



# House of Commons

## Committees on Arms Export Controls

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**Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2015): Scrutiny of the Government's UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013, the Government's Quarterly Reports from October 2013 to June 2014, and the Government's policies on arms exports and international arms control issues**

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## **Second Joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees of Session 2014–15**

Tenth Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee of Session 2014-15

Ninth Report of the Defence Committee of Session 2014-15

Eleventh Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Session 2014-15

Eleventh Report of the International Development Committee of Session 2014-15

### ***Volume III***

*Oral and written evidence*

*Ordered by the House of Commons to be published 9 March 2015*

## The Committees on Arms Export Controls

The Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees are appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and any associated public bodies.

### Current membership

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\* Member who participated in the inquiry leading to this Report

§ Chair of a participating Committee

### Powers

The Committees are departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in Standing Order No 152. The powers of the Committees to work together and agree joint reports are set out in Standing Order No. 137A. These Standing Orders are available on the Internet via [www.parliament.uk](http://www.parliament.uk).

### Publication

The Reports and evidence of the Committees are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committees (including news items) are on the internet at <http://www.parliament.uk/caeccomm>

### Committee staff

The current staff of the Committees are Keith Neary (Clerk), Su Panchanathan (Committee Assistant), and Alex Paterson (Media Officer)

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# Contents

## Oral evidence

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### Monday 10 November 2014

**Roy Isbister**, Team Leader, Small Arms and Transfer Controls, Saferworld, **Oliver Sprague**, Programme Director, Military Security and Police, Amnesty International UK, and **Martin Butcher**, Policy Adviser, Arms Campaign, Oxfam GB Ev w1

**Paul Everitt**, Chief Executive, ADS Group, **David Wilson**, Export Compliance, Hewlett-Packard Enterprise Services and Chairman of EGAD, **Sue Tooze**, Deputy Head of Trade Controls, Compliance and Assurance, BAE Systems, and **Bernadette Peers**, Compliance Manager, Strategic Shipping Company Ltd Ev w16

### Monday 1 December 2014

**Rt Hon Vince Cable MP**, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, **Edward Bell**, Head and **Chris Chew**, Head of Policy, Export Control Organisation, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Ev w27

**Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP** Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, **Jessica Hand**, Head, Arms Export Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and **Peter Jones**, Director, Defence and International Security, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev w42

## Published written evidence

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The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the Committee's website at [www.parliament.uk/facom](http://www.parliament.uk/facom). INQ numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1	Export Group for Aerospace and Defence ( <a href="#">AEC0001</a> )	Ev w56
2	Paul Holtom and Ioannis Chapsos ( <a href="#">AEC0003</a> )	Ev w60
3	Campaign Against Arms Trade ( <a href="#">AEC0004</a> )	Ev w66
4	Privacy International ( <a href="#">AEC0005</a> )	Ev w73
5	UK Working Group on Arms ( <a href="#">AEC0006</a> )	Ev w83
6	Campaign Against Arms Trade ( <a href="#">AEC0007</a> )	Ev w159
7	Export Group for Aerospace and Defence ( <a href="#">AEC0009</a> )	Ev w160

# Ministerial correspondence

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Previous Ministerial correspondence from 19 June 2013 to 20 May 2014 can be found in Volume III of the Committees' previous Report, Session 2014–15 HC 186 at [www.parliament.uk/caecom](http://www.parliament.uk/caecom)

Date	From	To	Subject	Evidence reference
21/07/2014	Chairman	Philip Hammond	Russia – suspensions and revocations	Ev w164
23/07/2014	Chairman	David Cameron	Russia – arms export policy	Ev w165
23/07/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Russia – extant arms exports	Ev w166
24/07/2014	Philip Hammond	Chairman	Ukraine – arms export policy	Ev w167
07/08/2014	Chairman	Philip Hammond	CAEC questions on the Government's Annual Report on Strategic Exports	Ev w167
07/08/2014	Chairman	Philip Hammond	Israel – arms exports	Ev w175
14/08/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Israel – extant arms exports	Ev w175
19/08/2014	Philip Hammond	Chairman	Israel – arms exports	Ev w176
19/08/2014	Philip Hammond	Chairman	Russia – extant arms exports and arms exports policy	Ev w178
20/08/2014	Philip Hammond	Chairman	Russia – arms export policy	Ev w181
02/09/2014	Chairman	Philip Hammond	CAEC questions on the Government's Annual Report on Strategic Exports	Ev w182
03/09/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Israel – extant arms exports	Ev w183
03/09/2014	Chairman	Philip Hammond	Russia – compliance with INF Treaty	Ev w183
10/09/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Russia – end-users of UK arms exports	Ev w184
10/09/2014	Philip Hammond	Chairman	CAEC questions on the Government's Annual Report on Strategic Exports	Ev w185
30/09/2014	Philip Hammond	Chairman	Russia – compliance with INF Treaty	Ev w185
06/10/2014	Philip Hammond	Chairman	CAEC questions on the Government's Annual Report on Strategic Exports	Ev w186
21/10/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Hong Kong – arms exports	Ev w209
28/10/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Hong Kong – arms exports	Ev w210
13/11/2014	Tobias Ellwood	Chairman	Russia – arms exports	Ev w211
13/11/2014	Tobias Ellwood	Ann McKechin	The Wassenaar Arrangement and the EU Dual-Use Regulation	Ev w213
13/11/2014	Tobias Ellwood	Jeremy Corbyn	Sri Lanka – arms exports policy	Ev w214

Date	From	To	Subject	Evidence reference
17/11/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Extant arms export licences to Countries of Concern	Ev w215
17/11/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Spyware export controls	Ev w216
25/11/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Egypt – arms exports policy	Ev w217
25/11/2014	Chairman	Philip Hammond	Syria – chlorine chemical weapons	Ev w218
02/12/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Revocations reporting by the Export Control Organisation, Uniformity of arms export licensing between countries, The Transparency Initiative, Pre-licence registration of arms brokers, and Extra-territoriality	Ev w218
10/12/2014	Philip Hammond	Chairman	Syria – chlorine chemical weapons	Ev w219
15/12/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI), Maritime Anti-Piracy, EU Torture Regulation, Reporting on revocations, Uniformity in export licensing systems, Transparency Initiative, pre-licence registration of arms brokers, Extra-Territoriality, Surveillance technology, Israel licences and arms export licences to Countries of Concern	Ev w220
06/01/2015	Chairman	Philip Hammond	Ukraine – arms exports	Ev w433
06/01/2015	Chairman	Vince Cable	Arms export revocations since 7 June 2014	Ev w433
08/01/2015	Chairman	Vince Cable	EU User's Guide	Ev w433
12/01/2015	Chairman	Vince Cable	Qatar – extant arms exports	Ev w434
16/01/2015	Philip Hammond	Chairman	EU User's Guide	Ev w434
19/01/2015	Chairman	Vince Cable	Duration of OIELs	Ev w434
21/01/2015	Vince Cable	Chairman	Arms export licence revocations since 7 June 2014, and Qatar – extant arms exports	Ev w435
27/01/2015	Philip Hammond	Chairman	Ukraine – arms exports	Ev w458
04/02/2015	Vince Cable	Chairman	Duration of OIELs	Ev w459
04/02/2015	Tobias Ellwood	Chairman	Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference	Ev w459

