken careful note of the changes that the US has made through the ECR process. Of course we want to ensure that UK exporters compete with their US counterparts on a level-playing field. However, US policy with respect to certain destinations, such as Israel, will continue to remain less restrictive than UK policy and inevitably this will have some impact on UK industry.<sup>216</sup>

**167. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response states whether it has any evidence to date that either the US Government's Export Control Reform (ECR) process or the movement of items from the US Munitions List**

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<sup>213</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 59

<sup>214</sup> Cm8935, p 28

<sup>215</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 60

<sup>216</sup> Cm8935, p 29

(USML) to the Commerce Control List (CCL) has resulted in a net benefit to UK exports.

## UK–France Defence and Security Co–operation Treaty

168. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the UK–France Defence and Security Co–operation Treaty is described at paragraphs 193–197 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendations are at paragraphs 61 and 62 of Volume I of that Report.

169. The Committees' Recommendations on UK–France Defence and Security Co–operation Treaty in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report provides a further update on the specific steps the Government is taking to ensure that the UK/France Defence and Security Co–operation Treaty is working satisfactorily for the UK defence industry.<sup>217</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The High Level Working Group (HLWG) chaired at Ministerial Level provides the opportunity for industry to raise cross–cutting issues such as export licensing. Additionally, in support of the UK–France Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty, both Governments are also working closely with industry on a spectrum of equipment programmes agreed at the 2014 Summit.

Attendance by industry to the HLWG has been analysed on a case–by–case basis to ensure the most value possible is gained both by Government and Industry partners, and provides a platform for industry to share their lessons learned on successful UK/France cooperation and identify ways of improving this relationship even further.

Good progress continues to be made with the implementation of the One Complex Weapons Sector strategy which aims to create efficiencies through greater harmonisation of industrial capabilities and capacities in the UK and France on Complex Weapons. As part of this, the UK and French Governments are in the process of helping to enable the implementation by MBDA (a multinational missile and missile systems development and manufacturing company) of an initial range of technological Centres of Excellence within MBDA–France and MBDA–UK. Included with this is the intention to use Letter of Intent Framework Agreement Global Project Licences (GPL) for each of the eight relevant Centres of Excellence in order to facilitate the transfer of information between the two nations for the variety of national and cooperative programmes that these Centres will serve in the future.

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<sup>217</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 61

The use of GPLs will also help the two governments have much greater visibility on the potential future export sales of Complex Weapons that incorporate these jointly developed technologies.<sup>218</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific issues relating to the Treaty are under negotiation between the British and French Governments.<sup>219</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

Both Governments are focused on delivering the equipment programmes agreed at the Brize Norton Summit and continue to work with industry to identify some areas where there might be the potential to export in the longer term.<sup>220</sup>

**170. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report provides a further update on the specific steps the Government is taking to ensure that the UK/France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty is working to the benefit of the UK defence industry.**

## **The Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU**

171. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU is described at paragraphs 198–203 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendations are at paragraphs 63–65 of Volume I of that Report.

172. The Committees' Recommendations on the Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states the name of the one UK company that had achieved certification for a general licence under the Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU as referred to by the Government in its last Response (Cm 8707), and the names of any additional UK companies which have been so certified.<sup>221</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

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<sup>218</sup> Cm8935, pp 29–30

<sup>219</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 62

<sup>220</sup> Cm8935, p 30

<sup>221</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 63

Roxel (UK Rocket Motors) Ltd was the company certified originally. Honeywell UK Ltd has been certified subsequently.<sup>222</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific proposals it has made in meetings on the ICT Directive in Brussels to improve visibility throughout the EU on the scope of general licences and the conditions attached to their use.<sup>223</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government, following discussions with representatives from UK industry, pressed the EU Commission and other Member States to establish measures to increase the visibility of their general licences established under the ICT Directive. The Government explained the practical obstacles faced by industry in not knowing which general licences were available in other Member States nor being able to understand them. The Government specifically requested that English versions of the complete general licences should be published with details of their goods coverage and conditions shown to facilitate their use. The Government also supported the need for "CERTIDER" (the Commission database established for certification arrangements) to be adapted to include a public area to include a centralised database of all the ICT general licences. The Commission has accepted the UK proposals and the need for a database. This is under development.<sup>224</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees also recommend that the Government states what specific steps it is taking to raise awareness of the potential benefits of the Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU for UK defence industry companies whilst maintaining adherence to UK national arms control policies.<sup>225</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government has no specific awareness raising plans related to the ICT Directive. The Directive introduced a framework of measures, in particular in respect of simplified licensing arrangements, that were required to be implemented by Member States. In the UK, these arrangements had largely been in operation over many years with benefits already being received by UK defence companies. Some additional benefits through faster procurement of defence items from other Member States under the general licences established under the Directive can be anticipated. The certification general licence has a role to play with regard to providing these additional benefits, but until greater transparency is in place with regard to the licences that have been established in Member States then both the Government and

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<sup>222</sup> Cm8935, p 30

<sup>223</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 64

<sup>224</sup> Cm8935, p 30

<sup>225</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 65

defence companies will continue to struggle to establish what benefits these licences will bring (see the answer to Question 64). Hence, any awareness activities on the certification scheme would not be worthwhile at this time.<sup>226</sup>

**173. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) **whether any UK companies in addition to Roxel (UK Rocket Motors) Ltd and Honeywell UK Ltd have achieved certification for a general licence under the Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU;**
- b) **whether English versions of the complete general licences with details of their goods coverage and conditions shown to facilitate their use have now been published, and, if not, by what date this is expected to be done; and**
- c) **whether the EU Commission has now adapted CERTIDER (the Commission database established for certification arrangements) to include a public area showing a centralised database of all ICT general licences, and, if not, by what date this will be done.**



## 8 Arms Control Agreements

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### Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

174. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is described at paragraphs 204–215 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation are at paragraphs 66 and 67 of Volume I of that Report.

175. In September 2014 the required number of ratifications triggered the 90-day period before the Arms Trade Treaty came into force. The Treaty came into force on 24 December 2014.<sup>227</sup>

176. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on the Arms Trade Treaty in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the Government's ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty is welcome.<sup>228</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is grateful for the Committees' conclusion. The UK's ratification of the ATT on 2 April 2014 (the day it opened for ratifications) shows its commitment to the Treaty.<sup>229</sup>

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) the total number of ratifications now achieved and the countries who have ratified;
- b) the countries which the Government considers to be the 20 largest arms exporters in view of the Foreign Secretary's statement on 2 April 2014 that the UK Government would be urging the largest arms exporters to ratify; and
- c) the specific steps the Government is taking both bilaterally and internationally to persuade individual countries to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty with particular reference to non-ratifying P5 countries and countries amongst the largest arms exporters.<sup>230</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

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<sup>227</sup> Treaty Series No. 1 (2015), Arms Trade Treaty, Cm8993

<sup>228</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 66

<sup>229</sup> Cm8935, p 31

<sup>230</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 67

- a) As of 06 October 2014, 53 states have ratified and 121 have signed the Treaty. Passing the fiftieth ratification triggers the Treaty's legal Entry into Force which will happen on Christmas Eve 2014. Full information on the UN states which have signed or ratified is available at <http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/>.
- b) The Government does not maintain a list of the top 20 largest arms exporters. The Government is aiming for the ATT to be a universal treaty and is encouraging all States that have not signed to sign and those that have signed to ratify. This naturally encompasses some of the largest exporters of arms.
- c) The Government continues to support the EU's new ATT Outreach Project conducted in the framework of Council Decision 2013/768/CFSP. Additionally, FCO funding has been granted for project work which will be led by a range of NGOs. These projects are funded by the Counter Proliferation Strategic Programme Fund and will focus on assisting selected countries in Africa, South America and East Asia to overcome the challenges they face in ratifying and implementing the ATT. The projects also aim to share lessons and best practice with neighbouring countries and regions. This year the Government has directly or indirectly lobbied non-ratifying P5 countries, among others, to ratify the ATT and intends to continue this work.<sup>231</sup>

177. Following publication of the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480) the Committees wrote to the Government asking two questions about the Arms Trade Treaty. The questions and answers were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

2.1 Arms Trade Treaty

Does the Government see any prospect in the foreseeable future of any of the 3 of the 5 Permanent Members of the UN Security Council who have not ratified the Arms Trade Treaty to date, namely China, Russia and the USA, doing so?

**The Government's answer:**

The Government has, directly or indirectly, lobbied non-ratifying P5 countries among other states this year to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and intends to continue this work. Signature or ratification of the Treaty is, of course, a matter for individual governments to decide.

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<sup>231</sup> Cm8935, pp 31-32

**The Committees' question:**

What additional legislation will be required by the Government to ensure full compliance by the UK with the terms of the Arms Trade Treaty, and when will that legislation be introduced?

**The Government's answer:**

The Export Control (Amendment) Order 2014 (S.I. 2014 No. 702), which came into force on 9 April, completed all the legislative changes necessary to ensure full compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty.<sup>232</sup>

178. UK Working Group (UKWG) stated in its Written Evidence that the current UK Government had played an active role in negotiating the ATT, and the UKWG hoped that it would be equally active in pursuing its universalisation and full implementation such that a high normative standard was established. It stated that in this context it was important that a strong lead should be taken at Ministerial level, through public statements and bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, in support of the ATT.<sup>233</sup>

179. UKWG had called for the UK Government to take into account a country's participation in the ATT when issuing arms export licences and had called for:

- consideration of a state's attitude to the ATT (i.e. has it signed the Treaty or acted contrary to the ATT) before entering into defence co-operation partnerships or issuing licences;
- states which have not signed the ATT should be removed as permitted destinations for Open Licences;
- promotion of the ATT should take precedence over promotion of arms exports; and
- invitations to arms fairs and permission for UK companies to exhibit or attend overseas arms fairs should be dependent upon the states attitude to the ATT.<sup>234</sup>

180. UKWG stated that the preparatory process towards the first ATT Conference of State Parties (CSP) had made a positive start, with the first informal consultations held in Mexico City on 8 & 9 September 2014. It was likely that the first Conference of States Parties would be held between June and November 2015. UKWG expressed a requirement that future discussions on the development of the ATT should be restricted to states and civil society that have shown a commitment to the ATT through signature, ratification and support of the ATT. It also expressed concerns about future financing of the ATT for the CSP and the secretariat.<sup>235</sup>

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<sup>232</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

<sup>233</sup> Ev w105

<sup>234</sup> Ev w105

<sup>235</sup> Ev w104 and Ev w106–107

181. When asked during the Oral Evidence session on 10 November 2014 about not inviting to trade fairs countries who had not signed the ATT and UK promotion of arms to those countries, Roy Isbister, Saferworld, said that:

I have been disappointed by what we have seen. There have been a number of promotional visits, promoting defence sales to non-ATT signatories, where [...] there is no indication that there is a pro-ATT element to the visit. It is very much about defence promotion; but I think it is up to the likes of us and Parliament to be holding the Government's feet to the fire on this kind of thing. [...] I think we have seen very little sign that, when there is a political-level push in promotion of arms exports, the issue of the Arms Trade Treaty features in that relationship.<sup>236</sup>

Oliver Sprague, Amnesty International, added that Open Licences should not be issued to countries that had not signed the Arms Trade Treaty.<sup>237</sup>

182. In the Westminster Hall Debate on the Committees' last Report (HC 186) held on 30 October 2014 the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, said that it was disappointing that of the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council only the UK and France had ratified the Treaty thus far. The US had signed but not ratified, and China and Russia had neither signed nor ratified. He said that "it would be a dismally poor example to the rest of the world if the remaining three members of the P5 failed to ratify the arms trade treaty" and he hoped that the British Government would "continue to do their utmost to get those key countries to do so."<sup>238</sup>

183. In the Oral Evidence session on 1 December 2014 the Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, was asked what impact the introduction of the ATT would have on UK arms exports. He replied that as the UK had an export control regime that was "already very transparent and very rigorous" and that the impact on the UK would be "relatively limited." He added that the Treaty would "not going to have a major behaviour-changing impact in the UK". The Foreign Secretary was then asked what the UK Government was doing to encourage the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council that had not signed or ratified the Arms Trade Treaty to do so. He stated:

We think that it would be a powerful signal if all the P5 states were to accede. You will know that France and the UK have ratified the treaty. The US has signed the treaty but not ratified it, and the truth is that internal domestic political issues with the gun lobby in the US are going to present great difficulties for the US in moving forward with ratification. Russia and China have neither signed nor ratified the treaty. We continue to press all three non-ratifying P5 members to move forward with this, because we believe that there is significant benefit in universality. A common P5 position will send a very strong signal to other states who have not yet signed. For those other states, where we can, we are seeking to offer technical support and assistance to move to a position to sign the treaty. And where people have

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<sup>236</sup> Qq 6–7

<sup>237</sup> Q 8 [Oliver Sprague]

<sup>238</sup> HC Deb, 30 October 2014, Col 123WH

signed, we are seeking to offer technical support and assistance to introduce compliant regimes to honour their obligations under the treaty.<sup>239</sup>

184. When asked whether the UK Government would consider excluding countries, and companies from countries, that have not ratified the ATT from attending or exhibiting at UK arms fairs the Foreign Secretary replied:

The Government will pursue this agenda by pointing its partners—potential signatories—to the benefits of the Arms Trade Treaty and, in particular, to the benefit that the Arms Trade Treaty-compliant regimes can deliver in terms of slowing or halting the proliferation of weapons into the hands of terrorist groups and others who seek to disrupt international good order. But we do not judge that using the Arms Trade Treaty as a stick to beat non-signatory powers with in terms of our trading activity would be appropriate, certainly not at this stage.<sup>240</sup>

185. On 8 January 2015 the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, wrote to the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, as follows:

In the Government's Response (Cm8935) to the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186) on page 12 there was no response provided to the Committees' recommendation that the Government states in its Response when it will be providing the Committees with its update on the EU User's Guide following the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty.<sup>241</sup>

The Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, replied on 16 January as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 8 January to the Secretary of State for BIS, about the updating of the EU User's Guide following the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty.

The EU User's Guide is being updated in the EU working group COARM. Efforts have been underway for some months now and will continue. The EU User's Guide will be updated in line with the Arms Trade Treaty, an essential component given its recent Entry into Force on 24 December 2014.

The UK will be maintaining its participation as part of the process and will continue to support efforts by the Member States and the EEAS. However, as work is still underway I cannot divulge further details.<sup>242</sup>

**186. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) whether it considers that China, Russia and the USA intend to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty or not;**

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<sup>239</sup> Q 157

<sup>240</sup> Q 158

<sup>241</sup> Ev w433 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 8 January 2015

<sup>242</sup> Ev w434 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 16 January 2015

- b) **what steps it will be taking to help ensure that those countries who have ratified the Arms Trade Treaty comply with the Treaty's provisions; and**
- c) **what is the latest position on the updating of the EU User's Guide in line with the Arms Trade Treaty which the Foreign Secretary rightly described as an essential component and what is the expected publication date of the EU User's Guide.**

## EU Council Common Position

187. On December 2008, the EU Council agreed a Common Position (2008/944/CFSP) defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment with which all EU Member States should comply. The EU Common Position provides some degree of protection for the UK defence industry from having its competitiveness undermined by other EU Member States whose Governments might otherwise have a less stringent policy on prohibiting arms exports which might violate human rights, facilitate internal repression or promote armed conflict than the UK Government. The full text of the EU Council Common Position is set out in Annex 6.

188. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the EU Council Common Position is described at paragraphs 216–218 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 68 of Volume I of that Report.

189. The Committees' Recommendation on the EU Council Common Position in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government when considering its future policy towards the EU should have in mind the significance of the EU Common Position in helping to maintain a fair competitive position in the EU for the UK defence industry.<sup>243</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees' recommendation.<sup>244</sup>

**190. I propose that the Committees continue to recommend that the Government when considering its future policy towards the EU should have in mind the significance of the EU Common Position on Arms Exports in helping to maintain a fair competitive position in the EU for UK defence industry exports.**

## Cluster Munitions

191. The Committees' previous scrutiny of cluster munitions is described at paragraphs 219–229 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with

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<sup>243</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 68

<sup>244</sup> Cm8935, p 32

the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation are at paragraphs 69 and 70 of Volume I of that Report.

192. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on cluster munitions in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the Evidence they have received clearly points to both financial institutions and civil society NGOs wishing to see the Government involved in developing a code of conduct on the indirect financing of cluster munitions.<sup>245</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees' conclusion.<sup>246</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that in the light of the Foreign Secretary's statement to the Committees that: "We will look at it again with the financial sector, if necessary, to see when and whether there is scope and need for the Government to act.", the Government states in its Response whether it will act in helping to develop a Code of Conduct on the indirect financing of cluster munitions.<sup>247</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

This issue is under active consideration by the Government, and we hope to update the Committees in due course as to how we are taking it forward.<sup>248</sup>

193. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)* the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The question and answer were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

2.5 The Convention on Cluster Munitions

What specific steps for further action were agreed at the fourth Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention in September 2013 and what role has the UK played in the implementation of those steps?

**The Government's answer:**

The 4th Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions considered the operation and status of the convention, including: universalisation; stockpile destruction; international cooperation and assistance; victim assistance; transparency measures; and national implementation measures. The UK continued

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<sup>245</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 69

<sup>246</sup> Cm8935, p 32

<sup>247</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 70

<sup>248</sup> Cm8935, p 33

to pursue its obligations in the wake of the MSP, including completing in December 2013 the obligation to destroy the national stockpile of cluster munitions.<sup>249</sup>

194. On 3 March 2015 the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs presented a Command Paper to Parliament, Cm9021, Post-Legislative Scrutiny of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibition) Act 2010.<sup>250</sup>

**195. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response when it will be updating the Committees as to how the Government will be taking forward the development of a Code of Conduct on the indirect financing of cluster munitions.**

### Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

196. The Committees' previous scrutiny of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is described at paragraphs 230–234 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 71 of Volume I of that Report.

197. The Committees' Recommendation on the Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what were its objectives at the Fifth Biennial Meeting in New York in June 2014 to consider Implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, together with the International Tracing Instrument, and how far progress was made with each of those objectives or not.<sup>251</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government played an active role at the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS5) to consider implementation of the UN Programme of Action (UNPoA) to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in All its Aspects, together with the International Tracing Instrument.

Objectives included securing by consensus a comprehensive, progressive and action-oriented outcome document that did not simply reaffirm old commitments, but drove the SALW agenda forward. This was achieved.

UK statements were made that reflected our priorities regarding stockpile management, international co-operation and assistance and the International Tracing Instrument. Copies of the statements are available on the UNPoA website. (<http://www.poa-iss.org/Poa/poa.aspx>)

<sup>249</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

<sup>250</sup> Post-Legislative Scrutiny of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010. Cm9021, March 2015

<sup>251</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 71



We ensured UK priorities were noted in the outcome document, evidenced by the strong focus on stockpile management, particularly in conflict and post-conflict areas such as Libya. The UK also successfully ensured references were included recognising the devastating consequences of illicit SALW on civilians, particularly women and children.

Whilst we took the opportunity at BMS5 to reaffirm the UK's commitment to ensuring full implementation of the UNPoA on SALW, we also highlighted the assistance and support the UK provides to implement the UNPoA effectively. We pushed for recent developments in the field of SALW to be included in the outcome document, such as UN Security Council Decision 2117 and the ATT. Unfortunately this could not be achieved by consensus.<sup>252</sup>

**198. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government's commitment to ensuring full implementation of the UN Programme of Action (UNPoA) to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in All its Aspects, together with the International Tracing Instrument, is welcome.**

**199. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what is the specific assistance and support that the UK Government is providing to implement the UNPoA effectively.**

## Landmines

200. The Committees' previous scrutiny of landmines is described at paragraphs 235–238 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 72 of Volume I of that Report.

201. The Committees' Recommendations on landmines in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendations:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the countries which have significant holdings of anti-personnel landmines and have not signed and ratified the Ottawa Landmines Convention. The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking with each of those countries to secure their ratification of the Landmines Convention.<sup>253</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The list of non-State Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention can be found here:

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<sup>252</sup> Cm8935, p 33

<sup>253</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 72

[http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/text\\_status/States-notparty-to\\_APMBC-en.pdf](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/text_status/States-notparty-to_APMBC-en.pdf)

[From the above website at the time of the Committees' Report, the states not party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention were:

Armenia	Korea, Republic of	Pakistan
Azerbaijan	Kyrgyzstan	Russian Federation
Bahrain	Laos	Saudi Arabia
China	Lebanon	Singapore
Cuba	Libya	Sri Lanka
Egypt	Marshall Islands	Syrian Arab Republic
Georgia	Micronesia, Fed, States of	Tonga
India	Mongolia	United Arab Emirates
Iran	Morocco	United States of America
Israel	Myanmar (Burma)	Uzbekistan
Kazakhstan	Nepal	Vietnam]
Korea, DPR of	Oman	

It is not easy to ascertain with certainty the stocks of anti-personnel mines held by these States.

The Government continues to use all appropriate bilateral and multilateral opportunities to promote the universalisation of the Convention. For example, we welcomed the announcement by the US at the Third Review Conference of the Convention that they will no longer produce or otherwise acquire antipersonnel mines in the future, and that they are 'diligently pursuing other solutions [to] ...ultimately allow us to accede to the Convention.' Additionally, through our support

of EU Council Decision 2012/700/CFSP, we were engaged with the work of a high-level EU ‘Universalisation Task Force.’<sup>254</sup>

202. Following publication of the Government’s *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)* the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. The question and answer were as follows:

**The Committees’ question:**

2.4 The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

What specific steps for further action were agreed at the 13<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention in December 2013 and what role has the UK played in the implementation of those steps?

**The Government’s answer:**

The 13th Meeting of States Parties (MSP) of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention: assessed the implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan in advance of the 3rd Review Conference in Mozambique (which took place in June 2014); appointed new co-chairs of coordinating committees; heard requests for extensions under Article 5; agreed the work plan and budget of the Implementation Support Unit; considered the Geneva Progress Report. The UK played a full part in this meeting. Following the 13th MSP, the UK mine action programme for 2014–17 continued to be developed, at the same time as the UK was progressing the fulfilment of all of its other obligations under the convention.<sup>255</sup>

**203. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) **whether the UK mine action programme for 2014–17 has now been developed and made public, and, if not, when it will be; and**
- b) **precisely what are the UK Government’s other obligations, in addition to the development of the UK mine action programme for 2014–17, under the Anti-Personnel Mine Convention.**

## **Barrel bombs**

204. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of barrel bombs is described at paragraphs 239–241 of the Chairman’s Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees’ 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees’ Recommendation is at paragraph 69 of that Report.

205. The Committees’ Conclusion and Recommendation on barrel bombs in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government’s Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

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<sup>254</sup> Cm8935, p 34

<sup>255</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

**The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that, like cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines, barrel bombs have been used indiscriminately against civilians.<sup>256</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

[No Government Response to this conclusion]

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that as the use of cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines has been banned under international Conventions, the Government should reconsider its position that "it does not currently have any plans to bring the issue of barrel bombs to the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons or any other fora."<sup>257</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government takes the view that existing International humanitarian law (IHL) provisions are appropriate and sufficient for governing the use of weapons. Therefore, our policy is to strengthen and better implement these existing IHL provisions and bear down on impunity rather than seek to create new law. We are committed to upholding the Geneva Conventions and strongly encourage others to do the same.

Barrel Bombs, air-delivered improvised explosive devices, unlike antipersonnel mines or cluster munitions, are not of themselves inherently indiscriminate nor necessarily excessively injurious. Barrel bombs, however defined, are capable of being used lawfully. At the heart of the matter are people in authority making decisions on the use of lethal force, which may be in close proximity to civilians or civilian objects, for which they should be held to account.<sup>258</sup>

**206. I propose that the Committees conclude that they do not agree with the Government's view that "Barrel Bombs, air-delivered improvised explosive devices, unlike antipersonnel mines or cluster munitions, are not of themselves inherently indiscriminate nor necessarily excessively injurious." The Committees consider that they are reinforced in this Conclusion by the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Committees of 10 December 2014 in which he said: "The Government believes that the Assad regime's armed forces have used chlorine as a chemical weapon on several occasions. There is no reason to believe that the chlorine used in these attacks had been subject to any specialist processing. The evidence suggests that chlorine cylinders were placed inside crude barrel bombs and delivered to targets in Syria."**

**207. I propose that the Committees continue to recommend that as the use of cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines has been banned under international**

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<sup>256</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 73

<sup>257</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 74

<sup>258</sup> CM8935, pp 34–35

**Conventions, the Government should reconsider its position that “it does not currently have any plans to bring the issue of barrel bombs to the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons or any other fora.”**

## **The Wassenaar Arrangement**

208. The Wassenaar Arrangement was established in 1995 in order to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations. Participating States seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to support such capabilities. The decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item is the sole responsibility of each Participating State. All measures with respect to the Arrangement are taken in accordance with national legislation and policies and are implemented on the basis of national discretion.

209. Representatives of Participating States meet regularly in Vienna where the Wassenaar Arrangement's Secretariat is located. The Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.<sup>259</sup> The name comes from Wassenaar, a town located in a suburb of the Hague, Netherlands, where an agreement was reached in 1995 to start a new type of multilateral co-operation.<sup>260</sup>

210. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Wassenaar Arrangement is described at paragraphs 242–250 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 70 of that Report.

211. The Committees' Recommendations on the Wassenaar Arrangement in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government provides the Committees with its promised update on Wassenaar Arrangement membership issues no later than in its Response to this Report.<sup>261</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

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<sup>259</sup> "Introduction", Wassenaar Arrangement, <http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html>

<sup>260</sup> Frequently Asked Questions, Wassenaar Arrangement, <http://www.wassenaar.org/faq/index.html>

<sup>261</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 75

Membership issues in the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) continue to be the subject of regular discussion. There has been no new member since Mexico joined in 2012. Currently there are several applications for membership, but these have not progressed. Cyprus is the only EU Member State remaining outside the regime and the UK continues to press for its inclusion. The UK is co-rapporteur with the US for Serbia's application. Serbia has made a promising and positive start in its bid for membership by drafting a revised Arms Control Law which is currently open for public consultation, and the UK will continue to support Serbia through the process.

The UK continues to advocate outreach as a way to encourage States who are holders of significant technology to adhere to the WA control lists. This year's outreach visit was to India in March 2014. Further visits have been proposed. One to Israel has been postponed given the current security situation. Brazil and China are also listed as prospective outreach targets.

The UK has worked closely with WA participating States and the Wassenaar Secretariat to promote new ways of engaging non-members. To this end, the UK has submitted, and repeatedly revised, a paper for consideration by participating States which explores the link between membership and outreach as well as ways to encourage adherence by non-members. The UK continues to take a lead on this issue given the importance of controlling the items listed by the WA.<sup>262</sup>

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) whether the comprehensive review of the Wassenaar controls list has now been completed or is still on-going; and
- b) whether the Wassenaar Arrangement's new export controls on surveillance and law enforcement/intelligence gathering tools and Internet Protocol network surveillance systems or equipment require any amendments to UK primary or secondary legislation to ensure UK compliance.<sup>263</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

- a) The comprehensive review of the Wassenaar Control List is still on-going. It was agreed in the WA that any comprehensive and systematic list review (CSLR) would pose an excessive burden due to the large number of control entries. Participating States have been encouraged to consider making national proposals to address out of date entries identified by the CSLR process that may need to be reviewed. The UK has submitted one proposal (covering four entries) to the Experts Group in 2014 as a result of the CSLR process.

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<sup>262</sup> Cm8935, p 35

<sup>263</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 76

- b) These changes will be implemented through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation. No changes to UK legislation will be necessary. See also the response to 110c below.<sup>264</sup>

212. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)* the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about changes to Common Military List covering changes in the Wassenaar Arrangement. The question and answer were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

Will the Government detail the additions to, and any deletions from, the Common Military List of the EU brought into force in the UK by The Export Control (Amendment) Order 2013?

**The Government's answer:**

Details of additions to, and any deletions from, the EU Common Military List brought into force in the UK are listed in Notice to Exporters 2013/13) issued at the time of the Amendment Order (which covers the 2012 Wassenaar Arrangement changes).<sup>265</sup>

213. The Committees also asked two questions regarding the section on the Wassenaar Arrangement within the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)*. The questions and answers were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

Will the Government provide the Committees, and make public, its latest report to the Wassenaar group of its exports of controlled arms, goods and technologies to non-Wassenaar members?

**The Government's answer:**

The Government reports to the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) using the organisation's secure online system. The data submitted to the WA in this way is not provided in a single report. However, the information is also available to the Committees and the public in the published quarterly and annual reports.

**The Committees' question:**

Do any of the 122 amendments to the Wassenaar Export Control Lists approved at the December 2013 Plenary Meeting – other than those relating to cyber equipment, software and technology which have been dealt with at Paragraph 1.2 above – require corresponding changes to either the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List, and, if so, have those changes been made?

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<sup>264</sup> Cm8935, pp 35–36

<sup>265</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

**The Government's answer:**

The changes to the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List (WA ML) will be implemented through an amendment to the UK Military List. We will make these changes as soon as the EU Common Military List has been amended in line with the WA ML. The changes to the Wassenaar Arrangement dual-use control lists will be implemented in full through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation. No changes to the UK Dual-Use List are necessary.<sup>266</sup>

214. EGAD stated in its Written Evidence that as new technologies emerged and existing technologies progressed, some new items were added each year, and some items were deleted from the Wassenaar control lists. Procedural problems between the European Commission and European Parliament in recent years had meant that the Wassenaar-driven amendments to the EU Dual-Use list had not included the internationally-agreed changes for 2011, 2012 or 2013. Similar delays had affected the internationally-agreed changes published periodically by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). However, EGAD pointed out that, other nations (notably the US and Singapore) implemented the changes very quickly after they were published to allow their exporters to take advantage of the internationally-agreed relaxations.

215. EGAD pointed out that the huge difference in bureaucratic reporting and recording effort demanded of exporters to use "Open" licences, rather than being able to export goods without an export licence, meant that larger, multinational companies with a global footprint chose to export these goods from countries that had implemented the de-controls promptly and in full, with a consequent damaging effect on the UK's position as an exporter and the UK's balance of payments. This effect was particularly evident in the high-technology industries, such as the manufacture and sale of computers and networking equipment, and software containing incidental cryptography, where consumers at all levels were demanding ever-faster and ever more secure equipment, making more sophisticated hardware and more built-in encryption the commercial norm rather than the exception. It continued by stating that the position for UK exporters was particularly difficult as the ECO and its advisers took a uniquely hard line on what equipment qualified for the Wassenaar-agreed decontrol of so-called "mass market" commercially-available encryption. EGAD said that this had driven exporters who could do so to export from other EU countries or the US, with consequential damage to the UK balance of payments.<sup>267</sup>

216. When asked about the impact of the delay in updating the dual-use list in the EU and UK during the Oral Evidence session on 10 November 2014 David Wilson, EGAD Chairman, said that it had been "huge". He said that the EU dual-use Regulation had not been updated since 2011, but he had been informed that the list would be updated by Christmas.<sup>268</sup>

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<sup>266</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

<sup>267</sup> Ev w58–59

<sup>268</sup> Q 64



217. During the Westminster Hall Debate on the Committees' last Report (HC 186) held on 30 October Ann McKechin MP welcomed the changes to controls that had been reached in 2014 via the Wassenaar Arrangement process, but that implementation was still awaited. She said that in its Response to the Committees Report, the Government had stated that it anticipated an amendment of the EU Dual-Use Regulation by the end of 2014. She asked the responding Minister, Tobias Ellwood MP, to confirm whether the timetable would definitely be adhered to. She suggested that the Government "may be falling behind the timetable for technical reasons" and, if so, she asked the Minister to confirm that the United Kingdom would consider unilateral measures, along the lines proposed earlier in 2014 by the German Government. She also asked if the UK Government had conducted any review of the human rights concerns raised by a number of organisations, including Privacy International, that the current criteria may not be effectively catching exports of surveillance equipment.<sup>269</sup>

218. In a follow-up to the Debate the responding Minister, Tobias Ellwood, wrote to Ann McKechin MP regarding implementation of EU controls adopted by the Wassenaar Arrangement. The text of the letter was as follows:

It was a pleasure to respond on behalf of the Government at the Westminster Hall Debate on arms export controls on 30 October. During the debate, you raised the issue of surveillance equipment and requested confirmation as to whether the timetable for implementation by the EU of controls adopted by the Wassenaar Arrangement would definitely be adhered to.

I can confirm that the agreed changes will be implemented through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the Dual-Use regulation.

As per standard EU procedures, the EU Commission adopted the Commission Delegated Regulation amending Annex 1 on 22 October. The regulation is now subject to a two month silence procedure, during which either the EU Council or the European Parliament can raise any objections. In the absence of objections from either organisation during this timeframe, the regulation is expected to be published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 30 December and to come into force the next day.

A draft copy of the updated Regulation and Control List is published on the EU Commission website at: <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/import-and-export-rules/export-from-eu/dual-use-controls/>.

We continue to work with industry and civil society groups, such as Privacy International, to ensure that exports of surveillance technology are controlled effectively while minimising administrative burdens on legitimate business. As with all other categories of goods, software and technology, licence applications for newly controlled items will be assessed on a case by case basis against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. However, we currently have no plans to introduce national controls in this area.

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<sup>269</sup> HC Deb, 30 October 2014, Col 127WH

I trust this information is helpful.<sup>270</sup>

219. Arms export control policies in relation to surveillance technology and equipment are at paragraphs 300 – 308 below.

**220. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) **what is the present position on Brazil, China, India, Israel and Serbia becoming members of the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA);**
- b) **whether the UK Government’s paper on consideration by states participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement of the link between membership and outreach as well as ways to encourage adherence by non–members has now been accepted by WA participating states, and, if so, whether it will be made public;**
- c) **whether the Wassenaar Arrangement’s new export controls on surveillance and law enforcement/intelligence gathering tools and on Internet Protocol network surveillance systems or equipment have now been implemented through amendment of Annex 1 of the EU Dual–Use Regulation, and, if not, the date by which they will be;**
- d) **whether the comprehensive review of the Wassenaar Control List is still on–going; and**
- e) **whether the changes to the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List have now been implemented in the UK through an amendment to the UK Military List, and, if not, the date by which they will be.**

### **The UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)**

221. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) is described at paragraphs 251–255 of the Chairman’s Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees’ 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees’ Recommendations are at paragraphs 77 and 78 of Volume I of that Report.

222. The Committees’ Recommendations on the UN Register of Conventional Weapons in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government’s Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government reviews its procedures for compiling its returns to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) to avoid errors in its returns in future.<sup>271</sup>

**The Government’s Response:**

The Government notes the Committees’ recommendation.<sup>272</sup>

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<sup>270</sup> Ev w213 – Letter from Tobias Ellwood to Ann McKechin dated 13 November 2014

<sup>271</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 77

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific progress it is making in achieving a widening and broadening of the categories of military equipment that are to be reported to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.<sup>273</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government continues to advocate a widening and broadening of the categories of military equipment that are to be reported to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. We will continue to do so each time the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) sits to evaluate the Register.<sup>274</sup>

223. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)* the Committees wrote to the Government asking four questions about UN Register of Conventional Weapons. The questions and answers were as follows:

**The Committees' questions:**2.6 The UN Register of Conventional Arms

- a) Does the Government include in its annual report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms its national holdings of Small Arms and Light Weapons? If so, why are these holdings not included in Annex C of the Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013?
- b) Which countries currently include in their annual report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms their national holdings of Small Arms and Light Weapons?
- c) Will the Government adopt a policy of making the submission of an annual report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms obligatory for UN member states?

**The Government's answer:**

The UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 includes a copy of the Government's 2013 report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

The UN's Report on International Conventional Arms Transfers (exports/imports) is produced according to UN General Assembly Resolutions 46/36 L and 58/34 and each Member State must provide the information required.

**224. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response which UN Member States do not provide the information required for the**

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<sup>272</sup> Cm8935, p 36

<sup>273</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 78

<sup>274</sup> Cm8935, p 36

**UN Register of Conventional Arms under UN General Assembly Resolutions 46/36L and 58/34, and what steps the UK Government is taking to encourage them to do so.**

### **The UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)**

225. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) is described at paragraphs 256–260 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendations are at paragraphs 79–81 of Volume I of that Report.

226. The Committees' Recommendations on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what were its objectives at the meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in November 2013 and what was the outcome of the meeting.<sup>275</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government's objectives at the meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in November 2013 were to discuss the status and operation of the Convention and its protocols, and to support a mandate for an Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. This mandate was adopted, and the meeting was subsequently held in May 2014.<sup>276</sup>

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response which countries are now Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and to each of its 5 Protocols.<sup>277</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

A list of High Contracting Parties to the CCW and its five protocols can be found here:

[http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/\(httpPages\)/3CE7CFC0AA4A7548C12571C00039CB0C?OpenDocument](http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/3CE7CFC0AA4A7548C12571C00039CB0C?OpenDocument)<sup>278</sup>

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

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<sup>275</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 79

<sup>276</sup> Cm8935, p 36

<sup>277</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 80

<sup>278</sup> CM8935, p 37

The Committees also recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking to encourage the universalisation of the Convention and to achieve adherence to the existing Protocols.<sup>279</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government continues to use all appropriate bilateral and multilateral opportunities to promote the universalisation of the Convention and its annexed protocols.<sup>280</sup>

227. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)* the Committees wrote to the Government asking two questions about the UN Convention on certain Conventional Weapons. The questions and answers were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

2.3 UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

What are the categories of weapons that fall within the description "Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems"?

**The Government's answer:**

There is no internationally agreed definition on what may constitute a lethal autonomous weapons system. Informal discussions under the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW) aim to build understanding and inform further work as necessary. For the UK, it is our understanding that such systems, which are able to comprehend higher level intent and which, once activated, may choose from a range of options to deliver lethal force, do not and are unlikely ever to exist. The UK has no plans to develop or acquire lethal autonomous weapons systems. Should there be development of an internationally agreed definition, it is important to note that it is the understanding of the UN CCW that this does not include existing and emerging remotely piloted capabilities.

**The Committees' question:**

Was the UK represented at the Convention's informal discussions on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems in May this year, and what was the outcome of those discussions?

**The Government's answer:**

The UK was represented at this meeting. The report on the informal discussions, to be submitted to the November UN CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties, indicates many states' wish for further informal discussions.<sup>281</sup>

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<sup>279</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 81

<sup>280</sup> Cm8935, p 37

<sup>281</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

**228. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response states:**

- a) **whether it is aware of countries that are developing, or have developed, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, and, if so, which those countries are;**
- b) **to what weapons systems it is referring to when it describes Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems or systems which are able to comprehend higher-level intent and which once activated may choose from a range of options to deliver lethal force;**
- c) **whether the report on the informal discussions at the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in May 2014 has now been made public; and**
- d) **what were the Government's objectives at the UN CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties in November 2014 and whether these were achieved.**

### **The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)**

229. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) is described at paragraphs 261–264 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 82 of Volume I of that Report.

230. In 1995 the Conference on Disarmament adopted the Shannon Mandate (named after Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon) to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally effective verifiable Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.<sup>282</sup> The use of the word "cut-off" (i.e. preventing future production) has raised the question as to how the Treaty would also cover existing stocks of fissile material. The primary debate that surfaced during the Shannon discussions centred on the inclusion of rules that would cover both existing stockpiles and the future production of fissile material.<sup>283</sup> Since 2010 Pakistan has been the only country blocking the start of negotiations because of a 2008 agreement by the world's key nuclear technology suppliers to lift long-standing restrictions on nuclear trade with India. Pakistan has maintained that a fissile material ban must cover existing stocks of fissile material as well as halting future production.<sup>284</sup>

231. The Committees' Recommendation on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

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<sup>282</sup> International Panel on Fissile Materials, *Banning the production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty*, 2008, Pp 2–3

<sup>283</sup> United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, *A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: Understanding the Critical Issues*, 2010, p 2

<sup>284</sup> "Pakistan's Nuclear Buildup Vexes FMCT talks", Arms Control Association, <http://www.armscontrol.org/>

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response by what date it expects the negotiations on the text of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty to start and, if it is unable to provide an expected date, to state what specific steps it will take to get negotiations started.<sup>285</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) operates on a consensus basis and all Member States must therefore agree before negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) can start. Politically, some members are not yet ready to do so.

However, in an effort to move this issue forward, the UK supported a General Assembly resolution establishing a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on a FMCT mandated to “*make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to, but not negotiate, a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.*” We were invited to nominate an expert to join the GGE along with experts from a further 24 countries party to the CD and put forward Dr Matthew Rowland, the UK Ambassador to the CD.

The FMCT GGE met in April and August 2014 with further meetings planned for 2015. These discussions are taking place in parallel with ongoing diplomatic engagement with CD Member States to try to agree a substantive programme of work. We believe the outcome of the FMCT GGE will put the CD in a more informed position when negotiations begin. As stated in our response to the Committees last year, we do not believe in setting an arbitrary deadline for negotiations to begin. We will continue to work to build confidence with both the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States to make progress on this necessary step towards disarmament.<sup>286</sup>

**232. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government's Response that the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) is a “necessary step towards disarmament” is welcome.**

**233. I propose that the Committees continue to recommend that the Government should agree with other like-minded Governments an alternative method of getting the FMCT negotiations started if the impasse at the Conference on Disarmament continues, notwithstanding the work of the Group of Government Experts in which the Committees welcome the UK's participation.**

## **The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)**

234. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is described at paragraphs 265–270 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendations are at paragraphs 83 and 84 of Volume I of that Report.

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<sup>285</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 82

<sup>286</sup> Cm8935, pp 37–38

235. The Current partners of the Missile Technology Control Regime are:

Argentina	Greece	Republic of Korea
Australia	Hungary	Russian Federation
Austria	Iceland	South Africa
Belgium	Ireland	Spain
Bulgaria	Italy	Sweden
Brazil	Japan	Switzerland
Canada	Luxembourg	Turkey
Czech Republic	Netherlands	Ukraine
Denmark	New Zealand	United Kingdom
Finland	Norway	United States of America <sup>287</sup>
France	Poland	
Germany	Portugal	

236. The Committees' Recommendations on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

Following the Government's statement to the Committees that it considers that the main missile technology exporters who remain outside the Missile Technology Control Regime include China, Israel, India and Pakistan, the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it has any further countries to add to this list.<sup>288</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

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<sup>287</sup> Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR partners, <http://www.mtcr.info/english/partners.html>

<sup>288</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 83



The Government does not have any other States to add to the already-named major technology holders that are currently outside the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The Government is open to looking at the merits of other States that are believed to be major holders of missile technology.<sup>289</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking in respect of each of its named main missile technology exporters currently outside the MTCR to encourage them to become Missile Technology Control Regime members.<sup>290</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

Outreach to prospective MTCR members is the responsibility of the MTCR Chair (Italy for 2013/14), assisted by the previous Chair (Germany) and incoming Chair (Norway for 2014/15). MTCR participating States are encouraged to join the visits. The UK supported a recent proposal for the participation of the TEM (Technical Experts Meeting) and IEM (Information Exchange Meeting) Chairs on future outreach visits. Under the Italian chairmanship of the MTCR outreach visits have taken place to Malaysia, Singapore, Israel and Belarus. In May 2014, before the annual Reinforced Points of Contact meeting in Paris, an MTCR-hosted Technical Outreach Meeting (TOM) was attended by a range of countries demonstrating a continued interest in the MTCR. UK experts attended and presented at the TOM.

As in the other export control regimes, the UK takes a supportive position on adherence by non-members to the MTCR guidelines and control lists. The UK presented a paper at the Rome Plenary in 2013 to explore ways in which adherence could be formally recognised and to identify States that adhere to the MTCR guidelines. The UK will continue to support adherence to the MTCR and the efforts of other partners.<sup>291</sup>

237. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)* the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about the Missile Technology Control Regime. The question and answer were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

2.9 Export Control Regimes – Missile Technology Control Regime

Do any of the technical changes to the Missile Technology Control Regime's export control list agreed via the Technical Experts Meeting require corresponding changes to either the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List, and, if so, have those changes been made?

**The Government's answer:**

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<sup>289</sup> Cm8935, p 38

<sup>290</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 84

<sup>291</sup> Cm8935, p 38

The changes to the Missile Technology Control Regime control lists will be implemented in full through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation. No changes to the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List are required.<sup>292</sup>

**238. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) **whether it expects Belarus, China, India, Israel, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore and any other states to become members of the Missile Technology Control Regime in the foreseeable future; and**
- b) **whether the UK paper at the Rome MTCR Plenary in 2013 to explore ways in which adherence to the MTCR could be formally recognised and to identify states that adhere to the MTCR guidelines has been adopted, implemented and made public.**

### **The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty**

239. Following a report in the New York Times stating that US officials believed that Russia had begun flight-testing cruise missiles in 2008 and that there was an ongoing interagency review to determine whether this was a violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF),<sup>293</sup> the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, on 3 September 2014 with a number of questions relating to the statements made by US State Department officials and in press reports regarding a possible violation of the INF Treaty by Russia. The text of the letter was as follows:

Following the statements made by US State Department officials and press reports that Russia may be in violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in respect of certain missile flight tests, I should be grateful for your answers to the following questions:

- 1) When did the US Government first make the British Government aware, either bilaterally or as a NATO ally, of its concerns about a possible INF violation by Russia in respect of these tests?
- 2) Are the US concerns in relation to Russian testing of the RS-26 missile or the R-500 missile derived from the land-based Iskander-K, or in relation to the testing of both?
- 3) Is it the case that the flight tests of concern commenced in 2008 or even in 2007? If not, when did they commence?

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<sup>292</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

<sup>293</sup> "U.S. says Russia Tested Missile, despite Treaty", *New York Times*, 29 January 2014

4) Has the British Government expressed any concerns itself to the Russian Government that these tests may be in violation of the INF Treaty and, if so, when were those concerns first conveyed?

5) Why have the Committees on Arms Export Controls who scrutinize the Government's policy across the entire range of international arms control issues not received any communication from the Government to date with regard to possible Russian violation of the INF Treaty?<sup>294</sup>

The Foreign Secretary replied on 30 September as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 3 September requesting information about the US reports of Russia's violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

The US formally shared its concerns with NATO Allies in January 2014 that Russia was developing and testing a missile that would fall within a prohibited treaty category. The US subsequently concluded that Russia is in breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty and senior US Government officials briefed the North Atlantic Council of this conclusion on 29 July 2014.

The US State Department's recent annual 'compliance' report (Adherence to and compliance with arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements and commitments) states that 'the United States has determined that the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles'. The US has not declared publically when it believes any flight tests of concern first commenced.

As a bilateral US-Russia treaty, the UK is not a party to the INF, but the UK fully supports the NATO Secretary General's statement of 30 July that Russia should work constructively to resolve this critical Treaty issue and preserve the viability of the INF Treaty by returning to full compliance in a verifiable manner. The Alliance's call on Russia to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty through ensuring full and verifiable compliance was repeated in the NATO Wales Summit Communiqué of 5 September.<sup>295</sup>

**240. I propose that the Committees conclude that it is a matter of utmost concern that "the United States has determined that the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500km to 5,500km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles."**

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<sup>294</sup> Ev w183 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Philip Hammond dated 3 September 2014

<sup>295</sup> Ev w185 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 30 September 2014

241. I propose that the Committees recommend that the UK Government gives the highest possible priority to helping to ensure that Russia returns to full compliance with the INF Treaty in a verifiable manner in accordance with the NATO Secretary General's statement of 30 July 2014, and further recommends that the Government states in its Response whether Russia has now done so.

## The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

242. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction is described at paragraphs 271–276 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations are at paragraphs 85–87 of Volume I of that Report.

243. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations on the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response its updated expenditure figures for its expenditure under the Global Threat Reduction Programme (GTRP) in 2013–14, 2014–15, 2015–16 and 2016–17.<sup>296</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

Expenditure under the Global Threat Reduction Programme in FY2013–14 was £10.85 million. Future expenditure is subject to approval of requirements and projects, but is predicted to be £10.5 million in FY2014–15 and estimated to be £10 million (nuclear projects only) in FY2015–16. Expenditure in FY 2016–17 will be determined following the next Spending Review.<sup>297</sup>

### **The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation:**

The Committees conclude that the security importance of reducing, and where possible eliminating, Russia's WMD stockpiles including of chemical weapons is such, that this programme should continue to be funded and recommends that the Government states in its Response whether it concurs with this view.<sup>298</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government continues to regard improving the security of material which might be used to produce WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction), including through reducing stockpiles, as a high priority internationally, including in Russia, and

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<sup>296</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 85

<sup>297</sup> Cm8935, p 39

<sup>298</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 86

continues to look for opportunities, where appropriate, to engage in cooperative work to achieve this.<sup>299</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government should resume producing its Annual Report "Global Threat Reduction Programme" (the last report was in 2010) on its policies and funding contributions in relation to The G8 (currently G7) Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction with details of the specific projects that the UK is funding.<sup>300</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government is currently looking into resources available to compile a summary report of activities and funding contributions under the Global Threat Reduction Programme, including details of projects where appropriate.<sup>301</sup>

**244. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states:**

- a) **its estimated expenditure under the Global Threat Reduction Programme in FY 2016–17 and subsequent years for which estimates are available;**
- b) **whether the Government is currently engaged in co-operative work with Russia to reduce Russian stockpiles of chemical weapons and chemicals for chemical weapons; and**
- c) **whether the Government has now found the resources to compile a summary report of activities and funding contributions under the Global Threat Reduction Programme, including details of projects, and, if so, when the summary report will be made public.**

## **The Nuclear Suppliers Group**

245. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Nuclear Suppliers Group is described at paragraphs 277–280 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendations are at paragraphs 88 and 89 of Volume I of that Report.

246. The current Governments participating in the Nuclear Suppliers Group are:

Argentina	Germany	Norway
Australia	Greece	Poland

<sup>299</sup> Cm8935, p 39

<sup>300</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 87

<sup>301</sup> Cm8935, p 39

Austria	Hungary	Portugal
Belarus	Iceland	Romania
Belgium	Ireland	Russian Federation
Brazil	Italy	Serbia
Bulgaria	Japan	Slovakia
Canada	Kazakhstan	Slovenia
China	Republic of Korea	South Africa
Croatia	Latvia	Spain
Cyprus	Lithuania	Sweden
Czech Republic	Luxembourg	Switzerland
Denmark	Malta	Turkey
Estonia	Mexico	Ukraine
Finland	Netherlands	United Kingdom
France	New Zealand	United States of America <sup>302</sup>

247. The Committees' Recommendations on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

Following the Government's statement to the Committees that it considers that the major nuclear technology holders who remain outside the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) include India, Pakistan and Israel, and that it also considers that suppliers of dual-use technology who are not members include the UAE, Malaysia and Singapore, the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response

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<sup>302</sup> Nuclear Suppliers Group, Participants, <http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/participants1>

whether it has any further countries to add to either its list of major technology holders outside the NSG or its list of suppliers of dual-use technology outside the NSG.<sup>303</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government does not have any other States to add to the already-named major technology holders that are currently outside the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). In addition, the Government does not maintain a list of dual-use supplier States outside the NSG, although the Group has met a number of States further to those listed above to discuss nuclear export controls over the past year.<sup>304</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking in respect of each of its named major nuclear technology holders currently outside the NSG to encourage them to become Nuclear Suppliers Group members, and also what specific steps it is taking in respect of each of its named suppliers of dual-use technology to cease being suppliers of technology that could facilitate nuclear proliferation.<sup>305</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

Outreach to prospective NSG members, including the named major technology holders, is primarily the remit of the Group's Chair (for 2013/14, Czech Republic), assisted by the previous Chair (US) and incoming Chair (Argentina, Chair for 2014/15). NSG participating governments do not take part in these outreach meetings. Over the past year, the Troika has met the Indian Foreign Minister and has held meetings with Israel and Pakistan in Vienna. In addition to this, the UK has discussed NSG matters with India, Israel and Pakistan bilaterally over the course of the last year. Prospective membership for these three States, which are not members of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, is the subject of ongoing discussion within the NSG.

Dual-use technology has legitimate non-nuclear uses, and the NSG does not seek to curtail such trade. However, the NSG actively engages with current and nascent nuclear and nuclear dual-use supplier States to ensure that they are aware of proliferation risks. As part of this effort, the NSG hosted a technical outreach meeting in Vienna in April 2014 that seven non-NSG members attended. At the meeting the UK gave presentations on enforcement and border control issues, as well as how to engage with domestic industry to strengthen export controls. In addition, the NSG also advocates that all States should adhere unilaterally to the NSG Guidelines whether or not they are members. Such a move would limit the opportunities for illicit nuclear trade to take place. In support of this, the UK presented a joint paper with the Netherlands at the 2014 NSG Plenary in Buenos

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<sup>303</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 88

<sup>304</sup> Cm8935, p 40

<sup>305</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 89

Aires exploring options to encourage non-NSG members to adhere unilaterally to the NSG Guidelines. The UK will continue to take a lead in future NSG discussions on this issue.<sup>306</sup>

248. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)* the Committees wrote to the Government asking three questions about the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The questions and answers were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

2.7 Export Control Regimes – Nuclear Suppliers Group

Do any of the 54 changes to the Nuclear Suppliers Group control lists made at the Group's Plenary Meeting in June 2013 require corresponding changes to either the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List, and, if so, have these changes been made?

**The Government's answer:**

The changes to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) control lists will be implemented in full through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation. No changes to the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List are required.

**The Committees' question:**

Is the UK represented on the Nuclear Supplier Group's Technical Experts Group established at the Plenary Meeting in June 2013?

**The Government's answer:**

The UK has maintained a full representation from across Government on the NSG's Technical Experts Group since it was established in June 2013.

**The Committees' question:**

What are the specific areas requiring further investigation in relation to the prospect of Indian membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and by what date is Indian membership likely to be achieved?

**The Government's answer:**

The NSG needs to further consider how a nuclear armed state that is not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, such as India, can be incorporated into the NSG. The NSG will also continue to work with India to ensure that its export control lists and guidelines are harmonised with those of the Group. It would not be useful to speculate on when membership might be achieved.<sup>307</sup>

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<sup>306</sup> Cm8935, p40

<sup>307</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014



249. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response states:

- a) whether it is supporting prospective membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for India, Israel and Pakistan, notwithstanding they are not members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and, if so, what specific steps the Government is taking to progress their membership;
- b) which were the seven non-NSG members who attended the NSG technical outreach meeting in Vienna in April 2014; and
- c) whether the UK-Netherlands joint paper presented at the 2014 NSG Plenary in Buenos Aires exploring options to encourage non-NSG members to adhere unilaterally to the NSG Guidelines has been made public.

### The Nuclear Security Summit

250. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Nuclear Security Summit is described at paragraphs 281–287 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 90 of Volume I of that Report.

251. The Committees' Recommendation on the Nuclear Security Summit in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what are the specific reforms of global security systems to ensure that vulnerable nuclear material does not fall into the wrong hands which the Government is determined to push through, and what are the specific steps it is taking to achieve such reforms.<sup>308</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is committed to tackling the threat of nuclear terrorism globally in a number of ways. The commitments made by the UK at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit are detailed below.

- To host an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Physical Protection Advisory Service Mission in 2015–16. This follows a 2011 Mission that reviewed security at our biggest site – Sellafield.
- To continue our Global Threat Reduction Programme of financial and expert assistance for nuclear and radiological security improvements overseas. Since 2010, our experts have assisted more than 20 countries, embedding high standards worldwide.

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<sup>308</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 90

- To contribute £3.4 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund in 2014, bringing the total UK contribution since 2010 to over £12 million.
- To contribute £500,000 to Interpol's Operation Fail Safe to track the movements of individuals involved in the illicit trafficking of radioactive or nuclear material.
- To continue to support the work of the Global Initiative on Combating Nuclear Terrorism.
- To extend outreach and assistance work to at least 16 countries that have yet to ratify or implement key international instruments in the nuclear security field, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
- To develop and share best practice on nuclear security and work to strengthen international nuclear security culture, including:
  - As Sponsor of the 2012 Multinational Statement on Nuclear Information Security, to lead international action to ensure the effective protection of sensitive nuclear information.
  - To continue to work with the IAEA and other States to develop and test security guidance on nuclear material accountancy and control, facilitating a roll out of this where States would find it beneficial.
  - To co-host, with the US, a workshop on Enhancing the Security of the Maritime Supply Chain.
- To continue to take forward the development of options for the future management of the UK's inventory of separated civil plutonium.
- To continue to prioritise security of our non-civil nuclear material, in line with our commitment in the UK's recent UNSCR1540 National Implementation Action Plan.
- To continue to develop our National Strategic Framework for nuclear emergency planning and response.
- With France, to continue the UK-France framework for cooperation on civil nuclear security to facilitate the exchange of good practice.
- In partnership with the US and France, and engaging with others, to continue to develop appropriate responses to the threat of nuclear terrorism including render-safe capability.<sup>309</sup>

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<sup>309</sup> Cm8935, p 41

252. I propose that the Committees conclude that the 12 commitments made by the UK Government at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit – detailed immediately below – are welcome:

- To host an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Physical Protection Advisory Service Mission in 2015–16. This follows a 2011 Mission that reviewed security at our biggest site – Sellafield.
- To continue our Global Threat Reduction Programme of financial and expert assistance for nuclear and radiological security improvements overseas. Since 2010, our experts have assisted more than 20 countries, embedding high standards worldwide.
- To contribute £3.4 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund in 2014, bringing the total UK contribution since 2010 to over £12 million.
- To contribute £500,000 to Interpol’s Operation Fail Safe to track the movements of individuals involved in the illicit trafficking of radioactive or nuclear material.
- To continue to support the work of the Global Initiative on Combating Nuclear Terrorism.
- To extend outreach and assistance work to at least 16 countries that have yet to ratify or implement key international instruments in the nuclear security field, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
- To develop and share best practice on nuclear security and work to strengthen international nuclear security culture, including:
  - As Sponsor of the 2012 Multinational Statement on Nuclear Information Security, to lead international action to ensure the effective protection of sensitive nuclear information.
  - To continue to work with the IAEA and other States to develop and test security guidance on nuclear material accountancy and control, facilitating a roll out of this where States would find it beneficial.
  - To co-host, with the US, a workshop on Enhancing the Security of the Maritime Supply Chain.
- To continue to take forward the development of options for the future management of the UK’s inventory of separated civil plutonium.
- To continue to prioritise security of our non-civil nuclear material, in line with our commitment in the UK’s recent UNSCR1540 National Implementation Action Plan.
- To continue to develop our National Strategic Framework for nuclear emergency planning and response.

- **With France, to continue the UK–France framework for cooperation on civil nuclear security to facilitate the exchange of good practice.**
- **In partnership with the US and France, and engaging with others, to continue to develop appropriate responses to the threat of nuclear terrorism including render-safe capability.**

253. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) **on what dates and where the UK Government will be hosting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Physical Protection Advisory Service Mission in 2015–16; and**
- b) **which are the 16 countries to which the Government referred to in its previous Response (Cm8935) that “have yet to ratify or implement key international instruments in the nuclear security field, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.”**

## The Australia Group

254. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of the Australia Group is described at paragraphs 288–291 of the Chairman’s Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees’ 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees’ Recommendation is at paragraph 91 of Volume I of that Report.

255. In early 1984, a United Nations investigation team found that Iraq had used chemical weapons (CW) in the Iran–Iraq war in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and that at least some of the precursor chemicals and materials for its CW program had been sourced through legitimate trade channels. In response, several countries introduced export controls on certain chemicals that could be used to manufacture CW. These controls suffered from a lack of uniformity, and it soon became apparent that attempts were being made to circumvent them. This led Australia to propose a meeting of the countries with export controls with the aim of harmonising their national licensing measures and enhancing cooperation. The first meeting of what subsequently became known as the Australia Group took place in Brussels in June 1985. At that meeting, the 15 participating countries and the European Commission agreed that there was value in exploring how existing export controls might be made more effective to prevent the spread of CW.<sup>310</sup>

256. The Australia Group (AG) is an informal forum of countries which, through the harmonisation of export controls, seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons. Coordination of national export control measures assists Australia Group participants to fulfil their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to the fullest extent possible.<sup>311</sup>

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<sup>310</sup> The Australia Group, The origins of the Australia Group, <http://www.australiagroup.net/en/origins.html>

<sup>311</sup> The Australia Group, Home, <http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html>

257. The current participants of the Australia Group are:

Argentina	Germany	New Zealand
Australia	Greece	Norway
Austria	Hungary	Poland
Belgium	Iceland	Portugal
Bulgaria	Ireland	Romania
Canada	Italy	Slovak Republic
Croatia	Japan	Slovenia
Republic of Cyprus	Republic of Korea	Spain
Czech Republic	Latvia	Sweden
Denmark	Lithuania	Switzerland
Estonia	Luxembourg	Republic of Turkey
European Union	Malta	Ukraine
Finland	Mexico	United Kingdom
France	Netherlands	United States of America <sup>312</sup>

258. The Committees' Recommendation on the Australia Group in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendations:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response which of the countries currently outside the Australia Group that it has said have large or developing chemical industries, for example China, India and Pakistan, or act as

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<sup>312</sup> The Australia Group, Australia Group Participants, <http://www.australiagroup.net/en/participants.html>

transshipment hubs for chemicals, such as Singapore and Vietnam, it would wish to see as members of the Australia Group, and what specific steps it is taking to achieve Australia Group membership by the countries concerned.<sup>313</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is a strong supporter of the Australia Group (AG). We welcome efforts by all countries to strengthen their national export control procedures on the sale of chemical and biological materials and equipment.

The Government considers potential new members on a case-by-case basis, with a particular focus on those States which play a strategically significant role in the industry or which host important transshipment hubs. Potential new members need to want to join the AG and must also demonstrate that their national export control procedures meet the requirements of membership. The AG is a consensus organisation, so all members must agree to accept any new member.

The AG Plenary in Paris in June 2014 agreed a new initiative for the growing number of non-members who use the AG Guidelines and Control Lists as a benchmark to set their national practices. Those non-members willing to engage will be afforded greater access to the AG and to a broader range of information to assist them in adopting global best practice. The UK will participate actively in this initiative.

The Government will continue to participate in AG outreach visits, resources permitting, either to promote good practice, or with a view to encouraging possible future membership. The AG Plenary in June 2014 agreed to undertake outreach visits to a number of States, including Burma, Singapore, China and India. The UK participated in outreach visits to India in 2012 and 2013, Vietnam in 2012, China, Pakistan and Malaysia in 2013.<sup>314</sup>

**259. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response which are the Australia Group non-member countries playing a strategically significant role in the chemicals industry or hosting important chemical transshipment hubs that the Government is actively supporting in becoming members of the Australia Group.**

### **The Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS)**

260. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) is described at paragraphs 292–295 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 92 of Volume I of that Report.

261. The Committees' Recommendation on the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

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<sup>313</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 91

<sup>314</sup> Cm8935, p 42

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees again recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) whether it remains satisfied that the UK's Academic Technology Approval Scheme continues to be effective in preventing those foreign students, who pose the greatest risk, from studying potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation subjects at UK Institutions of Higher Education; and
- b) whether it will consider introducing legislation to extend the scheme to include any UK students who similarly pose the greatest risk.<sup>315</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

- a) We continue to believe the Academic Technology Approval Scheme represents an appropriate response to the potential proliferation risk from transfers of knowledge and skills acquired through postgraduate study.
- b) The Government's position remains as stated in the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Committees of 12 November 2012. We have no plans to consider legislation to extend the Scheme to include UK students.<sup>316</sup>

262. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)* the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about the Academic Technology Approval Scheme. The question and answer were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**2.11 UK Activities. Academic Technology Approval Scheme

In which countries were the 739 foreign students, who have been denied clearance under the Academic Technology Approval Scheme since 2007 to study in the UK sensitive technologies relating to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, resident, and how many of these students were resident in each of the countries concerned?

**The Government's answer:**

The Academic Technology Approval Scheme applies to students who are not nationals of a European Economic Area state. The FCO does not publish detailed statistics on denials. The release of such information would undermine the effective operation of the Scheme, adversely impacting on the UK's security and its international relations.<sup>317</sup>

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<sup>315</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 92

<sup>316</sup> Cm8935, pp 42–43

<sup>317</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

263. Given that the Home Secretary, Theresa May, stated on 29 August 2014 that “We face a real and serious threat in the UK from international terrorism” when announcing a change in the threat level from substantial to severe,<sup>318</sup> I propose that the Committees conclude that it is extraordinary that the Government continues to reject the Committees’ recommendation in successive Reports that the Government should extend the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) to prevent students, not merely from abroad but also from the UK, who pose the greatest risk from studying potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation subjects at UK Institutions of Higher Education.

264. I propose that the Committees once again recommend the extension of the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) to prevent students from the UK, and not just from abroad, who pose the greatest risk, from studying potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation subjects at UK Institutions of Higher Education.

### The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

265. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is described at paragraphs 296–299 of the Chairman’s Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees’ 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees’ Recommendations are at paragraphs 93 and 94 of Volume I of that Report.

266. The Committees’ Recommendations on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government’s Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the countries that have still to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the dates of accession of any country that has acceded since Somalia’s accession on 29 May 2013.<sup>319</sup>

#### **The Government’s Response:**

Angola, Burma, Egypt, Israel, North Korea and South Sudan have yet to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Syria acceded to the Convention on 14 September 2013.<sup>320</sup>

#### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government states to which of the non-acceding countries it has participated in outreach on the Chemical Weapons Convention since the beginning of 2013.<sup>321</sup>

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<sup>318</sup> Home Office, Press Notice, “Threat-level from international terrorism increased”, 29 August 2014

<sup>319</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 93

<sup>320</sup> Cm8935, p 43

<sup>321</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 94



**The Government's Response:**

Since the beginning of 2013 the Government has reached out to Angola, Burma, Egypt, Israel and South Sudan to urge their adherence to the CWC. This has taken place bilaterally, in partnership with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and, for example, as chair of the G8 Non-Proliferation Directors Group during the UK's Presidency of the G8 in 2013. At the 76th Executive Council meeting of the OPCW in July 2014, the UK called on all States not party to the Convention to accede without delay, highlighting the opportunity for further outreach to these States, with the aim of achieving universality of the CWC by the time of the 100th anniversary in 2015 of the first large-scale use of chemical weapons during World War I.<sup>322</sup>

**267. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government's decision to reach out to 5 of the 6 countries that have still to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), namely Angola, Burma, Egypt, Israel and South Sudan (though not North Korea), to urge their adherence to the CWC is welcome.**

**268. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) **why so far, it had not reached out to North Korea to urge its adherence to the CWC; and**
- b) **what it assesses the prospects to be of realising the aim of achieving universality of the CWC through the accession of the remaining 6 countries, namely Angola, Burma, Egypt, Israel, North Korea and South Sudan, by the time of the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary in 2015 of the first large-scale use of chemical weapons during World War I.**

**The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)**

269. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is described at paragraphs 300–305 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations are at paragraphs 95–98 of Volume I of that Report.

270. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the detailed response given by the Government to the Committees' question on the Government's 2013 Annual Report on strategic exports as to "whether it considers the [UK] civil population to be at risk from state or non-

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<sup>322</sup> Cm8935, p 43

state holdings of biological or toxin weapons and, if so, what steps it is taking both nationally and internationally to mitigate that risk” is welcome.<sup>323</sup>

**The Government’s Response:**

The Government notes the Committees’ conclusion.<sup>324</sup>

**The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it still remains its long-term aim to establish a verification regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and, if so, what specific steps it is taking to try to realise this aim.<sup>325</sup>

**The Government’s Response:**

The Government’s main long-term objective is to seek agreement on a verification regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). However, at present there is no consensus among States Parties on what such a verification regime would look like in practice. Our focus, therefore, is on working with States Parties on the current issues of the Convention’s work programme, but we remain fully committed to working towards international agreement on meaningful verification arrangements for the BTWC. The work programme should help create the political conditions that might then make the establishment of a verification regime a practical proposition. The UK will continue to take an active role in any discussions or negotiations that take place on a verification regime.

We are beginning our preparations for the Eighth Review Conference, which is scheduled to take place in 2016. We hope that we will be able to identify options that could be agreed at the Conference and which could lead to a further substantive strengthening of the Convention.<sup>326</sup>

**The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government in its Response lists which states have now signed, but not ratified, the BTWC and which states have neither signed nor ratified the BTWC.<sup>327</sup>

**The Government’s Response:**

There are 170 States Parties to the BTWC. There are no new additions for this reporting period.

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<sup>323</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 95

<sup>324</sup> Cm8935, p 43

<sup>325</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 96

<sup>326</sup> Cm8935, p 44

<sup>327</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 97

The following ten States have signed but not ratified the BTWC: Central African Republic; Côte d'Ivoire; Egypt; Haiti; Liberia; Burma; Nepal; Somalia; Syrian Arab Republic; and the United Republic of Tanzania.

The following 16 States have neither signed nor ratified the BTWC: Andorra; Angola; Chad; Comoros; Djibouti; Eritrea; Guinea; Israel; Kiribati; Mauritania; Micronesia (Federated States of); Namibia; Niue; Samoa; South Sudan; and Tuvalu.<sup>328</sup>

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees also recommend that the Government states what specific steps it has taken since the beginning of 2013 to try to secure accession to the BTWC by those states who have not done so thus far.<sup>329</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government, bilaterally and as part of the EU, continues to encourage non-States Parties to accede to the BTWC. Five workshops have been organised under the EU assistance programmes for States and non-States Parties to the BTWC, which have promoted better understanding of requirements for accession, enhanced national implementation, and strengthened regional networking of the Convention. The workshops were organised for Colombia (March/June 2014), Mongolia (April 2014), Nepal (February/June 2014), Ecuador (March 2014) and Nepal (June 2013).<sup>330</sup>

**271. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government's statement that: "The Government's main long-term objective is to seek agreement on a verification regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)" is welcome.**

**272. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) **whether it is seeking to get the issue of a verification regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) placed on the agenda for the BTWC Eighth Review Conference scheduled to take place in 2016;**
- b) **what options the Government has identified so far that could be agreed at the Eighth Review Conference and which could lead to further substantive strengthening of the Convention;**
- c) **which of the following 10 states that have signed but not ratified the BTWC according to the Government's last Response (Cm8935), namely: Central African Republic; Côte d'Ivoire; Egypt; Haiti; Liberia; Burma; Nepal; Somalia; Syrian Arab Republic; and the United Republic of Tanzania, have now done so; and**

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<sup>328</sup> Cm8935, p 44

<sup>329</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 98

<sup>330</sup> Cm8935, pp 44-45

- d) which of the following 16 states that have neither signed nor ratified the BTWC according to the Government's last Response (Cm8935), namely: Andorra; Angola; Chad; Comoros; Djibouti; Eritrea; Guinea; Israel; Kiribati; Mauritania; Micronesia (Federated States of); Namibia; Niue; Samoa; South Sudan; and Tuvalu, have now done so.

## The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

273. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is described at paragraphs 306–310 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 99 of Volume I of that Report.

274. The Committees' Recommendation on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states as fully as possible in its Response what are now its objectives for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2015 and what specific steps it is taking to try to ensure that its objectives are realised.<sup>331</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government's objectives for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in 2015 reflect our overall approach to the NPT. We want to agree further progress towards a world free from nuclear weapons and to highlight our actions in support of this; encourage action that will help to contain any threat of proliferation or non-compliance with the NPT; and support the responsible global expansion of civil nuclear industries. We believe that the NPT should remain the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and therefore hope that NPT States Parties will be able to agree a consensual outcome balanced across all three mutually-reinforcing pillars to strengthen that position. We will continue to refine our approach in the run-up to the Review Conference.

Since the 2010 Review Conference, the UK has taken a variety of steps that support our objectives and help us to make parallel progress against the 2010 Action Plan. Many of these steps are set out in our statements to the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee, which are available on the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs website at the following link:

[http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/en/secretariat/unoda/npt/third-session-of-the-preparatory-committee-2014/statements-\(10\)/](http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/en/secretariat/unoda/npt/third-session-of-the-preparatory-committee-2014/statements-(10)/)

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<sup>331</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 99

Ahead of the Review Conference next year, the UK will continue to engage with key international partners to attempt to build support for a successful outcome in 2015.<sup>332</sup>

275. On 4 February 2015 the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the FCO, Tobias Ellwood wrote to the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, as follows:

I have pleasure in enclosing the United Kingdom's revised national report to the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. I have also arranged for a copy to be made available in the Library of the House.

This report has been revised in response to consultations with other states and civil society and we believe strikes the right balance between further transparency and protecting our national security interests. It will be presented by the UK delegation at the London P5 Conference on the 5<sup>th</sup> of February and then circulated as an official document at the Review Conference.<sup>333</sup>

A copy of the United Kingdom's revised national report to the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference can be found at [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/15](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/15).

**276. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response states the specific actions on which it will be seeking agreement at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference being held at the UN in New York on 27 April to 22 May 2015 in relation to each of the “Three mutually reinforcing pillars” it cited in its last Response (Cm8935), namely:**

- i. “further progress towards a world free from nuclear weapons”;
- ii. “action that will help to contain any threat of proliferation or non-compliance with the NPT”; and
- iii. “support the responsible global expansion of civil nuclear industries”.

## **The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)**

277. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is described at paragraphs 311–315 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 100 of Volume I of that Report.

278. The Committees' Recommendation on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

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<sup>332</sup> Cm8935, p 45

<sup>333</sup> Ev w459 – Letter from Tobias Ellwood to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 4 February 2015

The Committees again recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking with each of the remaining 8 countries whose signature and ratification is necessary to enable the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to enter into force—namely China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the USA—to try to persuade them to ratify the CTBT.<sup>334</sup>

#### **The Government’s Response:**

The Government strongly supports the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and wants to achieve its entry into force. Over the past year the UK has led or joined in numerous calls for the eight remaining Annex II States to sign and/or ratify the Treaty, including as chair of the G8 Non Proliferation Directors Group, at the Article XIV Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in September 2013, and at UNGA First Committee in October 2013. The UK has also raised the issue in bilateral meetings with China, Egypt, Israel, Pakistan and the US. In February 2014, the Rt Hon Sir Hugh Robertson MP, then Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and Dr Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the CTBT Organisation’s Preparatory Commission, discussed options for promoting universalisation and entry into force, during the latter’s UK Government–hosted visit to London.<sup>335</sup>

**279. I propose that the Committees again recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it has taken, or intends to take, since its last Response (Cm8935) with each of the remaining 8 countries whose signature and ratification is necessary to enable the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to enter into force—namely China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the USA—to try to persuade them to ratify the CTBT.**

### **Sub–strategic and tactical nuclear weapons**

280. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of sub–strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is described at paragraphs 316–318 of the Chairman’s Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees’ 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees’ Recommendation is at paragraph 101 of Volume I of that Report.

281. The Committees’ Recommendation on the sub–strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government’s Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether:

- a) it remains both the Government’s and NATO’s policy “that [NATO] Allies would consider further reducing NATO’s requirement for tactical nuclear weapons in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account Russia’s larger stockpile.”;

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<sup>334</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 100

<sup>335</sup> Cm8935, p 46

- b) it remains the Government's policy that it would be supportive of the eventual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, including those held by the US and Russia in Europe, provided that this is achieved in a manner that does not risk compromising the security of the UK and its Allies;
- c) it remains the Government's view that it is appropriate that the US embark upon the B-61 Life Extension programme to maintain NATO's appropriate nuclear force posture and to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of NATO's arsenal; and
- d) it is the Government's policy that dialogue with the Russian Government on sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons should continue, notwithstanding events in Ukraine.<sup>336</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

- a) The Government can confirm that both its and NATO's policy remains that NATO Allies would consider further reducing NATO's requirement for so-called 'tactical nuclear weapons' in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account Russia's larger stockpile. Since 1991, in the context of its adaptation to the improved security environment and in keeping with the Alliance's stated principle of keeping its forces at the minimum sufficient level, NATO has reduced the types and numbers of 'sub-strategic' nuclear forces assigned to it by over 85 percent.

The Government encourages all States with nuclear weapons to continue their efforts to reduce the size of their nuclear arsenals, recognising the particular responsibility of those with the largest numbers.

- b) The Government remains committed to the long-term objective of a world without nuclear weapons and can therefore confirm that it would be supportive of the eventual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, including those held by the US and Russia in Europe, provided that this is achieved in a manner that does not risk compromising the security of the UK and its Allies.

The Government is concerned by US reports that Russia has breached its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Any breach of the INF Treaty has the potential to damage the stability and confidence that has been established under this and other such treaties. [Russia's reported breach of its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is at paragraph 239 above of this Report] We are keen to see a restoration of the trust, compliance and transparency that forms the basis of successful security treaties. We remain determined to continue to work with partners across the international community to control proliferation and to make progress on multilateral nuclear disarmament, to build trust and confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States,

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<sup>336</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 101

and to take tangible steps toward a safer and more stable world in which countries with nuclear weapons feel able to relinquish them.

- c) The Government can confirm that its view remains that it is appropriate that the US embark upon the B-61 Life Extension programme to maintain NATO's appropriate nuclear force posture and to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of weapons assigned to NATO.

As a senior US official has stated in recent evidence to the House Armed Services Committee, the modernisation of these weapons 'would set the stage for a reduction in the total numbers of weapons in the [US] stockpile' as a part of a new approach to include a more reliable, but reduced nuclear stockpile. The presence of these weapons within the Alliance provides security confidence to NATO non-nuclear weapon States, negates the need for those States to consider obtaining their own nuclear weapons, and thereby helps sustain regional stability. These (and other nuclear weapons assigned to NATO) provide an important element of that assurance to NATO Allies and demonstrate an overall commitment to the role of nuclear weapons as stated in both the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept and the 2012 NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review.

- d) Russia unilaterally withdrew from discussions on nuclear issues with NATO Allies in the NATO-Russia Council in late 2013. More recently, as a result of Russia's actions in Ukraine, all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia has been suspended. Political dialogue in the NATO-Russia Council can continue at Ambassadorial level and above.

The Government intends to continue to work with Russia as part of the P5 process – under UK chairmanship in the coming year – to seek further progress against NPT commitments and other nuclear issues.<sup>337</sup>

**282. I propose that the Committees conclude that they welcome the Government's statement in its last Response (Cm8935) that "both its and NATO's policy remains that NATO Allies would consider further reducing NATO's requirement for so-called 'tactical nuclear weapons' in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account Russia's larger stockpile" and that the UK Government "would be supportive of the eventual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, including those held by the US and Russia in Europe, provided that this is achieved in a manner that does not risk compromising the security of the UK and its Allies".**

**283. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response on what specific aspects of "further progress against NPT commitments and other nuclear issues" it intends to continue to work with Russia as part of the P5 process during the UK Government's Presidency of the P5 in November 2015.**

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<sup>337</sup> Cm8935, pp 46–48



## A Middle–East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone

284. The Committees' previous scrutiny of a Middle–East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone is described at paragraphs 319–323 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation are at paragraphs 102 and 103 of Volume I of that Report.

285. The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation on a Middle–East Weapons of Mass Destruction Zone in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the failure to hold a regional conference on the establishment of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in 2013, as the Government had hoped, was most disappointing.<sup>338</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees' conclusion.<sup>339</sup>

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response states the latest position on the holding of such a Conference, and on the willingness of Iran and Israel to attend.<sup>340</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is committed to convening a Conference on a Middle East WMD Free Zone as soon as regional States agree on arrangements to allow that to happen, and preferably by the end of 2014. We continue to work closely with the Facilitator, fellow co-convenors and regional States in pursuit of this objective, and have been encouraged by a series of informal consultations that have taken place between regional States in Switzerland since October 2013. We hope that those consultations will lead to a successful Conference involving all regional States. The UK is also continuing to provide financial support to the Facilitator and his team.

As we have noted previously, Iran has indicated it would be willing to attend the Conference under certain circumstances. The UK would support Iran's participation in the Conference, although our current priority is on reaching a comprehensive agreement with Iran on its nuclear programme that addresses international concerns. Israel has publicly stated that it has yet to make a decision on whether it would attend any Conference, although we welcome their engagement on this issue

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<sup>338</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 102

<sup>339</sup> Cm8935, p 48

<sup>340</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 103

to date. We will continue to encourage regional States to agree arrangements for a Conference that all would find acceptable.<sup>341</sup>

286. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government's statement in its last Response (Cm8935) that: "The Government is committed to convening a Conference on a Middle East WMD Free Zone as soon as regional States agree on arrangements to allow that to happen, and preferably by the end of 2014", is welcome, though it was most disappointing once again that no such conference was held before the end of 2014.

287. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states once again, and subsequent to its last Response (Cm8935), what is now the latest position on the holding of a Conference on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, and on the willingness of Iran and Israel to attend.

### The National Counter–Proliferation Strategy

288. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the National Counter–Proliferation Strategy is described at paragraphs 324–327 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation are at paragraphs 104 and 105 of Volume I of that Report.