Date	From	To	Subject	Evidence reference
19/02/2015	Desmond Swayne	Chairman	DFID – Criterion 8 update	Ev w459





# Oral Evidence

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## Taken before the Committees on Arms Export Controls

on Monday 10 November 2014

Members present:

Sir John Stanley (Chair)

Mr Adrian Bailey

Sir Malcolm Bruce

Ann Clwyd

Mike Crockart

Mike Gapes

Fabian Hamilton

Dr Julian Lewis

Ann McKechin

Witnesses: **Roy Isbister**, Team Leader, Small Arms and Transfer Controls, Saferworld, **Oliver Sprague**, Programme Director, Military Security and Police, Amnesty International UK, and **Martin Butcher**, Policy Adviser, Arms Campaign, Oxfam GB, gave evidence.

**Q1 Chair:** Mr Isbister, Mr Sprague, Mr Butcher, welcome again. I want to begin with a broad but extremely important issue—as far as the Committees are concerned, it is probably the single most important policy issue before us—and that is the Government’s policy on the export of arms that can be used for internal repression. The question I want to put to you is, do you consider that, under the present Government, that policy has become more relaxed or tighter, or is it more or less unchanged from the previous policy, as stated in October 2000 by the previous Government?

**Oliver Sprague:** I think this year we are genuinely concerned about a number of statements and decisions that have emerged from the Government export control machine, ministerial answers to questions and things like that, which, for us, suggest that there is a worrying departure from the rules as we had known them. I think we will talk more about this in our evidence, but we would cite as examples the justification of the decision around the Gaza licensing situation recently, comments that were made in the light of the revelations that UK equipment had been found in Hong Kong and a statement that basically said, “If we don’t sell them, someone else would have done.” Those are departures from our understanding of the Government’s assessment and its support for things like the Arms Trade Treaty and the notion of clear risk.

**Q2 Chair:** Thank you. Can I ask you one further question that flows from that? As you know from our last report, which we published in July, when the present Government issued its own criteria earlier this year for approving or refusing arms export licence applications for the type of arms that could be used for internal repression, it dropped the wording in the previous Government’s consolidated criteria of October 2000, which read: “An export licence will not be

issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed...by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression". My question to you is, do you consider the dropping of that wording to be significant or not?

**Roy Isbister:** Looking back over the years at the way that licensing policy has worked—I am speaking for myself—I am not sure that that language in the opening statement and in the criterion specifically made a huge difference in practice. However, it has been interesting over the last year or so, with the dropping of that language from the new consolidated criteria, but also with the language with regard to licence suspensions for equipment going to Egypt, that the Government seem to have made it very clear that there is a substantive difference between those two standards, which I don't think came across very clearly before then. That at least makes us think you need to explain exactly what these two different things mean and what the difference is in practice.

**Q3 Chair:** You don't think there is a difference in wording and policy between the statement I read out and the very much more narrowly defined test in criteria two, which refers simply to a "clear risk"? The issue with "clear risk" is that you can say there is a risk, but when is a risk ever absolutely clear? On those grounds, you could sell almost anything to anybody.

**Roy Isbister:** There clearly is a difference in words. What I was doing was looking back over the way that licensing policy seems to have worked down the years. It is not clear to me that the Government saw there had been a difference in practice. But in the language they have produced in the last year—the "might be used" language with regard to suspensions to Egypt—they say explicitly, "This is a different threshold to the clear risk threshold." So I am looking back at my own interpretation and thinking, "Okay, maybe I've got this wrong."

**Chair:** Thank you. We are now going to move on to the Arms Trade Treaty.

**Q4 Mike Gapes:** As you know, the treaty is coming into force on 24 December. What impact will it have on arms exports by the UK and, indeed, by other countries?

**Martin Butcher:** We welcome very much the fact that the treaty is coming into force so quickly; in fact, it is the quickest entry into force of an arms control-related treaty that we have been able to find. The political will for change that this demonstrates to us is also very welcome.

At this stage, before the treaty enters into force, it is hard to talk about specific exports that might be denied because of the treaty and specific changes that might be made in that way, but, as is clear, we will, for the first time, have a global set of rules based in international humanitarian law, human rights law and the need for conflict prevention. So the kinds of rules the UK has operated and the EU has operated will, for the first time, become a global standard.

There will also, for the first time across a range of arms exports, be a transparency that has not existed before and, in the conference of states parties and the reporting that states will make to each other, a venue and a mechanism for them to hold each other to account on dubious arms transfers. This accountability process is at the heart of the potential benefits of the treaty, so that we would hope that many more states will be more rigorously applying risk assessments before making transfers and that, on the side of recipient states, they would be looking at security sector reform measures that are necessary to have better control of arms:

stockpile security and accounting; accountability within their own armed forces and security forces; as well as better control of their borders—this kind of thing.

In these very practical measures, if the mechanisms of the treaty and pressure by global civil society work to ensure the treaty is implemented robustly, then we would see that change would come. We have seen with, for example, the cluster munitions convention and land mine convention that public pressure of that kind has made a huge difference to the behaviour even of states that have not signed those treaties. We would see the same thing operating: public shaming and embarrassment can be a powerful force. We saw China transfer a large battery of arms to South Sudan and then, in embarrassment, announce they were not going to do the same thing again, during the course of this year. We would be confident that across the globe there will be a substantial effect.

**Q5 Mike Gapes:** You have said that a number of countries have not signed up. Clearly, Russia and China are among them. What can we do, as the UK, to make sure that more countries do sign and ratify the treaty?

**Roy Isbister:** I think there are a number of things that can be done, but I think the direction has to come from the top, and it has to be very public, and it has to be repeated. To go back to something that Ollie mentioned, the statement by the Foreign Secretary about the supply of tear gas to Hong Kong was pretty unhelpful, I think, because, “If we don’t sell, someone else will” is not how the Arms Trade Treaty operates.

We need political leaders to be making it very clear what is the philosophy for arms exports. They can do that publicly; they can also do that in terms of bilateral diplomacy. I think building on that there is a kind of carrot and stick approach that can be used, and in some way the carrot and the stick are the same thing. So that would be, for example: are you an ATT member? If you are, then in terms of defence relationships, defence supply relationships—the general attitude towards arms supplies to that country should be quite different if you are not an ATT member.

If we have a visit to another country that involves defence promotion, that should not be prioritised over making sure that that country is a member, or planning to become a member, of the ATT, or is implementing the ATT effectively. So it is about prioritising those kinds of issues, and obviously working with partners, I think, in doing that as well. That is a couple of examples, anyway.

**Q6 Mike Gapes:** You said, I think, in your written submission that participation of a state within the Arms Trade Treaty regime should be taken into consideration when invitations are issued to arms fairs or when defence co-operation agreements are signed or licences are issued to export to those countries. Do you think that is likely to happen? How do you see that working in practice?

**Roy Isbister:** So far, I have been disappointed by what we have seen. There have been a number of promotional visits, promoting defence sales to non-ATT signatories, where it is very difficult to get—there is no indication that there is a pro-ATT element to the visit. It is very

much about defence promotion; but I think it is up to the likes of us and Parliament to be holding the Government's feet to the fire on this kind of thing.

**Q7 Mike Gapes:** So are you saying that although the Government have signed up, there is already, before the treaty has come into force, a backsliding in attitudes to it, and they are not taking it seriously?

**Roy Isbister:** I would not say there has been backsliding. I don't think that has ever been the case. As we understand it, there have been plenty of *démarches* and work in embassies to promote the Arms Trade Treaty, but right through I think we have seen very little sign that, when there is a political-level push in promotion of arms exports, the issue of the Arms Trade Treaty features in that relationship.

**Q8 Mike Gapes:** This is the wider problem—isn't it?—where on the one hand, there are policies on human rights, and on the other, policies on exporting arms, and in the balance, it is normally the exports that take priority.

**Roy Isbister:** That is the impression we get, yes.

**Oliver Sprague:** If I could come in quickly, there is a wider point about the ATT and its relation to official invites to arms fairs, official delegations to trade exhibitions and so on. Signing and ratifying the Arms Trade Treaty is an international obligation. If you look, for example, at the eligibility for open general licences, and if you look on the schedule of permitted destinations—the countries that you are allowed to use those licences for, and more importantly, the countries that you are not allowed to use those licences for—many countries are on the list of non-permitted destinations because they have not signed up to relevant international instruments, whether that be the Australia group, whether that be the Chemical Weapons Convention, whether they be subject to an arms embargo or moratorium. I think the Arms Trade Treaty is as significant as any of those agreements and, in fact, more relevant than those agreements when exporting conventional weaponry. So it is a question for the Government, but I think it is one where there is a very strong case that those open licences should be amended, so that any country that has not signed the Arms Trade Treaty should not be eligible to use them.

**Q9 Mike Gapes:** Thank you. Finally, in terms of the progress of the treaty, there is supposed to be a conference next year of the states parties, and some kind of secretariat is supposed to be established. Are we any nearer being clear about how that is going to work and who is going to fund it?

**Roy Isbister:** We are getting close to being clearer. There is a meeting in Berlin at the end of the month which is a preparatory meeting towards the first conference of states parties, and in theory there will be something like five position papers presented at that conference, which will cover issues such as the provisional secretariat, the secretariat, rules of procedure, reporting templates and one other that has slipped my mind—financing, I think. That is going beyond options; it is suggesting that this is the best way forward. So we may be a lot closer in another month's time to having a sense of what this is going to look like.

**Chair:** Now we are going to come on to arms fairs.

**Q10 Sir Malcolm Bruce:** With reference to the biennial Defence & Security Equipment International exhibition, two companies were eventually thrown out, but only after outsiders had identified that they were promoting unsuitable equipment. That was a decision by the organisers to pack them up and throw them out. Those were MagForce and Tian Jin MyWay, but they were not prosecuted. You have expressed concern about that. Should they have been, and on what basis?

*Oliver Sprague:* One of the points here is that this is not an isolated incident. Looking back, we have been to this Committee on numerous occasions saying exactly the same thing over the years. Probably since 2005—

**Sir Malcolm Bruce:** 2005, 2007—

*Oliver Sprague:* Yes, I think every fair since 2005. It is alarming for me that if you look at the guidance and the law as written, our understanding, having been through the consultation process to develop that law, is that displaying and advertising category A goods—in this case it was leg irons and electro-shock weaponry—are offences. They are breaches of the legislation. If we read the signed memorandum of understanding between Clarion Defence, the organisers of DSEi, and BIS, we see that it quite categorically states that the advertising and promotion of category A goods without the prerequisite Government licence would be a breach of the law. In all those areas, there are very clear statements, as I read them, saying that this is against the law.

If, however, we read some of the Government's more detailed responses to your Committee—this is where I start to get a little worried—I get the feeling that the answer is that the law itself might not be clear enough, and that there is a reason why companies are not being prosecuted. What might be needed here is a re-look at the law, because the intention behind that law was clearly to make these illegal acts. Having been through the whole process, I am sure of that. If there is a reason why companies in breach of that law are not finding themselves prosecuted—I do not mean just being made to leave the building—that points out to me that there is a problem with the way the law is drafted. It needs to be tightened.

**Q11 Sir Malcolm Bruce:** The Business Secretary said to us that displaying pictures of category A goods might not necessarily constitute an offence. There is an export control order saying that “no person to whom this article applies shall directly or indirectly...do any act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of any category A goods, where that person knows or has reason to believe that such action or actions will, or may, result in the removal of those goods from one third country to another third country.” Is the Business Secretary saying it is okay if they honestly said that they did not expect it to go to the wrong places? Is the implication that the law is not clear for that reason?

*Oliver Sprague:* Again, that is a contradiction of the memorandum of understanding that I think the Secretary of State signed with Clarion.

**Q12 Sir Malcolm Bruce:** Was he being disingenuous?

**Oliver Sprague:** It clearly said that displaying this material, with the intention to supply, without the necessary licence would be an offence under the law. There is a mismatch somewhere that needs unpicking and understanding.

**Q13 Sir Malcolm Bruce:** Would it be more effective, or as effective, to include in any prosecution the organisers of the exhibition?

**Oliver Sprague:** Again, let's go back to the agreement they signed, as there is a clause saying that any company would be adequately vetted. There is a responsibility on them adequately to vet any company coming to exhibit there. We noticed that this was signed for five calendar days, or effectively two working days, before the fair took place—I think it was signed on 5 December or 2 December. In two days, I am not quite sure how one could realistically pre-vet any of the companies that are exhibiting. So this agreement needs to be revisited for the next fair, and much greater emphasis needs to be placed on the pre-scrutiny.

**Q14 Sir Malcolm Bruce:** So, perhaps just to pull all that together, how would you like it to look in terms of the procedures, for example? You say you want more robust procedures, but what should they be? What specific and explicit restrictions should be placed on companies? It seems to me that what you are saying is that nobody should be in any doubt about what can and cannot be done or about the penalties. If that was the case, in my view, it would be legitimate to say that the organisers had to take responsibility as well as the exhibitors. That is just my personal view.