289. The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation on the National Counter–Proliferation Strategy in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that they do not agree with the Government's Response in Cm8707 that there was not a need for amendments or update to the Government's National Counter–Proliferation Strategy for 2012–15 published in 2012.<sup>342</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government refers the Committees to its answer to Recommendation 6. [See para 9 above]<sup>343</sup>

#### **The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:**

The Committees further conclude that the key Government policy area of Counter–Proliferation is in constant change and recommends that the Government makes a full report on its National Counter–Proliferation Strategy annually.<sup>344</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

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<sup>341</sup> Cm8935, p 48

<sup>342</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 104

<sup>343</sup> Cm8935, p 48

<sup>344</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 105

The Government refers the Committees to its answer to Recommendation 6. [See para 9 above]<sup>345</sup>

**290. I propose that the Committees conclude that as the Government's National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012-15 published in 2012 was a stand-alone document and quite separate from the Government's "United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report", the Government's Response in Cm8935 to the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation with regard to the National Counter-Proliferation Strategy is irrelevant.**

**291. I propose that the Committees further conclude that as the present Strategy is now 3 years out of date and as the key Government policy area of Counter-Proliferation is in constant change, the Committees once again recommend that the Government updates its National Counter-Proliferation Strategy annually as a stand-alone document.**

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<sup>345</sup> Cm8935, p 49

## 9 Arms export control policies

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### Arms exports and human rights

292. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports and human rights is described at paragraphs 328–331 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation are at paragraphs 106 and 107 of Volume I of that Report.

293. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on arms exports and human rights in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees continue to conclude that, whilst the promotion of arms exports and the upholding of human rights are both legitimate Government policies, the Government would do well to acknowledge that there is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms exports to authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising their lack of human rights at the same time rather than claiming, as the Government continues to do, that these two policies "are mutually reinforcing".<sup>346</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees' conclusion and refers to its previous responses, most recently in Cm 8707 which was its reply to the Committees' previous Annual Report (HC 186). These responses can be found on pages Ev144–145 of the Committees' current report.<sup>347</sup>

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it will report to the Committees all breaches of its human rights policies and its international human rights commitments with the use of British Government approved exports of controlled goods, software, technology and components as and when any such breaches occur.<sup>348</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government does not accept the Committees' recommendation. The Government is active in informing the Committees directly of significant relevant policy developments and is committed to continuing to do so. However, the FCO already publishes an Annual Human Rights and Democracy Report and this Report sets out the Government's position on human rights around the world.<sup>349</sup>

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<sup>346</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 106

<sup>347</sup> Cm8935, p 49

<sup>348</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 107

<sup>349</sup> Cm8935, p 49

294. I propose that the Committees continue to conclude that, whilst the promotion of arms exports and the upholding of human rights are both legitimate Government policies, the Government would do well to acknowledge that there is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms exports to authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising their lack of human rights at the same time rather than claiming, as the Government continued to do in its last Response (Cm8935), that these two policies “are mutually reinforcing”. I propose that the Committees further conclude that it is a statement of the obvious that vigorous, sustained and public criticism by the British Government of an authoritarian regime’s abuses of basic human rights is likely to be prejudicial to British arms exports success with that regime in the highly competitive international arms exports market, and that the Government should acknowledge this inherent conflict.

295. I propose that the Committees conclude that in its previous Response (Cm8935) the Government has produced no valid or relevant justification for not accepting the Committees’ Recommendation that it “will report to the Committees all breaches of its human rights policies and its international human rights commitments with the use of British Government approved exports of controlled goods, software, technology and components as and when any such breaches occur”, and the Committees recommend that the Government now accepts this same Recommendation.

296. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it is aware of any breaches of its human rights policies and its international human rights commitments that have taken place with the use of British Government approved exports of controlled goods, software, technology and components during the lifetime of the present Parliament.

### **Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance**

297. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance is described at paragraphs 332–336 of the Chairman’s Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees’ 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees’ Conclusion and Recommendation are at paragraphs 108 and 109 of Volume I of that Report.

298. The Committees’ Conclusion and Recommendation on Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government’s Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the Government's acceptance of their recommendation that the requirement on officials in the previous Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance merely to consult the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria if military and security equipment is being exported in an OSJA programme should be replaced by a requirement to adhere strictly to the licensing criteria and procedures is welcome.<sup>350</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government welcomes the Committees' endorsement. All exports of controlled goods, even within the scope of a programme which has been Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA)-assessed, are subject to normal export licensing procedures.<sup>351</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government keeps the implementation of the revised OSJA Human Rights Guidance under close scrutiny and reports to the Committees any uses of goods exported from the UK in an OSJA programme in breach of UK or international human rights policies.<sup>352</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government undertakes to keep the implementation of OSJA guidance under review and to revise and enhance it as and when necessary. Given that equipment exported as part of an OSJA-assessed programme is subject to normal export licensing procedures, the Government does not see a need for a reporting mechanism over and above the extensive reporting to the Committees already in place.<sup>353</sup>

**299. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it is aware of any use of goods exported from the UK in an Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) programme which have been in breach of UK or international human rights policies during the lifetime of the present Parliament.**

## Surveillance technology and equipment

300. The Committees' previous scrutiny of surveillance technology and equipment is described at paragraphs 337–346 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 1865), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 110 of Volume I of that Report.

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<sup>350</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 108

<sup>351</sup> Cm8935, p 50

<sup>352</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 109

<sup>353</sup> Cm8935, p 50

301. The Committees' Recommendation on surveillance technology and equipment in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) whether it is the Government's policy that EU Council Regulations 36/2012 and 264/2012 prohibiting the supply to Syria and Iran of certain specified equipment and software for "monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications" should be extended to other countries, and, if so, to which other countries;
- b) whether the EU has now agreed to incorporate fully into the EU Dual-Use Regulation the new controls over the export of mobile phone intercept and monitoring equipment agreed at the Wassenaar Arrangement meeting in December 2011, and, if not, what steps the Government is taking to have this incorporation implemented by the EU at the earliest possible date;
- c) what are the specific new controls and what are the specific technologies of concern agreed by the states participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement at their meeting in December 2013 referred to by the Foreign Secretary in his Oral Evidence of 8 January 2014;
- d) whether the EU has now agreed to incorporate fully into the EU Dual-Use Regulation the new controls over the export of the specific surveillance technologies and equipment of concern agreed at the Wassenaar Arrangement meeting in December 2013, and, if not, what steps the Government is taking to have this incorporation implemented by the EU at the earliest possible date; and
- e) whether the Government will make subject to UK export controls those items of surveillance technology and equipment agreed at the Wassenaar Arrangement meetings in December 2011 and December 2013 if not yet incorporated into the EU Dual-Use Regulation.<sup>354</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

- a) It is not Government policy that these measures should be extended to other States.
- b) The controls over the export of mobile phone intercept and monitoring equipment agreed at the WA meeting in December 2011 will be implemented through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation, which we expect to be complete by the end of 2014.
- c) The controls agreed by the WA at its Plenary Meeting in December 2013 cover tools (equipment and software) for creating, delivering and controlling

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<sup>354</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 110

“intrusion software,” and tools for “extracting message content and metadata from a carrier class Internet Protocol network and using that data to map the relational networks of individuals or groups.”

- d) These controls will be implemented through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual–Use Regulation, which we expect to be complete by the end of the 2014.
- e) The Government has no plans to introduce national controls on these items pending the implementation of EU–wide controls through the EU Dual–Use Regulation.<sup>355</sup>

302. During the Westminster Hall Debate on the Committees’ last Report (HC 186) held on 30 October 2014 Ann McKechin MP said that she was “increasingly concerned” about the increasing use of surveillance equipment, including intrusion software. She welcomed changes to controls that had been reached in 2014 through the Wassenaar Arrangement process, but implementation was still awaited. She continued by saying that in its response to the Committees’ last Report (HC 186) the Government had stated that it anticipated an amendment of the EU Dual–Use Regulation by the end of 2014. She asked the responding Minister to confirm whether the timetable would “definitely be adhered to” as there had been a suggestion that the UK was “falling behind the timetable for technical reasons”. If this was so, she asked the Minister to confirm that the United Kingdom would consider unilateral measures, along the lines proposed earlier this year by the German Government. She also asked if the Government had conducted any recent review of the human rights concerns raised by a number of organisations, including Privacy International, that the current criteria may not be effectively catching exports of surveillance equipment. She continued by saying that Privacy International had mentioned the UK Government’s export of such software to the Indonesian Government with an export credit guarantee this year.<sup>356</sup> In replying to the Debate the FCO Minister, Tobias Ellwood, said that: “It is worth mentioning that the controls on monitoring equipment were agreed in the 2011 Wassenaar arrangement, and implementation through the EU Dual–Use Regulation amendment is expected by the end of 2014. There will be publication, and a journal put forward, in due course.”<sup>357</sup>

303. In a follow–up to the Westminster Hall Debate on the Committees’ last Report (HC 186) held on 30 October 2014 the responding Minister, Tobias Ellwood, wrote to Ann McKechin MP on 13 November 2014 as follows:

It was a pleasure to respond on behalf of the Government at the Westminster Hall Debate on arms export controls on 30 October. During the debate, you raised the issue of surveillance equipment and requested confirmation as to whether the timetable for implementation by the EU of controls adopted by the Wassenaar Arrangement would definitely be adhered to.

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<sup>355</sup> Cm8935, pp 50–51

<sup>356</sup> HC Deb, 30 October 2014, Col 127WH

<sup>357</sup> HC Deb, 30 October 2014, Col 143WH



I can confirm that the agreed changes will be implemented through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the Dual-Use regulation.

As per standard EU procedures, the EU Commission adopted the Commission Delegated Regulation amending Annex 1 on 22 October. The regulation is now subject to a two month silence procedure, during which either the EU Council or the European Parliament can raise any objections. In the absence of objections from either organisation during this timeframe, the regulation is expected to be published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 30 December and to come into force the next day.

A draft copy of the updated Regulation and Control List is published on the EU Commission website at: <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/import-and-export-rules/export-from-eu/dual-use-controls/>.

We continue to work with industry and civil society groups, such as Privacy International, to ensure that exports of surveillance technology are controlled effectively while minimising administrative burdens on legitimate business. As with all other categories of goods, software and technology, licence applications for newly controlled items will be assessed on a case by case basis against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. However, we currently have no plans to introduce national controls in this area.

I trust this information is helpful.<sup>358</sup>

304. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, on 17 November 2014 regarding new EU Regulations being introduced relating to intrusion software, otherwise known as spyware. The text of the letter was as follows:

I refer you to the attached article in the Guardian of 6 November headed “Spyware exports will need a licence under new EU rules; ‘Intrusion software’ joins nuclear reactors and rocket fuel on the EU’s list of technologies that may have military applications”.

Please could you tell me on what date the new EU Regulations referred to will come into effect.

Please could you also tell me by what legislation instrument(s) these regulations will be brought into legal effect in all parts of the UK and from what date.

Annex:

[The article referred to in the letter can be found at:

<http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/06/spyware-exports-licence-new-eu-rules-military-applications>]<sup>359</sup>

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<sup>358</sup> Ev w213 – Letter from Tobias Ellwood to Ann McKechin dated 13 November 2014

<sup>359</sup> Ev w216 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 17 November 2014

The Business Secretary replied to the Chairman's letter on 15 December 2014 as follows:

Surveillance technology

In response to your letter of 17 November on surveillance technology, I would reiterate comments made in the evidence session that new controls on equipment for the monitoring or interception of the internet or of mobile telecommunications are due to be implemented by the end of 2014 through an update to Annex I of Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 (which is known as the "EU Dual-Use Regulation").

As per standard EU procedures, the EU Commission adopted the Commission Delegated Regulation amending Annex I on 22 October. The Regulation is now subject to a two month silence procedure during which either the EU Council or the European Parliament can raise any objections from either organisation during this timeframe, the Regulation is now expected to be published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 31 December and to come onto force on 1 January. Regulation 428/2009 is directly applicable in all EU countries therefore no further legislation will be needed in the UK to implement the Regulation.<sup>360</sup>

305. Privacy International stated in its Written Evidence that it welcomed the adoption at the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) Plenary of December 2013 of two categories of surveillance technology, including software and technology that is used to create and control malicious software, or what the UK Government has termed "Advanced Persistent Threat Software and related equipment" as well as "IP network communications surveillance systems".<sup>361</sup> Privacy International said that it was hopeful that the UK would continue to push for inclusion of further categories of surveillance technology at forthcoming WA Plenaries.<sup>362</sup> It noted that Germany, a major exporter of conventional arms and surveillance technologies, had recognised the problem of the lack of appropriate export controls for surveillance technologies and had decided to take interim measures in this area. In May 2014, the German Minister for Economics, Sigmar Gabriel, said the move was designed to prevent spy software made in Germany from being used for internal repression by autocratic regimes. The Minister had given indications that Russia and Turkey would be two countries affected by the restrictions.<sup>363</sup>

306. In the Oral Evidence session held on 1 December 2014 the Committees asked the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, what the new Regulations would cover and what impact they would have on UK exports of surveillance technology. Chris Chew, Head of Policy, Export Control Organisation replied:

Specifically on the topic of surveillance, three new controls are relevant. One is on mobile phone intercept equipment. The second is on what is known as remote intrusion software, which is software that an attacker uses to gain access to someone's computer or mobile phone. The third is on a type of software which

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<sup>360</sup> Ev w220 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 15 December 2014

<sup>361</sup> Ev w76

<sup>362</sup> Ev w76

<sup>363</sup> Ev w76

enables you to analyse telecommunications data and extract information about people, who they are communicating with and who is in their social networks.<sup>364</sup>

When asked whether the Government would be advocating including further categories of surveillance technologies in the Wassenaar Arrangement Mr Chew said: “This year we have been discussing within Wassenaar some possible new controls on what are referred to as forensic tools, which is where a law enforcement agency captures the data that are on your computer device.”<sup>365</sup> When the Committees pointed out that Germany had taken unilateral action to tighten up its regulations on surveillance technologies and asked whether the UK Government would do likewise, the Business Secretary replied: “We will obviously look at the German model. If it sets a good example in this field, we would not want to be too far behind.”<sup>366</sup> When asked about the scale of this technology Chris Chew said that with regard to remote intrusion software the Government was aware of one specific UK company Gamma, which produces the FinFisher product. He said that the new control was “targeted very much at that type of product.”<sup>367</sup>

307. The Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, in the Oral Evidence session on 1 December 2014 was asked by the Committees for an update on the previously announced guidance “to address the risks posed by exports of information and communications technology that are not subject to export control but which might have impacts on human rights including freedom of expression online.”<sup>368</sup> The Foreign Secretary replied that techUK, which is the technology trade association, had published new guidance for companies entitled “Assessing Cyber Security Export Risks”. He stated that the guidance covered cyber–security and cyber–surveillance products, focused on human rights issues and was designed to help companies improve their due diligence processes in line with the UK’s business and human rights action plan. He said that the guidance had been produced with the assistance of the FCO, companies, industrial players and the Institute of Human Rights and Business.<sup>369</sup> When asked by the Committees whether the guidance was sufficient to control exports of this technology the Foreign Secretary replied:

[...] that it is much more challenging to apply the export control regime to dual–use goods than to pure military exports, where the end use is always fairly clear. In this case, there may be end uses that are entirely beneficial and other end uses that would be much less acceptable. A judgment has to be made about how the technologies in question are likely to be used in practice.<sup>370</sup>

**308. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

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<sup>364</sup> Q 113 [Chris Chew]

<sup>365</sup> Q 116

<sup>366</sup> Q 118 [Vince Cable]

<sup>367</sup> Q 114

<sup>368</sup> FCO, *Good Business: Implementing the UNGP on Business and Human Rights*, Cm8695, September 2013

<sup>369</sup> Q 165

<sup>370</sup> Q 168

- a) whether having looked at the German model of taking national action to tighten up its export controls over surveillance technology and equipment, the UK Government will now do likewise; and
- b) whether the Government is satisfied that the EU's recent amendment of its Dual-Use Regulation provides sufficiently comprehensive legislative controls over the export from the UK of surveillance technology and equipment which might be used contrary to the Government's human rights and freedom of expression policies.

## Cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components

309. Cryptographic equipment is used to encrypt data such that only users with a valid encryption key can decrypt an encrypted message into plain, readable text.

310. The Committees' previous scrutiny of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components is described at paragraphs 347–354 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation are at paragraphs 111 and 112 of Volume I of that Report.

311. The Committees' Recommendation on cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the scale of the Government's approval of export licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components both to the Government's principal Countries of Human Rights concern and to the Committees on Arms Export Controls' additional countries of concern is a matter of considerable disquiet, particularly given the fact that each and every one of the items involved by virtue of being subject to export licensing has an actual or possible military use.<sup>371</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government does not accept the Committees' conclusion. These products are subject to control because they have an "information security" (encryption) capability. This capability has become very widespread in recent years and is now a standard feature of a wide range of consumer, commercial and industrial devices. Many of these devices are of no strategic importance, and their use does not raise concerns regarding human rights. A significant proportion of the licences granted for cryptographic equipment, software and technology relate to these devices.<sup>372</sup>

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

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<sup>371</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 111

<sup>372</sup> Cm8935, pp 51–52

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether Ministers themselves will give greater scrutiny to export licence applications for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to the Government's principal Countries of Human Rights concern and to the Committees' additional countries of concern.<sup>373</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

Each application for cryptographic equipment (or a variant thereof) is assessed on a case-by-case basis. The majority of applications are for commercial equipment for commercial end-use. Applications are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria. A licence is not granted if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression or diverted to other uses contrary to the Consolidated Criteria.<sup>374</sup>

312. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)* the Committees wrote to the Government asking three questions about cyber equipment, software and technology. The questions and answers were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

1.2 Policy Developments – Cyber equipment, software and technology

Does the Government's definition of cyber equipment, software and technology include cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components?

**The Government's answer:**

The Government has not formally defined "cyber equipment" but the term is widely used by NGOs and in the media. The UK Cyber Security Strategy, published in November 2011, defined "cyber space" as "an interactive domain made up of digital networks that store, modify and communicate information. It includes the internet, but also the other networked information systems that support businesses, infrastructure and services." Within this space there are a range of products and services which provide a protective security function for information assets, or which may have security implications for the users of the networked systems. It is the latter category of products on which this work has focussed.

Not all of these products will have an encryption capability, which is why we have worked hard to agree specific controls. On the other hand, only a small proportion of cryptographic equipment, software and technology will fall into this category.

**The Committees' question:**

Will the Government be implementing in full the exports controls adopted by the Wassenaar Arrangement in December 2013 over both tools (equipment and software) for creating, delivering and controlling "intrusion software", and "tools for

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<sup>373</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 112

<sup>374</sup> Cm8935, p 52

extracting message content and metadata from a carrier class Internet Protocol network and using that data to map the relational networks of individuals or groups”? If so, when will both that legislation be introduced, and also the relevant legislation to ensure UK compliance with the forthcoming related amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual–Use Regulation coming into force in the second half of 2014?

**The Government’s answer:**

The new controls adopted by the Wassenaar Arrangement in December 2013 will be implemented in full through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual–Use Regulation. No other legislation is necessary to implement these changes.

**The Committees’ question:**

Why is the Government working only with industry “to develop guidance to address the risks posed by exports of information and communications technology that are not subject to export control but which might have impacts on human rights including freedom of expression online” and not also with those concerned with human rights and freedom of expression?

**The Government’s answer:**

The guidance is intended to be produced *by* industry *for* industry. However, the relevant industry trade association has been working closely with the Institute for Business and Human Rights on those aspects of the guidance dealing specifically with human rights issues.<sup>375</sup>

313. The Committees previous Report (HC 186) contained a list of extant arms export licences to the FCO’s main countries of human rights concern in Annex 9 of Volume II. That list of extant licences showed that 20 of the FCO’s 28 countries of human rights concern had received UK Government approval for the export of cryptographic equipment, cryptographic technology, cryptographic software and cryptographic components, including China, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe. Tables 3 and 4, below, show the number of extant SIEL and OIEL licences for cryptographic software, technology and components to the FCO’s Countries of Human Rights Concern and the Committees’ Additional Countries of Concern, as of December 2014.

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<sup>375</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

**Table 3—Extant licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to FCO Countries of Concern (December 2014)**

Country	Number of licences (OIELs and SIELs)	Value of SIELs (£) <sup>376</sup>
Afghanistan	14	3,665,828.46
Belarus	4	120,000.00
Burma	3	636,868.00
Central African Republic (CAR)	3	33,966.00
China	285	273,690,976.58
Colombia	17	160,200.38
Congo, Democratic Republic of	23	2,190,035.99
Cuba	0	0
Democratic Republic of Korea	0	0
Eritrea	3	0
Fiji	1	0
Iran	0	0
Iraq	31	5,448,667.75
Israel	119	45,280,269.20
Libya	32	9,607,241.68
Occupied Palestinian Territories	0	0
Pakistan	21	11,585,305.02
Russia	34	45,649,088.09
Saudi Arabia	56	32,517,070.68
Somalia	11	480,493.88
South Sudan	8	51,211.87
Sri Lanka	6	1,372,997.28
Sudan	3	7,397,992.65
Syria	17	13,200.00
Turkmenistan	10	1,370,810.60
Uzbekistan	4	1,534,181.00
Vietnam	13	28,417.20
Yemen	4	0
Zimbabwe	51	1,334,278.48
<b>Total</b>	<b>773</b>	<b>444,169,100.79</b>

Source: Letters from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 15 December 2014 and 21 January 2015<sup>377</sup>

<sup>376</sup> The value of OIELs is not provided as they are open licences of unlimited quantity and value for the goods exported under these licences.

<sup>377</sup> The full text of Vince Cable's letters of 15 December 2014 and 21 January 2015 to the Chairman of the Committees are at Ev w220 and Ev w435 of Volume III

**Table 4—Extant licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to CAEC Additional Countries and Territories of Concern (December 2014)**

Country	Number of licences (OIEs and SIEs)	Value of SIEs (£) <sup>378</sup>
Argentina	13	28,565,118.41
Bahrain	19	30,498,144.13
Egypt	28	5,553,258.77
Hong Kong	105	123,222,495.52
Qatar	24	4,036,452.10
Tunisia	9	1,219,140.17
Ukraine	9	18,072,852.18
<b>Total</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>211,167,462.48</b>

Source: Letters from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 15 December 2014 and 21 January 2015<sup>379</sup>

314. I propose that the Committees conclude that as the Government has now acknowledged that the export of some items of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to the Government’s principal Countries of Human Rights Concern and to the Committees on Arms Export Controls’ additional countries of concern may raise human rights issues, and that in virtually all of these countries there is no clear divide between the commercial and Government sectors, the Committees recommend that the Government adopts a more cautious policy towards approving export licences for these items to these particular countries.

315. The Committees further recommend that the Government in developing “guidance to address the risks posed by exports of information and communications technology that is not subject to export controls but which might have impacts on human rights including freedom of expression online” should work not only with industry but with human rights organisations also.

## Sniper rifles

316. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of sniper rifles is described at paragraphs 355–359 of the Chairman’s Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees’ 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees’ Recommendation is at paragraph 113 of Volume I of that Report.

317. The Committees’ Recommendation on sniper rifles in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government’s Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that, given the utility of sniper rifles for internal repression, particularly in situations of conflict or potential conflict, the Government

<sup>378</sup> The value of OIEs is not provided as they are open licences of unlimited quantity and value for the goods exported under these licences.

<sup>379</sup> The full text of Vince Cable’s letters of 15 December 2014 and 21 January 2015 to the Chairman of the Committees are at Ev w220 and Ev w435 of Volume III



should give closer scrutiny to export licence applications for sniper rifles to countries where human rights abuses are prevalent or are likely to increase.<sup>380</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government will continue to assess export licence applications for sniper rifles rigorously in accordance with the Consolidated Criteria, in particular Criterion 2. Licences are assessed on a case-by-case basis taking into account the prevailing circumstances at the time of the application. These considerations will include the end-user, intended end-use, characteristics and capabilities of the equipment, the use of the equipment during previous human rights abuses, and the situation within the recipient country.<sup>381</sup>

**318. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government's Response (Cm8935) to the Committees' previous Recommendation on the export of sniper rifles, namely that "given the utility of sniper rifles for internal repression, particularly in situations of conflict or potential conflict, the Government should give closer scrutiny to export licence applications for sniper rifles to countries where human rights abuses are prevalent or are likely to increase" is welcome.**

## **Tasers**

319. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the export of Tasers is described at paragraphs 360–362 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 1865), and the Committees' Conclusion is at paragraph 114 of Volume I of that Report.

320. The Committees' Conclusion on the export of Tasers in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the Government's confirmation that it will continue to report on breaches of export controls, and on enforcement action taken, including in relation to Tasers, in the UK Strategic Export Annual Report, and that this reporting will include details relating to prosecutions, confiscation proceedings, seizures, disruptions and compound penalties is welcome.<sup>382</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees' conclusion.<sup>383</sup>

**321. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether, since its previous Response (Cm8935), there have been any breaches of export controls in relation to Tasers and, if so, provides the Committees with details**

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<sup>380</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 113

<sup>381</sup> Cm8935, p 52

<sup>382</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 114

<sup>383</sup> Cm8935, p 52

**relating to prosecutions, confiscation proceedings, seizures, disruptions and compound penalties.**

### **Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) “Drones”**

322. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), “Drones”, is described at paragraphs 363–369 of the Chairman’s Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees’ 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees’ Recommendation is at paragraph 115 of Volume I of that Report.

323. The Committees’ Recommendation on the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), “Drones”, in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government’s Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) the circumstances, if any, in which it considers the giving of Government export licence approval to the export of weaponised, as opposed to surveillance, UAVs, their software, technology or components would be compatible with the Government’s national and international human rights undertakings and with international law; and
- b) the end–use undertakings it would seek from recipients of UK exports of weaponised UAVs, their software, technology or components before giving Government export licence approval.<sup>384</sup>

#### **The Government’s Response:**

- a) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), their technology and components, are controlled for export by both the MTCR and the WA. Export licences for all UAVs are approved in accordance with the Consolidated Criteria, which include an explicit requirement to comply with the UK’s international commitments (Criterion 1) and to consider human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination (Criterion 2). The Government always acts in accordance with international humanitarian law and international standards.
- b) The ECO would seek the same end–user undertakings that are required for any such proposed export of controlled goods within the established export licence application process.<sup>385</sup>

324. In March 2014 the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson QC, reported in his interim report to the General Assembly that: “Legal uncertainty in relation to the implementation and application of the core principles of international law governing

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<sup>384</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 115

<sup>385</sup> Cm8935, p 53

the use of deadly force in counter-terrorism operations leaves dangerous latitude for differences of practice by States.”<sup>386</sup>

**325. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it is willing in principle to give export licence approval, subject to its export control Criteria, to weaponised Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), their software, technology and components, as well as to surveillance UAVs, their software, technology and components.**

### **Arms exports to counter piracy**

326. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of arms exports to counter piracy is described at paragraphs 370–385 of the Chairman’s Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees’ 2014 Report (HC 205), and the Committees’ Conclusions and Recommendation are at paragraphs 116–118 of Volume I of that Report.

327. The Committees’ Conclusions and Recommendation on arms exports to counter piracy in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government’s Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees’ Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that it is a matter of much concern that both Ministers and their officials in the Business Department appeared to have been unaware of the volume of weapons for which the Department had given export licence approval to Private Marine Security Companies for counter-piracy purposes – 34,377 assault rifles, 5,100 shotguns, 28 machine guns, 2,976 pistols, 12,816 rifles, 1,401 sniper rifles, and 5,294 sporting guns in the period April 2012 to September 2013 alone – until this was brought to their attention by the Committees in the Oral Evidence session on 18 December 2013, notwithstanding the fact that all the information referred to by the Committees came from the Business Department’s own quarterly arms export licence reports.<sup>387</sup>

#### **The Government’s Response:**

The Department was aware of the volumes of weapons licensed for use by Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) and agreed to review licensing arrangements.<sup>388</sup>

#### **The Committees’ Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that it is also a matter of much concern that the Business Department in the two-year period 2012 and 2013 gave licence approval to Private Marine Security Companies to export automatic weapons and small arms for counter-piracy purposes vastly in excess of the number actually needed and shipped

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<sup>386</sup> “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism”, United Nations General Assembly, A/HCR/25/29, para 70

<sup>387</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 116

<sup>388</sup> Cm8935, p 53

– 181,708 individual items approved for export but only 3,273 (1.8%) actually shipped comprising 2,332 assault rifles; 83 combat shotguns; 6 machine guns; 63 pistols; 623 rifles; and 166 sporting guns.<sup>389</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government acknowledges that having licences for the potential export of quantities of weapons far in excess of the numbers exported is not satisfactory. That is why the Government announced that it was putting new licensing arrangements in place for these exports. These arrangements will limit the number of weapons than can potentially be exported under the licence. The number of weapons shipped over the two year period is proportionate to the number of companies operating in this field and there is no evidence of diversion to undesirable end-users or end-use.<sup>390</sup>

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) whether the Business Secretary's change of policy to put new licensing arrangements in place to closely align the volumes licensed and actual exported volumes has been put into effect and, if not, the date by which it will be;
- b) that it will inform the Committees when the revised version of the Open General Trade Control (Marine Anti-Piracy) licence has been put in place;
- c) whether the vessel MV Mahanuwara operated by Avant Garde Maritime Services of Sri Lanka and under the authorisation and protection of the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence is still being used as an armoury for weapons for counter-piracy exported with Government approval from the UK;
- d) what other vessels, and under what flags, are currently being used as armouries for weapons for counter-piracy exported with Government approval from the UK;
- e) whether the Government remains satisfied that none of the weapons it has approved for export for counter-piracy purposes has been diverted for other purposes;
- f) whether it has any evidence that any of the weapons the Government has approved for export for counter-piracy purposes have been used to facilitate internal repression in Sri Lanka or in any other authoritarian country;
- g) how many security companies currently registered to use Open General Export Licences for the export of weapons for counter-piracy from the UK are also UK registered companies, in what other countries and territories are the non-UK registered companies domiciled, and whether the Government

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<sup>389</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 117

<sup>390</sup> Cm8935, p 54

have any plans to terminate the OGEL registration of some of the companies as the piracy threat diminishes; and

- h) what prohibitions the Government has put in place, if any, to prevent Private Marine Security Companies who have been given Government export licence approval to export weapons for counter-piracy purposes from the UK subsequently transferring or on-selling from outside the UK's jurisdiction some or all of such weapons to third parties.<sup>391</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

- a) The new arrangements are not yet fully in place. The transition to new arrangements should be concluded by the end of this year.
- b) The Government will write to the Chairman of the Committees to advise him when the revised version of the licence has been put in place.
- c) This armoury is still being used.
- d) Here is a list of the vessels and their flag States as at 18 September 2014:

<b>Name of Vessel</b>	<b>Flag State</b>
MV HADI XII (IMO 8107713)	Bahrain
MV Milad (IMO 7624635)	Comoros
M/V Aladdin (IMO 6524230)	Djibouti
M/V SUUNTA – IMO 7392854	Djibouti
MV DYNAMIC KARIM	Djibouti
MV Star Global – IMO 7319242	Djibouti
MV SULTAN (IMO 7636339)	Djibouti
MV SIS Service	Liberia
AM230	Mongolia
MV Alphonsa (IMO 8413174)	Mongolia
MV Samaritan (IMO 8206105)	Mongolia
MV Sinbad (IMO 7932006)	Mongolia
MV Theresa (IMO 833506)	Mongolia
OW267	Mongolia
Seapol One – (IMO 8912572)	Mongolia
MV Antarctic Dream – [IMO 5278432]	Mongolian
MV Navis Star (IMO 7353432)	Panama
MV Arina Dilber (IMO 8107713)	Panama
MV Defiant (IMO 5427784)	Sierra Leone
MV Sea Lion (IMO 7115567)	Sierra Leone
MV Avant Garde – (IMO 8107036)	Sri Lanka
MV Mahanuwara (IMO 7412018)	Sri Lanka
MV MNG RESOLUTION (IMO 8413174)	St Kitts and Nevis
MV Northern Queen – IMO 7709253	St Kitts and Nevis

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<sup>391</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 118

MV Sea Patrol – IMO 4908729	St Kitts and Nevis
MV SAMRIYAH (IMO 7911777)	St Vincent & Grenadines
Abdullah –(IMO 8112823)	UAE
Al Nader (IMO 7027502)	UAE
MV Deena (IMO 7313432)	UAE
MV Soha Folk (IMO 8003175)	UAE
MV Southern Star (IMO 8627000)	Vanuatu

- e) There is no evidence of diversion. All the UK security companies involved in anti-piracy activities are subject to a code of conduct and rigorous pre-licensing checks. Holders of the Open General Trade Control Licence (Maritime Anti-Piracy) are also subject to post-licensing audits.
- f) There is no evidence of diversion. All the UK security companies involved in anti-piracy activities are subject to a code of conduct and rigorous pre-licensing checks. Holders of the Open General Trade Control Licence (Maritime Anti-Piracy) are also subject to post-licensing audits.
- g) The list of companies registered to use these licences was most recently published on 1 July 2014 and can be found here: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-general-trade-controllicence-maritime-anti-piracy-list-of-registered-companies> The list shows 87 companies. As noted on the licence, these comprise “a UK Private Security Company carrying out your business activities in the UK or a Private Security Company which is run by UK persons.” There are currently no plans to terminate registration.
- h) Under the terms of the OGTCL (Maritime Anti-Piracy), holders of that licence are required to abide by the terms and conditions of the licence. Section 2 of the licence reads:
- i. controlled goods transferred under this licence must be transferred aboard vessels that are registered to a Flag State;
  - ii. controlled goods being transferred under this licence must only be used by your personnel and are only to be used while the goods are being transferred;
  - iii. controlled goods transferred under this licence must not be made available for use on either a temporary or permanent basis, to any other person or entity;
  - iv. at all times, controlled goods must remain in the possession of:
    - a. your personnel; or
    - b. an approved in-country representative; or
    - c. an approved armoury; or
    - d. a designated national security organisation;

v. whether in use, in transit or in storage, controlled goods must be protected against unauthorised re-transfers, loss, theft or diversion;<sup>392</sup>

328. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)* in July 2014 the Committees wrote to the Government asking three questions about anti-piracy. The questions and answers were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

Anti Piracy

What is the specific evidence the Government looks for in anti-piracy export licence applications by Private Maritime Security Companies that the weapons and ammunition concerned will not be sold on to third parties?

**The Committees' question:**

Section 2, iii of the Open General Trade Control (Maritime Anti-Piracy) licence notes "controlled goods transferred under this licence must not be made available for use, on either a temporary or permanent basis, to any other person or entity." This means that Private Maritime and Security Companies (PMSCs) holding that licence cannot use it to sell controlled goods to third parties. In order to sell controlled goods, a UK company would need a separate trade licence from the ECO.

**The Committees' question:**

Whether the Government will make it a contractual condition when approving anti-piracy export licence applications by Private Maritime Security Companies that the weapons and ammunition concerned will not be sold on to third parties?

**The Government's answer:**

Section 2, iii of the Open General Trade Control (Maritime Anti-Piracy) licence notes "controlled goods transferred under this licence must not be made available for use, on either a temporary or permanent basis, to any other person or entity." This means that PMSCs holding that licence cannot use it to sell controlled goods to third parties. In order to sell controlled goods, a UK company would need a separate trade licence from the ECO.<sup>393</sup>

**The Committees' question:**

Annex C Information Required for the UN Register of Conventional Arms

UK Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons in 2013

Why, when Sri Lanka is listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as one of the Government's 28 Countries of Human Rights Concern, were the Government approved exports to Sri Lanka of:

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<sup>392</sup> Cm8935, pp 54-56

<sup>393</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

- revolvers and self-loading pistols the largest in quantity to any country;
- rifles and carbines the largest in quantity to any country;
- shotguns the second largest in quantity, after South Africa, to any country;
- sniper rifles the second largest in quantity, after the USA, to any country; and
- assault rifles the second largest in quantity, after South Africa, to any country?

**The Government's answer:**

These licences were for counter-piracy operations.

It is clear from contacts with exporters that they have routinely been applying for licences to cover volumes of exports vastly in excess of what is actually exported. This is because they have no firm estimate of likely exports over the two year validity period of each licence at the time when they apply for licences.

The volumes listed in many of these licences are not therefore an accurate prediction of the eventual level of exports. Although the overall volume shipped is proportionate to the activities of British Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) – and there is no evidence of diversion – this is not a satisfactory situation. Government officials are working with the suppliers of automatic weapons and small arms to PMSCs to put new licensing arrangements in place to closely align the volumes licensed and actual exported volumes. These arrangements, which should be fully implemented by the end of the year, will enable the UK Government to exercise greater supervision of these exports and will include regular reporting of volumes exported to be included in the routine quarterly publication of export licensing data.<sup>394</sup>

329. Since April 2012 the Government has indicated in its quarterly reports on arms export licences those goods that have been licensed for anti-piracy operations. The table below shows the total number of various categories of goods that have been licensed from April 2012 until 30 June 2014:

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<sup>394</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014



**Table 5 – Arms exports licence approvals for goods for use in anti-piracy operations April 2012 – 30 June 2014**

Country	Assault Rifles	Combat shotguns	Machine guns	Pistols	Rifles	Sniper rifles	Sporting Guns
Comoros	3,700	450	0	290	1,500	0	0
Djibouti	1,100	150	0	130	200	0	300
Egypt	700	150	0	60	0	200	700
Ghana	0	0	0	0	0	20	0
Kenya	500	100	0	100	201	0	200
Madagascar	5,100	850	0	540	1,300	204	300
Maldives	6,450	550	0	540	1,600	200	850
Mauritius	5,519	700	0	520	3,454	1	716
Oman	5,450	1,050	0	500	1,850	400	750
Russia	17	0	0	0	0	19	0
Seychelles	12	0	22	0	0	0	0
South Africa	9,069	1,000	6	886	3,851	657	1,778
Sri Lanka	3,760	997	0	640	1,657	200	200
Tanzania	600	150	0	30	200	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>41,977</b>	<b>6,147</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>4,236</b>	<b>15,813</b>	<b>1,901</b>	<b>5,794</b>

Source: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Quarterly pivot reports 2012 Q2 – 2014 Q2

330. Following questioning by the Committees in the Oral Evidence session on 18 December 2013 the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, wrote to the Chairman of the Committees on 6 June 2014 following investigation of the quantities of licences approved for anti-piracy operations. His letter included the following statement:

As well as looking at the quantity of items licensed over the two year period they [BIS officials] also identified what was actually exported. The investigation showed that the overall percentage of goods shipped against licences granted for automatic weapons and small arms was only some 1.8 per cent of the total figure licensed in 2012 and 2013. Although 181,708 individual items were licensed over the two year period, only 3,273 were shipped (2,332 assault rifles; 83 combat shotguns; 6 machine guns; 63 pistols; 623 rifles; 166 sporting guns).

It is clear from contacts with exporters that they have routinely been applying for licences to cover volumes of exports vastly in excess of what is actually exported. This is because they have no firm estimate of likely exports over the two year validity period of each licence at the point they apply for licences.

The volumes listed in many of these licences are not therefore an accurate prediction of the eventual level of exports. Although the overall volume shipped is proportionate to the activities of British PMSCs – and there is no evidence of diversion – this is not a satisfactory situation. My officials will be working with the suppliers of automatic weapons and small arms to PMSCs over the next few months

to put new licensing arrangements in place to closely align the volumes licensed and actual exported volumes.<sup>395</sup>

331. When the Committees questioned the Business Secretary on 1 December 2014 about the large disparity between the number of items licensed and the number shipped he said: “The reason, as I understand it, is that the company involved massively over-budgeted or overestimated the likely demand for their services, and they applied for a licence that was way in excess of the likely market involved.”<sup>396</sup> When it was pointed out to the Business Secretary that more than one company was involved he replied: “Well, there are several; I can’t give you an exact figure. It is clear that there is a serious disparity. It does not make a great deal of sense to be licensing on that scale. As I understand it, procedures have now been tightened up considerably, so that licences are issued only when they are considered to be realistic, quite apart from the propriety of the people involved.”<sup>397</sup> When questioned further whether the Export Control Organisation had tightened up its procedures for the licensing of goods for anti-piracy operations, the Business Secretary said: “Yes, I think it has tightened them up [...]”<sup>398</sup> Edward Bell, Head, Export Control Organisation, added:

Yes, in terms of the supply of weapons, [...] we looked at that in detail. Hence the letter back in June. A number of companies supply weapons to private marine security companies. It became clear following a dialogue with some of those companies that, when they apply for a licence for a two-year period, they are not clear at that stage how much equipment they are going to supply. The numbers represent a high level of ambition. Clearly, on looking at that, although we did not have any concerns about the licences, the huge disparity between what was licensed and what was shipped suggested that we needed to put stronger arrangements in place, and we have done that. We have moved from a position where we have companies holding numbers of licences to a company holding one licence with particular terms and conditions that we can monitor closely. One aspect there is that we are now insisting that the companies will report on shipments on a quarterly basis. We will make that information available with the regular publication of quarterly data. It is now being monitored very closely in addition to the general case-by-case assessment of the licence.<sup>399</sup>

332. In July 2014 it was reported that one of the world’s biggest private maritime security companies, Lymington-based Gulf of Aden Group Transits Ltd., had ceased trading.<sup>400</sup> The company was registered with ECO to use the Open General Trade Control Licence (Maritime Anti-Piracy).<sup>401</sup> In their Written Evidence Paul Holtom and Ioannis Chapsos of Coventry University informed the Committees that the company had left arms and

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<sup>395</sup> See HC (2014-15) 186, Ev 499

<sup>396</sup> Q 87

<sup>397</sup> Q 88

<sup>398</sup> Q 90 [Vince Cable]

<sup>399</sup> Q 90 [Edward Bell]

<sup>400</sup> “Security staff scattered at sea as anti-piracy firm goes bust; Britons among the dozens of guards now facing fight to claim lost wages - and get home safely”, *The Independent*, 30 July 2014

<sup>401</sup> HC (2013-14) 186, Volume II, Annex 12

ammunition on board vessels and floating armouries.<sup>402</sup> When the Business Secretary and his officials were questioned on 1 December 2014 about what happens when private maritime security companies goes into administration Edward Bell said:

The anti-piracy operations are changing, for sure, and the sector is certainly contracting. One issue we have been looking at is the way that we license the private marine security companies, as opposed to the companies that supply weapons to those companies. Part of that dialogue this year has been focused on what happens when a company goes into administration. Just to be clear, if a private marine security company goes into administration, it is required by law to secure a trade licence in order to sell its weapons on to another company. When it applies for that licence, it will be subject to the same level of high scrutiny that the previous licence received.<sup>403</sup>

333. Paul Holtom and Ioannis Chapsos of Coventry University pointed out in their Written Evidence that the Government had told the Committees that there was no evidence that arms licensed for anti-piracy operations had been diverted.<sup>404</sup> They also stated that the conditions of the UK-issued Open General Trade Control Licence (Maritime Anti-Piracy) include a commitment not to transfer arms to any other entity. However, they stated: “PMSCs [Private Maritime Security Companies] increasingly share arms and equipment with other PMSCs, using floating armouries to carry out such practices.” A company storing arms on a floating armoury would complete a ‘Transfer Request Form’ to transfer the arms to another company that required them to conduct a transit of a protected vessel. The transfer takes place with or without the knowledge of the owners of the floating armoury as the property of the first company is taken off by the second company. When the Committees asked ECO officials on 1 December 2014 about PMSCs sharing arms Chris Chew, Head of Policy, ECO, said: “[...] the licences that we grant to those companies only permit use of those weapons by that company.”<sup>405</sup> He continued: “If they are passing their weapons on or allowing them to be used by someone else then that would be a breach of their licence condition. If there is evidence of that happening, then we would obviously want to see specific details and then we can take it up with the companies concerned.”<sup>406</sup> When asked if ECO had investigated whether such transfers had occurred Edward Bell, Head, ECO, responded: “I don’t believe we have had a specific investigation on that point, but it is the sort of point that would come up during a post-licensing audit.”<sup>407</sup>

334. In a follow-up to the evidence given by the Business Secretary in the Oral Evidence session he wrote to the Committees on 15 December 2014 on the issue of the sharing of equipment by Private Maritime Security Companies. The relevant section of the Business Secretary’s letter was as follows:

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<sup>402</sup> Ev w64

<sup>403</sup> Q 91

<sup>404</sup> See HC (2014–15) 186 Ev w499 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 June 2014

<sup>405</sup> Q 93

<sup>406</sup> Q 94

<sup>407</sup> Q 97

### Maritime Anti-Piracy

The Committees raised a concern about allegations of private maritime Security Companies sharing arms, The Open general Trade Control Licence for Maritime Anti-Piracy (OGTCL MA-P) states that “controlled goods transferred under this licence must not be made available for use, on either a temporary or permanent basis, to any other person or entity”. This means that the controlled goods covered by this licence are not to be shared with people outside the company that owns them and we will test this point during compliance audits after the licence has been granted.

The OGTCL MA-P was first introduced in spring 2012, and it is currently being reviewed. The review will further tighten the language used in the licence so as to eliminate any possible confusion on this point. The Export Control Organisation (ECO) is working closely with the Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG) – the trade body for the MP-A sector – to ensure that the revised licence is fit for purpose. It will be ready by the end of the first quarter 2015 and will be publicised via circulation to members of SCEG and also through an ECO Notice to Exporters.<sup>408</sup>

**335. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government’s acknowledgement that it “is not a satisfactory situation” that exporters of arms for counter-piracy operations “have routinely been applying for licences to cover volumes of exports vastly in excess of what is actually exported” is welcome.**

**336. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) whether the Government’s new licensing arrangements for supplies of automatic weapons and small arms for counter-piracy purposes to Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) designed to align closely the volumes licensed and the volumes actually exported, following the Committees on Arms Export Controls’ concerns that the numbers being approved for export were vastly in excess of the numbers actually needed, are now fully in place, and, if not, when they will be;
- b) whether these new arrangements limit the number of weapons that can be exported under the licence;
- c) the operating area or approximate location of each of the 31 vessels being used as floating armouries for weapons for counter-piracy purposes with Government approval from the UK as listed at paragraph 118 of the Government’s last Response (Cm8935);
- d) whether the revised version of the Open General Trade Control (Marine Anti-Piracy) licence will be put in place as scheduled by the end of the first quarter of

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<sup>408</sup> Ev w220 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 15 December 2014

2015 with the Committees receiving the Government’s promised letter confirming this;

- e) whether it is still the case that the Government has “no evidence of diversion” of the weapons it has approved for export for counter–piracy purposes being diverted for use for other purposes; and
- f) what steps the Government is taking to stop Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) sharing weapons in breach of their licence conditions.

## The licensing of security services

337. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of the licensing of security services is described at paragraphs 386–389 of the Chairman’s Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees’ 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees’ Recommendation is at paragraph 119 of Volume I of that Report.

338. The Committees’ Recommendation on the licensing of security services in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government’s Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### The Committees’ Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response

how many UK–registered Private Marine Security Companies are now members of the International Code of Conduct Association and the names of those companies; and

whether it remains the Government’s position that it has no plans to extend legislation, other than the requirement for export or trade control licences, to UK–based Private Military and Security Companies.<sup>409</sup>

### The Government’s Response:

- a) As of 19 August 2014, 48 UK–headquartered private security companies (PSCs) are listed as transitional members of the International Code of Conduct Association, pending full membership procedures. They are:

Company Name	Type of Service
“+Mitigate”	Land based
AEGIS	Both
Asset Maritime Security Services	Maritime
Black Pearl Maritime Security	Maritime
Britam Defense Ltd	Both
Citadel Maritime	Maritime
Control Risks	Both
DrumCussac	Both

<sup>409</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 119

Edinburgh International	Land based
Endeavour Maritime	Maritime
Eos Risk Management	Both
Frontier Horizons	Land based
G4S Risk Management Limited	Land based
Global Strategies Group	Land based
Graspan Frankton Ltd	Both
Group EHC	Both
Guardian Global Resources	Both
Hawki Worldwide Ltd	Land based
HSS Risk Management Ltd	Both
International Security	Both
LPD Risk Management Ltd	Land based
Maritime Defence Force	Maritime
Milne Management Security Services and Milne	
Maritime Security Solutions	Both
MS Risk Ltd	Maritime
Olive Group	Land based
Optimal Risk Management Ltd	Both
Orcas Security Management Ltd	Maritime
Page Protective Services Ltd	Land based
Pangolin Group	Not specified
Pilgrims Group Ltd	Land based
Plexus Consultancy Ltd	Both
Principal Risk Solutions Ltd	Land based
Professional Global Services Group Ltd	Both
Protection Vessels International Ltd	Maritime
REE Training	Maritime
Saladin	Both
Salamanca Risk Management Limited	Both
Securewest International	Maritime
Ship Security International Ltd	Maritime
Solace Global	Both
SOMSEC Ltd	Land based
Spartent Global Solutions	Both
Special Projects and Services Ltd	Both
Stent International Ltd	Both
Strategic Protection Ltd	Both
United SPS Ltd	Maritime
Veritas International	Both
ZA Defence Ltd	Land based

- b) The Government has no plans to extend legislation, other than the requirement for export or trade control licences, to UK-based PSCs operating in complex environments. With our partners in industry, other governments and civil society, we are still in the process of establishing the system by which we intend to raise standards among PSCs using accredited certification and oversight by the International Code of Conduct Association. We will need to test and review this approach over time before considering any alternative method of regulation.<sup>410</sup>

**339. I propose that the Committee recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it will consider making the export of security services, as opposed to goods, that raise human rights issues subject to export controls.**

### Arms exports and internal repression

340. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports and internal repression is described at paragraphs 390–403 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation are at paragraphs 120–123 of Volume I of that Report.

341. The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation on the arms exports and internal repression in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the evidence of the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, that: "Licence applications have always been assessed against the eight Criteria and not against general statements contained in the introductory text" is in direct contradiction with the evidence of the former Foreign Office Minister, Peter Hain, who when asked if there had been a change of policy by the present Government, answered: "In the statement issued by the Business Secretary last month, yes, it has. It has been relaxed in the sense that the broader test that I applied no longer exists. [...] then there is a repeat of the second test, as it were, the narrow test, which is welcome, but the broader test has been dropped. So I do think the policy has changed. It is a more relaxed approach to arms exports." He subsequently added: "By omitting the broader test of concern, we have relaxed the policy".<sup>411</sup>

#### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees further conclude that, contrary to the Government's claim when the Business Secretary announced the revised Criteria for the Government's approval or refusal of arms exports that: "None of these amendments should be taken to mean that there has been any substantive change in policy.", the omission of the wording in the previous Consolidated Criteria that: "An export licence will not be issued if the

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<sup>410</sup> Cm8935, pp 57–58

<sup>411</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 120

arguments for doing so are outweighed by [...] concern that the goods might be used for internal repression” does constitute a substantive change of policy.<sup>412</sup>

### **The Committees’ Conclusion:**

The Committees further conclude that the Government’s welcome decision to use the broad test of “equipment which might be used for internal repression” rather than the narrow test of a “clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression” when exercising its power to suspend arms export licences as stated in the Foreign Secretary’s letter to the Chairman of the Committees on 6 January 2014 makes it even more anomalous and regrettable that the Government has omitted the broad test from its revised Criteria for arms exports.<sup>413</sup>

### **The Government’s Response to the 3 Conclusions above:**

The Government does not accept the Committees’ conclusions. As stated on a number of occasions by both the Foreign Secretary and the Business Secretary, the policy that has always been applied is that set out in Criterion 2 itself, namely: “[the Government will] not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression.”

There has been no change to that policy, and no weakening of our export controls.

In respect of the suspension of export licences for Egypt, the Foreign Secretary’s letter of the 6 January 2014 made clear that the action taken was a departure from standard practice:

“In two important respects Egypt was a special case...Secondly, we applied suspension to ‘equipment which might be used for internal repression.’ This is, of course, a lower risk threshold than Criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria, where the test is a ‘clear risk that the equipment might be used for internal repression.’ These specific steps were the result of conclusions reached jointly with our EU Partners on 21 August [2013].”

Therefore there is no “anomaly” between the way we apply the Criteria in general and the specific action taken in respect of Egypt.<sup>414</sup>

### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

As the broad test that: “An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by [...] concern that the goods might be used for internal repression”, which has been Government policy since October 2000, provides an important safeguard against military and dual-use goods, components, software and technology being exported from the UK from being used for internal repression, the

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<sup>412</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 121

<sup>413</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 122

<sup>414</sup> Cm8935, p 59



Committees recommend that this now omitted wording is re-introduced into the Government's arms exports controls policy.<sup>415</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government does not accept the Committees' recommendation. We will continue to apply the test as set out in Criterion 2, i.e. "clear risk."<sup>416</sup>

**342. I propose that the Committees adhere to their previous Conclusion that the previously applied broad policy test for arms exports that: "An export licence will not be issued if arguments for doing so are outweighed [...] by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression", which had been Government policy since October 2000 until deleted by the present Government in March 2014, provides an important safeguard against military and dual-use goods, components, software and technology being exported from the UK from being used for internal repression. The Committees, therefore, repeat their previous Conclusion and Recommendation (as also stated in paragraphs 76 and 77 above) that the broad test is re-instated into the Government's revised Consolidated Criteria alongside the existing narrow "clear risk" test in Criteria 2 as had been the case from October 2000.**

### **The Government's Arab Spring arms export policy review**

343. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Government's Arab Spring arms export policy review is described at paragraphs 404–408 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 124 of Volume I of that Report.

344. The Committees' Recommendation on the Government's Arab Spring arms export policy review in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it has any additions or amendments to make to its previous statements on the outcome of its Arab Spring arms export policy review.<sup>417</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government continues to apply the lessons learned in the Review of Arms Export Policy. The suspension mechanism has demonstrated its value by enabling the Government to respond to events in Egypt in 2013 and in Russia and Ukraine in 2014. It allows the Government to act quickly, proportionately and flexibly to suspend extant export licences or halt the processing of new export licence applications while countries are in crisis or experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability, and in circumstances where it is not possible to make proper

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<sup>415</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 123

<sup>416</sup> Cm8935, p 59

<sup>417</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 124

assessments against the Consolidated Criteria. Every case and each response is different, and all decisions are kept under regular review, enabling the Government to adjust its policy for a specific country according to the prevailing circumstances.

The UK implemented the decision of the EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on 21 August 2013 to suspend all export licences for Egypt for items which might be used in internal repression. We initially took a precautionary approach and suspended 48 extant export licences. We then reviewed all export licences for Egypt and released 31 from suspension. Several licences which were suspended had expired so no action was required on them. The suspended licences cover a range of equipment including spares for helicopters and components for firearms.

On 20 February 2014, the EU FAC agreed to suspend, until further notice, all export licensing to Ukraine for equipment which might be used for internal repression. We then suspended all extant licences for goods that *might* be used for internal repression in accordance with that decision. As a result, we suspended licences for sniper rifles, silencers for civilian use and body armour for the Ukrainian Security Forces. This action was taken in response to the indiscriminate killing of protesters from 18–20 February by Ukrainian Security Forces under the control of then-President Yanukovich and his Government. On 22 July 2014, the EU FAC unanimously agreed to lift the suspension. The Government implemented this decision.

On 18 March 2014, the Government decided to suspend export licensing and extant licences for exports of military and dual-use items destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine; and to suspend licences for exports to third countries for incorporation into equipment for export to Russia where there is a clear risk that the end product will be used against Ukraine.

While outside the period covered by the Report, it is worth noting that, on 12 August 2014, the Government announced the findings of a review of licensed exports to Israel which identified twelve licences for components which could be part of equipment used by the Israel Defence Forces in Gaza. The Government made clear that, in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities, it would suspend these licences as a precautionary step.<sup>418</sup>

**345. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether its Arab Spring arms export policy review is now completed, and, if not, the areas in which it is continuing.**

### Arms export licence revocations

346. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms export licence revocations is described at paragraphs 409–417 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 125 of Volume I of that Report.

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<sup>418</sup> Cm8935, p 60

347. On 17 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, wrote to the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, requesting a list of all arms export licence revocations made in the period 14 May 2013 and 17 April 2014.<sup>419</sup> The Business Secretary replied on 6 June 2014 providing details of the revoked arms export licences within the requested period.<sup>420</sup> Following analysis of the list of revocations provided by the Business Secretary in comparison to the listed revocations in the Government's Quarterly reports on arms export licences it was discovered that there were discrepancies between the two sets of information. The Chairman subsequently wrote to the Business Secretary on 12 June 2014 highlighting the discrepancies and asking for an explanation of what was the correct information and why the discrepancies had occurred. The Business Secretary replied on 30 June 2014 stating that an error had occurred in how the licences had been processed within the SPIRE licensing system and stated: "Clearly these errors are unacceptable." [This exchange of letters is reproduced in full on pages Ev w505–506 and Ev w508–510 in Volume III of the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186)].

348. The Committees' Recommendation on arms export revocations in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) the standard wording it uses to the exporters of controlled goods regarding its right to revoke export licences for controlled goods that it has approved;
- b) the grounds on which the Government has the right to revoke export licences for controlled goods that it has approved;
- c) the means by which the Government protects itself from financial liabilities if it exercises its right to revoke export licences for controlled goods that it has approved; and
- d) what specific steps have been taken to deal with the errors, rightly described as "unacceptable" by the Business Secretary in his letter to the Committees' Chairman of 30 June 2014, whereby extant licences are being described in the Government's Quarterly arms export Report as having been revoked when they have not been, and by what date these errors will have been eliminated for the future".<sup>421</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

- a) For SIELs/SITCLs there is a standard template that is amended to suit individual circumstances. The template wording is:

"...the Secretary of State has revoked this export licence for the goods on the copy of the enclosed licence, under article 32(1) of the Export Control Order

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<sup>419</sup> See: HC (2014-15) 186, Ev 211

<sup>420</sup> See: HC (2014-15) 186, Ev 499

<sup>421</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 125

2008 (as amended), which empowers the Secretary of State to vary or revoke export licences at any time.

After further careful and detailed consideration, we assess that this export [add reason for revocation] is contrary to Criterion [ ] of the EU & National Arms Export Licensing Criteria”.

For OGELs it is along the lines of “The Secretary of State has the power to vary or withdraw export licences at any time” and;

For OITCLs/OIELs – “... the Secretary of State has revoked this export licence for the goods on the copy of the enclosed licence, under article 32(1) of the Export Control Order 2008 (as amended), which empowers the Secretary of State to vary or revoke export licences at any time.

After further careful and detailed consideration, we assess that this export [add reason for revocation] is contrary to Criterion [ ] of the EU & National Arms Export Licensing Criteria.”

b) Article 32(1) of the Export Control Order 2008 provides that:

“The Secretary of State may by notice—

- (a) amend, suspend or revoke a licence granted by the Secretary of State;
- (b) suspend or revoke a general licence granted by the Secretary of State as it applies to a particular licence user.”

In accordance with Article 33 of the 2008 Order, the licence holder must be given written notification of the revocation which explains the reasons for that decision. The licence holder has 28 days to appeal against that decision. The 2008 Order does not specify the grounds on which a licence may be revoked. In practice the reasons include:

- (i) As a result of the imposition of EU or UN sanctions;
- (ii) Where there has been a change in Government policy in respect of the export of certain goods, or the export of specified goods to a certain destination, and the proposed export is no longer consistent with the revised policy;
- (iii) Where there has been a change in circumstances in the destination country or region such that the proposed export is no longer consistent with the Consolidated Criteria or with other relevant, announced, policies;
- (iv) Where new information has come to light about a particular export which indicates that the proposed export is no longer consistent with the Consolidated Criteria or with other relevant, announced, policies;
- (v) Where an exporter has failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the licence, or as a result of enforcement action by HMRC/UKBA;

- (vi) For administrative reasons, such as a company ceasing to trade and therefore no longer being able to use the licence, or where the exporter requests an amendment to a licence and revoking and re-issuing it is simpler than making an amendment.
- c) In order to protect itself from financial claims, the Government must be able to show that it has acted in accordance with the general principles of good decision-making and that:
  - (i) Where the revocation is for policy reasons the decision is clearly in accordance with announced policy;
  - (ii) The action is procedurally fair, and that licence holders have been properly notified and given the opportunity to appeal; and
  - (iii) In all cases revocation must be a reasonable and proportionate step to take in the circumstances.
- d) The problem identified with the automated process within the ECO's online export licensing system (SPIRE), which led to the licences being incorrectly reported in the Pivot Report as revoked, is currently being investigated and we expect this to be resolved by the end of the year.<sup>422</sup>

349. In the Westminster Hall Debate on the Committees' last Report (HC 186) held on 30 October 2014, the FCO Minister responding to the debate, Tobias Ellwood, said with regard to the revocations mechanism that:

[...] we have the power to revoke any licence if we judge that changed circumstances mean that it is no longer consistent with the consolidated criteria. Again, revocations should be viewed as indicative of the fact that the system can respond to change, not as a sign that our case-by-case assessment of export licence applications is flawed. We make the best decision possible at the time of each application, and if circumstances change, we can react appropriately. Action to revoke or suspend licences is, then, not a sign that the system is broken; in fact, the flexibility to respond effectively to change is a sign of health and demonstrates how seriously the Government take the guiding principle of responsible exports.<sup>423</sup>

350. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary on 2 December 2014 as follows:

#### **Revocations reporting by the Export Control Organisation**

1. In your letter to the Committees on 30 June, recognising errors in reporting revocations on the quarterly reports, you said that further work was required to identify the exact causes of the error and that changes may need to be made to SPIRE. Have those causes been identified and fixed?

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<sup>422</sup> Cm8935, pp 61–62

<sup>423</sup> HC Deb, 30 October 2014, Col 139

Were any changes to SPIRE necessary?

What was the impact of the errors and any corrections that had to be made?

Why were these errors not identified by ECO staff?

2. How confident can the Committees be in the accuracy of the data contained in the quarterly reports?<sup>424</sup>

The Business Secretary replied on 15 December 2014 as follows:

### **Reporting on revocations**

Turning to matters raised in your letter of 2 December, I can tell you that we have now completed our investigations into the discrepancies between the revocations reported in the Quarterly Reports and those reported in response to specific requests from the Committees.

These discrepancies have arisen as a direct result of the original design of the public reporting database in 2008. The database was set up to report as “revoked” not only those licences that were revoked in full but also those licences that were amended by the removal of a destination or a goods line, including where that amendment was at the exporter’s request. In responding to queries from the Committees my officials searched for information only on those licences that were revoked in full or were amended at the Government’s initiative, e.g. as a result of changed circumstances in that destination or the imposition of sanctions. They did not include information on licences that were amended at the exporter’s request. These discrepancies were not identified by ECO staff because they did not cross-reference the data provided to the Committees with the data available in the Quarterly Reports.

We are currently assessing the feasibility and cost of modifying the reporting database so that licences amended at the exporter’s request are reported separately from those revoked or amended at the Government’s initiative. I should stress that no exporter has suffered any loss as a result of these differences in reporting. It is purely of the way changes to certain licences have been reported in the Quarterly Reports.

I am confident that the data in Quarterly Reports is accurate. It is clear, however, that the way data is presented in those reports may lead to discrepancies when compared to data obtained in response to specific queries. It is, of course, of the utmost importance that Parliament and the public have confidence in the accuracy and veracity of the published data. In the New Year my officials will commence a project to classify export licensing data as “Official Statistics” under The Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007. As a result, the data will be produced and published according to the requirements of the Code of Practice for Official Statistics and be

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<sup>424</sup> Ev w218 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 2 December 2014

subject to oversight by the Independent Statistics Authority. The project will take around 6 months to complete.<sup>425</sup>

351. The Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, wrote to the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, on 6 January 2015 requesting details of all licence revocations since 7 June 2014 to the present as follows:

**Arms export licence revocations for the period 7 June 2014 to the present**

Please could you provide details of **all** licence revocations made in the period 7 June 2014 to the present, by country.

Please could you provide the information in the same format as in Annex 1 of Cm 8079 (SIELS/OIELS/etc., End User Country, Annual Report Summary, Rating, Reason for Revocation). Please could you also include the date of revocation in each case.<sup>426</sup>

The Business Secretary replied on 21 January 2015 as follows:

**Revocations for the period 7 June 2014 to the present**

I have attached these in Annex A. The excel spreadsheet contains two worksheets. The first contains licences that have been revoked in full.

Please note that this data includes 8 licences that were revoked in June 2014 and were reported to you in my letter dated 30 June 2014. One of the licences for “components for body armour” was previously reported as “body armour”. This was an error in reporting and the relevant Quarterly Report (Q1 2014 covering January – March 2014 licences) will be republished at the same time as when we publish Q3 2014 licences covering July–September 2014. The licence itself was not affected by this reporting error. It was granted with a full and accurate list of approved goods.

Annex A also includes 9 licences for the Ukraine that were revoked on 16 January 2015. This followed a review of the 20 extant export licences for Ukraine that had been suspended in February 2014. The Foreign Secretary is writing to you separately about these licences.

The second worksheet covers all multi–destination Open Individual licences where a country (namely Russia in all cases was removed and each licence was subsequently reissued.<sup>427</sup>

Annex A

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<sup>425</sup> Ev w220 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 15 December 2015

<sup>426</sup> Ev w433 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 6 January 2015

<sup>427</sup> Ev w435 – letter from Vince cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 21 January 2015

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Revoke Date	Revoke Reason [ <sup>428</sup> ]
SIEL	military support vehicles, components for military support vehicles	ML6a	Central African Republic [CAR]	11/06/2014	Licence was converted from a licence for export to Latvia to a licence for export to CAR
SIEL	tear gas/irritant ammunition	ML3a	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	components for body armour	ML13d2	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	anti-riot/ballistic shields	PL5001b	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	components for body armour	ML13d2	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	civil body armour	1A005	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	civil body armour, body armour, components for body armour	1A005, ML13d	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	small arms ammunition	ML3a	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	components for military aircrew protective equipment	ML10g	France	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11a	France	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11a	France	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	targeting equipment	ML5b	France	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	military aircraft head-up/down displays	ML10a	France	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Italy	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Italy	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Italy	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11a	Italy	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	ML4b2, ML4b1	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, sniper rifles (15), weapon cleaning	ML1a, PL5017	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

<sup>428</sup> Where the number is given in this column it refers to the Criterion number in the Government's Consolidated Criteria, set out in Annex 6, relevant to the Government's revocation of the particular licence in question



	equipment				
SIEL	focal plane arrays	6A002a3c	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	focal plane arrays	6A002a3c	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	focal plane arrays	6A002a3c	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	sniper rifles (3), gun mountings, components for sniper rifles	ML1a, ML1d	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	sniper rifles (42), gun mountings, components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, weapon cleaning equipment	ML1a, ML1d, PL5017	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	ML17h	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	ML17h	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	ML17h	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	components for military helicopters	ML10a	South Africa	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for inertial equipment, guidance/navigation equipment, inertial equipment	7A103a1, 7A103a2	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1a, ML2a, ML3a, ML1b, ML1d, ML2c	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5A002a1b, 5D002c1, 5D002d, 5E002b	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	technology for the production of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

SIEL	civil NBC protection equipment, NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment	1A004a3, 1A004a4, ML7f1, 1A004a1	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	components for sporting guns	ML1a	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	components for sporting guns	ML1a	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	body armour, components for body armour	ML13d	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	submersible equipment	8A002c, 8A002i2, 8A002a3	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	sniper rifles (1)	ML1a	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	sniper rifles (1)	ML1a	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	sporting guns (1), weapon sights, small arms ammunition	ML1a, ML1d, ML3a	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	military aircraft ground equipment	ML10f	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	equipment for the use of military communications equipment	ML11a	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	mass spectrometers	3A233c	India	05/11/2014	1
SIEL	sporting guns (33)	ML1a	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	rifles (10)	ML1a	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	sniper rifles (5)	ML1a	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	sporting guns (1)	ML1b	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	sniper rifles (3), sporting guns (11)	ML1a	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	ML13c, ML13d1, ML13d2	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	gun silencers	ML1d	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	components for sporting guns	ML1a	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	components for sniper rifles	ML1a	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Removal Date	Review Reason
OIEL	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	1A001a, 1A001c, 7A103a1	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

OIEL	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters	ML10a, ML10f, ML11a, ML22a, PL5017	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	inertial equipment	7A103a1	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5E002a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	acoustic seabed survey equipment, equipment employing cryptography, guidance/navigation equipment, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles, underwater sonar navigation systems	5A002a1a, 6A001a1a1, 6A001a1a2, 6A001a1a3, 6A001a1d, 6A001a2d, 6A001b1, 6A001b2, 6A003b4a, 6A003b4b, 6A006a2, 6A006a3, 7A003a1, 7A003c1, 7A003d, 7A008, 7A103a, 8A001c1, 8A001c2, 8A001d1, 8A001d2, 8A001d3, 8A002c	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	technology for military communications equipment	ML22a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets	1A007a, 1A007b2, 3A231	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

OIEL	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	1A001c, ML10, ML10b, ML10d, ML10f, ML10g, ML11a, ML15d, ML22a, ML5b, PL5017	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	aircraft cannons, components for air launched rockets, components for air-to-air missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft carriers, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for command communications control and intelligence software, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for depth charges, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for machine guns, components for military aero-	ML10, ML10a, ML10d, ML10f, ML11, ML11a, ML1a, ML21b4, ML22a, ML2a, ML2d, ML4a, ML4b1, ML5a, ML5b, ML5d, ML9a1	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

<p>engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval guns, components for naval mines, components for periscopes, components for sensor integration equipment, components for submarines, components for surface launched rockets, components for surface-to-surface missiles, components for targeting equipment, components for torpedoes, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, machine guns, military aero-engines, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval engines, naval guns, technology for air launched rockets, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for depth charges, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets,</p>				
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	technology for machine guns, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military radars, technology for torpedoes, torpedoes				
OIEL	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	1A001c, ML10, ML10b, ML10d, ML10f, ML10g, ML11a, ML15d, ML22a, ML5b, PL5017	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5E002b, NLR	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a, 5D002c1, 5E002	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5A002a1b1, 5A002a1b2, 5A002a1b3, 5D002a, 5D002c1, 5E002	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	Fibrous/filamentary materials	1C010b	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	towed hydrophone arrays	6A001a2b1, 6A001a2b2	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

OIEL	towed hydrophone arrays	6A001a2b1, 6A001a2b2	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	7A103a1, 7E101	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OITCL	gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1a, ML1d, ML3a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a, 5D002c1, 5E002a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	6A001a2d	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	components for rifles, components for sporting guns, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1a, ML1b, ML1d, ML2a, ML3a	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	inertial equipment	7A003d, 7A103a1	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a, 5D002c1, 5E002a	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5A002a1b1, 5A002a1b2, 5A002a1b3	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	air guns	ML1a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002c1	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	inertial equipment	7A003a1, 7A103a2	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	pressure transducers, software for semiconductor process equipment, technology for	2B230, 3D002, 3E001	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

	semiconductor process equipment				
OIEL	software for inertial equipment	7D101	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	software for inertial equipment	7D101	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	biotechnology equipment, components for biotechnology equipment	2B352d1, 2B352d2	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems	1A002b1, 1C202a, 3A201a2, 6A001a2d, 6A003b4c, 8A002a2, 8A002a3, 8A002a4, 8A002c, 8A002f1, 8A002f2, 8A002i2, 8C001	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	non-military detonators	1A007b4	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	6A001a1a1, 6A001a1d, 6A001b1, 6A001b2, 6A006a2, 7A003a1, 7A003d, 7A103a1, 7A103a2, 8A002i1a, 8A002i1b, 8A002i2	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	accessories for underwater telecommunications systems, components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	1C352a1, 1C352a10, 1C352a11, 1C352a13, 1C352a15, 1C352a16, 1C352a3, 1C352a4, 1C352a5	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	lasers	6A005a6a1, 6A005a6a2, 6A005b6c1b, 6A005b6c1c	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment,	7A101, 7A102, 7A103a1, 7A103a2, 7A103d	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia



	gyroscopes				
OIEL	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	6A001a2a2, 6A001a2b7	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	animal pathogens	1C352a1, 1C352a10, 1C352a11, 1C352a13, 1C352a15, 1C352a16, 1C352a3, 1C352a4, 1C352a5	Russia	11/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5A002a1b1, 5A002a1b2, 5A002a1b3, 5B002a, 5B002b, 5D002a, 5E002	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

352. The Committees deal with the Government's revocation policies in relation to individual Countries of Concern in Chapter 10 below. Annex 7 below contains a list of revocations from January 2011 to 21 January 2015.

**353. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report:**

- a) whether it is satisfied that the powers it has under the Export Control Order 2008 (as amended) to vary or revoke export licences and the procedure it is currently following enable the Government to vary or revoke UK arms export licences with sufficient speed to take account of fast-moving military events or human rights violations in UK arms export destination countries; and
- b) whether the Government's project to classify export licensing data as "Official Statistics" under The Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007 will result in any diminution in the extent and timeliness of arms export licensing data becoming publically available.

### Arms export licence suspensions

354. Included in the package of changes proposed in the framework of the post-Arab Spring review of the UK defence and security export policy, the Foreign Secretary announced on 13 October 2011 a new procedure to:

Allow immediate licensing suspension to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability. Applications in the pipeline would be stopped and no further licenses issued, pending Ministerial or departmental review.<sup>429</sup>

355. The Government pointed out shortly after the introduction of this policy that while new applications would be reviewed for suspension, it was possible that licences for some arms export goods could be suspended whilst existing licences for the same goods could remain valid and the goods could continue to be exported.<sup>430</sup>

356. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms export licence suspensions is described at paragraphs 418–428 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation are at paragraphs 427 and 428 of Volume I of that Report.

357. The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation on arms export suspensions in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Conclusions:**

The Committees conclude that the Government's decision to apply the broad test of "equipment which might be used for internal repression" rather than the narrow test of "clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression" for deciding whether arms export licences should be suspended is welcome. The Committees further conclude that the Government's decision to apply its suspension mechanism not just to arms export licences applications that are under consideration but also to those that have been approved and are extant is also welcome.<sup>431</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

As pointed out in response to paragraphs 120 to 122 of the Committees' Report above, the "broader" test of "might be used for internal repression" was applied to licence suspensions for Egypt as a special case following the agreement of EU Member States on 21 August 2013 to apply this specific test. EU Member States also agreed to apply this test, as a special case, in respect of export licences for Ukraine on 20 February 2014. In all other cases we will apply the usual test of "clear risk" set out in Criterion 2.<sup>432</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) the standard wording it uses to the exporters of controlled goods regarding its right to suspend export licences for controlled goods that it has approved;

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<sup>429</sup> FCO Announcement, *Foreign Office review of export policy*, 13 October 2011, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-review-of-export-policy>

<sup>430</sup> See HC (2014–15) 186 Ev w199 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 3 February 2014

<sup>431</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 126

<sup>432</sup> Cm8935, p 63

- b) the grounds on which the Government has the right to suspend export licences for controlled goods that it has approved; and
- c) the means by which the Government protects itself from financial liabilities if it exercises its right to suspend export licences for controlled goods that it has approved.<sup>433</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

- a) There is no standard wording. When informing a licence holder that their licence has been suspended the notice will set out the grounds on which the licence has been suspended and the reason for the suspension.
- b) As noted in response to paragraph 125 above, the power to suspend licences is set out in the Export Control Order 2008, but the Order does not set out the grounds on which suspension may occur. In general, we will suspend licences as a short term measure in situations where rapidly changing circumstances on the ground mean it is unclear whether the proposed export is still consistent with the Consolidated Criteria, or as a result of collective agreement of EU Member States to suspend licences in specific circumstances. We may also suspend Open Individual licences, or a specific exporter's right to use an Open General licence, where the licence holder has been found to be noncompliant with the terms and conditions of the licence. In this case, the licence holder will be given a specific period of time in which to take corrective action, at which point the suspension may be lifted or the licence, or licence holder's right to use the licence, may be revoked.
- c) In order to protect itself from financial claims, the Government must be able to show that it has acted in accordance with the general principles of good decision making and that:
  - (i) Where the suspension is for policy reasons, the decision is clearly in accordance with announced policy;
  - (ii) The action is procedurally fair, and that licence holders have been properly notified and given the opportunity to appeal; and
  - (iii) In all cases, suspension must be a reasonable and proportionate step to take in the circumstances.<sup>434</sup>

358. In the Westminster Hall Debate on the Committees' last Report (HC 186) held on 30 October 2014, the FCO Minister responding to the debate, Tobias Ellwood, said with regard to the suspensions mechanism that:

The suspension mechanism allows for the suspension of pending licence applications to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability such that it is not possible to make a clear assessment of whether the consolidated criteria have

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<sup>433</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 127

<sup>434</sup> Cm8935, pp 63–64

been met. Following EU Council decisions, it has now been applied to extant licences as well as pending applications. The suspension of licences should, therefore, be viewed not as an admission that there has been a mistake, but as an indication that, on the contrary, the system is appropriately in tune with the reality that circumstances change and that the export licensing system must be able to react appropriately.<sup>435</sup>

359. The Committees deal with the Government's suspension policies in relation to individual Countries of Concern in Chapter 10 below.

**360. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report whether it is satisfied that the powers it has under the Export Control Order 2008 (as amended) to vary or revoke export licences and the procedure it is currently following enable the Government to suspend UK arms export licences with sufficient speed to take account of fast-moving military events or human rights violations in UK arms export destination countries.**

### Exports of gifted equipment

361. The Committees' previous scrutiny of exports of gifted equipment is described at paragraphs 429–434 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendations are at paragraphs 128 and 129 of Volume I of that Report.

362. The Committees' Recommendations on exports of gifted equipment in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it will assess all proposals to gift controlled goods not only against its Criteria for Arms Exports announced on 25 March 2014, but also against the "lower threshold" Criterion which the Government is using to suspend licences for arms exports, namely "equipment which might be used for internal repression" as stated in the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Chairman of the Committees of 6 January 2014.<sup>436</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government would like to reassure the Committees that all proposals to gift export controlled goods and technology are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria. This is the all-encompassing set of Criteria which is used by Government in the assessment of exports, regardless of whether they are in relation to the pursuance of an export licence by industry, or by Government when proposing to gift controlled goods to foreign entities.

As set out in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 January 2014, Criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria deals with human rights and internal repression. This states

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<sup>435</sup> HC Deb, 30 October 2014, Col 139

<sup>436</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 128

that, having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, the Government will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression. This applies equally to the assessment of a proposed gift of controlled goods.<sup>437</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Departmental Minutes relating to gifts that require Parliamentary approval state in respect of each item to be gifted which are on the Government's export controls Military List or Dual-Use List and which are not.<sup>438</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Committees will be aware that Departmental Minutes which relate to gifts that require Parliamentary approval do not currently set out whether the particular item/s to be gifted are on the Government's export controls Military or Dual-Use Lists. However, we will review this recommendation.<sup>439</sup>

363. In the period of June 2014 – February 2015 the Government has laid Departmental Minutes for the gifting of equipment as follows:

- 9 September 2014 – Government of Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government
- 17 October 2014 – Lebanon
- 17 October 2014 – Ukraine
- 22 October 2014 – Afghanistan
- 18 November 2014 – Ukraine
- 14 January 2015 – Pakistan
- 27 January 2015 – Jordan
- 3 March 2015 – Free Syrian Police
- 3 March 2015 – Syrian civil defence teams

The full text of each Departmental Minute listed above can be found in Annex 12.

364. The Committees deal with the Government's gifting of equipment in relation to individual Countries of Concern in Chapter 10 below.

**365. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the outcome of its review of the Committees' previous Recommendation that**

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<sup>437</sup> Cm8935, p 64

<sup>438</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 129

<sup>439</sup> Cm8935, pp 64–65

“the Departmental Minutes relating to gifts that require Parliamentary approval state in respect of each item to be gifted which are on the Government’s export controls Military List or Dual–Use List”.

## Transfers from Standard Individual Export Licences to Open Individual Export Licences

366. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of transfers from Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) to Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) was included in the section on performance of the Export Control Organisation described at paragraphs 90–103 of the Chairman’s Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees’ 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees’ Recommendation relating to this subject is at paragraph 35 of Volume I of that Report.

367. The Committees’ Recommendation on transfers from Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) to Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government’s Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it remains its policy “to develop a strategy to encourage exporters to shift from individual to open licences”, and, if so, what assessment it has made of the risk of an increase in breaches of the Government’s arms export control policies as a result.<sup>440</sup>

### **The Government’s Response:**

The ECO confirms that it is committed to developing a strategy to encourage exporters to transfer from Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) to Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) where possible. OIELs are granted to individual exporters, usually for three or five years, for a pattern of exports of named goods to named end users. They remove the need for prior approval for each shipment that falls within these parameters. Experience and analysis shows that a large number of SIELs annually relate to exports for which OIELs would be suitable, i.e. less sensitive goods to less sensitive destinations, with exporters using SIELs for repeat business – same goods, same end user, same group of destinations. The Government’s risk appetite will not change as a result of this new policy as the exports concerned are those which do not raise significant concerns against the Consolidated Criteria. A company’s use of open licences is, of course, audited by the ECO’s Compliance Inspectors who have the ability to recommend the suspension or revocation of an open licence in the event of a company not complying with its terms and conditions.