**Oliver Sprague:** That would be my view, too. If you are asking for simple steps, the first thing that needs to happen is that all companies exhibiting must have their materials vetted in advance and the necessary licences given or not given as appropriate. It would be good to have a statement from the Government in no uncertain terms that displaying this stuff is clearly an offence that will lead to an automatic suspension from the fair and a move to prosecute. Any company that has been found to be in violation should not be allowed back, and companies that have not signed the relevant international agreements—the Arms Trade Treaty, for example—should not automatically be eligible to come and exhibit.

**Q15 Sir Malcolm Bruce:** So, just to clarify that, any company from a country that has not signed the treaty should be ineligible?

**Oliver Sprague:** They should not automatically be able to come.

**Q16 Sir Malcolm Bruce:** There is a suggestion they should not be eligible to come.

**Oliver Sprague:** Similarly with cluster bombs, where any country has not signed the cluster bombs convention or any company has not got a categorical statement in writing to say that none of its subsidiaries or partnership companies are involved in the production and promotion of cluster bombs, there should be an outright prohibition on those companies too. Is that clear?

**Sir Malcolm Bruce:** Yes.

**Q17 Ann Clwyd:** This has been going on for years. I remember asking questions in the previous Committees—I don't know how many years ago, but it was years and years ago—and getting the



same sort of answers and weasel words. How serious are Governments—I am not picking out one—about actually cracking down on this kind of export fair?

**Roy Isbister:** I think the evidence so far is that they are not serious. We would like it if they were.

**Oliver Sprague:** It sends entirely the wrong message, and it is deeply unfortunate—I might use stronger words than that actually—that this has happened every year since 2005, or every other year.

**Martin Butcher:** With particular reference to the Arms Trade Treaty, aside from the provisions on human rights and humanitarian law, one reason why our Government chose to pursue this was, as was said many times, to level the playing field of regulation and law for British firms and foreign firms. If they are not going to do that at home, where else are they going to do it?

**Chair:** Thank you. We now come to revocations and suspensions.

**Q18 Ann McKechin:** I would like to turn to two countries of concern. The first is Russia. Yesterday, former President Gorbachev warned that we might be facing another cold war. You have collectively expressed concerns about suspensions and revocations to Russia in March. What are those concerns, and what should the Government now do to allay them? Do you think the Government have gone far enough, or is there more to be done?

**Roy Isbister:** The concern was a lot about the way the change was communicated, in one sense. The statement that was read to the House—I think in March—talked about the specific types of licences. It said the UK would “suspend all extant licences and application processing for licences for direct export to Russia for military and dual-use items destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine.” There was a bit more about licences for incorporation. That was very widely interpreted as meaning that a unilateral embargo was being put in place on arms sales to Russia, and that was far from the case. Reading the words carefully, this isn’t what it says.

I’m not sure the Government ever actually said, “This is an embargo,” but they never clarified what the situation really was. They seemed very comfortable with people interpreting this to mean an embargo, when that was not the case at all. That is why we put down a freedom of information request to find out what was going on. Then we discovered that only 10% of existing licences had been suspended. So it was very misleading, and the Government could have done a lot better in explaining the situation. In these situations, the Government has a responsibility to be clear. Also, on the 90% of licences that are not being suspended or cancelled, why is the Government confident that those are safe exports? So, much more information should be provided in those situations to show what the basis for these things is. That would be extremely helpful in general in these cases.

**Q19 Ann McKechin:** So, in general, where you have a country that is of concern due to emergency events, you would prefer the Government to state not only why they are suspending licences, but why they have chosen not to suspend or revoke licences?

**Roy Isbister:** Listing still extant licences in that circumstance would be very helpful—much clearer for the likes of you and us—in trying to make sense of what is actually happening.

**Q20 Ann McKechin:** Obviously the EU arms embargo on Russia was somewhat controversial, given the actions of the French Government shortly after the embargo was announced, but do you think the embargo currently goes far enough, or should the UK be taking additional unilateral action to strengthen the embargo?

**Roy Isbister:** I think the embargo does not go far enough, but I am not sure how much the UK can do unilaterally. The big issue is the sale of amphibious assault ships, from France to Russia. The idea of an embargo that allows that to proceed because the deal was agreed beforehand, but will prevent very small transfers of relatively inoffensive equipment, as long as it is on the military list or dual-use list, that may have no offensive capability at all—that, to me, seems perverse. So I think the embargo, and embargoes in general, should be applied retrospectively to any transfer previously agreed but not yet delivered.

**Q21 Ann McKechin:** If I could turn now to Israel, it is obviously a subject of controversy, and the Chair has mentioned, and you have mentioned today, that the Government, in talking about the possibility of suspension and revocation, said that they would only do so if there was a resumption of significant hostilities. You have argued that this has set a fundamentally dangerous and alarming precedent. Could I ask each of you what you think the implications are of that phraseology; and where does it actually leave us, in terms of the arms criteria?

**Oliver Sprague:** Up until that statement—that licences would be suspended pending a resumption of significant hostilities—we were always under the assumption that UK Government policy had been based on a risk assessment, based on the likelihood and foreseeability of breaches of the criteria. So if you look, for example, at criterion 2, is there a “clear risk” that the equipment “might be used for internal repression”, which also includes deciding how likely that is, based on evidence of how equipment might have been used in the past? So when one of the Foreign Ministers, in a debate in Parliament, says that this is the third time in six years that Gaza has escalated into crisis, using precisely the kind of equipment that we believed was subject to the licences, the Government had admitted that those 12 licences covered systems that were at risk of being used. I think if you take all of that together, the UK’s existing policy should have been clear: it should have suspended or revoked any licence that it saw as at risk of being used in that crisis.

Three or four years ago, the Government concluded that arms of that type had actually been used in the previous crisis, in 2009—I think the phrase they used was that “almost certainly” they had been used. In that respect, I think, using a phrase like “a resumption of significant hostilities” in some ways rides a coach and horses through the previous understanding of a preventive approach based on clear risk.

**Q22 Ann McKechin:** Can I just ask whether you are aware if any other EU exporting state applied any suspension or revocation this summer?

**Oliver Sprague:** Spain unilaterally suspended all of its export licences in light of the crisis.



**Roy Isbister:** I think there are some other EU member states that have some very strict licensing policies anyway on exports to Israel. Sweden is one example, where the only military exports to Israel are for production purposes—for equipment that will not be used in Israel, but will be exported to a third destination. Clearly it is a sensitive destination for a number of states across the EU.

**Martin Butcher:** I just want to add from Oxfam's perspective that our concerns about Gaza and this area relate to our mission as a humanitarian organisation. Over the last 10 years, the European Union, as the largest donor in Gaza, has given €1.3 billion for rebuilding—half a billion of that after the military operations in 2009. Much more is required this time. If we are talking about the test of significant hostilities, we saw 17,000 homes destroyed, the single operating power plant put out of action; at one point, at least in August, everybody living in Gaza was without access to clean water. Oxfam is providing water and sanitation to hundreds of thousands of people. Gaza needs 89,000 new dwellings and 226 schools just to get back to the status quo ante.

**Q23 Ann McKechin:** Where they were before July.

**Martin Butcher:** Exactly. So we have very significant humanitarian concerns, and we note that the use of arms under international humanitarian law in these situations is supposed to include an element of proportionality to a threat. Given statistics like these, it is open to question—

**Q24 Ann McKechin:** Can I press you a little more? Is your view that the Government should still suspend these licences until there is a marked improvement in terms of where the future is between Gaza and the Israeli authorities? Is your view that there is still a clear risk, which would justify a suspension of the licences that have been identified by the Government?

**Oliver Sprague:** Yes, Amnesty went further and called for an arms embargo on all sides in response to the 2009 crisis, and we don't think anything has significantly changed in the nature of the conflict to allay fears that this isn't going to erupt again. In our view, if the Government has identified equipment that risks being used in the current crisis, licences should be suspended until that risk no longer exists, and I don't think we have in any way nearly reached that threshold. So yes, they should clearly revoke the licences.

**Chair:** On the same subject, Fabian Hamilton.

**Q25 Fabian Hamilton:** Is there not a danger, though, that policy is dictated by what happens to have good media coverage? It is right, of course, that a conflict like Gaza has good media coverage, but I am thinking of conflicts where British arms exports may be used for internal repression, but we never hear about it—for example, in China and Tibet. That is one example, and there will be many others around the world. Should our policy on arms exports and suspending licences simply depend on what we know about, and not what we don't know about? Shouldn't we be more consistent?

**Martin Butcher:** From Oxfam's perspective, we should certainly be consistent. No, policy should not be dictated just by what we see on News 24 or whatever. One recent example,

for us, would be South Sudan—something which is rarely, if ever, seen on any British media. A crisis has been going on there in recent weeks. We have published a report on food insecurity in South Sudan and identified the conflict as the main cause of that insecurity for over a million people there. We have called for an embargo. Britain is not supplying weapons to South Sudan, but other people are. That is an example of something we have tried to push up the news agenda to get action taken. So, yes, absolutely, consistency is important.

**Oliver Sprague:** I would hope that the Government would never apply its policy based on the amount of media coverage that the crisis generates.

**Q26 Fabian Hamilton:** No, the point is that it is the media coverage that gets people upset, and when people are upset they write to their MPs and the Government, saying, “You must do something about this.” If they don’t know about what is going on, the exports can carry on, they can be used for internal repression and nobody knows anything about it. Often, of course, it is Israel’s actions that are foremost in the news, and no one else’s. You can understand the point I am trying to make.

**Roy Isbister:** It is a very fair point, and you can only operate on the information you have—that is just the way it is. The Government licensing system is supposed to be comprehensive, and every licence is supposed to be considered carefully. In the first instance, it falls to the Government to make sure that it is taking its obligations seriously. The more transparency you have around Government arms transfer decisions, the great opportunity that creates for others to try to keep a better eye on things. But we have to face the fact that we live in a world with imperfect information and limited resources. But, certainly, we would not support the inconsistent application of Government policy.

**Q27 Chair:** Thank you. For the record, I would like to make it clear that for the first time over the last two years these Committees have been putting into the public domain the whole list of weapons that could be used for internal repression by the countries listed formally by the Government as being the countries that are at the top of human rights concerns, with some additional countries added.

**Roy Isbister:** We would say that that was a major step forward; we are very grateful to the Committees for having got this up and running.

**Ann Clwyd:** May I ask a supplementary?

**Chair:** Very quickly, as we need to move on.

**Q28 Ann Clwyd:** There has always been an argument about end use and who monitors end use. Do we have enhanced intelligence that monitors end use? I seem to remember East Timor and the Hawk aircraft intimidating the East Timorese. There was nobody tracking what was going on; our embassy representatives were not really tracking what happened.

**Roy Isbister:** Additional steps are being taken. A number of things have happened on the international environment; there is the international tracing instrument, which is of some use, in relation to small arms and light weapons. Work is done by EU embargo panels, and there is a new NGO called iTRACE, which is doing a lot of work in certain conflict zones, but it is all

patchwork. It is not comprehensive. For many years, we have argued that the Government could be doing more to monitor end use than it does. We would continue to push the Government to do more.

**Oliver Sprague:** We have been consistently frustrated with replies suggesting there was little evidence of misuse, when the question should have been, “What steps have you taken to identify any potential misuse?”—two very different questions, and the answers depend on what question is asked.

**Chair:** Thank you. Let us move on to the subject of arms exports to Kurdish groups opposing ISIL.

**Q29 Ann Clwyd:** What does the Government have to do to ensure that the recently gifted equipment, including arms to Kurdish groups in Iraq, is not diverted and does not fall into the hands of extremists? I have just been to Iraq and Kurdistan with the Foreign Affairs Select Committee. We saw some of the deliveries and we saw people being trained in the use of heavy guns.

**Martin Butcher:** This is linked to a certain extent to your last question. It is clear that while the Government is supplying equipment to a regional government that is not a national Government but has the structures in place that a national Government would have, or is supplying potentially to non-state groups, there is perhaps a duty to watch over that equipment more carefully than might be the case than if the supply was going to Luxembourg.

There has been a history in this region of arms swapping hands and the diversion of arms either deliberately or through capture in battle over recent years. As we see with ISIS, it is heavy weapons, but now they are being destroyed by air force action. In large part, American weapons were supplied to the Iraqi military and then taken. Keeping a watch over the units supplied with the weapons, ensuring that someone is keeping track of what is being done with them and exercising more vigilance than might normally be the case—all these are important.

**Q30 Ann Clwyd:** There is also a complaint about where the equipment goes. Equipment for the Kurds has had to go to Baghdad first, so there is a delay in transferring the equipment, and one does not know how it is shared out. So there is a delay in transferring the equipment, and one does not know how it is shared out. Some of the political groups in Kurdistan complain that they are not getting as much as another group, and so on.

**Martin Butcher:** The details of supply to, say, the Kurdish Regional Government in the north of Iraq might be somewhat different from the details of supply to, say, Kurds in Syria, where the situation is even more complex. The Kurdish Regional Government is not a national Government, and the Iraqi national Government is not keen on the military forces of the Kurdish Regional Government being built up. I would imagine that that is why the Government is dealing with the equipment in this way. There might be some legal difficulties in direct supply if that cannot be negotiated with the national Government in Baghdad.