First steps have been taken to develop the strategy, namely a review of the application, approval and renewal processes to make them simpler to navigate for exporters and officials. Next steps will include an analysis of the likely “conversion

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<sup>440</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 34

rate” from SIELs to OIELs and a review of resource implications within Government.<sup>441</sup>

368. The Government has revoked or suspended the following Open Licences since the Arab Spring:

**Table 6 – Open Licence revocations: January – July 2011**

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
Bahrain	Body armour.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain	Ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, military helmets.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain	Technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon sights.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain	Technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sights.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain	Rifles, shotguns, small arms ammunition, sporting gun ammunition, sporting rifles, weapon sights.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain	Components for military utility vehicles, military utility vehicles, technology for the production of military utility vehicles,	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain	Components for gun laying equipment, components for military image equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain	Components for military communications equipment, components for test equipment for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military helmets, software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the development of military communications equipment, technology for the development of military helmets,	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

<sup>441</sup> Cm8935, p 15

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
	technology for the development of military communications equipment, technology for the production of military helmets, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military helmets, test equipment for military communications equipment.	
<b>Bahrain</b>	Components for military utility vehicles, military utility vehicles, technology for the production of military utility vehicles, technology for the use of military utility vehicles.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Components for gun laying equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Components for military communications equipment, components for test equipment for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military helmets, software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the development of military communications equipment, technology for the development of military helmets, technology for the production of military communications equipment, technology for the production of military helmets, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military helmets, test equipment for military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Software for military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	CS hand grenades, demolition charges, demolition devices, exploding simulation devices, fire simulation equipment for small arms ammunition, illuminators, military devices for initiating explosives, signal flares, signal hand	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3



End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
	grenades, smoke ammunition, smoke canisters, smoke generators, smoke hand grenades, stun grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, thunderflashes, training anti-aircraft ammunition, training hand grenades.	
<b>Bahrain</b>	Ballistic shield, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, military helmets.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain/Egypt</b>	Technology for the development of software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the production of software for the use of military communications equipment, Technology for the use of software for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of command communications control and intelligence software, technology for the production of command communications control and intelligence software, command communications control and intelligence software.	Increasing tension in Bahrain/Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain/Egypt</b>	Test equipment for military communications equipment, components for test equipment for military communications equipment, technology for the use of test equipment for military communications equipment, technology for the use of components for test equipment for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of components of military communications equipment, military helmets, components for military helmets, technology for the use of military helmets, technology for the use of components for military helmets.	Increasing tension in Bahrain/Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain/Egypt</b>	Military distress signalling equipment, equipment for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military distress signalling equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain/Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain/Egypt</b>	Components for military distress signalling equipment, military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain/Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
Egypt	Components for military aero-engines, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Egypt	Military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, components for military electronic equipment, technology for the use of military flying helmets, technology for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military electronic equipment, military flying helmets.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Egypt	Components for military training aircraft, ejector seats, components for ejector seats, military parachutes, components for military parachutes, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of military parachutes, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Egypt	Military parachutes, military parachutist equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Egypt	Military flying helmets, aircrew protective masks, components for aircrew protective masks, components for military flying helmets, military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military flying helmets, components for equipment for the use of military flying helmets, equipment for the use of aircrew protective masks, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military flying helmets, technology for the use of aircrew protective masks, technology for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military communication equipment.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Egypt	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for military aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military transport aircraft, software for the use of military transport aircraft, equipment for the	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
	use of military transport aircraft.	
<b>Libya</b>	Artillery computers, bombing computers, command and control vehicles, command communications control and intelligence equipment. Command communications control and intelligence software, components for military electronic equipment, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of artillery computers, equipment for the use of command communications control and intelligence equipment, equipment for the use of fire control equipment, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of laser rangefinders, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, fire control equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun laying equipment, laser rangefinders, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military navigation equipment, software for the modelling of military operation scenarios, software for the simulation of military operations scenarios, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Software for the use of military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, communications equipment, military containers, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Mine clearing equipment, components for mine clearing equipment, mine countermeasures equipment, components for mine countermeasures equipment, equipment for the	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
	use of mine clearing equipment, components for equipment for the use of mine clearing equipment, technology for the use of mine clearing equipment, technology for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of general military vehicle components, technology for the use of equipment for the use of mine clearing equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment, military field engineer equipment, components for military field engineer equipment, general military vehicle components, minefield breaching vehicles.	
Libya	Technology for the use of military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Tunisia	Laser range finders, components for laser range finders, aiming devices, components for aiming devices, weapon sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of laser range finders, military image intensifier equipment, components for military intensifier equipment, night vision goggles, components for night vision goggles, weapon sights, equipment for the use of laser range finders.	Increasing tension in Tunisia resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

Source: Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010–12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm8079, Annex 1

No Open Licences were revoked between July 2011 and June 2013

**Table 7 – Open Licence revocations: June 2013 – 6 June 2014**

LICENCES REVOKED					
Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Revocation Date	Refusal Reason <sup>[442]</sup>
OIEL	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
OIEL	technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for anti-armour missiles, technology for anti-ship missiles, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for fire control equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for general military vehicle	ML22a	Russia	24/03/2014	4

<sup>442</sup> Where the number is given in this column it refers to the Criterion number in the Government's Consolidated Criteria, set out in Annex 6, relevant to the Government's revocation of the particular licence in question

	LICENCES REVOKED				
Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Revocation Date	Refusal Reason <sup>[442]</sup>
	components, technology for guided missile decoying equipment, technology for laser rangefinders, technology for laser warning detectors, technology for military combat vehicles, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for optical target acquisition equipment, technology for optical target surveillance equipment, technology for periscopes, technology for tanks, technology for turrets, technology for weapon night sights, technology for weapon sights				
OIEL	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
	COUNTRIES REMOVED FROM EXTANT LICENCES				
OIEL	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	Russia	24/03/2013	4
OIEL	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	ML11a, ML17d, ML22a, ML4b1, ML6a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
OIEL	components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment	1C202a, 3A201a1, 6A001a2d, 8A002a2, 8A002a3, 8A002a4, 8A002c, 8A002i2	Russia	19/03/2014	4
OIEL	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	ML21c, ML22a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2

LICENCES REVOKED					
Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Revocation Date	Refusal Reason <sup>[442]</sup>
OIEL	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	ML21c, ML22a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OIEL	sporting guns	ML1a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OIEL	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the production of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	ML11a, ML18a, ML21a, ML22a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OITCL	gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1a, ML1d, ML3a	Ukraine	25/02/2014	2

Source: Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 June 2014

**Table 8 – Open Licence revocations: 17 June 2014 – 21 January 2015**

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Revoke Date	Revoke Reason
OIEL	components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for inertial equipment, guidance/navigation equipment, inertial equipment	7A103a1, 7A103a2	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1a, ML2a, ML3a, ML1b, ML1d, ML2c	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5A002a1b, 5D002c1, 5D002d, 5E002b	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	technology for the production of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

Source: Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 21 January 2015

The following table contains a list of multi-destination Open Individual Export Licences in which Russia was removed (effectively revoked) as a destination from the licences.

**Table 9 – Multiple destination Open Individual Export Licences with Russia destination removed: 7 June 2014 – 21 January 2015**

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Removal Date	Review Reason
OIEL	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	1A001a, 1A001c, 7A103a1	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters	ML10a, ML10f, ML11a, ML22a, PL5017	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	inertial equipment	7A103a1	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5E002a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	acoustic seabed survey equipment, equipment employing cryptography, guidance/navigation equipment, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles, underwater sonar navigation systems	5A002a1a, 6A001a1a 1, 6A001a1a 2, 6A001a1a 3, 6A001a1d, 6A001a2d, 6A001b1, 6A001b2, 6A003b4a, 6A003b4b, 6A006a2, 6A006a3, 7A003a1, 7A003c1, 7A003d, 7A008, 7A103a, 8A001c1, 8A001c2, 8A001d1, 8A001d2, 8A001d3, 8A002c	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	technology for military communications equipment	ML22a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Removal Date	Review Reason
					Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets	1A007a, 1A007b2, 3A231	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	1A001c, ML10, ML10b, ML10d, ML10f, ML10g, ML11a, ML15d, ML22a, ML5b, PL5017	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia



Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Removal Date	Review Reason
OIEL	aircraft cannons, components for air launched rockets, components for air-to-air missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft carriers, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for command communications control and intelligence software, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for depth charges, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for machine guns, components for military aero-engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval guns, components for naval mines, components for periscopes, components for sensor integration equipment, components for submarines, components for surface launched rockets, components for surface-to-surface missiles, components for targeting equipment, components for torpedoes, components for	ML10, ML10a, ML10d, ML10f, ML11, ML11a, ML1a, ML21b4, ML22a, ML2a, ML2d, ML4a, ML4b1, ML5a, ML5b, ML5d, ML9a1	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Removal Date	Review Reason
	<p>weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, machine guns, military aero-engines, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval engines, naval guns, technology for air launched rockets, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for depth charges, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for machine guns, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military radars, technology for torpedoes, torpedoes</p>				
OIEL	<p>components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment</p>	<p>1A001c, ML10, ML10b, ML10d, ML10f, ML10g, ML11a, ML15d, ML22a, ML5b, PL5017</p>	<p>Russia</p>	<p>05/09/2014</p>	<p>EU Sanctions imposed on Russia</p>
OIEL	<p>equipment employing cryptography</p>	<p>5A002a1a</p>	<p>Russia</p>	<p>05/09/2014</p>	<p>EU Sanctions imposed on Russia</p>

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Removal Date	Review Reason
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5E002b, NLR	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a, 5D002c1, 5E002	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5A002a1b 1, 5A002a1b 2, 5A002a1b 3, 5D002a, 5D002c1, 5E002	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	Fibrous/filamentary materials	1C010b	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	towed hydrophone arrays	6A001a2b 1, 6A001a2b 2	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	towed hydrophone arrays	6A001a2b 1, 6A001a2b 2	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	7A103a1, 7E101	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OITCL	gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1a, ML1d, ML3a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a, 5D002c1, 5E002a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	6A001a2d	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Removal Date	Review Reason
OIEL	components for rifles, components for sporting guns, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1a, ML1b, ML1d, ML2a, ML3a	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	inertial equipment	7A003d, 7A103a1	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a, 5D002c1, 5E002a	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5A002a1b 1, 5A002a1b 2, 5A002a1b 3	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	air guns	ML1a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002c1	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	inertial equipment	7A003a1, 7A103a2	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	pressure transducers, software for semiconductor process equipment, technology for semiconductor process equipment	2B230, 3D002, 3E001	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	software for inertial equipment	7D101	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	software for inertial equipment	7D101	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	biotechnology equipment, components for biotechnology equipment	2B352d1, 2B352d2	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Removal Date	Review Reason
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems	1A002b1, 1C202a, 3A201a2, 6A001a2d, 6A003b4c, 8A002a2, 8A002a3, 8A002a4, 8A002c, 8A002f1, 8A002f2, 8A002i2, 8C001	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	non-military detonators	1A007b4	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	6A001a1a 1, 6A001a1d, 6A001b1, 6A001b2, 6A006a2, 7A003a1, 7A003d, 7A103a1, 7A103a2, 8A002i1a, 8A002i1b, 8A002i2	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	accessories for underwater telecommunications systems, components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	1C352a1, 1C352a10, 1C352a11, 1C352a13, 1C352a15, 1C352a16, 1C352a3, 1C352a4, 1C352a5	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	lasers	6A005a6a 1, 6A005a6a 2, 6A005b6c 1b, 6A005b6c 1c	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	7A101, 7A102, 7A103a1, 7A103a2, 7A103d	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	6A001a2a 2, 6A001a2b 7	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Removal Date	Review Reason
OIEL	animal pathogens	1C352a1, 1C352a10, 1C352a11, 1C352a13, 1C352a15, 1C352a16, 1C352a3, 1C352a4, 1C352a5	Russia	11/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5A002a1b 1, 5A002a1b 2, 5A002a1b 3, 5B002a, 5B002b, 5D002a, 5E002	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

Source: Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 21 January 2015

369. On 19 January 2015 the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, wrote to the Business Secretary requesting clarification of the length of OIELs. The text of his letter was as follows:

In the Government's Response (Cm8935) to the Committees'

2014 Report (HC 186) on page 15 it states that: "OIELs are granted to individual exporters, usually for three or five years [...]". However, in the quarterly "Country Pivot Reports" the definition of an OIEL states that "OIELs covering the export of items entered on the Military List are generally valid for two years [...]".

Would you please clarify the apparent contradiction of the two statements above and confirm to me the duration of an OIEL.<sup>443</sup>

The Business Secretary replied on 4 February 2015 as follows:

#### VALIDITY PERIOD FOR OPEN INDIVIDUAL EXPORT LICENCES

Thank you for your letter dated 19 January 2015 concerning the validity period for Open Individual Export Licences. Generally open licences are valid for five years, however, Dealer to Dealer OIELs and military OIELs to EU destinations are issued for up to three years.

In fact this statement had already been identified for amendment and the correct OIEL validity period is reflected in the latest data report covering Q3 (July – September) 2014. This report has just been released and is available at <https://www.exportcontroldb.bis.gov.uk/sdb/fox>

I trust you find this information helpful.<sup>444</sup>

<sup>443</sup> Ev w434 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 19 January 2015

370. I propose that the Committees conclude that there is a risk of an increase in breaches of the Government's arms export control policies as a result of its strategy to encourage exporters to transfer from Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) to Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) where possible. Notwithstanding the fact that the Government has stated that this policy will only be applied to arms exports which do not raise significant concerns against the Consolidated Criteria, I propose that the Committees further conclude that their own concerns about this policy are reinforced by the fact that since the start of the so-called Arab Spring in December 2010 the Government has had to revoke or suspend a total of 52 Open Licences including to Bahrain, Central African Republic, Egypt, France, Libya, India, Italy, Russia, Thailand and Ukraine, and with regard to a further 47 multiple-destination OIELs the Government has had to remove Russia as a destination. (Details of each of these 52 Open Licences and 47 multiple-destination OIELS can be found in Volume II, paragraph 368).

371. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific safeguards it will put in place to ensure that its policy of encouraging exporters to transfer from SIELs to OIELs where possible, does not result in breaches of the Government's arms export control policies.

372. I propose that the Committees conclude that as the Business Secretary has now acknowledged in his letter of 4 February 2015 to the Chairman of the Committees that his Department's information that the length of the validity of OIELs was generally two years was incorrect and that "generally open licences are valid for five years", the Government's policy of encouraging exporters to transfer from SIELs to OIELs, where possible, is likely to increase the risk of breaches of the Government's arms export control policies. The Committees further conclude that the Government's policy of transferring SIELs to OIELs must inescapably reduce the transparency of the scale of the Government's approved arms exports given that the Government discloses the financial value of SIELs but not of OIELs. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it will disclose the value of controlled goods actually shipped under each open licence in its Quarterly reports.

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<sup>444</sup> Ev w459 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 4 February 2015

## 10 Arms exports to Countries of concern

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### Extant arms export licences to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's (FCO) countries of Human Rights concern worldwide, and to the Additional Countries and Territories of concern to the Committees

373. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Countries of concern is described at paragraphs 435–441 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusions are at paragraphs 97–100 of that Report.

374. The Committees' Recommendation on arms exports to Countries of concern in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it is satisfied that each of the 3,375 extant arms export licences to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's 28 Countries of Human Rights concern, valued at £11.9 billion, and each of the 421 extant arms export licences to the Committees' Additional 5 Countries of concern, valued at £166 million, are currently compliant with all of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria with particular reference to:

- a) Criterion One (Respect for the UK's international obligations and commitments, in particular sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations);
- b) Criterion Two (The respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country for international humanitarian law);
- c) Criterion Three (The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts);
- d) Criterion Four (Preservation of regional peace, security and stability); and
- e) Criterion Six (The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law).<sup>445</sup>

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<sup>445</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 130



**The Government's Response:**

The FCO examines every application on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated Criteria. We draw on all available information, including NGO reports and our overseas network.

We do approve export applications for equipment to countries which feature as countries of concern in the FCO's Annual Human Rights and Democracy Report, not least because many licensable goods have perfectly legitimate civilian uses. However, commercial relationships do not, and will not, prevent the Government from speaking frankly and openly to the governments of these countries about issues of concern, including human rights.

The Government has confidence in the UK's thorough and robust export licensing system to distinguish between exports for legitimate defence and security purposes and exports which pose unacceptable risks to human rights.

When making export licensing decisions for goods destined for a country of concern, the Government examines the political and security conditions in the destination country, the nature of the equipment to be exported, the organisation or unit which will ultimately be the user of the equipment, and all available information about how similar equipment has been used in the past and how it is likely to be used in the future. We consult FCO experts in the UK and in our Embassies and High Commissions overseas, and take into account reports from NGOs and the media. Many applications, including all sensitive or finely-balanced cases, are submitted to Ministers for decision.<sup>446</sup>

375. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)* the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about Countries of concern. The question and answer were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**1.4 Awareness: Cross-Departmental Working

Which are the specific countries of concern on which the Government is currently providing updates and what are the specific concerns, for example potential weapons of mass destruction (WMD) end-use, that relate to each of those countries?

**The Government's answer:**

The Government's countries of concern are those which feature in the FCO's Annual Human Rights and Democracy Report.

When making export licensing decisions for goods destined for a country of concern, the Government examines the political and security conditions in the destination country, the nature of the equipment to be exported, the organisation or unit which will ultimately be the user of the equipment, and all available information about how

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<sup>446</sup> Cm8935, pp 65-66

similar equipment has been used in the past and how it is likely to be used in the future. Commercial relationships do not, and will not, prevent the Government from speaking frankly and openly to governments about issues of concern (including human rights).<sup>447</sup>

376. On 17 November 2014 the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, wrote to the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, requesting details of all extant licences to the FCO's Countries of Human rights concern and, in addition, to Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Hong Kong, Tunisia and Ukraine. The text of the letter was as follows:

I should be grateful for an update of the information you provided to the Committees in your reply of 12 May 2014 on extant export licences to Countries of concern and adding Hong Kong.

**1) Extant licences for the FCO Countries of Human Rights concern**

Please could you state which UK strategic export control licences are currently extant, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence, to each of the 28 countries listed as Countries of Human Rights concern in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's 2013 Human Rights and Democracy Report namely:

Afghanistan  
 Belarus  
 Burma  
 Central African Republic (CAR)  
 China  
 Colombia  
 Cuba  
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)  
 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)  
 Eritrea  
 Fiji  
 Iran  
 Iraq  
 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories  
 Libya  
 Pakistan  
 Russia  
 Saudi Arabia  
 Somalia  
 South Sudan  
 Sri Lanka  
 Sudan  
 Syria

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<sup>447</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

Vietnam

Yemen

Zimbabwe

## **2) Extant licences for other countries**

Please could you state which UK strategic export control licences are currently extant, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence, to each of the six following countries:

Argentina

Bahrain

Egypt

Hong Kong

Tunisia

Ukraine<sup>448</sup>

The Chairman of the Committees also wrote to the Business Secretary on 12 January 2015 requesting details of the extant licences to Qatar.<sup>449</sup>

The Business Secretary replied on 15 December 2014 and 21 January 2015 providing the information on extant licences sought in each letter.<sup>450</sup>

Details of the extant licences can be found at Annex 13. A summary of the extant licences is included in Table 10 below.

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<sup>448</sup> Ev w215 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 17 November 2015

<sup>449</sup> Ev w434 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 12 January 2015

<sup>450</sup> Ev w220 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Exports dated 15 December 2014 and Ev w435 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Exports dated 21 January 2015

**Table 10 – Extant arms export licences to FCO Countries of Human Rights concern  
December 2014**

Country	Value of SIELs (£)	Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs)	Country	Value of SIELs (£)	Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs)
Afghanistan	15,031,406	63	Libya	43,762,521	69
Belarus	3,984,960	14	Pakistan	1,263,345,658	279
Burma	3,846,062	10	Russia	168,536,910	248
Central African Republic (CAR)	277,966	7	Saudi Arabia	1,745,881,543	482
China	1,393,858,218	1148	Somalia	3,137,927	30
Colombia	18,999,489	76	South Sudan	272,888	14
Cuba	0	4	Sri Lanka	62,119,174	87
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0	0	Sudan	10,097,992	6
Democratic Republic of Congo	2,986,541	33	Syria	289,862	23
Eritrea	968,641	7	Turkmenistan	3,195,423	27
Fiji	37,720	4	Uzbekistan	4,733,871	13
Iran	316,658,733	43	Vietnam	27,445,914	79
Iraq	37,744,356	84	Yemen	1,579,587	13
Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories	92,941,347	402	Zimbabwe	1,367,423	53
			<b>Total</b>	<b>5,223,102,143</b>	<b>3298</b>

Source: Ev w220 – Annex to letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 15 December 2014

N.B. The monetary values shown are for SIELs only as the Government does not supply the value of OIEL licences.

**Table 11 – Extant arms export licences to Additional Countries and Territories of concern to the Committees—December 2014**

Country	Value of SIELs (£)	Number of extant licences	Country	Value of SIELs (£)	Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs)
Argentina	30,441,417	59	Qatar	39,364,880	197
Bahrain	45,030,026	105	Tunisia	2,643,358	51
Egypt	63,901,534	123	Ukraine	32,682,245	89
Hong Kong	142,834,867	209	<b>Total</b>	<b>356,088,332</b>	<b>833</b>

Source: Ev w220 and Ev w435 – Annex to letters from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 15 December 2014 and 21 January 2015

N.B. The monetary values shown are for SIELs only as the Government does not supply the value of OIEL licences.

377. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it is satisfied that each of the 3,298 extant arms export licences to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's 28 Countries of Human Rights concern, valued at £5.2 billion (SIELs only), and each of the 833 extant arms export licences to the Committees' Additional 7 Countries of concern, valued at £356.1 million (SIELs only), are currently compliant with all of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria namely:

- a) Criterion One (Respect for the UK's international obligations and commitments, in particular sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations);
- b) Criterion Two (The respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country for international humanitarian law);
- c) Criterion Three (The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts);
- d) Criterion Four (Preservation of regional peace, security and stability);
- e) Criterion Five (The national security of the UK and territories whose external relations are the UK's responsibility, as well as that of friendly and allied countries);
- f) Criterion Six (The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law);

- g) Criterion Seven (The existence of a risk that the items will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions); and**
- h) Criterion Eight (The compatibility of the transfer with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources).**

### **Extant arms export licences to certain individual countries within the FCO's list of 28 Countries of Human Rights concern**

378. Specific evidence given to the Committees in relation to 12 of these 28 countries and the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendations in relation to those countries follows immediately below.

#### ***Afghanistan***

379. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Afghanistan is described at paragraphs 445–447 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 131 of Volume I of that Report.

380. The Committees' Recommendation on Afghanistan in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Afghanistan for assault rifles, body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for pistols, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, general military vehicle components, gun silencers, machine guns, military support vehicles, pistols, small arms ammunition and technology for military support vehicles are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three, Four and Six.<sup>451</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that the currently extant licences for Afghanistan are compliant with the Consolidated Criteria and the UN Arms Embargo sanctions. However, as was shown in Ukraine, circumstances can and do change rapidly, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same Criteria. In such cases, the Government would revoke the licence. The

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<sup>451</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 131

Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.<sup>452</sup>

381. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)* the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about gifting equipment to Afghanistan. The question and answer were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

1.2 Policy Developments – Gifting equipment currently in Afghanistan

Why is the Government assessing proposals to gift equipment currently in Afghanistan against the narrow test in the Consolidated Criteria, as revised in May 2014, as to whether “there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression” rather than against the broad test of whether the items “might be used for internal repression” which the Government is, rightly, continuing to apply when deciding whether or not to suspend existing licences?

**The Government's answer:**

All proposals to gift export controlled goods and technology are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria. This is the all-encompassing set of Criteria which is used by Government in the assessment of exports, regardless of whether they are in relation to the pursuance of an export licence by industry or by Government when proposing to gift controlled goods to foreign entities.

As set out in the (former) Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 January 2014, Criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria deals with human rights and internal repression. This states that, having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, the Government will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression. This applies equally to the assessment of a proposed gift of controlled goods.<sup>453</sup>

**382. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Afghanistan for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, assault rifles, body armour, components for body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for pistols, cryptographic software, electronic warfare equipment, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, machine guns, military helmets, military support vehicles, pistols, small arms ammunition, software for electronic warfare equipment, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for**

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<sup>452</sup> Cm8935, p 66

<sup>453</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

**equipment employing cryptography and technology for military communications equipment are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: One, Two, Three, Four and Six.**

### **China**

383. A declaration by the Madrid European Council on 27 June 1989 established an arms embargo on China.<sup>454</sup>

384. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to China is described at paragraphs 448–452 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendations are at paragraphs 132 and 133 of Volume I of that Report.

385. The Committees' Recommendations on China in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it remains the Government's policy to continue to support the maintenance of the EU embargo on China but not to widen the military or dual-use goods to which it applies.<sup>455</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government's interpretation of the embargo is kept under regular review. At present, there is no intention to widen the interpretation.<sup>456</sup>

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to China for components for equipment employing cryptography, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the production of equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for military communications equipment, technology for the production of military communications equipment and weapon

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<sup>454</sup> Department for Business, innovation and Skills, 2013 Q4 Pivot Report, page 68, [https://www.exportcontrol.db.bis.gov.uk/sdb/fox/!STREAM?id=s39sxUg\\_ploBu6phS&stid=s39sxU6\\_ploBu6phS&app\\_mnem=sdb&mode=view&xfsessionid=sid\\_s39sxU5\\_ploBu6phS](https://www.exportcontrol.db.bis.gov.uk/sdb/fox/!STREAM?id=s39sxUg_ploBu6phS&stid=s39sxU6_ploBu6phS&app_mnem=sdb&mode=view&xfsessionid=sid_s39sxU5_ploBu6phS)

<sup>455</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 132

<sup>456</sup> Cm8935, p 66



sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One and Two.<sup>457</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that the currently extant licences for China are compliant with the Consolidated Criteria.

A declaration by the Madrid European Council on 27 June 1989 established an arms embargo on China. The UK interpretation of the embargo is that it applies to:

- lethal weapons such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles;
- specially designed components of these items and ammunition; military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms;
- any equipment which might be used for internal repression.

All exports for China were assessed in accordance with the sanctions in place.

Some approved items were military-rated, but were intended for non-lethal purposes. As such, they were not covered by the EU Arms Embargo, e.g. industrial components, or NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) equipment for use by environmental agencies. All items not covered by the embargo are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria.

In 2013 the majority of applications for cryptographic-related equipment were for commercial equipment for commercial end-use: building public mobile phone networks and internet infrastructure, or for use in building virtual private networks for private companies. A licence would not have been granted if there was a clear risk that the items might have been used for internal repression.<sup>458</sup>

**386. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to China for components for body armour, components for equipment employing cryptography, components for equipment for the use of military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the production of body armour, equipment for the production of equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, small arms ammunition, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for military communications equipment, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of**

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<sup>457</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 133

<sup>458</sup> Cm8935, p 67

equipment employing cryptography, technology for body armour, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment for the production of military electronic equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the production of military communications equipment, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: One , Two, Three and Four.

387. I propose that the Committees again recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it remains the Government's policy to continue to support the maintenance of the EU embargo on China but not to widen the UK Government's interpretation of the military and dual-use goods to which the EU embargo applies.

### *Iran*

388. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Iran is described at paragraphs 453–456 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 134 of Volume I of that Report.

389. The Committees' Recommendation on Iran in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Iran for equipment employing cryptography are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three, Four and Seven.<sup>459</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that the currently extant licences for Iran are compliant with the Consolidated Criteria. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences. Sanctions against Iran now include wide restrictions on trade including the export of 'dual-use' goods and goods that could contribute to Iran's nuclear programme as well as an arms embargo. There are also wide restrictions targeting investment in Iran's energy sector, including the supply of key equipment and the purchase of oil and gas. Furthermore, there are wide prohibitions on dealings with large sections of the financial sectors, including the freezing of funds and economic resources of certain

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<sup>459</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 134

individuals and entities, as well as restrictions on the provision of insurance to the Government of Iran and restrictions on the transfer of funds with Iranian banks. All extant licences for Iran were approved in accordance with the sanctions in place. Goods which are not caught by sanctions, such as some military<sup>1</sup> and dual-use items, are carefully assessed with particular attention paid to equipment which could be used for internal repression, could provoke or prolong existing tensions, for aggressive use against another country, or diversion to undesirable or unspecified end-users.<sup>460</sup>

**390. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Iran for components for military electronic equipment are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: One, Two, Three, Four and Seven.**

### *Iraq*

391. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Iraq is described at paragraphs 457–459 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 135 of Volume I of that Report.

392. The Committees' Recommendation on Iraq in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Iraq for anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour, components for military support vehicles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of ground vehicle communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for anti-riot/ballistic shields, technology for body armour, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: One, Two, Three, Four, Six and Seven.<sup>461</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that the currently extant licences for Iraq are compliant with the Consolidated Criteria. However, as was shown in Ukraine, circumstances can and do change rapidly, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same Criteria. In such cases, the Government would

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<sup>460</sup> Cm8935, p 68

<sup>461</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 135

revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

There is an arms embargo on arms and related materiel against Iraq, which provides exemptions for equipment required by the Iraqi Government. All extant licences for Iraq were approved in accordance with the sanctions in place.<sup>462</sup>

393. On 9 September 2014 the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, laid a Departmental Minute announcing the gifting of military equipment to the Government of Iraq including the Kurdish Regional Government. The Minute stated that :

The UK is committed to assisting the GoI [Government of Iraq] by: alleviating the humanitarian suffering of those Iraqis targeted by ISIL terrorists; promoting an inclusive, sovereign and democratic Iraq that can push back on ISIL advances and restore stability and security across the country; and working with the international community to tackle the broader threat that ISIL poses to the region and other countries around the world, including the UK. The Kurdish forces remain significantly less well equipped than ISIL and we are responding to help them defend themselves, protect citizens and push back ISIL advances.

The initial gifting package is scheduled to arrive in Iraq on Wednesday 10 September and will consist of heavy machine guns and ammunition. The total cost is approximately £1.6 million plus an estimated £475,000 in transport costs.<sup>463</sup>

394. UK Working Group (UKWG) in its Written Evidence stated that there was a clear rationale behind the immediate support for Kurdish forces: to stop the spread of ISIL into strategically important zones, such as the Kirkuk oil field; the protection of civilians and displaced persons; and to provide support to the Iraqi army. It stated however, that such transfers raised questions which it felt required a Government response. UKWG continued by stating:

The history of arming third-party groups whose stated aims are broadly in line with those of Western governments (in this case the defeat of ISIL) is not a happy one. Transfers authorised for one stated purpose may be diverted for other uses to other groups whose aims are not compatible with the terms of the original transfer, or to groups who may share similar goals but whose behaviour in pursuit of those goals is unacceptable. There is evidence of problems of this nature occurring recently in Iraq and Syria, where modern military hardware is now in the hands of human rights abusers. ISIL has itself seized large quantities of Western-sourced equipment from defeated Iraqi forces. There are also regional sensibilities and security issues that need to be considered, including Turkey's relationship to Kurdish groups (and populations) in both Turkey and Northern Iraq. Kurdish groups are also active in Iran and Syria. Members of Syrian-based Kurdish groups have reportedly been brought into Iraq to aid Kurdish forces there in the conflict with ISIL. Given this

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<sup>462</sup> Cm8935, p 69

<sup>463</sup> HC Deb, 9 September 2014, Col 33WS

context, it is clearly incumbent upon the UK Government to make a very careful assessment of the risks of diversion of any arms shipments into the conflict.<sup>464</sup>

395. The Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, was asked in the Oral Evidence session held on 1 December 2014 what confidence the UK Government had that UK-gifted arms to Turkish and Syrian-based Kurdish groups would not fall into the hands of militants. The Foreign Secretary replied that:

We have calibrated carefully the equipment that we have supplied to the Peshmerga to respond to their operational needs, but with an awareness of the potential risk that inevitably exists. We have sought a series of assurances from the KRG [Kurdistan Regional Government] that weapons will be used to meet urgent operational requirements, that they will remain in Iraq, that they will be used in fighting ISIL or for the defence of the civilian population only, that they will not be stockpiled for other purposes and that they will be used in accordance with international law including international humanitarian law. We have also satisfied ourselves that the Peshmerga have a weapons management system in place that allows them to monitor compliance with those assurances, and that weapons are being used and stored securely.<sup>465</sup>

**396. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Iraq (these include those to Kurdistan) for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles, body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for weapon mountings, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the production of military helmets, equipment for the use of weapon sights, military helmets, pistols, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for anti-riot/ballistic shields, technology for body armour, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military helmets, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography and weapon night sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: One, Two, Three, Four, Six and Seven.**

### *Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories*

397. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories is described at paragraphs 460–467 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 105 of Volume I of that Report.

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<sup>464</sup> Ev w92

<sup>465</sup> Q 151

398. The Committees' Recommendations on Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories for anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for equipment employing cryptography, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, general military vehicle components, military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for military communications equipment, technology for small arms ammunition, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, water cannon and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three and Four.<sup>466</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response whether the entirety of the extant export licences to Israel for cryptographic equipment, software and technology valued at £7.8billion are fully compliant with arms export Criterion 2 (Respect for Human Rights) notwithstanding the fact that when the Committees asked in respect of an export licence application to Israel in Quarter 3 of 2013: "Why was a SIEL [Standard Individual Export Licence] for equipment employing cryptography refused?", the Government's answer was: "We refused this SIEL under Criterion 2 because the exporter did not provide sufficient information or assurances over potential ultimate recipients and end-use. We therefore assessed there was a clear risk that the export might be used for internal repression."<sup>467</sup>

**The Government's Response to the two Recommendations above:**

The Government is satisfied that the currently extant licences for Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories are compliant with the Consolidated Criteria. However, as was shown in Ukraine, circumstances can and do change rapidly, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same Criteria. In such cases, the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

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<sup>466</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 136

<sup>467</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 136

While outside the period covered by the Report, it is worth noting that, on 12 August 2014, the Government announced the findings of a review of licensed exports to Israel which identified twelve licences for components which could be part of equipment used by the Israel Defence Forces in Gaza. The Government made clear that, in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities, it would suspend these licences as a precautionary step.<sup>468</sup>

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees also recommend that the Government sends the Committees, when published, the Initial Assessment made by the UK National Contact Point of the complaint made under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises with regard to supplies to Israel security services from G4S.<sup>469</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Initial Assessment of the complaint against G4S has been published and is available at the following link: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-ncpinitial-assessment-complaint-against-g4s><sup>470</sup>

399. In the Government's Response (Cm8935) to the Committees' Recommendation on the Arab Spring in its last Report (HC 186) it stated:

While outside the period covered by the Report, it is worth noting that, on 12 August 2014, the Government announced the findings of a review of licensed exports to Israel which identified twelve licences for components which could be part of equipment used by the Israel Defence Forces in Gaza. The Government made clear that, in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities, it would suspend these licences as a precautionary step.<sup>471</sup>

400. As a result of Israel's military campaign in Gaza the Government announced on 4 August 2014 that it would review arms export licences to Israel granted to British companies to ensure they were not being used for internal repression or to provoke further conflict.<sup>472</sup> On 7 August 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary requesting information about the review of UK arms exports to Israel. The text of the letter was as follows:

The Government has stated that it is reviewing its approved arms export licences to Israel.

Please could you tell me by what date you expect this review to be completed both for exports on the Military List and on the Dual-Use List.

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<sup>468</sup> Cm8935, pp 69–70

<sup>469</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 137

<sup>470</sup> Cm8935, p 70

<sup>471</sup> Cm8935, p 60

<sup>472</sup> "Downing Street reviews £8bn arms sales to Israel", *Financial Times*, 4 August 2014

Please could you confirm that the Committees on Arms Export Controls will be informed of the results of this review as soon as Ministers have reached their conclusions.

Finally, please could you in your reply to this letter list all the controlled goods, including components, technologies and software, that have received British Government approval for export to Israel which the Government has reason to believe may have been used by the Israelis in the course of Operation Protective Edge either from within Israel or in Gaza itself.<sup>473</sup>

401. On 12 August the Government announced the result of its review into licensed exports to Israel. The Government announced that it had found that the vast majority of exports currently licensed for Israel were not for items that could be used by Israeli forces in operations in Gaza in response to attacks by Hamas. However, twelve licences had been identified for components which could be part of equipment used by the Israel Defence Forces in Gaza and had been “suspended as a precautionary step”. The Government stated that it would continue to monitor closely the situation in Israel and Gaza, and if existing licences were found to be no longer consistent with the criteria, those licences would be revoked.<sup>474</sup> The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary on 14 August 2014 as follows:

Following your statement on August 12 that the Government would suspend 12 of its extant arms export licences to Israel in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities, please could you identify which are the 12 extant licences to which you were referring within the list of the 470 extant licences to Israel that you detailed in your reply to me of 12 May 2014.<sup>475</sup>

402. The Foreign Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees on 19 August 2014 (attaching the Press Release announcing the results of the review) as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 7 August about the Government’s review of extant licences for Israel.

I am sure you appreciate that this is a complex and delicate issue and I have considered it carefully in the context of our obligations under the EU and National Export Licensing Criteria in order to ensure that the Criteria are applied rigorously and appropriately.

The situation in Gaza is unpredictable and there have been several points at which it seemed that a ceasefire might be possible. Although none of these has yet led to a lasting cessation of hostilities, we now have another in place that should be given every chance of success.

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<sup>473</sup> Ev w175 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Philip Hammond dated 7 August 2014

<sup>474</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Press Notice, *Government announces findings of review of licensed exports to Israel*, 12 August 2014

<sup>475</sup> Ev w175 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 14 August 2014



Officials have scrutinised extant licences and identified those relating to items most likely to be part of equipment used by the Israeli Defence Forces in Gaza. In making this assessment, officials have judged it unlikely that many of the components that were the subject of extant licences were for incorporation into systems that would be likely to be used offensively in Gaza, for example: imaging cameras or decoy and counter-measures.

However, 12 licences have been identified (8 for items to be incorporated into equipment manufactured in the US and Germany, and 4 for items to be exported directly to Israel) where, in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities, and on the basis of information currently available to us, there could be a risk that the items might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law. Therefore, the Government has concluded that, in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities, these 12 licences should be suspended.

Whilst the Government is committed to full and open provision of information to the CAEC, I would ask you to consider and respect the extreme sensitivities of the current situation and understand that I am not willing to release the list of licences for possible suspension at this stage. Should suspension become necessary, the Government will then release the list to the CAEC.

The findings of the review are summarised in the attached press release which issued from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills on 12 August.

#### Attached Press Release

#### GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES FINDINGS OF REVIEW OF LICENSED EXPORTS TO ISRAEL (12 August 2014)

The government has today announced the findings of a review of licensed exports to Israel. It has found that the vast majority of exports currently licensed for Israel are not for items that could be used by Israeli forces in operations in Gaza in response to attacks by Hamas.

Twelve licences have now been identified for components which could be part of equipment used by the Israel Defence Forces in Gaza. Currently there is a ceasefire in place and the government continues to urge both sides to respect this and to secure a lasting end to hostilities through the negotiations taking place in Cairo. However, in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities, the government is concerned that it would not be able to clarify if the export licence criteria are being met. It would therefore suspend these licences as a precautionary step.

The Business Secretary Vince Cable said:

“We welcome the current ceasefire in Gaza and hope that it will lead to a peaceful resolution. However the UK government has not been able to clarify if the export licence criteria are being met. In light of that uncertainty we have taken the decision to suspend these existing export licences in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities.

“No new licences of military equipment have been issued for use by the Israeli Defence Force during the review period and as a precautionary measure this approach will continue until hostilities cease.

The UK aims to have one of the most rigorous and transparent export licence regimes in the world with strict criteria governing the provision of licences. In the event of the renewal of significant hostilities, the government’s concern is that it may not have sufficient information to determine whether the licence assessment criteria have been contravened, for example, whether a serious violation of international humanitarian law has occurred and whether equipment containing UK components has been used. It therefore would suspend licences while it establishes more information.

The government continues to monitor closely the situation in Israel and Gaza, and if existing licences are found to be no longer consistent with the criteria, those licences will be revoked.

The priority remains lasting peace in the region that allows both Israelis and Palestinians to live alongside one another securely and peacefully. The UK government will continue to work closely with colleagues in the EU and the US to help achieve this.<sup>476</sup>

The Business Secretary, Vince Cable, replied to the Chairman of the Committees’ letter on 3 September as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 14 August asking me to identify the 12 licences to be suspended should there be a resumption of significant hostilities in Gaza.

The Government is committed to full and open provision of information to the Committees as far as we possibly can. We do not feel it would be right at this stage to give public exposure to the licences. Should suspension become necessary, the Government will provide the list of licences to the Committees.

You should also be aware that we have received a request for disclosure of this information from Leigh Day & Co. solicitors acting on behalf of Campaign Against the Arms Trade, which we are treating as a request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, and two separate requests for disclosure under the Act. We have not yet reached a decision in these cases if we decide we must disclose the information under the Act then I will of course also provide it to the Committees.<sup>477</sup>

403. Following the Oral Evidence session on 1 December 2014, when again the Committees requested further details of the 12 export licences that were cited in the statement of 12 August, the Business Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees on 15 December providing the information about these licences that the Committees had requested on 14 August as follows:

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<sup>476</sup> Ev w176 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 19 August 2014

<sup>477</sup> Ev w183 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 3 September 2014

### Israel licences

Annex B provides information on the twelve export licences for Israel that were cited in our statement of 12 August 2014 concerning our review of licensed exports to Israel, which was undertaken at the time of the recent Israel./Gaza conflict. The Committees requested this information initially in its letter of 14 August 2014, and reiterated this in the evidence session. The Committees may wish to note that the information on extant licences provided by the ECO in May, which was cited in your letter of 14 August 2014 and in the evidence session, covered direct exports to Israel. Of the twelve licences listed in Annex A, four licences are for direct export to Israel. The additional eight were issued for other countries (in this case USA and Germany) but are included in the list as Israel is noted in those cases as a third party ultimate end-user.<sup>478</sup>

### Annex B

Application Type	Country Outcome (Direct Export)	Goods Summary	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military aero-engines	3187.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	16000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	18000

Application Type	Country Outcome (For Incorporation)	Goods Summary	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	Germany	components for military radars	6210
SIEL (Permanent)	United States	technology for military aero-engines, technology for naval engines	100
SIEL (Permanent)	United States	components for combat aircraft	49797.6
SIEL (Permanent)	Germany	components for military radars	6831
SIEL (Permanent)	Germany	components for tanks	330000
SIEL (Permanent)	United States	components for military radars	2388.44
SIEL (Permanent)	United States	components for combat aircraft	45000
SIEL (Permanent)	United States	launching/handling/control equipment for munitions	104000

404. UK Working Group (UKWG) in its Written Evidence expressed concerns regarding arms exports to Israel during the recent crisis in Gaza. It believed that the Government had not followed its own existing export licensing criteria, including its obligations under Articles 6 and 7 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). In UKWG's view, these obligations were clear, and required the UK not to supply military equipment where there was a clear risk

<sup>478</sup> Ev w220 – letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 15 December 2014

that such equipment might be used in the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including violence against women and children.<sup>479</sup>

405. UKWG continued by stating that:

While details of these specific licences have not been published to date, the UK has licensed a range of military equipment to Israel, including components for air-to-surface missiles and surface-to-surface missiles, combat aircraft, military combat vehicles, unmanned air vehicles, combat naval vessels, targeting equipment and electronic warfare equipment, small arms ammunition and sniper rifles, military aero engines and targeting equipment. In this context, it should be noted that previous government investigations have concluded that components of UK origin have almost certainly been used in previous armed attacks by the Israeli military in Gaza. This included components for combat aircraft exported to the US and incorporated into systems that were subsequently re-exported to Israel.<sup>480</sup>

406. The UKWG believed that by linking the suspension of licences to an arbitrary and subjective threshold, such as resumption of “significant hostilities”, the Government had set a fundamentally dangerous and alarming precedent for the future application of UK arms export policy. In doing so, it believed that the Government had essentially re-written existing rules in place which state that “the Government will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression [or] ... in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law.” The phrase “significant hostilities” appeared nowhere in the existing transfer control criteria, nor in any user guides on implementation of criteria that UKWG was aware of currently in use by licensing officials working across the EU. The term “significant hostilities” was not an objective standard recognised by Amnesty International for use in applying human rights considerations to export licensing decisions, nor by the International Committee of the Red Cross in applying similar considerations relating to international humanitarian law. Under Criterion 2 of the existing transfer control guidelines, or Articles 6 and 7 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), Government policy required it to deny any export licences that risk being used for serious human rights violations, or violations of international humanitarian law, including the particular risks associated with violence against women and children. UKWG believed that when assessing the likelihood that UK-supplied equipment could be used, that risk assessment must take into account previous evidence of the use of that (or similar) equipment in previous violations and whether those violations form part of an established pattern. In relation to conflict in Gaza the UKWG thought this threshold had already clearly been reached, which should have triggered an immediate cancelling of all export licences that risked being used in the conflict.<sup>481</sup>

407. In the Oral Evidence session on 10 November 2014 Oliver Sprague, Amnesty International, said that there was concern about a number of statements made by the Government relating to arms exports, which, he said, was “a worrying departure from the rules as we had known them”<sup>482</sup> He went on to say that: “[...], using a phrase like “a

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<sup>479</sup> Ev w87

<sup>480</sup> Ev w87

<sup>481</sup> Ev w88–89

<sup>482</sup> Q 1

resumption of significant hostilities” in some ways rides a coach and horses through the previous understanding of a preventive approach based on clear risk.”<sup>483</sup>

408. It was reported on 23 November that Ministers in the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) had ordered a fresh review of military export licences to Israel. The report stated that the announcement of the review came after campaigners had begun proceedings in the High Court to challenge the Government’s decision not to suspend the 12 licences previously identified for “components that could be part of equipment used by the Israel defence Forces in Gaza.” The report also stated that: “BIS [...] wanted to consider ‘new information’ concerning the issue [...]”.<sup>484</sup>

409. When the Committees, in the Oral Evidence session on 1 December 2014, questioned the Business Secretary about the process the Government had taken in reviewing arms export licences to Israel Vince Cable said:

When the fighting broke out, it was very clear that issues of arms licensing would occur. An investigation was initiated into what equipment was involved. I think, in parenthesis, it is important to explain that our trade with Israel does not consist of selling tanks or aircraft to their defence services. Much of it covered by the licensing regime consists of the supply chains of complex electronic equipment. Because Israel is a very high-tech exporter, British companies are involved with those supply chains, so it is not a straightforward matter.

There was an investigation undertaken into, as you say, 400-plus items. Of those, it was identified that 40 could conceivably or potentially be used in a way that would be against the consolidated criteria in the Gaza conflict. Of those 40, 12 were identified as potentially presenting a risk. That is why the action was subsequently taken. That is the numerical explanation.<sup>485</sup>

410. When the Committees then asked the Business Secretary about the phrase “in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities” not appearing in any existing transfer control criteria or in any user guidance he replied: “I think that that is a question you will have to put to the Foreign Secretary, because it came from his judgment. As you know, I do not run my own foreign or defence policy; we rely on the Foreign Office for advice on judgment of military situations, and he advised us that that would be an appropriate criteria.”<sup>486</sup> When it was pointed out that it was the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills that had responsibility for issuing arms export licences the Business Secretary replied: “We rely on the Foreign Office for advice on the political, human rights and conflict elements within it.”<sup>487</sup> When the Foreign Secretary was questioned in the same Oral Evidence session about where the phrase “in the event of a resumption of significant

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<sup>483</sup> Q 21

<sup>484</sup> “UK approved £7m Israeli arms sales in six months before Gaza conflict”, *The Independent*, 23 November 2014

<sup>485</sup> Q 98

<sup>486</sup> Q 101

<sup>487</sup> Q 102

hostilities” had originated, he replied: “The Foreign Secretary provides advice to the Business Secretary, who makes the decision [...] That is the legal position.”<sup>488</sup>

The Foreign Secretary added:

The Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary provide advice. Export licensing decisions are made by the Business Secretary; he is the Secretary of State as provided for in the legislation. However, I am not seeking to hide behind that. I provide advice, and I will tell you how we arrived at the expression of that advice. The question of this came in the aftermath of Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, when we reviewed the extant licences and identified 12 licences that relate to technology or items that we believe might give rise, in the circumstances of renewed conflict, to a concern about their use in contravention of criterion 2c—the international humanitarian law criterion. Unless and until there is a resumption of significant hostility, we do not judge that the items delivered under those 12 licences give rise to that concern. If there was a context of a significant hostility, we judge that the precautionary principle would apply and the licences should be suspended.

The issue is, where licences are extant and there is only turbulence in the situation and changing facts on the ground, we would expect to regularly review whether any of the consolidated criteria were engaged. In this case, we were under pressure to set out our views about these 12 licences. We have, gratuitously—there is no obligation on us to do this—expressed in advance what we think the situation would be. We have identified 12 licences and said that if a set of circumstances on the ground were to arise—that is, there were to be a resumption of significant hostility—the advice that I would expect to give to the Business Secretary in those circumstances is that it would be appropriate to suspend those 12 licences. We have provided a forewarning of the advice that would likely be delivered in those circumstances.<sup>489</sup>

411. On 2 February 2015 the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, tabled a Written Parliamentary Question as follows:

To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, for what reason the value of extant standard individual export licences to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories fell from £7.9 billion, as stated in his letter of 12 May 2014 to the Rt hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling, to £93 million, as stated in his letter of 15 December 2014 to the same Rt hon. Member.

The Minister of State, Matthew Hancock, answered on 9 February as follows:

The difference is accounted for by one licence, to the value of £7.7 billion, which was surrendered unused by the exporter in August 2014 and therefore ceased to be extant.<sup>490</sup>

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<sup>488</sup> Q 169

<sup>489</sup> Qq 169-170

<sup>490</sup> HC Deb, 9 February 2015, WPQ 222938

On 10 February, the Chairman of the Committees, tabled a further Written Question as follows:

To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, pursuant to the Answer of 9 February 2015 to Question 222938, regarding the standard individual export licence for equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography to the value of £7.7 billion approved by his Department for export to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, what the reasons were for the surrender of that licence by the exporter in August 2014; what role was played by his Department in the surrender of that licence; and what the reasons were for his Department's approval of that licence in the first quarter of 2013 when it was then surrendered unused by the exporter 18 months later.

The Minister of State, Matthew Hancock, answered on 23 February as follows:

Exporters are not obliged to give reasons for surrendering licences. This was a purely commercial decision by the company and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills played no part in the decision to surrender the licence.

As is the case with all applications, this application was assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria in the usual way, taking into account the nature of the goods and the intended end-use. The application was for electronic components and circuit boards, which are specifically designed for building mobile phone networks for public use. The proposed export did not breach any of the Criteria and therefore the licence was granted.<sup>491</sup>

**412. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories for anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour, components for equipment employing cryptography, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for small arms ammunition, components for unmanned air vehicles, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for military electronic equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military combat vehicles, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights, general military vehicle components, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military helmets, small arms ammunition, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for military communications equipment, technology for small arms ammunition, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography,**

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<sup>491</sup> HC Deb, 23 February 2015, WPQ 224113

technology for the use of weapon sights and technology for unmanned air vehicles are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: One, Two, Three and Four.

413. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) the reasons why it decided to provide the Committees in the Business Secretary's reply of 15 December 2014 with the information for which the Committees had asked about the 12 arms export licences the Government had approved for Israel where, in the Government's own words, "in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities, and on the basis of information currently available to us, there could be a risk that the items might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law", when the Business Secretary and the Foreign Secretary had previously refused to provide the Committees with this same information 4 months earlier in August 2014. The information concerned is set out immediately below:

Application Type	Country Outcome (Direct Export)	Goods Summary	Total Goods Value (£)
<b>SIEL (Permanent)</b>	<b>Israel</b>	<b>components for military aero-engines</b>	<b>3187.50</b>
<b>SIEL (Permanent)</b>	<b>Israel</b>	<b>components for targeting equipment</b>	<b>16000.00</b>
<b>SIEL (Permanent)</b>	<b>Israel</b>	<b>components for targeting equipment</b>	<b>30000.00</b>
<b>SIEL (Permanent)</b>	<b>Israel</b>	<b>components for targeting equipment</b>	<b>18000.00</b>

Application Type	Destination country for incorporation before export to Israel	Goods Summary	Total Goods Value (£)
<b>SIEL (Permanent)</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>components for military radars</b>	<b>6210.00</b>
<b>SIEL (Permanent)</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>technology for military aero-engines, technology for naval engines</b>	<b>100.00</b>
<b>SIEL (Permanent)</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>components for combat aircraft</b>	<b>49797.60</b>
<b>SIEL (Permanent)</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>components for military radars</b>	<b>6831.00</b>
<b>SIEL (Permanent)</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>components for tanks</b>	<b>330000.00</b>
<b>SIEL (Permanent)</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>components for military radars</b>	<b>2388.44</b>
<b>SIEL (Permanent)</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>components for combat aircraft</b>	<b>45000.00</b>
<b>SIEL (Permanent)</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>launching/handling/control equipment for munitions</b>	<b>104000.00</b>

- b) whether the Government considers there could be a risk that the UK components, technology and equipment in the 12 weapons systems in the table



above might already have been used “in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law” in Gaza.

414. With regard to the Government’s approval in the first quarter of 2013 of a licence for the export to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories of equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography to the value of £7.7 billion, the Committees conclude that it is regrettable that the Government has not been more forthcoming as to why the exporter took the unprecedented step of surrendering in August 2014 an export licence of this magnitude granted to one of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s top 28 Countries of Human Rights Concern within 18 months of it receiving Government approval. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) whether the export licence application to export to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography to the value of £7.7 billion was put to Ministers for approval and, if not, whether such licence applications will be put to Ministers in future;
- b) whether it is its policy to encourage exporters to surrender approved licences, both SIELs and OIELs, that they no longer intend to use rather than wait until they become time-expired;
- c) whether, in order to see that any appropriate lessons are learnt, the Government has now established from the exporter in question the reason for its surrender of its unused £7.7 billion export licence 18 months after it received Government approval; and
- d) what changes it will be making to its export control procedures in the light of the surrender of this unused £7.7 billion export licence 18 months after it received Government approval.

### **Libya**

415. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of arms exports to Libya is described at paragraphs 468–471 of the Chairman’s Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees’ 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees’ Recommendation is at paragraph 139 of Volume I of that Report.

416. The Committees’ Recommendation on Libya in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government’s Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Libya for anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of pistols,

hand grenades, military combat vehicles, military support vehicles, pistols, small arms ammunition, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three, Four, and Seven.<sup>492</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that the currently extant licences for Libya are compliant with the Consolidated Criteria. Due to the political and security issues in Libya, we assess all licences for the Libyan Government robustly and do not approve licences for the Libyan Government for goods with internal repression, internal tension and diversion concerns unless we have confirmed through the correct Libyan Government channels that the Government placed the order, is expecting receipt and can secure the goods. However, as was shown in Ukraine, circumstances can and do change rapidly, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same Criteria. In such cases, the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.<sup>493</sup>

417. In the Committees' questions to the Government on its quarterly information on arms export licences for April–June 2014 the Committees requested more information about why SIELs for body armour, military helmets, civil body armour and components for body armour to Libya had been refused. The Government replied:

As indicated in the Quarterly Report, the licences under reference were refused under Consolidated Criteria 1, 2, 3, 4, 7. This was because the exporter did not provide sufficient information or assurances over potential ultimate recipients or end use.

We were therefore unable to determine whether these goods were going to be exported to credible Government end users in Libya and so could be stored securely and used appropriately.

In addition, we determined the SIEL for body armour and military helmets wasn't a legitimate order and that the end-user undertaking was a forgery.<sup>494</sup>

**418. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Libya for anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, hand grenades, military helmets, military support vehicles, pistols, small arms ammunition, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, smooth-**

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<sup>492</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 139

<sup>493</sup> Cm8935, pp 70–71

<sup>494</sup> See Annex 1

bore weapons, software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment and technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: One, Two, Three, Four and Seven.

419. I also propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what action the Government and the Crown Prosecution Service have taken in relation to the licence applicant who submitted the application for the export to Libya of body armour and military helmets that the Export Control Organisation determined in April–June 2014 was not a legitimate order and that the end-user undertaking was a forgery, and, if no action has been taken, the reason why not.

### *Russia*

420. Following the events in Ukraine on 18 March 2014 the then Foreign Secretary, William Hague, announced in the House of Commons that the Government was suspending arms exports licences to Russia.<sup>495</sup> The Export Control Organisation (ECO) subsequently issued a Notice to Exporters announcing that it had suspended a number of licences for incorporation in third countries of military and dual-use goods exported from the UK before subsequently being exported to Russia.<sup>496</sup>

421. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Russia is described at paragraphs 472–474 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 140 of Volume I of that Report.

422. The Committees' Recommendation on Russia in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved and still extant arms export licences to Russia valued at £132 million, including for body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun mountings, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, weapon night sights and weapon sights are currently compliant with

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<sup>495</sup> HC Deb, 18 March 2014, col 658

<sup>496</sup> Export Control Organisation, Notice to Exporters 2014/06: UK suspends all licences and licence applications for export to Russian military that could be used against Ukraine. *Export Control Organisation*, 18 March 2014

the following Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three, and Four.<sup>497</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government rigorously applies the Consolidated Criteria in assessing all licence applications. In respect of Russia, on 18 March 2014, the Government suspended export licencing and extant licences for exports of military and dual-use items destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine; and suspended licences for exports to third countries for incorporation into equipment for export to Russia where there is a clear risk that the end product will be used against Ukraine. It also removed Russia from three OGELs. The Government has agreed a robust set of EU measures against Russia, including an arms embargo and restrictive measures on the export of dual-use goods to the Russian military and military end-users. The European Council's decision and EU Regulations announced on 31 July 2014 secured this outcome. The EU embargo supersedes the UK's unilateral measures announced in March 2014. The Government welcomes the new EU measures which go beyond our suspension and is implementing the new EU sanctions in full. As a result, as of 10 September 2014, the Government has revoked the 26 suspended SIELs and added Russia to the list of non-permitted destinations for nine OGELs. We have removed Russia from 50 OIELs and revoked 7 OIELs which breach the terms of the EU sanctions. Further EU sanctions were announced on 12 September and these are now being implemented. This was explained in the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Chairman of the Committees of 20 August 2014.<sup>498</sup>

423. The Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, on 21 July 2014 requesting information about the suspension and revocation of arms export licences to Russia. The text of the letter was as follows:

On the World At One yesterday, you said that the UK's arms exports to Russia is something we must look at.

In his reply of 12 May to my letter to him of 10 April, the Business Secretary stated that as at May 2014 there were 285 Government approved extant arms export licences to Russia, and that those which were Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) were valued at £131.5 million. The Government does not provide values for Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) because of their open nature.

Your predecessor, William Hague, stated in the House on 18 March: "The UK will now, with immediate effect, suspend all extant licences and application processing for licences for direct export to Russia for military and dual-use items destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine. We will also suspend licences for exports to third countries for incorporation into equipment for export to Russia where there is a clear risk that the end product will be used against Ukraine."

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<sup>497</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 140

<sup>498</sup> Cm8935, p 71

On 24 April I wrote to William Hague asking for details of all licence suspensions, and of any subsequent revocations or re-instatements, to Russia in the period 10 March 2014 to the present.

The information I received from the Business Secretary in his reply to me of 14 May, and which is published in full in our 2014 Report, at Ev 218 of Volume II, showed that of the 285 extant licences to Russia only a relatively small number, 34, had been suspended, revoked or re-issued without Russia.

Please could you state in your reply:

1. Whether the Government will be suspending, revoking or re-issuing without Russia all or some of the remaining extant arms export licences to Russia. If so, please provide the details in the same format as in Annex 4, “Licences Suspended for Russia” of the Business Secretary’s reply of 14 May.
2. Whether the Government will be suspending the processing of all applications for arms export licences to Russia regardless of whether the military or dual-use items concerned could be or are being deployed against Ukraine. If so, please state what conditions Russia will have to fulfil for the UK Government’s suspension of the processing of arms export licence applications to Russia to be lifted.
3. What specific steps the UK Government is taking to persuade NATO and EU Member States to adopt the same policies on arms exports to Russia as the UK.<sup>499</sup>

The Chairman of the Committees also wrote to the Prime Minister on 23 July 2014 requesting information about the Government’s policy on arms exports to Russia. The text of the letter was as follows:

I should be grateful for your clarification of what is now the Government’s policy on arms exports to Russia following the answers you gave to 2 questions after your statement on Ukraine (Flight MH17) and Gaza in the House of Commons on 21 July.

In your reply to Harriet Harman you said: “It is time to start to go into the tier 3 sanctions. For instance, future military sales from any country in Europe should not be going ahead. We have already stopped them from Britain.” (Col. 1153).

In your reply to Liam Fox you said: “On the issue of defence equipment, we already unilaterally said – as did the US – that we would not sell further arms to Russia.” (Col 1156).

Please could you tell me in the light of your replies:

- a) whether all, or only some, of the UK Government’s approved 285 extant arms export licences to Russia (as detailed in Evidence pages 498–510 of

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<sup>499</sup> Ev w164 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Control to Philip Hammond dated 21 July 2014

Volume II of our Report published today) have now been revoked, suspended, or re-issued without Russia as a permitted destination;

- b) if only some, what is the Government's policy for deciding which of these 285 extant licences should be revoked, suspended or re-issued without Russia as a permitted destination, and which should be left extant; and
- c) again, if only some, please could you state precisely – licence-by-licence – which of these 285 extant arms export licences have been revoked, suspended or re-issued without Russia as a permitted destination, and which not.

Please could you also tell me:

- a) whether the Government has now suspended all, or only some, application processing of licences for direct export to Russia of military and dual-use items, and of licences for exports to third countries of military and dual-use goods for incorporation into equipment for indirect export to Russia; and
- b) if only some, what is the Government's policy for deciding which new licence applications for direct or indirect military and dual-use exports to Russia should be processed or not.

Finally, in the debate on Ukraine on 18 March this year, the then Foreign Secretary, William Hague, announced the Government's policy on the export of military and dual-use items to Russia as follows:

“We believe that in the current circumstances there is a compelling case for EU member states to act on defence export licences. The UK will now, with immediate effect, suspend all extant licences and application processing for licences for direct export to Russia for military and dual-use items destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine. We will also suspend licences for exports to third countries for incorporation into equipment for export to Russia where there is a clear risk that the end product will be used against Ukraine. All such licences were reviewed following the Prime Minister's statement on 10 March, and so we are able to act immediately. We encourage other European nations to take similar action.” (Col 658).

Please could you tell me whether there has been any change of this policy. If so, what is the change of policy, and what was the date on which that change of policy took place.<sup>500</sup>

The Foreign Secretary replied to both of the above letters on 19 August as follows:

Thank you for your letters of 21 July to me and 23 July to the Prime Minister about the Government's policy on arms exports to Russia. This reply will address all the issues raised in both letters.

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<sup>500</sup> Ev w165 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Control to David Cameron dated 23 July 2014

1. You asked me:

“whether the Government will be suspending, revoking or re-issuing without Russia all or some of extant export licences for Russia. If so, please provide the details in the same format as in Annex 4, “Licences Suspended for Russia” of the Business Secretary’s reply of 14 May”.

And you asked the Prime Minister:

“a) whether all, or only some, of the UK Government’s approved 285 extant arms export licences to Russia (as detailed in Evidence pages 498–510 of Volume II of our Report published today) have now been revoked, suspended, or re-issued without Russia as a permitted destination.”

b) if only some, what is the Government’s policy for deciding which of these 285 extant licences should be revoked, suspended or re-issued without Russia as a permitted destination, and which should be left extant;”

c) again, if only some, please could you state precisely – licence-by-licence – which of these 285 extant arms export licences have been revoked, suspended or re-issued without Russia as a permitted destination, and which not.”

On 31 July the European Union adopted restrictive measures (sanctions) against Russia, including an arms embargo (applying to import and export) and a prohibition on the export of dual-use equipment to Russia for military use or for military end-users, and on the provision of related services. These measures are set out in Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014, which came into force on 1 August. I attach copies of both for ease of reference.

The Government has decided that the EU embargo will supersede its national suspension of licences, announced on 18 March by my predecessor, both for clarity of application, but also because we took national action in the absence of concerted EU measures. We welcome the new EU measures which go beyond our suspension.

As a result, the Government has revoked 25 extant licences that were previously suspended under the UK national measures announced on 18 March (note: 28 licences were originally suspended, but 3 expired during the period of suspension). Officials are working through the remaining extant licences to bring all licences for Russia in line with the EU restrictive measures. Once this work is complete, my officials will provide the Committees with a further update.

In addition, on 12 May one Standard Individual Export Licence for components for combat helicopters was revoked. On 13 June, prior to the Farnborough Air Show, the Government removed Russia from the Open General Export Licence (Military Goods: for Demonstration). This meant that all military goods exhibited by Russia at the event would require a Standard Individual Export Licence in order to be returned to Russia. On 14 August, the Government removed Russia as a permitted destination for the following Open General Licences:

- Access Overseas to Software and Technology for Military Use

- Historic Military Goods
- Military Surplus Vehicles
- International Non–Proliferation Regime Decontrol: Military Items
- Military and Dual–Use Goods: UK Forces deployed in non–embargoed destinations
- Transshipment Licence (Sporting Guns)
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Category C Goods)
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Trade and Transshipment: Small Arms and Light Weapons)
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Maritime Anti–Piracy)

The Notice to Exporters announcing these changes above is available on the gov.uk website.

The EU sanctions provide exemptions for transactions which concern “the execution of an obligation arising from a contract or an agreement concluded before 1 August”. There is also an exemption for the “provision of spare parts and services necessary to the maintenance and safety of existing capabilities within the EU”. Anyone seeking to take advantage of these exemptions will have to submit a new licence application to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. Any such applications will be assessed against EU Council Regulation 833/2014 and, in the case of exports, the EU and National Consolidated Criteria.

2. You asked me:

“Whether the Government will be suspending the processing of all applications for arms export licences to Russia regardless of whether the military or dual–use items concerned could be or are being deployed against Ukraine. If so, please state what conditions Russia will have to fulfil for the UK Government’s suspension of the processing of arms export licence applications to Russia to be lifted.

And you asked the Prime Minister:

a) whether the Government has now suspended all, or only some, application processing of licences for direct export to Russia of military and dual–use items, and of licences for exports to third countries of military and dual–use goods for incorporation into equipment for indirect export to Russia; and

b) if only some, what is the Government’s policy for deciding which new licence applications for direct or indirect military and dual–use exports to Russia should be processed or not.

Finally, you asked the Prime Minister (and I paraphrase) whether there has been any change of the policy outlined in the (then) Foreign Secretary’s announcement on 18



March this year during the debate on Ukraine, and “If so, what is the change of policy, and what was the date on which that change of policy took place”.

With respect to the Government’s policy on applications for export licences to Russia, the EU restrictive measures adopted on 31 July supersede the UK national measures announced on 18 March. All new licence applications are being assessed against EU Council Regulation 833/2014 and the EU and National Consolidated Criteria. The Council Decision requires constant review, and “shall be renewed, or amended as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met.” The Council Decision also makes clear that the restrictive measures will be reviewed no later than 31 October 2014.

The Government has condemned Russian action against Ukraine, and continues to urge the Russian Government to desist from its policies to destabilise Ukraine and support separatists in the East. The EU restrictive measures adopted on 31 July are designed to impose a cost on Russia for its behaviour, and encourage it to change course; to stop fuelling the conflict and to engage constructively with Ukraine and the international community, including stopping the flow of weapons across the Russian border into Ukraine.

Finally, you asked me:

“What specific steps the UK Government is taking to persuade NATO and EU Member States to adopt the same policies on arms exports to Russia as the UK”.

Since the introduction of the UK suspension of exports of military and dual-use items to the Russian military on 18 March, the UK has been at the forefront of efforts to persuade its EU Partners to agree a robust set of measures against Russia (the so-called Tier III measures), including an arms embargo and restrictive measures on the export of dual-use goods to the Russian military and military end-users. The European Council’s Decision and EU Regulation announced on 31 July secured this outcome.

With respect to action within NATO, the Government’s focus has been on securing a robust set of binding EU measures – largely economic and trade-related, focused on defence, finance and energy – where we have judged the levers of influence over Russian behaviour are strongest. NATO is playing a supportive role in this respect. The Government is, of course, in close touch with the US Government, which has taken similar measures against Russia to those introduced by the EU on 31 July. The Government will continue to align its approach to Russia closely with the US. Non-EU countries including EU candidate countries, countries of the EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process, EFTA countries, and members of the EEA are encouraged to associate themselves with the Council Decision. Some, such as Norway, have announced that they are likely to do so; we expect other countries to follow suit.<sup>501</sup>

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<sup>501</sup> Ev w178 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 19 August 2014

424. UK Working Group (UKWG) stated in its Written Evidence that it had questioned the Government regarding one still-extant OIEL for transfers to Russia. The licence permitted the transfer to Russia of the following equipment:

Aircraft cannons, components for air launched rockets, components for air-to-air missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft carriers, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for command communications control and intelligence software, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for depth charges, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for machine guns, components for military aero-engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval guns, components for naval mines, components for periscopes, components for sensor integration equipment, components for submarines, components for surface launched rockets, components for surface-to-surface missiles, components for targeting equipment, components for torpedoes, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, machine guns, military aero-engines, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval engines, naval guns, technology for air launched rockets, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for depth charges, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for machine guns, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military radars, technology for torpedoes and torpedoes.<sup>502</sup>

UKWG stated that in response to enquiries, a Government spokesperson had explained that this licence was for transfers of items exclusively for the use of “the Brazilian navy

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<sup>502</sup> Ev w96

which enables their vessels to be repaired in 23 countries around the world, including Russia.”<sup>503</sup>

425. On 23 July 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, requesting more information regarding end-user information of extant arms export licences to Russia. The letter was as follows:

In your letter to me of 12 May 2014 you provide the information I had requested about the extant arms export licences to each of the Government’s 28 Countries of Human Rights Concern, one of which is Russia. Your reply gave details of the 285 licences to Russia that were extant in May. Those details are reproduced at Evidence pages 498–510 in Volume II of the Committees’ Report published today.

In view of the concern about British Government arms exports to Russia, I should be grateful if you would re-submit the details of the 285 arms export licences to Russia that were extant in May adding an extra column stating the end-user for each licence. You will remember that you also provided this information to the Committees in respect of the licences approved for the export of dual-use chemicals to Syria.<sup>504</sup>

The Business Secretary replied to this letter on 10 September as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 23 July.

We previously agreed terms of disclosure of licence information on a confidential basis (company names relating to Syria chemicals) and, I think it would be appropriate to explore the possibility of disclosure on a confidential basis again, in response to your request for names of end-users relating to the licences for exports to Russia. If the terms of disclosure on this basis remain unchanged, I would be happy to proceed in this way.

If you agree, the names of the end-users will be provided in relation to the Standard Individual Export licences only because end-users are not specified on Open Individual Export Licences.

Please be aware that we are currently assessing which licences are not consistent with the terms of the EU sanctions and those licences that are not have been or will shortly be revoked where the exemption for pre-existing contracts does not apply.

Finally, please note that we have identified one licence that was suspended (date of suspension 18 march 2014) at the time of my original response to you. This licence was subsequently revoked on 6 August. This licence is listed at line 2381 in the spreadsheet that was provided to you on 12 May. It was for the supply of focal plane arrays with a total value of £96000.<sup>505</sup>

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<sup>503</sup> ‘UK arms export licences for Russia still in place despite claims of embargo—report’, The Guardian, 23 July 2014

<sup>504</sup> Ev w166 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 23 July 2014

<sup>505</sup> Ev w184 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 10 September 2014

426. In response to the Business Secretary's letter of 10 September 2014 the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, raised the issue of the reluctance of the Business Secretary to supply the Committees with the names of the end-users for extant arms exports to Russia in the Westminster Hall Debate on 30 October. He stated:

[...] I wrote to the Business Secretary to ask him for the stated end user of each of the 285 extant arms export licences to Russia. Disappointingly, he refused to give the Committees that information unless we agreed not to make it public. I see no justification for imposing that condition on the Committees. It is hardly in accordance with the Government's supposed commitment to transparency on arms exports, and it raises a significant issue of policy for the Committees and, therefore, the House. The Government already make public the countries to which approved UK arms exports are going, but in many cases we need to know not just the names of the countries, but the end users in those countries. For example, will the end user be a Government body, a Government security authority or a civilian user? That is key information, but at the moment, the Government simply pick and choose when they will disclose the end users. They gave the Committees the end users when we wanted to know who they were in relation to the export of dual-use chemicals to Syria. They told us the end users when we wanted to know who they were for sniper rifles exported to Ukraine. However, they have refused to give us that information for Russia on the basis that it may be made public, and the Committee will want to address that policy issue further.<sup>506</sup>

427. On 20 August 2014 the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees to update the Committees on a change in the Government's policy on arms export licensing for Russia. The text of the letter was as follows:

I am writing to update the Committees on a change in the Government's policy on arms export licensing for Russia.

On 31 July the European Union adopted restrictive measures (sanctions) against Russia, including an arms embargo (applying to import and export) and a prohibition on the export of dual-use equipment to Russia for military use or for military end-users, and on the provision of related services. These measures are set out in Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014, which came into force on 1 August. The UK both welcomes and is bound to apply these measures, which have superseded the national suspension announced by the Foreign Secretary on 18 March this year. Officials carefully reviewed the terms of the embargo alongside those of the suspension and concluded that the embargo goes further than our national measures and therefore negates the need to maintain them.

Officials are now reviewing all remaining extant licences for exports to Russia. Any extant licences that breach the new EU sanctions will be revoked. All new licence applications for Russia will be rigorously assessed against the sanctions measures (under Criterion 1) and all other relevant EU and National Consolidated Criteria. Any new licences which are inconsistent with the Criteria will be refused.

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<sup>506</sup> HC Deb, 30 October 2014, Cols 118–119WH

The Council Decision prohibits the ‘direct or indirect sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related materiel of all types’ to Russia. The UK interprets this prohibition as applying to all items on the UK Military List. The Council Regulation stipulates that it is prohibited ‘to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance related to the goods and technology listed in the Common Military List, or related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of goods included in that list, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia; and ‘to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, dual-use goods and technology, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia, if those items are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for military use or for a military end. Where the end-user is the Russian military, any dual-use goods and technology procured by it shall be deemed to be for military use.’

The Council Decision prohibits EU Member States from inter alia importing, purchasing or transporting weapons, ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and related spares – but with the second exception below.

The new measures contain exceptions for:

- i. An obligation arising from a contract or an agreement concluded before 1 August 2014,
- ii. and to the provision of assistance necessary to the maintenance and safety of existing capabilities within the EU.<sup>507</sup>

428. In the Westminster Hall Debate on the Committees’ last Report (HC 186) on 30 October 2014 several Members raised the issue of arms exports to Russia. The FCO Minister, Tobias Ellwood, in his reply stated:

Our reaction to the events this year in Ukraine provides a good example of our responsiveness and our determination to ensure that UK exports do not contribute to internal repression or external aggression.

Restrictive measures have been put in place against Russia, with a view to increasing the costs of Russian action to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and promoting a peaceful settlement of the crisis. It is worth making a distinction between a collective desire to bring in sanctions, which are themselves an attempt to affect behaviour, and taking action when weapons systems or other equipment that has been sold are used in an oppressive manner. There is a distinction between the two, but they can lead to the same thing, which is the removal of some form of arms exports.

In the absence of agreement among EU partners on taking concerted action against Russia, the UK took the initiative in reacting to the deterioration in events in Ukraine by announcing the national suspension of a number of export licences in March, and that is an example of what I was just talking about. The aim was to restrict exports of

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<sup>507</sup> Ev w181 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 20 August 2014

equipment to the Russian military that could be used in Ukraine. As we did before announcing the action, we encouraged other EU member states to follow suit. The national suspension was superseded by sanctions against Russia, introduced by the EU in July. The package included an arms embargo and prohibitions on the export of certain technologies suited to the oil industry, on the export of dual-use equipment to Russia for military end use, and on the provision of related services.

Further restrictive measures were announced in September in response to Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. In addition, during that period we reviewed existing export licences for Russia and took the decision to revoke 39 standard individual export licences and seven open individual export licences, and to remove Russia as a permitted destination for 50 multi-destination open individual export licences. The Government will continue to monitor conditions in Ukraine and will keep export licensing restrictions under review.<sup>508</sup>

429. Following the debate in Westminster Hall the responding Minister, Tobias Ellwood, wrote to the Chairman of the Committees on 13 November 2014 providing further information relating to export licensing restrictions in relation to Russia. The text of the letter was as follows:

It was a pleasure to respond for the Government at the Westminster Hall Debate on 30 October. I committed to revert to you with more information to clarify the extent of the recent export licensing restrictions in relation to Russia.

Restrictive measures have been put in place against Russia with a view to increasing the costs of Russia's action to undermine Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as to promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis. In the absence of agreement among EU Partners to take concerted action against Russia, the UK took the initiative in reacting to the deterioration in events in Ukraine by announcing a national suspension on 18 March. Consequently, the UK suspended all extant licences, and applications for export licences, for direct export to Russia of military and dual-use items destined for units of the Russian armed forces, or other state agencies which could be, or were being, deployed against Ukraine. We also suspended licences for exports to third countries for incorporation into equipment for export to Russia, where there was a clear risk that the end product would be used against Ukraine. In parallel, we encouraged other EU Member States to adopt similar measures against Russia.

As a consequence of this national suspension, twenty-eight Standard Individual Export licences (SIELs) were suspended in March, with a further three suspended in May. I should add that three Open Individual Export licences (OIELs) for Russia were revoked in March, with Russia also removed from three multi-destination OIELs. In May, one additional SIEL was revoked.

The national suspension was superseded by sanctions against Russia introduced by the EU on 31 July. This package included an arms embargo, a prohibition on the export of certain technologies suited to the oil industry, a prohibition on the export

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<sup>508</sup> HC Deb, 30 October 2014, Col 140WH

of dual-use equipment to Russia for military end-use, and on the provision of related services. These measures are set out in Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014, which came into force on 1 August. We welcomed the new EU measures, which the UK was instrumental in bringing about and which go beyond the national suspension.

Of the thirty-one SIELs suspended under the UK national measures detailed above, four licences had expired during the period of suspension and one was voluntarily surrendered by the licensee. One other licence was found to have been fully exhausted. As a result of the EU sanctions, the Government revoked the remaining 22 licences.

Officials then worked through other extant licences to bring all licences for Russia in line with the EU sanctions.

The review of extant licences identified 77 SIELs and one Standard Individual Trade Control Licence (SITCL) for goods falling within the scope of the sanctions, i.e. military goods, or dual-use items for military end-users or military end-use.

There is an exemption in the sanctions for transactions which concern the execution of an obligation arising from a contract or an agreement concluded before 1 August. In order to ensure that only those licences for transactions covered by a contract concluded before 1 August remained extant, the Export Control Organisation wrote to licence holders asking them to: (i) provide evidence of a relevant contract, or (ii) surrender the licence. It was made clear that failure to respond would result in the licence being revoked.

As a result of this exercise, 50 were surrendered (49 SIELs and one SITCL) and 10 were revoked. Two licences expired during this period, and five had been exhausted. The remaining eleven continue to be extant as the licensee was able to provide sufficient evidence of a prior contract.

In addition to this, Russia was removed as a permitted destination from the fifty OIELs and one Open Individual Trade Control Licence (OITCL), and was also removed as a permitted destination from the Cryptography OIEL, which affected fifty-five licences.

No licences for military goods, or dual-use items for military end-use or military end-users, will be granted unless the proposed export meets the terms of the exemptions in the sanctions, namely prior contract as described above or for the maintenance of existing capabilities in the EU. Licences not falling within the scope of the sanctions, i.e. dual-use items for commercial/civil end-uses and end-users, are not affected. New licence applications will continue to be assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria in the usual way.

I hope you find this information useful. Please be assured that the Government will continue to monitor conditions in Ukraine and we will keep export licensing restrictions under review.<sup>509</sup>

430. UK Working Group (UKWG), in its Written Evidence, expressed concerns about licence suspensions and revocations to Russia following developments in the Ukraine. UKWG stated that only 34 licences were suspended out of 333 extant licences. The value of suspended licences was £37million while more than £142 million remained in place. UKWG called for further, more detailed information regarding which licences had been suspended and/or revoked and which had not. It said that the 18 March statement had implied that decisions whether to suspend licences had been taken at least in part on the basis of the identity of the end-user (i.e. licences were suspended for items “destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine”). UKWG considered that it was unclear on what the Government had based its confidence that so many exports to Russia were not at risk of being used in Ukraine. It continued by stating that the Government should provide further information regarding the steps taken by the Government to identify who the (likely) end-user would be for each licence. It also questioned whether the Government was relying on end-use undertakings from Russia, or whether independent assessments had been made. UKWG said that as time and the conflict in Ukraine had progressed, the Government had made it clear that it placed little faith in Russian statements regarding its conduct, for example with regard to the presence of Russian forces in Ukraine and the circumstances of the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines flight MH-17. UKWG believed that the Government should clarify whether this lack of trust had always, and/or now, extended to arms transfer end-use undertakings, and how this might impact upon future arms transfer licensing decisions.<sup>510</sup>

431. The Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, questioned the Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, about the Government’s policy on arms exports to Russia during the Oral Evidence session on 1 December 2014. The Chairman stated:

given the well-established and deeply regrettable Russian track record of expanding its influence territorially, which we have seen in Moldova, Georgia and now Ukraine, plus the fact that Russia is one of the countries of top human rights concern—as designated by your own Department—it would seem that the Government’s arms export policy towards Russia has been extraordinarily lenient and, some might say, reckless.