**Chair:** Thank you. I want to turn now to Syria. Mike Gapes?

**Q31 Mike Gapes:** This follows up those remarks. The Kurdistan Regional Government is a legitimate, democratically elected Government, but there is an increasing sign that the British Government is supplying equipment of different kinds—including quite expensive equipment, £30 million worth, that is defined as non-lethal but includes things like night vision and various other types of material—to groups within Syria, which are not Government but are under the heading “Free Syrian Army” or “Syrian opposition forces”.

How concerned should we be about transfers of equipment of any kind, which could potentially be a multiplier in the battlefield, to people over whom there might be a great deal of uncertainty as to who they are and, first, whether they are capable of retaining that weaponry or, secondly, whether there might be a defection to some other group?

**Martin Butcher:** Clearly the situation within Syria is much more confused and much more difficult than the situation in Iraq. As you said, the Kurdish Regional Government is an elected Government. It is, compared to some others in the region, stable and able to control its territory. Within Syria, with the opposition groups there, we see a much more fluid picture both of whole units switching the affiliation of which command they answer to and of individual fighters switching between groups on a regular basis.

The position that we have taken is that there are procedures in place for this. The risk assessments that have to be made have to be rigorously applied in all cases. It may be—although we are not privy to the private deliberations within the Foreign Office—that there was a drive at a certain point to have the ability to supply arms to opposition groups inside Syria, which fairly quickly gave way, after the EU embargo was dropped, to the supply only of certain types of non-lethal equipment. The concerns have not been as strong, I think, with potential supply, for example, to the Iraqi region—the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq.

**Roy Isbister:** Oxfam and Saferworld produced—I think it was last year—a paper on supplying arms to Syria at around the time when France and the UK were advocating that the terms of the embargo should be shifted to allow this. We argued at the time that if you want to do that, the consolidated criteria, the EU common position criteria, still apply, and under our assessment of those criteria, we could not see how you could justify those transfers. I am not sure that anything has changed in Syria that would change our assessment of that.

**Chair:** We are going to move, now, to the Government’s transparency initiative, as the Government called it, alongside its policy on open licences.

**Q32 Mike Crockart:** An opening question, first of all: you have expressed continuing concerns in the evidence; you have submitted a few recommendations in the paper. Perhaps you could just expand on what concerns you have about the transparency initiative, in relation to open licences, and perhaps give us some pointers as to where you think the Government should be making changes.

**Oliver Sprague:** For us, we were deeply concerned that we had all been through a fairly rigorous and intensive consultation process, with stakeholders including my colleagues from the defence industry and relevant officials. We all came to a common understanding that the moves to increase transparency over open licences—to start with the open licences as a transparency

problem, to give much better qualitative and quantitative information on those and much more timely information on exports made under those licences—was inherently a good thing. We were aghast when it was an 11th hour decision, a unilateral decision, to scale back on that.

We have been trying to figure out where that opposition might have come from, and how it might have come, and we think it is possible that there were concerns that had been raised within the dual use exporting sector that the reporting requirements for that sector were too onerous. That was surprising to us, because the focus of the review was always on military list items, and the review was done on the basis that we were talking about arms that were exported under open licences. So if it was the case that it was voices within the dual use sector that were voicing concerns, then we should have dealt first with the military side of things—quite clearly, because that is what the primary focus of the first phase of the consultation was about. We could then have had a separate conversation, or looked at the dual use sector at a later date.

That is not to say that reporting on dual use is not important, because of course it is, but the primary focus, and a solution around military—there was a widespread agreement as to what that was. If that was the reason, then we are very concerned that that was not brought to our attention, because we think we would have found a working solution to that.

**Q33 Mike Crockart:** But to be clear, your concerns, as I read them, are particularly in relation to the delay in its coming into effect, the age of the data by the time it is published, because the move from quarterly to annual reporting would then make that data quite old by the time it came out, and the non-specific nature of the data. Is that fair?

**Oliver Sprague:** Yes, essentially I think it is fair to say that the improvements in transparency are now only marginal at best. The fact that now only annually we will get very vague information on how many times a licence was used—we will not get any information on the amount of equipment supplied or even the types of equipment within the licence that was supplied—is a problem.

We also think that the very generic level of end user information they are going to give is actually going to throw up many more questions than it answers, because, for example, just by flagging an end user as a Government—it could be many shades of government. It could be a police force, it could be an internal security force, and, importantly, it could actually be a foreign Government.

For example, one of the big open licences relates to the Brazilian Navy, and they need, basically, a licence to be able to repair and maintain their ships when they are visiting ports, so there is an extremely broad licence that is available for a number of countries, but the end user is the Brazilian Navy and not the end user Government. In the report, however, it would be flagged as government.

So you can see the problem here. You could get a country that would raise very significant human rights concerns at the moment—for example, Russia. You could see that this licence is very broad, covering a whole range of lethal equipment, from missile systems to combat helicopter parts, and is being used for Russia, and the end user would be flagged as government. I think that would be entirely unhelpful because what it should actually do is

explain that the end user for this licence is the Brazilian Navy, and if that was done—a greater level of transparency—a lot of fears may well be allayed.

**Q34 Mike Crockart:** Helpfully, you have moved on to my next question and pretty much answered it. I was going to ask about the variability of the conditions contained in the open licences. What additional information do you think should be there to enable Parliament and civil society to understand better the implications of those licences?

**Roy Isbister:** This relates to an even more fundamental issue about a weakness that the transparency initiative has thrown up—that is, it is not just a transparency issue; it is a Government information issue. Government repeatedly, when asked what exports have left the country, says, “We don’t collect information on exports. We don’t know what has left the country under different licences.” We have argued for years that that is not good enough, and the transparency initiative would have allowed Government information and information collection to operate much more effectively. That links in with some of the revelations that have come out about licences for private maritime and security companies—it is through the efforts of this Committee that that has come to light.

Over a year and a half, something like 181,000 items were licensed for transfer to PMSCs for anti-piracy operations, and as it turned out, only 3,000 or so of those items had been exported. I was gobsmacked—I could not believe what I was hearing when I heard that. So the Government is operating on incredibly incomplete information, and the transparency initiative has been helpful not only to us; it has been very helpful for the Government, so that it knew what was happening on its watch.

With reference to the extra information that you talked about, the generic description of open licences is multiple transfers with no upper limit, and no upper limit on values or quantities exported. When we have started to ask a bit more about open licences, we have been told, “A lot of open licences have different conditions applied under each of these elements of the licence, and there is quite a lot of variability about the way they work.”

In the first instance, it would be very helpful to find out what the conditions are that apply to open licences, because we still do not know how the different conditions work in different circumstances. Armed with that information, we could start to think about the best way of collecting it, making it available, communicating it and so on. There is so much that we do not know about the licences that it is difficult to give a proper answer to your question.