The Foreign Secretary replied: “our response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea has been pursued essentially through our EU engagement: trade sanctions and other measures, including restrictions on arms exports through the EU.” He continued: “It is very clear to us that we deliver maximum effect against Russia by having solidarity across Europe in responding. Licences that are then covered by the EU measures have now been revoked. For those that were not covered by the EU measures, the suspension has been relaxed, so that we have symmetry across the European Union

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<sup>509</sup> Ev w211 – Letter from Tobias Ellwood to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 13 November 2014

<sup>510</sup> Ev w90–91



countries in their response.”<sup>511</sup> When asked by the Chairman whether this was not yet “another example of shutting the stable door after the arms have bolted” the Foreign Secretary replied:

[...] many of these licences are for components and dual–use items. It is not as if we are by and large exporting completed military systems to a country like Russia. It is important overall, in dealing with our response to Russia, that we calibrate that response. We needed to signal very clear disapproval of Russian behaviour. We needed to signal that Russia will pay a price for that unacceptable behaviour. We also needed to signal that if Russia starts to move into compliance, we will be able to recalibrate our response appropriately and that we have further steps we could take if Russia were to take further unacceptable measures and steps of aggression. That is very important. We have to be very careful that we do not play all the cards in our hand and leave ourselves in a position where further Russian escalation cannot be responded to within the scope of economic and trade sanctions of the type that we have already set out.<sup>512</sup>

432. The Chairman, asked the Foreign Secretary to “reflect further on the distinction you have made between a component of a lethal weapon and a complete lethal weapon.” The Chairman suggested that “a critical component is every bit as much an arms export as a completed item.” The Foreign Secretary replied: “you will recognise that many such components will be dual use. It is often the case that components that are widely used in, for example, cellular telephone systems have military applications and may be subject to licensing because of those military applications. A significant volume of components exported will probably be used in civilian telecommunications, but because there is an application in military use, they will be controlled items none the less.”<sup>513</sup>

433. The Committees asked why the Government Statement on arms export restrictions to Russia, made on 18 March 2014 in which the then Foreign Secretary, William Hague, had stated that the licences would be suspended for “all extant licences and application processing for licences for direct export to Russia for military and dual–use items destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine”<sup>514</sup> and was so limited. The Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, replied:

It is a question of whether it is likely to be. We know what the Russians are doing in Ukraine, and we know how they are providing support to the separatists and the type of support that they are providing, the types of weapons systems involved and the types of Russian forces that have been involved in this conflict, and we can make a judgment on that basis.<sup>515</sup>

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<sup>511</sup> Q 128

<sup>512</sup> Q 129

<sup>513</sup> Q 131

<sup>514</sup> HC Deb, 18 March 2014, Col 658

<sup>515</sup> Q 132

434. In the Oral Evidence session on 1 December 2014 the Foreign Secretary was also asked whether given the increased Russian aggression in the Ukraine and other recent Russian behaviour, the Government should be reviewing its policy on arms exports to Russia again. Philip Hammond replied:

I imagine the Committees will jealously guard the principle that we should use the consolidated criteria when deciding how we should respond to arms export licensing questions. The extremely aggressive probing of our airspace by Russian aircraft is an issue that concerns us, but it does not, in my interpretation, engage any of the consolidated criteria, and therefore it would not be an appropriate use of the arms export licensing regime to respond to a behaviour that we didn't like but that didn't engage the consolidated criteria.<sup>516</sup>

When asked whether the EU and NATO were facing “consolidated Russian offensive against Europe and its interests” and whether NATO and EU countries should have joined-up government internationally the Foreign Secretary replied:

[...] it is entirely appropriate for NATO countries in particular to work together to respond to what is a change in the tone of Russia's dealings with NATO and, indeed, the non-NATO European countries. [...] there is a distinct sense of a resetting of the relationship, and we have to be prepared to respond to that. My point is simply that the application of the consolidated criteria to applications by British businesses for licences to export their products is an established mechanism. Applying it consistently is important, because failure to apply it consistently would almost certainly lead to judicial challenge by companies that feel they have been disadvantaged.<sup>517</sup>

435. When the Foreign Secretary was asked, by the Committees, in the Oral Evidence session held on 1 December, whether the French President should have stated that his decision to suspend the delivery of the Mistral warships to Russia included consideration of the EU Consolidated Criteria, he replied: “The complication in relation to the Mistral contract is that it is a historic contract—a contract already entered into. The European Union sanctions explicitly do not include contracts already extant. They are forward-looking, in terms of new engagements and commitments to supply to Russia.”<sup>518</sup> When asked whether the UK and other European countries should base arms export decisions on EU criteria the Foreign Secretary responded by stating: “In the case of the UK, the European Union guidance is incorporated into our own consolidated criteria. The current set of European Union sanctions against Russia are a specific Foreign Affairs Council-mandated set of sanctions, which include restrictions on arms exports that were put in place specifically in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, and therefore they sit outside the routine evaluation of export licence applications against the criteria. So there is an overriding body of EU law that now applies.” The Foreign Secretary went on to say: “The UK's position now is that, first, we will apply the EU sanctions. If an application for

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<sup>516</sup> Q 133

<sup>517</sup> Q 134

<sup>518</sup> Q 135

licensing is not caught by the EU sanctions, we will then apply the consolidated criteria and make a decision on a case-by-case basis according to the consolidated criteria.”<sup>519</sup>

**436. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Russia for components for military helicopters, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military helicopters, small arms ammunition and software for equipment employing cryptography are currently compliant with the following of the Government’s Arms Export Licensing Criteria: One, Two, Three and Four and with EU sanctions on arms exports to Russia.**

**437. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) **what is now the Government’s policy on the revocation or suspension of the 248 extant Government approved Military and Dual-use goods export licences to Russia valued at £168,536,910 (SIELs only) and on determining new licence applications for Military and Dual-use goods to Russia; and**
- b) **what use has been made by Russian forces, and by those in Ukraine whom Russia is supporting, of UK Government export licence approved weapons, components, technology and software for weapon systems, in military operations in Crimea and in other areas of Ukraine.**

### ***Saudi Arabia***

438. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of arms exports to Saudi Arabia is described at paragraphs 475–478 of the Chairman’s Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees’ 2014 Report (HC 1865), and the Committees’ Recommendation is at paragraph 141 of Volume I of that Report.

439. The Committees’ Recommendation on Saudi Arabia in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government’s Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Saudi Arabia for anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, command communications control and intelligence software, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for body armour, components for ground vehicle communications equipment, components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for sniper rifles, components for weapon sight mounts, crowd control ammunition, cryptographic software, CS hand grenades, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the production of machine guns, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, ground vehicle

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<sup>519</sup> Q 137

communications equipment, gun mountings, gun silencers, hand grenades, military communications equipment, radio jamming equipment, small arms ammunition, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for ground vehicle military communications equipment, software for radio jamming equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, tear gas/irritant ammunition, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criterion: Two.<sup>520</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that the currently extant licences for Saudi Arabia are compliant with the Consolidated Criteria. However, as was shown in Ukraine, circumstances can and do change rapidly, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same Criteria. In such cases, the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

The Government of Saudi Arabia faces a number of security issues, with concerns arising from the fractious regional situation and external sources, and so has a legitimate requirement for this type of equipment in the performance of its sovereign defensive responsibilities.<sup>521</sup>

**440. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Saudi Arabia for anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles, ballistic shields, body armour, command and control vehicles, command communications control and intelligence equipment, command communications control and intelligence software, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for general purpose machine guns, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for military auxiliary/support vehicles, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for sniper rifles, components for submachine guns, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sight mounts, crowd control ammunition, CS hand grenades, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the production for machine guns, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, general military vehicle components, general purpose machine guns, gun mountings, gun silencers, hand grenades, machine guns, machine pistols, military**

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<sup>520</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 141

<sup>521</sup> Cm8935, p 72

communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military helmets, military support vehicles, night vision goggles, pistols, radio jamming equipment, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, simulators for military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, sniper rifles, software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for ground vehicle military communications equipment, software for radio jamming equipment, software for the use of command and control vehicles, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, submachine guns, tear gas/irritant ammunition, technology for command communications control and intelligence software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for the use of command and control vehicles, technology for the use of command communications control and intelligence equipment, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of weapon sight mounts, technology for the use of weapon sights, technology for unmanned air vehicles, technology for weapon night sights, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: Two, Three and Four.

### *Sri Lanka*

441. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Sri Lanka is described at paragraphs 479–484 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraphs 142 of Volume I of that Report.

442. The Committees' Recommendation on Sri Lanka in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Sri Lanka for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, components for rifles, equipment employing cryptography, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing

cryptography, sporting guns and weapons sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One and Two.<sup>522</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, components for rifles, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns and weapon sights were used by PMSCs in counter-piracy operations. In each instance, the PMSCs were all signed up to the International Code of Conduct which helps to mitigate our concerns and ensures that they have the correct procedures in place for the use and storage of all the equipment listed above. We have no evidence that PMSCs have diverted any goods to government agencies or other end-users in Sri Lanka. The equipment was not used in the vicinity of civilians. Therefore, the equipment could not have been used to facilitate internal repression which would cause the UK to breach its International obligations.

The end-users of the equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography were private companies and an educational establishment. The stated end-uses of the equipment include educational and research purposes, facilitation of conference calls, secure communications and transactions. The equipment and software employing cryptography neither inhibits nor intercepts communication. The equipment would not prevent individuals from exercising their right to freedom of expression.<sup>523</sup>

443. In the Westminster Hall Debate on the Committees' last Report (HC 186) held on 30 October 2014 Jeremy Corbyn MP asked the FCO Minister, Tobias Ellwood, if he would give an indication of the "Government's current thinking about the supply of arms to Sri Lanka" and whether the Government was "now planning to resume the sale of equipment to Sri Lanka, or not."<sup>524</sup> In a follow up letter to Jeremy Corbyn MP Tobias Ellwood, the FCO Minister who responded to the debate wrote as follows:

It was a pleasure to respond on behalf of the Government at the Westminster Hall Debate on arms export controls on 30 October. During the debate, you raised your concerns about Sri Lanka, and in particular, asked for an update on the Government's current thinking about the supply of arms to the country.

The Government assesses all export licences to Sri Lanka on a case by case basis in light of the prevailing circumstances, and in accordance with the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. Arms export licensing decisions for Sri Lanka take into account alleged violations of international humanitarian and human rights law during the military conflict which ended in 2009, as well as the nature of the equipment and whether it might be used in a manner inconsistent with the

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<sup>522</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 142

<sup>523</sup> Cm8935, pp 72–73

<sup>524</sup> HC Deb, 30 October 2014, Cols 128–130WH

Criteria. A licence will not be issued where there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression.

Arms exports to Sri Lanka appear to have increased recently, as we have granted a number of licences for weapons and other equipment that will be used by maritime security companies undertaking commercial anti-piracy work. These ongoing efforts to fight piracy are important for international trade and security. Our assessment of these applications has taken into account the fact that the weapons will be held in secure storage whilst in Sri Lanka, and that the companies are signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times.

I must emphasise that these particular licences do not permit supply to the government of Sri Lanka, and we have seen no evidence that this equipment has been diverted for government use.

I trust this information is helpful.<sup>525</sup>

[The Committees' report deals with arms exports for counter-piracy in paragraphs 326–336 above.]

**444. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Sri Lanka for acoustic devices for riot control, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: One and Two.**

## **Syria**

### *Conventional arms exports and gifted equipment*

445. In May 2011 the EU imposed sanctions on Syria. The sanctions included an embargo on the supply of arms, military equipment and equipment that might be used for internal repression. In January and June 2012 further EC Council decisions specified in more detail the items and services banned under the arms embargo. In November 2012 the EU decided to extend restrictive measures until 1 March 2013; these measures were extended for a further three months in February 2013, but eased restrictions on the provision of non-lethal support and technical assistance for the protection of civilians. In April 2013 the EU decided to allow the supply of certain equipment to Syrian opposition forces, such as "non-lethal equipment to the Syrian National Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary

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<sup>525</sup> Ev w214 – Letter from Tobias Ellwood to Jeremy Corbyn dated 13 November 2014

forces when intended for the protection of civilians.<sup>526</sup> A further extension of the EU arms embargo on Syria was prevented by Britain and France.

446. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Syria is described at paragraphs 485–502 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations are at paragraphs 143 to 145 of Volume I of that Report

447. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations on Syria in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the decision of the UK Government, together with the French Government, to end the EU arms embargo on Syria in May 2013 has thus far had no discernible impact on President Assad or on contributing to a peace settlement in Syria.<sup>527</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government lists in its Response the items of equipment, which would be categorized as controlled goods if exported commercially, that have been gifted to Syria during the present Parliament stating in each case:

- a) the quantity;
- b) the recipient to whom it was gifted; and
- c) whether the Government has any information as to whether the item has been on–sold or transferred to a third party, and, if so, the name of the third party.<sup>528</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Syria for body armour, components for all–wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and components for body armour are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three and Four.<sup>529</sup>

**The Government's Response to the three Recommendations above:**

The Government has been supporting the moderate opposition in Syria for two years with the provision of non–lethal equipment. To date, the UK has only provided

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<sup>526</sup> "EU arms embargo on Syria", SIPRI, [http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu\\_arms\\_embargoes/syria\\_LAS/eu-embargo-on-Syria](http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/syria_LAS/eu-embargo-on-Syria)

<sup>527</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 143

<sup>528</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 144

<sup>529</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 145



non-lethal equipment. In 2013, we provided £20 million in support to the Syrian population – search and rescue equipment and training, power generators, communications, support and training to civil administration.

In 2013, the Government gifted three packages of controlled goods for end users in Syria. These were:

- Basic equipment for the detection of chemical weapons (x10,000 units) and 5,000 escape hoods to enable people to escape from an area affected by the use of chemical weapons gifted to the Free Syrian Army
- Non-lethal equipment for a close protection team for a senior member of the moderate Syrian opposition (x 20 sets)
- Armoured vehicles for the protection of UN-OPCW teams working in Syria (x2)

The Government has also approved licences for the commercial export of protective equipment for international NGOs working in Syria, and for the UN Force in the Golan Heights.

Both the packages of equipment that were gifted to end-users in Syria and the commercial exports were assessed against the Consolidated Criteria.<sup>530</sup>

448. When the Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, was asked in the Oral Evidence session on 1 December 2014 whether it was still the Government's policy to gift only non-lethal equipment to opposition groups that were opposing either the Syrian regime or ISIL in Syria, the Foreign Secretary replied "It is." He added:

That is the Government's position. We have made it clear on multiple occasions in Parliament that our decision is that we will not at the present time supply lethal equipment to the Syrian opposition. We supply a range of non-lethal equipment, and we supply them with technical support. We have done quite a lot of work with them on civil policing and on civil defence response in areas of the country which are controlled by the moderate opposition, but we do not supply them with lethal equipment.<sup>531</sup>

When asked whether the Government's policy should change due to the attacks on Syrian opposition groups by ISIL the Foreign Secretary said:

The Government's judgment at the moment is that we do not wish to change that position. There are many others supplying lethal equipment to Syrian opposition fighters. Our judgment at the moment is that the complexities of monitoring and managing the supply of such equipment in such a complex situation on the ground make it something that we would find challenging. We do not feel that there is a

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<sup>530</sup> Cm8935, pp 73–74

<sup>531</sup> Qq 152–153

necessity for this, given the substantial amounts of lethal equipment that are getting through to the Syrian opposition.<sup>532</sup>

**449. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Syria for body armour, components for body armour, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography and military helmets are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: One, Two, Three and Four.**

**450. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what further items which would be categorized as controlled goods if exported commercially, the Government has gifted to end-users in Syria since those listed in its previous Response (Cm8935) stating in each case:**

- a) the quantity;
- b) the recipient to whom it was gifted; and
- c) whether the Government has any information as to whether the item has been on-sold or transferred to a third party

**together with the answer to c), not previously answered by the Government in Cm8935, in relation to the controlled goods listed in paragraph 449 above.**

### *Dual-use chemical exports*

451. The Committees' previous scrutiny of dual-use chemicals exports to Syria is described at paragraphs 503–528 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendations are at paragraphs 146 to 153 of Volume I of that Report

452. The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendations on dual-use chemicals exports to Syria in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committee conclude that given the fact that Syria was a known holder of chemical weapons and a known non-signatory of the Chemicals Weapons Convention, banning the manufacture or use of chemical weapons, and given also the nature of the Assad regime, the decision of the previous Government to give 5 export licence approvals for a dual-use chemical to Syria between July 2004 and May 2010 was highly questionable.<sup>533</sup>

#### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

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<sup>532</sup> Q 154

<sup>533</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 146

The Committees further conclude that the decision of the present Government to give 2 export licence approvals for dual–use chemicals to Syria in January 2012 after the civil war had started in Syria in 2011 was irresponsible.<sup>534</sup>

**The Committees’ Conclusion:**

The Committees also conclude that given that:

- a) Syria was a known holder of chemical weapons;
- b) that Syria was a known non–signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- c) the nature of the Assad regime;
- d) that a civil war was raging in Syria;
- e) that sodium and potassium fluoride were both listed by the Australia Group and the EU in its Dual–Use Regulations as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons; and
- f) the company concerned appears to be a “Brass Plate” one

the present Government’s claim that at the time the two dual–use chemical export licences for sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride to Syria were approved in January 2012 “there were no grounds for refusal” is grossly inaccurate.<sup>535</sup>

**The Committees’ Conclusion:**

The Committees also conclude that, given the factors a) to f) in paragraph 148 [of Volume I of the this Report] above, there was a serious failure of due process within the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills in that neither of the licence applications for the export of sodium fluoride or potassium fluoride to Syria in January 2012 was put to Ministers for approval.<sup>536</sup>

**The Committees’ Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the arguments advanced by the Government against the Committees taking evidence from the dual–use chemical export licence applicant companies in public were either invalid or outweighed by the public interest that parliamentary proceedings should be conducted in public unless there are compelling reasons for not doing so.<sup>537</sup>

**The Committees’ Recommendation:**

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<sup>534</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 147

<sup>535</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 148

<sup>536</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 149

<sup>537</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 150

The Committees recommend that the Government should state in its Response whether it will adopt a policy of a very strong presumption against approving licence applications for dual–use chemical exports to countries that:

- a) are known holders of chemical weapons;
- b) have not signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention; and
- c) are not participating in an Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–verified destruction programme

and that any proposals to approve such licence applications should be put to Ministers for decision.<sup>538</sup>

**The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response whether the OPCW has agreed that further information contained in the Syrian declaration of its chemical weapons and the chemicals used, including precursor chemicals, in their manufacture can be placed in the public domain, and, if so, to provide the Committees with that information.<sup>539</sup>

**The Committees’ Recommendation:**

Following the Written Ministerial Statement made by the Foreign Secretary on 9 July 2014 on “The Historical Role of UK Companies in Supplying Dual Use Chemicals to Syria”, the Committees also recommend that the Government states in its Response whether the existing export controls over dual–use chemicals need to be widened and strengthened, and, if so, in what ways.<sup>540</sup>

**The Government’s Response to the five Conclusions and three Recommendations above:**

The Government does not agree with the Committees’ conclusions in respect of the licences granted for export of dual–use chemicals to Syria between 2004 and 2012.

The Government has a robust legal framework and a transparent process for making decisions that takes account of a wide range of potential risks, including the risk of diversion of dual–use chemicals to a chemical weapons programme. Each of the licences in question was carefully assessed by advisers across a number of Departments, taking account of information from open and other sources. There was no information available at the time to indicate that the chemicals would be used for anything other than the stated, legitimate, end–uses and we have seen no information subsequently to suggest that they were diverted to a Chemical Weapons (CW) programme. Because there was no evidence that these chemicals would be

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<sup>538</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 151

<sup>539</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 152

<sup>540</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 153

diverted to any Syrian programme, these applications were considered at official level.

Only six countries have yet to accede to the CWC: Angola, Burma, DPRK, Egypt, Israel, and South Sudan. As a State Party, the UK abides by the strict controls of the CWC on the transfer of scheduled chemicals. The schedules are designed for the application of verification measures on a range of toxic chemicals and other precursor chemicals needed for the production of nerve and mustard chemical warfare agents. Chemicals listed in Schedule 1 (primarily CW agents or used for CW production) and Schedule 2 chemicals (toxic chemicals and precursors for Schedule 1 chemicals) can only be transferred to States Parties. Schedule 3 chemicals (toxic chemicals and precursor chemicals for those listed in Schedule 2) can be only traded to non-state parties under measures taken to ensure that the transferred chemicals are only used for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. We will continue to assess export licence applications for dual-use chemicals to non-States Parties very carefully and on a case-by-case basis.

The UK is also a member of the Australia Group (AG), an informal group of countries that have agreed to harmonise their national export controls to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons. The AG undertakes regular reviews of the list of chemicals whose trade is controlled, and members of the group share information on procurement attempts. The UK is closely involved in this process and will continue to promote the addition of new controls where they are practical and can reduce proliferation.

No agreement has been reached to allow the publication of information contained in Syria's declarations to the OPCW. The OPCW reminded States Parties on 24 July of their obligations to ensure adequate controls are in place to ensure OPCW classified information is not put into the public domain.

While the Government will continue to review developments in science and technology to help ensure that export controls remain relevant and up-to-date, the Government does not accept that the information in the 9 July 2014 Written Ministerial statement should of itself prompt further revisions to the existing controls covering dual-use chemicals. The chemical exports concerned took place 30 years ago, and the UK's own export controls as well as those of like-minded States in the AG, have been completely overhauled and up-dated since then. In addition, the CWC is now in force. The three chemicals listed in the statement are now subject to stringent international export controls, which was not the case when the exports took place.<sup>541</sup>

**453. I propose that the Committees continue to conclude that the Government's decision to give 2 export licence approvals for dual-use chemicals, sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride, to Syria in January 2012 when:**

- a) Syria was a known holder of chemical weapons;

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<sup>541</sup> Cm8935, pp 75–76

- b) Syria was, at the time, a known non-signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- c) given the nature of the Assad regime;
- d) a civil war was raging in Syria;
- e) sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride were both listed by the Australia Group and by the EU in its Dual-Use Regulation as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons; and
- f) the company granted the licences appeared to be a “Brass Plate” one was irresponsible.

454. I propose that the Committees continue to recommend that the Government should adopt a policy of a very strong presumption against approving applications for dual-use chemical exports to countries that:

- a) are known holders of chemical weapons;
- b) have not signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention; and
- c) are not participating in an Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-verified destruction programme

and that any proposals to approve such licence applications should be put to Ministers for decision.

### *Continuing use of chemical weapons*

455. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) established a fact-finding mission in April 2014 to establish facts surrounding allegations of the use of chlorine “for hostile purposes” in Syria. The mission’s third report stated that the investigators had concluded “with a high degree of confidence” that chlorine gas had been used as a weapon against three opposition-controlled villages in Syria in 2014, affecting between 300 and 500 people and killing 13. The OPCW did not apportion blame for the use of chemicals.<sup>542</sup>

456. The Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, on 25 November 2014, regarding the reports of the continuing use of chemical weapons in Syria as follows:

There have been a number of reports including from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that chlorine chemical weapons have been used in Syria subsequent to the Assad regime’s commitment to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and to destroy its own chemical weapon stocks.

Please could you state:

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<sup>542</sup> “Inspectors confident chlorine gas used in Syrian villages”, *Associated Press*, 7 January 2015

1. whether the Government agrees that these reports are correct;
2. whether the chlorine was weaponised in Syria and, if so, where and by whom;
3. whether the chlorine weapon attacks were by the Assad regime's armed forces and, if not, by whom; and
4. the estimated number of deaths and serious injuries as a result of these chlorine weapon attacks.<sup>543</sup>

The Foreign Secretary replied on 10 December as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 25 November about the use of chlorine in Syria.

The Government believes that the Assad regime's armed forces have used chlorine as a chemical weapon on several occasions. There is no reason to believe that the chlorine used in these attacks had been subject to any specialist processing. The evidence suggests that chlorine cylinders were placed inside crude barrel bombs and delivered to targets in Syria.

The OPCW Fact Finding Mission (FFM) confirmed the use of chlorine in Syria in its second report, published on 10 September. Following that report I issued a statement confirming the Government's view that the findings of the FFM corroborate allegations that the Assad regime continues to use chemical weapons in Syria, in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The systematic and repeated use of chlorine in northern Syria and the consistent reports from witnesses of the presence of helicopters at the times of the attacks leave little doubt as to responsibility. Only the Assad regime's armed forces were able to fly helicopters over the relevant territory at the time.

Whilst the number of allegations of chemical attacks continues to rise, without access to individuals on the ground it is not possible to give a reliable estimate of the number of deaths or serious injuries caused. Media reporting suggests that since September 2013 the use of chemical weapons has killed at least 50 people and injured more than 1,100 including women and children.

The Government remains concerned over the accuracy and completeness of Syria's declarations to the OPCW and considers that Syria is failing to comply with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Government fully supports the ongoing work led by the OPCW to address these issues and continues to work to bring the perpetrators of these and other atrocities in Syria to account.<sup>544</sup>

**457. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

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<sup>543</sup> Ev w218 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Philip Hammond dated 25 November 2014

<sup>544</sup> Ev w219 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 10 December 2014

- a) **whether there have been any further chlorine, or other, chemical weapon attacks in Syria since the Foreign Secretary's reply to the Committees of 10 December 2014, and, if so, by whom and with what number of deaths and serious injuries as a result;**
- b) **in what specific ways the Government considers that Syria is failing to comply with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention; and**
- c) **in what specific ways the Government continues to work to bring the perpetrators of these and other atrocities in Syria to account.**

### ***Uzbekistan***

458. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Uzbekistan is described at paragraphs 529–531 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 154 of Volume I of that Report.

459. The Committees' Recommendation on Uzbekistan in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Uzbekistan for body armour and components for body armour are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criterion: Two.<sup>545</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that the currently extant licences for Uzbekistan are compliant with the Consolidated Criteria. However, as was shown in Ukraine, circumstances can and do change rapidly, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same Criteria. In such cases, the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.<sup>546</sup>

**460. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Uzbekistan for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, small arms ammunition, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography and technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: Two.**

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<sup>545</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 154

<sup>546</sup> Cm8935, p 77



## Yemen

461. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Yemen is described at paragraphs 532–534 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 155 of Volume I of that Report.

462. The Committees' Recommendation on Yemen in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Yemen for acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles and components for body armour are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criterion: Two.<sup>547</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that the currently extant licences for Yemen are compliant with the Consolidated Criteria. However, as was shown in Ukraine, circumstances can and do change rapidly, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same Criteria. In such cases, the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

The Government of Yemen faces a number of security issues, with concerns arising from both internal and external sources, and so has a legitimate requirement for this type of equipment in the performance of its sovereign defensive responsibilities.<sup>548</sup>

**463. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Yemen for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for military support vehicles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military support vehicles, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography and technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: Two.**

**464. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether in the light of the insurgency by Shi'a Houthi rebel group, the**

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<sup>547</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 155

<sup>548</sup> Cm8935, p 77

**Government has reviewed its arms and dual-use exports policy to Yemen, together with the extant licences for both, and, if so, with what results.**

### **Extant arms export licences to the 7 Additional Countries and Territories of concern to the Committees**

465. In addition to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's 28 Countries of Human Rights concern listed in the FCO's Human Rights Annual Report 2013 (Cm8842) published in April 2014, the Committees have concerns about arms export to 7 additional countries – Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Hong Kong, Qatar, Tunisia and Ukraine.

466. Specific evidence given to the Committees in relation to these 7 countries and the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendations in relation to those countries follow immediately below.

#### **Argentina**

467. On 26 April 2012, the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, announced a tightening of arms export controls to Argentina in a Written Ministerial Statement. The Business Secretary's Written Ministerial Statement was as follows:

Export Control Policy

#### **The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (Vince Cable):**

I would like to inform the House of a change of policy on the licensing of exports of, and trade by British persons (trafficking and brokering) in, controlled goods and technology to military end-users in Argentina. Previous policy dating from 1998 required the refusal of licences for exports and trade which would enhance Argentine military capabilities but permitted licences for goods which maintained existing capability. In practice this has meant the authorisation of the export and trade of components for maintenance purposes.

The Government have reviewed this policy in the light of recent actions by the Argentine Government aimed at harming the economic interests of the Falkland Islanders. We are determined to ensure that no British licensable exports or trade have the potential to be used by Argentina to impose an economic blockade on the Falkland Islanders or inhibit their legitimate rights to develop their own economy.

New restrictions on the export and trade of licensable goods with the Argentine military will now be introduced with immediate effect. In future no licences shall be granted for any military or dual-use goods and technology being supplied to military end-users in Argentina, except in exceptional circumstances. We will review extant licences for military goods to the Argentine armed forces with a view to revoking any that are not consistent with the revised policy. This decision will not affect licences for items intended for end-users other than the Argentine military.<sup>549</sup>

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<sup>549</sup> HC Deb, 26 April 2012, 43WS

468. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Argentina is described at paragraphs 537–543 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations are at paragraphs 541–543 of Volume I of that Report.

469. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations on Argentina in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

**The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees continue to conclude that it is reprehensible that the Government, given the relatively recent history of British ships being sunk in the Falklands War by missiles supplied by a fellow NATO member and the statement by the Argentinian Foreign Minister, as reported on 5 February 2013, regarding Argentinian control of the Falkland Islands, when he said "I don't think it will take another 20 years", is unwilling to lobby other Governments to make the same change in arms exports policy to Argentina as that announced by the British Government on 26 April 2012. The Committees recommend that the Government should do so.<sup>550</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government's consistent response on this challenge is that we do not expect other governments to align their export control policies with ours over Argentina. This is primarily a bilateral issue and an international embargo would not be appropriate.<sup>551</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response which other NATO member countries, and other arms exporting countries to Argentina have now made the same change in arms exports policy to Argentina as that announced by the British Government on 26 April 2012.<sup>552</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

We are not aware that any NATO member countries, and other arms exporting countries to Argentina, have made the same change in arms exports policy to Argentina as that announced by the Government on 26 April 2012. NATO does not engage in arms exports as an institution. Each NATO state will assess export licences for Argentina against their own national arms export licensing criteria.<sup>553</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

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<sup>550</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 156

<sup>551</sup> Cm8935, p 78

<sup>552</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 157

<sup>553</sup> Cm8935, p 78

Following the Government's arms exports Quarterly Report for July–September 2013, the Committees put the following questions to the Government regarding exports to Argentina:

Given the current political tensions between the United Kingdom and Argentina and the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Chairman of 26 April 2012, the Committees wish know why was an OIEL including artillery ammunition, components for artillery, components for combat naval vessels, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, signalling devices, smoke canisters, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, technology for artillery, technology for combat naval vessels, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for general naval vessel components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military radars, technology for naval communications equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval engines, technology for naval gun installations/mountings, technology for naval guns, technology for signalling devices, technology for smoke canisters, technology for weapon control equipment, training artillery ammunition and weapon control equipment approved?

**The Government's Response:**

The OIEL was approved because all items in the licence are for the sole use of a non–Argentinean naval mission and are not to be re–exported or sold for export to a Third Party. We had no Criteria concerns.<sup>554</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response explains:

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<sup>554</sup> Cm8935, p 79

- a) what use the non-Argentinian naval mission has for items such as artillery ammunition and components for artillery;
- b) how export approval of the above goods for export to Argentina can be reconciled with the Business Secretary's change of policy on arms exports to Argentina in his Written Ministerial Statement of 26 April 2012 in which he said: "In future no licences will be granted for military or dual-use goods for military end users in Argentina unless there are compelling exceptional reasons to do so"; and
- c) why the Government approved the above goods to be exported to Argentina rather than to the country of the non-Argentinian naval mission referred to.<sup>555</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The licence application was submitted by the non-Argentine naval end-user. The application was for a variety of naval and weaponry components. The export licence application states that the goods exported to the countries listed, one of which was Argentina, would always be delivered to the non-Argentine naval end-user's naval vessel visiting the listed country. The exporter also stated that the goods were for the sole use of the non-Argentine naval end-user's navy and would not be re-exported or sold to a third party. BIS added a condition to their approval letter that 'Exports are only permitted for use by the non-Argentine naval end-user in this destination.'

Listing countries that vessels may visit as a destination is appropriate because the vessels may need to be repaired or undergo maintenance while in a foreign port. In this case, the exporter provided all the required assurances that the goods would not be diverted into the listed destinations.

The non-Argentine naval end-user has now confirmed to BIS that it has not used the OIEL for Argentina.<sup>556</sup>

**470. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Argentina for anti-riot/ballistic shields, artillery ammunition, components for artillery, components for combat naval vessels, components for launching/handling/control of equipment for missiles, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helmets, components for naval guns, components for sniper rifles, components for weapon control systems, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, gun mountings, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for artillery, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions,**

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<sup>555</sup> HC (2014-15) 186, para 158

<sup>556</sup> Cm8935, p 79

technology for military communications equipment, technology for naval combat vessels, technology for naval guns, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for weapon control equipment, weapon control equipment and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: Four and Five, and with the Written Ministerial Statement of the Business Secretary on 26 April 2012.

471. I propose that the Committees continue to conclude that it is reprehensible that the Government, given the relatively recent history of British ships being sunk in the Falklands War by missiles supplied by a fellow NATO member and the statement by the Argentinian Foreign Minister, as reported on 5 February 2013, regarding Argentinian control of the Falkland Islands, when he said "I don't think it will take another 20 years", is unwilling to lobby other Governments to make the same change in arms exports policy to Argentina as that announced by the British Government on 26 April 2012. The Committees continue to recommend that the Government should do so.

### **Bahrain**

472. Following the Arab Spring Bahrain witnessed generally peaceful demonstrations which were responded to by often violent internal repression with deaths, imprisonments and torture. Trials in special security courts took place which, according to International Crisis Group, lacked even the semblance of due process of law, including of medical professionals who treated casualties of the protests. In October 2012 it was announced that all rallies in Bahrain would be banned because of security concerns.<sup>557</sup> According to Human Rights Watch Bahrain's human rights record regressed further in key areas in 2013 and the Government made little real progress regarding reforms it claimed to pursue. Security forces continued to arrest scores of individuals arbitrarily in towns where anti-government protests regularly took place. High-profile critics of the Government remained in jail on charges that related solely to exercising their rights to freedom of expression and assembly. The judicial system, headed by ruling family members, has yet to hold any senior official responsible for serious human rights violations that have occurred since 2011, including torture-related deaths in detention.<sup>558</sup>

473. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Bahrain is described at paragraphs 544–547 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 159 of Volume I of that Report.

474. The Committees' Recommendation on Bahrain in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

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<sup>557</sup> Foreign and Commonwealth office Press Notice, "*Foreign Office Minister concerned at ban on protests in Bahrain*", 30 October 2012

<sup>558</sup> Human Rights Watch, "*Human Rights in Bahrain*", <http://www.hrw.org/middle-eastn-africa/bahrain>

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Bahrain for anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for gun mountings, components for machine guns, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of machine guns, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, general military vehicle components, gun mountings, gun silencers, hand grenades, machine guns, military communications equipment, pistols, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for telecommunications jamming equipment, sporting guns, technology for military communications equipment, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, telecommunications jamming equipment, weapon night sights and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: Two, Four, and Seven.<sup>559</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that the currently extant licences for Bahrain are compliant with the Consolidated Criteria. However, as was shown in Ukraine, circumstances can and do change rapidly, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same Criteria. In such cases, the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

Since the popular unrest that started in February 2011, we have monitored the situation in Bahrain closely, assessing export licence applications on a case-by-case basis. We continue to pay particular attention to the risk that goods might be used in internal repression (Criterion 2) and/or used to aggravate existing tensions in country (Criterion 3). The level of violence has diminished since 2011, although incidents increase during sensitive anniversaries and clashes in Shi'a villages continue. In April 2013, following a review of the management of public order by Bahrain's security forces, we approved a number of licences for the Bahrain Defence Force (BDF) including armoured personnel carrier components, firearms, helmets and shields. This was based on our assessment that Bahrain had significantly moderated its approach to public order situations to allow these licences to be approved, and provided good evidence that the BDF is unlikely to be deployed to handle public order incidents in the future.<sup>560</sup>

475. Elections took place in Bahrain over the weekend of 22–23 November 2014. It was reported that the elections were marred by violent clashes and by a boycott by opposition parties. Bahrain's Shia opposition dismissed the elections as a "farce" and boycotted the

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<sup>559</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 159

<sup>560</sup> Cm8935, p 80

poll in protest at the Sunni royal family's failure to implement political reform following the crisis in 2011.<sup>561</sup>

476. In the Oral Evidence session held on 1 December 2014 the Foreign Secretary was asked why Bahrain remained a priority arms export market for the UK. The Foreign Secretary informed the Committees that the decision related “to opportunity”. He continued by saying:

The Bahrainis have certain requirements for items such as sophisticated fighter jets—not something that we would judge likely to be used in internal repression. They are also an important partner is pursuing agendas that are strategically important to the UK, both against ISIL recently and longer term, ensuring freedom of navigation in the Gulf.

I recognise that Bahrain still has a distance to go in creating a proper and satisfactory human rights environment, but my judgment is that it is moving in the right direction. Steps that were taken after 2011 were positive, in contrast to what we have seen in many other countries where similar events have occurred and the response has been for the regime to turn its back on criticisms of its human rights record.

The regime in Bahrain has engaged; it set up the commission; it is responding and has implemented some of the measures recommended by the commission, not all of them. We are engaged with the Government of Bahrain in encouraging them to continue down that route, providing them where we can with technical support and assistance to implement recommendations. I see Bahrain as a country where we should be hopeful that, with continued engagement and encouragement from the UK, it is heading and will continue to head in the right direction. I am afraid I think that disengagement would be rather more likely to lead to the triumph of those elements that do not wish to see Bahrain addressing these challenges and engaging with its international critics in a constructive way.<sup>562</sup>

477. When asked if he was confident that UK arms exported to Bahrain had not been used against protestors the Foreign Secretary replied: “In the immediate aftermath of the events of 2011, we did review all licences, and we revoked a number of licences that we felt were not being used in accordance with the consolidated criteria. Twenty–three single licences and seven open licences to Bahrain were revoked at that time.”<sup>563</sup>

**478. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Bahrain for anti–riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles, command communications control and intelligence software, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for gun mountings, components for machine guns, components for military communications equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptographic software for the use of equipment**

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<sup>561</sup> “Bahrain rocked by violence as elections turn to chaos”, *The Times*, 24 November 2014

<sup>562</sup> Q 144

<sup>563</sup> Q 145



employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of machine guns, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, general military vehicle components, gun mountings, gun silencers, hand grenades, machine guns, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military helmets, military support vehicles, military utility vehicles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for telecommunications jamming equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, tear gas/riot control agents, technology for command communications control and intelligence software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, telecommunications jamming equipment, weapon night sights and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: Two, Four and Seven.

### **Egypt**

479. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Egypt is described at paragraphs 548–563 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendations are at paragraphs 160–162 of Volume I of that Report.

480. The Committees' Recommendations on Egypt in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Egypt for acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for radio jamming equipment, components for sniper rifles, components for sporting guns, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, general military vehicle components, military communications equipment, pistols, radio jamming equipment, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for military communications equipment, sporting guns and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: One, Two and Three.<sup>564</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that the currently extant licences for Egypt are compliant with the Consolidated Criteria and the EU FAC suspension. We assess all export licence applications for Egypt against both thresholds and will suspend any

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<sup>564</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 160

licence if we assess that it ‘might be used for internal repression.’ As was shown in Egypt in 2013, circumstances can and do change rapidly, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same Criteria. In such cases, the Government would revoke licences. The Government’s answers to the Committees’ Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees’ Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.<sup>565</sup>

**The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response provides an update of Annex 1 to the Business Secretary’s letter of 14 May 2014 listing the Government’s subsequent revocations, suspensions, un-suspensions and re-instatements of export licences to Egypt.<sup>566</sup>

**The Government’s Response:**

As of 28 August 2014, the list of revocations, suspensions, un-suspensions and re-instatements of export licences to Egypt remains the same as listed in Annex 1 of the Business Secretary’s letter to the Committees of 14 May 2014.<sup>567</sup>

**The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees scrutiny has established that there were 9 countries in Africa and the Middle East to which the Government gave approval in July to September 2013 of Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs) for goods that could be used for internal repression all with destinations which included Egypt. The Committees questions in relation to each of the 9 countries were:

Ghana: Why were OITCLs approved which included acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights when the destination countries included Egypt?

Mozambique: Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights approved?

Nigeria: Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights approved?

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<sup>565</sup> Cm8935, p 81

<sup>566</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 161

<sup>567</sup> Cm8935, p 81

Oman: Why were OITCLs with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?

Saudi Arabia: Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for combat shotguns, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sporting guns, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved?

Seychelles: Why were OITCLs with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?

Singapore: Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for rifles, components for sporting guns, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved?

South Africa: Why were OITCLs with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?

Tanzania: Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?

The Government's response to each of the 9 questions was: "The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response why, when the EU Foreign Affairs Council agreed on 21 August 2013 to suspend export licences to Egypt for equipment which might be used for internal repression,

the Government continued to approve OITCL licences for the above goods with Egypt as a destination after that date.<sup>568</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

All OITCLs were assessed against the Consolidated Criteria and the lower threshold introduced by the EU FAC suspension (if goods might be used for internal repression). Taking into account all relevant factors, we assessed that neither threshold was met and therefore approved the goods.<sup>569</sup>

481. In the Government's Response to the Committees' Recommendation on the Arab Spring in its last Report (HC 186) it stated:

The UK implemented the decision of the EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on 21 August 2013 to suspend all export licences for Egypt for items which might be used in internal repression. We initially took a precautionary approach and suspended 48 extant export licences. We then reviewed all export licences for Egypt and released 31 from suspension. Several licences which were suspended had expired so no action was required on them. The suspended licences cover a range of equipment including spares for helicopters and components for firearms.<sup>570</sup>

482. On 25 November 2014 the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, wrote to the Chairman of the Committees regarding arms export licences to Egypt. The text of the letter was as follows:

**EXPORT LICENCES FOR EGYPT**

You will be aware that the EU Foreign Affairs Council imposed a restriction on exports to Egypt in August 2013. This EU-wide suspension remains in place and as a consequence we will not grant licences for Egypt for equipment which might be used for internal repression. This is a different test to that set out in Criterion 2 of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria (that we will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that items might be used for internal repression).

A range of export licences for Egypt was suspended following the EU announcement, including a number of helicopters and helicopter components. This was because of concerns about the way helicopters were being used to police public demonstrations.

The Foreign Secretary has advised me that the situation in Egypt has been changed since August 2013. The political situation has become more stable and we no longer see large-scale confrontations between demonstrators and the security services. At the same time it has become increasingly clear that Egypt faces a serious and growing threat from extreme terrorist groups, not only in Sinai but across the country as a whole.

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<sup>568</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 162

<sup>569</sup> Cm8935, p 83

<sup>570</sup> Cm8935, p 60

In the light of these changed circumstances – and based on advice from the Foreign Secretary – I am now willing to consider licence applications to export helicopters and helicopter components to Egypt. Specifically, in relation to the use of Apache helicopters in Sinai counter terrorism operations. I am content that their use does not meet the threshold for refusal under the EU restrictions.

Having said this there will be a continuing presumption of denial of equipment for crowd control policing. I would need to see credible evidence of a significant change in crowd control policing in Egypt before reconsidering this position.

I know that you remain concerned that the Government considers clear risk when assessing the potential of exports to be used for internal repression. Clear risk has been a feature of Criterion 2 since the Consolidated Criteria were introduced in 2000 and remains so today. This criterion, with its clear risk test, has been applied consistently to licensing decisions for fourteen years and there has been no change to this particular aspect of our policy during the lifetime of this Government. There are exceptions to this rule, such as an EU suspension of export licensing, or where the UK initiates suspension as precautionary measure in cases where there is not enough information to assess whether the Consolidated Criteria are met because of a rapid deterioration in security or stability in the export destination.<sup>571</sup>

**483. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Egypt for acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for military auxiliary/support vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, general military vehicle components, military combat vehicles, military communications equipment, military helmets, military support vehicles, pistols, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for military communications equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, telecommunications jamming equipment and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government’s Arms Export Licensing Criteria: One, Two and Three, and with the EU’s arms exports suspension Criterion applying to Egypt requiring suspension of exports “which might be used for internal repression”.**

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<sup>571</sup> Ev w217 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 25 November 2014

## Hong Kong

484. Following the use of tear gas by the Hong Kong police against peaceful protesters in September 2014 it was established that some of the tear gas had been supplied by a UK supplier under a UK export licence. When the Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, was questioned about the use of UK-supplied tear gas, on *BBC Daily Politics*, he said that he did not condone the use of tear gas against the protesters and that the tear gas was a legitimate export. He stated: “CS gas is available from large numbers of sources around the world. To be frank, I think that is a rather immaterial point. They could buy CS gas from the US.”<sup>572</sup>

485. UKWG stated in its Written Evidence that the Foreign Secretary’s comments were “unfortunate” and sent “a very different message” about arms exports than the Government’s approach to championing the Arms Trade Treaty. UKWG stated:

The implications of his comments, that the canisters being used by the Chinese riot police were a legitimate export and that “CS gas is available from large numbers of sources around the world”, are that he was endorsing an approach to arms transfers—‘if we don’t sell, someone else will’—which was thoroughly discredited in the 1990s and which if widely followed would seriously undermine the intent and potential benefits of the ATT.

UKWG called on the UK Government to explain its position over the transfer to, and use of tear gas in, Hong Kong and to make clear that no violations of the Arms Trade Treaty are acceptable.<sup>573</sup> The Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) in a supplementary Written submission to the inquiry said that the Foreign Secretary’s statement was: “a totally unacceptable statement from a UK Government Minister, especially from the head of the department responsible for promoting human rights overseas and for checking export licence application compliance with the human rights criteria. It is a long time since a UK government has publicly used the excuse that ‘if we didn’t sell, someone else would’ and it is deplorable that the Foreign Secretary has done so now.”<sup>574</sup>

486. On 21 October 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary requesting further information regarding the export of tear gas and pepper spray to Hong Kong. The letter was as follows:

I attach the Committees on Arms Export Controls’ analysis “Licence approvals for arms exports to Hong Kong that could be used for internal repression” from 2012 Q1 to 2014 Q1, the data for which has been taken from your Department’s Quarterly Reports on UK arms export licence approvals published on the BIS website.

Following the widespread reports of tear gas and pepper spray being used against those demonstrating peacefully in Hong Kong, please may I have your answers to the following questions:

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<sup>572</sup> “UK Firm that sold teargas to Hong Kong to review sales policy”, *Guardian*, 30 September 2014

<sup>573</sup> Ev w105

<sup>574</sup> Ev w159

- a) Is pepper spray included in the “tear gas/irritant ammunition” listed in the Quarterly licence approvals of arms exports to Hong Kong?
- b) Does the Government agree that tear gas manufactured in the UK may have been used against peaceful demonstrators in Hong Kong, and that, as reported, tear gas canisters with “Made in the UK” written on them have been seen on the streets in Hong Kong?
- c) Will the Government confirm, as has been reported, that it has given export licence approval to the UK company Chemring to export tear gas to Hong Kong?
- d) Since 2012 Q4 a significant number of the Government approved exports on the BIS website of both lethal and non-lethal equipment have had “see note below” attached. The note reads “Indicated as licence granted for use by a law enforcement agency” or “for end use by a law enforcement agency”. What is the name of the law enforcement agency or agencies in each case where this note is entered?
- e) Have any extant Government approved export licences to Hong Kong been revoked or suspended? If so, what was the date of revocation or suspension and the description of the controlled goods in each case?
- f) What is the Government’s present policy on approving new licences for the export of arms and equipment to Hong Kong that could be used for internal repression?

Attachment

**Licence approvals for arms exports to Hong Kong that could be used for internal repression.**

**2012 Q1**

Non-Lethal equipment

Anti-riot/ballistic shields

Components for military communications equipment

Military communications equipment

Tear gas/irritant ammunition

Technology for military communications equipment

Training tear gas/irritant ammunition

Lethal equipment

Components for assault rifles

Components for bombs

Components for exploding grenade ammunition

Components for grenade launchers  
Components for machine guns  
Components for mortar bombs  
Components for rifles  
Components for small arms ammunition  
Equipment for the use of machine guns  
Grenade launchers  
Gun silencers  
Machine guns  
Rifles  
Small arms ammunition  
Weapon sights

**2012 Q2**

Non-Lethal equipment

Body armour  
Components for body armour  
Military helmets  
Tear gas/irritant ammunition

Lethal equipment

Small arms ammunition

**2012 Q3**

Non-Lethal equipment

None

Lethal equipment

Weapon sights

**2012 Q4**

Non-Lethal equipment

Anti-riot/ballistic shields (see Note below)  
Components for military communications equipment  
Military communications equipment  
Technology for military communications equipment

Lethal equipment



Equipment for the use of weapon night sights

Weapon night sights

**2013 Q1**

Non-Lethal equipment

Blank/inert ammunition

Equipment for the use of military communications equipment

Lethal equipment

Assault rifles

Combat shotguns (see Note below)

Components for assault rifles

Components for machine guns

Components for small arms ammunition

Machine guns (see Note below)

Pistols (see Note below)

Weapon night sights

Weapon sights

**2013 Q2**

Non-Lethal equipment

Components for military communications equipment

Lethal equipment

Components for sniper rifles

Equipment for the use of sniper rifles (see Note below)

Gun silencers (see Note below)

Hand grenades

Small arms ammunition

Sniper rifles

Weapon sights

**2013 Q3**

Non-Lethal equipment

Components for military communications equipment

Military communications equipment

Military helmets

Technology for military communications equipment

Lethal equipment

Hand grenades (see Note below)

Sporting guns

**2013 Q4**

Non-Lethal equipment

Components for military communications equipment

Tear gas/irritant ammunition (see Note below)

Lethal equipment

Components for sniper rifles (see Note below)

Components for sporting guns

Equipment for the use of sniper rifles (see Note below)

Gun silencers (see Note below)

Sniper rifles (see Note below)

Weapon sights (see Note below)

**2014 Q1**

Non-Lethal equipment

Anti-riot/ballistic shields (see Note below)

Body armour

Components for body armour

Military helmets

Tear gas/irritant ammunition (see Note below)

Lethal equipment

Components for sniper rifles (see Note below)

Equipment for the use of sniper rifles (see Note below)

Equipment for the use of weapon sights (see Note below)

Gun silencers (see Note below)

Sniper rifles (see Note below)

Weapon sights (see Note below)

**Note: Indicated as “licence granted for use by a law enforcement agency” or “for end use by a law enforcement agency”.<sup>575</sup>**

The Business Secretary replied on 28 October as follows:

#### HONG KONG EXPORT LICENCES

Thank you for your letter of 21 October 2014 regarding the Committees on Arms Export Controls’ analysis of export licences covering Q1 2012 to Q1 2014. I will respond by taking each point in turn from your letter to me:

1. Pepper sprays are not included in the “tear gas/irritant ammunition” annual report summary. Pepper sprays are controlled under item 3.1 of Annex III to Council Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The control entry we apply is HR AIII 3.1 with annual report summary “pepper sprays for self-protection”.

We have not identified any licences for pepper spray being applied for or approved for Hong Kong.

2. It appears from public images that some of the tear gas canisters used during the protests in Hong Kong on 28 September were manufactured by Chemring Ltd (a UK company), but Hong Kong Police have not verified this and we have no independent confirmation.

3. I can confirm that the Government granted an export licence approval to Chemring for export of tear gas to Hong Kong on August 2010.

4. In general “law enforcement agency” will refer to the police, customs, border security, internal security forces or other similar bodies responsible for the maintenance of law and order of the country in question. In respect of Hong Kong the law enforcement agency referred to is the Hong Kong Police Force. However in three of the Annual Report Summaries you listed in your letter, for Quarter 1 2013 (namely “combat shotguns”, “machine guns” & “pistols”) the export licences were for a movie film production company and not a law enforcement agency.

5. No licences for Hong Kong have been revoked, suspended, or had Hong Kong removed from a multiple destination open licence. The Foreign Secretary has advised me that the use of tear gas by the Hong Kong Police was an uncharacteristic response at an early stage of the protests, the scale of which caught the police by surprise, and was not indicative of a wider pattern of behaviour that would cross the threshold of Criterion 2. It is his view that, since that incident, the Hong Kong Police have generally approached the protests carefully and proportionately. I have accepted this advice.

6. The UK Government assesses all export licence applications on a case by case basis in light of prevailing circumstances and in accordance with the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. In particular, Criterion 2 deals with “The

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<sup>575</sup> Ev w209 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 21 October 2014

respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country for international humanitarian law.” A licence would not be granted if there was a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression. In making these assessments we will take full account of the recent disturbances in Hong Kong.

I hope you find this information helpful.<sup>576</sup>

487. In the Oral Evidence session on 10 November 2014 Oliver Sprague, Amnesty International, expressed concern about the Foreign Secretary’s comments and said that his statement “basically said, ‘If we don’t sell them, someone else would have done.’”<sup>577</sup> Roy Isbister, Saferworld, later said: “[...]the statement by the Foreign Secretary about the supply of tear gas to Hong Kong was pretty unhelpful, I think, because, ‘If we don’t sell, someone else will’ is not how the Arms Trade Treaty operates.”<sup>578</sup>

488. In the Oral Evidence session on 1 December 2014 the Business Secretary was asked about the use of tear gas in Hong Kong and whether the UK would be taking any further action to revoke arms export licences for tear gas. He replied:

We will hopefully get advice very quickly about whether the events of the past few days change the situation. On the judgment that was made earlier not to cancel the extant licence, tear gas was used once in the early stages of the demonstrations. Subsequently, a judgment was made by the people who give us advice about the foreign affairs aspect of it that the Hong Kong police were handling it in a proportionate way.<sup>579</sup>

Speaking later in the same Oral Evidence session the Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond said that: “[...] statements by the Hong Kong police and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government about how they intend to manage these processes have reassured us that we do not expect to see inappropriate use of CS gas by the Hong Kong police.”<sup>580</sup>

489. The Foreign Secretary went on to explain why he thought the provision of tear gas for policing was legitimate. He said:

that CS gas is supplied as a public order policing tool. When we grant a licence for the supply of CS gas to a police force, we should expect that it may be deployed, in appropriate circumstances, in a public order policing situation. It is not the case that any use of CS gas would automatically lead to circumstances in which it would be appropriate to revoke or suspend a licence. It would be disingenuous of us to supply a product, the sole use of which is as a public order policing control tool, and then say that any use of it would be inappropriate. We would have to look at the circumstances of use to ensure that it was proportionate and appropriate.

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<sup>576</sup> Ev w210 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 28 October 2014

<sup>577</sup> Q 1

<sup>578</sup> Q 5

<sup>579</sup> Q 105

<sup>580</sup> Q 140

I have seen words used in the media and elsewhere that I do not think are appropriate, so I would draw a distinction between public order policing and internal repression. Public order policing is a legitimate activity. If it is carried out properly, with proper restraint and proportionality, it is something that we would expect Governments to do. Internal repression is clearly a different issue. If any materials that were supplied for the purpose of public order policing were diverted to be used in internal repression, that would clearly give rise to the need to review the licence under which they had been exported.<sup>581</sup>

However, the Chairman of the Committees pointed out to the Foreign Secretary that; “the critical issue is whether the demonstrators are demonstrating purely peacefully or engaging in activities that could cause harm to members of the police forces or others.” He went on to ask the Foreign Secretary if it was Government’s policy that British–exported tear gas should not be used against those who are exercising their right to demonstrate purely peacefully. The Foreign Secretary replied:

Our position on the demonstrations in Hong Kong is that it is very important that we preserve and protect the right of peaceful demonstration in Hong Kong. That is one of the characteristics of life in Hong Kong that is protected under the joint declaration to which we and the Government of the People’s Republic of China were signatories. We would certainly not condone the use of CS gas, British–supplied or otherwise, in inappropriate circumstances. It would depend entirely on the circumstances.

As I have said, our understanding is that the use of CS gas on 28 September was an isolated incident. We have seen nothing to suggest that the Hong Kong police are going to make use of CS gas on a routine basis to deal with the current wave of demonstrations. If we were to see anything of that nature, we would obviously have to look very carefully at the circumstances of such use. At the moment, the question does not arise because we have seen nothing to indicate systematic use.<sup>582</sup>

**490. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Hong Kong for anti-riot/ballistic shields, ballistic shields, body armour, components for anti-riot/ballistic shields, components for ballistic shields, components for body armour, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helmets, components for small arms ammunition, components for the use of military communications equipment, components for weapon night sights, cryptographic software, CS hand grenades, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, gun mountings, gun silencers, hand grenades, handcuffs, military communications equipment, military helmets, military utility vehicles, small arms ammunition, smoke ammunition, smoke canisters, smoke hand grenades, software enabling equipment to function as equipment employing cryptography, software for**

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<sup>581</sup> Q 140

<sup>582</sup> Q 141

cryptographic equipment, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, stun grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for ground vehicle communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for weapon night sights, thunderflashes, weapon night sights and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: Two and Three.

491. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response states whether, given that there has been repeated use by the Hong Kong police of pepper sprays, and at least one use of tear gas, against those demonstrating peacefully, it remains its policy to be willing to grant licence approval for these items to be exported to the Hong Kong Police Force.

### **Qatar**

492. Concerns have been raised about Qatar funding Islamist extremist groups in both Syria and Libya. The *Telegraph* reported that:

Western officials have tracked the Qatari arms flights as they land in the city of Misrata, about 100 miles east of Tripoli, where the Islamist militias have their stronghold. Even after the fall of the capital and the removal of Libya's government, Qatar is "still flying in weapons straight to Misrata airport", said a senior Western official.<sup>583</sup>

The report continued by stating that Qatar had "deliberately channelled guns and cash towards Islamist rebels" in Syria. It went on to say that individuals residing in Qatar identified by the US Treasury have transferred large amounts of cash, over \$2 million per month" to al-Qaeda in Iraq – Qatar has failed to act against these individuals.<sup>584</sup>

493. Prior to a visit to the UK by the Emir of Qatar on 28–30 October 2014 British media reports had focused on long-running allegations from neighbouring Gulf Arab states that Qatar was using its vast oil and gas wealth to support Islamists across the Middle East. During the visit the Prime Minister, David Cameron, urged the Emir to move swiftly against terrorist paymasters alleged to be sheltering in the Gulf state.<sup>585</sup>

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<sup>583</sup> "How Qatar is funding the rise of Islamist extremists; The fabulously wealthy Gulf state, which owns an array of London landmarks and claims to be one of our best friends in the Middle East, is a prime sponsor of violent Islamists", *The Telegraph*, 21 September 2014

<sup>584</sup> "How Qatar is funding the rise of Islamist extremists; The fabulously wealthy Gulf state, which owns an array of London landmarks and claims to be one of our best friends in the Middle East, is a prime sponsor of violent Islamists", *The Telegraph*, 21 September 2014

<sup>585</sup> "PM asks Emir of Qatar to act over terror funding", *The Daily Telegraph*, 30 October 2014

494. The Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, was asked, in the Oral Evidence session held on 1 December 2014, whether, given the reports of Qatari funding of Islamic militias and ISIL, the UK should continue exporting arms to Qatar. The Foreign Secretary replied that the British Government was aware of reports that “individual citizens from the region [...] may be providing or may have provided support to not only ISIL, but other militant organisations”. He continued: “We have determined that there is no evidence to suggest that the Government of Qatar, or any of the Governments that we engage with in the Gulf, is involved in this regime.” The Foreign Secretary said that following a recent meeting with the Emir of Qatar, the Emir had “confirmed his absolute determination to comply with the UN Security Council Resolution that we were instrumental in bringing about, which seeks to cut off not only the flow of foreign fighters, but the flow of finance to ISIL in Iraq and Syria.”<sup>586</sup>

495. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Qatar for anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles, ballistic shields, body armour, combination rifle-shotguns, command communications control and intelligence software, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combination rifle-shotguns, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for shotguns, components for small arms ammunition, components for submachine guns, components for weapon night sights, cryptographic software, CS hand grenades, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for small arms ammunition, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of grenade launchers, equipment for the use of machine guns, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, general purpose machine guns, grenade launchers, gun mountings, gun silencers, machine guns, machine pistols, military communications equipment, military helmets, pistols, rifles, semiautomatic pistols, shotguns, small arms ammunition, smoke ammunition, smoke canisters, smoke hand grenades, sniper rifles, software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, software for radio jamming equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, stun grenades, submachine guns, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, technology for assault rifles, technology for command communications control and intelligence software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for machine guns, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of weapon sights, telecommunications jamming equipment, unmanned air vehicles, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights, are currently compliant with the following of the Government’s Arms Export Licensing Criteria: Two, Four, Six and Seven.

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<sup>586</sup> Q 147

**496. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it is aware of any military or dual-use goods exported to Qatar under UK Government approved licences subsequently being transferred to Islamist militants in Libya, Iraq, Syria or other countries.**

### **Tunisia**

497. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Tunisia is described at paragraphs 564–566 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 163 of that Report.

498. The Committees' Recommendation on Tunisia in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Tunisia for components for military communications equipment, components for military support vehicles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military communications equipment and small arms ammunition are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: Two and Seven.<sup>587</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that the currently extant licences for Tunisia are compliant with the Consolidated Criteria. However, circumstances can and do change rapidly, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same Criteria. In such cases, the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.<sup>588</sup>

**499. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Tunisia for body armour, command communications control and intelligence software, components for body armour, components for military communications equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military support vehicles, small arms ammunition, software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for radio jamming equipment, technology for command communications control and intelligence software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology**

<sup>587</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 163

<sup>588</sup> Cm8935, p 83



**for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, telecommunications jamming equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: Two and Seven.**

### **Ukraine**

500. In response to the deteriorating political situation and increasing violence within the Ukraine the EU Foreign Affairs Council introduced targeted sanctions against certain individuals from that country. On 20 February 2014 the EU Council also agreed to reassess export licences of equipment covered by the EU Common Position on arms exports. As a result of the review the ECO issued a Notice to Exporters on 24 February announcing that all extant licences to the Ukraine were being examined to determine which equipment could be used for internal repression and would therefore be subject to suspension.<sup>589</sup>

501. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Ukraine is described at paragraphs 567–569 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Recommendation is at paragraph 164 of that Report.

502. The Committees' Recommendation on Ukraine in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Ukraine for body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of weapon sights, small arms ammunition and weapon sights are currently compliant the decision of the EU Foreign Affairs Council on 20 February 2014 on arms exports to Ukraine and with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: Three and Four.<sup>590</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government rigorously applies the Consolidated Criteria in assessing all licence applications. On 20 February 2014, EU Member States at the FAC agreed to suspend, until further notice, all export licensing to Ukraine for equipment which might be used for internal repression. We suspended all extant licences for goods that might be used for internal repression in accordance with the EU FAC decision.<sup>591</sup>

503. In the Government's Response (Cm8935) to the Committees' last Report (HC 186) the Government stated:

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<sup>589</sup> Notice to Exporters 2014/04: EU suspends all export licensing to Ukraine for any equipment which might be used for internal repression, *Export Control Organisation*, 24 February 2014

<sup>590</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 164

<sup>591</sup> Cm8935, pp 83–84

On 20 February 2014, the EU FAC [Foreign Affairs Council] agreed to suspend, until further notice, all export licensing to Ukraine for equipment which might be used for internal repression. We then suspended all extant licences for goods that *might* be used for internal repression in accordance with that decision. As a result, we suspended licences for sniper rifles, silencers for civilian use and body armour for the Ukrainian Security Forces. This action was taken in response to the indiscriminate killing of protesters from 18–20 February by Ukrainian Security Forces under the control of then-President Yanukovich and his Government. On 22 July 2014, the EU FAC unanimously agreed to lift the suspension. The Government implemented this decision.<sup>592</sup>

504. On 24 July 2014 the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees announcing a change in the Government’s policy towards arms export licences to Ukraine as follows:

I am writing to update the Committees on a change in the Government’s policy towards arms export licences to Ukraine.

On 22 July, I attended the EU Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels which unanimously agreed through the Council minutes that:

“In light of developments in Ukraine since 20 February and of increased EU engagement in support of Ukraine including in the field of civilian security sector reform, the Council took note that

Member States agreed to discontinue the application of their agreement of 20 February 2014 on export licences;

The Common Position 2008/944 continues to apply.”

This new agreement removes the blanket approach to all licences for the Ukrainian internal security forces and enables states to consider licence applications on a case-by-case basis against the EU and relevant national Arms Export licensing Criteria.

From a UK perspective, I can assure you that all new licence applications for Ukraine will be rigorously assessed, taking into account all relevant factors including end user and end-use details. Those licences which we were previously suspended will also be re-assessed against the EU and National Consolidated Criteria. Any licences which are inconsistent with the Criteria will be revoked.<sup>593</sup>

On 6 January 2015 the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond as follows:

Following your letter to me of 24 July 2014 about the Government’s policy towards arms exports to Ukraine, please could you tell me:

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<sup>592</sup> Cm8935, p 60

<sup>593</sup> Ev w167 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 24 July 2014

1. the results of the re-assessment against the EU and National Consolidated Criteria of those licences which the Government previously suspended – licence by licence; and
2. the details – licence by licence – of any licences which have been revoked as being inconsistent with the Criteria.<sup>594</sup>

The Foreign Secretary replied on 27 January 2015 as follows;

Thank you for your letter of 6 January 2015. You asked me about arms exports to Ukraine, specifically:

1. the results of the reassessments against the EU and National Consolidated Criteria of those licences which the Government previously suspended, licence by licence; and
2. the details, licence by licence, of any licences which have been revoked as being inconsistent with the Criteria.

Officials reviewed 20 suspended extant export licences for Ukraine. Following this review, 6 licences for low calibre air weapons and hunting rifles for pest control and sporting and leisure markets were reinstated. Of the remaining 14 licences for large calibre sporting shot guns, sound moderators for hunting rifles and body armour, some of which were for stock rather than a named end user, 9 were revoked as officials assessed the export posed a sufficient risk under Criteria 3 and 7. The remaining 5 were not revoked because they had expired during the period of suspension.

BIS are in contact with the relevant exporters to inform them about the 6 licences that have been reinstated following the review. Of those, extensions have been granted for licences that expired during the suspension, where the business requirement remains.

Current licence applications for Ukraine continue to be assessed on a case by case basis against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. Officials continue to monitor conditions in Ukraine and take account of these in the consideration of Export Licence applications.<sup>595</sup>

505. On 24 February 2015 the Chairman of the Committees asked the following Written Parliamentary Questions:

- a) To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, on what date or dates (a) export licence approval was given for the export of Saxon armoured vehicles to Ukraine, (b) the number of Saxon armoured vehicles for which export approval was given and (c) their stated value;

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<sup>594</sup> Ev w433– Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Philip Hammond dated 6 January 2015

<sup>595</sup> Ev w458 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 27 January 2015

- b) To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what information he has to whether Saxon armoured vehicles exported to Ukraine will have arms mounted on them by Ukroboronprom or any other Ukrainian organisation; and
- c) To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, whether he will be laying a Gifting Minute before the House in respect of Saxon armoured vehicles exported to Ukraine.

The following replies were received:

- a) Answered by Matthew Hancock:

On 23 December 2014 two licences were granted for export to Ukraine of a total of 75 Saxon Armoured Personnel Carriers. The stated value of the export was £2,075,000.<sup>596</sup>

- b) Answered by Philip Dunne:

The Ministry of Defence supplied the first batch of 20 Saxon vehicles to the Ukrainian Government. The vehicles were delivered unarmed and any subsequent decision to arm those vehicles is a matter for the Ukrainian Government.<sup>597</sup>

- c) Answered by David Lidington:

The 20 Saxon armoured vehicles exported to Ukraine was a commercial sale between a private company and the Ukraine Ministry of Defence, and subject to the rigorous export licensing process. The vehicles were not gifted to Ukraine by the Government, therefore a gifting minute will not be laid before the House.<sup>598</sup>

**506. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Ukraine for body armour, command communications control and intelligence software, components for body armour, components for sniper rifles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of weapon sights, gun silencers, military electronic equipment, military helmets, military support vehicles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for command communications control and intelligence software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, weapon night sights and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: One, Two, Three, and Four.**

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<sup>596</sup> HC Deb, 3 March 2015, 224887WPQ

<sup>597</sup> HC Deb, 3 March 2015, 224886WPQ

<sup>598</sup> HC Deb, 3 March 2015, 224888WPQ

**507. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what is now its policy on the export of military and dual-use goods to Ukraine, and on the extant export licences to Ukraine for both categories of goods.**

**508. The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) whether, when it gave export licence approval in December 2014 for the export of 75 Saxon Armoured Personnel Carriers valued at £2,075,000, it was aware that they were likely to be armed after their delivery to Ukraine, and**
- b) whether it remains the Government's policy to export or gift only non-lethal goods to Ukraine.**

## 11 Arms exports to authoritarian regimes and Countries of concern worldwide

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509. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to authoritarian regimes and Countries of concern worldwide is described at paragraphs 574–580 of the Chairman's Memorandum to the Committees, published as Volume II with the Committees' 2014 Report (HC 186), and the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation are at paragraphs 167–169 of that Report.

510. The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation on arms exports to authoritarian regimes and Countries of concern worldwide in their 2014 Report (HC 186) and the Government's Response (Cm8935) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the fact that in the last 2½ years alone the Government has been obliged by changed circumstances to revoke 209 export licences to 17 countries, and has had to suspend 109 export licences to 3 countries, whilst welcome in itself, indicates that, with regard to those items of military and dual-use goods that might be used for internal repression being exported to authoritarian regimes, the Government's arms export policy is essentially one of reacting to events and not taking sufficient account of the nature of the regimes concerned at the point when the decision is made to approve the export licence or not.<sup>599</sup>

### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees further conclude that whilst the Government's assertion that there is "no evidence of any misuse of controlled military goods exported from the United Kingdom" may be factually correct with regard to a lack of evidence, this is not at all surprising and is of little or no value as an assurance given that for the great majority of the exported goods concerned — ammunition, small arms, light weapons, components, communications equipment, surveillance equipment technology and software, cryptographic equipment, technology and software, and dual-use goods — it will be impossible to identify that they are from the UK once the goods have left the country.<sup>600</sup>

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committee, therefore, repeat their previous Recommendation that the Government should apply significantly more cautious judgements when considering arms export licence applications for goods to authoritarian regimes which might be used for internal repression.<sup>601</sup>

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<sup>599</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 167

<sup>600</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 168

<sup>601</sup> HC (2014–15) 186, para 169

**The Government's Response to the two Conclusions and Recommendation above:**

The Government takes its arms export responsibilities very seriously and aims to operate one of the most rigorous arms export control regimes in the world. We consider how the equipment will be used by the end-user. Although we have concerns about some end-users in particular countries – and work with respective governments to explain our concerns – we judge that other end-users will use exported equipment appropriately. We will not approve an export licence if we believe that there is a clear risk that an export might be used for internal repression.

Our export licensing system allows us to respond quickly to changing facts on the ground. We have revoked or suspended licences when the level of risk changes – for example in Egypt, Ukraine, and Russia. This shows how seriously we take the guiding principle of responsible export controls.<sup>602</sup>

**511. I propose that the Committees conclude that events worldwide relating to internal repression since the Committees' last Report was published in July 2014 provide compelling support for their previous Recommendation that the Government should apply significantly more cautious judgements when considering arms export licence applications for goods to authoritarian regimes which might be used for internal repression,**

**512. I propose that the Committees, therefore, adhere to, and repeat, their previous Recommendation that the Government should apply significantly more cautious judgements when considering arms export licence applications for goods to authoritarian regimes which might be used for internal repression.**

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<sup>602</sup> Cm8935, p 85

## Annex 1: The Committees' quarterly licence questions and the Government's answers (2013 Q4, 2014 Q1 and 2014 Q2)

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Following the quarterly publication of the list of licence approvals, refusals and appeals by the Export Control Organisation (ECO) within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills the Committees have compiled a series of questions to obtain more information about the licences approved, rejected or appealed.

Following discussions between the Committees and Government Departments in 2011 it was agreed that the Committees would publish the Committees' questions and the Government's non-classified answers as from Q3 2010. The Committees' questions and the Government's answers for the period covered by this Report are reproduced below.

Note: The Committees' questions are in normal type and the Government's answers are in bold italic type.

Note:

OIEL: Open Individual Export Licence; SIEL: Standard Individual Export Licence; OITCL: Open Individual Trade Control Export Licence; SITCL: Standard Individual Trade Control Export Licence

### The Committees' 2013 Quarter 4 (October – December) questions and the Government's answers

The Committees would be grateful for more information about why the following licences were granted or refused during the fourth quarter (October–December) of 2013:

**Afghanistan:** Given the current conflict in Afghanistan, the arms embargo sanctions under UN Security Council Resolution 2082 and that Afghanistan was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report published in April 2013, the Committees wish to know why SIELs for body armour, components for body armour, military support vehicles and equipment employing cryptography; and SITCLs for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for machine guns, equipment for the use of machine guns, gun mountings, machine guns and technology for machine guns were approved?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, the arms embargo sanctions for Afghanistan applied to those individuals designated under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2082.*

*The licences under reference were for equipment for end users exempt from existing sanctions (e.g. International Security Assistance Force/Diplomatic Missions/United Nations/recognised NGOs). There were no other Criteria concerns about these exports.*

*The Resolution applies only to any individual, group, undertaking and entity designated as*



*or associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan. UNSCR 2082 was superseded in June 2014 by UNSCR 2160.*

**Argentina:** Given the current political tensions between the United Kingdom and Argentina and the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Chairman of 26 April 2012, the Committees wish to know why were SIELs for sporting guns, equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography approved?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, no licences shall be granted for any military or dual-use goods and technology to be supplied to military end-users in Argentina, except in exceptional circumstances. This decision will not affect licences for items intended for end-users other than the Argentine military.*

*The licences under reference were for the export of equipment destined for civilian/commercial end use. There were no other Criteria concerns about these exports.*

**Armenia:** Given the OSCE embargo for Armenia prohibiting the export of any military goods or technology to any person, or any destination, in Armenia why was a SIEL for equipment employing cryptography approved?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, the UK interpreted the OSCE arms embargo for Armenia as prohibiting the export of any military goods or technology to any person, or to any destination, in Armenia or in Azerbaijan. It has been UK practice occasionally to make an exemption in its interpretation of the embargo by approving exports of non-lethal military goods to humanitarian, media or peacekeeping organisations where it is clear that the embargo was not intended to prevent those exports and there is a strong humanitarian case for them.*

*The SIEL under reference was for the export of equipment destined for civil end use. The equipment was not military rated and thus not covered by the UK interpretation of the OSCE embargo. We had no other Criteria concerns.*

*The UK revised its interpretation of the OSCE arms embargo for Azerbaijan in a written ministerial statement on 2 July 2014 as "prohibiting the supply of military list equipment which have the technical capacity to be used or modified for use in the Nagorno-Karabakh region or on the land border between Armenia and Azerbaijan".*

**Azerbaijan:** Given the OSCE embargo of 1992 to Azerbaijan why were SIELs for equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography approved?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, the UK interpreted the OSCE arms embargo for Azerbaijan as prohibiting the export of any military goods or technology to any person, or to any destination, in Armenia or in Azerbaijan. It has been UK practice occasionally to make an exemption in its interpretation of the embargo by approving exports of non-lethal military goods to humanitarian, media or peacekeeping organisations where it is clear that the embargo was not intended to prevent those exports and there is a strong humanitarian case for them.*

*The SIELs under reference were approved because the equipment was not military rated and thus not covered by the UK interpretation of the OSCE embargo. We had no other*

**Criteria concerns.**

*The UK revised its interpretation of the OSCE arms embargo for Azerbaijan in a written ministerial statement on 2 July 2014 as “prohibiting the supply of military list equipment which have the technical capacity to be used or modified for use in the Nagorno–Karabakh region or on the land border between Armenia and Azerbaijan”.*

**Bahrain:** Given the concerns over human rights raised during the protests on-going since 2011 and the FCO’s latest update on Human Rights concerns regarding Bahrain why were SIELs for gun silencers, small arms ammunition and sporting guns approved?

Why was an OIEL for equipment employing cryptography refused?

*The SIELs under reference were approved because they were for personal end use for sporting/hunting purposes. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we have Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Bangladesh:** Why was an OIEL for imaging cameras refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we have Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Belgium:** Why was an OIEL for components for military aero-engines and military aero-engines revoked?

*The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills wrote to the Committees on 30 June 2014 regarding discrepancies in data published on revoked licences. The Secretary of State explained in this letter that processing errors caused certain licences (including those under reference) to be reported as revoked, but no actual revocation took place.*

*These errors affected the OIEL for components for military aero-engines and military aero-engines as follows:*

*“In this case the exporter had asked for the coverage of the licence to be amended shortly after it was issued. The amendment has caused the licence to be reported as revoked, but no actual revocation took place.”*

**Brazil:** Why was an OIEL for imaging cameras refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we have Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow*

*more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Chad:** Why was an OIEL for components for military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, technology for general military aircraft components and technology for military support aircraft refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we have Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**China:** Given the Madrid European Council arms embargo to China and that China was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report published in April 2013, why were SIELs for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing approved?

None of the goods and equipment approved under SIELs were covered by the UK interpretation of the EU Arms Embargo.

*The UK interpretation of the Arms Embargo on China, given in Parliament on 3 June 1998, is that it applies to:*

- *Lethal weapons, such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles. Specially designed components for these and ammunition.*
- *Military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms.*
- *Any equipment which might be used for internal repression.*

*Some approved items were military-rated but were intended for non-lethal purposes. As such, they were not covered by the EU Arms Embargo e.g. industrial components or NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) equipment for use by environmental agencies. All items not covered by the embargo are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria.*

*In Q4 2013 the majority of applications for cryptographic related equipment were for commercial equipment for commercial end-use: building public mobile phone networks and internet infrastructure, or for use in building virtual private networks for private companies. A licence would not have been granted if there was a clear risk that the items might have been used for internal repression.*

**Colombia:** Given that Colombia was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report published in April 2013, why were SIELs for radio jamming equipment and software for radio jamming equipment and a SITCL for body armour with destinations including Sri Lanka approved?

*The SIELs under reference were approved because we assessed that there was no clear risk that these exports might be used for internal repression.*

*The Government does have some human right concerns about Colombia but our assessment noted the improvement in the human rights record of Colombian law enforcement agencies in recent years and that there was no evidence to support a clear risk of this sort of equipment being deployed in human rights violations.*

*The SITCL under reference was approved because it was for garments to protect personnel against IED and mines.*

**Comoros:** Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt and for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for crowd control ammunition, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for gun mountings, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, components for sporting guns, components for tear gas/irritant ammunition, components for wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, crowd control ammunition, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun mountings, military communications equipment, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns, tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights approved?

*The OITCL under reference was approved because it was for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*To qualify for a licence, private security companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.*

**Congo, Democratic Republic of:** Given that arms sanctions against DRC are currently in place under UN Security Council resolution 1807 (renewed through UNSCR 2078 (2012)) and that the DRC was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report published in April 2013, why was were SIELs for equipment employing cryptography and OIELS for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for cryptographic software approved?

*All these licences were for the export of equipment intended for civil end use by commercial companies. These dual use goods were not military rated and therefore not covered by the*

*arms embargo and we had no other Criteria concerns.*

**Djibouti:** Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt and for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, blank/inert ammunition, body armour, clips for assault rifles, clips for machine guns, clips for pistols, clips for rifles, clips for sniper rifles, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for crowd control ammunition, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for gun mountings, components gun silencers, components for machine guns, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, components for sporting guns, components for tear gas/irritant ammunition, components for wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, crowd control ammunition, flash suppressors, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun mountings, gun silencers, machine guns, military communications equipment, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns, tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights approved?

*The OITCL under reference was approved because it was for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*To qualify for a licence, private security companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.*

**Egypt:** Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country, why were SIELs for components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment and equipment employing cryptography approved?

Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for equipment including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for crowd control ammunition, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for gun mountings, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, components for sporting guns, components for tear gas/irritant ammunition, components for wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, components for weapon night sights, components for

weapon sights, crowd control ammunition, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun mountings, military communications equipment, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns, tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights approved?

*The SIEL for components for military communications equipment and military communications equipment was approved because it was a temporary export for product demonstration purposes. We did not assess the temporary demonstration of this equipment met the threshold for refusal or suspension. Approval of this export does not fetter our discretion in considering future applications for permanent export of this product.*

*The SIEL for equipment employing cryptography was approved because it for product demonstrations purposes for civilian/commercial end use. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*The OITCL under reference was approved because it was for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*To qualify for a licence, private security companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.*

**Eritrea:** Given the arms embargo issued under UN Security Council Resolution 1907 and EU Council decision 2010/127/CFSP for arms to Eritrea the Committees wish to know why was an OIEL for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software and technology for equipment employing cryptography approved?

*The OIEL under reference was approved because it was for the export of equipment intended for civil end use by commercial companies. These dual use goods were not military rated and therefore not covered by the arms embargo and we had no other Criteria concerns.*

**France:** Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country why were incorporated SIELs for destinations including Egypt for components for military combat vehicles and components for weapon control equipment approved?

*The incorporated SIELs under reference were approved because Egypt was not an end user for any of the equipment. The Quarterly Report entry for France contains the following explanatory note: "The items being incorporated in this destination are ultimately destined for all or some of the following [destinations]"*

**Germany:** Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the

Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country why were incorporated SIELs for destinations including Egypt for components for military combat vehicles, components for tanks, general military vehicle components, ground vehicle military communications equipment and military communications equipment approved?

*The incorporated SIELs for military combat vehicles, components for tanks, general military vehicle components, ground vehicle military communications equipment were approved because Egypt was not an end user for any of the equipment. The Quarterly Report entry for Germany contains the following explanatory note: “The items being incorporated in this destination are ultimately destined for all or some of the following [destinations]”.*

*The incorporated SIEL for military communications equipment was approved because we assessed this licence did not exceed the threshold for refusal or suspension.*

**India:** The Committees wish to know why SIELs for instrumentation cameras and an OIEL for imaging cameras were refused.

Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country why was an OITCL for destinations including Egypt for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?

*The SIELs under reference were refused under Criterion 7 because we assessed there was a risk that the equipment might be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.*

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we have Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users*

*The OITCL under reference was approved because it was for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*To qualify for a licence, private security companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies’ control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.*

**Indonesia:** Why were OIELs for imaging cameras; and components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, equipment for the use of NBC protective/defensive equipment and NBC protective/defensive equipment refused?

*The OIELs under reference were refused because we have Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Israel:** Why were SIELs for incorporation to Azerbaijan for components for military radars and equipment employing cryptography refused?

*The SIEL under reference was refused under Criterion 1 because the UK interpretation of the OSCE arms embargo on Azerbaijan prohibits the export of such components.*

**Jordan:** Why was an OIEL for equipment employing cryptography refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we have Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Kazakhstan:** Why was an OIEL for imaging cameras refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we have Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Kenya:** Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country why was an OITCL for destinations including Egypt for acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for crowd control ammunition, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for gun mountings, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, components for sporting guns, components for tear gas/irritant ammunition, components for wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, crowd control ammunition, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun mountings, military communications equipment, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns, tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights approved?

*The OITCL under reference was approved because it was for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*To qualify for a licence, private security companies must meet strict conditions. They must*



*keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.*

**Latvia:** Why was an OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of software for military communications equipment revoked?

*The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills wrote to the Committees on 30 June 2014 regarding discrepancies in data published on revoked licences. The Secretary Of State explained in this letter that processing errors caused certain licences (including those under reference) to be reported as revoked, but no actual revocation took place.*

*These errors affected the OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of military communications equipment as follows:*

*“When an OIEL nears its expiry date an exporter may request a short extension to the licence to allow exports to continue while a new (replacement) application is processed. In a few such cases the exporter will ask us to remove some of the goods lines from the extended licence. The way this request is processed within SPIRE causes the whole licence to appear in the Pivot Report as revoked, when in fact only specific goods lines have been removed.”*

**Madagascar:** Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country why was an OITCL for destinations including Egypt for acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for crowd control ammunition, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for gun mountings, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, components for sporting guns, components for tear gas/irritant ammunition, components for wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, crowd control ammunition, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun mountings, military communications equipment, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns, tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights approved?

*The OITCL under reference was approved because it was for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*To qualify for a licence, private security companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times and it must be stored securely when*

*not in use.*

**Malaysia:** Why was an OIEL for imaging cameras refused?

The Committees wish to know why was an OIEL for components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment and test equipment for military aero-engines revoked.

*The OIEL for imaging cameras was refused because we have Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

*The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills wrote to the Committees on 30 June 2014 regarding discrepancies in data published on revoked licences. The Secretary Of State explained in this letter that processing errors caused certain licences (including those under reference) to be reported as revoked, but no actual revocation took place.*

*These errors affected the OIEL for components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment and test equipment for military aero-engines as follows:*

*“In this case the exporter had asked for the coverage of the licence to be amended shortly after it was issued. The amendment has caused the licence to be reported as revoked, but no actual revocation took place.”*

**Maldives:** Why were SIELs for body armour, components for body armour, components for sniper rifles, imaging cameras, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights refused?

*The SIELs under reference were refused under Criterion 2 because we assessed there was a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression.*

**Mauritius:** Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country why was an OITCL for destinations including Egypt for acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for crowd control ammunition, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for gun mountings, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, components for sporting guns, components for tear gas/irritant ammunition, components for wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, components for weapon night sights, components for

weapon sights, crowd control ammunition, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun mountings, military communications equipment, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns, tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights approved?

*The OITCL under reference was approved because it was for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*To qualify for a licence, private security companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.*

**Morocco:** Why was an OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of software for military communications equipment revoked?

*The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills wrote to the Committees on 30 June 2014 regarding discrepancies in data published on revoked licences. The Secretary Of State explained in this letter that processing errors caused certain licences (including those under reference) to be reported as revoked, but no actual revocation took place.*

*These errors affected the OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of military communications equipment as follows:*

*“When an OIEL nears its expiry date an exporter may request a short extension to the licence to allow exports to continue while a new (replacement) application is processed. In a few such cases the exporter will ask us to remove some of the goods lines from the extended licence. The way this request is processed within SPIRE causes the whole licence to appear in the Pivot Report as revoked, when in fact only specific goods lines have been removed.”*

**Mozambique:** Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country why was an OITCL for destinations including Egypt for acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for crowd control ammunition, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for gun mountings, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, components for sporting guns, components for tear gas/irritant ammunition, components for wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, crowd control ammunition, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun mountings, military communications equipment, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns, tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and

weapon sights approved?

*The OITCL under reference was approved because it was for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*To qualify for a licence, private security companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.*

**Nigeria:** Why were a SIEL for radio jamming equipment refused and a SIEL for radio jamming equipment and software replicating controlled telecommunications equipment revoked?

*The SIELs under reference were refused and revoked under Criterion 2 in response to human rights developments in Nigeria because we assessed there was a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression.*

**Oman:** Why was an OIEL for equipment employing cryptography refused?

Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt and for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, blank/inert ammunition, body armour, clips for assault rifles, clips for machine guns, clips for pistols, clips for rifles, clips for sniper rifles, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for crowd control ammunition, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for gun mountings, components gun silencers, components for machine guns, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, components for sporting guns, components for tear gas/irritant ammunition, components for wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, crowd control ammunition, flash suppressors, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun mountings, gun silencers, machine guns, military communications equipment, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns, tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights approved?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because this was an open licence where no named end users were identified. We were therefore unable to make an assessment of the end users and in this case it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

*The OITCL under reference was approved because it was for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*To qualify for a licence, private security companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.*

**Pakistan:** Why was an OIEL for imaging cameras refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we have Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Philippines:** Why was an OIEL for imaging cameras refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we have Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Qatar:** Why was an OIEL for equipment employing cryptography refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we have Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Russia:** Why was an OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of software for military communications equipment revoked?

*The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills wrote to the Committees on 30 June 2014 regarding discrepancies in data published on revoked licences. The Secretary Of State explained in this letter that processing errors caused certain licences (including those under reference) to be reported as revoked, but no actual revocation took place.*

*These errors affected the OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of military communications equipment as follows:*

*“When an OIEL nears its expiry date an exporter may request a short extension to the licence to allow exports to continue while a new (replacement) application is processed. In a few such cases the exporter will ask us to remove some of the goods lines from the extended licence. The way this request is processed within SPIRE causes the whole licence to appear in the Pivot Report as revoked, when in fact only specific goods lines have been removed.”*

**Saudi Arabia:** Given that Saudi Arabia was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report published in April 2013, why were SIELS for body armour, components for military combat vehicles, equipment for the production of

machine guns, military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, weapon mounts and weapon night sights approved?

Given Criteria 4, “Preservation of regional peace, security and stability” and the regional conflicts taking place in Syria and Iraq why were all the above items approved?

Why were OIELs for equipment employing cryptography; imaging cameras; and components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, equipment for the use of NBC protective/defensive equipment and NB protective/defensive equipment refused?

Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt and for goods including assault rifles, blank/inert ammunition, body armour, clips for assault rifles, clips for machine guns, clips for pistols, clips for rifles, clips for sniper rifles, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for gun mountings, components gun silencers, components for machine guns, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, components for sporting guns, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, flash suppressors, gun mountings, gun silencers, machine guns, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights approved?

*Saudi Arabia has been and remains the target of external aggression and domestic terrorist threats over many years. Most recently, Saudi towns and security forces in both the northern border area close to Iraq and to the south with Yemen have been attacked by terrorist groups. The SIELs under reference were approved because we assessed there were legitimate reasons for the Saudi authorities to require this equipment. The UK supports efforts by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to improve regional security cooperation. Defence and security exports to Saudi Arabia and other GCC states are consistent with this policy.*

*The OIELs under reference were refused because we assessed that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

*The OITCL under reference was approved because it was for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*To qualify for a licence, private security companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies’ control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.*

**Somalia:** Given the continued arms trade sanctions against Somalia adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 2093 (2013) and that Somalia was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report published in April 2013, why were SIELs for components for military support vehicles, military support vehicles, equipment

employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography approved?

*The sanctions in place for Somalia provide for exemptions for supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, weapons and military equipment for the support or use of AMISOM or the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, or to be used by UN member states against piracy, or supplies and assistance for developing the security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia. Procedures vary: some exports must be approved in advance by the Sanctions Committee.*

*All exports for this destination were approved in accordance with the sanctions in place and were for international organisations or civilian/commercial end use.*

**South Africa:** Why was a SIEL for aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment and military communications equipment refused?

Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country why was an OITCL for destinations including Egypt for acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for crowd control ammunition, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for gun mountings, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, components for sporting guns, components for tear gas/irritant ammunition, components for wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, crowd control ammunition, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun mountings, military communications equipment, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns, tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights approved?

*The SIEL under reference was refused because the exporter did not provide sufficient information or assurances over potential ultimate recipients or end use. We therefore assessed there was a clear risk that the goods might be diverted within the buyer country or re exported under undesirable conditions.*

*The OITCL under reference was approved because it was for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*To qualify for a licence, private security companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.*

**Sri Lanka:** Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt

immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country why was an OITCL for destinations including Egypt for acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for crowd control ammunition, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for gun mountings, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, components for sporting guns, components for tear gas/irritant ammunition, components for wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, crowd control ammunition, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun mountings, military communications equipment, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns, tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights approved?

*The OITCL under reference was approved because it was for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*To qualify for a licence, private security companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.*

**South Sudan:** Given the embargo implemented by EU Council Decision 2011/423/CFSP, as amended and UN Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004), that South Sudan was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report published in April 2013, why were SEILs for equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing technology approved?

*The UK interprets the sanctions to cover all items on the UK military list. These goods are on the EU dual-use list rather than military-rated and are therefore not covered by the sanctions.*

*The licences were for the export of equipment to a commercial end user to upgrade existing network infrastructure. We had no Criteria concerns.*

**Tanzania:** Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country why was an OITCL for destinations including Egypt for acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for crowd control ammunition, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for gun mountings,



components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, components for sporting guns, components for tear gas/irritant ammunition, components for wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, crowd control ammunition, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun mountings, military communications equipment, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns, tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights approved?

*The OITCL under reference was approved because it was for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*To qualify for a licence, private security companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.*

**Thailand:** Why were OIELs for imaging cameras, and components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, equipment for the use of NBC protective/defensive equipment and NBC protective/defensive equipment refused?

*The OIELs under reference was refused because we have Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Tunisia:** Why was an OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of software for military communications equipment revoked?

*The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills wrote to the Committees on 30 June 2014 regarding discrepancies in data published on revoked licences. The Secretary Of State explained in this letter that processing errors caused certain licences (including those under reference) to be reported as revoked, but no actual revocation took place.*

*These errors affected the OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of military communications equipment as follows:*

*“When an OIEL nears its expiry date an exporter may request a short extension to the licence to allow exports to continue while a new (replacement) application is processed. In a few such cases the exporter will ask us to remove some of the goods lines from the extended licence. The way this request is processed within SPIRE causes the whole licence to appear in the Pivot Report as revoked, when in fact only specific goods lines have been removed.”*

**Turkey:** Why were SIELs for body armour, components for body armour, military helmets and spectrometers refused?

Why were OIELs for imaging cameras, and components for NBC protective/defensive

equipment, equipment for the use of NBC protective/defensive equipment and NBC protective/defensive equipment refused?

Why was an OIEL for components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment and test equipment for military aero-engines revoked?

*The SIEL for body armour, military helmets was refused under Criterion 2 because the export was destined for ultimate end use by a government user in Turkey involved in public security. We had continuing human rights concerns about the policing of demonstrations in Turkey. We assessed that there was a clear risk that this equipment might be used with existing equipment for internal repression and that the export would risk aggravating existing tensions.*

*The SIEL for spectrometers was refused because we assessed that this export represented a clear and unacceptable risk of diversion to a WMD programme in another country of high proliferation concern.*

*The OIELs for imaging cameras, and components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, equipment for the use of NBC protective/defensive equipment and NBC*

*protective/defensive equipment were refused because we have Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users*

*The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills wrote to the Committees on 30 June 2014 regarding discrepancies in data published on revoked licences. The Secretary Of State explained in this letter that processing errors caused certain licences (including those under reference) to be reported as revoked, but no actual revocation took place.*

*These errors affected the OIEL for components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment and test equipment for military aero-engines as follows:*

*“In this case the exporter had asked for the coverage of the licence to be amended shortly after it was issued. The amendment has caused the licence to be reported as revoked, but no actual revocation took place.”*

**Turkmenistan:** Why was an OIEL for diver location sonars and software for dive locations sonars refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because Turkmenistan was removed as a destination in the licence application at the exporter’s request.*

**United Arab Emirates:** Why was an OIEL for equipment employing cryptography refused?

Why were OIELs for: military engineer vehicles; software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of military communications equipment; and components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment and test equipment for military aero-engines revoked?

Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country why was an OITCL for destinations including Egypt for assault rifles, blank/inert ammunition, body armour, clips for assault rifles, clips for machine guns, clips for pistols, clips for rifles, clips for sniper rifles, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for gun mountings, components gun silencers, components for machine guns, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, components for sporting guns, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, flash suppressors, gun mountings, gun silencers, machine guns, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights approved?

*The OIEL for equipment employing cryptography was refused because we have Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

*The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills wrote to the Committees on 30 June 2014 regarding discrepancies in data published on revoked licences. The Secretary Of State explained in this letter that processing errors caused certain licences (including those under reference) to be reported as revoked, but no actual revocation took place.*

*These errors affected the OIELs for military engineer vehicles; software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of military communications equipment as follows:*

*“When an OIEL nears its expiry date an exporter may request a short extension to the licence to allow exports to continue while a new (replacement) application is processed. In a few such cases the exporter will ask us to remove some of the goods lines from the extended licence. The way this request is processed within SPIRE causes the whole licence to appear in the Pivot Report as revoked, when in fact only specific goods lines have been removed.”*

*These errors affected the OIEL for components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment and test equipment for military aero-engines as follows:*

*“In this case the exporter had asked for the coverage of the licence to be amended shortly after it was issued. The amendment has caused the licence to be reported as revoked, but no actual revocation took place.”*

*The OITCL under reference was approved because it was for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*To qualify for a licence, private security companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies’ control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.*

**United States of America:** Why were SIELs for components for combat helicopters and small arms ammunition refused?

Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, why was Egypt included in the list of countries for destination for an incorporated SIEL for equipment including components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military training equipment, components for military utility helicopters, components for targeting equipment, equipment for the use of military aircraft head-up/down displays, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, general military vehicle components, military aircraft head-up/down displays, military communications equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, range finding equipment, software for military communications equipment, targeting equipment, technology for military communications equipment, unfinished products for combat aircraft, unfinished products for military support aircraft, equipment employing cryptography, guidance/navigation equipment, radar equipment, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for radar equipment and technology for radar equipment approved?

Why was a SIEL for components for combat helicopters revoked?

*The SIEL for components for combat helicopters was refused under Criterion 2 because the export was destined for ultimate end use by a government user in Egypt involved in public security. We had continuing human rights concerns about the policing of demonstrations in Egypt. We assessed that there was a clear risk that this equipment might be used with existing equipment for internal repression and that the export would risk aggravating existing tensions.*

*The SIEL for small arms ammunition going to a stockist end user was refused under Criterion 2 because the exporter did not provide sufficient information or assurances about*

*who the ultimate end users would be. We therefore assessed there was a clear risk that the export might be used for internal repression in one of the end-user destination countries.*

*The incorporated SIEL for equipment including components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military training equipment, components for military utility helicopters, components for targeting equipment, equipment for the use of military aircraft head-up/down displays, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, general military vehicle components, military aircraft head-up/down displays, military communications equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, range finding equipment, software for military communications equipment, targeting equipment, technology for military communications equipment, unfinished products for combat aircraft, unfinished products for military support aircraft, equipment employing cryptography, guidance/navigation equipment, radar equipment, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for radar equipment and technology for radar equipment was approved because Egypt was not an end user for any of the equipment. The Quarterly Report entry for United States contains the following explanatory note: “The items being incorporated in this destination are ultimately destined for all or some of the following [destinations]”.*

*The incorporated SIEL for components for military aero-engines was approved because we assessed this licence did not exceed the threshold for refusal or suspension.*

*The ultimate end user for the SIEL for components for combat helicopters was in Egypt. This licence was revoked in accordance with EU policy in place for this destination. In response to events in Egypt, EU Foreign Ministers agreed in August 2013 to suspend export licensing to Egypt for equipment which might be used for internal repression. This suspension applied to licences for the Egyptian Army, Air Force and Internal Security Forces or Ministry of the Interior. It applied to extant licences as well as applications for new licences.*

**Vessel, Platform in International Waters:** Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country why was an OITCL for destinations including Egypt for acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, blank/inert ammunition, body armour, clips for assault rifles, clips for machine guns, clips for pistols, clips for rifles, clips for sniper rifles, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for crowd control ammunition, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for gun mountings, components gun silencers, components for machine guns, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, components for sporting guns, components for tear gas/irritant ammunition, components for wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition,

components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, crowd control ammunition, flash suppressors, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun mountings, gun silencers, machine guns, military communications equipment, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns, tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights approved?

*The OITCL under reference was approved because it was for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*To qualify for a licence, private security companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.*

**Zimbabwe:** Given that Zimbabwe was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report published in April 2013, why were SIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography, and OIELs for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for cryptographic software approved? The Committees wish to know what equipment this is, what the uses of this equipment are and who the recipients of this equipment are.

*The licences under reference were approved because they were for the export of equipment to commercial end users to upgrade existing network infrastructure. We had no Criteria concerns.*<sup>603</sup>

## **The Committees’ 2014 Quarter 1 (January – March) questions and the Government’s answers**

**Azerbaijan:** Given the OSCE embargo of 1992 to Azerbaijan why was a SIEL for equipment employing cryptography approved?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, the SIEL under reference is for the export of equipment destined for commercial end use. The equipment is not military-rated and so not covered by the UK interpretation of the OSCE embargo. We had no other Consolidated Criteria concerns.*

**Bahrain:** Given the concerns over human rights raised during the protests on-going since 2011 and the FCO’s latest update on Human Rights concerns regarding Bahrain why were SIELs for components for gun mountings, components for machine guns, equipment for the use of machine guns, gun mountings, hand grenades, machine guns, software for telecommunications jamming equipment and telecommunications jamming equipment approved?

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<sup>603</sup> The answer to the Committees’ second question on Zimbabwe was provided on a “classified” basis and, therefore, has not been published.

*Since the popular unrest that started in February 2011, we have monitored the situation in Bahrain closely, assessing export licence applications on a case-by-case basis. We continue to pay particular attention to the risk that goods might be used in internal repression (Criterion 2) and/or used to aggravate existing tensions in the country (Criterion 3). We assessed that the level of violence has diminished since 2011, although incidents increase during sensitive anniversaries and clashes in Shi'a villages continue. We also assessed that Bahrain had significantly moderated its approach to public order situations.*

*The SIEL for “components for gun mountings, components for machine guns, equipment for the use of machine guns, gun mountings, machine guns” was approved because we assessed that the stated end user was unlikely to be deployed to handle public order incidents. We also assessed that the stated end use (for coastal protection purposes) was credible.*

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, the SIEL for hand grenades (and training devices containing military pyrotechnic materials) was approved because the export was for training purposes only. We assessed that the equipment (non-lethal training grenades designed for explosive simulation and signalling purposes) had no credible role to play in internal repression.*

*The SIEL for software for telecommunications jamming equipment and telecommunications jamming equipment was approved because it was a temporary export for product demonstration purposes. We did not assess that the temporary demonstration of this equipment met the threshold for refusal or suspension. Approval of this export does not fetter our discretion in considering future applications for permanent export of this product.*

**Bangladesh:** Why was a SIEL for equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography refused?

*The SIEL under reference was refused under Criterion 2 because we assessed that there was a clear risk that the export might be used for internal repression.*

*The SIEL was subsequently reassessed and approved after appeal.*

**Benin:** Why was an OITCL for body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon cleaning equipment refused?

*The OITCL under reference was refused under Criterion 1.*

*For a UK exporter to export weapons to a West African country it must first obtain an exemption from the ECOWAS commission in Nigeria. It states clearly in the ECOWAS guidance that “An export licence for small arms and light weapons (SALW), components or ammunition will not be issued unless the ECOWAS Commission has issued an exception to the moratorium. The exporter must also have proof from the ECOWAS Commission that no other member state objects to this importation”. In this instance the exporter had not been able to provide the necessary exemption.*

*This application also included the use of the Ocean 7 floating armoury which would be operating off the coast of Nigeria. The UK's policy on floating armouries was only*

*changed to allow the use of these for counter piracy operations in the waters off Somalia in the Indian Ocean, and not for West Africa. On that basis this application also had to be rejected as it was against current UK Policy.*

**Brazil:** Why was an OIEL for components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives and test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives revoked?

*The exporter submitted a licence extension request for the OIEL under reference in Q1 2014.*

*The extension request was rejected for Brazil because we had Consolidated Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Burkina Faso:** Why was an OIEL for components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of military helicopters, equipment for the development of military support aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew



breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, test models for military support aircraft and test models for military training aircraft refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we had Consolidated Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Burundi:** Why was a SIEL transshipment for water cannons refused?

*We refused the SIEL under reference because we assessed that there was a clear risk the export might be used for internal repression.*

**Cape Verde:** Why were OITCLs for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for body armour, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon cleaning equipment refused?

*We refused the OITCL for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, military helmets, pistols, small arms ammunition and sniper rifles for this destination under Criterion 1 because the exporter did not submit the required ECOWAS exemption certificate.*

*The OITCL for body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon cleaning was refused under Criterion 1.*

*For a UK exporter to export weapons to a West African country it must first obtain an exemption from the ECOWAS commission in Nigeria. It states clearly in the ECOWAS guidance that “An export licence for small arms and light weapons (SALW), components or ammunition will not be issued unless the ECOWAS Commission has issued an exception to the moratorium. The exporter must also have proof from the ECOWAS Commission that no other member state objects to this importation”. In this instance the exporter had not been able to provide the necessary exemption.*

*This application also included the use of the Ocean 7 floating armoury which would be operating off the coast of Nigeria. The UK's policy on floating armouries was only changed to allow the use of these for counter piracy operations in the waters off Somalia in the Indian Ocean, and not for West Africa. On that basis this application also had to be rejected as it was against current UK Policy.*

**Chad:** Why was an OIEL for components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, components

for equipment for the production of military helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of military helicopters, equipment for the development of military support aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, test models for military support aircraft and test models for military training aircraft refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we had Consolidated Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Chile:** Why was an OIEL for components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives and test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives revoked?

*The exporter submitted a licence extension request for the OIEL under reference in Q1 2014.*

*The extension request was rejected for Chile because we had Consolidated Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about*

*whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**China:** Given the Madrid European Council arms embargo to China and that China was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report published in April 2013:

- why was a SIEL for components for combat aircraft approved when the footnote stated that the licence was granted “for accessories/spare parts for civilian/commercial end use”; and
- why were SIELs for components for combat naval vessels, components for military communications equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, general naval vessel components, military communications equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, small arms ammunition, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military patrol/assault craft and unfinished products for military patrol/assault craft approved?

*As noted in the Quarterly Report footnotes, all exports for this destination were approved in accordance with the sanctions in place.*

*None of the goods and equipment under reference were covered by the UK interpretation of the arms embargo. Some approved items were military-rated but were intended for non-lethal purposes. As such, they were not covered by the arms embargo. All items not covered by the embargo are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria. The Government is satisfied that the currently extant licences for China are compliant with the Consolidated Criteria.*

Why was an OIEL for dimensional measuring equipment refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we had Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Colombia:** Given that Colombia was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report published in April 2013, why were SIELs for anti-riot/ballistic shields, radio jamming equipment and software for radio jamming equipment approved?

*The SIELs under reference were approved because we assessed that they did not exceed the risk thresholds under the Consolidated Criteria.*

*The Government does have some human rights concerns about Colombia but our assessment noted the improvement in the human rights record of Colombian law enforcement agencies in recent years, and that there was no evidence to support a clear risk of this sort of equipment being deployed in human rights violations.*

***The SIELS for radio jamming equipment and software for radio jamming equipment were also temporary licences. Approval of these exports does not fetter our discretion in considering future applications for permanent export of this product.***

Why was an OIEL for components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives and test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives revoked?

***The exporter submitted a licence extension request for the OIEL under reference in Q1 2014.***

***The extension request was rejected for Colombia because we had Consolidated Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.***

Egypt: Why was an OIEL for components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives and test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives revoked?

***The exporter submitted a licence extension request for the OIEL under reference in Q1 2014.***

***The extension request was rejected for Egypt because we had Consolidated Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.***

**Equatorial Guinea:** Why was a SIEL for imaging cameras refused?

***The SIEL under reference was refused under Criterion 2 because the export was destined for ultimate end use by a government/law enforcement agency end user in Equatorial Guinea. We had continuing human rights concerns about Equatorial Guinea. We assessed that there was a clear risk that this equipment might be used with existing materiel for internal repression in the event of any new aggravation of existing tensions.***

**Ghana:** Why was an OITCL for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, military helmets, pistols, small arms ammunition and sniper rifles refused?

***The OITCL under reference was refused for this destination under Criterion 1 because the exporter did not submit the required ECOWAS exemption certificate.***

**Israel:** Why was an OIEL for components for fire location equipment, components for military radars, components for range finding equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment and components for targeting equipment refused?

***The OIEL under reference was refused because we had Consolidated Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no***

*named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Kenya:** Why was a SIEL for sporting guns refused?

*The SIEL under reference was refused under Criterion 7 because of concerns over potential recipients and end use. The goods were for a stockist end user and the exporter did not provide sufficient information or assurances over potential ultimate recipients or end use. We assessed that there was a risk that the goods might be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.*

**Korea, South:** Why was a SIEL for components for military combat vehicles refused?

*The SIEL under reference was refused under Military End Use Control. The goods were intended for incorporation into military equipment in South Korea, for supply to Libya. Libya is subject to an arms embargo.*

**Kuwait:** Why was an OIEL for components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military combat vehicles, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military support vehicles, components for military training aircraft, components for tanks, general military aircraft components and general military vehicle components refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we had Consolidated Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users*

**Libya:** Why was a SIEL for military combat vehicles refused?

*The licence under reference was refused under Criteria 2, 3, 4 and 7 because the exporter did not provide sufficient information or assurances about potential ultimate recipients or end use.*

**Morocco:** Why was an OIEL for components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the development of

combat helicopters, equipment for the development of military helicopters, equipment for the development of military support aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, test models for military support aircraft and test models for military training aircraft refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we had Consolidated Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Mozambique:** Why was an OIEL for components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of military helicopters, equipment for the development of military support aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of military helicopters,

equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, test models for military support aircraft and test models for military training aircraft refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we had Consolidated Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Nigeria:** Why was an OITCL for body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon cleaning equipment refused?

*The OITCL under reference was refused Criterion 1.*

*For a UK exporter to export weapons to a West African country it must first obtain an exemption from the ECOWAS commission in Nigeria. It states clearly in the ECOWAS guidance that “An export licence for small arms and light weapons (SALW), components or ammunition will not be issued unless the ECOWAS Commission has issued an exception to the moratorium. The exporter must also have proof from the ECOWAS Commission that no other member state objects to this importation”. In this instance the exporter had not been able to provide the necessary exemption.*

*This application also included the use of the Ocean 7 floating armoury which would be operating off the coast of Nigeria. The UK's policy on floating armouries was only changed to allow the use of these for counter piracy operations in the waters off Somalia in the Indian Ocean, and not for West Africa. On that basis this application also had to be rejected as it was against current UK Policy.*

**Pakistan:** Why were SIELs for assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for pistols, components for rifles, gun

silencers, military electronic equipment, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights refused?

*The SIELS for assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, gun silencers, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights was refused under Criterion 3 (the internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts and Criterion 7 (the existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions).*

*The SIEL for components for naval electrical/electronic equipment was refused under Criterion 5 (the national security of the UK, or territories whose external relations are the UK's responsibility, and of its allies, EU Member States and other friendly countries, taking into account the need to protect UK military classified information and capabilities).*

*The SIEL for military electronic equipment was refused under Criterion 5 (the national security of the UK, or territories whose external relations are the UK's responsibility, and of its allies, EU Member States and other friendly countries, taking into account the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer), and Criterion 7 (the existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions).*

Why was an OIEL for components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives and test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives revoked?

*The exporter submitted a licence extension request for the OIEL under reference in Q1 2014.*

*The extension request was rejected for Pakistan because we had Consolidated Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELS would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Qatar:** Why was some or all of a SIEL for weapon cleaning equipment revoked?

Why was a SIEL for weapon cleaning equipment revoked?

*The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills wrote to the Committees on 30 June 2014 regarding discrepancies in the published data on revoked licences. The Secretary of State explained in this letter that processing errors caused certain licences (including those under reference) to be reported as revoked, but no actual revocation took place.*

*These errors affected the licenses under reference as follows:*

*“In this case the exporter had asked for the coverage of the licence to be amended shortly after it was issued. The amendment has caused the licence to be reported as revoked, but no actual revocation took place.”*



**Saudi Arabia:** Why was an OIEL for components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military combat vehicles, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military support vehicles, components for military training aircraft, components for tanks, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we had Consolidated Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Singapore:** Why was an OIEL for dimensional imaging equipment refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we had Consolidated Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**South Africa:** Why was an OIEL for weapon night sights refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we had Consolidated Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

Why were OIELs for: components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives and test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives; and components for air-to-surface missiles, components for bombs, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for devices containing military pyrotechnic materials, components for man portable air defence system missiles, components for surface launched rockets, components for surface-to-air missiles, components for torpedoes, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for devices containing military pyrotechnic materials and technology for man portable air defence system missiles, technology for surface launched rockets, technology for surface-to-air missiles and technology for torpedoes revoked?

*The exporter submitted a licence extension request for the OIEL for components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives and test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives in Q1 2014.*

*The extension request was rejected for South Africa because we had Consolidated Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about*

*whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

*The OIEL for components for air-to-surface missiles, components for bombs, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for devices containing military pyrotechnic materials, components for man portable air defence system missiles, components for surface launched rockets, components for surface-to-air missiles, components for torpedoes, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for devices containing military pyrotechnic materials and technology for man portable air defence system missiles, technology for surface launched rockets, technology for surface-to-air missiles and technology for torpedoes was revoked for South Africa because this destination was removed from the licence application with the exporter's agreement to expedite processing of the licence application*

**Sri Lanka:** Why was a SITCL for components for unmanned air vehicles refused?

*The SITCL under reference was refused under Criterion 2 because the export was destined for ultimate end use by a government/armed forces end user in Sri Lanka. We had continuing human rights concerns about Sri Lanka. We assessed that there was a clear risk that this equipment might be used with existing materiel for internal repression in the event of any new aggravation of existing tensions.*

**Taiwan:** Why was an OIEL for dimensional imaging equipment refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we had Consolidated Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Thailand:** Why was an OIEL for dimensional imaging equipment refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we had Consolidated Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Turkey:** Why were SIELs for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, military helmets and dimensional measuring equipment refused?

Why was an SITCL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection refused?

*The licences under reference were refused under Criterion 2 because the export was destined for ultimate end use by Turkish law enforcement agencies. We had continuing human rights concerns about the policing of demonstrations in Turkey. We assessed that there was a clear risk that this equipment might be used with existing materiel for internal repression in the event of any new aggravation of existing tensions.*

**United Arab Emirates:** Why were SIELs for accessories for valves, components for machine tools, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment and machine tools refused?

*The SIELs for accessories for valves, components for machine tools and machines tools were refused because we assessed the exports represented a clear and unacceptable risk of diversion to a Weapons of Mass Destruction programme in another country of high proliferation concern.*

*The SIEL for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing was refused under Criterion 7 (the existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions) because we assessed the goods had a utility in programmes of concern and the goods were going into stock with no named end users so there was a risk of diversion.*

**Uzbekistan:** Why were SIELs for equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography refused?

*The SIEL under reference was refused under Criterion 2 because the export was destined for ultimate end use by a government/armed forces end user in Uzbekistan. We had continuing human rights concerns about Uzbekistan. We assessed that there was a clear risk that this equipment might be used with existing materiel for internal repression in the event of any new aggravation of existing tensions.*

**Vietnam:** Why was an OIEL for components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military combat vehicles, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military support vehicles, components for military training aircraft, components for tanks, general military aircraft components and general military vehicle components refused?

*The OIEL under reference was refused because we had Consolidated Criteria concerns about some end users in this destination. As this was an open licence, and there were no named end users, the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

## **The Committees' 2014 Quarter 2 (April – June) questions and the Government's answers**

**Azerbaijan:** Given the OSCE embargo of 1992 to Azerbaijan why were SIELs for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography approved?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, the UK interprets the OSCE arms embargo for Azerbaijan as prohibiting the export of any military goods or technology to any person, or to any destination, in Azerbaijan. It has been UK practice to occasionally make an exemption in its interpretation of the embargo by approving exports of non-lethal military goods to humanitarian, media or peacekeeping organisations, where it is clear*

*that the embargo was not intended to prevent those exports and there is a strong humanitarian case for them.*

*The SIELs under reference were approved because they were for the export of equipment destined for commercial end use. The equipment is not military rated and not covered by the UK interpretation of the OSCE embargo. We had no other Consolidated Criteria concerns.*

**Bahrain:** Given the concerns over human rights raised during the protests on-going since 2011 and the FCO's latest update of 16 October 2014 on Human Rights concerns regarding Bahrain why were SIELs for equipment for the use of weapon night sights, weapon night sights, weapon sights, equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography approved?

*Since the popular unrest that started in February 2011, we have monitored the situation in Bahrain closely, assessing export licence applications on a case-by-case basis. We continue to pay particular attention to the risk that goods might be used in internal repression (Consolidated Criterion 2) and/or used to aggravate existing tensions in the country (Consolidated Criterion 3). We assessed that the level of violence has diminished since 2011, although incidents increase during sensitive anniversaries and clashes in Shi'a villages continue. We also assessed that Bahrain had significantly moderated its approach to public order situations.*

*As indicated in the Quarterly Report, the SIEL for equipment for the use of weapon night sights, weapon night sights and weapon sights was a temporary export. We assessed that the temporary export of relatively small quantities of this equipment for product demonstration purposes (and which would then be returned to the exporter) did not meet the threshold for refusal or suspension. Approval of this export does not fetter our discretion in considering future applications for permanent export of this product. Any future sales arising from the demonstration of these goods will be subject to a full assessment against the Consolidated Criteria, taking account of exact end user details and prevailing conditions on the ground.*

*The SIELs for equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography were approved because the equipment was destined for commercial end use.*

**Central African Republic:** Given UN Security Council Resolution 2127 (2013) establishing an arms embargo, why were SIELs for components for military support vehicles and military support vehicles; and a SITCL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection approved?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, UN Security Council Resolution 2127 (2013) established an arms embargo to restrict exports of arms, or related material, and of training, technical or financial assistance related to military activities; exemptions apply to some UN, humanitarian, peacekeeping and government entities. S/RES/2134 (2014) extended the arms embargo until 28 January 2015 and amended the exemptions.*

*The SIEL under reference was approved because the equipment was destined for an EU Member State armed forces end user on an international peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic.*

*The SITCL under reference was approved because the equipment was destined for an international organisation end user on a humanitarian mission in the Central African Republic.*

**China:** Why was an OIEL for pressure transducers, software for semiconductor process equipment and technology for semiconductor process equipment refused?

*This was an open licence and there were no named end users. As the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns, it was considered that in this case applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to enable closer scrutiny.*

**Egypt:** Why was an OIEL for pressure transducers, software for semiconductor process equipment and technology for semiconductor process equipment refused?

*This was an open licence and there were no named end users. As the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns, it was considered that in this case applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to enable closer scrutiny.*

**India:** Why was an OIEL for pressure transducers, software for semiconductor process equipment and technology for semiconductor process equipment refused?

*This was an open licence and there were no named end users. As the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns, it was considered that in this case applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to enable closer scrutiny.*

**Israel:** Why was a SIEL for anti-armour ammunition and small arms ammunition refused?

*As indicated in the Quarterly Report, the SIEL under reference was refused under Consolidated Criterion 7. This was because we assessed there was a clear risk this equipment might be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.*

Why was an OIEL for pressure transducers and software for semiconductor process equipment refused?

*This was an open licence and there were no named end users. As the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns, it was considered that in this case applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to enable closer scrutiny.*

**Latvia:** Why was a SIEL for components for military support vehicles and military support vehicles revoked?

*The SIEL under reference was revoked as the exporter put the incorrect destination on their application. A new licence was subsequently issued for the correct destination.*

**Libya:** Why were SIELs for body armour, military helmets, civil body armour and components for body armour refused?

*As indicated in the Quarterly Report, the licences under reference were refused under Consolidated Criteria 1, 2, 3, 4, 7. This was because the exporter did not provide sufficient information or assurances over potential ultimate recipients or end use.*

*We were therefore unable to determine whether these goods were going to be exported to credible Government end users in Libya and so could be stored securely and used appropriately.*

*In addition, we determined the SIEL for body armour and military helmets wasn't a legitimate order and that the end-user undertaking was a forgery.*

**Malaysia:** Why was a SIEL for electronic test equipment, microwave components, signal analysers and signal generators refused?

*As indicated in the Quarterly Report, the SIEL under reference was refused under Consolidated Criterion 1. This was because we assessed the export represented a clear and unacceptable risk of diversion to a Weapons of Mass Destruction programme of concern in another country of high proliferation concern.*

**Mali:** Why was a SITCL with a destination of Australia for military communications equipment refused?

*We had no Consolidated Criteria concerns over the Australian third party acting as a shipping agent for this export.*

*The SIEL under reference was refused under Consolidated Criteria 3 and 7 because we assessed the stated military end-user in Mali could not guarantee the security of the equipment.*

**Pakistan:** Why were SIELs for chemicals, components for electronic test equipment, components for equipment for the use of pressure sensors, electronic test equipment, equipment for the use of pressure sensors, pneumatic systems, pressure monitoring equipment, pressure transducers, process control equipment, radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment, technology for electronic test equipment, technology for pneumatic systems, technology for pressure sensors, technology for pressure transducers, temperature measurement equipment and vacuum pumps refused?

*As indicated in the Quarterly Report, the SIELs under reference were refused under Consolidated Criteria 1 and 2.*

*The SIELs for chemicals, components for electronic test equipment, components for equipment for the use of pressure sensors, electronic test equipment, equipment for the use of pressure sensors, pneumatic systems, pressure monitoring equipment, pressure transducers, process control equipment, technology for electronic test equipment, technology for pneumatic systems, technology for pressure sensors, technology for pressure transducers, temperature measurement equipment and vacuum pumps were refused under Consolidated Criterion 1. This was because we assessed the exports represented a clear and unacceptable risk of diversion to a Weapons of Mass Destruction programme of concern.*

*The SIEL for radio jamming equipment and software for radio jamming equipment was refused under Consolidated Criterion 2. This was because we assessed that there was a clear risk that this equipment might be used for internal repression.*

Why was an OIEL for pressure transducers, software for semiconductor process equipment and technology for semiconductor process equipment refused?

*This was an open licence and there were no named end users. As the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns, it was considered that in this case applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to enable closer scrutiny.*

**Saudi Arabia:** Why was an OIEL for pressure transducers and software for semiconductor process equipment refused?

*This was an open licence and there were no named end users. As the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns, it was considered that in this case applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to enable closer scrutiny.*

**Singapore:** Why was an OIEL for pressure transducers and software for semiconductor process equipment refused?

*This was an open licence and there were no named end users. As the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns, it was considered that in this case applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to enable closer scrutiny.*

**South Africa:** Why was a SIEL for body armour refused?

*As indicated in the Quarterly Report, the SIEL under reference was refused under Consolidated Criterion 2. This was because of concerns over potential recipients and end use.*

*The goods were going to a stockist in South Africa and there were no named ultimate end users.*

*We had continuing human rights concerns about the conduct of some law enforcement agency end users in South Africa.*

**Taiwan:** Why was a SIEL for components for military helmets refused?

*As indicated in the Quarterly Report, the SIEL under reference was refused under Consolidated Criteria 1 and 2. This was because the export was going to a stockist in Taiwan who planned to supply the armed forces/internal security forces of China and Macao Special Administrative Region. The UK interpretation of the EU arms embargo in place on China and Macao Special Administrative Region prohibited the export of such equipment.*

Why was an OIEL for pressure transducers, software for semiconductor process equipment and technology for semiconductor process equipment refused?

*This was an open licence and there were no named end users. As the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns, it was considered that in this case applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to enable closer scrutiny.*

**Thailand:** Why were SIELs for anti-riot/ballistic shields, components for body armour, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition and civil body armour revoked?

*The SIELs under reference were revoked because we assessed that there was a clear risk that these items, destined for the Thai authorities, may be used in ways contrary to Consolidated Criterion 2.*

Why was an OIEL for pressure transducers and software for semiconductor process equipment refused?

*This was an open licence and there were no named end users. As the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns, it was considered that in this case applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to enable closer scrutiny.*

**Turkey:** Why were SIELs for radio jamming equipment and software for radio jamming equipment refused?

*As indicated in the Quarterly Report, the SIEL under reference was refused under Consolidated Criterion 2. This was because the export was destined for ultimate end use by a law enforcement agency in Turkey. We had continuing human rights concerns about the policing of demonstrations in Turkey. We assessed that there was a clear risk that this equipment might be used inappropriately in the event of any new aggravation of existing tensions.*

Why was an OIEL for pressure transducers refused?

*This was an open licence and there were no named end users. As the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns, it was considered that in this case applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to enable closer scrutiny.*

**Ukraine:** Why was a SIEL for body armour and components for body armour refused?

*As indicated in the Quarterly Report, the SIEL under reference was refused under Consolidated Criterion 7. This was because we assessed there was a risk that the goods, destined for a stockist in Ukraine, would be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.*

**United Arab Emirates:** Why was an OIEL for pressure transducers and software for semiconductor process equipment refused?

*This was an open licence and there were no named end users. As the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns, it was considered that in this case applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to enable closer scrutiny.*

**Venezuela:** Why were SIELs for equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography revoked?

*The SIELs under reference were revoked under Consolidated Criteria 2 and 7 because of concerns about potential end users following social unrest in Venezuela.*

Why was an OIEL for pressure transducers and software for semiconductor process equipment refused?



*This was an open licence and there were no named end users. As the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns, it was considered that in this case applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to enable closer scrutiny.*

**Vietnam:** Why was an OIEL for pressure transducers, software for semiconductor process equipment and technology for semiconductor process equipment refused?

*This was an open licence and there were no named end users. As the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns, it was considered that in this case applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to enable closer scrutiny.*

## Annex 2: The Committees' questions on the Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480) published in July 2014 and the Government's answers

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The text of the letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Chairman of the Committees dated 6 October 2014 reproducing the Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Report 2012* (HC 561) and providing the Government's answers was as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 07 August enclosing questions on the *UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013* (HC 480). I now attach the response, agreed with other relevant Departments, which addresses the questions in the annex to your letter.<sup>604</sup>

Note: The Committees' questions are in normal type and the Government's answers are in bold italic type.

The paragraph numbers follow those in the Government's Report.

### **Ministerial Foreword**

In his Written Ministerial Statement of 25 March 2014 the Business Secretary announced the Government's revised Consolidated Criteria for arms exports from which the previous Government's broad test of refusing arms exports "which might be used for internal repression" was dropped, leaving only the very much narrower test of refusing arms exports "if there is a clear risk that items might be used for internal repression." How does the Government justify applying only the narrow clear risk test to the generality of UK arms exports whilst continuing, rightly, to apply the broad test of refusing arms exports "which might be used for internal repression" when suspending existing licences, for example to Egypt as set out in the Case Study on Egypt on page 16 of the Government's Report?

*Criterion 2a of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria (known as the Consolidated Criteria) announced to Parliament in October 2000 states clearly that "[the Government will] not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression." This commitment is repeated in the updated version of the Consolidated Criteria announced by the Business Secretary on 25 March 2014. As the Government has pointed out on a number of occasions, there has been no change in policy in respect of the application of Criterion 2a.*

*Egypt is a special case. At the EU Foreign Affairs Council on 21 August 2013 the "Member States agreed to suspend export licences on equipment which might be used for internal*

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<sup>604</sup> Ev w186 – Letter from Philip Hammond to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 October 2014

*repression and reassess export licences for equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.” This is a lower threshold than that set out in the Consolidated Criteria (“might be used” rather than “clear risk”) and that is the basis on which licences for Egypt were suspended.*

## **Section 1: UK and EU Policy Developments in 2013**

### **1.1 Legislation**

Will the Government detail the additions to, and any deletions from, the Common Military List of the EU brought into force in the UK by The Export Control (Amendment) Order 2013?

*Details of additions to, and any deletions from, the EU Common Military List brought into force in the UK are listed in Notice to Exporters 2013/13) issued at the time of the Amendment Order (which covers the 2012 Wassenaar Arrangement changes).*

- a) In respect of the EU Commission’s proposals for amendments to the EU system of exports controls for dual–use items, will the Government state for each proposal whether it wishes to amend it and, if so, in what way, or whether it opposes it and, if so, why?

**The European Commission’s Communication – available here: [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/april/tradoc\\_152446.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/april/tradoc_152446.pdf) – does not contain concrete proposals to amend export controls for dual–use items.**

- b) Will Council Regulation (EU) 258/2012 establishing “export authorisation, import and transit measures for “civilian” firearms, their parts and components and ammunition in respect of export from the customs territory of the Union to or through third countries” require UK national legislation in order to achieve UK compliance with this Regulation, and, if so, when will that legislation be introduced?

**The provisions of Council Regulation (EU) 258/2012 are directly applicable in UK law and there is no additional requirement for separate national legislation.**

### **1.2 Policy Developments – Cyber equipment, software and technology**

- a) Does the Government’s definition of cyber equipment, software and technology include cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components?

*The Government has not formally defined “cyber equipment” but the term is widely used by NGOs and in the media. The UK Cyber Security Strategy, published in November 2011, defined “cyber space” as “an interactive domain made up of digital networks that store, modify and communicate information. It includes the internet, but also the other networked information systems that support businesses, infrastructure and services.” Within this space there are a range of products and services which provide a protective security function for information assets, or which may have security implications for the users of the networked systems. It is the latter category of products on which this work has focussed.*

*Not all of these products will have an encryption capability, which is why we have worked hard to agree specific controls. On the other hand, only a small proportion of cryptographic equipment, software and technology will fall into this category.*

- b) Will the Government be implementing in full the exports controls adopted by the Wassenaar Arrangement in December 2013 over both tools (equipment and software) for creating, delivering and controlling “intrusion software”, and “tools for extracting message content and metadata from a carrier class Internet Protocol network and using that data to map the relational networks of individuals or groups”? If so, when will both that legislation be introduced, and also the relevant legislation to ensure UK compliance with the forthcoming related amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation coming into force in the second half of 2014?

*The new controls adopted by the Wassenaar Arrangement in December 2013 will be implemented in full through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation. No other legislation is necessary to implement these changes.*

- c) Why is the Government working only with industry “to develop guidance to address the risks posed by exports of information and communications technology that are not subject to export control but which might have impacts on human rights including freedom of expression online” and not also with those concerned with human rights and freedom of expression?

*512. The guidance is intended to be produced by industry for industry. However, the relevant industry trade association has been working closely with the Institute for Business and Human Rights on those aspects of the guidance dealing specifically with human rights issues.*

## 1.2 Policy Developments – Gifting equipment currently in Afghanistan

Why is the Government assessing proposals to gift equipment currently in Afghanistan against the narrow test in the Consolidated Criteria, as revised in May 2014, as to whether “there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression” rather than against the broad test of whether the items “might be used for internal repression” which the Government is, rightly, continuing to apply when deciding whether or not to suspend existing licences?

*All proposals to gift export controlled goods and technology are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria. This is the all-encompassing set of Criteria which is used by Government in the assessment of exports, regardless of whether they are in relation to the pursuance of an export licence by industry or by Government when proposing to gift controlled goods to foreign entities.*

*As set out in the (former) Foreign Secretary’s letter of 6 January 2014, Criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria deals with human rights and internal repression. This states that, having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, the Government will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression. This applies equally to the assessment of a proposed gift of controlled goods.*

### 1.3 Transparency and Accountability

Will the Government in the data it publishes quarterly on the Strategic Export Controls: Reports and Statistics website on individual export and trade licences granted, refused and revoked add the end-user stated for each licence as the Government has already done for the licences for the export of dual-use chemicals to Syria between 2004 and 2012 and for Gifted Equipment?

*The Government is actively considering ways in which we can make available more information about types of end-users. However, for reasons of confidentiality and commercial sensitivity, we currently have no plans to routinely identify actual end-users.*

### 1.4 Awareness: Dedicated Training Courses for Business

What is the specific advice that the Government gives on its Dedicated Training Courses for Business “on how to make the best of open licences”?

*The current Open Licence and Compliance workshops for business focus on the range of Open General Licences (OGLs) and Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) that are available. Specific modules on open licence use are also incorporated in the Beginners and Intermediate training events, as well as in on-site training. The modules are developed to provide guidance for business to determine:*

- *which OIELs and OGLs are most appropriate for specific exports*
- *how to read an OGL to determine permitted control list entries and destinations*
- *what other terms and conditions apply*
- *the on-line tools available to facilitate their choice of which licence to register for*
- *specific information about how to remain compliant in using open licences*

*Following the launch of the new OIEL service, there will be targeted training for regular users of Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs), who will be the main beneficiaries of the service.*

### 1.4 Awareness: Cross-Departmental Working

Which are the specific countries of concern on which the Government is currently providing updates and what are the specific concerns, for example potential weapons of mass destruction (WMD) end-use, that relate to each of those countries?

*The Government’s countries of concern are those which feature in the FCO’s Annual Human Rights and Democracy Report.*

*When making export licensing decisions for goods destined for a country of concern, the Government examines the political and security conditions in the destination country, the nature of the equipment to be exported, the organisation or unit which will ultimately be the user of the equipment, and all available information about how similar equipment has been used in the past and how it is likely to be used in the future. Commercial*

*relationships do not, and will not, prevent the Government from speaking frankly and openly to governments about issues of concern (including human rights).*

### 1.5 Advisory Services

Approximately how many complaints has the Government received about its replacement of the Rating Enquiry Service with the Control List Classification Advice Service and the End-User Advice Service, and what have been the main grounds of such complaints?

*The Control List Classification Advice Service and the End-User Advice Service were launched in June 2011 to replace the Rating Enquiry Service. The ECO has no record of receiving any specific complaints about this change since the launch of the new services.*

## Section 2: International Policy in 2013

### 2.1 Arms Trade Treaty

- a) Does the Government see any prospect in the foreseeable future of any of the 3 of the 5 Permanent Members of the UN Security Council who have not ratified the Arms Trade Treaty to date, namely China, Russia and the USA, doing so?

*The Government has, directly or indirectly, lobbied non-ratifying P5 countries among other states this year to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and intends to continue this work. Signature or ratification of the Treaty is, of course, a matter for individual governments to decide.*

- b) What additional legislation will be required by the Government to ensure full compliance by the UK with the terms of the Arms Trade Treaty, and when will that legislation be introduced?

*The Export Control (Amendment) Order 2014 (S.I. 2014 No. 702), which came into force on 9 April, completed all the legislative changes necessary to ensure full compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty.*

### 2.3 UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

- a) What are the categories of weapons that fall within the description “Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems”?

*There is no internationally agreed definition on what may constitute a lethal autonomous weapons system. Informal discussions under the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW) aim to build understanding and inform further work as necessary. For the UK, it is our understanding that such systems, which are able to comprehend higher level intent and which, once activated, may choose from a range of options to deliver lethal force, do not and are unlikely ever to exist. The UK has no plans to develop or acquire lethal autonomous weapons systems. Should there be development of an internationally agreed definition, it is important to note that it is the understanding of the UN CCW that this does not include existing and emerging remotely piloted capabilities.*

- b) Was the UK represented at the Convention's informal discussions on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems in May this year, and what was the outcome of those discussions?

***The UK was represented at this meeting. The report on the informal discussions, to be submitted to the November UN CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties, indicates many states' wish for further informal discussions.***

#### 2.4 The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

What specific steps for further action were agreed at the 13th Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention in December 2013 and what role has the UK played in the implementation of those steps?

***The 13th Meeting of States Parties (MSP) of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention: assessed the implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan in advance of the 3rd Review Conference in Mozambique (which took place in June 2014); appointed new co-chairs of coordinating committees; heard requests for extensions under Article 5; agreed the work plan and budget of the Implementation Support Unit; considered the Geneva Progress Report. The UK played a full part in this meeting. Following the 13th MSP, the UK mine action programme for 2014–17 continued to be developed, at the same time as the UK was progressing the fulfilment of all of its other obligations under the convention.***

#### 2.5 The Convention on Cluster Munitions

What specific steps for further action were agreed at the fourth Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention in September 2013 and what role has the UK played in the implementation of those steps?

***The 4th Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions considered the operation and status of the convention, including: universalisation; stockpile destruction; international cooperation and assistance; victim assistance; transparency measures; and national implementation measures. The UK continued to pursue its obligations in the wake of the MSP, including completing in December 2013 the obligation to destroy the national stockpile of cluster munitions.***

#### 2.6 The UN Register of Conventional Arms

- a) Does the Government include in its annual report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms its national holdings of Small Arms and Light Weapons? If so, why are these holdings not included in Annex C of the Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013?
- b) Which countries currently include in their annual report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms their national holdings of Small Arms and Light Weapons?
- c) Will the Government adopt a policy of making the submission of an annual report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms obligatory for UN member states?

***The UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 includes a copy of the Government's 2013 report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.***

***The UN's Report on International Conventional Arms Transfers (exports/imports) is produced according to UN General Assembly Resolutions 46/36 L and 58/34 and each Member State must provide the information required.***

#### 2.7 Export Control Regimes – Nuclear Suppliers Group

- a) Do any of the 54 changes to the Nuclear Suppliers Group control lists made at the Group's Plenary Meeting in June 2013 require corresponding changes to either the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List, and, if so, have these changes been made?  
***The changes to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) control lists will be implemented in full through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation. No changes to the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List are required.***
- b) Is the UK represented on the Nuclear Supplier Group's Technical Experts Group established at the Plenary Meeting in June 2013?  
***The UK has maintained a full representation from across Government on the NSG's Technical Experts Group since it was established in June 2013.***
- c) What are the specific areas requiring further investigation in relation to the prospect of Indian membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and by what date is Indian membership likely to be achieved?

***The NSG needs to further consider how a nuclear armed state that is not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, such as India, can be incorporated into the NSG. The NSG will also continue to work with India to ensure that its export control lists and guidelines are harmonised with those of the Group. It would not be useful to speculate on when membership might be achieved.***

#### 2.9 Export Control Regimes – Missile Technology Control Regime

Do any of the technical changes to the Missile Technology Control Regime's export control list agreed via the Technical Experts Meeting require corresponding changes to either the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List, and, if so, have those changes been made?

***The changes to the Missile Technology Control Regime control lists will be implemented in full through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation. No changes to the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List are required.***

#### 2.10 Export Control Regimes – Wassenaar Arrangement

- a) Will the Government provide the Committees, and make public, its latest report to the Wassenaar group of its exports of controlled arms, goods and technologies to non-Wassenaar members?

***The Government reports to the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) using the organisation's secure online system. The data submitted to the WA in this way is not provided in a single report. However, the information is also available to the Committees and the public in the published quarterly and annual reports.***

- b) Do any of the 122 amendments to the Wassenaar Export Control Lists approved at the December 2013 Plenary Meeting – other than those relating to cyber equipment,



software and technology which have been dealt with at Paragraph 1.2 above – require corresponding changes to either the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List, and, if so, have those changes been made?

***The changes to the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List (WA ML) will be implemented through an amendment to the UK Military List. We will make these changes as soon as the EU Common Military List has been amended in line with the WA ML. The changes to the Wassenaar Arrangement dual-use control lists will be implemented in full through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation. No changes to the UK Dual-Use List are necessary.***

### 2.11 UK Activities. Academic Technology Approval Scheme

In which countries were the 739 foreign students, who have been denied clearance under the Academic Technology Approval Scheme since 2007 to study in the UK sensitive technologies relating to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, resident, and how many of these students were resident in each of the countries concerned?

***The Academic Technology Approval Scheme applies to students who are not nationals of a European Economic Area state. The FCO does not publish detailed statistics on denials. The release of such information would undermine the effective operation of the Scheme, adversely impacting on the UK's security and its international relations.***

### Section 3: Export Licensing Case Studies

What are the criteria that the Government is using to decide which countries and issues (for example Anti Piracy) are selected to be case studies in its Strategic Export Controls Annual Report?

***The Government selected countries and issues likely to be of interest to the Committees and other readers of the Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013, and that showed different aspects of export licensing.***

#### Pakistan

The Case Study of Pakistan states: “We also refused a £6.5 million export of several thousand small arms and ammunition for sporting purposes due to concerns that they might contribute to repression and conflict in the region.” Since the beginning of 2014 which other exports of small arms and ammunition for sporting purpose have been refused to countries worldwide because of similar concerns? Please state the value of the export, the quantity of small arms and ammunition involved and the country of destination in each case.

***The Government does not currently analyse all refused worldwide licences to such a level of detail. The Committees have highlighted that it may be useful to apply our approach to case studies more widely. The Government will investigate how the requested information can be provided and revert to the Committees once this has been done.***

#### Anti Piracy

- a) What is the specific evidence the Government looks for in anti-piracy export licence applications by Private Maritime Security Companies that the weapons and ammunition concerned will not be sold on to third parties?

*Section 2, iii of the Open General Trade Control (Maritime Anti-Piracy) licence notes “controlled goods transferred under this licence must not be made available for use, on either a temporary or permanent basis, to any other person or entity.” This means that Private Maritime and Security Companies (PMSCs) holding that licence cannot use it to sell controlled goods to third parties. In order to sell controlled goods, a UK company would need a separate trade licence from the ECO.*

- b) Whether the Government will make it a contractual condition when approving anti-piracy export licence applications by Private Maritime Security Companies that the weapons and ammunition concerned will not be sold on to third parties?

*Section 2, iii of the Open General Trade Control (Maritime Anti-Piracy) licence notes “controlled goods transferred under this licence must not be made available for use, on either a temporary or permanent basis, to any other person or entity.” This means that PMSCs holding that licence cannot use it to sell controlled goods to third parties. In order to sell controlled goods, a UK company would need a separate trade licence from the ECO.*

#### **Section 4: Export Licensing Data and Performance Against Targets During 2013**

##### 4.1 Information on licences processed during 2013

Please provide the information for Open General Export Licences (OGELs), Open General Trade Control Licences (OGTCLs) and Open General Transshipment Licences (OGTLs) as has been provided in Table 4.I for Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs), in Table 4.II for Standard Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCLs), in Table 4.III for Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs), in Table 4.IV for Standard Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCLs), and Table 4.V for Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs).

<b>Number of businesses registering for Open Licences:</b>	
Applying for the first time*	227

<b>Number of OGEL registrations</b>	
Issued	1172
Deregistrations	23
Revoked	1

<b>Number of OGTCLs registrations</b>	
Issued	91
Surrendered	9
Revoked	0

<b>Number of Transshipments registrations</b>	
Issued	5
Surrendered	1
Revoked	0

\*businesses which have no record of having been previously registered on SPIRE

##### 4.2 Information on SIELs, SITLs, OIELs, SITCLs and OITCLs

In furtherance of its policy of Transparency will the Government ask licence applicants for SITLs, OIELs, SITCLs and OITCLs to provide an estimate of the value of the goods they propose to ship, tranship or trade, and will the Government include the estimated value for each licence in its Quarterly Reports?

*Exporters already provide an estimate of the value of the goods they propose to ship against SITL licences and these are available in the published quarterly and annual reports. The Government will consider the feasibility of seeking and reporting on estimates for SITCLs.*

*The Government has asked exporters to provide usage returns for OIELs and OITCLs on an annual basis from 2015. There are no plans to seek usage returns from exporters on SIELs, SITLs and SITCLs.*

#### 4.3 Technical Assistance Licences

Will the Government provide details in its Quarterly Reports of licence applications required under Article 19 of the Export Control Order 2008, as amended, for the provision of technical assistance for anything with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) purposes, and the Government's decision on each such application?

*The Government can provide numbers of WMD technical assistance licences issued and refused each quarter, subject to an upgrade being implemented to enable the information to be made available via the online searchable database. Due to the small numbers of such licences, providing any details other than numbers might compromise confidentiality.*

#### 4.4 Refusals and revocations

Will the Government provide in two separate Tables for the 168 refusals or revocations of SIELs in 2013 the following information for each refusal or revocation:

- i. End User Country;
- ii. Annual Report Summary  
(Description of goods);
- iii. Rating; and
- iv. Reasons for refusal or revocation

*Please find this information in the spreadsheet below.*

#### 4.6 Open General Export Licences (OGELs)

Rather than OGELs remaining in force until they are revoked, will the Government introduce a time limit for such licences?

*The Government has no plans to introduce a fixed validity period for OGELs.*

### Section 5: Compliance and Enforcement

### 5.1 Compliance

- a) Following the finding of the compliance review team “that there were unacceptable levels of non-compliance by first time users of open licences”, what evidence is there, if any, thus far that the new processes introduced by the Government have resulted in significantly improved compliance by first time users of open licences?

*The new policy has only recently been introduced and therefore there is insufficient data as yet, to undertake analysis of the impact of such changes.*

- b) Has the Government considered introducing a penalty if companies cancel their scheduled compliance audit at the last moment, thus reducing the efficiency of the Export Control Organisation’s compliance team?

*Proportionally, the late cancellation of audits although not ideal, is relatively small, less than 3% of all audits undertaken. Systems that were introduced two years ago have significantly reduced the number of audits being cancelled at short notice, with the majority of the remaining cancellations being outside the control of the companies. In these instances it would not be appropriate for a penalty to be incurred. We have, however, issued warning letters to companies in instances where no substantive reason has been given as to why an audit cannot take place.*

### 5.2 Enforcement activity undertaken by HMRC, Border Force and the Crown Prosecution Service

What is the Government’s explanation for the very significant rise in Strategic Export and Sanctions Seizures – up from 141 in 2011–12, to 280 in 2012–13, and to 450 in 2013–14?

*The increase in seizures is partly due to a large increase in seizures of portable devices designed for the purpose of riot control or self-protection (for example, pepper sprays, CS gas sprays, electric shock devices and stun guns.) These items are controlled under EU Regulation No 1236/2005 “The Torture Regulation.” Prior to entry into force of the Torture Regulation, these items were controlled under PL5001 on the UK Military List.*

*There were 30 seizures of such items in 2011–12, compared with 78 seizures in 2012–13 and 186 seizures in 2013–14. Invariably, these were individual portable devices being carried for the personal protection of the owner. These seizures have had a disproportionate impact on the seizure statistics.*

*The EU export controls on these goods are primarily intended to prevent misuse of such devices by police, paramilitary or law enforcement bodies, or to prevent their use in torture. Whilst individual devices will still be seized under UK national legislation (since they are considered to be offensive weapons in the UK), HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) believes that it might present a misleading picture of export control compliance to continue to report these seizures in the strategic export control statistics. Therefore, in future, HMRC will not include seizures of individual self-protection devices in the statistics when the devices are in the possession of their user for the user’s own personal protection.*

*However, HMRC will continue to include commercial seizures of portable riot control or self-protection devices in the statistics. This is consistent with the EU Regulation, which includes an exemption for individual devices carried for the user's personal protection.*

*In addition to that, in financial years 2013–14 and 2012–13 there were significant increases in the number of seizures of controlled computer equipment, communications and information technology systems, and equipment employing cryptography. There were 78 seizures of such equipment in 2013–14, and 69 seizures in 2012–13, compared to only 11 seizures in 2011–12.*

*Another factor that has led to an increase in seizures is an overall increase in defence and dual-use exports. The majority of customs export seizures are the result of mistakes on the part of UK exporters, rather than deliberate attempts to evade export controls or sanctions. The volume of trade in military and dual-use goods has increased significantly over the last few years, as evidenced by corresponding increases in export licence applications. The rapid increase in the volume of trade increases the likelihood and frequency of unlicensed exports being seized.*

*Analysis of the seizure statistics does not reveal any other significant trends, or point towards any particular cause that might underlie the general increase in seizure totals.*

#### **Annex A Export Controls: Process and Responsibilities**

##### A.4 Assessment of Export Licence Applications

- a) Why has the Government misleadingly described the text that preceded the listing of the 8 Criteria for arms exports in the Written Statement made on 26 October 2000 by the then Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Rt Hon Peter Hain MP, as the “preamble” when that description was never used by the then Minister and the text in question contains a substantive statement of policy?
- b) Will the Government discontinue using the word “preamble” in this context?

*The text that preceded the listing of the 8 Criteria for arms exports in the Written Statement made on 26 October 2000 served as a preliminary or introductory statement, explaining in general terms the object and purpose of the Criteria. That is why it was referred to as a “preamble.” The text in question did not contain any substantive statement of policy – the policy was set out in the statement of the 8 Criteria themselves.*

##### A.6 Types of Licences

What is the period during which Open General Trade Control Licences (OGTCLs) remain in force?

*OGTCLs remain in force until they are revoked.*

#### **Annex C Information Required for the UN Register of Conventional Arms**

##### UK Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons in 2013

Why, when Sri Lanka is listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as one of the Government's 28 Countries of Human Rights Concern, were the Government approved exports to Sri Lanka of:

- revolvers and self-loading pistols the largest in quantity to any country;
- rifles and carbines the largest in quantity to any country;
- shotguns the second largest in quantity, after South Africa, to any country;
- sniper rifles the second largest in quantity, after the USA, to any country; and
- assault rifles the second largest in quantity, after South Africa, to any country?

*These licences were for counter-piracy operations.*

*It is clear from contacts with exporters that they have routinely been applying for licences to cover volumes of exports vastly in excess of what is actually exported. This is because they have no firm estimate of likely exports over the two year validity period of each licence at the time when they apply for licences.*

*The volumes listed in many of these licences are not therefore an accurate prediction of the eventual level of exports. Although the overall volume shipped is proportionate to the activities of British Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) – and there is no evidence of diversion – this is not a satisfactory situation. Government officials are working with the suppliers of automatic weapons and small arms to PMSCs to put new licensing arrangements in place to closely align the volumes licensed and actual exported volumes. These arrangements, which should be fully implemented by the end of the year, will enable the UK Government to exercise greater supervision of these exports and will include regular reporting of volumes exported to be included in the routine quarterly publication of export licensing data.*

#### 4.4 Refusals and revocations (Spreadsheet)

Application Type	Country Name	Case Summary List	Rating List	Outcome	Reason for Refusal
PERMANENT	Argentina	components for military training aircraft	ML10	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Argentina	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	1,7
PERMANENT	Argentina	space qualified solar devices	3A001	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Armenia	sporting guns (1), weapon sights	ML1	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Azerbaijan	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	ML6	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Azerbaijan	weapon sights	ML1	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Bahrain	general military vehicle components	ML6	REFUSAL	2,3
TEMPORARY	Bahrain	weapon night sights	ML1	REFUSAL	2,3
PERMANENT	Chad	anti-riot/ballistic shields	PL5001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	China	civil body armour	1A005	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	China	components for radar equipment	6A008	REFUSAL	5,7
PERMANENT	China	components for radar equipment, software for the use of radar equipment, technology for the use of radar equipment	6A008, 6D002, 6E101	REVOKE	5,7

PERMANENT	China	focal plane arrays	6A002	REFUSAL	5,7
PERMANENT	China	focal plane arrays	6A002	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	China	focal plane arrays	6A002	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	China	general industrial production equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	China	general military vehicle components	ML6	REFUSAL	1,2
PERMANENT	China	general purpose integrated circuits, microwave components	3A001	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	China	imaging cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	China	imaging cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	1,2,7
PERMANENT	China	imaging cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	2,7
PERMANENT	China	imaging cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	5,7
PERMANENT	China	imaging cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	China	machine tools	2B001	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	China	radio jamming equipment, telecommunications software	5A001, 5D001	REFUSAL	1,2
PERMANENT	China	Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating weapon systems, technology for Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating weapon systems	ML21, ML22	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	China	software for optimising equipment design	ML21	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	China	technology for general military vehicle components	ML22	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	China	technology for weapon cleaning equipment, weapon cleaning equipment	ML22, PL5017	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	China	test equipment for global positioning satellite receivers	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	China	test equipment for pressure monitoring equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Congo, Democratic Republic of	anti-riot/ballistic shields	PL5001	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Congo, Democratic Republic of	military construction equipment	ML17	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Egypt	components for machine guns	ML1	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Egypt	components for machine guns	ML1	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Egypt	components for military combat vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Egypt	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002, 5D002	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Egypt	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Egypt	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Ethiopia	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	5A001, 5D001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Ethiopia	software for radio jamming equipment	5D001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	France	components for military training aircraft	ML10	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Germany	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Germany	components for military training aircraft	ML10	REFUSAL	5

PERMANENT	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region	technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22	REFUSAL	5,7
PERMANENT	India	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, technology for accelerometers	7A001, 7E001	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	India	accessories for instrumentation cameras, instrumentation cameras	6A003, End Use	REFUSAL	1,7
PERMANENT	India	instrumentation cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	India	instrumentation cameras	6A203	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	India	materials analysis equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	India	materials analysis equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	accessories for power supplies	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	ML6	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	components for biotechnology equipment, components for filtration equipment	2B352, End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	components for flow forming machines	2B109	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	components for general industrial production equipment, electric motors	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	components for industrial gas turbines	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	gaskets	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	gaskets	IRN	REFUSAL	IRAN
PERMANENT	Iran	non-ferrous alloys	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	non-ferrous alloys	IRN	REFUSAL	1, IRAN
PERMANENT	Iran	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1, IRAN
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1, IRAN
PERMANENT	Iran	toxic gas monitoring equipment	IRN	REFUSAL	IRAN
PERMANENT	Iraq	accessories for materials analysis equipment, materials analysis equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iraq	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Iraq	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Iraq	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Iraq	software for equipment employing cryptography	5D002	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Iraq	spectrophotometers	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Israel	bismuth	1C229	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Israel	bismuth	1C229	REFUSAL	7



PERMANENT	Israel	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	1C450	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Israel	components for military aero-engines	ML10	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Israel	components for military radars	ML5	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Israel	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Israel	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Israel	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment, technology for radio jamming equipment	5A001, 5D001, 5E001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Kenya	pistols (20)	ML1	REFUSAL	7
TEMPORARY	Korea, North	luxury goods	PRK	REFUSAL	1
TEMPORARY	Korea, North	luxury goods, magnetometers	6A006, PRK	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Liberia	military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Libya	anti-riot helmets, body armour, civil body armour, civil unmanned air vehicles, components for body armour, military helmets, military image intensifier equipment, projectile launchers, unmanned air vehicles	1A005, 9A012, LBY, ML2, ML10, ML13, ML15	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Libya	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	ML13	REFUSAL	3,7
PERMANENT	Libya	body armour, military helmets	ML13	REFUSAL	2,3,7
PERMANENT	Libya	imaging cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Maldives	body armour, components for body armour, components for sniper rifles, imaging cameras, military helmets, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (5), weapon sights	6A003, ML1, ML3, ML13	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Mauritius	assault rifles (175), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	6A002, ML1, ML3, ML13	REVOKE	7
PERMANENT	Mozambique	rifles (2), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (3)	ML1, ML3	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Namibia	components for sniper rifles, weapon sight mounts	ML1, PL5017	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Nigeria	components for tanks	ML6	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Nigeria	military field generators, military support vehicles	ML6, ML17	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Nigeria	radio jamming equipment	5A001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Nigeria	radio jamming equipment	5A001	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Nigeria	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	5A001, 5D001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Nigeria	radio jamming equipment, software replicating controlled telecommunications equipment	5A001, 5D001	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Oman	assault rifles (175), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	6A002, ML1, ML3, ML13	REVOKE	7

PERMANENT	Oman	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	6A002, ML1, ML3, ML13	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Oman	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	6A002, ML1, ML3, ML13	REVOKE	7
PERMANENT	Pakistan	accessories for pumps, components for pumps, electric motors, pumps, seals	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Pakistan	anti-friction bearings	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Pakistan	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2B350	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Pakistan	drilling/mining equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Pakistan	equipment for the use of general industrial production equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Pakistan	military electronic equipment, software for military electronic equipment	ML11, ML21	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	Pakistan	non-ferrous alloys	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Pakistan	process control equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Romania	valves	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Russia	components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters	ML10, PL5017	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Russia	fibrous/filamentary materials	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Russia	focal plane arrays	6A002	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	Russia	machine tools	2B001	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	Senegal	military patrol/assault craft	ML9	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Singapore	components for fire location equipment	ML5	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Singapore	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, NBC protective/defensive equipment	ML7	REFUSAL	5
TEMPORARY	Somalia	components for military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1
TEMPORARY	Somalia	military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1
TEMPORARY	Somalia	military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1
TEMPORARY	Somalia	military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	South Africa	aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, military communications equipment	ML10, ML11	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	South Africa	assault rifles (175), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	6A002, ML1, ML3, ML13	REVOKE	7
PERMANENT	South Africa	body armour	ML13	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	South Africa	general military aircraft components	ML10	REFUSAL	1,7
PERMANENT	South Africa	small arms ammunition	ML3	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Sri Lanka	components for military patrol/assault craft	ML9	REFUSAL	2

PERMANENT	Sudan, South	body armour	ML13	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Syria	accessories for inspection equipment, equipment for the use of inspection equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Syria	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, NBC protective/defensive equipment	ML7	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Syria	inspection equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Taiwan	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, NBC protective/defensive equipment	ML7	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	Turkey	armoured plate	ML13	REFUSAL	2,3
PERMANENT	Turkey	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	ML13	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Turkey	components for military combat vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	2,3
PERMANENT	Turkey	components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML15	REFUSAL	5,7
PERMANENT	Turkey	CS hand grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition	ML3, ML4	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Turkey	spectrometers	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Turkmenistan	components for rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, sniper rifles (2), weapon sight mounts	ML1, PL5017	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	United Arab Emirates	accessories for electron microscopes, components for electron microscopes, electron microscopes	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	United Arab Emirates	accessories for valves	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	United Arab Emirates	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	1C350	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	United Arab Emirates	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	1C350	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	United Arab Emirates	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	1C450	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	United Arab Emirates	components for surface coating equipment, pumps, surface coating equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	United States of America	components for combat helicopters	ML10	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	United States of America	components for combat helicopters	ML10	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	United States of America	components for military training aircraft	ML10	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	United States of America	small arms ammunition	ML3	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Vietnam	military communications equipment	ML11	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Vietnam	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	5A001, 5D001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Zambia	military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1,7
PERMANENT	Zimbabwe	military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1

## Annex 3: The Committees' letters to and from Ministers

The letters listed below can be read in full in Volume III of this Report at the evidence references shown, and constitutes the CAEC's correspondence with Ministers since the last Report (HC 186) covering the period on 1 July 2014 until 19 February 2015.

Date	From	To	Subject	Evidence reference
21/07/2014	Chairman	Philip Hammond	Russia – suspensions and revocations	Ev w164
23/07/2014	Chairman	David Cameron	Russia – arms export policy	Ev w165
23/07/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Russia – extant arms exports	Ev w166
24/07/2014	Philip Hammond	Chairman	Ukraine – arms export policy	Ev w167
07/08/2014	Chairman	Philip Hammond	CAEC questions on the Government's Annual Report on Strategic Exports	Ev w167
07/08/2014	Chairman	Philip Hammond	Israel – arms exports	Ev w175
14/08/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Israel – extant arms exports	Ev w175
19/08/2014	Philip Hammond	Chairman	Israel – arms exports	Ev w176
19/08/2014	Philip Hammond	Chairman	Russia – extant arms exports and arms exports policy	Ev w178
20/08/2014	Philip Hammond	Chairman	Russia – arms export policy	Ev w181
02/09/2014	Chairman	Philip Hammond	CAEC questions on the Government's Annual Report on Strategic Exports	Ev w182
03/09/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Israel – extant arms exports	Ev w183
03/09/2014	Chairman	Philip Hammond	Russia – compliance with INF Treaty	Ev w183
10/09/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Russia – end-users of UK arms exports	Ev w184
10/09/2014	Philip Hammond	Chairman	A CAEC questions on the Government's Annual Report on Strategic Exports	Ev w185
30/09/2014	Philip Hammond	Chairman	Russia – compliance with INF Treaty	Ev w185
06/10/2014	Philip Hammond	Chairman	A CAEC questions on the Government's Annual Report on Strategic Exports	Ev w186
21/10/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Hong Kong – arms exports	Ev w209
28/10/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Hong Kong – arms exports	Ev w210
13/11/2014	Tobias Ellwood	Chairman	Russia – arms exports	Ev w211
13/11/2014	Tobias Ellwood	Ann McKechin	The Wassenaar Arrangement and the EU Dual-Use Regulation	Ev w213
13/11/2014	Tobias Ellwood	Jeremy Corbyn	Sri Lanka – arms exports policy	Ev w214
17/11/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Extant arms export licences to Countries of Concern	Ev w215
17/11/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Spyware export controls	Ev w216
25/11/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Egypt – arms exports policy	Ev w217
25/11/2014	Chairman	Philip Hammond	Syria – chlorine chemical weapons	Ev w218

Date	From	To	Subject	Evidence reference
02/12/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Revocations reporting by the Export Control Organisation, Uniformity of arms export licensing between countries, The Transparency Initiative and Pre-licence registration of arms brokers and extra-territoriality	Ev w218
10/12/2014	Philip Hammond	Chairman	Syria – chlorine chemical weapons	Ev w219
15/12/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI), Maritime Anti-Piracy, EU Torture Regulation, Reporting on revocations, Uniformity in export licensing systems, Transparency Initiative, Register of Arms Brokers, Extraterritoriality, Surveillance technology and Israel licences & Extant licences to various countries	Ev w220
06/01/2015	Chairman	Philip Hammond	Ukraine – arms exports	Ev w433
06/01/2015	Chairman	Vince Cable	Arms export revocations since 7 June 2014	Ev w433
08/01/2015	Chairman	Vince Cable	EU User's Guide	Ev w433
12/01/2015	Chairman	Vince Cable	Qatar – extant arms exports	Ev w434
16/01/2015	Philip Hammond	Chairman	EU User's Guide	Ev w434
19/01/2015	Chairman	Vince Cable	Duration of OIELs	Ev w434
21/01/2015	Vince Cable	Chairman	Arms export licence revocations since 7 June 2014 and Qatar – extant arms exports	Ev w435
27/01/2015	Philip Hammond	Chairman	Ukraine – arms exports	Ev w458
04/02/2015	Vince Cable	Chairman	Duration of OIELs	Ev w459
04/02/2015	Tobias Ellwood	Chairman	Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference	Ev w459
19/02/2015	Desmond Swayne	Chairman	DFID – Criterion 8 update	Ev w459

## Annex 4: Extra-territoriality (Offences)

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The following is a list of offences committed overseas for which a British citizen could be prosecuted in this country. The list is based on *Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 2013*:

- i. Sexual offences committed against children and young people under the age of 16 (Sexual Offences (Conspiracy and Incitement) Act 1996 and Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.72 and Schedule 2);
- ii. Trafficking for sexual exploitation under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss.59A;
- iii. Offences of dishonesty and blackmail where property is despatched from, or received at, a place in England and Wales; or where there is a communication of information etc. sent by any means from a place in England and Wales to a place elsewhere, or from a place elsewhere to a place in England and Wales (Criminal Justice Act 1993 ss.1–6);
- iv. Offences connected with aircraft (Civil Aviation Act 1982 s.92);
- v. Homicide (Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s.9–10);
- vi. Offences in connection with taxation etc. within the European Community (Criminal Justice Act 1993, s.71);
- vii. Offences by servants of the Crown (Criminal Justice Act 1948 s.31(1));
- viii. Offences in connection with the slave trade (Slave Trade Act 1873);
- ix. Offences under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (Merchant Shipping Act 1995 ss.279–281) offences committed by British seamen (Merchant Shipping Act 1995 s.282) and offences in the Admiralty jurisdiction;
- x. Offences on offshore installations (Petroleum Act 1998 s.10);
- xi. Bribery and corruption committed outside the UK (Bribery Act 2010, s.12)
- xii. Torture (Criminal Justice Act 1988, ss.134–135);
- xiii. International Criminal Offences (International Criminal Court Act 2001);
- xiv. Offences against the Geneva Convention (Geneva Convention Act 1957);
- xv. Explosives offences (Explosive Substances Act 1883 ss.2–3);
- xvi. Treason
- xvii. Offences under the Terrorism Act 2000:
  - Membership of a proscribed organisation (Terrorism Act 2000 s.11)
  - Weapons training (Terrorism Act 2000 s.54)

- Directing a terrorist organisation (Terrorism Act 2000 s.56)
- Collecting information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism (Terrorism Act 2000 s.58)
- Inciting terrorism overseas (Terrorism Act 2000 s.59)
- Terrorist bombing (Terrorism Act 2000 s.62)
- xviii. Offences under the Terrorism Act 2006:
  - Encouragement of terrorism and dissemination of terrorist publications (Terrorism Act 2006 ss1–2)
  - Preparation of terrorist acts (Terrorism Act 2006 s.5)
  - Terrorist training and attendance at a place used for terrorist training (Terrorism Act 2006 ss.6, 8)
- xix. Offences against United Nations personnel (United Nations Personnel Act 1997)
- xx. Offences against the safety of Channel Tunnel trains and the tunnel system (Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 [S.I.1994/570])
- xxi. Offences against the Foreign Enlistment Act 1870
- xxii. Offences against the Official Secrets Acts 1920 and 1989
- xxiii. Fraudulent evasion of duty etc. (Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 s.170(2) (b))
- xxiv. Bigamy (Offences against the Person Act 1861 s.57)
- xxv. Offences covered by the War Crimes Act 1991
- xxvi. Offences involving the supply or delivery of restricted goods without a licence from the Secretary of State (Trade in Goods (Control) Order 2003 SI 2003/2765)
- xxvii. Corporate manslaughter (Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s28)
- xxviii. Trafficking or labour and other exploitation under the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004, s.4; and
- xxix. Hijacking or endangering the safety of aircraft under the Aviation Security Act 1982, ss 1–3.