**Q35 Mike Crockart:** So you can’t say what extra information should be given until you know what information there is—

**Roy Isbister:** Until we know what conditions the Government puts in place, we do not know what that information is. We do not know if we can find out the maximum amount that might be exported under this licence, because we do not know if the Government requires that information or not. It sounds like sometimes not, sometimes yes. Just a bit more information about how it works in reality would be helpful.

**Q36 Chair:** On this issue, and with reference to both standard individual licences and open licences, I do not know whether you have had time to read the Westminster Hall debate, but if



you have, you will have seen the point that I made: when I asked the Business Secretary for the end users of the 285 extant arms export licences to Russia, he declined to give us the information unless we undertook to make it confidential—in other words, not to put it into the public domain.

On other occasions, we have been able to get end user information from the Government. We got it from the Government on the major and sensitive question of to whom the dual-use chemicals were exported in Syria, and we got it out of the Government when we asked to whom the sniper rifles exported to the Ukraine went. Do you consider it would be beneficial in terms of transparency that the Government, as a matter of course, in the quarterly information that it makes public, states not merely the country to which the arms export is going, but the end user in that country?

**Roy Isbister:** Certainly we think that should be the standard operating procedure. Potentially you could work the system that has worked for delivering information on quantities of small arms which are provided. Once upon a time that did not happen; a system was introduced so that that information would be made available unless a company specifically requested that it should not be. That might be a way forward in addressing circumstances—I don't know what they are, but there might be some kind of particular legitimate concern about those confidentiality issues.

If I may, I shall make just one very quick final point on the PMSC question. I note from the Foreign Secretary's most recent response to the Committee that the PMSC licences and the discrepancy between licensed equipment and exported equipment have been acknowledged as problematic, and something is going to be done about it. I think it has been acknowledged as problematic not to know what is happening under a licence. In that circumstance, I think maybe that could be applied more widely as well. That is very relevant to the transparency initiative.  
*[Interruption.]*

**Chair:** I know that that noise was not meant to be the lead-in to Ann Clwyd's next question. On a serious issue, Ann Clwyd is going to lead on torture and end use.

**Q37 Ann Clwyd:** Some people might find that torturous!

You have called on the UK Government to play a constructive and active role to strengthen the EU Commission's proposals on the regulation on torture end-use goods. What specific actions should we be taking?

**Oliver Sprague:** I think one of the most important things the Government could do here is reinvigorate or re-establish its commitment to establish the torture end-use control. Those who have been on this Committee for a long time will remember that it was a Government priority to introduce, as part of the review of the legislation in 2008, a new provision on torture to bring things into line with what currently exists for arms embargos and in relation to weapons of mass destruction. In cases in which it is known what the equipment is going to be used for, there is an obligation to deny the transfer, or stop the transfer, even if it is not on the annexed control list. The Government argued that it would not take this as a unilateral step, but it would

be far more effective to do it at an EU-wide level. Subsequently, it cautiously and carefully dropped that initiative.

We were very concerned that the Government decided not to push the torture end-use control. Now is the time for them to push it, because now is the time that the EU instrument is under formal review. It is under review now, and it is going to go on for all of next year. The Commission are drawing up proposals, and both the Parliament and member states are looking at a load of areas, including brokering provisions and advertising and promotion provisions, to close those loopholes. I think the one thing that the UK Government can do—because now is the time: if ever there was the time, it is now—is to push the EU to agree to the torture catch-all clause.

**Q38 Ann Clwyd:** Do you know what views our representatives are expressing in the Commission?

**Oliver Sprague:** My view on the EU regulation is that there is a lot of good will among all the actors involved to strengthen that regulation. They see it as a very important contribution to the international debate on export controls. It is, at the moment, the only regional control regime on this specific type of equipment—torture and death penalty equipment and so forth. So I can see this serving as a model for other regulations, and perhaps in 10 years' time we will be in this Committee talking about the UN regulation on torture equipment, the new torture treaty. I think there is genuine good will to see these things improved, and I think there is a genuine commitment to strengthening it with regard to brokering, technical assistance and promotion and advertising—strengthening it at the DSEi arms fair, for example—across Europe.

As I said, I think the UK can play a really strong point, because it has already put in place supposedly very strong laws in this area, so it could lead from the front. It should not be sitting back and letting these discussions happen; it should be pushing its views very actively forward. But it is early days in the negotiations, so it is from now onwards that these things are going to happen. I hope that when Ministers come before the Committee in a few weeks' time, they will be able to detail to you exactly how hard they are pushing this.

**Chair:** We will have to finish there. Mr Isbister, Mr Sprague, Mr Butcher, thank you very much indeed for your evidence.

### Examination of Witnesses

*Witnesses:* **Paul Everitt**, Chief Executive, ADS Group, **David Wilson**, Export Compliance, Hewlett-Packard Enterprise Services and Chairman of EGAD, **Sue Tooze**, Deputy Head of Trade Controls, Compliance and Assurance, BAE Systems, and **Bernadette Peers**, Compliance Manager, Strategic Shipping Company Ltd, gave evidence.

**Q39 Chair:** Good afternoon, representatives from EGAD. Welcome to Mr Everitt, Mr Wilson, Miss Tooze and Miss Peers.



I am going to start with the same question I put to the UK working group. As you will have seen in successive reports that these Committees have produced, we are particularly concerned about the Government's export policy on arms that could be used for internal repression. Is your view that, under the present Government, that policy has become more relaxed or tighter, or that it is broadly the same as under the previous Government?

**Paul Everitt:** I guess we would take the view that the policy is clear. We are not aware of any change. For clarity, nor have we sought any change.

**David Wilson:** I think, generally, we have found that the emphasis changes depending on the political situation in the various destination places over time and whether there is seen to be a risk—that is always the difficult bit that, it is accepted, Government has to follow. How much of a risk is there in sending stuff that we supply to our own police forces to a similar police force in Hong Kong? Was there seen to be a risk at the time? I would suggest that, probably, there wasn't. It is probably not seen as a great deal more of a risk than providing the same material to the Metropolitan police. So the emphasis hasn't changed, as far as I am aware.

**Q40 Chair:** Thank you. There is a further question I want to ask you. When the present Government issued its own consolidated criteria for arms exports in March this year, it dropped the policy statement made by the previous Government in that Government's consolidated criteria issued in October 2000. The wording read: "An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed...by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression". Do you consider that the dropping of those words is a matter of significance or not?

**Paul Everitt:** I am not aware that there has been any substantive change, nor would we infer from a change in wording that there had been a change in approach.

**David Wilson:** What I think disappeared was a certain amount of Government freedom of action to say that the risk is outweighed by something else, but of course we have no knowledge of what those other things that outweighed it might have been. I think I speak for all my industry colleagues when I say that if we think there is a risk—a clear risk, an outweighed risk; that is semantics—if we think there is a risk, nobody will be surprised if an export licence is refused.