The report of the Home Office Steering Committee's Review of Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction includes the following list of criteria used by the Government in deciding whether or not to take extra-territorial jurisdiction in respect of particular offences:

Against this background, it is suggested that consideration should be given to taking extra-territorial jurisdiction only where at least one of the following tests was satisfied:

Where the offence is serious (this might be defined, in respect of existing offences, by reference to the length of sentence currently available);

Where, by virtue of the nature of the offence, the witnesses and evidence necessary for the prosecution are likely to be available in UK territory, even though the offence was committed outside the jurisdiction;

Where there is international consensus that certain conduct is reprehensible and that concerted action is needed involving the taking of extra-territorial jurisdiction;

Where the vulnerability of the victim makes it particularly important to be able to tackle instances of the offence;

Where it appears to be in the interests of the standing and reputation of the UK in the international community;

Where there is a danger that the offences would otherwise not be justiciable.

The fact that an offence satisfied one or more of the above guidelines would not positively determine the extension of jurisdiction. But it would suggest that action might be justified, particularly if the practical enforcement issues did not appear to be insurmountable.

*Source: This Note is supplied by the House of Commons Library*



## Annex 5: The UK Consolidated Criteria (2000–2014)

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The Consolidated Criteria are the consolidation of the UK's national criteria and the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.

In a Written Answer (dated 26 October 2000, cols 199–203W) Peter Hain, the then Minister of State in the FCO, announced the establishment of the Consolidated Criteria:

**Laura Moffatt:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps the Government have taken to consolidate the UK's national criteria against which the Government assess licence applications to export arms and dual-use equipment with those of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports; and if he will make a statement.

**Mr. Hain:** Licences to export arms and other goods controlled for strategic reasons are issued by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, acting through the Export Control Organisation of the DTI. All relevant individual licence applications are circulated by DTI to other Government Departments with an interest, as determined by those Departments in line with their own policy responsibilities. These include the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development.

In the Foreign Secretary's reply to my hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Mr. Timms) on 28 July 1997, Official Report, column 27, he set out the criteria which would be used in considering advance approvals for promotion prior to formal application for an export licence, applications for licences to export military equipment, and dual-use goods where there are grounds for believing that the end-user will be the armed forces or internal security forces of the recipient country. As my right hon. Friend said then, the Government are committed to the maintenance of a strong defence industry as part of our industrial base as well as of our defence effort, and recognise that defence exports can also contribute to international stability by strengthening collective defence relationships; but believe that arms transfers must be managed responsibly. We have since taken a range of measures designed to ensure the highest standards of responsibility in our export control policies. These include the adoption during the UK's Presidency of the EU of a Code of Conduct on Arms Exports; the publication of Annual Reports on Strategic Export Controls which are among the most transparent of those of any arms exporting country; the ban on the export of equipment used for torture; the ratification of the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel landmines and the passage of the Land Mines Act; and our many efforts to combat illicit trafficking in and destabilising accumulations of small arms.

Since the Council of the European Union adopted the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports on 8 June 1998, all relevant licence applications have been assessed against the UK's national criteria and those in the Code of Conduct, which represent minimum standards that all member states have agreed to apply. The criteria in the EU Code of Conduct are compatible with those which I announced in July 1997. At the same time there is a large degree of overlap between the two. It is clearly in the interests of Government Departments involved in assessing licence applications, British exporters and

other interested parties that the criteria which are used should be set out as clearly and unambiguously as possible.

With immediate effect, therefore, the following consolidated criteria will be used in considering all individual applications for licences to export goods on the Military List, which forms Part III of Schedule 1 to the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1994; advance approvals for promotion prior to formal application for an export licence; and licence applications for the export of dual-use goods as specified in Annex 1 of Council Decision 94/942/CFSP when there are grounds for believing that the end-user of such goods will be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the recipient country, or that the goods will be used to produce arms or other goods on the Military List for such end-users. The criteria are based on those in the EU Code of Conduct, incorporating elements from the UK's national criteria where appropriate. As before, they will not be applied mechanistically but on a case-by-case basis, using judgment and commonsense. Neither the fact of this consolidation, nor any minor additions or amendments to the wording of the two sets of criteria used before, should be taken to imply any change in policy or in its application.

An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by the need to comply with the UK's international obligations and commitments, by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression or international aggression, by the risks to regional stability or by other considerations as described in these criteria.

#### **CRITERION ONE**

*Respect for the UK's international commitments, in particular sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council and those decreed by the European Community, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations.*

The Government will not issue an export licence if approval would be inconsistent with, inter alia:

- a) The UK's international obligations and its commitments to enforce UN, OSCE and EU arms embargoes, as well as national embargoes observed by the UK and other commitments regarding the application of strategic export controls;
- b) The UK's international obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- c) The UK's commitments in the frameworks of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement;
- d) The Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers agreed by the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council, and the OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports;
- e) The UK's obligations under the Ottawa Convention and the 1998 Land Mines Act;
- f) The UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

**CRITERION TWO**

*The respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination.*

Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, the Government will:

- a) Not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression;
- b) Exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or by the EU.

For these purposes equipment which might be used for internal repression will include, inter alia, equipment where there is evidence of the use of this or similar equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the equipment will be diverted from its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression.

The nature of the equipment will be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; summary, arbitrary or extra-judicial executions; disappearances; arbitrary detentions; and other major suppression or violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The Government considers that in some cases, the use of force by a government within its own borders, for example to preserve law and order against terrorists or other criminals is legitimate and does not constitute internal repression, as long as force is used in accordance with the international human rights standards described above.

**CRITERION THREE**

*The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.*

The Government will not issue licences for export which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.

**CRITERION FOUR**

*Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.*

The Government will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country, or to assert by force a territorial claim. However, a purely theoretical possibility that the items concerned might be used in the future against another state will not of itself lead to a licence being refused.

When considering these risks, the Government will take into account inter alia:

- a) The existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;
- b) A claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;
- c) Whether the equipment would be likely to be used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient.

The need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way, taking into account the balance of forces between the states of the region concerned, their relative expenditure on defence, the potential for the equipment significantly to enhance the effectiveness of existing capabilities or to improve force projection, and the need not to introduce into the region new capabilities which would be likely to lead to increased tension.

#### **CRITERION FIVE**

*The national security of the UK, or territories whose external relations are the UK's responsibility, and of allies, EU Member States and other friendly countries.*

The Government will take into account:

- a) The potential effect of the proposed export on the UK's defence and security interests or on those of other territories and countries as described above, while recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the criteria on respect of human rights and on regional peace, security and stability;
- b) The risk of the goods concerned being used against UK forces or on those of other territories and countries as described above;
- c) The risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer;
- d) The need to protect UK military classified information and capabilities.

#### **CRITERION SIX**

*The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law*

The Government will take into account inter alia the record of the buyer country with regard to :

- a) its support or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;
- b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international conflicts;

- c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in sub-para b) of Criterion One.

## **CRITERION SEVEN**

*The existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.*

In assessing the impact of the proposed export on the importing country and the risk that exported goods might be diverted to an undesirable end-user, the following will be considered:

- a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any involvement in UN or peace-keeping activity;
- b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use the equipment;
- c) the capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls.

The Government will pay particular attention to the need to avoid diversion of UK exports to terrorist organisations. Proposed exports of anti-terrorist equipment will be given particularly careful consideration in this context.

## **CRITERION EIGHT**

*The compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources*

The Government will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, IMF and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reports, whether the proposed export would seriously undermine the economy or seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country.

The Government will consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid, and its public finances, balance of payments, external debt, economic and social development and any IMF- or World Bank-sponsored economic reform programme.

## **OTHER FACTORS**

Operative Provision 10 of the EU Code of Conduct specifies that Member States may where appropriate also take into account the effect of proposed exports on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, but that these factors will not affect the application of the criteria in the Code.

The Government will thus continue when considering export licence applications to give full weight to the UK's national interest, including:

- a) the potential effect on the UK's economic, financial and commercial interests, including our long-term interests in having stable, democratic trading partners;
- b) the potential effect on the UK's relations with the recipient country;
- c) the potential effect on any collaborative defence production or procurement project with allies or EU partners;
- d) the protection of the UK's essential strategic industrial base.

In the application of the above criteria, account will be taken of reliable evidence, including for example, reporting from diplomatic posts, relevant reports by international bodies, intelligence and information from open sources and non-governmental organisations.

## Annex 6: The revised UK Consolidated Criteria (2014)

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On 25 March 2014 the Business Secretary, Vince Cable made the following Written Ministerial Statement revising the UK's Consolidated Criteria.<sup>605</sup>

**RT HON DR VINCE CABLE, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS; DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION AND SKILLS**

### **THE CONSOLIDATED EU AND NATIONAL ARMS EXPORT LICENSING CRITERIA**

**25 MARCH 2014**

The UK's defence industry can make an important contribution to international security, as well as provide economic benefit to the UK. The legitimate international trade in arms enables governments to protect ordinary citizens against terrorists and criminals, and to defend against external threats. The Government remains committed to supporting the UK's defence industry and legitimate trade in items controlled for strategic reasons. But we recognise that in the wrong hands, arms can fuel conflict and instability and facilitate terrorism and organised crime. For this reason it is vital that we have robust and transparent controls which are efficient and impose the minimum administrative burdens in order to enable the defence industry to operate responsibly and confidently.

The Government's policy for assessing applications for licences to export strategic goods and advance approvals for promotion prior to formal application for an export licence was set out on behalf of the then Foreign Secretary on 26 October 2000, *Official Report*, Column 200W. Since then there have been a number of significant developments, including:

- the entry into force of the Export Control Act 2002
- the application of controls to electronic transfers of software and technology and to trade (brokering) in military goods between overseas destinations
- the adoption by the EU of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment
- further development of EU export control law, including: the adoption of Council Regulation (EC) 1236/2005 of 27 June 2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; Directive 2009/43/EC of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community; and the re-

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<sup>605</sup> HC Deb, 25 March 2014, col 9–14WS

cast Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items

- the adoption by the UN General Assembly on 2 April 2013 of an international Arms Trade Treaty, which the UK signed on 3 June 2013.

The Government believes that the procedures for assessing licence applications and our decision-making processes are robust and have stood the test of time. We also believe that the eight Criteria continue to adequately address the risks of irresponsible arms transfers and are fully compliant with our obligations under the EU Common Position and the Arms Trade Treaty. Nevertheless it is appropriate to update these Criteria in light of developments over the last 13 years. In particular: the list of international obligations and commitments in Criterion 1 has been updated; there is explicit reference to international humanitarian law in Criterion 2; and the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer is now addressed under Criterion 7 rather than Criterion 5. There are also minor changes to improve the clarity and consistency of the language used throughout the text. None of these amendments should be taken to mean that there has been any substantive change in policy.

These Criteria will be applied to all licence applications for export, transfer, trade (brokering) and transit/transshipment of goods, software and technology subject to control for strategic reasons (referred to collectively as “items”); and to the extent that the following activities are subject to control, the provision of technical assistance or other services related to those items. They will also be applied to MOD Form 680 applications and assessment of proposals to gift controlled equipment.

As before, they will not be applied mechanistically but on a case-by-case basis taking into account all relevant information available at the time the licence application is assessed. While the Government recognises that there are situations where transfers must not take place, as set out in the following criteria, we will not refuse a licence on the grounds of a purely theoretical risk of a breach of one or more of those Criteria. In making licensing decisions I will continue to take into account advice received from FCO, MOD, DFID, and Other Government Departments and agencies as appropriate. The Government’s Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports will continue to provide further detailed information regarding policy and practice in strategic export controls.

The application of these Criteria will be without prejudice to the application to specific cases of specific criteria as may be announced to Parliament from time to time; and will be without prejudice to the application of specific criteria contained in relevant EU instruments.

This statement of the Criteria is guidance given under section 9 of the Export Control Act. It replaces the consolidated criteria announced to Parliament on 26 October 2000.



**CRITERION ONE**

*Respect for the UK's international obligations and commitments, in particular sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations.*

The Government will not grant a licence if to do so would be inconsistent with, *inter alia*:

- a) The UK's obligations and its commitments to enforce United Nations, European
- b) Union and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) arms embargoes, as well as national embargoes observed by the UK and other commitments regarding the application of strategic export controls;
- c) The UK's obligations under the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty;
- d) The UK's obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- e) The UK's obligations under the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Convention on Cluster Munitions (the Oslo Convention), the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (the Ottawa Convention) and the Land Mines Act 1998;
- f) The UK's commitments in the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation;
- g) The OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers and the European Union Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.

**CRITERION TWO**

*The respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country for international humanitarian law.*

Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, the Government will:

- a) Not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression;
- b) Exercise special caution and vigilance in granting licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or by the European Union;
- c) Not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law.

For these purposes items which might be used for internal repression will include, *inter alia*, items where there is evidence of the use of these or similar items for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the items will be diverted from their stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression.

The nature of the items to be transferred will be considered carefully, particularly if they are intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, *inter alia*, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; summary or arbitrary executions; disappearances; arbitrary detentions; and other major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

In considering the risk that items might be used for internal repression or in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law, the Government will also take account of the risk that the items might be used to commit gender-based violence or serious violence against women or children.

### **CRITERION THREE**

*The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.*

The Government will not grant a licence for items which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.

### **CRITERION FOUR**

*Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.*

The Government will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the items aggressively against another country, or to assert by force a territorial claim.

When considering these risks, the Government will take into account, *inter alia*:

- a) The existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;
- b) A claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;
- c) The likelihood of the items being used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient;
- d) The need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way, taking into account the balance of forces between the states of the region concerned, their relative expenditure on defence, the potential for the equipment significantly to enhance the effectiveness of existing capabilities or to improve force projection, and the need not to introduce into the region new capabilities which would be likely to lead to increased tension.

### **CRITERION FIVE**

*The national security of the UK and territories whose external relations are the UK's responsibility, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.*

The Government will take into account:

- a) The potential effect of the proposed transfer on the UK's defence and security interests or on those of other territories and countries as described above, while recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the criteria on respect of human rights and on regional peace, security and stability;
- b) The risk of the items being used against UK forces or against those of other territories and countries as described above;
- c) The need to protect UK military classified information and capabilities.

#### **CRITERION SIX**

*The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law.*

The Government will take into account, *inter alia*, the record of the buyer country with regard to:

- a) Its support for or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;
- b) Its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international conflicts;
- c) Its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament instruments referred to in criterion one.

#### **CRITERION SEVEN**

*The existence of a risk that the items will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.*

In assessing the impact of the proposed transfer on the recipient country and the risk that the items might be diverted to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end-use, the Government will consider:

- a) The legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any involvement in United Nations or other peace-keeping activity;
- b) The technical capability of the recipient country to use the items;
- c) The capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls;
- d) The risk of re-export to undesirable destinations and, as appropriate, the record of the recipient country in respecting re-export provisions or consent prior to re-export;
- e) The risk of diversion to terrorist organisations or to individual terrorists;

f) The risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer.

#### **CRITERION EIGHT**

*The compatibility of the transfer with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources*

The Government will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, IMF and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reports, whether the proposed transfer would seriously undermine the economy or seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country.

The Government will consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid, and its public finances, balance of payments, external debt, economic and social development and any IMF- or World Bank-sponsored economic reform programme. .

#### **OTHER FACTORS**

Article 10 of the EU Common Position specifies that Member States may, where appropriate, also take into account the effect of proposed exports on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, but that these factors will not affect the application of the criteria in the Common Position.

The Government will thus continue when considering licence applications to give full weight to the UK's national interest, including:

- a) The potential effect on the UK's economic, financial and commercial interests, including our long-term interests in having stable, democratic trading partners;
- b) The potential effect on the UK's international relations;
- c) The potential effect on any collaborative defence production or procurement project with allies or EU partners;
- d) The protection of the UK's essential strategic industrial base.

In the application of the above criteria, account will be taken of reliable evidence, including for example, reporting from diplomatic posts, relevant reports by international bodies, intelligence and information from open sources and non-governmental organisations.

## Annex 7: EU Council Common Position (2008/944/CFSP)

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### COUNCIL COMMON POSITION 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008

defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty of the European Union, and in particular Article 15 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Member States intend to build on the Common Criteria agreed at the Luxembourg and Lisbon European Councils in 1991 and 1992, and on the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted by the Council in 1998.

(2) Member States recognise the special responsibility of military technology and equipment exporting States.

(3) Member States are determined to set high common standards which shall be regarded as the minimum for the management of, and restraint in, transfers of military technology and equipment by all Member States, and to strengthen the exchange of relevant information with a view to achieving greater transparency.

(4) Member States are determined to prevent the export of military technology and equipment which might be used for internal repression or international aggression or contribute to regional instability.

(5) Member States intend to reinforce cooperation and to promote convergence in the field of exports of military technology and equipment within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

(6) Complementary measures have been taken against illicit transfers, in the form of the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms.

(7) The Council adopted on 12 July 2002 Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP on the European Union's contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons.

(8) The Council adopted on 23 June 2003 Common Position 2003/468/CFSP (2) on the control of arms brokering.

(9) The European Council adopted in December 2003 a strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and in December 2005 a strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition, which

imply an increased common interest of Member States of the European Union in a coordinated approach to the control of exports of military technology and equipment.

(10) The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was adopted in 2001.

(11) The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was established in 1992.

(12) States have a right to transfer the means of self-defence, consistent with the right of self-defence recognised by the UN Charter.

(13) The wish of Member States to maintain a defence industry as part of their industrial base as well as their defence effort is acknowledged.

(14) The strengthening of a European defence technological and industrial base, which contributes to the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in particular the Common European Security and Defence Policy, should be accompanied by cooperation and convergence in the field of military technology and equipment.

(15) Member States intend to strengthen the European Union's export control policy for military technology and equipment through the adoption of this Common Position, which updates and replaces the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted by the Council on 8 June 1998.

(16) On 13 June 2000, the Council adopted the Common Military List of the European Union, which is regularly reviewed, taking into account, where appropriate, similar national and international lists.

(17) The Union must ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, in accordance with Article 3, second paragraph of the Treaty; in this respect the Council takes note of the Commission proposal to amend Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual use items and technology,

HAS ADOPTED THIS COMMON POSITION:

*Article 1*

1. Each Member State shall assess the export licence applications made to it for items on the EU Common Military List mentioned in Article 12 on a case-by-case basis against the criteria of Article 2.

2. The export licence applications as mentioned in paragraph 1 shall include:

— applications for licences for physical exports, including those for the purpose of licensed production of military equipment in third countries,

— applications for brokering licences,

- applications for ‘transit’ or ‘transhipment’ licences,
- applications for licences for any intangible transfers of software and technology by means such as electronic media, fax or telephone.

Member States’ legislation shall indicate in which case an export licence is required with respect to these applications.

## Article 2

### Criteria

1. Criterion One: Respect for the international obligations and commitments of Member States, in particular the sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations.

An export licence shall be denied if approval would be inconsistent with, *inter alia*:

- (a) the international obligations of Member States and their commitments to enforce United Nations, European Union and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe arms embargoes;
- (b) the international obligations of Member States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- (c) the commitment of Member States not to export any form of anti-personnel landmine;
- (d) the commitments of Member States in the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

2. Criterion Two: Respect for human rights in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country of international humanitarian law.

— Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, Member States shall:

- (a) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used for internal repression;
- (b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the military technology or equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the United Nations, by the European Union or by the Council of Europe;

For these purposes, technology or equipment which might be used for internal repression will include, *inter alia*, technology or equipment where there is evidence of the use of this or similar technology or equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the technology or equipment will be diverted from its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression. In line with Article 1 of this Common Position, the nature of the technology or equipment will be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes.

Internal repression includes, *inter alia*, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions and other major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

— Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by instruments of international humanitarian law, Member States shall:

(c) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used in the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law.

3. Criterion Three: Internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.

Member States shall deny an export licence for military technology or equipment which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.

4. Criterion Four: Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.

Member States shall deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the military technology or equipment to be exported aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim.

When considering these risks, Member States shall take into account *inter alia*:

(a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;

(b) a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;

(c) the likelihood of the military technology or equipment being used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient;

(d) the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way.

5. Criterion Five: National security of the Member States and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.

Member States shall take into account:

(a) the potential effect of the military technology or equipment to be exported on their defence and security interests as well as those of Member State and those of friendly and allied countries, while recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the criteria on respect for human rights and on regional peace, security and stability;

(b) the risk of use of the military technology or equipment concerned against their forces or those of Member States and those of friendly and allied countries.

6. Criterion Six: Behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law.



Member States shall take into account, *inter alia*, the record of the buyer country with regard to:

- (a) its support for or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;
- (b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, and with international humanitarian law;
- (c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in point (b) of Criterion One.

7. Criterion Seven: Existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.

In assessing the impact of the military technology or equipment to be exported on the recipient country and the risk that such technology or equipment might be diverted to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end use, the following shall be considered:

- (a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any participation in United Nations or other peace-keeping activity;
- (b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use such technology or equipment;
- (c) the capability of the recipient country to apply effective export controls;
- (d) the risk of such technology or equipment being re-exported to undesirable destinations, and the record of the recipient country in respecting any re-export provision or consent prior to re-export which the exporting Member State considers appropriate to impose;
- (e) the risk of such technology or equipment being diverted to terrorist organisations or to individual terrorists;
- (f) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer.

8. Criterion Eight: Compatibility of the exports of the military technology or equipment with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should meet their legitimate security and defence needs with the least diversion of human and economic resources for armaments.

Member States shall take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reports, whether the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. They shall consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid.

#### *Article 3*

This Common Position shall not affect the right of Member States to operate more restrictive national policies.

#### *Article 4*

1. Member States shall circulate details of applications for export licences which have been denied in accordance with the criteria of this Common Position together with an explanation of why the licence has been denied. Before any Member State grants a licence which has been denied by another Member State or States for an essentially identical transaction within the last three years, it shall first consult the Member State or States which issued the denial(s). If following consultations, the Member State nevertheless decides to grant a licence, it shall notify the Member State or States issuing the denial(s), giving a detailed explanation of its reasoning.

2. The decision to transfer or deny the transfer of any military technology or equipment shall remain at the national discretion of each Member State. A denial of a licence is understood to take place when the Member State has refused to authorise the actual sale or export of the military technology or equipment concerned, where a sale would otherwise have come about, or the conclusion of the relevant contract. For these purposes, a notifiable denial may, in accordance with national procedures, include denial of permission to start negotiations or a negative response to a formal initial enquiry about a specific order.

3. Member States shall keep such denials and consultations confidential and not use them for commercial advantage.

#### *Article 5*

Export licences shall be granted only on the basis of reliable prior knowledge of end use in the country of final destination. This will generally require a thoroughly checked end-user certificate or appropriate documentation and/or some form of official authorisation issued by the country of final destination.

When assessing applications for licences to export military technology or equipment for the purposes of production in third countries, Member States shall in particular take account of the potential use of the finished product in the country of production and of the risk that the finished product might be diverted or exported to an undesirable end user.

#### *Article 6*

Without prejudice to Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000, the criteria in Article 2 of this Common Position and the consultation procedure provided for in Article 4 are also to apply to Member States in respect of dual-use goods and technology as specified in Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 where there are serious grounds for believing that the end-user of such goods and technology will be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the recipient country.

References in this Common Position to military technology or equipment shall be understood to include such goods and technology.

#### *Article 7*

In order to maximise the effectiveness of this Common Position, Member States shall work within the framework of the CFSP to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of exports of military technology and equipment.

#### *Article 8*

1. Each Member State shall circulate to other Member States in confidence an annual report on its exports of military technology and equipment and on its implementation of this Common Position.

2. An EU Annual Report, based on contributions from all Member States, shall be submitted to the Council and published in the 'C' series of the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

3. In addition, each Member State which exports technology or equipment on the EU Common Military List shall publish a national report on its exports of military technology and equipment, the contents of which will be in accordance with national legislation, as applicable, and will provide information for the EU Annual Report on the implementation of this Common Position as stipulated in the User's Guide.

#### *Article 9*

Member States shall, as appropriate, assess jointly through the CFSP framework the situation of potential or actual recipients of exports of military technology and equipment from Member States, in the light of the principles and criteria of this Common Position.

#### *Article 10*

While Member States, where appropriate, may also take into account the effect of proposed exports on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, these factors shall not affect the application of the above criteria.

#### *Article 11*

Member States shall use their best endeavours to encourage other States which export military technology or equipment to apply the criteria of this Common Position. They shall regularly exchange experiences with those third states applying the criteria on their military technology and equipment export control policies and on the application of the criteria.

#### *Article 12*

Member States shall ensure that their national legislation enables them to control the export of the technology and equipment on the EU Common Military List. The EU Common Military List shall act as a reference point for Member States' national military technology and equipment lists, but shall not directly replace them.

#### *Article 13*

The User's Guide to the European Code of Conduct on Exports of Military Equipment, which is regularly reviewed, shall serve as guidance for the implementation of this Common Position.

*Article 14*

This Common Position shall take effect on the date of its adoption.

*Article 15*

This Common Position shall be reviewed three years after its adoption.

*Article 16*

This Common Position shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.  
Done at Brussels, 8 December 2008.<sup>606</sup>

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<sup>606</sup> European Council, EU COUNCIL COMMON POSITION 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, December 2008

## Annex 8: The text of the Arms Trade Treaty

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The text of the Arms Trade Treaty adopted by The Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty on 28 March 2013 was as follows:

### **The Arms Trade Treaty**

#### *Preamble*

*The States Parties to this Treaty,*

*Guided* by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

*Recalling* Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations which seeks to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

*Underlining* the need to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and to prevent their diversion to the illicit market, or for unauthorized end use and end users, including in the commission of terrorist acts,

*Recognizing* the legitimate political, security, economic and commercial interests of States in the international trade in conventional arms,

*Reaffirming* the sovereign right of any State to regulate and control conventional arms exclusively within its territory, pursuant to its own legal or constitutional system,

*Acknowledging* that peace and security, development and human rights are pillars of the United Nations system and foundations for collective security and recognizing that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing,

*Recalling* the United Nations Disarmament Commission Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36H of 6 December 1991,

*Noting* the contribution made by the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, as well as the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons,

*Recognizing* the security, social, economic and humanitarian consequences of the illicit and unregulated trade in conventional arms,

*Bearing in mind* that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict and armed violence,

*Recognizing* also the challenges faced by victims of armed conflict and their need for adequate care, rehabilitation and social and economic inclusion,

*Emphasizing* that nothing in this Treaty prevents States from maintaining and adopting additional effective measures to further the object and purpose of this Treaty,

*Mindful* of the legitimate trade and lawful ownership, and use of certain conventional arms for recreational, cultural, historical, and sporting activities, where such trade, ownership and use are permitted or protected by law,

*Mindful also* of the role regional organizations can play in assisting States Parties, upon request, in implementing this Treaty,

*Recognizing* the voluntary and active role that civil society, including non-governmental organizations, and industry, can play in raising awareness of the object and purpose of this Treaty, and in supporting its implementation,

*Acknowledging* that regulation of the international trade in conventional arms and preventing their diversion should not hamper international cooperation and legitimate trade in materiel, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes,

*Emphasizing* the desirability of achieving universal adherence to this Treaty,

*Determined* to act in accordance with the following principles;

#### *Principles*

- The inherent right of all States to individual or collective self-defence as recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;
- The settlement of international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered in accordance with Article 2 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations;
- Refraining in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations in accordance with Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations;
- Non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State in accordance with Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United Nations;

- Respecting and ensuring respect for international humanitarian law in accordance with, inter alia, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and respecting and ensuring respect for human rights in accordance with, inter alia, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- The responsibility of all States, in accordance with their respective international obligations, to effectively regulate the international trade in conventional arms, and to prevent their diversion, as well as the primary responsibility of all States in establishing and implementing their respective national control systems;
- The respect for the legitimate interests of States to acquire conventional arms to exercise their right to self-defence and for peacekeeping operations; and to produce, export, import and transfer conventional arms;
- Implementing this Treaty in a consistent, objective and non-discriminatory manner,

*Have agreed as follows:*

## **Article 1**

### **Object and Purpose**

The object of this Treaty is to:

- Establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms;
- Prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion;

for the purpose of:

- Contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability;
- Reducing human suffering;
- Promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties.

## **Article 2**

### **Scope**

1. This Treaty shall apply to all conventional arms within the following categories:

- (a) Battle tanks;
- (b) Armoured combat vehicles;
- (c) Large-calibre artillery systems;

- (d) Combat aircraft;
- (e) Attack helicopters;
- (f) Warships;
- (g) Missiles and missile launchers; and
- (h) Small arms and light weapons.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the activities of the international trade comprise export, import, transit, trans-shipment and brokering, hereafter referred to as “transfer”.

3. This Treaty shall not apply to the international movement of conventional arms by, or on behalf of, a State Party for its use provided that the conventional arms remain under that State Party’s ownership.

### **Article 3**

#### **Ammunition/Munitions**

Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of ammunition/munitions fired, launched or delivered by the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and shall apply the provisions of Article 6 and Article 7 prior to authorizing the export of such ammunition/munitions.

### **Article 4**

#### **Parts and Components**

Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of parts and components where the export is in a form that provides the capability to assemble the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) and shall apply the provisions of Article 6 and Article 7 prior to authorizing the export of such parts and components.

### **Article 5**

#### **General Implementation**

1. Each State Party shall implement this Treaty in a consistent, objective and non-discriminatory manner, bearing in mind the principles referred to in this Treaty.

2. Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system, including a national control list, in order to implement the provisions of this Treaty.

3. Each State Party is encouraged to apply the provisions of this Treaty to the broadest range of conventional arms. National definitions of any of the categories covered under Article 2 (1) (a)–(g) shall not cover less than the descriptions used in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms at the time of entry into force of this Treaty. For the category covered under Article 2 (1) (h), national definitions shall not cover less than



the descriptions used in relevant United Nations instruments at the time of entry into force of this Treaty.

4. Each State Party, pursuant to its national laws, shall provide its national control list to the Secretariat, which shall make it available to other States Parties. States Parties are encouraged to make their control lists publicly available.

5. Each State Party shall take measures necessary to implement the provisions of this Treaty and shall designate competent national authorities in order to have an effective and transparent national control system regulating the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) and of items covered under Article 3 and Article 4.

6. Each State Party shall designate one or more national points of contact to exchange information on matters related to the implementation of this Treaty. Each State Party shall notify the Secretariat, established under Article 18, of its national point(s) of contact and keep the information updated.

## **Article 6**

### **Prohibitions**

1. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if the transfer would violate its obligations under measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular arms embargoes.

2. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if the transfer would violate its relevant international obligations under international agreements to which it is a Party, in particular those relating to the transfer of, or illicit trafficking in, conventional arms.

3. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if it has knowledge at the time of authorization that the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as defined by international agreements to which it is a Party.

## **Article 7**

### **Export and Export Assessment**

1. If the export is not prohibited under Article 6, each exporting State Party, prior to authorization of the export of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, under its jurisdiction and pursuant to its national control system, shall, in an objective and non-discriminatory manner, taking into

account relevant factors, including information provided by the importing State in accordance with Article 8 (1), assess the potential that the conventional arms or items:

- (a) would contribute to or undermine peace and security;
- (b) could be used to:
  - (i) commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law;
  - (ii) commit or facilitate a serious violation of international human rights law;
  - (iii) commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to terrorism to which the exporting State is a Party; or
  - (iv) commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to transnational organized crime to which the exporting State is a Party.

2. The exporting State Party shall also consider whether there are measures that could be undertaken to mitigate risks identified in (a) or (b) in paragraph 1, such as confidence-building measures or jointly developed and agreed programmes by the exporting and importing States.

3. If, after conducting this assessment and considering available mitigating measures, the exporting State Party determines that there is an overriding risk of any of the negative consequences in paragraph 1, the exporting State Party shall not authorize the export.

4. The exporting State Party, in making this assessment, shall take into account the risk of the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of the items covered under Article 3 or Article 4 being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children.

5. Each exporting State Party shall take measures to ensure that all authorizations for the export of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4 are detailed and issued prior to the export.

6. Each exporting State Party shall make available appropriate information about the authorization in question, upon request, to the importing State Party and to the transit or trans-shipment States Parties, subject to its national laws, practices or policies.

7. If, after an authorization has been granted, an exporting State Party becomes aware of new relevant information, it is encouraged to reassess the authorization after consultations, if appropriate, with the importing State.

## **Article 8**

### **Import**

1. Each importing State Party shall take measures to ensure that appropriate and relevant information is provided, upon request, pursuant to its national laws, to the exporting State Party, to assist the exporting State Party in conducting its national

export assessment under Article 7. Such measures may include end use or end user documentation.

2. Each importing State Party shall take measures that will allow it to regulate, where necessary, imports under its jurisdiction of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Such measures may include import systems.
3. Each importing State Party may request information from the exporting State Party concerning any pending or actual export authorizations where the importing State Party is the country of final destination.

## **Article 9**

### **Transit or trans-shipment**

Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to regulate, where necessary and feasible, the transit or trans-shipment under its jurisdiction of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) through its territory in accordance with relevant international law.

## **Article 10**

### **Brokering**

Each State Party shall take measures, pursuant to its national laws, to regulate brokering taking place under its jurisdiction for conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Such measures may include requiring brokers to register or obtain written authorization before engaging in brokering.

## **Article 11**

### **Diversions**

1. Each State Party involved in the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) shall take measures to prevent their diversion.
2. The exporting State Party shall seek to prevent the diversion of the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) through its national control system, established in accordance with Article 5 (2), by assessing the risk of diversion of the export and considering the establishment of mitigation measures such as confidence-building measures or jointly developed and agreed programmes by the exporting and importing States. Other prevention measures may include, where appropriate: examining parties involved in the export, requiring additional documentation, certificates, assurances, not authorizing the export or other appropriate measures.
3. Importing, transit, trans-shipment and exporting States Parties shall cooperate and exchange information, pursuant to their national laws, where appropriate and feasible,

in order to mitigate the risk of diversion of the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

4. If a State Party detects a diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), the State Party shall take appropriate measures, pursuant to its national laws and in accordance with international law, to address such diversion. Such measures may include alerting potentially affected States Parties, examining diverted shipments of such conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and taking follow-up measures through investigation and law enforcement.

5. In order to better comprehend and prevent the diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), States Parties are encouraged to share relevant information with one another on effective measures to address diversion. Such information may include information on illicit activities including corruption, international trafficking routes, illicit brokers, sources of illicit supply, methods of concealment, common points of dispatch, or destinations used by organized groups engaged in diversion.

6. States Parties are encouraged to report to other States Parties, through the Secretariat, on measures taken in addressing the diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

## **Article 12**

### **Record keeping**

1. Each State Party shall maintain national records, pursuant to its national laws and regulations, of its issuance of export authorizations or its actual exports of the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

2. Each State Party is encouraged to maintain records of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) that are transferred to its territory as the final destination or that are authorized to transit or trans-ship territory under its jurisdiction.

3. Each State Party is encouraged to include in those records: the quantity, value, model/type, authorized international transfers of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), conventional arms actually transferred, details of exporting State(s), importing State(s), transit and trans-shipment State(s), and end users, as appropriate.

4. Records shall be kept for a minimum of ten years.

## **Article 13**

### **Reporting**

1. Each State Party shall, within the first year after entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, in accordance with Article 22, provide an initial report to the Secretariat of

measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, including national laws, national control lists and other regulations and administrative measures. Each State Party shall report to the Secretariat on any new measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, when appropriate. Reports shall be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat.

2. States Parties are encouraged to report to other States Parties, through the Secretariat, information on measures taken that have been proven effective in addressing the diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

3. Each State Party shall submit annually to the Secretariat by 31 May a report for the preceding calendar year concerning authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Reports shall be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat. The report submitted to the Secretariat may contain the same information submitted by the State Party to relevant United Nations frameworks, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Reports may exclude commercially sensitive or national security information.

#### **Article 14** **Enforcement**

Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to enforce national laws and regulations that implement the provisions of this Treaty.

#### **Article 15** **International Cooperation**

1. States Parties shall cooperate with each other, consistent with their respective security interests and national laws, to effectively implement this Treaty.

2. States Parties are encouraged to facilitate international cooperation, including exchanging information on matters of mutual interest regarding the implementation and application of this Treaty pursuant to their respective security interests and national laws.

3. States Parties are encouraged to consult on matters of mutual interest and to share information, as appropriate, to support the implementation of this Treaty.

4. States Parties are encouraged to cooperate, pursuant to their national laws, in order to assist national implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, including through sharing information regarding illicit activities and actors and in order to prevent and eradicate diversion of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

5. States Parties shall, where jointly agreed and consistent with their national laws, afford one another the widest measure of assistance in investigations, prosecutions and

judicial proceedings in relation to violations of national measures established pursuant to this Treaty.

6. States Parties are encouraged to take national measures and to cooperate with each other to prevent the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) becoming subject to corrupt practices.

7. States Parties are encouraged to exchange experience and information on lessons learned in relation to any aspect of this Treaty.

## **Article 16**

### **International Assistance**

1. In implementing this Treaty, each State Party may seek assistance including legal or legislative assistance, institutional capacity-building, and technical, material or financial assistance. Such assistance may include stockpile management, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, model legislation, and effective practices for implementation. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide such assistance, upon request.

2. Each State Party may request, offer or receive assistance through, inter alia, the United Nations, international, regional, subregional or national organizations, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

3. A voluntary trust fund shall be established by States Parties to assist requesting States Parties requiring international assistance to implement this Treaty. Each State Party is encouraged to contribute resources to the fund.

## **Article 17**

### **Conference of States Parties**

1. A Conference of States Parties shall be convened by the provisional Secretariat, established under Article 18, no later than one year following the entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter at such other times as may be decided by the Conference of States Parties.

2. The Conference of States Parties shall adopt by consensus its rules of procedure at its first session.

3. The Conference of States Parties shall adopt financial rules for itself as well as governing the funding of any subsidiary bodies it may establish as well as financial provisions governing the functioning of the Secretariat. At each ordinary session, it shall adopt a budget for the financial period until the next ordinary session.

4. The Conference of States Parties shall:

- (a) Review the implementation of this Treaty, including developments in the field of conventional arms;
- (b) Consider and adopt recommendations regarding the implementation and operation of this Treaty, in particular the promotion of its universality;
- (c) Consider amendments to this Treaty in accordance with Article 20;
- (d) Consider issues arising from the interpretation of this Treaty;
- (e) Consider and decide the tasks and budget of the Secretariat;
- (f) Consider the establishment of any subsidiary bodies as may be necessary to improve the functioning of this Treaty; and
- (g) Perform any other function consistent with this Treaty.

5. Extraordinary meetings of the Conference of States Parties shall be held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference of States Parties, or at the written request of any State Party provided that this request is supported by at least two-thirds of the States Parties.

## **Article 18**

### **Secretariat**

1. This Treaty hereby establishes a Secretariat to assist States Parties in the effective implementation of this Treaty. Pending the first meeting of the Conference of States Parties, a provisional Secretariat will be responsible for the administrative functions covered under this Treaty.
2. The Secretariat shall be adequately staffed. Staff shall have the necessary expertise to ensure that the Secretariat can effectively undertake the responsibilities described in paragraph 3.
3. The Secretariat shall be responsible to States Parties. Within a minimized structure, the Secretariat shall undertake the following responsibilities:
  - (a) Receive, make available and distribute the reports as mandated by this Treaty;
  - (b) Maintain and make available to States Parties the list of national points of contact;
  - (c) Facilitate the matching of offers of and requests for assistance for Treaty implementation and promote international cooperation as requested;
  - (d) Facilitate the work of the Conference of States Parties, including making arrangements and providing the necessary services for meetings under this Treaty; and
  - (e) Perform other duties as decided by the Conferences of States Parties.

## **Article 19**

### **Dispute Settlement**

1. States Parties shall consult and, by mutual consent, cooperate to pursue settlement of any dispute that may arise between them with regard to the interpretation or application

of this Treaty including through negotiations, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement or other peaceful means.

2. States Parties may pursue, by mutual consent, arbitration to settle any dispute between them, regarding issues concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty.

## **Article 20**

### **Amendments**

1. Six years after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose an amendment to this Treaty. Thereafter, proposed amendments may only be considered by the Conference of States Parties every three years.

2. Any proposal to amend this Treaty shall be submitted in writing to the Secretariat, which shall circulate the proposal to all States Parties, not less than 180 days before the next meeting of the Conference of States Parties at which amendments may be considered pursuant to paragraph 1. The amendment shall be considered at the next Conference of States Parties at which amendments may be considered pursuant to paragraph 1 if, no later than 120 days after its circulation by the Secretariat, a majority of States Parties notify the Secretariat that they support consideration of the proposal.

3. The States Parties shall make every effort to achieve consensus on each amendment. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall, as a last resort, be adopted by a three-quarters majority vote of the States Parties present and voting at the meeting of the Conference of States Parties. For the purposes of this Article, States Parties present and voting means States Parties present and casting an affirmative or negative vote. The Depositary shall communicate any adopted amendment to all States Parties.

4. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 shall enter into force for each State Party that has deposited its instrument of acceptance for that amendment, ninety days following the date of deposit with the Depositary of the instruments of acceptance by a majority of the number of States Parties at the time of the adoption of the amendment. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party ninety days following the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance for that amendment.

## **Article 21**

### **Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession**

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in New York by all States from 3 June 2013 until its entry into force.

2. This Treaty is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by each signatory State.



3. Following its entry into force, this Treaty shall be open for accession by any State that has not signed the Treaty.

4. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

#### **Article 22**

##### **Entry into Force**

1. This Treaty shall enter into force ninety days following the date of the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval with the Depositary.

2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, this Treaty shall enter into force for that State ninety days following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

#### **Article 23**

##### **Provisional Application**

Any State may at the time of signature or the deposit of instrument of its of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally Article 6 and Article 7 pending the entry into force of this Treaty for that State.

#### **Article 24**

##### **Duration and Withdrawal**

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty. It shall give notification of such withdrawal to the Depositary, which shall notify all other States Parties. The notice of withdrawal shall take effect ninety days after the receipt of the notification of withdrawal by the Depositary, unless the notification of withdrawal specifies a later date.

3. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this Treaty while it was a Party to this Treaty, including any financial obligations that it may have accrued.

#### **Article 25**

##### **Reservations**

1. At the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, each State may formulate reservations, unless the reservations are incompatible with the object and purpose of this Treaty.

2. A State Party may withdraw its reservation at any time by notification to this effect addressed to the Depositary.

#### **Article 26**

##### **Relationship with other international agreements**

1. The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing or future international agreements, to which they are parties, where those obligations are consistent with this Treaty.

2. This Treaty shall not be cited as grounds for voiding defence cooperation agreements concluded between States Parties to this Treaty.

#### **Article 27**

##### **Depositary**

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Treaty.

#### **Article 28**

##### **Authentic Texts**

The original text of this Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

DONE AT NEW YORK, this twenty-eighth day of March, two thousand and thirteen.

## Annex 9: National Counter Proliferation Strategy 2012–2015

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The text of the letter and the attachment from the FCO Minister Alistair Burt to the Chairman of the Committees' dated 21 March 2012 relating to the National Counter Proliferation Strategy for 2012–2015 was as follows:

I write to inform you that the Government has agreed a National Counter Proliferation Strategy for 2012–2015. It flows from key risks identified in the National Security Strategy and formulates three overarching objectives:

- To deny access to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials and expertise to terrorists;
- To prevent acquisition by states of capabilities and their means of delivery (whether conventional or CBRN) which would threaten stability and UK vital interests, including our armed forces overseas; and
- To support, strengthen and extend the rules-based international system of counter proliferation treaties, regimes and organizations that underpins global security and prosperity.

It describes the actors on whom we focus our activities, the tools and resources we deploy, and our internal governance arrangements under the National Security Council. I attach to this letter the public version of the strategy, which will be released in the next few days.

We are already using it to drive forward more coherent and focused work across government departments and with our international partners. In the last few months, we have:

- continued work alongside the United States in Libya to locate and secure stockpiles of advanced conventional weapons, including MANPADs;
- played a key role in the final preparatory conference on an Arms Trade Treaty held in February, which achieved consensus on the process for the negotiations in July, and the adoption of the Chairman's paper as a basis for these negotiations;
- as part of implementation of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review Conference outcomes, and along with the US and Russia, supported closely the Finnish facilitator for the Middle East WMD Free Zone, as he prepares his strategy for a conference;
- kept up the pressure on Iran over its nuclear programme by securing a strong EU sanctions package at January's Foreign Affairs Council, and a good E3+3 statement at the March meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors.

The next key event will be the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul on 26–27 March, at which the deputy prime Minister will be leading the UK delegation. President Obama convened the first such summit in Washington in 2010, as part of his drive to secure vulnerable fissile material around the world within four years. The second summit will assemble 53 countries, and the UN, the EU, the IAEA and Interpol, to assess progress and reinvigorate commitment.

The Deputy Prime Minister will be able to report significant achievements against our commitments from Washington, including helping to secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union (not least, 775 bombs' worth in Kazakhstan); hosting a successful IAEA security advisory mission to Sellafield and Barrow; and leading efforts to secure last year's renewal of the G8-based Global partnership against the spread of WMD.

I expect him to make new commitments for the two years up to the next summit in 2014, including further close partnership with the IAEA, the US, the EU and others on risk reduction programmes overseas; further development of plans for the future management of our inventory of separated civil plutonium; and implementation of the new UK/France framework for cooperation on civil nuclear security and emergency response.

Our key contribution, and the summit's most innovative element, will be our ground-breaking work on the security of nuclear information. Over the past year we have built consensus on the need for greater focus on protecting not just nuclear material but also the information that a terrorist would need to obtain the material, build it in to an improvised explosive device, and mount an attack. Such information ranges from maps of nuclear installations, to how to construct a bomb, to how to beat border security and emergency response plans. At the summit, I expect our work to be reflected in a dedicated paragraph in the communiqué, and an additional UK-led statement, in which at least 20 countries will join us, committing to specific national actions to improve the practice of information security.

I look forward to engaging with you and your committee further on these and other matters in due course.

## **NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION STRATEGY 2012–2015**

### **WHY DO WE NEED A NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION STRATEGY?**

1. The proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and their delivery systems is a huge challenge which poses several serious risks to the UK's national security. These include a CBRN attack on the UK by terrorists or a threatening state, or an international military crisis. Conventional weapon systems also present the clearest threat to the UK's Armed Forces deployed on operations. Reducing these risks requires a comprehensive approach to counter proliferation.

2. The National Counter Proliferation Strategy sets the framework for this activity. Much of our approach is internationally focussed; in priority countries, with partners, or through

the rules-based international system. Ensuring that we have the right controls and security in place domestically is also a key element.

### **A risk-based approach**

3. The National Security Strategy takes a risk-based approach to prioritise the Government's national security response. Counter proliferation work is critical to reducing several of the most serious national security risks identified:

#### **RISK 1: A terrorist chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attack on the UK or its interests, including UK Armed Forces.**

4. Al Qaeda has a long-held desire to obtain and use CBRN devices. Without continued global efforts to reduce vulnerabilities in the security of material and information, there is a significant likelihood that terrorists will at some point acquire CBRN capability.

#### **RISK 2: An international military crisis**

5. The proliferation of CBRN and conventional military technologies to countries, and the enhancement by countries of their existing capabilities, have the potential to increase instability and precipitate an international military crisis, or exacerbate the consequences of such a crisis, including for UK deployed forces.

#### **RISK 3: A state (or proxy) CBRN attack on the UK or its overseas territories**

6. While there is currently a low threat of CBRN attack on the UK, it is still important that we retain our ability to monitor—and where possible prevent—CBRN weapons advancements by other countries, maintain our defences against attack, and lead global efforts to strengthen the rules-based international system that has helped to limit the number of CBRN possessor states thus far.

### **Our objectives**

7. We are working to reduce proliferation risks by:

1. Denying access to CBRN materials and expertise by terrorists;
2. Preventing acquisition by states of capabilities and their means of delivery (whether conventional or CBRN) which would threaten stability and UK vital interests, including our armed forces overseas; and
3. Supporting, strengthening and extending the rules-based international system of counter proliferation treaties, regimes and organisations that underpins global security and prosperity.

### **WHERE WE SEEK TO FOCUS**

8. We are focusing activity on four broad groups of actors:

- states which may have **vulnerabilities** in the security of their CBRN information and materials;
- states which may have the **capability or intent** to develop CBRN or advanced conventional weapons;

- states which may actively or inadvertently **supply or transit** CBRN weapons, delivery systems and conventional weapons, or related technologies, to actors of concern; and
- partners and multilateral organisations with whom we can **effect change**, including the UN, G8, NATO and the EU.

#### **States with CBRN security vulnerabilities**

9. Many countries possess significant quantities of CBRN material or expertise, or have a significant CBRN technological base; some countries have CBRN weapons. In several of these we assess that security weaknesses could make such capabilities easier for non-state groups to acquire or exploit for malicious purposes.

#### **States with the capability or intent to develop CBRN or advanced conventional weapons**

10. A number of states have active CBRN and advanced conventional weapons and delivery system programmes—either to acquire a new capability or to improve an existing one. The existence of either can be destabilising for a region and can lead to an arms race or a military response by a regional or global power. This would increase the risk of a state threat to the UK and its overseas interests.

11. Despite Iran's claims that its nuclear programme is peaceful, serious concerns about a military dimension remain as a result of Iran's actions over recent years. We continue to follow the dual track strategy of engagement and sanctions. We also have continuing concerns about North Korea's proliferation activities. We continue to urge North Korea to refrain from further provocative actions and to re-engage in dialogue with the international community.

12. Alongside our commitment to prevent the spread of such weapons, we are promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the right to which is enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

#### **States which may supply or transit material and technologies which threaten security**

13. Where states admit to, or are judged to, have a nuclear weapons capability, or chemical or biological technologies and materials, controls are essential to prevent more states from acquiring CBRN weapons. We want all states with these dual use technologies to have the will and ability to prevent leakage.

14. Globalisation has increased the flow of trade and knowledge making it harder to identify cargoes and technologies destined for weapons programmes of concern. We cannot stop this trade on our own, so we need to work with trading hubs to improve policing.

#### **Partners and multilateral organisations with whom we can effect change**

15. We are working with our closest international partners and in the multilateral environment, including in the UN, G8, NATO and the EU, to effect change in both specific countries and the rules-based international system.

## WHAT WE SEEK TO CHANGE

16. The rules-based international system is a network of organisations, ad hoc groups, treaties and regimes that has been built up over the last 80 years and has over that period successfully limited, and even helped to reduce, the number of states with—or looking to acquire—WMD or their delivery systems, or advanced conventional capabilities. In developing the rules-based international system, we seek to:

- Strengthen international commitments to non-proliferation treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- Lead in groups such as the Nuclear Security Summit or G8 Global Partnership which are delivering CBRN security improvements on the ground;
- Provide financial, technical and diplomatic support to the international bodies that monitor and verify compliance against these commitments, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;
- Strengthen enforcement of existing obligations and export control regimes, and adoption of non-obligatory guidelines, while developing and implementing new ones such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an Arms Trade Treaty, and a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty;
- Lead by example internationally in terms of our own domestic security practices and export controls;
- Identify, and seek consensus to mitigate, any gaps in the international architecture.

17. To complement this, we are:

- Working to encourage states to **improve nuclear and biological security**, and ensure that **sensitive science** is not misused for hostile intent;
- Aiming to **disrupt proliferation networks**, through helping others to enforce sanctions and export regimes more rigorously;
- Supporting the international community in **tackling proliferation finance** by working with banks to identify front companies and freeze assets;
- Tackling the supply of **delivery systems**;
- Promoting the **peaceful use of nuclear energy**.

## HOW WE ARE EFFECTING CHANGE

18. We are using the **diplomatic network** to increase our understanding of and influence on the drivers of policy in priority countries including government, industry and civil society.

Our missions to international institutions and organisations—especially in Vienna, New

York, Geneva and the Hague—are playing a crucial role in developing, strengthening and upholding the rules-based international system.

19. Our **export controls and enforcement capability** enable us to reduce the risks of material getting into the wrong hands. We are acting to maintain a robust and effective national export control regime, and to improve international export controls. We are at the forefront of efforts to gather international support for a legally binding Arms Trade Treaty to regulate the global trade in conventional weapons.

20. We have prioritised our objectives to ensure that we make best use of available resources. We are providing **technical and financial support** to deliver concrete improvements in the security of materials and know-how in partner countries; **facilitating debate and delivering training** to help build partners' engagement and capacities; and **maintaining our own technical and scientific expertise** in counter proliferation, arms control and CBRN security.

21. The National Security Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, ultimately oversees implementation of this strategy. We will **measure, evaluate and report progress** on its delivery at regular intervals, including through reports to Parliament on implementation of the Strategic Defence and Security Review.<sup>607</sup>

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607 "National Counter Proliferation Strategy 2012–2015", FCO website, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/>



## Annex 10: Companies registered with Export Control Organisation to use the Open General Trade Control Licence (Maritime Anti-Piracy)

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This list is compiled and published by the Export Control Organisation (ECO). It lists companies who are registered to use the Open General Trade Control Licence (Maritime Anti-Piracy) via the ECO's export licensing database, SPIRE—

[https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/325135/14-944-ogtcl-maritime-registered-companies.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/325135/14-944-ogtcl-maritime-registered-companies.pdf)

Companies registered to use the licence need to meet all the terms and conditions of the licence. They are also subject to compliance audits conducted by the ECO's Compliance Unit.

As of 9 September 2014, the following 90 companies are registered to use the licence.

### **Name of Entity, Company or Organisation**

ACTUS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY LTD

ACUITAS (LONDON) LTD

AEGIS DEFENCE SERVICES LIMITED

ALPHARD MARITIME LIMITED

AMBREY RISK LTD

APPDS MARITIME SECURITY LTD

ARCH SHIPPING FZ LLC

ARGONAUT SECURITY LTD

ASPIDA MARITIME SECURITY (UK) LTD

ASSET MARITIME SECURITY SERVICES LIMITED

ATLAS INC LIMITED

AURORA ASSOCIATES MARITIME LTD

BLACK PEARL MARITIME SECURITY MANAGEMENT LIMITED

BOWLINE DEFENCE LTD

BRITANNIA MARITIME SECURITY LTD

CASTOR VALI MARITIME LIMITED

CESEC LTD

CITADEL MARITIME LIMITED

CLAYMORE SECURITY SOLUTIONS LTD

COMMERCIAL MARITIME PROTECTION LIMITED

CONTROL RISKS GROUP LIMITED

CORINTHIAN PROTECTION INTERNATIONAL LTD

DC RMS LTD

EOS RISK MANAGEMENT LIMITED

ERUS MARITIME SECURITY SERVICES LIMITED

GALENE GLOBAL MARITIME SECURITY LIMITED

GEOS INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING LIMITED

GLOBAL SPRINT SECURITY LTD

GROSVENOR GLOBAL RISK LTD

GRUNTS SECURITY PARTNERSHIP LTD

GUARDIAN GLOBAL RESOURCES LIMITED

GULF OF ADEN GROUP TRANSITS LTD

HADCON LIMITED

HART SECURITY LIMITED

HAYMARKET RISK MANAGEMENT LTD

HR MARITIME CONSULTANTS LTD

INFINITE SECURITY SOLUTIONS LTD

ISC GROUP GULF WLL

MARCUS LAWLER CONSULTING LTD

MARITIME ASSET SECURITY AND TRAINING (MAST) LTD

MARITIME ASSET SECURITY AND TRAINING (MAST) SERVICES & LOGISTICS LTD

MARITIME DEFENCE INTERNATIONAL LTD

MARITIME INTEGRATED SERVICES LTD

MARITIME RESPONSE SERVICE MRS LTD  
MARITIME RISK INTERNATIONAL  
MARITIME SECURITY CONSULTANCY LTD  
MARSEC INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS LIMITED  
MIRIS INTERNATIONAL LTD  
NEPTUNE MARITIME SECURITY LTD  
OCEANBLUE RISK MANAGEMENT LTD  
OCEAN PROTECTION SERVICES LIMITED  
OFFSHORE MARINE SECURITY LTD  
OLIVE GROUP (UK) LIMITED  
OPSEC LTD  
OPTIMAL RISK MANAGEMENT LTD  
ORCHID MARITIME LTD  
ORION NAUTICAL RISK SOLUTIONS FZ LLC  
PGS MARITIME SECURITY LTD  
PHOENIX MARITIME PROTECTION LIMITED  
PLEXUS CONSULTANCY LTD  
PORT 2 PORT MARITIME SECURITY LTD  
PRORISK INTERNATIONAL LTD  
PROTECTION VESSELS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED  
PROTEUS MARITIME SECURITY LIMITED  
P S L MARITIME LIMITED  
QUINSEC LIMITED  
REGAL DEFENSE SOLUTIONS LTD  
SALAMA FIKIRA  
SALAMANCA RISK MANAGEMENT LIMITED  
SANS PEUR MARITIME SECURITY LIMITED  
SEA HAWK MARITIME LIMITED

SEA MARSHALS LTD

SECURE A SHIP LIMITED

SECUREWEST INTERNATIONAL LIMITED

SECURITY SERVICES MARITIME LTD

SHIP SECURITY INTERNATIONAL LIMITED

SOLACE GLOBAL MARITIME LTD

SPEARFISH MARITIME

SPECIAL PROJECTS AND SERVICES LIMITED

STENT (INTERNATIONAL) LIMITED

STRATEGIC PROTECTION LTD

TRANSAFE MARITIME (UK) LIMITED

TRISKEL SERVICES LIMITED

TUNDRA STRATEGIES INC (MARITIME)

UNDERWATER SECURITY CONSULTANTS LIMITED

UNITY SPS LIMITED

VERITAS INTERNATIONAL LTD

V SECURITY GROUP (UK) LTD

WATCHWOOD RESOURCES LIMITED

ZEAL GLOBAL MARITIME SOLUTIONS LTD <sup>608</sup>

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608 [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/325135/14-944-ogtcl-maritime-registered-companies.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/325135/14-944-ogtcl-maritime-registered-companies.pdf)

## Annex 11: Arms export licence revocations

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The Government conducted a review of arms exports following the “Arab Spring” in 2011. The Government provided details in Annex 1 of its Response (Cm8079) to the Committees’ 2011 Report (HC 686) of 158 arms export licence revocations it had made between January and July 2011, which is reproduced below. The reason for each of these 158 revocations was given as: “Increasing tension in (the respective country) resulted in re-assessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 and 3HC 60HC 608”. The Government provided the Committees with further licence revocations in two letters from the Foreign Secretary to the Chairman of the Committees dated 6 December 2012 and 13 May 2013. The total number of revocations for each of the countries concerned from 1 January 2011 to 6 June 2014 were as follows:

Country	Number of revocations
Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar	2
Argentina	37
Bahrain	39
Bahrain/Egypt	4
Belarus	1
China	3
Egypt	48
Germany	1
Iraq	1
Libya	72
Mauritius	1
Nigeria	2
Oman	2
Russia	8
South Africa	1
Syria	1
Tunisia	1
Ukraine	6
United States	1
Venezuela	2

Country	Number of revocations
Zambia	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>234</b>

Source: Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010–12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011); UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm8079, Annex 1; Letter from the Foreign Secretary to the CAEC Chairman dated 6 December 2012, Annex B; and Letter from Foreign Secretary to CAEC Chairman dated 16 May 2013; Letter from the Business Secretary to CAEC Chairman dated 6 June 2014, Annex B

Details of all the arms export licence revocations from 1 January 2011 to 6 June 2014 are detailed below:

### **Arms export licence revocations January–July 2011**

#### *Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs)*

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar	Equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon day and night sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar	Equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights,	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain	Assault rifles (2), components for assault rifles, sporting rifles (2), semi automatic pistols (3), components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns (2), semi-automatic pistols (3), small arms ammunition, weapon sights, weapon cleaning equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
<b>Bahrain</b>	Non-sporting shotgun ammunition, small arms ammunition, training ammunition for wall and door breaching projectile launchers.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Crowd control ammunition, non-sporting shotgun ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall and door breaching projectiles.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Cryptographic software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Artillery, components for artillery, equipment for the use of artillery, technology for artillery, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon mountings.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Small arms ammunition.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Anti-armour ammunition, small arms ammunition.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
<b>Bahrain</b>	Components for assault rifles, components for machine guns.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Equipment for the use of sniper rifles.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Blank/inert ammunition.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Components for military training aircraft.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Components for military training aircraft.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Components for armoured personnel carriers.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3





<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Cryptographic software.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Cryptographic software.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights, direct view imaging equipment, weapon day and night sights, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, test equipment for weapon sights, technology for the use of test equipment for weapon sights, imaging cameras, weapon sights, weapon sight mounts.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Direct view imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Tear gas/irritant ammunition	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Weapon cleaning equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Ammunition for wall and door breaching projectile launchers, crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Components for semi-automatic pistols, training small arms ammunition.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and

<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
		that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Ammunition for wall and door breaching projectile launchers, crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Ammunition for wall and door breaching projectile launchers, crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Components for combat aircraft.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Weapon cleaning equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Artillery computers, command communications control and intelligence equipment, command communications control and intelligence software, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, software for the modelling of military operation scenarios, software for the use of military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Military helmets.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Technology for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Technology for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
		contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Technology for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Equipment employing cryptography, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military containers, military electronic equipment, military field generators, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Direct view imaging equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, command and control vehicles, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, test equipment for military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Cryptographic software.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Military cargo vehicles, military communications equipment, military containers, software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military cargo vehicles, technology for the use of military containers.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for multi-role missiles, components for surface-to-air missiles.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Optical target surveillance equipment, components for optical target surveillance equipment,	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and

<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
	equipment for the use of optical target surveillance equipment, laser rangefinders, military cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment.	that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Imaging cameras.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Components for combat aircraft.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Body armour.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Weapon cleaning equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Components for anti-armour missiles.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Components for anti-armour missiles.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Software for the use of military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Components for military transport aircraft.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Components for anti-armour missiles.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Technology for the use of naval communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
Libya	Radio jamming equipment, software for the use of radio jamming equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Spacecraft.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	NBC respirators.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Laser radar equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Laser radar equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for optical target surveillance equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Technology for the use of optical target surveillance equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Optical target surveillance equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Unfinished products for optical target acquisition equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for airborne radars.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for military aircraft navigation equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for airborne radars.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
Libya	Components for optical target surveillance equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for military aircraft navigation equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for military cargo vehicles, military cargo vehicles.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, components for military parachutes, military parachutes, military parachutist equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Inert illuminators, inert signal flares, inert smoke canisters, inert smoke hand grenades, inert stun grenades, inter thunderflashes.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for military communications equipment, equipment employing cryptography, imaging cameras, military cameras, military communications equipment, military video recording equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Imaging cameras.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Imaging cameras.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Anti-riot/ballistic shields.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Inert chaff, inert decoy flares.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3



<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
<b>Tunisia</b>	Components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for semi-automatic pistols, training small arms ammunition.	Increasing tension in Tunisia resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

Source: Government response to CAEC, *First Joint Report of Session 2010–12*, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm8079, Annex 1

### *Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs)*

<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
<b>Bahrain</b>	Body armour.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, military helmets.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon sights.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sights.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Rifles, shotguns, small arms ammunition, sporting gun ammunition, sporting rifles, weapon sights.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Components for military utility vehicles, military utility vehicles, technology for the production of military utility vehicles,	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Components for gun laying equipment, components for military image equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Components for military communications equipment, components for test equipment for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military helmets, software for the use of military communications	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
	equipment, technology for the development of military communications equipment, technology for the development of military helmets, technology for the development of military communications equipment, technology for the production of military helmets, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military helmets, test equipment for military communications equipment.	
<b>Bahrain</b>	Components for military utility vehicles, military utility vehicles, technology for the production of military utility vehicles, technology for the use of military utility vehicles.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Components for gun laying equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Components for military communications equipment, components for test equipment for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military helmets, software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the development of military communications equipment, technology for the development of military helmets, technology for the production of military communications equipment, technology for the production of military helmets, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military helmets, test equipment for military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Software for military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	CS hand grenades, demolition charges, demolition devices, exploding simulation devices,	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
	fire simulation equipment for small arms ammunition, illuminators, military devices for initiating explosives, signal flares, signal hand grenades, smoke ammunition, smoke canisters, smoke generators, smoke hand grenades, stun grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, thunderflashes, training anti-aircraft ammunition, training hand grenades.	that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Ballistic shield, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, military helmets.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain/Egypt</b>	Technology for the development of software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the production of software for the use of military communications equipment, Technology for the use of software for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of command communications control and intelligence software, technology for the production of command communications control and intelligence software, command communications control and intelligence software.	Increasing tension in Bahrain/Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain/Egypt</b>	Test equipment for military communications equipment, components for test equipment for military communications equipment, technology for the use of test equipment for military communications equipment, technology for the use of components for test equipment for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of components of military communications equipment, military helmets, components for military helmets, technology for the use of military helmets, technology for the use of components for military helmets.	Increasing tension in Bahrain/Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain/Egypt</b>	Military distress signalling equipment, equipment for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military distress signalling equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain/Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain/Egypt</b>	Components for military distress signalling equipment, military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain/Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Components for inertial equipment, inertial	Increasing tension in Egypt

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
	equipment.	resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Components for military aero-engines, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, components for military electronic equipment, technology for the use of military flying helmets, technology for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military electronic equipment, military flying helmets.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Components for military training aircraft, ejector seats, components for ejector seats, military parachutes, components for military parachutes, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of military parachutes, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Military parachutes, military parachutist equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Military flying helmets, aircrew protective masks, components for aircrew protective masks, components for military flying helmets, military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military flying helmets, components for equipment for the use of military flying helmets, equipment for the use of aircrew protective masks, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military flying helmets, technology for the use of aircrew protective masks, technology for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military communication equipment.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
Libya	Components for military aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military transport aircraft, software for the use of military transport aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Artillery computers, bombing computers, command and control vehicles, command communications control and intelligence equipment. Command communications control and intelligence software, components for military electronic equipment, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of artillery computers, equipment for the use of command communications control and intelligence equipment, equipment for the use of fire control equipment, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of laser rangefinders, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, fire control equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun laying equipment, laser rangefinders, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military navigation equipment, software for the modelling of military operation scenarios, software for the simulation of military operations scenarios, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Software for the use of military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, communications equipment, military containers, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
Libya	Mine clearing equipment, components for mine clearing equipment, mine countermeasures equipment, components for mine countermeasures equipment, equipment for the use of mine clearing equipment, components for equipment for the use of mine clearing equipment, technology for the use of mine clearing equipment, technology for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of general military vehicle components, technology for the use of equipment for the use of mine clearing equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment, military field engineer equipment, components for military field engineer equipment, general military vehicle components, minefield breaching vehicles.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Technology for the use of military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Tunisia	Laser range finders, components for laser range finders, aiming devices, components for aiming devices, weapon sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of laser range finders, military image intensifier equipment, components for military intensifier equipment, night vision goggles, components for night vision goggles, weapon sights, equipment for the use of laser range finders.	Increasing tension in Tunisia resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

Source: Government response to CAEC, *First Joint Report of Session 2010–12*, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm8079, Annex 1

### Standard Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCLs)

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
Libya	Pepper sprays for self protection, tear gas for self protection.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Military utility vehicles.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

Source: Government response to CAEC, *First Joint Report of Session 2010–12*, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm8079, Annex 1

### **Arms export licence revocations July 2011– December 2012**

Following analysis of the Government's Response (Cm8441) to the Committees 2012 Report (HC 419) the Committees put the following question to the Government on arms export revocations. The Committees question, with the Government's answer were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

What arms export licence revocations has the Government made worldwide since those listed in Cm 8079, and will the Government list those revocations under the same headings as in Cm 8079?

The Government provided the following table in answer to the Committees' question

**Annex B—Export licence revocations since Cm 8079 (published July 2011)**

<b>End Use Countries</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Rating</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
<b>Argentina</b>	components for combat aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
<b>Argentina</b>	components for combat aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
<b>Argentina</b>	components for military support aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
<b>Argentina</b>	components for military support aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
<b>Argentina</b>	components for military support aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
<b>Argentina</b>	components for military support aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
<b>Argentina</b>	components for military support aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
<b>Argentina</b>	components for military support aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
<b>Argentina</b>	components for military transport aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
<b>Argentina</b>	components for military support aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012

End Use Countries	Annual Report Summary	Rating	Reason for Revocation
Argentina	components for military support aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military training aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military utility helicopters	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military aero-engines	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military aero-engines	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military aero-engines	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military aero-engines	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military aero-engines	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military aero-engines	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military aero-engines	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft ground equipment	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for ejector seats	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for body armour	ML13	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012



End Use Countries	Annual Report Summary	Rating	Reason for Revocation
Argentina	components for military radars	ML5	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military radars	ML5	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	military radars	ML5	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military radars	ML5	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military radars	ML5	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military radars	ML5	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military radars	ML5	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for naval engines	ML9	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for naval engines	ML9	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for combat naval vessels	ML9	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for combat naval vessels	ML9	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for destroyers	ML9	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Belarus	weapon sights	ML1	Introduction of EU arms embargo
China	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	3C001	unacceptable risk of diversion to a WMD programme
China	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	3C001	unacceptable risk of diversion to a WMD programme
Iraq	components for general purpose machine guns, equipment for the use of general purpose machine guns	ML1, PL5017	Notification received from the Official Receiver that the exporting company has been liquidated.
Syria	small arms ammunition	ML3	Introduction of EU arms embargo

End Use Countries	Annual Report Summary	Rating	Reason for Revocation
Zambia	components for military support vehicles, military support vehicles	ML6	Discrepancies between the licence and shipping documents presented to HMRC

Source: Letter from the Foreign Secretary to the CAEC Chairman dated 6 December 2012, Annex B

### Arms export licence revocations January–May 2013

On 7 May 2013 the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls wrote to the Foreign Secretary requesting details of all worldwide arms export licence revocations subsequent to those listed in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 December 2012 (in table above).<sup>609</sup> The Foreign Secretary responded to the Chairman's letter by providing the following table. He pointed out in the letter that the majority of these licence applications were for equipment intended for use in maritime security, specifically anti-piracy activities.

End User Country	Item	Rating	Reason for Revocation
Oman	Assault rifles (100), components for assault rifles, rifles (100), components for rifles, pistols (50), components for pistols, small arms ammunition, military helmets, body armour, weapon sights, direct view imaging equipment	ML1a, ML3a, ML13c, ML13d, ML1d, 6A002c1	Criterion 7: risk of diversion
Oman	Assault rifles (75), components for assault rifles, rifles (100), components for rifles, assault rifles (100), pistols (50), components for pistols, small arms ammunition, military helmets, body armour, components for body armour, weapon sights, direct view imaging equipment	ML1a, ML3a, ML13c, ML13d, ML1d, 6A002c1	Criterion 7: risk of diversion
Mauritius	Assault rifles (75), components for assault rifles, rifles (100), components for rifles, assault rifles (100), pistols (50), components for pistols, small arms ammunition, military helmets, body armour, components for body armour, weapon sights, direct view imaging equipment	ML1a, ML3a, ML13c, ML13d, ML1d, 6A002c1	Criterion 7: risk of diversion
South Africa	Assault rifles (75), components for assault rifles, rifles (100), components for rifles, assault rifles (100), pistols (50), components for pistols, small arms ammunition, military helmets, body armour, weapon sights, direct view imaging equipment	ML1a, ML3a, ML13c, ML13d, ML1d, 6A002c1	Criterion 7: risk of diversion
China	Components for radar equipment, technology for the use of radar equipment, software for the use of radar equipment	6A008k1, 6E101, 6D002	Criterion 5c: risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer, Criterion 7: risk

609 Ev 170—Letter from Committees on Arms Export Controls Chairman to William Hague dated 7 May 2013

			of diversion
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Source: Letter from Foreign Secretary to CAEC Chairman dated 16 May 2013

### Arms export licence revocations June 2013–6 June 2014

On 17 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls wrote to the Business Secretary requesting details of all worldwide arms export licence revocations subsequent to those listed in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 16 May 2013 (in table above).<sup>610</sup> The Business Secretary responded to the Chairman's letter on 6 June 2014 by providing the following table:

LICENCES REVOKED					
Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Revoke Date	Refusal Reason
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	Venezuela	28/05/2014	2,7
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Venezuela	28/05/2014	2,7
SIEL	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Russia	12/05/2014	4
OIEL	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
OIEL	technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for anti-armour missiles, technology for anti-ship missiles, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for fire control equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for general military vehicle components, technology for guided missile decoying equipment, technology for laser rangefinders, technology for laser warning detectors, technology for military combat vehicles, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for optical target acquisition equipment, technology for optical target surveillance equipment, technology for periscopes, technology for tanks, technology for turrets, technology for weapon night sights, technology for weapon sights	ML22a	Russia	24/03/2014	4

610 See HC (2014–15) 186: Ev w209—Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 17 April 2014

OIEL	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
SIEL	body armour, components for body armour	ML13d	Ukraine	04/02/2014	2
SIEL	software replicating controlled telecommunications equipment, radio jamming equipment	5D001c, 5A001f2	Nigeria	15/11/2013	2
SIEL	radio jamming equipment	5A001f2	Nigeria	15/11/2013	2
SIEL	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	United States	25/10/2013	2
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Egypt	25/10/2013	2
SIEL	equipment for the use of military helicopters, components for military helicopters	PL5017, ML10b	Russia	25/10/2013	2
SIEL	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Germany	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	components for machine guns	ML1a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	components for machine guns	ML1a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
	<b>COUNTRIES REMOVED FROM EXTANT LICENCES</b>				
<b>Licence Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary</b>	<b>Goods Rating</b>	<b>End User Countries</b>	<b>Revoke Date</b>	<b>Refusal Reason</b>
OIEL	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	Russia	24/03/2013	4
OIEL	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	ML11a, ML17d, ML22a, ML4b1, ML6a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
OIEL	components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment	1C202a, 3A201a1, 6A001a2d, 8A002a2, 8A002a3, 8A002a4, 8A002c, 8A002i2	Russia	19/03/2014	4
OIEL	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment,	ML21c, ML22a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2

	technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment				
OIEL	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	ML21c, ML22a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OIEL	sporting guns	ML1a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OIEL	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the production of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	ML11a, ML18a, ML21a, ML22a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OITCL	gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1a, ML1d, ML3a	Ukraine	25/02/2014	2

Source: Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 June 2014

### Arms export licence revocations 6 June 2014–21 January 2015

On 6 January 2015 the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls wrote to the Business Secretary requesting details of all worldwide arms export licence revocations subsequent to those listed in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 June 2014 (in table above).<sup>611</sup> The Business Secretary responded to the Chairman's letter on 21 January 2015 by providing the following table:

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Revoke Date	Revoke Reason
SIEL	military support vehicles, components for military support vehicles	ML6a	Central African Republic	11/06/2014	Licence was converted from a licence for export to Latvia to a licence for export to CAR
SIEL	tear gas/irritant ammunition	ML3a	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	components for body armour	ML13d2	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	anti-riot/ballistic shields	PL5001b	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	components for body armour	ML13d2	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	civil body armour	1A005	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	civil body armour, body armour, components for body armour	1A005, ML13d	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	small arms ammunition	ML3a	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	components for military aircrew protective	ML10g	France	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on

611 Ev w433—Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 6 January 2015

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Revoke Date	Revoke Reason
	equipment				Russia
SIEL	military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11a	France	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11a	France	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	targeting equipment	ML5b	France	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	military aircraft head-up/down displays	ML10a	France	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Italy	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Italy	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Italy	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11a	Italy	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	ML4b2, ML4b1	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, sniper rifles (15), weapon cleaning equipment	ML1a, PL5017	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	focal plane arrays	6A002a3c	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	focal plane arrays	6A002a3c	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	focal plane arrays	6A002a3c	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	sniper rifles (3), gun mountings, components for sniper rifles	ML1a, ML1d	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Revoke Date	Revoke Reason
SIEL	sniper rifles (42), gun mountings, components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, weapon cleaning equipment	ML1a, ML1d, PL5017	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	ML17h	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	ML17h	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	ML17h	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	components for military helicopters	ML10a	South Africa	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for inertial equipment, guidance/navigation equipment, inertial equipment	7A103a1 , 7A103a2	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1a, ML2a, ML3a, ML1b, ML1d, ML2c	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1 a, 5A002a1 b, 5D002c1, 5D002d, 5E002b	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	technology for the production of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	civil NBC protection equipment, NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment	1A004a3 , 1A004a4 , ML7f1, 1A004a1	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	components for sporting guns	ML1a	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Revoke Date	Revoke Reason
SIEL	components for sporting guns	ML1a	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	body armour, components for body armour	ML13d	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	submersible equipment	8A002c, 8A002i2, 8A002a3	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	sniper rifles (1)	ML1a	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	sniper rifles (1)	ML1a	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	sporting guns (1), weapon sights, small arms ammunition	ML1a, ML1d, ML3a	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	military aircraft ground equipment	ML10f	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	equipment for the use of military communications equipment	ML11a	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	mass spectrometers	3A233c	India	05/11/2014	1
SIEL	sporting guns (33)	ML1a	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	rifles (10)	ML1a	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	sniper rifles (5)	ML1a	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	sporting guns (1)	ML1b	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	sniper rifles (3), sporting guns (11)	ML1a	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	ML13c, ML13d1, ML13d2	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	gun silencers	ML1d	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	components for sporting guns	ML1a	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	components for sniper rifles	ML1a	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7



## Annex 12: Department Minutes for the gifting of equipment July 2014–February 2015

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*9 September 2014*

### **DEPARTMENTAL MINUTED DATED 9 SEPTEMBER 2014 CONCERNING THE GIFTING OF EQUIPMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ, INCLUDING THE KURDISH REGIONAL GOVERNMENT**

1. It is normal practice that when a Government department proposes to make a gift of a value over £300,000 for a Minute to be presented to the House of Commons giving circumstances and particulars of the gift. The department should refrain from making the gift until fourteen parliamentary sitting days after the issue of the Minute, except in cases of special urgency. Ministers judged that in this case the operational circumstances met that condition.
2. The gift in this case is to the Ministry of Peshmerga. The equipment gifted comprises heavy machine guns (.50 calibre) and ammunition. The provision of this equipment was a response to a request from the Government of Iraq, including the Kurdish regional Government to provide urgent military and associated support. The specific requirements were affirmed by the MOD operational liaison and reconnaissance team.
3. The total cost of the UK package is approximately £1.6 million. The cost of the items has initially been written off against the Defence Core Budget. The cost of movement will be funded by the Deployed Military Activity Pool (DMAP), including six C130s to transport the equipment at an estimated cost of £475,000.
4. It is the Government's policy that proposals to gift military equipment to foreign Governments or entities should normally be assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. This assessment has been made and the gifting approved.
5. The Treasury has approved the proposal in principle.

*17 October 2014*

### **Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Minute dated 17th October 2014 on the gifting of non-lethal equipment to Ukraine**

It is normal practice when a Government Department proposes to make a gift of a value exceeding £300 000, for the Department concerned to present to the House of Commons a Minute giving particulars of the gift and explaining the circumstances; and to refrain from making the gift until fourteen Parliamentary sitting days after the issue of the Minute, except in cases of special urgency.

The situation in eastern Ukraine remains extremely fragile despite the Minsk Protocol, including a ceasefire agreement, being signed on 5 September. We are seeing daily outbreaks of violence which have led to over 50 Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) fatalities since the ceasefire began. Some progress has been made including the withdrawal of several thousand Russian regular troops, but we estimate a few hundred remain. The Government is committed to supporting Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The UAF are facing a chronic shortage of basic equipment which will become more acute when winter sets in. Our non-lethal equipment package is defensive and designed to prevent further UAF fatalities and casualties.

This Departmental Minute sets out the proposal to gift non-lethal equipment worth £840,300 to the Ukraine Armed Forces/ Ministry of Defence.

It will be funded by the Government's Conflict Pool fund (FCO, MoD and DFID). It is in response to a direct request from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (UAF). The Defence Attaché's Office at the British Embassy in Kyiv has designed the package in close cooperation with the UAF. It has also been carried out in close coordination with other donors (US, Canada and France), who are providing similar equipment.

The proposed gift will consist of the following UK-sourced equipment:

1. 1000 sets of body armour (NIJ level IV) and helmets (NIJ Level IIIA): £408,000
2. 80 Medical kits (for vehicles): £52,800
3. 500 sets of winterisation equipment (winter clothing/sleeping bags): £314,500
4. 500 Ponchos: £10,000
5. Transport and clearance: £55,000

The proposed gift has been assessed against the consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. The proposed gift has been scrutinised and approved by a senior, cross-Whitehall Conflict Pool Approval Board, which has confirmed that it fits with the Government's strategic and delivery objectives. Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials also assessed the project for human rights risks, using the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance guidelines established by the Foreign Secretary in 2011. They concluded that the risk of human rights violations arising from the project's delivery could be successfully mitigated.

The Treasury has approved the proposal in principle. If, during the period of fourteen parliamentary sitting days beginning on the date on which this Minute was laid before the House of Commons, a Member signifies an objection by giving notice of a Parliamentary Question or of a Motion relating to the Minute, or by otherwise raising the matter in the House, final approval of the gift will be withheld pending an examination of the objection.

*17 October 2014*

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Minute dated 17 October 2014 on the gifting of equipment to the 3rd Land Border Regiment of the Lebanese Armed Forces**

It is the normal practice when a government department proposes to make a gift of a value exceeding £300,000, for the department concerned to present to the House of Commons a minute giving particulars of the gift and explaining the circumstances; and to refrain from making the gift until fourteen parliamentary sitting days after the issue of the minute, except in cases of special urgency.

Contagion from the worsening crisis in Syria is having a direct effect on its neighbours, particularly in areas adjacent to Lebanon's eastern border. The UK remains firmly committed to Lebanon's stability, and in supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to minimise contagion from the Syrian conflict, and to combat the spread of ISIL. As part of this commitment, since 2012, the UK has been assisting the LAF to establish and mentor the LAF Land Border Regiments (LBRs). The mission of the LBRs is to observe, identify, deter and interdict activities by illegal armed actors in the near border areas, in line with agreed international human rights standards. Between 2012 and 2014 around £14m of Conflict Pool funds was allocated to enhance the capabilities of 1 and 2 LBRs. These efforts have resulted in the construction of 12 Protected Border Observation Posts along 140km of the border, and the deployment of the two LBRs.

Recent ISIL actions in the Aarsal area, and the threat that ISIL poses to UK interests, now make it imperative that the LAF expands the presence of the LBRs southwards, as part of an overall strategy to bring the entire eastern border with Syria back under the authority of the State. The Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces has recently authorised the establishment of 3LBR to cover a further 70km of the border south from Aarsal to Tfail. He has requested UK assistance consistent with that already provided to 1 and 2 LBRs.

This Departmental Minute therefore sets out our intention to gift a package of £3,596,844 of equipment to support the establishment of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Land Border Regiment of the Lebanese Armed Forces. The proposed gift will be funded by the Government's Conflict Pool Programme and will consist of the following UK-sourced equipment:

- 800 sets of Personal Protective Equipment, including body armour, helmets, gloves, belts, first aid kits, camouflage clothing and protective glasses. £793,600
- 14 Land Rover Defenders and additional equipment to enable them to operate in difficult terrain. £408,244
- 5 Protected Border Observation Posts and 6 Mobile Observation Platforms, with observation aids and ballistic protection for fixed 3LBR positions. £1,395,000
- Radio equipment to allow the command elements of 3LBR to link back to LAF HQ in Beirut. £1,000,000

Alongside the gift, the UK is expanding its existing package of training and mentoring with additional operational and engineering expertise worth £1,402,197.

The proposed gift has been assessed against the consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. The proposed gift has been scrutinised and approved by a senior, cross-Whitehall Conflict Pool Approval Board, which has confirmed that it fits with the Government's strategic and delivery objectives. Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials also assessed the project for human rights risks, using the Overseas Security

and Justice Assistance guidelines established by the Foreign Secretary in 2011. They concluded that the risk of human rights violations arising from the project's delivery could be successfully mitigated.

The Treasury has approved the proposal in principle. If, during the period of fourteen parliamentary sitting days beginning on the date on which this minute was laid before the House of Commons, a Member signifies an objection by giving notice of a Parliamentary Question or a Motion relating to the minute, or by otherwise raising the matter in the House, final approval of the gift will be withheld pending an examination of the objection.

*22 October 2014*

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Minute dated 22 October 2014 on the Gifting of equipment, stores and infrastructure to the Government of Afghanistan**

It is the normal practice when a Government Department proposes to make a gift of a value exceeding £300,000, for the Department concerned to present to the House of Commons a Minute giving particulars of the gift and explaining the circumstances; and to refrain from making the gift until fourteen Parliamentary sitting days after the issue of the Minute, except in cases of special urgency.

The UK is committed to developing counter-terrorism (CT) capability in Afghanistan in furtherance of the Government's counter terrorism objectives under CONTEST. As part of this approach, the UK assists key partner nations to develop effective and sustainable CT capabilities which operate in line with agreed international human rights standards. By helping countries to undertake counter terrorism activities locally, it targets the problem at source and reduces the risk of a terrorist attack against that nation or another.

Afghanistan remains a top priority for the Government. Post 2014 it will remain one of the poorest and most insecure countries in the world. We remain concerned that terrorist groups based in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are re-establishing a presence in Afghanistan, and that the threat to the UK mainland will not decrease in the short term.

The MoD has been running three projects which aim to develop the capability of operational units within the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to tackle the Afghan insurgency by conducting human rights compliant CT operations. As part of these projects the MoD procured equipment over a number of years from 2009 to use with Afghan units. The equipment is currently in Afghanistan.

The proposal is for the MoD to gift equipment to the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) to allow these units to continue to reduce the terrorist threat once International Security Assistance Forces withdraw from Afghanistan at the end of 2014. The package of gifting and training will provide the ANSF with a valuable and sustainable capability to deal with the threat.

The original total cost was approximately £6m, and an approximate estimate of the current value is £0.4m.

The proposed gift has been assessed and approved against the consolidated EU & National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. The projects, including information on the equipment to be procured, were approved by the cross-HMG programme boards, which confirmed that they fit with the Government's strategic and delivery objectives. MoD officials also assessed the projects in 2013 for human rights risks, using the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance guidelines.

The Treasury has approved the proposal in principle. If, during the period of fourteen parliamentary sitting days beginning on the date on which this Minute was laid before the House of Commons, a Member signifies an objection by giving notice of a Parliamentary Question or of a Motion relating to the Minute, or by otherwise raising the matter in the House, final approval of the gift will be withheld pending an examination of the objection.

*18 November 2014*

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Minute dated 18 November 2014  
on the Gifting of Armoured Vehicles to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to  
Ukraine**

It is normal practice when a Government Department proposes to make a gift of a value exceeding £300 000, for the Department concerned to present to the House of Commons a Minute giving particulars of the gift and explaining the circumstances; and to refrain from making the gift until fourteen Parliamentary sitting days after the issue of the Minute, except in cases of special urgency.

The United Kingdom is committed to supporting Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Throughout the crisis that has unfolded during 2014, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has played a crucial role in monitoring events on the ground and facilitating dialogue between Ukrainian and separatist factions in the east of the country. The OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) has been operating in Ukraine since March 2014, and the UK has been a strong supporter of its role, providing nearly £2million in funding and seconding a number of UK nationals into the Mission.

The Minsk Protocol, the peace plan and ceasefire agreed between Ukraine and Russia on 5 September has tasked the SMM with significant additional responsibilities, notably monitoring and verifying the ceasefire and monitoring the Ukraine-Russia border. The ceasefire is just about holding but with continued outbreaks of violence, and fatalities. It is therefore vital that the Mission receives the funding and equipment it needs to expand to its full capacity of 500 international monitors and be enabled to fulfil its mandate while operating within an often very challenging environment. As part of a package of enhanced support to the OSCE, the UK therefore intends to provide 10 armoured vehicles to the Mission, which have been identified as being crucial to allowing monitors to operate securely in the more volatile eastern parts of Ukraine.

This package will be funded by the Government's Conflict Pool fund (FCO, MoD and DFID). It is in direct response to a request from Swiss Federal President and OSCE Chairman-in-Office Didier Burkhalter, who has written to OSCE Foreign Ministers requesting the provision of people, money and equipment.

This Departmental Minute sets out the proposal to gift 10 armoured vehicles and associated communications equipment worth £1,169,006 to the OSCE. The proposed gift will consist of the following UK sourced equipment:

1. 10 Armoured Vehicles (8 x LC200, 2 x LC105): £1,120,000
2. 10 AV Spares kits: £11,266
3. 10 Motorola DM4601 VHF Radio plus ancillaries: £4,740
4. 10 Codan Envoy X1 HR Radio: £33,000

The proposed gift has been assessed against the consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. The proposed gift has been scrutinised and approved by a senior, cross-Whitehall Conflict Pool Approval Board, which has confirmed that it fits with the Government's strategic and delivery objectives. Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials also assessed the project for human rights risks, using the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance guidelines established by the Foreign Secretary in 2011. They concluded that the risk of human rights violations arising from the project's delivery could be successfully mitigated.

The Treasury has approved the proposal in principle. If, during the period of fourteen parliamentary sitting days beginning on the date on which this Minute was laid before the House of Commons, a Member signifies an objection by giving notice of a Parliamentary Question or of a Motion relating to the Minute, or by otherwise raising the matter in the House, final approval of the gift will be withheld pending an examination of the objection.

*14 January 2015*

**Ministry of Defence – Gifting of equipment (Pakistan)**

**The Secretary of State for Defence (Michael Fallon):** I have today laid before the House a departmental minute describing a package of surplus counter-improvised explosive device (CIED) equipment which the UK intends to gift to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, at their request.

Pakistan faces a severe threat from IED attacks perpetrated by terrorist groups, and has sought assistance from the UK in tackling this threat and developing the capabilities of its security forces. The UK is delivering a CIED programme to assist Pakistan in establishing a multi-agency capability for tackling IEDs. This package will complement that programme.

Pakistan has a rapidly expanding CIED capability with close to 5,000 practitioners already trained. IEDs are being defeated across the provinces and lives are being saved. Pakistani battalions who benefited from UK support are now operating in counter-terrorism operations in the North Waziristan agency and Pakistan's Chief of General Staff has reported a noticeable reduction in casualties: UK help is saving lives.

Developing counter-terrorism capability in Pakistan supports UK objectives under the counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST), targets the problem at source and reduces the risk of a terrorist attack against that nation or another, including the UK.<sup>612</sup>

*27 January 2015*

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Minute dated 27 January 2015 on the gifting of non-lethal equipment to the Jordanian Armed Forces**

It is the normal practice when a government department proposes to make a gift of a value exceeding £300,000, for the department concerned to present to the House of Commons a Minute giving particulars of the gift and the rationale for it; and to refrain from making the gift until fourteen parliamentary sitting days after the issue of the Minute, except in cases of special urgency.

My right honourable Friend the former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague) informed the House on 6 March 2013 (Official Report, column 961) that he intended to provide additional non-lethal equipment to the Syrian opposition in order to help save lives. He then laid a departmental Minute on 15 April 2013 and issued a Written Ministerial Statement containing details of that gift which included, amongst other equipment, five 4x4 vehicles with ballistic protection. The equipment was due to be donated to the Syrian opposition National Coalition's Assistance Coordination Unit based in Turkey. Although we have been able to deliver some of the equipment, regrettably, we have been unable to deliver the five 4x4 vehicles as planned.

There are two reasons for this:

- i. only the US government and United Nations have been granted permission by the Turkish government to use such vehicles in Turkey; and
- ii. the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) was not a registered entity at the time and therefore the ACU would have only been permitted to store and use the vehicles within Syria.

Our assessment is that delivering the vehicles to Syria carries too much of a risk of them ending up in the wrong hands. For example, on 7 December 2013 the Islamic Front raided the Syrian Military Council's headquarters in Bab al-Hawa and took some of their equipment. We therefore now consider that the best option is to gift the vehicles to the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF). The JAF would use them in their efforts to manage current insecurity on their border with Syria, including cross-border smuggling activity. This option represents the least risk of the vehicles falling into the wrong hands and is most cost-effective to the taxpayer given that the vehicles are already stored in Jordan.

This gift has been scrutinised to ensure that the provision of this equipment is consistent with export controls and complies with our international obligations. Recipients have been carefully selected to prevent equipment being given to those involved in extremist activities or human rights violations.

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<sup>612</sup> Hc Deb, 14 January 2015, Col 25WS

Vehicles with ballistic protection are subject to export controls. Arms Export Policy Department has assessed the equipment against the EU Consolidated Criteria and has no objections to the release of these items. A crown immunity letter has been issued.

The value of these vehicles is £386,375.70.

The Treasury has approved the proposal in principle. If, during the period of fourteen parliamentary sitting days beginning on the date on which this Minute was laid before the House of Commons, a Member signifies an objection by giving notice of a Parliamentary Question or of a Motion relating to the Minute, or by otherwise raising the matter in the House, final approval of the gift will be withheld pending an examination of the objection.

*3 March 2015*

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Minute dated 3 March 2015 on the gifting of equipment to the Free Syrian Police**

It is the normal practice when a government department proposes to make a gift of a value exceeding £300,000, for the department concerned to present to the House of Commons a minute giving particulars of the gift and explaining the circumstances; and to refrain from making the gift until fourteen parliamentary sitting days after the issue of the minute, except in cases of special urgency.

The conflict in Syria remains catastrophic, with an estimated 200,000 people killed and more than half the Syrian population in need of humanitarian assistance. The UK will continue to do all it can to end the conflict through a political settlement, while also alleviating humanitarian suffering and protecting UK national security.

The UK is committed to working with the moderate opposition to help develop their capacity to meet needs on the ground and to reduce suffering and to save lives, thereby also helping reduce the space for extremists to operate. In line with this approach, on 6 February 2014, my predecessor, Rt Hon Member for Richmond (Yorks) (Mr William Hague), laid before the House of Commons a departmental Minute which set out our plans to expand a UK-funded pilot project to train and equip Free Syrian Police officers, enabling them to provide community policing. I am pleased to present a further UK contribution of practical support to the Free Syrian Police, aimed at furthering their work.

The UK is working with international donors to provide training, technical assistance, maintenance funds, and basic equipment to the Free Syrian Police operating in opposition-controlled areas of Syria. The UK is also supporting the development of greater community oversight and monitoring of the police to help ensure that they are responsive to local needs. Through this support the UK is aiming to build community resilience and moderate governance to help counter the threat from extremist groups. Following the success of an initial pilot and subsequent phases, developing the capacity of community policing has become a core aspect of the UK's ongoing support to the moderate opposition in Syria.

This departmental Minute sets out in more detail our plans to gift office and communications equipment, uniforms, non-armoured vehicles and other operational equipment to the Free Syrian Police. Subject to assessment under the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, it is proposed that this will include a limited



amount of controlled equipment, namely body armour and helmets (for conducting vehicle checks outside towns), CS spray (small canisters for individual personal protection), handcuffs (for making arrests), and night-vision goggles (early warning system for approaching regime helicopters).

The goods will be procured, distributed and delivered by an implementing partner carefully selected through competitive tender. The total cost of the proposed gift is up to £750,000, which will be met by the Government's Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). The UK's assistance forms part of an approach coordinated with other donors that will help deliver the best value for money. Other donors, including the US, Denmark and the Netherlands, are also contributing on a similar scale.

The gift forms part of a renewed comprehensive UK programme of training and technical assistance worth approximately £2.5 million in the current financial year, which will be delivered by implementing partners. The training aims to build the capacity of the Free Syrian Police including through developing their strategy, planning and management mechanisms and enhancing coordination between Free Syrian Police units, as well as strengthening the relationship between police actors and local communities.

The Free Syrian Police are responsible for providing basic civilian policing in large areas of opposition-controlled territory. Police actors, local administrative councils and the National Coalition's Interim Ministers have all underlined to us the need to improve policing and security, and we have worked closely with Syrian partners and other donors to design a comprehensive programme of support.

The gift is being scrutinised to ensure that it is consistent with export controls and complies with our international obligations. Recipients have been carefully selected to prevent equipment being given to those involved in extremist activities or human rights violations. All our assistance is carefully calibrated and legal, is aimed at alleviating human suffering and supporting moderate groups and is regularly monitored and evaluated. We have assessed the project for human rights risks, using the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance guidelines established by the Foreign Secretary in 2011 as part of ensuring these risks are effectively mitigated.

The Treasury has approved the proposal in principle. If, during the period of fourteen parliamentary sitting days beginning on the date on which the departmental minute was laid before the House of Commons, a Member signifies an objection by giving notice of a Parliamentary Question or a Motion relating to the minute, or by otherwise raising the matter in the House, final approval of the gift will be withheld pending an examination of the objection.

### *3 March 2015*

#### **Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Minute dated 3 March 2015 on the gifting of search and rescue equipment to Syrian civil defence teams**

It is the normal practice when a government department proposes to make a gift of a value exceeding £300,000, for the department concerned to present to the House of Commons a minute giving particulars of the gift and explaining the circumstances; and to refrain from

making the gift until fourteen Parliamentary sitting days after the issue of the minute, except in cases of special urgency.

The situation in Syria continues to deteriorate. An estimated 200,000 people have been killed since the war began four years ago, many of them innocent civilians. The Assad regime continues to use the most barbaric military methods and tactics available, including the use of indiscriminate artillery fire, chemical weapons and barrel bombs. The UK remains committed to doing all it can to promote a political settlement to end the conflict, to alleviate the humanitarian suffering, and to protect UK national security through countering terrorist and extremist threats.

In January and May 2014, my predecessor, the Rt Hon Member for Richmond (Yorks) (Mr William Hague), laid departmental minutes before the House of Commons and issued Written Ministerial Statements, setting out our plans to gift equipment to civil defence teams operating in opposition-controlled areas of Syria. No objections were received to either gift and the UK distributed the equipment to civil defence teams along with comprehensive training packages. These defence teams have now saved over 10,000 lives by rescuing civilians trapped in damaged buildings, fighting fires and by providing emergency first aid. Our assistance has helped increase the legitimacy and capacity of local councils and supported communities in dealing with the aftermath of attacks. Other donors, including the US, Denmark and Japan, have also contributed to the civil defence initiative.

The UK intends to continue its support to this programme by increasing the communications capability and mobility of the teams, providing more medium-weight rescue equipment and equipping further emergency medical teams. This departmental Minute sets out our proposal to gift £3.5 million in equipment to Syrian beneficiaries operating within civil defence. The proposed list of equipment includes cutting and rescue tools, personal protective gear including helmets and goggles, stretchers, medicines and medical supplies, radios, firefighting equipment and 4x4 vehicles. The programme will also increase coordination between the Syrian Interim Government and civil defence teams, and provide civilian outreach for the civil defence teams, improving the resilience of local communities. The programme is expected to cost £10 million and will be funded through the Government's Conflict, Security and Stability Fund (CSSF).

The use of CSSF funds to cover the costs of the gift has been approved by members of the Middle East and North Africa Strategic Programme Board from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development and Ministry of Defence. The gift has been scrutinised to ensure that the provision of this equipment is consistent with export controls and complies with our international obligations. Recipients have been carefully selected to prevent equipment being given to those involved in extremist activities or human rights violations. All our assistance is carefully calibrated and legal, is aimed at alleviating human suffering and supporting moderate groups and is regularly monitored and evaluated.

The Treasury has approved the proposal in principle. If, during the period of fourteen parliamentary sitting days beginning on the date on which the departmental minute was laid before the House of Commons, a Member signifies an objection by giving notice of a Parliamentary Question or a Motion relating to the minute, or by otherwise raising the

matter in the House, final approval of the gift will be withheld pending an examination of the objection.

## Annex 13: Extant arms export licences to Countries of concern

The Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls wrote to the BIS Secretary of State, Vince Cable, on 17 November 2014 requesting details of extant UK strategic export licences to each of the 28 countries listed as the FCO's Countries of human rights concern. The BIS Secretary replied on 15 December 2014.<sup>613</sup>

N.B. Only values for SIELs are shown. The Government does not provide values for OIELs because of their open nature. OIELs can be for either single destination countries or multiple destination countries.

### The FCO's Countries of Human Rights concern—extant licences

#### *Afghanistan*

Application Type	Goods Summary (Afghanistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Transshipment)	components for combat helicopters	451,636.97
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	350.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, equipment for the use of military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	34,643.18
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment	26,498.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	26,654.84
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	27,809.12
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment	554,838.12
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	73,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	5,086.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	1,360.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	81,180.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	400,000.00
SIEL	assault rifles (32), components for assault rifles, components for	56,223.00

<sup>613</sup> Ev w220 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 15 December 2014

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Afghanistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)	pistols, pistols (17)	
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	178,568.00
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	119,962.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	83,933.77
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	125,603.34
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	23,693.23
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	5,912,739.16
SIEL (Permanent)	military support vehicles	62,718.41
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military bridges/pontoons/ferries	104,525.16
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	16,053.28
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,577,581.73
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	75,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment	308,078.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for body armour, military helmets	44,252.64
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	101,790.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	10,269.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	655,910.26
SIEL (Permanent)	components for machine guns, components for pistols, machine guns (25), pistols (25)	38,275.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	208.50
SIEL (Permanent)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	1,427,443.30
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	19,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	5,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for assault rifles	500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	30,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,520,061.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	100,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for electronic warfare equipment	40,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	67,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	82,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general military aircraft components, military aircrew life support equipment	40,739.18
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, equipment	340,000.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Afghanistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
	for the use of military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (4), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, training small arms ammunition	9,596.58
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (5), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, pistols (3)	8,838.00
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	150,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	287.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military support aircraft, military guidance/navigation equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for signalling devices, technology for test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MN; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed or modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Afghanistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
Dual Use)*	for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for ejector seats, components for military parachutes, components for military training aircraft, ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military distress signalling equipment, military parachutes, technology for the development of ejector seats, technology for the development of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the development of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the development of military parachutes, technology for the development of military training aircraft, technology for the production of ejector seats, technology for the production of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the production of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the production of military parachutes, technology for the production of military training aircraft, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes, technology for the use of military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, devices for initiating explosives, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>15,031,406.77</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Afghanistan

## Belarus

Application Type	Goods Summary (Belarus)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	9,988.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Belarus)	Total Goods Value (£)
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment employing cryptography	120,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	8,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray accelerators	1,692,011.62
SIEL (Permanent)	laser optical components	2,700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray generators	2,018,653.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	18,304.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	114,804.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>3,984,960.62</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Belarus

## Burma

Application Type	Goods Summary (Burma)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	3,200,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general laboratory equipment	9,194.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	636,868.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	acoustic seabed survey equipment, equipment employing cryptography, guidance/navigation equipment, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles, underwater sonar navigation systems	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>3,846,062.00</b>



\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Burma

### Central African Republic (CAR)

Application Type	Goods Summary (Central African Republic)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for body armour, military helmets	19,050.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	168,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	9,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	33,966.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, bomb suits, components for devices for initiating explosives, devices for initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disruptors	47,000.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>277,966.00</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Central African Republic

### China

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Temporary)	lasers	120,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	military communications equipment	2,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	400.00
SIEL (Temporary)	lasers	198,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	54,094.81
SIEL (Temporary)	inertial equipment	115,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	inertial equipment	87,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	imaging cameras	15,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	components for military communications equipment	146.66
SIEL (Temporary)	general military aircraft components	200.00
SIEL (Temporary)	acoustic seabed survey equipment	11,662.00
SIEL (Temporary)	military communications equipment	500.00
SIEL (Temporary)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	92,585.00
SIEL (Temporary)	imaging cameras	15,351.00
SIEL (Temporary)	rebreathing swimming equipment	15,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	40,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of chemical agent detection equipment, military electronic equipment, software for NBC detection equipment	540,656.80
SIEL (Temporary)	focal plane arrays	25,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	uranium isotope separation equipment	1,500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for nuclear reactors, technology for nuclear reactors	42,936.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	880,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for nuclear reactors	3.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	705,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for nuclear reactors	73,108.00
SIEL (Permanent)	numerical control software	1,500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for instrumentation cameras	30,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for instrumentation cameras	8,140.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for military helicopters	0.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for nuclear reactors	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5,850,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	mass spectrometers	344,099.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	970,110.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	520,625.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	1,476,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	2,776,150.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	970,110.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment	3,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, magnetometers	3,333.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	12,582.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	16,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	2,000,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	42,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for the production of civil aero-engines	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,625.00
SIEL (Permanent)	high speed pulse generators	17,793.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for imaging cameras	100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	4,000,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	5,174.40
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	15,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	4,535.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	29,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, magnetometers	7,038.00
SIEL (Permanent)	accessories for digital computers, accessories for vibration test equipment, components for vibration test equipment, digital computers, software for vibration test equipment	45,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	114,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	55,301.60
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	2,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military electronic equipment	10.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	43,411.20
SIEL (Permanent)	laser optical components	8,560.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	300,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,625.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for NBC detection equipment	500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for chemical agent detection equipment, software for chemical agent detection equipment, technology for chemical agent detection equipment	471,150.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	600,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	25,001.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible vehicles	1,736,777.00
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	20,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,095,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	881,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	21,750,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	2,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,138.58
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	17,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	41,887.50
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	3,430.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	3,430.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	3,430.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	3,430.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	9,972.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	200,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	625,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	19,625.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	37,455.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	423,087.50
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	253,175.89
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy tubes	14,995.90
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	92,575.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	528,150.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	137,170.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	165,434.78
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	12,104.83
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	19,917.00
SIEL (Permanent)	RF direction finding equipment	25,188.00
SIEL (Permanent)	pressure transducers	1,867.50
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	1,367.52
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional inspection equipment	120,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	rebreathing swimming equipment	25,043.48
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	3,596.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	19,625.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	28,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	74,050.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for the development of space qualified focal plane arrays	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment, marine position fixing equipment	264,325.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	127,740.00
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	30,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,888,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	192,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,955,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	606,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,043,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	1,705,142.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4,500,000.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	74,050.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	521.82
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	25,001.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	173,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	40,622.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	32,710.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19,394.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	600.92
SIEL (Permanent)	software for cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,625.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	418,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	12,903.23
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	516,384.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	5,148.00
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	39,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	41,025.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	355,525.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	12,781.92
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	10,222.56
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	37,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	46,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	68,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	96,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	2,615.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,625.00
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	6,814.50
SIEL (Permanent)	pressure transducers	502.90
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	476,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	606,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4,325,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	thorium	743.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	19,625.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	27,539.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,846,350.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	59,850,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for the production of military communications equipment	500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	47,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	55,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,195,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	7,959.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military communications equipment	190.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	3,000,720.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	6,757.70
SIEL (Permanent)	military electronic equipment	2,510.03
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	9,972.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	15,830.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment	3,982.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for chemical agent detection equipment, equipment for the use of chemical agent detection equipment, software for chemical agent detection equipment, technology for chemical agent detection equipment	50,661,170.85
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	80,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	94,195.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	146.46
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	25,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	24,645.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	48,349.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	107,120.00
SIEL (Permanent)	nuclear grade graphite	10,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,314.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	14,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military helicopters	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	370,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	565,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	53,040.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	530,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,607,450.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	618,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	0.01
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	418,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,131.79
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	24,411.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for instrumentation cameras	46,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	guidance/navigation equipment	26,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	320,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	19,719.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	1,852.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	60,683.60
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	250,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	4,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	300,000.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, military communications equipment	5,276.36
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment	31,658.16
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	3,380.50
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	40,045.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5,400,720.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	27,295.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,925,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	128,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	19,844.56
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	320.50
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,507.68
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	magnetometers	3,366.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	960,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	143,040.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	900,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	45,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	226,840.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	181,618.36
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	51,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,625.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,650,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4,867,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,061.58
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,345,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	299,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,968,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5,050,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	970,110.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	410,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	262,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	2,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,625.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,525,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,254.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military electronic equipment	0.01
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	36,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	213,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	44,654.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	690,550.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,184,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,529.00
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	11,850.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for computer analogue to digital equipment, technology for computer analogue to digital equipment	2.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	118,539.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	76,344.02
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	239,540.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for civil aero-engines	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	35,448.00
SIEL (Permanent)	electronics cooling fluids	55,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	300,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,311,535.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	72,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	11,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,943.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	27,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	laser optical components	24,234.40
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	190.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	2,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,229.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	31,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	3,792.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	168.95
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	21,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	24,411.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	24,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	280,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	175,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	187,590.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	519,700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	437,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,310.00
SIEL (Permanent)	laser optical components, lasers	456,504.48
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	24,688.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,755.00
SIEL (Permanent)	pressure transducers	1,353.55
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	225,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	magnetometers	3,986.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,061.58
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	75,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	350,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	99,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	150,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	44,930.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	72,255.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	203,050.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	249,030.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,016,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	33,156.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	91,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	28,400.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	22,262.80
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	730,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for chemical/materials production	27,634.10
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	100,024.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,308,575.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	65,772.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,869,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,625.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,087,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,043,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	35,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	22,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	22,848.29
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,396.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	110,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	25,620.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,850.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	38,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19,210.52
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,061.58
SIEL (Permanent)	military aircraft ground equipment	14,470.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,265.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military patrol/assault craft	72,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	18,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	639,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	34,180.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	107,120.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19,424.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	28,943.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	24,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	22,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	2,460,659.23
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	128.06
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	44,295.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,169.22
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	975,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	61,957.50
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	150,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	mass spectrometers	330,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	441,580.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	195,493.33
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	17,164.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	72,969.74
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	71,250.00



Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,687,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,100,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military helicopters	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military aircraft head-up/down displays, software for military aircraft head-up/down displays, technology for military aircraft head-up/down displays	27,854.32
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	310,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	206,727.47
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	84,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	44,430.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	9,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	97,650.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	99,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	15,995.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for periscopes	17.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of military aero-engines	2,527.00
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	66,095.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	7,725.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	97,650.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	120,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	11,976.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	14,121.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,462,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4,575,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	737,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	19,256.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,558.86
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers, technology for semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,610,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,749.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,247.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	852,562.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	35,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	12,228.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	79,863.60
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	760,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	44,735.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,462,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	737,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	7,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	318,806.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	55,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	15,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	27,176.95
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	26,413.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	4,010.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,480.00
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	30,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	327,883.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,955.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for metal alloy materials	200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	1,095,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	105,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	11,048.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	374,999.88
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	36,309.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	11,002.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	19,496.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	4,000,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,925,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,231,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,475,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	455,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	8,937,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,462,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,256,111.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	50,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	37,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	22,520.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	27,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	140,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for weapon cleaning equipment, weapon cleaning equipment	1,934,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	20,514.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	17,606.64
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military electronic equipment	50.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	991.94
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,608.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,843.59
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	53,726.64
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment for the production of gas turbines, technology for military aero-engines	0.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment for the production of gas turbines, technology for military aero-engines	0.00
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	2,635.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	15,540.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	132,960.00
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	32,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	38,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	968,676.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	21,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	382.30
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,738.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment	281,269.45
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,933.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,500,000.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	342,671.02
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5,134.05
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	19,104.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	5,429.56
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	11,767.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	260,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC detection software, civil NBC detection systems, components for civil NBC detection systems	1,018,342.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	208,014.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	516,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	294.40
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,558.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	32,761.02
SIEL (Permanent)	electronics cooling fluids	15,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,270,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,847.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	84,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	17,606.64
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	896.03
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures	2.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,411.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	8,373.84
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,955.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	22,664.82
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,462,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	12,787,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	392,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	2,000,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	392,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	392,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	893,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	893,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,644.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	17,140.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	60,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	67,294.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	19,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	6,900,996.00
SIEL (Permanent)	pyrotechnics/fuels and related substances	562,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,925,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	13,162,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for imaging cameras	1,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	30,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	30,151.46
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	2.00
SIEL (Permanent)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	5,789.70

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	185,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	135,530.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	15,601,440.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	71,160.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	468,040.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13,570.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,002.80
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	1,240,985.92
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	23,625.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for lasers	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	27,468.00
SIEL (Permanent)	magnetometers	9,974.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	84,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	27,356.25
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	25,481.93
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	25,481.93
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	20.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,040,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment employing cryptography	1,315.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,834.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	120,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	1,000,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	2,398,681.64
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	3,006.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	39,970.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	388,044.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	970,110.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,294,871.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	37,662.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	292,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of military aero-engines	4,707.60
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	7,279.36
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	224.90
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	8,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	12,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,790.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	336,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	16,875,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	13,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	1,680.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	8,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	84,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	66,610.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	16,604.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	206,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7,380.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for mass spectrometers, mass spectrometers	475,710.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	600,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	70,221.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	65,650.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	9,525,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	242,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	61,875.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5,725,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	11,425,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,925,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,010,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military patrol/assault craft, unfinished products for military patrol/assault craft	755,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	6,200,480.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	21,645.16
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	3.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,430.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	797,562.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	19,353.64
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	932,607.50
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	24,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	932,607.50
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	932,607.50
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	857,998.90
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	895,303.20
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	820,694.60
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	932,607.50
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	857,998.90
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	857,998.90
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	932,607.50
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	919,871.76
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,065.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	41,846.00
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	311,407.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	200,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,339.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	11,110.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13,860.00
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits	75,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	1,600,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	33,887,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,900,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	760,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	260,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	30,380.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	7,435.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for chemical/materials production	124,623.45
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	17,281.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13,861.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	16,764.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	9,775.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	9,527.59
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	84,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,701.98
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	2,398,681.64
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	52,360.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,320.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	15,000,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	60,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	68,650.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,464.52
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	105,432.29
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	40,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloys in powder form	2,231.60
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	163,551.12
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,949.00
SIEL (Permanent)	high speed pulse generators, instrumentation cameras	30,760.00
SIEL (Permanent)	high speed pulse generators	19,050.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	9,425,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,043,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, general naval vessel components, military guidance/navigation equipment, radar equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	93,778.35
SIEL (Permanent)	microwave components	100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,462,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	14,625,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5,850,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	21,417.10
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	25,412,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,320.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,425.49
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	4,176.56
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	92,395.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	62,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	299,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	26,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,000,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	63,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software	8,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, military training equipment	20,610.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military patrol/assault craft	1,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment	6,000,480.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
	employing cryptography	
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	11,000,480.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	8,190.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	836,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment employing cryptography	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	2,166,865.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	467,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,597,317.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,597,317.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,214,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	1,214,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	9,112.47
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	2,748.02
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional inspection equipment, dimensional measuring equipment, machine tools	5,052,410.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,810.76
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	29,645.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	29,060.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	760,424.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	123,962.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	2,916,608.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	2,916,608.00
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	28,437.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	22,162,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	3,172,712.24
SIEL (Permanent)	components for lasers	3,172,712.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submersible equipment, submersible equipment	472,860.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	118,579.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	18,942.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	44,430.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	9,480.00
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	784,848.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software	62,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	12,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	calibration equipment for guidance/navigation equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, magnetometers	26,947.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	30,937.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	44,430.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	9,006.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,978,791.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	400,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	gravity gradiometers	2,500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	1,160,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,450,048.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military patrol/assault craft	2,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	44,208.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	26,181.03
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	257,584.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	69,360.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5,800,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	21,110.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,830,862.50
SIEL (Permanent)	aromatic polyamide-imides	600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,210.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	174,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	3,975.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	2,760,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1,140,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	1,561.06
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	17,812.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	145,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	9,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,625.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	582,612.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	21,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment for the production of military electronic equipment	300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	23,229.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	300,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	28,226.00
SIEL (Permanent)	space qualified focal plane arrays	250,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	30,030.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,100,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	15,523.50
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	900,002.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	29,312,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	27,912,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	108,680.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	27,325,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	33,887,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,925,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	2,000,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	588,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for semiconductor process equipment, semiconductor process equipment	12,429.55
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	582,612.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	34,000,960.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,482.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,074.21
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	12,560.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	4,610.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for lasers	5,053.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	19,800.00



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	30,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	37,037.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	704,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	146,112.69
SIEL (Permanent)	software for military communications equipment	9,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13,760.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	22,319.00
SIEL (Permanent)	electronics cooling fluids	40,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	11,653.95
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	60,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,414,721.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy materials	22,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	414,860.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	11,953.50
SIEL (Permanent)	magnetometers	23,265.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	442.47
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	50,324.10
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	272,625.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	440.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment	144.90
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits, military helmets	73,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6,686.10
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	750,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	300,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	20.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4,450,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	3,887,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	19,600,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	25,350,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	190.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	394,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	52,750,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray accelerators	165,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	21,417.10
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	300,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	6,280.43
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	32,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	160,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	1,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,718.28
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	325,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	1,200,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,115.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	320,000.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	39,420.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	33,555.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military electronic equipment	0.01
SIEL (Permanent)	mass spectrometers	898,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	1,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for cryptographic software	4,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	mass spectrometers	450,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	44,430.00
SIEL (Permanent)	laser optical components	6,483.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars, radar equipment, technology for military radars	93,778.35
SIEL (Permanent)	numerical control software, optics finishing machines, software for optics finishing machines	1,100,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	11,495.50
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	400,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for advanced telecommunications equipment	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	1,054,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	27,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7,200.23
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,124.50
SIEL (Permanent)	hafnium	398.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for advanced telecommunications equipment	1,000,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	56,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6,702.92
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	174,370.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	69,360.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	58,956.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for imaging cameras	1,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	electronics cooling fluids	500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	94,195.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	45,631.25
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	144,660.23
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	43,290.32
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	839.10
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	330,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	16,787.50
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	194,045.62
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,049.00
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	464,967.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	525,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	87,750,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	27,437,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	29,375,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,462,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,600.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	controlled atmosphere furnaces, nuclear grade graphite	130,183.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	837.69
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	65,731.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	9,220.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	15,353.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	28,325.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,522.84
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	55,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	350,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5,050.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,213,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4,423.33
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	15,793.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,180.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	1,052.77
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	1,052.88
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	1,052.75
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	22,573.62
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	65,082.43
SIEL (Permanent)	radiation hardened TV camera lenses, radiation hardened TV cameras	33,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	150,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,955.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	2,360,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	2,360,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	327.55
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, magnetometers	3,384.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software	0.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	1,044.21
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	438.42
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	1,039.91
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	21,570.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	23,650.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	14,250,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	72,500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	155,538.14
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	17,450.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	40,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	63.90
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1,896.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	63.90

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,343.43
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of equipment employing cryptography	5.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	642.81
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits, military helmets	39,310.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	882.72
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	13.60
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	microwave components	13,450.00
SIEL (Permanent)	magnetometers	13,829.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	318.01
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray generators	160,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	1,300,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	11,600,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	46,120.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy materials	250,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	30,740.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	29.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	106,889.73
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,014,905.20
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	50,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5,822.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	604,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	360,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	226.25
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	210,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for semiconductor process equipment, semiconductor process equipment	604,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	217.37
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	315.25
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	50.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	81,340.55
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	59,322.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	43,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	magnetometers	5,664.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military patrol/assault craft	1,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	315.50
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	176,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibre prepregs	580,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	24,090.56
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	430.42
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,175.80
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for lasers	1.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for lasers	9.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	63,333.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	84,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	12,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	14,140.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	11,560.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	19,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,889.46
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	17,020.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for cryptographic software	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	30,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	45,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools, numerical control software	30,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	35,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	60,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	22,837.50
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	22,837.50
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	38,470.55
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	22,837.50
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	150,570.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	14,480.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for instrumentation cameras	27,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	400,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	180,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	34,000,480.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloys in powder form, propellants	6,445.79
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	319.50
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	19,030.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	23,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	126,698.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	63,333.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	3,115.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,239.60
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,889.46
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	394.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment, radar equipment	39,495.36
SIEL (Permanent)	mass spectrometers	340,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	14,616.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,308.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	29,336.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4,000,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	207,000.00

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	rebreathing swimming equipment	1,231,719.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	14,616.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	100,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	8,070.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,515.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	12,873.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	215.50
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	3,961.30
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,140,108.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals, pyrotechnics/fuels and related substances	1,300,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	600,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	9,400,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for imaging cameras	1,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	502.50
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,763.03
SIEL (Permanent)	RF direction finding equipment	1,220,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras, technology for instrumentation cameras	161,676.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	322.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	88,115.29
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	443.07
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	323.00
SIEL (Permanent)	marine position fixing equipment	125,084.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	32,448.00
SIEL (Permanent)	magnetometers, military electronic equipment	5,839.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	84,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for NBC detection equipment	2.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	44,125.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	29,460.24
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,289.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	60,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	23,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	33,257.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	238,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	87,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	43,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	28,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	20,953.90
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	11,500,480.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,378.31
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	11,500,480.00
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	217,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	18,732.50
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	650,268.75
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	942,075.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	magnetometers	28,965.00
SIEL (Permanent)	magnetometers	6,165.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	29,480.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	1,060,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	320.50
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	15,081.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	1,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	4,406.50
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	15,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	86,575.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	31,562.50
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	158,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	microwave components	39,852.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	668.50
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submarines	23,686.32
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	320.50
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	672,761.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	20,341.50
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	27,759.58
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	mass spectrometers	477,937.50
SIEL (Permanent)	mass spectrometers	305,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	290.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	17,256.50
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	318,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	448.82
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	448.78
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	69,280.00
SIEL (Permanent)	toxic gas detectors	11,247.51
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	14,812,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	37,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military electronic equipment	25.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13,593.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	11,623.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13,833.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	35,312.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for focal plane arrays	0.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	15,380.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	23,700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	16,364.17
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, military electronic equipment	25,877.61
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1,558.00
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	108,657.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, military	11,501.16

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
	electronic equipment	
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	140.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	74,252.75
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	14,850.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	769.23
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	769.23
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13,833.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	17,626.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	18,132.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	15,968.00
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	35,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,913.40
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	16,068,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	60,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	30,050.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	25,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	9.74
SIEL (Permanent)	microwave components	55,346.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,783.08
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	13,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	17,110.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil NBC detection systems, technology for civil NBC detection systems	100,610.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	19,030.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	15,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	19,762.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	8,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	769.23
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	769.23
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	31,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	5,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,597.70
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of military aero-engines	2,490.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of military aero-engines	1,442.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	58,956.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	22,837.50
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	19,262.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	740,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	4,756.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	8,500,480.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4,687.50
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	26,090.00
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	207,000.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for the production of military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military /	metal alloy cylindrical forms	



Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
Dual Use)		
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	lasers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for semiconductor process equipment, components for semiconductor process equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for NBC detection equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of digital cellular radio system, technology for the development of frequency agility techniques, technology for the development of spread spectrum techniques	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of digital cellular radio system, technology for the development of frequency agility techniques, technology	

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
	for the development of spread spectrum techniques	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military radars, equipment for the use of military radars, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military radars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	fibrous/filamentary materials	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	lasers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	military improvised explosive device disposal equipment,	

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
Dual Use)*	military utility vehicles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for marine position fixing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accessories for underwater telecommunications systems, components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, frequency synthesisers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for periscopes, components for weapon night sights, periscopes, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for periscopes, technology for weapon night sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for equipment for the use of military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accessories for semiconductor process equipment, components for semiconductor process equipment, software for the use of semiconductor process equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment	

Application Type	Goods Summary (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
	employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military utility helicopters, equipment for the production of military utility helicopters, equipment for the use of military utility helicopters, technology for the development of military utility helicopters, technology for the production of military utility helicopters, technology for the use of military utility helicopters, test equipment for military utility helicopters, unfinished products for military utility helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	diver location sonars, software for diver location sonars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for body armour, components for military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the production of body armour, equipment for the production of goods treated for signature suppression for military use, equipment for the production of military aircrew protective equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for body armour, technology for goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for military aircrew protective equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	lasers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	technology for civil aero-engines	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>1,393,858,218.14</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including China

## Colombia

Application Type	Goods Summary (Colombia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Temporary)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	56,423.45
SIEL (Temporary)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	24,349.32
SIEL (Temporary)	military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	185,540.00
SIEL (Temporary)	radio jamming equipment	40,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment employing cryptography	12,352.00
SIEL (Temporary)	targeting equipment	50,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment employing cryptography	69,088.00
SIEL (Temporary)	military cameras/photographic equipment, military electronic equipment, military image recording/processing equipment	2,350.00
SIEL (Permanent)	telecommunications software	18,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	32,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military helmets	243.72
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	3,750,000.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Colombia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	1,476.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	371.46
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	25,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military guidance/navigation equipment	974,628.00
SIEL (Permanent)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment	8,637.20
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,738.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,738.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,516.38
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	2,450.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	40,676.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military patrol/assault craft	11,200,637.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, civil body armour	20,150.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	40,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	324,405.00
SIEL (Permanent)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	578,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	2,950.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for assault rifles, components for machine guns, components for pistols, equipment for the use of machine guns, training small arms ammunition	430,263.00
SIEL (Permanent)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	161,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for artillery	10,737.18
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	93,764.38
SIEL (Permanent)	high performance air traffic control software	80.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	14,570.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,918.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military helmets	235,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,050.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for devices for initiating explosives, devices for initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disruptors	304,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military communications equipment	280.00
SIEL (Permanent)	toxins	285.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil unmanned air vehicles	63,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	2,922.81
SIEL (Permanent)	telecommunications jamming equipment	185,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,000.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the production of ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for signalling devices, components for test models for ejector seats, components for test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for test models for military aircrew protective equipment, ejector seats, equipment for the production of ejector seats, equipment for the production of military aircrew protective equipment, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment,	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Colombia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for signalling devices, test models for ejector seats, test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, test models for military aircrew protective equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for unmanned air vehicles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	military guidance/navigation equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft cannons, components for air launched rockets, components for air-to-air missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft carriers, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for command communications control and intelligence software, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for depth charges, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for machine guns, components for military aero-engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval guns, components for naval mines, components for periscopes, components for sensor integration equipment, components for submarines, components for surface launched rockets, components for surface-to-surface missiles, components for targeting equipment, components for torpedoes, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Colombia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, machine guns, military aero-engines, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval engines, naval guns, technology for air launched rockets, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for depth charges, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for machine guns, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military radars, technology for torpedoes, torpedoes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military electronic equipment, components for military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Colombia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for combat aircraft, components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of military helicopters, equipment for the development of military support aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology	



Application Type	Goods Summary (Colombia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, test models for military support aircraft, test models for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of artillery, components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of artillery, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military transport aircraft	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>18,999,489.90</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including China

## Cuba

Application Type	Goods Summary (Cuba)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	towed hydrophone arrays	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>0</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Cuba

**Democratic Republic of Congo**

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Democratic Republic of Congo)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Temporary)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	751,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	118,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, military equipment for initiating explosives	13,005.30
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,376.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	300,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,376.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,520,061.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	9,566.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	79,631.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	987.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,652.50
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	3,471.74
SIEL (Permanent)	military support vehicles	32,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,238.75
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	75,847.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,291.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	8,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	59,538.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, magnetometers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, magnetometers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	towed hydrophone arrays	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Democratic Republic of Congo)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	underwater television cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>2,986,541.29</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Democratic Republic of Congo

## Eritrea

Application Type	Goods Summary (Eritrea)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	960,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, military helmets	8,640.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>968,641.00</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Eritrea

## Fiji

Application Type	Goods Summary (Fiji)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	devices for initiating explosives	37,720.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Fiji)	Total Goods Value (£)
	valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>37,720.00</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Fiji

## Iran

Application Type	Goods Summary (Iran)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic measurement equipment	24,546.17
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	64,778.68
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	55,036.33
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	32,133.74
SIEL (Permanent)	components for petrochemical plant, components for pneumatic systems, seals	4,604.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	59,389.70
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	30,893.60
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	85,575.90
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	41,969.66
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	205,514.24
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	79,929.56
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	299,587.69
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	534,161.01
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	793,900.63
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	5,077.44
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	402,518.15
SIEL (Permanent)	materials analysis equipment	49,382.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil aircraft	862,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	biochemicals	15,658.69
SIEL (Permanent)	biochemicals	1,147.30
SIEL (Permanent)	biochemicals, general laboratory equipment	15,278.03
SIEL (Permanent)	biochemicals, general laboratory equipment	8,856.96
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals	677,952.00
SIEL (Permanent)	biochemicals	991.14
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals, components for filtration equipment, general laboratory equipment	20,510.01
SIEL (Permanent)	biochemicals	3,266.87
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil aircraft	611,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil aircraft	1,632,000.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Iran)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	civil aero-engines	10,000,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil aircraft	1,244,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil aircraft	625,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment for the use of industrial gas turbines, equipment for the use of industrial gas turbines	40,178.45
SIEL (Permanent)	valves	2,894,036.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil aircraft	3,691,650.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil aircraft	2,043,466.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil aircraft	556,320.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection clothing	1,050.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil aircraft	49,373.40
SIEL (Permanent)	civil aircraft	281,700,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil aircraft	850,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	process control equipment	95,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil aero-engines	3,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil aero-engines	3,125,000.00
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>316,658,733.35</b>

## Iraq

Application Type	Goods Summary (Iraq)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Temporary)	bomb suits, components for demolition charges, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	9,055.00
SIEL (Temporary)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment, military communications equipment, military laser protection equipment	17,090.00
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	2,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	inertial equipment, technology for gyroscopes	751,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights	122,327.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights	23,790.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,226.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	577,835.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment	26,498.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	22,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	blank/inert ammunition, components for blank/inert ammunition, components for naval guns, equipment for the use of naval guns, technology for equipment for the use of naval guns, technology for naval guns	1,181,290.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	296,904.57
SIEL (Permanent)	software for spectrophotometers, spectrophotometers	5,076.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	294,783.82
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	35,040.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	100,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,602.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military training aircraft	100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography,	1,455,500.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Iraq)	Total Goods Value (£)
	software for equipment employing cryptography	
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	1,373,505.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,484.86
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	11,451.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment for the use of naval guns	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval gun installations/mountings, inertial equipment	3,746,981.40
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings	3,466,981.40
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	42,514.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment	108,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, civil body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	45,520.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for body armour	320.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,329.00
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray generators	5,321,590.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	24,983.02
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for anti-riot/ballistic shields, technology for body armour, technology for military helmets	50,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray generators	1,435,270.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of military helmets	369,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	100,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	25,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	457,570.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ballistic test equipment	140,273.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,309,205.00
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray generators	2,168,101.32
SIEL (Permanent)	components for body armour	292,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for body armour	597,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, high performance air traffic control software	667,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	4,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits, military helmets	469,907.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	165,514.05
SIEL (Permanent)	components for weapon mountings	17,324.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	26,235.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment	14,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray generators, software for X-ray generators	5,975,033.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of weapon sights	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	392,575.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	2,182.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	33,428.43
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (37), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, pistols (15)	63,214.80

Application Type	Goods Summary (Iraq)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military image recording/processing equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment	2,855,319.90
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	22,026.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	8,498.00
SIEL (Permanent)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	676,471.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	17,124.70
SIEL (Permanent)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	281,006.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment, radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	devices for initiating explosives, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, technology for test models for military training aircraft, test models for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cable systems sensitive to eavesdropping, components for equipment employing cryptography, components for equipment for generating hopping codes, components for equipment for generating spreading codes, components for impulse radio equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for generating hopping codes, equipment for generating spreading codes, equipment with reduced electromagnetic emanations, impulse radio equipment, non-cryptographic information security equipment, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	X-ray generators	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for ejector seats, components for military parachutes, components for military training aircraft, ejector	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Iraq)	Total Goods Value (£)
	seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military distress signalling equipment, military parachutes, technology for the development of ejector seats, technology for the development of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the development of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the development of military parachutes, technology for the development of military training aircraft, technology for the production of ejector seats, technology for the production of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the production of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the production of military parachutes, technology for the production of military training aircraft, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes, technology for the use of military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military transport aircraft	
<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>		<b>316,658,733.35</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Iraq

### Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories

Application Type	Goods Summary (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Transshipment)	components for small arms ammunition	2,395.00
SIEL (Temporary)	components for military helicopters	10,000.00



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Temporary)	laser radar equipment	3,200,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	high power RF weapon systems	600,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	imaging cameras	10,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras	12,500.00
SIEL (Temporary)	components for targeting equipment	8,274.00
SIEL (Temporary)	imaging cameras	5,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment, software for computer analogue-to-digital equipment	10,388.00
SIEL (Temporary)	signal generators	18,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	signal generators	68,800.00
SIEL (Temporary)	components for military helicopters	7,480.87
SIEL (Temporary)	general military vehicle components	42,069.80
SIEL (Temporary)	software enabling equipment to function as military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	2,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	towed hydrophone arrays	420,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	RF direction finding equipment	10,495.00
SIEL (Temporary)	military guidance/navigation equipment	44,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	aerial target equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment	1,355,778.00
SIEL (Temporary)	RF direction finding equipment	75,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	components for military helicopters	11,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for air-to-surface missiles	17,927.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for unmanned air vehicles	73,070.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	9,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military electronic equipment	3,891.18
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	16,212.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	100,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	13,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	13,755,691.80
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	11,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	gyroscopes	14,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	28,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	650,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for civil aero-engines	1,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	113,295.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	200,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13,875.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,224.58
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10,015.45
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	47,276.32
SIEL (Permanent)	electronics cooling fluids	81,101.03
SIEL (Permanent)	unfinished products for military support aircraft	11,926.43
SIEL (Permanent)	pressure transducers	11,163.77
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,648.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	22,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for aircraft missile protection systems	9,906.00
SIEL (Permanent)	gyroscopes	460,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	nickel powders	3,000.00

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,750,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	constituents of propellants	51.29
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	4,593.47
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	600,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	gyroscopes	37,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,425,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aircraft head-up/down displays	120,939.16
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	12,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,000,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	190,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	43,245.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	80,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	23,545.50
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	22,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for surface-to-surface missiles	21,133.21
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloys in powder form	200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	150,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	10,664.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,026.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	100,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,262.66
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	130,997.24
SIEL (Permanent)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment	15,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	2,677.32
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for surface launched rockets, test models for surface launched rockets	34,797.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	627.57
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, pressure transducers	505,292.33
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, electronics cooling fluids, pressure transducers	987,140.08
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for unmanned air vehicles	300,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	nickel powders	9,661.84
SIEL (Permanent)	nuclear grade graphite	9,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment	420,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	755,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	110,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support vehicles	34,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	106,778.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	50,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	604,264.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, pressure transducers	738,369.58
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	596.25
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	3,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, pressure transducers	364,995.13
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment employing cryptography	14,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,313.95

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	8,458.53
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	92,456.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	550,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,450.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	53,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	132,573.18
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4,197.57
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	505,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military electronic equipment	266,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	9,064.00
SIEL (Permanent)	accelerometers	2,886.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	3,187.50
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	83,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	6,619.33
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	765,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	678.50
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,177,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	133,323.08
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	2,250,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for unmanned air vehicles	65,392.94
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	266,663.07
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	18,118.81
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	300,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	21,335.90
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	12,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	rebreathing swimming equipment	17,759.85
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	4,254.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	80,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloys in particulate form	1,316.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military electronic equipment	23,277.73
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for unmanned air vehicles	300,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	163,485.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	5,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of decoying/countermeasure equipment	66,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	16,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of weapon sights	8,170.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	8,888.63
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	1,500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	11,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military parametric technical databases, software for equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment	2,400.01
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military airborne equipment	4,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	19,006.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	210.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for body armour, components for military support vehicles	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	200,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for small arms ammunition	0.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	7,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloys in powder form	30,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	25,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	24,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for air-to-surface missiles, test models for air-to-surface missiles	45,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	2,080.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	34,591.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	42,099.62
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	17,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	33,990.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	13,973.71
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	525,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	26,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	973,013.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	4,645.20
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	330,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	3,318.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	11,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic countermeasure equipment	11,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	13,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	triggered spark gaps	360,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,172.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	55,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	pressure transducers	500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	108,674.95
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,660.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	33,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	20,040.00
SIEL (Permanent)	beryllium alloys, beryllium manufactures	3,065.80
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,931,805.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	78,140.00
SIEL (Permanent)	gyroscopes	13,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	3,468.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	23,270.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	15,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloys in powder form	11,347.45
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for civil aero-engines	40.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submarines	9,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	324,950.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,150,000.00

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	9,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	35,455.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	75,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	25,807.63
SIEL (Permanent)	components for unmanned air vehicles	58,125.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	15,098.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for small arms ammunition	0.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	197,550.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	22,350.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	180,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	180,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	30,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	5,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,060,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	74,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	15,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	2,497.20
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	35,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	armoured plate	11,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	188,825.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,900,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment, military electronic equipment	38,241.50
SIEL (Permanent)	pressure transducers	740.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	53,643.93
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	102,625.86
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	350,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	350,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	118,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	21,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-friction bearings	42,025.00
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	117,765.55
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	325,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-armour ammunition	8,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23,105.17
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	377.55
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submarines	7,105.00
SIEL (Permanent)	aircraft military communications equipment	67,328.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	18,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	65,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	15,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	9,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	5,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	547,537.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	125,475.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	6,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,300,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	6,260.76
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	10,309.74

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, military electronic equipment	235,838.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	5,196.00
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	155,015.15
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	18,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	415,895.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	948.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	218,333.54
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	20,738.80
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	52,700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	10,957.32
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment employing cryptography	3,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	28,113.60
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	11,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	19,760.00
SIEL (Permanent)	water cannons	67,187.50
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	105,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment	154,077.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	100,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	15,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	30,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	8,650,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aircraft head-up/down displays	219,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	306,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	25,824.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	20,086.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for unmanned air vehicles	79,606.86
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submarines	7,105.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil NBC protection equipment	40,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras, weapon night sights	1,913,406.88
SIEL (Permanent)	military equipment for initiating explosives	400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	46,017.48
SIEL (Permanent)	components for unmanned air vehicles	5,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	520.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submarines	2,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	31,752.76
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	255,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	4,002,167.00
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	1,305,970.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	165,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	targeting equipment, technology for targeting equipment	8,759.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	288,270.00
SIEL (Permanent)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	4,495.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	14,062.74
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	224,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	43,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,346.41
SIEL (Permanent)	direct view imaging equipment	8,000.00

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	21,228.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	10,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	1,706.40
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	39,278.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for command/control equipment for unmanned air vehicles, technology for command/control equipment for unmanned air vehicles	10,408.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for gas turbine engines	1,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,147.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	52,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	28,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	6,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	60,698.76
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submarines	112.16
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submarines	885.68
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submarines	112.16
SIEL (Permanent)	components for surface-to-air missiles	2,806.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft, components for military training aircraft	168,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	35,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	targeting equipment	58,752.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	805,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submarines	112.23
SIEL (Permanent)	components for surface-to-air missiles	2,989.52
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submarines	956.89
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7,360.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	493.34
SIEL (Permanent)	military aircraft navigation equipment	41,901.87
SIEL (Permanent)	components for unmanned air vehicles	2,862.30
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military spacecraft	140,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	bismuth	700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	19,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	pathogenic genetic elements	20.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	98,233.00
SIEL (Permanent)	targeting equipment	61,182.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	5,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	250,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	275,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	calcium	85.32
SIEL (Permanent)	triggered spark gaps	250,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for attack alerting/warning equipment	15,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	71,453.96
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	30,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	30,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	70,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	15,175.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	25,654.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	14,684.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	609,559.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	12,470.97
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	24,500.00

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	80,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	13,668.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars, military radars, software for military radars, technology for military radars	412,320.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	50,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military aero-engines	22,700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	1,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,134.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	4,555.32
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	314,220.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	108,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	246,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	49,355.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment	11,375.00
SIEL (Permanent)	enriched boron	100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	140,275.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles, equipment for the use of military combat vehicles	78,509.96
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	2,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	rebreathing swimming equipment	19,259.85
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of weapon sights, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights	8,410.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	biotechnology equipment, components for biotechnology equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for the development of corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for the production of corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for the use of corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the production of ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, ejector seats, equipment for the production of ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for ejector seats, technology for equipment for the production of ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, test models for ejector seats, test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, test models for military aircrew protective equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military aircrew breathing	



Application Type	Goods Summary (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)	Total Goods Value (£)
	equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military parachutes and equipment, components for military training equipment, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, general military aircraft components, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military parachutes and equipment, military training equipment, software for combat aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for production installations for combat aircraft, test models for combat aircraft, unfinished products for combat aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, software for aerial target equipment, technology for aerial target equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for naval communications equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of naval communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, naval communications equipment, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for naval communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military training aircraft, test models for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	imaging cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accessories for semiconductor process equipment, components for semiconductor process equipment, software for the use of semiconductor process equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>92,941,347.79</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories

## Libya

Application Type	Goods Summary (Libya)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	2,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	10,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	5,220.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	52,866.00
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour	1,528,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	targeting equipment	25,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	accessories for improvised explosive device disposal remotely operated vehicles, bomb suits, civil explosive detection/identification equipment, gun mountings, improvised explosive device disposal remotely operated vehicles, military helmets, sporting guns (9)	1,833,980.76
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	50,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	472.30
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	501,771.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	38,875.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (35), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, hand grenades, pistols (21), small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment	76,847.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	400,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	9,000,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military support vehicles	11,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	17,940.00
SIEL (Permanent)	combat shotguns (5)	4,600.56
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device jamming equipment	255,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,763.66
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,873.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment	78,460.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment	11,822.00
SIEL (Permanent)	pistols, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition	38,850.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	961.88
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	232,954.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	693.13
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,389.38
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6,460.40
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,366.88

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Libya)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray accelerators	1,994,756.67
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	21,080.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	57,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	25,012.50
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, military equipment for initiating explosives	24,303.70
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	13,812.50
SIEL (Permanent)	civil body armour, components for body armour	1,137.88
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray accelerators, technology for X-ray accelerators	13,341,333.36
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray accelerators, components for X-ray accelerators, software for X-ray accelerators, technology for X-ray accelerators	5,012,666.66
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	27.26
SIEL (Permanent)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	14,390.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	49,743.75
SIEL (Permanent)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	4,707.07
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	3,892,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	6,724.06
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	2,501,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, smooth-bore weapons	21,709.28
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	underwater television cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>43,762,521.64</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Libya

## Pakistan

Application Type	Goods Summary (Pakistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Transshipment)	exploding grenade ammunition	24,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	radio jamming equipment	50,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	radio jamming equipment	80,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	2,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, sniper rifles (1), weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sights	8,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	assault rifles (2), components for assault rifles	1,950.00
SIEL (Temporary)	components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, sniper rifles (6), weapon sights	33,050.00
SIEL (Permanent)	radio jamming equipment	236,157.81
SIEL (Permanent)	accessories for materials analysis equipment, components for materials analysis equipment, materials analysis equipment, technology for materials analysis equipment	17,277.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	342,540.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun mountings, sniper rifles (5), technology for sniper rifles, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	53,128.50
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for combat aircraft	214,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,890,078.24
SIEL (Permanent)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	49,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	397.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment	12,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	2,079.92
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	32,966.15
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sporting guns, sporting guns (1)	500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	66.98
SIEL (Permanent)	pistols (1)	750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	pistols (1)	750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for gas processing equipment	42,866.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,117.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for general industrial production equipment	217.45
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	26,639.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	13,133.34
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	11,829.40
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	14,493.92
SIEL (Permanent)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for general industrial production equipment	201.90
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	103,428.33
SIEL (Permanent)	accessories for materials processing equipment	1,550.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	16,909.49
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	2,472,333.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	2,079.92
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	32,966.15

Application Type	Goods Summary (Pakistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for pumps	3,464.85
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	2,014.15
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	196.69
SIEL (Permanent)	valves	261.00
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (8), weapon sights	6,313.44
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,435,040.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars, equipment for the use of military radars, technology for equipment for the use of military radars, technology for military radars	2,967,464.98
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	1,390.00
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon night sights	24,034.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	2,688.92
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	4,163.93
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	3,650.52
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	13,558.13
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	662.40
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	3,916.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	96,333.33
SIEL (Permanent)	military helmets	1,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	6,487.98
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-armour ammunition	2,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	2,342.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	568,291.66
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	26,315.63
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military airborne equipment, technology for equipment for the use of military airborne equipment	1,141.90
SIEL (Permanent)	military radars	929,726.67
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat helicopters	4,227.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	18,157.50
SIEL (Permanent)	general military aircraft components	1,450.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	1,564.93
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	529.68
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval electrical/electronic equipment	34,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	unfinished products for assault rifles	56,814.63
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	416.56
SIEL (Permanent)	military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars	6,375,332.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	310,285.78
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of pressure monitoring equipment	4,125.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	2,642.43
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	31,977.42
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	9,449.71
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	9,670.49
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	10,643.73
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	7,445.76
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	112.74
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	35,544.34
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	22,279.87
SIEL (Permanent)	military guidance/navigation equipment	5,400.00

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Pakistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval guns	43.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aircrew breathing equipment	15,291.26
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	353.86
SIEL (Permanent)	military helmets	59,655.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	1,249.50
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	128.21
SIEL (Permanent)	components for unmanned air vehicles	3,626.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	13,110.43
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	98.50
SIEL (Permanent)	general laboratory equipment	1,632.00
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	610,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for machine tools, machine tools	1,701,938.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	2,532.47
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	7,888.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	4,665.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of artillery ammunition	3,100,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	25,484.72
SIEL (Permanent)	materials testing equipment	3,489.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	10,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general laboratory equipment	5,034.55
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	2,286.80
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat helicopters	1,879.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lubricants, non-ferrous metals	8,061.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment	215.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	25,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	389,509.96
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	1,608.65
SIEL (Permanent)	decoying/countermeasure equipment	235,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	52.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	10,164.66
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-armour ammunition	3,477.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	1,560.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7,216.00
SIEL (Permanent)	naval engines	420,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	188.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	730.83
SIEL (Permanent)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	1,625.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	442.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	11,755.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military support aircraft	342,176.56
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,235,920.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general military aircraft components	1,829.14
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	25,615.19
SIEL (Permanent)	general military aircraft components	4,073.96
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	539.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	14,377.70
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	442.10



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Pakistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	6,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	power supplies	68,960.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	60,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	aircraft military communications equipment	13,471.07
SIEL (Permanent)	animal pathogens	1,287.50
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	3,819.39
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	41,580.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for gas processing equipment	28,816.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	170,952.00
SIEL (Permanent)	direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights	152,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of pistols, equipment for the production of rifles	4,483.30
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (30), weapon sights	28,290.48
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of rifles	25,412.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment	135,869.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment, technology for military electronic equipment	5,194.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military parachutes and equipment, military parachutes and equipment	140,699.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	50,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	5,820.00
SIEL (Permanent)	accessories for temperature measurement equipment, temperature measurement equipment	2,155.15
SIEL (Permanent)	temperature measurement equipment	8,780.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	20,736.00
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (1)	5,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	6,524.57
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	37,017.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	104,206.20
SIEL (Permanent)	components for pistols, components for sporting guns, pistols (1), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (4)	8,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat helicopters	162.30
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	3,388.22
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	1,142.40
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	31,488.00
SIEL (Permanent)	launching/handling/control equipment for missiles	9,076.98
SIEL (Permanent)	military guidance/navigation equipment	106,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of artillery ammunition	643,789.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1,022.40
SIEL (Permanent)	ferrous metals	21,773.70
SIEL (Permanent)	military cameras/photographic equipment	75,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	42,860.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military guidance/navigation equipment	2,700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	169.75
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	3,613.86
SIEL (Permanent)	pressure transducers	22,463.59
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,734.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military image recording/processing equipment	30,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	181,342.79
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of assault rifles	7,957.00
SIEL (Permanent)	targeting equipment, technology for targeting equipment	16,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support vehicles	5,000.00

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Pakistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	components for gas processing equipment	34,417.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	1,455.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	39,007.98
SIEL (Permanent)	industrial generators	1,215,853,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	43,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	accessories for valves, valves	19,152.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military helmets	25,950.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military helmets	42,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines	6,800,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	27,550.00
SIEL (Permanent)	direct view imaging equipment	110,950.11
SIEL (Permanent)	ballistic test equipment, components for ballistic test equipment	27,929.93
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC detection systems, technology for civil explosive detection/identification equipment	42,750.50
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC detection systems, technology for civil explosive detection/identification equipment	42,750.50
SIEL (Permanent)	general military aircraft components	17,098.49
SIEL (Permanent)	military helmets	46,169.76
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles, small arms ammunition	2,415.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	11,371.22
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	18,729.85
SIEL (Permanent)	sniper rifles (1), weapon sights	126,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	pressure monitoring equipment	8,699.98
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment	20.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas	274,425.06
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	155.62
SIEL (Permanent)	general laboratory equipment	350.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for pistols, pistols (1), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (2), sporting shotguns (1)	10,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for pistols, components for rifles, pistols (1), rifles (2), small arms ammunition, sporting shotguns (1)	10,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	7,744.25
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	525.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general laboratory equipment	350.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	362,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aircraft head-up/down displays	71,230.00
SIEL (Permanent)	temperature measurement equipment	513.75
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	420.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	7,652.35
SIEL (Permanent)	military guidance/navigation equipment	2,700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military guidance/navigation equipment	96,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4,224.32
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	363,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	28,305.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	38,304.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general industrial production equipment	11,200.45
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment	6,730.00
SIEL (Permanent)	naval engines	140,000.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Pakistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	13,050.90
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	5,521.60
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	284.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military guidance/navigation equipment	47,000.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for frigates, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat helicopters, devices containing military pyrotechnic materials, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, pyrotechnic signalling devices, software for the use of combat helicopters, software for the use of equipment for the use of combat helicopters, technology for the use of combat helicopters, technology for the use of devices containing military pyrotechnic materials, technology for the use of equipment for the use of combat helicopters, technology for the use of pyrotechnic signalling devices, unfinished products for combat helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	general naval vessel components, technology for the use of general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment for the use of general naval vessel components, general naval vessel components, technology for the use of equipment for the use of general naval vessel components, technology for the use of general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military electronic equipment, components for naval navigation equipment, components for naval radars, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment, naval navigation equipment, naval radars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, technology for the production of military aero-engines, technology for the use of military aero-engines, unfinished products for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military parachutes, ejector seats, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military distress signalling equipment, military parachutes, technology for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of general military aircraft components, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for artillery, components for mortars, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for turrets, components for weapon control equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	anti-aircraft guns, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for counter-countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for counter-countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, components for counter-countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, components	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Pakistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>for counter-countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for fire location equipment, components for general naval vessel components, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military imaging radar sensor equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for naval hull penetrators/connectors, components for periscopes, components for projectile launchers, components for rangefinding equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for sensor integration equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, counter-countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, counter-countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, counter-countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, counter-countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of fire location equipment, equipment for the use of general naval vessel components, equipment for the use of military cameras/photographic equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use</p>	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Pakistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military imaging radar sensor equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of naval communications equipment, equipment for the use of naval electrical/electronic equipment, equipment for the use of naval gun installations/mountings, equipment for the use of naval hull penetrators/connectors, equipment for the use of periscopes, equipment for the use of rangefinding equipment, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, equipment for the use of sensor integration equipment, equipment for the use of targeting equipment, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, fire location equipment, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military cameras/photographic equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military imaging radar sensor equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military radars, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, naval gun installations/mountings, naval guns, naval hull penetrators/connectors, periscopes, projectile launchers, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment, sensor integration equipment, targeting equipment, technology for anti-aircraft guns, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for fire location equipment, technology for general naval vessel components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image intensifier equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military imaging radar sensor equipment, technology for military radars, technology for naval communications equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval gun installations/mountings, technology for naval guns, technology for naval hull penetrators/connectors, technology for periscopes, technology for projectile launchers, technology for rangefinding equipment, technology for recognition/identification equipment, technology for sensor integration equipment, technology for targeting equipment, technology for weapon control equipment, technology for weapon night sights, technology for weapon sights, weapon control equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment,	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Pakistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
	components for military electronic equipment, ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for combat aircraft, technology for ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for ejector seats, test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, test models for military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the production of ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for signalling devices, ejector seats, equipment for the production of ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for combat aircraft, technology for ejector seats, technology for equipment for the production of ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, test models for ejector seats, test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, test models for military aircrew protective equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, signalling devices, technology for combat aircraft, technology for devices containing military pyrotechnic materials, technology for ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for aircraft carriers, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for military aero-engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military combat vehicles, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military support aircraft, components for military support vehicles, components for military training aircraft, components for military underwater remotely operated vehicles, components for naval engines, components for submarines, components for tanks, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military training aircraft, military aircraft	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Pakistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
	ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for aircraft carriers, components for combat naval vessels, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military electronic equipment, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for submarines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	general naval vessel components, technology for general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for air defence systems, components for aircraft carriers, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for military communications equipment, components for military radars, components for military support vehicles, components for military trailers, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for submarines, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of air defence systems, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military radars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for naval engines, equipment for the use of naval engines, military containers, naval engines, software for naval engines, technology for naval engines, unfinished products for naval engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MN; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed of modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Pakistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military utility vehicles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for combat aircraft, components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for aircraft carriers, components for combat naval vessels, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military patrol/assault craft, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for military training equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, military training equipment, software for aerial target equipment, software for military training equipment, technology for aerial target equipment, technology for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use) /	components for military utility helicopters, equipment for the	



Application Type	Goods Summary (Pakistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
Dual Use)*	production of military utility helicopters, equipment for the use of military utility helicopters, technology for the development of military utility helicopters, technology for the production of military utility helicopters, technology for the use of military utility helicopters, test equipment for military utility helicopters, unfinished products for military utility helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military electronic equipment, components for signalling devices, ejector seats, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of general military aircraft components, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector seats, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for signalling devices, test models for ejector seats, test models for general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military aero-engines, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military electronic equipment, components for military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military electronic equipment	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Pakistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>43,762,521.64</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Pakistan

## Russia

Application Type	Goods Summary (Russia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Temporary)	imaging cameras	23,100.00
SIEL (Temporary)	imaging cameras	5,765.00
SIEL (Temporary)	imaging cameras	15,351.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment employing cryptography	15,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	2.00
SIEL (Temporary)	towed hydrophone arrays	1,200,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	towed hydrophone arrays	8,900.00
SIEL (Temporary)	components for marine position fixing equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	5,932,305.00
SIEL (Temporary)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	337,415.51
SIEL (Permanent)	radiation hardened integrated circuits	208,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	1,250,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	23,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	15,351.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	24,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	3,000,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	8,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	zirconium alloys	2,670.00
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	375.00
SIEL (Permanent)	space qualified solar devices	75,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	210,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	162,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	137,269.93
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	150,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13,343.84
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	140,445.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	25,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	23,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	rebreathing swimming equipment	6,260.87
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	316.95
SIEL (Permanent)	millimetric wave components, signal analysers	93,390.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	2,540,131.50
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	60,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	2,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	5,295.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	42,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	5,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	hydrophones	14,200,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	3,500.00

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Russia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	450,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	175,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	4,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	5,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools, numerical control software, software for machine tools	662,727.76
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	microwave components	1,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	9,972.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	1,760,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	15,351.00
SIEL (Permanent)	hydrophones	12,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	980,666.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,693,150.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	44,028.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	8,154.84
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	157,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment, civil NBC protection clothing	4,499.58
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	13,535.51
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	9,063.40
SIEL (Permanent)	global positioning satellite receivers	1,095,660.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	450,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	450,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	250,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	250,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	zirconium alloys	200,650.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	35,822.04
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	58,481.31
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	26,852.00
SIEL (Permanent)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	21,050.00
SIEL (Permanent)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment, software for computer analogue-to-digital equipment	23,650.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	26,975.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	17,969,636.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for semiconductor device manufacturing processes	4,150.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	51,961.29
SIEL (Permanent)	radiation hardened integrated circuits	456,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	animal pathogens	10.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	115,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium solutions	103.50
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	11,242.00
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	448.44
SIEL (Permanent)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	420,000.00

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Russia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	581,980.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	22,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	573,228.00
SIEL (Permanent)	accelerometers	2,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	guidance/navigation equipment, inertial equipment	49,550.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,235,920.00
SIEL (Permanent)	radiation hardened TV camera lenses	3,550.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	3,520,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	480.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,534,181.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,269,650.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	218,521.02
SIEL (Permanent)	gyro-astro compasses	333,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	microwave components	400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	8,359,450.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters	937,695.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	18,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	12,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	rotary position encoders	4,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	925,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicle control systems, submersible vehicles	1,211,454.35
SIEL (Permanent)	beryllium manufactures	2,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	47,757.50
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	4,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	63,807.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	3.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	3.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for composite tubes, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	3.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,534,181.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	160,476.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment	20,880.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters	479,685.00
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	225,390.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	9,686.70
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	150,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	126,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,534,181.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	350,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	high energy capacitors	15,526.35

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Russia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	20,665.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	37,603.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	58.26
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for gas turbine engines	1,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	86,160.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	1,584,256.00
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible vehicles	922,373.45
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	6,620.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	2,000,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	50,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	51,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (8)	36,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	141,913.77
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	22,985.90
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	1,750,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	5,900,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	90,688.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy powder production equipment	361,432.17
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	34,001.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	160,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	animal pathogens	10.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	35,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	215.02
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	159,135.78
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	177,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloys in powder form	51,135.51
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	1,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for submersible vehicles, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	812,928.13
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	372,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	176,818.00
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	318,091.00
SIEL (Permanent)	enriched uranium	36,000,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	global positioning satellite receivers	500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	enriched uranium	1,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	5,418,360.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	346,148.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	950,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	950,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	950,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	1,832,243.81
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	19,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	1,750,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	38,711.33
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	11,805.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil industry equipment/materials	22,184.30
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	211,902.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	276,807.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	8,479.14
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	4,254.99
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	487.00

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Russia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	35,852.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	11,624.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	18,012.00
SIEL (Permanent)	microwave components	500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	10,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submersible vehicles	4,508.35
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	6,094.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	920,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	10,399.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	20,778.77
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	19,158.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	11,582.96
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	2,995.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	10,588.60
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	4,927.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	12,637.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	5,357.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	12,890.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	23,929.22
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	38,649.93
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	600,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	4,486.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	8,375.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	480,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	7,344.65
SIEL (Permanent)	components for semiconductor process equipment	622.44
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	539.32
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	23,840.00
SIEL (Permanent)	guidance/navigation equipment	450,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	40,621.07
SIEL (Permanent)	oil industry equipment/materials	134,911.16
SIEL (Permanent)	oil industry equipment/materials	3,739,595.74
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	1,283.09
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	5,524.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	195,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	97,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	8,885.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	125.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,361.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	90.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	22,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	29,935.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy powder production equipment	1,900,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	4,291.00
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	5,461.32
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	7,579.53
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	4,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	30,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	603.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	91,472.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	2,825,029.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Russia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	electronic measurement equipment	10,055.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	2,309.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	7,176.70
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	4,332.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	3,337.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for machine tools, software for machine tools	25,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	22,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	6,223.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	12,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	10,154.48
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	59,965.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	97,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	14,210.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	780.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	3,270.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	190.00
SIEL (Permanent)	magnetometers	2,055.00
SIEL (Permanent)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	4,007.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	110,500.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for oil industry equipment/materials, technology for oil industry equipment/materials	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>168,536,910.08</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Russia

### Saudi Arabia

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Transshipment)	periscopes	2,143,218.00
SIEL (Temporary)	military electronic equipment	7,700.00
SIEL (Temporary)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	32,074.13
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367,560.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367,560.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment employing cryptography	1,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	fire location equipment, recognition/identification equipment, software for fire location equipment, software for recognition/identification equipment	19,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	radio jamming equipment	45,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment, components for civil riot control agent protection equipment, military communications equipment, rebreathing swimming	12,350.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	equipment, technology for military communications equipment	
SIEL (Temporary)	military image intensifier equipment, weapon night sights	85,500.00
SIEL (Temporary)	weapon night sights	85,500.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	51,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	military communications equipment	190,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment, military laser protection equipment	18,090.00
SIEL (Temporary)	military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	14,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	targeting equipment	23,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	military cameras/photographic equipment, weapon night sights	3,717.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment employing cryptography	60,300.06
SIEL (Permanent)	direct view imaging equipment	18,954.00
SIEL (Permanent)	crowd control ammunition, hand grenades, illuminators, signalling devices, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training crowd control ammunition	3,809,075.40
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	30,085.60
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	30,085.60
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for unmanned air vehicles	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	100,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for air-to-surface missiles	5,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	366.18
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	3,622.15
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	1,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	913.67
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	447.03
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	1,133.13
SIEL (Permanent)	military aircraft ground equipment	2,751.55



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	243,605.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	41,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for ground vehicle military communications equipment, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment	13,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,650.00
SIEL (Permanent)	illuminators	74,371.20
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval communications equipment	51,444.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	2,930.00
SIEL (Permanent)	pressure transducers	9,690.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	9,742.00
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	9,415.15
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	78,583.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	400,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	524,235.37
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	2,525.94
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	5,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4,261.30
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	476,957.00
SIEL (Permanent)	graphite materials, nuclear grade graphite	18,497.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for machine guns	21,744.00
SIEL (Permanent)	tear gas/irritant ammunition	215,712.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	2,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	140,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4,375.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	370,000.00

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6,817.20
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aircraft ground equipment	1,964.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,980.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	441,375.68
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,313,392.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	4,122.71
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	471,460.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for turrets	3,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for turrets	1,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	537,766.58
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,675.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	315.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	223.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	5,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers	600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,060.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23,036.70
SIEL (Permanent)	software for semiconductor process equipment	0.00
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium solutions	110.84
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,052.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	68,963.86
SIEL (Permanent)	combat aircraft, military airborne equipment	1,582,666,650.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	695,830.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	79,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,248.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	51,820.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,918.92
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	1,234,972.48
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits, components for military equipment for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of improvised explosive device disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disruptors, military equipment for initiating explosives, military helmets, night vision goggles	2,189,215.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	47,700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	blank/inert ammunition	196,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	931.50
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns	5,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aircraft ground equipment	1,247.54
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	675,973.00
SIEL (Permanent)	direct view imaging equipment	9,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour	959.84
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	11,465.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	247,541.44
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23,114.71
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	42,892.97
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	18,751.97
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10,415.45
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10,434.55
SIEL (Permanent)	ballistic test equipment	26,380.85
SIEL (Permanent)	direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights	136,584.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	56,382.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	52,682.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	12,976.29
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	160,663.27
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	4,726.25
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	215.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	4,726.25
SIEL (Permanent)	non-military firing sets	6,620,757.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,716.66
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment, civil NBC protection clothing	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	materials analysis equipment	10,950.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	94,809.36
SIEL (Permanent)	CS hand grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition	970,001.00
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers	400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	toxic gas monitoring equipment	344.40
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	26,921.28
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for civil unmanned air vehicles	0.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	205,508.50
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	417,741.98
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	95.83
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	60.03
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	119.36
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	286,837.83
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	200.80
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	73.27

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	7,022.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19,114.64
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,876,416.53
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	239,719.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	781.25
SIEL (Permanent)	software for military aero-engines	200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	105,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits, military helmets	96,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval communications equipment	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	2.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	100,006.00
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	33,020.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of machine guns	12,760.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	576.00
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers, sporting guns (20)	10,360.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	175,299.05
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	1,045.50
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	501.50
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-armour ammunition, blank/inert ammunition, crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition	20,510.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	580,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	59,121.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for weapon sight mounts, equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts	27,923.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits, civil NBC detection systems, components for improvised explosive device disposal remotely operated vehicles, equipment for the use of civil NBC detection systems, equipment for the use of military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, improvised explosive device detection equipment, military communications equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military support vehicles	2,841,079.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	227.00
SIEL (Permanent)	toxins	87,840.00
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	4,742.77
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	7,575.26
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	757.53
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	137,199.59
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	12,178.66
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,110.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	122,004.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	100,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	33,842.25
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	26,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	969.49
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	891.93
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	2,326.78
SIEL (Permanent)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	1,308.50
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval communications equipment	18,889.50
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval communications equipment	80,166.90
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	667.00
SIEL (Permanent)	frequency changers	375.70
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment, targeting equipment	261,372.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	54,174.00
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	552.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	20,940.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5,221.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	9,405.00
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon night sights	6,178,373.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	11,574.79
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	12,038.33
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon night sights	161,280.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submersible equipment, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	342,854.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	32,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4,644.83
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, technology for improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	93,852.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	130,773.19
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	580.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	381.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for improvised explosive device disruptors	42,286.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,475.90
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	66,343.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	309,677.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	569,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-armour ammunition, small arms ammunition	1,349,840.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	36,468.96
SIEL (Permanent)	software for software for military guidance/navigation equipment	50.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	778,681.64
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	13,422.00
SIEL (Permanent)	acoustic seabed survey equipment	90,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,421.56
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	31,144.95
SIEL (Permanent)	electronics cooling fluids	31,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	96,057.57
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	138,011.69
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	69.99
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	29,955.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	570,523.50
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	161.79
SIEL (Permanent)	components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment	545,283.87
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	9,861,331.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	9,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	18,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	12,536.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	138,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	24,097.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	1,785.05
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23,009.00
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, technology for improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	295,294.00
SIEL (Permanent)	non-military firing sets	20,955.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,989.00



Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	379.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	21,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ballistic test equipment	119,677.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ballistic test equipment, technology for ballistic test equipment, weapon cleaning equipment	49,839.90
SIEL (Permanent)	components for bombs	8,254,258.16
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	12,475.87
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aircraft ground equipment	615,000.68
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	21,670.96
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,027.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, military laser protection equipment	2,790.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	16,313.70
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon night sights, weapon sights	17,553.00
SIEL (Permanent)	radio jamming equipment	104,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	1,066,560.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	76.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1,141.80
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,397.16
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	69,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1,013,879.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military airborne equipment	1,927.16
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aircraft ground equipment	6,551.24
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,529.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	17,058.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5,640.00

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,520,061.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,516.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	3,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7,258.59
SIEL (Permanent)	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment	1,638.70
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,172.02
SIEL (Permanent)	general military aircraft components	21,675.00
SIEL (Permanent)	non-military firing sets	25,898.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	57,565.00
SIEL (Permanent)	combat aircraft	38,750,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for military aircraft ground equipment	4,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	17,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	25,827.13
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10,288.08
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,956,485.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,008.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,160.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	307.00
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	2,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	5,154.00
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	4,312.50
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	574,756.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	355,230.01
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	3,849.38

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aircraft ground equipment	1,613.95
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval communications equipment	3,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval communications equipment	26,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars, software for military radars	2,699,670.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, technology for weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts	201,974.41
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	97,015.57
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4,329.20
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment	68,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	102,770.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	1,020.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	9,201,789.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	98,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	862.50
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,840.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	765.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	765.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	765.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	765.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5,267.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	886.17
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	3,969.08
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,263.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	17,675.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	164,195.50
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	103.40

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, sniper rifles (60), weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	294,403.67
SIEL (Permanent)	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	3,770,700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	28,746.80
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	81,960.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	12,141.40
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	3,155,180.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23,588.61
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval communications equipment	5,484.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment	3,831,280.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,393.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	476,510.00
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray accelerators	16,986,529.50
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	15,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	948,215.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	469.38
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4,408.41
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	106,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	command communications control and intelligence software	120,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for pistols, gun silencers	600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	29,680.00
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	176,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military communications equipment	25,666.75
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,776.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection clothing	635,000.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for chemical/materials production	20,700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, sniper rifles (50), weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	338,507.34
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	326,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,299.00
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	18,777.21
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	913.15
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	321.49
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,749.78
SIEL (Permanent)	military helmets	10.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment	10,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	565.25
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	634.33
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	18,896.20
SIEL (Permanent)	command communications control and intelligence software	120,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,703.25
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	118,910.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	180,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military field generators	279.00
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, technology for improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	55,834.64
SIEL (Permanent)	military training equipment	44,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military training equipment	1,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for machine guns, machine guns, weapon cleaning equipment	501,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	26,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	4,761,890.86
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	88.79

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	320,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	6,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	11,555.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	871.98
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	1,419.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	6,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submersible equipment, submersible equipment	183,790.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	83,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	106,439.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	37,812.42
SIEL (Permanent)	software for semiconductor process equipment	21.38
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support vehicles	2,184.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne surveillance equipment, airborne targeting equipment, aircraft cannons, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft missile protection systems, aircraft radars, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, attack alerting/warning equipment, chaff, chaff equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for airborne surveillance equipment, components for airborne targeting equipment, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft missile protection systems, components for aircraft radars, components for aircrew protective masks, components for anti-g/pressure suits, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for chaff equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for electronic countermeasures equipment, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the use of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the use of ejector seats, components for guided missile decoying equipment, components for imaging countermeasures equipment, components for laser rangefinders, components for laser warning detectors, components for liquid oxygen converters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft head-up displays, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military flying helmets, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military imaging radar equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military video processing equipment, components for military video recording equipment, components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment,	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>components for sensor data recorders, components for test equipment for combat aircraft, components for weapon control systems, components for weapon sights, decoy flares, ejector seats, electronic countermeasures equipment, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of ejector seats, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, guided missile decoying equipment, guided missile detection equipment, imaging countermeasures equipment, laser rangefinders, laser warning detectors, launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, launching equipment for bombs, liquid oxygen converters, materials for reduced electromagnetic reflectivity for military use, military aero-engines, military aircraft flight data recorders, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft head-up displays, military aircraft navigation equipment, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military containers, military field generators, military flying helmets, military image intensifier equipment, military imaging radar equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes, military parametric technical databases, military video processing equipment, military video recording equipment, optical target acquisition equipment, production technology for combat aircraft, recognition/identification equipment, sensor data recorders, signature suppression coatings for military use, signature suppression fittings for military use, signature suppression treatments for military use, software for the production of airborne electronic warfare equipment, software for the production of airborne surveillance equipment, software for the production of airborne targeting equipment, software for the production of aircraft cannons, software for the production of aircraft missile protection systems, software for the production of aircraft radars, software for the production of aircrew protective masks, software for the production of anti-g/pressure suits, software for the production of chaff, software for the production of chaff equipment, software for the production of combat aircraft, software for the production of decoy flares, software for the production of ejector seats, software for the production of equipment for the production of combat aircraft, software for the production of equipment for the use of combat aircraft, software for the production of equipment for the use of ejector seats, software for the production of guided missile decoying equipment, software for the production of guided missile detection equipment, software for the production of imaging countermeasures equipment, software for the production of laser rangefinders, software for the production of launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, software for the production of launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, software for the production of launching equipment for bombs, software for the production of liquid oxygen converters, software for the production of military aero-engines, software for the production of military aircraft flight data recorders, software for the production of military aircraft ground equipment, software for the production of military aircraft head-up displays, software for the production of military aircraft navigation equipment, software for the production of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, software for the production of military containers, software for the production of military field generators, software for the production of military flying helmets, software for the production of military image</p>	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	intensifier equipment, software for the production of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for the production of military parachutes, software for the production of military parametric technical databases, software for the production of military video processing equipment, software for the production of military video recording equipment, software for the production of optical target acquisition equipment, software for the production of recognition/identification equipment, software for the production of signature suppression fittings for military use, software for the production of signature suppression treatments for military use, software for the production of test equipment for combat aircraft, software for the production of test equipment for military aero-engines, software for the production of unfinished products for combat aircraft, software for the production of weapon control systems, software for the production of weapon sights, software for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, software for the use of airborne surveillance equipment, software for the use of airborne targeting equipment, software for the use of aircraft cannons, software for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, software for the use of aircraft radars, software for the use of anti-g/pressure suits, software for the use of chaff equipment, software for the use of combat aircraft, software for the use of ejector seats, software for the use of equipment for the production of combat aircraft, software for the use of equipment for the use of combat aircraft, software for the use of equipment for the use of ejector seats, software for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, software for the use of guided missile detection equipment, software for the use of imaging countermeasures equipment, software for the use of laser rangefinders, software for the use of launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, software for the use of launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, software for the use of launching equipment for bombs,	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for landing craft, components for military search and rescue aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, equipment for the production of airborne refuelling equipment, equipment for the production of landing craft, equipment for the production of military search and rescue aircraft, equipment for the production of military transport aircraft, equipment for the production of military utility aircraft, equipment for the use of airborne refuelling equipment, equipment for the use of landing craft, equipment for the use of military search and rescue aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, equipment for the use of military utility aircraft, technology for the use of airborne refuelling equipment, technology for the use of landing craft, technology for the use of military search and rescue aircraft, technology for the use of military transport aircraft, technology for the use of military utility aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	airborne refuelling equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats,	



Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	components for ground based radars, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft head-down displays, components for military aircraft head-up displays, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military cameras, components for military communications equipment, components for military transport aircraft, components for tanker aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aircraft navigation equipment, military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, military communications equipment, simulators for military communications equipment, software for the use of equipment for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of simulators for military communications equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of simulators for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ballistic test equipment, components for ballistic test equipment, software for the use of ballistic test equipment, technology for the use of ballistic test equipment, test equipment for armoured plate, test equipment for body armour, test equipment for constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, test equipment for military helmets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for gun laying equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, gun laying equipment, military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of gun laying equipment, technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sight mounts, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	command and control vehicles, command communications control and intelligence equipment, command communications control and intelligence software, software for the use of command and control vehicles, technology for the use of command and control vehicles, technology for the use of command communications control and intelligence equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	assault rifles, blank ammunition, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, training small arms ammunition	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for the development of civil unmanned air vehicle engines, technology for the development of civil unmanned air vehicles, technology for the development of control equipment for unmanned air vehicles, technology for the development of guidance equipment for unmanned air	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	vehicles, technology for the development of remote control equipment for unmanned air vehicles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for test equipment for combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of combat aircraft, test equipment for combat aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for the development of air-to-surface missiles, technology for the production of air-to-surface missiles, technology for the use of air-to-surface missiles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military radars, components for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for ejector seats, components for military parachutes and equipment, components for military training aircraft, military parachutes and equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, software for the use of military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating weapon systems, aerial target equipment, aircraft cannon ammunition, aircraft cannons, aircraft military communications equipment, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for aircraft cannon ammunition, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for ejector seats, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for fire location equipment, components for fuze setting devices, components for general	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>military aircraft components, components for global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for military containers, components for military field generators, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military training equipment, components for rangefinding equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for sensor integration equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings, components for weapon sights, countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, ejector seats, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft cannon ammunition, equipment for the use of aircraft cannons, equipment for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, equipment for the use of countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the use of decoying/countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of fire location equipment, equipment for the use of fuze setting devices, equipment for the use of global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of</p>	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>military airborne equipment, equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of military aircraft head-up/down displays, equipment for the use of military aircraft pressure refuellers, equipment for the use of military aircrew breathing equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the use of military cameras/photographic equipment, equipment for the use of military containers, equipment for the use of military field generators, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the use of military mobile repair shops and related equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training equipment, equipment for the use of rangefinding equipment, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, equipment for the use of sensor integration equipment, equipment for the use of targeting equipment, equipment for the use of test models for combat aircraft, equipment for the use of test models for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of test models for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of weapon mountings, equipment for the use of weapon sights, fire location equipment, fuze setting devices, general military aircraft components, global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, military aero-engines, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft head-up/down displays, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military cameras/photographic equipment, military containers, military field generators, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military mobile repair shops and related equipment, military parametric technical databases, military radars, military training equipment, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment, sensor integration equipment, signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, software for aerial target equipment, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for combat aircraft, software for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for decoying/countermeasure equipment, software for determining the effects of weapons, software for electronic countermeasure equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, software for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, software for fire location equipment, software for fuze setting devices, software for global navigation satellite systems jamming</p>	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>equipment, software for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, software for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, software for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, software for military aero-engines, software for military airborne equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft head-up/down displays, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military image intensifier equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, software for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, software for military radars, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, software for military training equipment, software for rangefinding equipment, software for recognition/identification equipment, software for sensor integration equipment, software for targeting equipment, software for weapon control equipment, targeting equipment, technology for Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating weapon systems, technology for aircraft cannon ammunition, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for ejector seats, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for fire location equipment, technology for fuze setting devices, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military airborne equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft head-up/down displays, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military containers, technology for military field generators, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image intensifier equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, technology for military radars, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for military training equipment, technology for rangefinding equipment, technology for recognition/identification equipment, technology for sensor integration equipment, technology for software for</p>	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	determining the effects of weapons, technology for targeting equipment, technology for test models for combat aircraft, technology for test models for military support aircraft, technology for test models for military training aircraft, technology for weapon control equipment, technology for weapon mountings, technology for weapon sights, test models for combat aircraft, test models for military support aircraft, test models for military training aircraft, unfinished products for combat aircraft, unfinished products for military support aircraft, unfinished products for military training aircraft, weapon control equipment, weapon mountings, weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military support aircraft, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	military aircrew breathing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, aerial target equipment, components for accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military radars, components for military training aircraft, components for military training equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training equipment, military aero-engines, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military radars, military training aircraft, military training equipment, technology for accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for aerial target equipment, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	recording/processing equipment, technology for military radars, technology for military training aircraft, technology for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military parachutes and equipment, signalling devices, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for equipment for the use of military helicopters, software for military aero-engines, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military helicopters, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for equipment for the use of military helicopters, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military parachutes and equipment, technology for signalling devices, technology for software for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for software for equipment for the use of military helicopters, technology for software for military aero-engines, technology for software for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for software for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for software for military helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating military operation scenarios, Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating weapon systems, armoured plate, artillery ammunition, attack alerting/warning equipment, command communications control and intelligence software, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for fire location equipment, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military containers, components for military field generators, components for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, components for military radars, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, components for naval guns, components for pistols, components for rangefinding equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for sensor integration equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, environmental test facilities for military auxiliary/support vessels, equipment for the production of military auxiliary/support vessels, equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of fire location equipment, equipment for the use of military auxiliary/support vessels, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of rangefinding equipment, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, equipment for the use of sensor integration equipment, equipment for the use of targeting equipment, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment,	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	explosives, fire location equipment, general naval vessel components, global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, military auxiliary/support vessels, military communications equipment, military containers, military diving apparatus, military electronic equipment, military field generators, military guidance/navigation equipment, military imaging radar sensor equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military mobile repair shops and related equipment, military parametric technical databases, military radars, military scenario simulation equipment, military software, military training equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, naval engines, naval gun installations/mountings, naval guns, pistols, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment, sensor integration equipment, signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, small arms ammunition, small arms training equipment, software for determining the effects of weapons, software for electronic warfare equipment, software for military communications equipment, targeting equipment, tear gas/riot control agents, technology for military auxiliary/support vessels, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for production installations for military auxiliary/support vessels, test models for military auxiliary/support vessels, weapon control equipment, weapon mountings, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for software for air-to-surface missiles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	air-to-surface missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for equipment for the use of air-to-surface missiles, components for inert air-to-surface missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military training equipment, components for test equipment for air-to-surface missiles, equipment for the use of air-to-surface missiles, inert air-to-surface missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military training equipment, software for air-to-surface missiles, software for inert air-to-surface missiles, software for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, software for military communications equipment, software for military electronic equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military training equipment, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for inert air-to-surface missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military training equipment, technology for replica air-to-surface missiles, test equipment for air-to-surface missiles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft military communications equipment, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for	



Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>military airborne equipment, components for military containers, components for military field generators, components for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, electronic warfare equipment, environmental test facilities for combat aircraft, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, general military aircraft components, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, military aero-engines, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military cameras/photographic equipment, military containers, military electronic equipment, military field generators, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military imaging radar sensor equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military mobile repair shops and related equipment, military parametric technical databases, military radars, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment, signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for combat aircraft, software for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, software for general military aircraft components, software for goods treated for signature suppression for military use, software for military aero-engines, software for military airborne equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for military containers, software for military field generators, software for military image intensifier equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, software for military imaging radar sensor equipment, software for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, software for military parametric technical databases, software for military radars, software for rangefinding equipment, software for recognition/identification equipment, software for signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, software for targeting equipment, software for test models for combat aircraft, software for weapon control equipment, targeting equipment, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military airborne equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military containers, technology for military image intensifier equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military imaging radar sensor equipment, technology for military</p>	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, technology for military parametric technical databases, technology for military radars, technology for rangefinding equipment, technology for recognition/identification equipment, technology for signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, technology for targeting equipment, technology for test models for combat aircraft, technology for weapon control equipment, test models for combat aircraft, weapon control equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft missile protection systems, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft missile protection systems, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for sensor integration equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military airborne equipment, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft head-up/down displays, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military cameras/photographic equipment, military communications equipment, military containers, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parametric technical databases, military radars, sensor integration equipment, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for aircraft missile protection systems, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for decoying/countermeasure equipment, software for electronic countermeasure equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, software for military airborne equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft head-up/down displays, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for military communications equipment, software for military electronic equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military image intensifier equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, software for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for military radars, software for sensor integration equipment, software for targeting equipment, software for	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>weapon control equipment, targeting equipment, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for aircraft missile protection systems, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for military airborne equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft head-up/down displays, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military containers, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image intensifier equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military radars, technology for sensor integration equipment, technology for targeting equipment, technology for weapon control equipment, weapon control equipment</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	<p>cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	<p>accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, aerial target equipment, components for accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military radars, components for military training aircraft, components for military training equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training equipment, military aero-engines, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military radars, military training aircraft, military training equipment, technology for accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for aerial target equipment, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military radars, technology for military training aircraft, technology for military training equipment</p>	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military electronic equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the use of combat aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military containers, components for military training equipment, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, military aircraft ground equipment, military containers, military parametric technical databases, military training equipment, software for air-to-air missiles, software for combat aircraft, software for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for combat aircraft, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military training equipment, technology for training air-to-air missiles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military containers, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines, unfinished products for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment for the production of military aero-engines, components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military containers, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines, technology for software for military aero-engines, test equipment for military aero-engines,	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	unfinished products for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	<p>airborne refuelling equipment, aircraft cannons, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, attack alerting/warning equipment, chaff equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for fire control equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, fire control equipment, guided missile decoying equipment, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military containers, military electronic equipment, military flying helmets, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes and equipment, software for airborne refuelling equipment, software for aircraft cannons, software for aircrew protective masks, software for anti-g/pressure suits, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for chaff equipment, software for combat aircraft, software for ejector seats, software for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, software for fire control equipment, software for guided missile decoying equipment, software for military aero-engines, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military containers, software for military flying helmets, software for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for military parachutes and equipment, technology for airborne refuelling equipment, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for aircrew protective masks, technology for anti-g/pressure suits, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for chaff equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for ejector seats, technology for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for fire control equipment, technology for guided missile decoying equipment, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military containers, technology for military flying helmets, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military parachutes and equipment</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	<p>air launched rockets, air-to-air missiles, air-to-surface missiles, bombs, components for air launched rockets, components for air-to-air missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for bombs, components for explosive charges/devices, components for illuminators, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for military containers, components for military training aircraft, components for multi-role missiles, components for signalling devices, components for surface-</p>	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	to-air missiles, components for surface-to-surface missiles, components for torpedoes, decoying/countermeasure equipment, explosive charges/devices, illuminators, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, military containers, military parametric technical databases, multi-role missiles, signalling devices, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, technology for air launched rockets, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for bombs, technology for explosive charges/devices, technology for illuminators, technology for multi-role missiles, technology for production installations for air launched rockets, technology for production installations for air-to-air missiles, technology for production installations for air-to-surface missiles, technology for production installations for bombs, technology for production installations for explosive charges/devices, technology for production installations for illuminators, technology for production installations for multi-role missiles, technology for production installations for signalling devices, technology for production installations for surface-to-air missiles, technology for production installations for surface-to-surface missiles, technology for production installations for torpedoes, technology for signalling devices, technology for surface-to-air missiles, technology for surface-to-surface missiles, technology for torpedoes, torpedoes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military training aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the use of military training aircraft, technology for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for military training equipment, components for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, equipment for the use of munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, software for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bombs, components for bombs, components for military containers, equipment for the use of bombs, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, military containers, military parametric technical databases, military software, military training equipment, software for bombs, technology for bombs, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the use of bombs	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment for the use of air-to-surface missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for air-to-surface missiles, components for military training equipment, equipment for the use of air-to-surface missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, military software, military training equipment, software for air-to-surface missiles, technology for equipment for the use of air-to-surface missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for air-to-surface missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	airborne refuelling equipment, aircraft cannons, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, chaff equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	for combat aircraft, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, guided missile decoying equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military containers, military electronic equipment, military flying helmets, technology for airborne refuelling equipment, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for aircrew protective masks, technology for anti-g/pressure suits, technology for chaff equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for guided missile decoying equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military containers, technology for military flying helmets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military radars, equipment for the use of military radars, software for military radars, technology for military radars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MN; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed of modified for the use of goods specified	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	in 6/7/8 above	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	sporting guns	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for combat aircraft, components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the	



Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	development of combat aircraft, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of military helicopters, equipment for the development of military support aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, test models for military support aircraft, test models for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for the use of test equipment for inertial equipment, test equipment for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for tanker aircraft	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accessories for military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for military training equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, military training equipment, software for aerial target equipment, software for military training equipment, technology for aerial target equipment, technology for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, components for equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the use of military training aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for test equipment for aerial target equipment, components for test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for training airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, military training aircraft, technology for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of training airborne electronic warfare equipment, test equipment for aerial target equipment, test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, training airborne electronic warfare equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, aircraft radars, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military video recording equipment, components for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, components for weapons simulators, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft radars, equipment for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military video recording equipment, equipment for the use of training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, equipment for the use of weapons simulators, military aircraft navigation equipment, military training aircraft, military video recording equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of aircraft radars, technology for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military video recording equipment, technology for the use of	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of weapons simulators, test equipment for aerial target equipment, test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, test equipment for aircraft radars, test equipment for military aircraft navigation equipment, test equipment for military video recording equipment, test equipment for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, test equipment for weapons simulators, training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, weapons simulators	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accessories for airborne targeting equipment, accessories for bombing computers, accessories for film processing equipment, accessories for imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, accessories for imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, accessories for imaging countermeasures equipment, accessories for military cameras, accessories for military image intensifier equipment, accessories for military imaging radar equipment, accessories for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, accessories for military photographic equipment, accessories for military video processing equipment, accessories for military video recording equipment, accessories for night vision goggles, accessories for optical target acquisition equipment, accessories for optical target designator equipment, accessories for optical target surveillance equipment, accessories for optical target tracking equipment, accessories for sensor data recorders, accessories for sensor integration equipment, accessories for simulators for military training aircraft, accessories for training equipment for military training aircraft, accessories for weapon control systems, airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne refuelling equipment, airborne targeting equipment, aircraft radars, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, bomb handling equipment, bombing computers, chaff equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for airborne targeting equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for aircrew protective masks, components for anti-g/pressure suits, components for automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, components for bombing computers, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for equipment for the use of military training aircraft, components for film processing equipment, components for helmet mounted display equipment, components for imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, components for imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, components for imaging countermeasures equipment, components for liquid oxygen converters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military cameras, components for military containers, components for military flying helmets, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military imaging radar equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military parachutes, components for military parachutist equipment, components for military	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>photographic equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military video processing equipment, components for military video recording equipment, components for night vision goggles, components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for optical target designator equipment, components for optical target surveillance equipment, components for optical target tracking equipment, components for sensor data recorders, components for sensor integration equipment, components for simulators for military training aircraft, components for training equipment for military training aircraft, components for weapon control systems, control equipment for air-to-air missiles, control equipment for bombs, control equipment for decoy flares, control equipment for fragmentation rockets, control equipment for practice bombs, ejector seats, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, film processing equipment, handling equipment for air-to-air missiles, handling equipment for bombs, handling equipment for decoy flares, handling equipment for fragmentation rockets, handling equipment for practice bombs, helmet mounted display equipment, imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, imaging countermeasures equipment, launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, launching equipment for bombs, launching equipment for decoy flares, launching equipment for fragmentation rockets, launching equipment for practice bombs, liquid oxygen converters, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft navigation equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military cameras, military containers, military flying helmets, military image intensifier equipment, military imaging radar equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes, military parachutist equipment, military parametric technical databases, military photographic equipment, military video processing equipment, military video recording equipment, night vision goggles, optical target acquisition equipment, optical target designator equipment, optical target surveillance equipment, optical target tracking equipment, sensor data recorders, sensor integration equipment, simulators for military training aircraft, software enabling equipment to function as military training aircraft, software for military training aircraft, software for the evaluation of weapon systems, software for the modelling of military operation scenarios, software for the modelling of weapon systems, software for the simulation of military operation scenarios, software for the simulation of weapon systems, software for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military training aircraft, test equipment for military training aircraft, test models for the development of military training aircraft, training equipment for military training aircraft, weapon control systems</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for aircraft cannons, equipment for the use of aircraft cannons, software for aircraft cannons, technology for aircraft cannons	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for combat aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military containers, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines, unfinished products for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	acoustic seabed survey equipment, guidance/navigation equipment, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	diver location sonars, software for diver location sonars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of artillery, components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of artillery, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military transport aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, software for aircraft missile protection systems, technology for aircraft missile protection systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	imaging cameras	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	fibrous/filamentary materials	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, military helmets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military transport aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military electronic equipment, components for signalling devices, ejector seats, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of general military aircraft components, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector seats, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for signalling devices, test models for ejector seats, test models for general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military aero-engines, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military electronic equipment, components for military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	mixtures containing chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military radars, military software, technology for military radars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for naval engines, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew breathing equipment,	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	equipment for the use of military helicopters, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of naval engines, general military aircraft components, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for naval engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew protective equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>1,745,881,543.96</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Saudi Arabia

## Somalia

Application Type	Goods Summary (Somalia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	27,810.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military helmets	712.00
SIEL (Permanent)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	158,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	14,858.90
SIEL (Permanent)	military helmets	4,304.25
SIEL (Permanent)	decoying/countermeasure equipment	122,700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military equipment for initiating explosives, non-military firing sets	950.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	19,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military support vehicles	45,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military support vehicles	268,385.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military support vehicles	464,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	11,962.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support vehicles, military support vehicles	1,218,850.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	338,835.31

Application Type	Goods Summary (Somalia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	108,664.67
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, improvised explosive device disruptors	21,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	45,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	10.00
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, technology for improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	230,700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	devices for initiating explosives	4,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, military helmets	13,972.80
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	6,163.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>		<b>3,137,927.93</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Somalia

## South Sudan

Application Type	Goods Summary (South Sudan)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	142,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	33,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	38,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	2,008.36
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	30.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	44.82
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	22,882.57
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	14,120.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	10,890.12
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, military helmets	6,927.00



Application Type	Goods Summary (South Sudan)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,236.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bomb suits, components for bomb suits, components for devices for initiating explosives, components for improvised explosive device disposal equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, devices for initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military helmets, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, non-military firing sets	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>3,137,927.93</b>

### Sri Lanka

Application Type	Goods Summary (Sri Lanka)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military training aircraft	150.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	4,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, military helmets	3,228.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	2,006,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (100), weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (160), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, military helmets, rifles (160), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	788,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Sri Lanka)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (300), body armour, components for assault rifles (100), components for pistols, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,713,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (300), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,707,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Sri Lanka)	Total Goods Value (£)
	weapon sights	
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (250), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,309,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military airborne equipment	20.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon night sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,428.28
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	207,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	950,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	214,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (200), weapon sights	1,788,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (200), weapon sights	1,788,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,788,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (175), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	987,225.00
SIEL (Permanent)	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	190,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), combat shotguns (300), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (200), weapon sights	1,779,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (300), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for pistols, pistols (100), small arms ammunition	135,000.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Sri Lanka)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (250), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (100), weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, military helmets	24,336.00
SIEL (Permanent)	combat shotguns (97), components for combat shotguns, components for rifles, rifles (247), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	430,598.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	2,774.90
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	4,311.04
SIEL (Permanent)	components for assault rifles	3,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,797,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	64.85
SIEL (Permanent)	acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns (100), components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for rifles, components for weapon sights, military helmets, rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,501,475.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	4,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military airborne equipment, technology for military airborne equipment	300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,315,969.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,744,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (200), sporting shotgun ammunition, weapon sights	1,797,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (200), sporting shotgun ammunition, weapon sights	1,797,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	3,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Sri Lanka)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (200), sporting shotgun ammunition, weapon sights	1,797,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for cryptographic software	53,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	302,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	333,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	aircraft military communications equipment	2,844.38
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (100), weapon sights	1,464,500.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military airborne cargo handling equipment, military airborne cargo handling equipment, technology for the production of military airborne cargo handling equipment, unfinished products for military airborne cargo handling equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	body armour, components for body armour, equipment employing cryptography, military helmets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, devices for initiating explosives, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Sri Lanka)	Total Goods Value (£)
	detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	<p>components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of military helicopters, equipment for the development of military support aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, test models for military support aircraft, test models for military training aircraft</p>	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Sri Lanka)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for body armour, components for military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the production of body armour, equipment for the production of goods treated for signature suppression for military use, equipment for the production of military aircrew protective equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for body armour, technology for goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for military aircrew protective equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for sporting guns, military helmets, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, sporting shotgun ammunition	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	mixtures containing chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	bomb suits, civil body armour, components for bomb suits, components for civil body armour, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, demolition devices, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military helmets, mine detection equipment, non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	towed hydrophone arrays	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>62,119,174.45</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Sri Lanka

## Sudan

Application Type	Goods Summary (Sudan)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	7,382,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	2,700,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	15,492.65
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bomb suits, components for bomb suits, components for devices for initiating explosives, components for improvised explosive device disposal equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, devices for initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military helmets, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, non-military firing sets	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Sudan)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>10,097,992.65</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Sudan

## Syria

Application Type	Goods Summary (Syria)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	800.00
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	800.00
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	800.00
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	1,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	1,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	800.00
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	800.00
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	800.00
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	800.00
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SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	800.00
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	800.00
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	800.00
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	800.00
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	800.00
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	800.00
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	800.00
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, military helmets	126,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	47,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	43,384.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for body armour	45,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	14,778.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>289,862.00</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Syria

## Turkmenistan

Application Type	Goods Summary (Turkmenistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Temporary)	components for aerial target equipment	376,328.00
SIEL (Temporary)	software for diver location sonars	8,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	9,326.00
SIEL (Permanent)	diver location sonars, software for diver location sonars	1,228,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,216.00



Application Type	Goods Summary (Turkmenistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	57,299.62
SIEL (Permanent)	high performance air traffic control software	32,880.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	3,616.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	10,846.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	83,739.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	9,709.98
SIEL (Permanent)	components for assault rifles, components for pistols, training small arms ammunition	166,463.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, high performance air traffic control software	578,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, high performance air traffic control software	628,000.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, inertial equipment, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military parachutes and equipment, signalling devices, software for equipment for the use of military helicopters, software for military aero-engines, software for military helicopters, software for the use of inertial equipment, technology for equipment for the use of military helicopters, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military helicopters, technology for military parachutes and equipment, technology for signalling devices, technology for the use of inertial equipment, unfinished products for military helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MN; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi]	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Turkmenistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
	weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed or modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew protective equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	non-military detonators	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>3,195,423.60</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Turkmenistan

## Uzbekistan

Application Type	Goods Summary (Uzbekistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray accelerators	3,141,190.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	28,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment	1,534,181.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Uzbekistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
	employing cryptography	
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	30,000.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MN; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed or modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Uzbekistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
	equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>4,733,871.00</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Uzbekistan

## Vietnam

Application Type	Goods Summary (Vietnam)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Temporary)	imaging cameras	96,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	targeting equipment	160,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	RF direction finding equipment	70,490.00
SIEL (Permanent)	radio jamming equipment	28,950.00
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	99.22
SIEL (Permanent)	human pathogens	25.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection clothing	152,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	radio jamming equipment	28,950.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms training equipment, software enabling equipment to function as small arms training equipment	336,223.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms training equipment, software enabling equipment to function as small arms training equipment	665,767.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	796,850.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels, technology for military auxiliary/support vessels	1,080,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military equipment for initiating explosives	30,302.05
SIEL (Permanent)	zirconium	200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	towed hydrophone arrays	22,400,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon night sights	173,973.25
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	89,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment	100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	75,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	marine position fixing equipment	20,850.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	4,217.50
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	13,365.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	131,258.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	70,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military patrol/assault craft	2,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	5,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	25,417.20
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection clothing	29,457.32
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment	10,953.56
SIEL (Permanent)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	8,315.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ballistic test equipment, components for ballistic test equipment, software for ballistic test equipment, technology for ballistic test equipment	17,718.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Vietnam)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	1,002.50
SIEL (Permanent)	bismuth	800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicle control systems, submersible vehicles	872,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection clothing	44,423.20
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs	2.00
SIEL (Permanent)	toxic gas detectors	305.80
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, radio jamming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, radio jamming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cable systems sensitive to eavesdropping, components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for generating hopping codes, equipment for generating spreading codes, equipment with reduced electromagnetic emanations, impulse radio equipment, non-cryptographic information security equipment, software for cable systems sensitive to eavesdropping, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment for generating hopping codes, software for equipment for generating spreading codes, software for equipment with reduced electromagnetic emanations, software for impulse radio equipment, software for non-cryptographic information security equipment, technology for cable systems sensitive to eavesdropping, technology for cryptographic software, technology for digital cellular radio system, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment for generating hopping codes, technology for equipment for generating spreading codes, technology for equipment with reduced electromagnetic emanations, technology for impulse radio equipment, technology for non-cryptographic information security equipment, technology for software for cable systems sensitive to eavesdropping, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment for generating hopping codes, technology for software for equipment for generating spreading codes, technology for software for equipment with reduced electromagnetic emanations, technology for software for impulse radio equipment, technology for software for non-cryptographic information security equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military diving apparatus, military diving apparatus, rebreathing swimming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for NBC detection equipment, technology for software for NBC detection equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for inertial equipment	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Vietnam)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for combat aircraft, components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	acoustic seabed survey equipment, equipment employing cryptography, guidance/navigation equipment, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles, underwater sonar navigation systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accessories for underwater telecommunications systems, components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military utility helicopters, equipment for the production of military utility helicopters, equipment for the use of military utility helicopters, technology for the development of military utility helicopters, technology for the production of military utility helicopters, technology for the use of military utility helicopters, test equipment for military utility helicopters, unfinished products for military utility helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military /	lasers	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Vietnam)	Total Goods Value (£)
Dual Use)*		
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	technology for civil aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military aero-engines, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military electronic equipment, components for military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	bomb suits, civil body armour, components for bomb suits, components for civil body armour, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, demolition devices, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military helmets, mine detection equipment, non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	towed hydrophone arrays	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>4,733,871.00</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Vietnam

## Yemen

Application Type	Goods Summary (Yemen)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Transshipment)	assault rifles (400), components for assault rifles, weapon cleaning equipment	570,125.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	20,407.97
SIEL (Permanent)	acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	987,225.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	1,830.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment,	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Yemen)	Total Goods Value (£)
	military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>1,579,587.97</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Yemen

## Zimbabwe

Application Type	Goods Summary (Zimbabwe)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	27,809.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,452.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	15,414.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	6,265.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	33,961.38
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,834.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	100,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	96,504.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	31,155.13
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,530.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	336,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,021.00
SIEL (Permanent)	devices for initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disruptors	19,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	15,143.00



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Zimbabwe)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,230.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1,362.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,699.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	732.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	33,836.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,593.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,534.69
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,325.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,755.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1,080.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	990.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	4,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,166.25
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,821.25
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,142.50
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	45,700.72
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	8,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,376.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,216.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	765.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,878.28
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	480.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,878.28
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	3,141.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,288.00
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	13,945.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>1,367,423.48</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Zimbabwe

## Countries and Territories of concern to the Committees — extant licences

The Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls wrote to the BIS Secretary of State, Vince Cable, on 17 November 2014 requesting details of extant UK strategic export licences to 7 countries of concern to the Committees. The BIS Secretary replied on 15 December 2014.<sup>614</sup>

N.B. Only values for SIELs are shown. The Government does not provide values for OIELs because of their open nature. OIELs can be for either single destination countries or multiple destination countries.

### Argentina

Application Type	Goods Summary (Argentina)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Temporary)	components for sporting guns, sporting guns (2)	9,800.00
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (1)	10,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting shotguns (1)	7,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting shotguns (2)	6,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting shotguns (2)	4,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting shotguns (2)	8,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting shotguns (1)	3,500.00
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting shotguns (2)	95,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting shotguns (1)	8,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (3)	70,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting shotguns (2)	14,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (2)	1,500.00
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting shotguns (2)	2,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting shotguns (2)	3,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	31,520.12
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,232,871.00
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	109,210.00
SIEL (Permanent)	human pathogens	300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (15)	12,992.20
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	50,700.00

<sup>614</sup> Ev w220 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 15 December 2014

Application Type	Goods Summary (Argentina)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	805.41
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	9,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (600)	210,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	31,578.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	100,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	9,861,331.00
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy powder production equipment	437,385.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	9,861,331.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helmets	1,668.00
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	666,937.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (1), weapon sights	8,066.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting shotguns (2)	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	2,376.84
SIEL (Permanent)	products containing radium-226, products containing thorium	2,716.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	7,552,080.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	animal pathogens	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	triggered spark gaps	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Argentina)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	lasers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	artillery ammunition, components for NBC detection equipment, components for artillery, components for combat naval vessels, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Argentina)	Total Goods Value (£)
	communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, signalling devices, smoke canisters, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, technology for NBC detection equipment, technology for artillery, technology for combat naval vessels, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for general naval vessel components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military radars, technology for naval communications equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval engines, technology for naval gun installations/mountings, technology for naval guns, technology for signalling devices, technology for smoke canisters, technology for weapon control equipment, training artillery ammunition, weapon control equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	sporting guns	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	pressure transducers, software for semiconductor process equipment, technology for semiconductor process equipment	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>30,441,417.57</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Argentina

## Bahrain

Application Type	Goods Summary (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights	20,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	machine guns (1), sniper rifles (1)	13,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, improvised explosive device jamming equipment	70,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	software for telecommunications jamming equipment, telecommunications jamming equipment	51,272.54
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	379,960.00
SIEL (Temporary)	components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (1), weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sights	11,110.00
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	67,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	2,428.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sporting guns, sporting guns (3), weapon sights	3,657.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	321,830.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	24,806.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment	24,620.00
SIEL (Permanent)	accessories for materials analysis equipment	6,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (2)	3,345.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	594.91
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers, sporting guns (1), weapon sights	4,735.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment	369.72
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	31,990.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval guns, components for weapon mountings, equipment for the use of naval guns, naval guns, technology for naval guns, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon mountings, weapon sight mounts	1,517,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	3,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment	369.72
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,895.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	4,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	616.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (5000), components for assault rifles, equipment for the use of assault rifles, weapon cleaning equipment	6,538,537.80
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sporting guns, gun silencers, pistols (1), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (4)	35,837.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	250,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military bridges/pontoons/ferries	3,389,954.44
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	38,407.20
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	2,280,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	246,718.91
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	185,700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military helmets	400,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,231,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5,875,950.00
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	153,483.02
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	52,804.33
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	425.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general military aircraft components	6,357.60
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	4,036.50
SIEL (Permanent)	components for gun mountings, components for machine guns, equipment for the use of machine guns, gun mountings, machine guns (50)	484,875.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	7,745,545.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5,875,950.00
SIEL (Permanent)	hand grenades, training devices containing military pyrotechnic materials	335,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	13,057.68
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	2,926.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	480,205.40
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	182,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	7,694.24
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	1,152.93
SIEL (Permanent)	high performance air traffic control software	100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	15,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	8,289.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	5,854.00
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers, sporting guns (6)	81,800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	2,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	2,962.30
SIEL (Permanent)	tear gas/riot control agents	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	signalling devices	16,384.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	245,769.49
SIEL (Permanent)	components for body armour	80,650.00
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (2)	185,000.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft cannons, components for aircraft cannons	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for recognition/identification equipment, software for recognition/identification equipment, technology for recognition/identification equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military training aircraft, military guidance/navigation equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
	engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for military cameras/photographic equipment, accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, aircraft military communications equipment, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for ejector seats, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military containers, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military parachutes and equipment, components for military radars, components for military scenario simulation equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military training equipment, components for rangefinding equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, ejector seats, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military airborne equipment, equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of military aircraft head-up/down displays, equipment for the use of military aircraft pressure refuellers, equipment for the use of military aircrew breathing equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the use of military cameras/photographic equipment, equipment for the use of military containers, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military parachutes and equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of military scenario simulation equipment, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training equipment, equipment for the use of rangefinding equipment, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, equipment for the use of targeting equipment, equipment for the use of weapon control	



Application Type	Goods Summary (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>equipment, general military aircraft components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, military aero-engines, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft head-up/down displays, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military cameras/photographic equipment, military communications equipment, military containers, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military parachutes and equipment, military radars, military scenario simulation equipment, military training equipment, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for ejector seats, software for electronic countermeasure equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, software for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, software for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, software for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, software for military aero-engines, software for military airborne equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft head-up/down displays, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military aircrew breathing equipment, software for military aircrew protective equipment, software for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for military containers, software for military electronic equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, software for military parachutes and equipment, software for military radars, software for military scenario simulation equipment, software for military training aircraft, software for military training equipment, software for rangefinding equipment, software for targeting equipment, software for weapon control equipment, targeting equipment, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for ejector seats, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military airborne equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft head-up/down displays, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military containers, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military parachutes and equipment, technology for military radars, technology for military scenario simulation equipment, technology for military training aircraft, technology for military training equipment, technology for rangefinding equipment, technology for targeting equipment, technology for weapon control equipment, weapon control equipment</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
	equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MNs; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed or modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military utility vehicles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for combat aircraft, components for military support	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
/ Dual Use)*	aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	<p>components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of military helicopters, equipment for the development of military support aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, test models for military support aircraft, test models for military training aircraft</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	<p>components for military radars, components for weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, software for military radars, software for weapon control equipment, technology for military radars, technology for weapon control equipment</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for aircraft carriers, components for combat naval vessels, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military patrol/assault craft, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for the use of test equipment for inertial equipment, test equipment for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for tanker aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for small arms ammunition, small arms ammunition	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accessories for military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for military training equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, military training equipment, software for aerial target equipment, software for military training equipment, technology for aerial target equipment, technology for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, components for equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the use of military training aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for test equipment for aerial target equipment, components for test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for training airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, military training aircraft, technology for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of training airborne electronic warfare equipment, test equipment for aerial target equipment, test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, training airborne electronic warfare equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, aircraft radars, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military video recording equipment, components	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, components for weapons simulators, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft radars, equipment for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military video recording equipment, equipment for the use of training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, equipment for the use of weapons simulators, military aircraft navigation equipment, military training aircraft, military video recording equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of aircraft radars, technology for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military video recording equipment, technology for the use of training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of weapons simulators, test equipment for aerial target equipment, test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, test equipment for aircraft radars, test equipment for military aircraft navigation equipment, test equipment for military video recording equipment, test equipment for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, test equipment for weapons simulators, training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, weapons simulators</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	<p>accessories for airborne targeting equipment, accessories for bombing computers, accessories for film processing equipment, accessories for imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, accessories for imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, accessories for imaging countermeasures equipment, accessories for military cameras, accessories for military image intensifier equipment, accessories for military imaging radar equipment, accessories for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, accessories for military photographic equipment, accessories for military video processing equipment, accessories for military video recording equipment, accessories for night vision goggles, accessories for optical target acquisition equipment, accessories for optical target designator equipment, accessories for optical target surveillance equipment, accessories for optical target tracking equipment, accessories for sensor data recorders, accessories for sensor integration equipment, accessories for simulators for military training aircraft, accessories for training equipment for military training aircraft, accessories for weapon control systems, airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne refuelling equipment, airborne targeting equipment, aircraft radars, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, bomb handling equipment, bombing computers, chaff equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for airborne targeting equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for aircrew protective masks, components for anti-g/pressure suits, components for automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, components for bombing computers, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for equipment for the use of military training aircraft, components for film processing equipment, components for helmet mounted display equipment, components for imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, components for imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, components for imaging countermeasures equipment, components for liquid oxygen converters, components for military aero-engines,</p>	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military cameras, components for military containers, components for military flying helmets, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military imaging radar equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military parachutes, components for military parachutist equipment, components for military photographic equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military video processing equipment, components for military video recording equipment, components for night vision goggles, components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for optical target designator equipment, components for optical target surveillance equipment, components for optical target tracking equipment, components for sensor data recorders, components for sensor integration equipment, components for simulators for military training aircraft, components for training equipment for military training aircraft, components for weapon control systems, control equipment for air-to-air missiles, control equipment for bombs, control equipment for decoy flares, control equipment for fragmentation rockets, control equipment for practice bombs, ejector seats, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, film processing equipment, handling equipment for air-to-air missiles, handling equipment for bombs, handling equipment for decoy flares, handling equipment for fragmentation rockets, handling equipment for practice bombs, helmet mounted display equipment, imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, imaging countermeasures/counter-countermeasures equipment, imaging countermeasures equipment, launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, launching equipment for bombs, launching equipment for decoy flares, launching equipment for fragmentation rockets, launching equipment for practice bombs, liquid oxygen converters, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft navigation equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military cameras, military containers, military flying helmets, military image intensifier equipment, military imaging radar equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes, military parachutist equipment, military parametric technical databases, military photographic equipment, military video processing equipment, military video recording equipment, night vision goggles, optical target acquisition equipment, optical target designator equipment, optical target surveillance equipment, optical target tracking equipment, sensor data recorders, sensor integration equipment, simulators for military training aircraft, software enabling equipment to function as military training aircraft, software for military training aircraft, software for the evaluation of weapon systems, software for the modelling of military operation scenarios, software for the modelling of weapon systems, software for the simulation of military operation scenarios, software for the simulation of weapon systems, software for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military training aircraft, test equipment for military training aircraft, test models for the development of military training aircraft, training equipment for military training aircraft, weapon control systems</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for aircraft cannons, equipment for the use of aircraft cannons, software for aircraft cannons, technology for aircraft cannons	
OIEL (Military	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
/ Dual Use)*	military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for combat aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military containers, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines, unfinished products for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	acoustic seabed survey equipment, guidance/navigation equipment, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for inertial equipment	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>45,030,026.73</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Bahrain

## Egypt

Application Type	Goods Summary (Egypt)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Temporary)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment	3,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	168,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	weapon cleaning equipment	19,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras	4,600.00
SIEL (Temporary)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	40,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	telecommunications jamming equipment	100,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	545,541.70
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (200), sporting guns (150), weapon sights	1,758,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	1,162,225.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	33,150.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	463.36
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (200), weapon sights	1,771,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	3,762.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submersible vehicles	1,744.39
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	50,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	9,114.70
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters, military guidance/navigation equipment	43,428,430.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	21,978.78
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	1,761,870.80

Application Type	Goods Summary (Egypt)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	39,211.99
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10,168.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	12,657.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (100), components for assault rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon sights	230,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	8,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	99,711.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (350), weapon sights	1,713,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	30,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	859.60
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,937.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	35,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	16,336.62
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment	32,785.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6,089.25
SIEL (Permanent)	general military aircraft components	1,535.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	12,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	543.23
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	540.45
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	371,997.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	2,239.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for ballistic test equipment	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	324,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	324,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,152.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment	49,999.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1,483,602.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,235,920.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	8,520.00
SIEL (Permanent)	materials testing equipment	2,133.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	694,890.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	60,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,625.00
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	71,706.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	0.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,675.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	67,435.63
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,625.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	36,557.00
SIEL (Permanent)	constituents of propellants, deuterium compounds	271.12
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	18,986.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	12,580.00
SIEL (Permanent)	acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, military helmets	987,225.00



Application Type	Goods Summary (Egypt)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	37,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,481.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military combat vehicles, military support vehicles	120,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	85,370.00
SIEL (Permanent)	toxic gas monitoring equipment	901.20
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	21,334.32
SIEL (Permanent)	components for ballistic test equipment	3,114.60
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23,472.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,620.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	276,496.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	39,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	devices for initiating explosives	4,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	380,402.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	NBC filters, chaff, chaff equipment, command communications control and intelligence equipment, components for chaff equipment, components for command communications control and intelligence equipment, components for corvettes, components for defensive systems against NBC agents, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for fast attack craft, components for frigates, components for heavy machine guns, components for military distress signalling equipment, components for military inflatable craft, components for military navigation equipment, components for naval acoustic equipment, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun mountings, components for naval radars, components for naval sonar equipment, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for surface-to-air missiles, components for surface-to-surface missiles, control equipment for surface-to-air missiles, control equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, defensive systems against NBC agents, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of corvettes, equipment for the use of fast attack craft, equipment for the use of frigates, equipment for the use of naval radars, equipment for the use of surface-to-air missiles, general naval vessel components, handling equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, heavy machine guns, launching equipment for surface-to-air missiles, launching equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, military distress signalling equipment, military inflatable craft, military navigation equipment, naval acoustic equipment, naval communications equipment, naval electrical equipment, naval electronic equipment, naval engines, naval gun mountings, naval radars, naval sonar equipment, semi-automatic pistols, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, test equipment for military communications equipment, test equipment for naval radars, test equipment for surface-to-air missiles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for ground based radars, accessories for naval radars, components for ground based radars, components for naval radars, equipment for the use of ground based radars, equipment for the use of naval radars, software for ground based radars, software for naval radars, technology for ground based radars, technology for naval radars, test equipment for ground based radars, test equipment for naval radars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military electronic equipment, ejector seats, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Egypt)	Total Goods Value (£)
	of general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector seats, technology for general military aircraft components, test models for ejector seats, test models for general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	imaging cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft cannons, components for air launched rockets, components for air-to-air missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft carriers, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for command communications control and intelligence software, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for depth charges, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for machine guns, components for military aero-engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval guns, components for naval mines, components for periscopes, components for sensor integration equipment, components for submarines, components for surface launched rockets, components for surface-to-surface missiles, components for targeting equipment, components for torpedoes, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, machine guns, military aero-engines, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval engines, naval guns, technology for air launched rockets, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for depth charges, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for machine guns, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military radars, technology for torpedoes, torpedoes	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Egypt)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military training equipment, equipment for the use of military training equipment, software for military training equipment, technology for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for military training equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, military training equipment, software for aerial target equipment, software for military training equipment, technology for aerial target equipment, technology for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	airborne refuelling equipment, aircraft cannons, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, chaff equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military imaging radar sensor equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for weapon control equipment, countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, guided missile decoying equipment, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military cameras/photographic equipment, military containers, military electronic equipment, military flying helmets, military image intensifier equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military imaging radar sensor equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes and equipment, military paragliders, software for airborne refuelling equipment, software for aircraft cannons, software for aircrew protective masks, software for anti-g/pressure suits, software for chaff equipment, software for combat aircraft, software for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, software for guided missile decoying equipment, software for military aero-engines, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for military containers, software for military flying helmets, software for military image intensifier equipment, software for military	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Egypt)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>image recording/processing equipment, software for military imaging radar sensor equipment, software for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for military parachutes and equipment, software for military paragliders, software for weapon control equipment, technology for airborne refuelling equipment, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for aircrew protective masks, technology for anti-g/pressure suits, technology for chaff equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for guided missile decoying equipment, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military containers, technology for military flying helmets, technology for military image intensifier equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military imaging radar sensor equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military parachutes and equipment, technology for military paragliders, technology for weapon control equipment, weapon control equipment</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	<p>aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Egypt)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military radars, components for weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, software for military radars, software for weapon control equipment, technology for military radars, technology for weapon control equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for aircraft carriers, components for combat naval vessels, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military patrol/assault craft, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for the use of test equipment for inertial equipment, test equipment for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for tanker aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for marine position fixing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Egypt)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accessories for underwater telecommunications systems, components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of artillery, components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of artillery, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	underwater television cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, software for aircraft missile protection systems, technology for aircraft missile protection systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	imaging cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	fibrous/filamentary materials	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for sporting guns, military helmets, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, sporting shotgun ammunition	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>63,091,534.74</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Egypt

**Hong Kong**

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Hong Kong)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Temporary)	targeting equipment	50,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	RF direction finding equipment	10,495.00
SIEL (Temporary)	explosives detection equipment	42,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	inertial equipment	87,000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	focal plane arrays	30,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	11,130.40
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	214,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	195,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	human pathogens	900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon night sights	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	2,997.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	17,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	40,050,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	8,829.32
SIEL (Permanent)	human pathogens	900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,765.92
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,447.22
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	500,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for small arms training equipment, equipment for the use of small arms training equipment, small arms training equipment, software for small arms training equipment	55,216.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	815.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military small arms training equipment, components for small arms training equipment, equipment for the use of small arms training equipment, military small arms training equipment, small arms training equipment	13,265.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,836.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,957.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	3,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	2,570.00
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	6,937.50
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	255.74
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military electronic equipment	0.01
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	175.94
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	658,081.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software enabling equipment to function as equipment employing cryptography	37,478.33
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	37,478.33
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	4,261.20
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	53,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	18,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	300,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,510.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	45,729.75
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,559.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Hong Kong)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	515,785.63
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	3,169.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	10,308.14
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	29,289.51
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	18,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment	0.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	49,418.88
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	9,311.28
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for civil aero-engines, technology for fibrous materials production equipment, technology for machine tools, technology for materials processing equipment, technology for metal-working manufacturing processes	2,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	19,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	22,135.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	224,257.70
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	68,366.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	73,266.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	650,560.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,247.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	15,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	hydrophones	1,500,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	27,172.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	1,100,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,162.80
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	2,996.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military helicopters	523.87
SIEL (Permanent)	handcuffs	9,434.75
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	47,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	4,231.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military equipment for initiating explosives, military equipment for initiating explosives	9,963.75
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	23,940.79
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	23,729.78
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays, imaging cameras, special support components for optical sensor	281,596.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	214,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	88,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	240,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	86,210.60
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for FADEC	1,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,753.36



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Hong Kong)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	23,591.13
SIEL (Permanent)	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	88,021.68
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,231,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	29,289.51
SIEL (Permanent)	components for radar equipment, radar equipment, software for radar equipment, technology for radar equipment	731,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	66,557.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	270,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	7,525.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	9,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	software for cryptographic software	8,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	24,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	18,675.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,216.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	550,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,135.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,895.10
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	2,984.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	75.00
SIEL (Permanent)	constituents of propellants	1,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	952.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	6,558.39
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,450,048.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	1,385.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	2,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	480.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,439.45
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval engines	5,357.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	29,269.82
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	3,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	460.00
SIEL (Permanent)	hand grenades	19,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	235.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	710,100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military equipment for initiating explosives	11,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	21,250.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,056.99
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	462.00
SIEL (Permanent)	gun mountings	2,279.55
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	625,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	15,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	10,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting shotgun ammunition	12,700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	3,430.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	200,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,286.04

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Hong Kong)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	35.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography	561.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,047.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	16,577.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	721.72
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	315.60
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,183,617.80
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	18,605,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,418,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,146.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,515.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,512.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	104,040.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	37,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	6,900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,149,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	25,455,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	handcuffs	17,127.70
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	15,920,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,244.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	448.78
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	683.78
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	656.73
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	220.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	10.17
SIEL (Permanent)	munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	14,610.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military small arms training equipment, components for small arms training equipment, equipment for the use of military small arms training equipment, small arms training equipment, software for small arms training equipment	27,880.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment	622.43
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military small arms training equipment, equipment for the use of military small arms training equipment, equipment for the use of small arms training equipment, military small arms training equipment, small arms training equipment, software for small arms training equipment	28,010.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	285,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	non-certified aero-engines	12,000,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	42,750.00
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers	498.99
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	10,094.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	232.50
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	693.50

Application Type	Goods Summary (Hong Kong)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights, imaging cameras, weapon night sights, weapon sights	1,355,013.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	CS hand grenades, demolition charges, demolition devices, exploding simulation devices, fire simulation equipment for small arms ammunition, illuminators, military devices for initiating explosives, signal flares, signal hand grenades, smoke ammunition, smoke canisters, smoke generators, smoke hand grenades, stun grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, thunderflashes, training anti-aircraft ammunition, training hand grenades	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for ballistic shields, components for body armour, components for bomb suits, components for civil body armour, components for military helmets, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military helmets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	anti-riot/ballistic shields, components for anti-riot/ballistic shields	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	sporting guns	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	sporting guns	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	toxins	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	lasers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Hong Kong)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military utility vehicles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for small arms ammunition, small arms ammunition	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accessories for military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, frequency synthesisers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for periscopes, components for weapon night sights, periscopes, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for periscopes, technology for weapon night sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for equipment for the use of military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military communications	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Hong Kong)	Total Goods Value (£)
	equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accessories for semiconductor process equipment, components for semiconductor process equipment, software for the use of semiconductor process equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military utility helicopters, equipment for the production of military utility helicopters, equipment for the use of military utility helicopters, technology for the development of military utility helicopters, technology for the production of military utility helicopters, technology for the use of military utility helicopters, test equipment for military utility helicopters, unfinished products for military utility helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, military helmets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>142,834,867.86</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Hong Kong

## Qatar

Application Type	Goods Summary (Qatar)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment	19012.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	22.36
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	121500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1900.00

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Qatar)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	2240.48
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5194.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment	4687.50
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	86147.00
SIEL (Permanent)	toxins	1425.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	27319.14
SIEL (Permanent)	military guidance/navigation equipment	6634.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	922.00
SIEL (Permanent)	munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	329.00
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (1526), components for assault rifles, components for machine guns, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of grenade launchers, grenade launchers, machine guns (2), technology for assault rifles, technology for machine guns, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sights	3387675.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	1204.00
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-armour ammunition, small arms ammunition	2800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military airborne equipment	3576.20
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	12700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	58500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	37.45
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1490.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for machine guns, equipment for the use of machine guns, gun mountings, machine guns (1), technology for machine guns	8041.92
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	277000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	401.04
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	30752.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7316.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for machine guns, machine guns (100), technology for machine guns	162100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for machine guns, gun silencers, machine guns (40), technology for weapon cleaning equipment, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sights	118613.70

Application Type	Goods Summary (Qatar)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (5), grenade launchers, small arms ammunition, training small arms ammunition	116600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	26852.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	23175.00
SIEL (Temporary)	military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	2330000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sporting guns, components for weapon night sights, gun mountings, gun silencers, rangefinding equipment, sporting guns (12), weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	522000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	366.40
SIEL (Temporary)	military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	23444.50
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	80000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	weapon cleaning equipment	28000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367560.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367560.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367560.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367560.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	366.40
SIEL (Temporary)	civil unmanned air vehicles	150000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7611.45
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	436900.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367560.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1939000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	body armour, civil unmanned air vehicles, components for body armour, components for civil body armour, military helmets, projectile launchers, unmanned air vehicles	419186.00
SIEL (Temporary)	diver location sonars, software for diver location sonars	301000.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Qatar)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	9353.60
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	753.52
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment	27383.90
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	130200.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367560.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367560.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	185955.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for military communications equipment	303370.00
SIEL (Temporary)	components for turrets, equipment for the use of weapon sights, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, turrets	1365637.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of artillery, training small calibre artillery ammunition, turrets	405000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, weapon night sights	200600.00
SIEL (Temporary)	components for military radars	958552.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for machine guns, gun silencers, machine guns (35)	53373.52
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	355980.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	338175.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	565494.15
SIEL (Temporary)	accelerometers	10000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	components for turrets	1764.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment employing cryptography, imaging cameras	14559.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1033.20
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment	3537200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment	159000.00



Application Type	Goods Summary (Qatar)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines	7500000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	425.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	355980.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	355980.00
SIEL (Temporary)	software for radio jamming equipment, telecommunications jamming equipment	60144.13
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	782.30
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	331100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	space qualified solar devices	11200.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment employing cryptography	204352.00
SIEL (Temporary)	body armour, civil unmanned air vehicles, components for body armour, military helmets, projectile launchers, unmanned air vehicles	419186.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	470.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of sniper rifles	1000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	6850.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	300.00
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	48540.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	16000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	271.20
SIEL (Permanent)	flash suppressers, gun mountings, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (4), weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	29539.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment	9700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	human pathogens	1200.00
SIEL (Temporary)	Software for modelling/simulating military operation scenarios	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	207051.72
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	11544.18

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary (Qatar)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC detection systems	123566.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	384.59
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	14852.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas	48568.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10592.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6772.97
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	13269.66
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	57353.37
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	20731.95
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	159232.11
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19002.86
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1194240.80
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6476.99
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	18688.46
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	380000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts	29592.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment	987500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (3), sporting shotguns (1), weapon sights	165100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	292.88
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	348.29
SIEL (Permanent)	signalling devices	6309.90
SIEL (Permanent)	projectile launchers	127000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	26903.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	207051.72
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Qatar)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	25571.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	22412.25
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment	90000.00
SITCL	artillery ammunition	30128.00
SITCL	explosive ordnance disposal equipment	15338.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	CS hand grenades, demolition charges, demolition devices, exploding simulation devices, fire simulation equipment for small arms ammunition, illuminators, military devices for initiating	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Qatar)	Total Goods Value (£)
	explosives, signal flares, signal hand grenades, smoke ammunition, smoke canisters, smoke generators, smoke hand grenades, stun grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, thunderflashes, training anti-aircraft ammunition, training hand grenades	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	NBC filters, chaff, chaff equipment, command communications control and intelligence equipment, components for chaff equipment, components for command communications control and intelligence equipment, components for corvettes, components for defensive systems against NBC agents, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for fast attack craft, components for frigates, components for heavy machine guns, components for military distress signalling equipment, components for military inflatable craft, components for military navigation equipment, components for naval acoustic equipment, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun mountings, components for naval radars, components for naval sonar equipment, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for surface-to-air missiles, components for surface-to-surface missiles, control equipment for surface-to-air missiles, control equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, defensive systems against NBC agents, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of corvettes, equipment for the use of fast attack craft, equipment for the use of frigates, equipment for the use of naval radars, equipment for the use of surface-to-air missiles, general naval vessel components, handling equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, heavy machine guns, launching equipment for surface-to-air missiles, launching equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, military distress signalling equipment, military inflatable craft, military navigation equipment, naval acoustic equipment, naval communications equipment, naval electrical equipment, naval electronic equipment, naval engines, naval gun mountings, naval radars, naval sonar equipment, semi-automatic pistols, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, test equipment for military communications equipment, test equipment for naval radars, test equipment for surface-to-air missiles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for ejector seats, components for military parachutes, components for military training aircraft, ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military distress signalling equipment, military parachutes, technology for the development of ejector seats, technology for the development of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the development of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the development of military parachutes, technology for the development of military training aircraft, technology for the production of ejector seats, technology for the production of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the production of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the production of military parachutes, technology for the production of military training aircraft, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes, technology for the use of military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military utility helicopters, equipment for the production of military utility helicopters, equipment for the use of military utility helicopters, technology for the development of military utility helicopters, technology for the production of	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Qatar)	Total Goods Value (£)
	military utility helicopters, technology for the use of military utility helicopters, test equipment for military utility helicopters, unfinished products for military utility helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for the use of test equipment for inertial equipment, test equipment for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, military helmets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for gun laying equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, gun laying equipment, military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of gun laying equipment, technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sight mounts, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MNs; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed or modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	combination rifle-shotguns, components for combination rifle-shotguns, components for shotguns, components for sporting rifles, shotguns, small arms ammunition, sporting rifles, weapon sights	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Qatar)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	assault rifles, blank ammunition, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, training small arms ammunition	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	general naval vessel components, technology for general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	fibrous/filamentary materials	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the development of military helicopters, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military parachutes and equipment, signalling devices, software for combat helicopters, software for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, software for equipment for the production of military helicopters, software for military helicopters, technology for combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military helicopters, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military parachutes and equipment, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, unfinished products for combat helicopters, unfinished products for military aero-engines, unfinished products for military helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for small arms ammunition, small arms ammunition	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of artillery, components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of artillery, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Qatar)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for underwater telecommunications systems, components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, software for aircraft missile protection systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military helicopters, components for equipment	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Qatar)	Total Goods Value (£)
	for the development of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of military helicopters, equipment for the development of military support aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, test models for military support aircraft, test models for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	towed hydrophone arrays	



Application Type	Goods Summary (Qatar)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, equipment for the use of NBC protective/defensive equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military transport aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	acoustic seabed survey equipment, guidance/navigation equipment, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for military training equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, military training equipment, software for aerial target equipment, software for military training equipment, technology for aerial target equipment, technology for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military support aircraft, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military radars, equipment for the use of military radars, software for military radars, technology for military radars	
OITCL	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	
OITCL	bomb suits, components for bomb suits, military helmets	
OITCL	military helmets	
OITCL	bomb suits, military helmets	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>39,364,880.76</b>

## Tunisia

Application Type	Goods Summary (Tunisia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Transshipment)	anti-armour ammunition, small arms ammunition	272,232.87
SIEL (Temporary)	body armour, imaging cameras, military communications equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	264,200.00
SIEL (Temporary)	components for body armour, imaging cameras, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night	506,700.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Tunisia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	
SIEL (Temporary)	software for radio jamming equipment, telecommunications jamming equipment	32,074.13
SIEL (Temporary)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	189,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil riot control agent protection equipment	72,065.01
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,849.69
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	600,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	31,819.02
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,472.00
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	5,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	570,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval guns	46,863.50
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment	26,642.72
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	805.90
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	13,634.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	general naval vessel components, technology for general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military helicopters, military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	lasers	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Tunisia)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of military helicopters, equipment for the development of military support aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, test models for	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Tunisia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	combat aircraft, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, test models for military support aircraft, test models for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military utility helicopters, equipment for the production of military utility helicopters, equipment for the use of military utility helicopters, technology for the development of military utility helicopters, technology for the production of military utility helicopters, technology for the use of military utility helicopters, test equipment for military utility helicopters, unfinished products for military utility helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military transport aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	underwater television cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	fibrous/filamentary materials	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military transport aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for military radars, military software, technology for military radars	
OIEL (Military /	components for combat aircraft, components for combat	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Tunisia)	Total Goods Value (£)
Dual Use)*	helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for naval engines, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew breathing equipment, equipment for the use of military helicopters, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of naval engines, general military aircraft components, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for naval engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	small arms ammunition	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>2,643,358.84</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Tunisia

## Ukraine

Application Type	Goods Summary (Ukraine)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Temporary)	military training equipment	25,030.00
SIEL (Temporary)	military electronic equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	202,640.00
SIEL (Temporary)	military electronic equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	202,640.00
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras, weapon night sights, weapon sights	202,940.00
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	31,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers	140,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	sniper rifles (3)	16,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles, sniper rifles (3)	30,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-air missiles	714,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	547,700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (33)	37,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	4,267.02
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	104,450.00
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	80,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	rifles (10)	19,588.00
SIEL (Permanent)	rebreathing swimming equipment	3,507.00
SIEL (Permanent)	sniper rifles (5)	22,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	10,000.00

Application Type	Goods Summary (Ukraine)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	625.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	407,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	937.81
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	7,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers, sporting guns (65)	19,200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for imaging cameras	600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	150,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	217.94
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	404,189.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	98,833.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	17,969,636.00
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (1)	69,805.00
SIEL (Permanent)	sniper rifles (3), sporting guns (11)	36,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	7,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	346,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers	80,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sporting guns	15,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon sights	100,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles	8,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	15,053.00
SIEL (Permanent)	rebreathing swimming equipment	3,507.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,300.00
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	2,850.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	22,828.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures	3.00
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools, software for machine tools	880,314.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	6,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	511,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for combat naval vessels	31,700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for aircraft missile protection systems	100,154.46
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	1,551,640.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	1,117,694.00
SIEL (Permanent)	rebreathing swimming equipment	17,759.85
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	4,325,152.00
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	1,405,120.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,146.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	37.00
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for attack alerting/warning equipment	200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray generators	165,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military containers, military support vehicles, military trailers	124,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	2,981.63
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	220,000.00
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	americium-241, devices for initiating explosives, hydrophones, linear cutting explosive charges, materials containing natural	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Ukraine)	Total Goods Value (£)
	uranium, materials containing thorium, neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets, oxidisers, radioactive sources, technology for the use of devices for initiating explosives, technology for the use of linear cutting explosive charges, technology for the use of non-military detonators, technology for the use of non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	air guns	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment, components for civil riot control agent protection equipment, military communications equipment, rebreathing swimming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	imaging cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	lasers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	pressure transducers, software for semiconductor process equipment, technology for semiconductor process equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military	

Application Type	Goods Summary (Ukraine)	Total Goods Value (£)
	support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	small arms ammunition	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)*	non-military detonators	
	<b>Total Value of SIELs</b>	<b>32,682,245.71</b>

\* – OIEL for multiple destinations including Ukraine



## Annex 14: Selected arms export licence approvals of arms or components of arms which might be used to facilitate internal repression in the period 1 October 2013 to June 2014

In its 2013 Human Rights and Democracy Report,<sup>615</sup> published in April 2014, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office identified 28 Countries of concern where the FCO had the most serious human rights concerns. The Countries of concern were: Afghanistan, Belarus, Burma, Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Fiji, Iran, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Libya, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen and Zimbabwe. The Committees on Arms Export Controls has identified an additional 7 countries that are of concern to it: these are Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Hong Kong, Qatar, Tunisia and Ukraine. The following table provides details of licences authorised by the Government in the period 1 October 2013 to 30 June 2014 for equipment that might be used to facilitate internal repression for the FCO's Countries of concern and 6 of the Committees' additional countries of concern (Argentina is dealt with separately in Annex 15). The Committees' questions on certain of the arms export licence approvals listed below and the Government's answers are in Annex 1 above.

Country	Examples of approved arms exports from 1 October 2013 until 30 June 2014
<b>Afghanistan</b>	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, assault rifles, body armour components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for mortars, components for pistols, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of machine guns, gun mountings, gun silencers, machine guns, military helmets, military support vehicles, pistols, small arms ammunition, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for machine guns.
<b>Bahrain</b>	Components for gun mountings, components for machine guns, components for machine guns, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of machine guns, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, gun mountings, gun silencers, hand grenades, machine guns, military helmets, small arms ammunition, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for telecommunications jamming equipment, telecommunications jamming equipment, weapon mountings, weapon night sights and weapon sights.
<b>Burma</b>	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection.
<b>Central African Republic (CAR)</b>	Anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sight

615 FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2013 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8342, April 2014

Country	Examples of approved arms exports from 1 October 2013 until 30 June 2014
	mounts, weapon sights.
<b>China</b>	Components for body armour, components for equipment employing cryptography, components for military communications equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the production of body armour, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military helmets, small arms ammunition, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for military communications equipment, technology for body armour, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for the production of military electronic equipment, technology for military communications equipment and technology for military electronic equipment.
<b>Colombia</b>	Anti-riot/ballistic shields, components for assault rifles, components for machine guns, components for pistols, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of machine guns, radio jamming equipment and software for radio jamming equipment.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software and technology for equipment employing cryptography.
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography, ground vehicles communications equipment, gun mountings, military communications equipment, military helmets, pistols, radio jamming equipment, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights.
<b>Eritrea</b>	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software and technology for equipment employing cryptography.
<b>Hong Kong</b>	Anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for sniper rifles, components for sniper rifles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, equipment for the use of weapon sights, gun mountings, gun silencers, hand grenades, military helmets, sniper rifles, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, tear gas/irritant ammunition, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights.
<b>Iraq</b>	Body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for body armour, components for weapon mountings, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military communications equipment, military helmets, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for anti-riot/ballistic shields, technology for body armour and technology for military helmets.
<b>Israel and the OPTs</b>	Components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for combat vehicles, components for command/control equipment for unmanned air vehicles, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for sniper rifles, components for unmanned air vehicles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of

Country	Examples of approved arms exports from 1 October 2013 until 30 June 2014
	military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights, general military vehicle components, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military support vehicles, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for command/control equipment for unmanned air vehicles, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for military communications equipment, technology for small arms ammunition, water cannons, weapon night sights and weapon sights.
<b>Libya</b>	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for body armour, components for hand grenades, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military helmets, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography.
<b>Pakistan</b>	Assault rifles, body armour, components for body armour, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the production of small arms ammunition, components for machine guns, components for military electronic equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the production of pistols, equipment for the production of rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, machine guns, military communications equipment, pistols, radio jamming equipment, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for sniper rifles, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights.
<b>Qatar</b>	Assault rifles, body armour, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for sniper rifles, components for weapon night sights, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, grenade launchers, gun mountings, gun silencers, machine guns, military communications equipment, military helmets, projectile launchers, radio jamming equipment, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for radio jamming equipment, technology for machine guns, technology for sniper rifles, unmanned air vehicles, weapon night sights and weapon sights.
<b>Russia</b>	Components for sniper rifles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, weapon night sights and weapon sights.
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	Assault rifles, body armour, civil riot control agent protection equipment, clips for assault rifles, clips for machine guns, clips for pistols, clips for rifles, clips for sniper rifles, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for gun mountings, components for gun silencers, components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for military helmets, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sight mounts, components for weapon sights, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the production

Country	Examples of approved arms exports from 1 October 2013 until 30 June 2014
	of machine guns, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, general military vehicle components, gun mountings, gun silencers, machine guns, military communications equipment, military helmets, military support vehicles, pistols, radio jamming equipment, rifles, small arms ammunition, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for military communications equipment, software for radio jamming equipment, tear gas/irritant ammunition, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for military communications equipment, weapon mountings, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights.
<b>Somalia</b>	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour, components for body armour, components for military support vehicles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military helmets, military support vehicles and software for equipment employing cryptography.
<b>South Sudan</b>	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour, components for body armour, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military helmets, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography.
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	Acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for crowd control ammunition, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for gun mountings, components for military communications equipment, components for military helmets, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, components for tear gas/irritant ammunition, components for wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, crowd control ammunition, equipment employing cryptography, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun mountings, military communications equipment, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mountings and weapon sights.
<b>Sudan</b>	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography.
<b>Syria</b>	Body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography.
<b>Tunisia</b>	Anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour, components for military communications equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military communications equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights.
<b>Turkmenistan</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.
<b>Ukraine</b>	Body armour, components for body armour, components for sniper rifles, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of weapon sights, gun silencers, military helmets, small arms ammunition, software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment and weapon sights.
<b>Uzbekistan</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.

Country	Examples of approved arms exports from 1 October 2013 until 30 June 2014
<b>Vietnam</b>	Components for military communications equipment, equipment employing cryptography, military helmets, small arms ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights and software for equipment employing cryptography.
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software and technology for equipment employing cryptography.

*Source: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1 October 2013–31 December 2013, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1 January 2014–31 March 2014; and Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1 April 2014–30 June 2014*

## Annex 15: Export licences to Argentina in the period 1 October 2012 to June 2014

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In the period 1 January to 30 June 2014 the Government approved, refused and revoked the following export licences to Argentina. There are currently 59 extant arms export licences to Argentina are listed at Annex 13 above.

### 1 October 2012–31 December 2012

#### SIELs

##### Approved

- Military (total value £29,863)
  - Small arms ammunition
  - Sporting guns (9)
- Other (total value £4,428,138)
  - equipment employing cryptography
  - radiation hardened TV cameras
  - software for equipment employing cryptography

#### OIELs

##### Approved

- accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes
- equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography
- cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment, employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography

##### Refused

- aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation

equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment,  
technology for military support aircraft

**1 January 2013–31 March 2013**

SIELs

Approved

Military (total value £56,082)  
Military improvised explosive device  
decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment  
Small arms ammunition  
Sporting guns (2)  
Sporting guns (15)  
Other (total value £1,342,381)  
equipment employing cryptography  
human pathogens  
software for equipment employing cryptography  
submersible equipment

Refused

Military  
components for military training aircraft  
Other  
equipment employing cryptography

OIELs

Approved

lasers  
triggered spark gaps

**1 April 2013–30 June 2013**

SIELs

Approved

Military (total value £14,000)  
sporting guns (2)  
Other (total value £51,454)  
equipment employing cryptography

SIELS – incorporated

Refused

Space qualified solar devices

**1 July 2013–30 September 2013**

SIELs

Approved

Military (total value £285,700)

components for sporting guns  
 sporting guns (1) (6 licences)  
 sporting guns (2)  
 sporting guns (2) (5 licences)  
 sporting guns (3)  
 sporting guns (600)  
 weapon sights  
 Other (total value £41,328)  
 imaging cameras

OIELs

Approved

artillery ammunition, components for artillery, components for combat naval vessels, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for NBC detection equipment, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, signalling devices, smoke canisters, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, technology for artillery, technology for combat naval vessels, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for general naval vessel components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military radars, technology for naval communications equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval engines, technology for naval gun installations/mountings, technology for naval guns, technology for NBC detection equipment, technology for signalling devices, technology for smoke canisters, technology for weapon control equipment, training artillery ammunition, weapon control equipment

**1 October 2013–31 December 2013**

SIELs

Approved



Military (total value £114,527)  
small arms ammunition  
sporting guns (1)  
sporting guns (2)  
Other (total value £20,160,047)  
equipment employing cryptography (2 licences)  
metal alloy powder production equipment  
software for equipment employing cryptography (2 licences)

OIELs

Approved

software for inertial equipment  
towed hydrophone arrays

**1 January 2014–31 March 2014**

SIELs

Approved

Military (total value £21,293)  
anti-riot/ballistic shields  
components for sporting guns  
sporting guns (1)  
sporting guns (2)  
Other (total value £38,705)  
civil NBC protection equipment  
civil riot control agent protection equipment  
toxic gas detectors

Refused

Pressure transducers

OIELs

Approved

software for equipment employing cryptography

**1 April 2014–30 June 2014**

SIELs

Approved

Military (total value £40,020)  
components for sniper rifles  
gun mountings]  
small arms ammunition  
sniper rifles (1)  
sporting guns (8)  
sporting shotguns (1)  
sporting shotguns (2) (3 licences)  
weapon sights  
Other (total value £666,937)

semiconductor process equipment

OIELs

Approved

bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment  
pressure transducers, software for semiconductor process equipment, technology for semiconductor process equipment

Refused

towed hydrophone arrays

*Source: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1 October 2012–31 December 2012, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1 January 2013–31 March 2013; Country Pivot Report 1 April 2013–30 June 2013, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1 July 2013–30 September 2013; Country Pivot Report 1 October 2013–31 December 2013; 1 January 2013–31 March 2014; and Country Pivot Report 1 April 2013–30 June 2014*