**Chair:** Thank you. Now we come to the Arms Trade Treaty.

**Q41 Mike Gapes:** The Arms Trade Treaty comes into effect from December. What impact do you think it will have on your members?

**David Wilson:** Very little, I think, because we have worked closely with Government and the negotiators over a number of years to try and ensure that the Arms Trade Treaty brings other countries into line with the very clear processes that the UK already has, which are internationally accepted as robust. So to find that the Arms Trade Treaty outline processes are broadly similar to the ones that the UK has already implemented inevitably means that we as potential exporters are not going to be faced with a huge variety of great extra difficulty or bureaucracy. Little change is the simple answer to your question.

**Q42 Mike Gapes:** Does that apply to small companies as well as larger ones?

**David Wilson:** I would say so.

**Bernadette Peers:** I think it would do. The key problem for small and medium-sized enterprises is a lack of awareness. There has been much discussion about the Arms Trade Treaty so many SMEs are aware of it. It is more a Government concern than an industry concern because industry is following export control procedures anyway. Nothing will greatly change as a result of the treaty, so firms should not see a huge impact, but Government needs to make them aware that the treaty is now in force and, although the ECO's limited resources may struggle with this, do some awareness work with SMEs on the fact that the treaty is in place, that there is a reporting requirement and what that reporting requirement is.

**Sue Tooze:** Industry is very supportive of the treaty and very keen to work with Government on the implementation arrangements. We are keen to continue to be involved with that initiative and to keep that dialogue open in the future.

**Chair:** We now come to the Export Control Organisation within the Business Department, and its computer system.

**Q43 Mike Crockart:** June this year saw the ECO issue a notice to exporters stating that it had recently migrated to a new system and had experienced a “significant short term impact on the performance and availability of the ECO SPIRE system”. What has been the impact on you and your members?

**David Wilson:** Quite a lot. As we understand it, it was largely Microsoft's fault—it is always Microsoft's fault—for withdrawing support to the operating system on which SPIRE was built, so it had to be substantially rebuilt. Short-term glitches were expected. What we were not expecting was the withdrawal of the control classification service at the same time.

The classification service enables exporters to say, “I have a piece of kit here that is rated as ML10 or whatever and therefore needs an export licence to so-and-so. Do you agree that it is ML10?” The corollary of that is to go on and ask, “Do you think I would get an export licence for it or should I not bother to have a sales push?” The lack of that ability is hurting.

**Q44 Mike Crockart:** And that functionality was there previously?

**David Wilson:** It was. You were able to ask in SPIRE whether or not something was subject to an export licence. What has increasingly happened—I think there has been a spate of it recently—is that you try and find out the answer, and they say, “Apply for an export licence, and we will tell you whether it needs one.” That is a waste of the Export Control Organisation's resources, and it is a huge waste of industry's resources, because you have to go to the potential customer, you have to get an end user undertaking and you have to fill in all the bits and pieces. Then you apply for an export licence, and they say, “Actually, you didn't need one” or “You did need one, but you can't have one because—”.

So there is an element of where industry used to work collaboratively, if perhaps informally, with the Export Control Organisation that has changed recently. There are two reasons for those changes. One is that the system has changed a bit. The other is the lack of

resources as the Export Control Organisation has been hollowed out. I understand you want to address that situation further later.

**Paul Everitt:** I was going to say that we obviously understand why there were some hitches with the upgrade of the system; those are normal things that happen, and that, of itself, did not create major problems for industry. But the withdrawal of what was regarded as a very valuable and useful service alongside that has created further issues.

**Q45 Mike Crockart:** In the movement from the previous system to the new SPIRE system, how involved were your members in looking at the functionality that was there previously and in defining what functionality the new system should have?

**Bernadette Peers:** We had no impact at all on any discussions or consultations in terms of what we would like to see from SPIRE. We have always been very pleased with SPIRE—it has been a fabulous system, and what it provides is very useful to industry—but the removal of that control list classification service has had quite large ramifications for SMEs, because they don't always have the technical expertise in-house, so they got quite a benefit from the CLCS. With its removal, being told to apply for licences now is not a good solution for industry or for ECO.

**Q46 Mike Crockart:** You say that there were two types of impacts. One was the removal of a piece of functionality, and one was the movement from one operating system to another. Has the second lot of issues gone?

**David Wilson:** Pretty much.

**Bernadette Peers:** Yes.

**David Wilson:** It was a change of operating system. Our understanding was that the functionality would just move from Windows XP or whatever it was to the new operating system, and various bits of it would change a little bit around the edges. That is, substantially, what has now happened, except for CLCS.

**Q47 Mike Crockart:** We visited the department dealing with these things, and we were shown the wonderful new system and how wonderfully it is working now, and I am glad that you are backing up that that is the case. But at the time, I asked what processes they had for feedback from users of the system to define what functionality was missing or needed upgrading or working on, and there did not seem to be anything there.

**David Wilson:** There isn't a formal system, but we have a really good working relationship, in that if we think something has gone badly wrong, there is a bunch of people we can ring up. We can say, "Oy! This doesn't work. What are you going to do about this?" and it will be fixed as quickly as possible. Our collective view, I think, is that SPIRE has been a success story on the part of the Government.

**Q48 Mike Crockart:** Okay, but in June this year, a piece of functionality was removed, and you have presumably been shouting about it since June.

**David Wilson:** Yes.

**Q49 Mike Crockart:** When is that functionality going to be put back?

**David Wilson:** The answer is when the Export Control Organisation is given more resources by the Government. There appears to be a lack of the technical skills inside the Government to make the technical decisions on whether something is licensable or not, and that is proving to be a big issue across a number of areas—in my case, in the dual-use area, where the UK Government has decided to take a uniquely strong line on what bits of computer equipment should be subject to export control and which bits should not be.

We have found since the end of last year that, with pieces of computer equipment, other Governments have said, “No, you don’t need a licence for that.” Particularly the US—that is where most computer equipment comes from—has said, “No, you don’t need a licence for that.” We have checked with the French, and the French have said “No, you don’t need a licence for that.”

So the company puts out advice to all its clients to say, “This piece of kit is rated as ‘no licence required’. You don’t need a licence for it.” Then it gets stopped at customs because the Export Control Organisation has said, “Oh! We think this does need an export licence.” Then you apply for a rating, and they come back and say, “Some of it is, some of it isn’t.” “OK—how do we know which?” “Ah! Well, you have to apply for a licence.” It is Catch-22, and it goes very slowly.

Worse still, when you then appeal, there is no response to the appeal. We have had an appeal in since April: no response. That has resulted in huge damage—by our standards—to the UK balance of payments, because instead of stuff being sold from the UK, multinational companies now sell it from somewhere else. Simple. There is a pipeline from a manufacturer, and instead of that pipeline ending in the UK and then being sold from the UK, it now stops somewhere else, and the goods are sold from somewhere else.

**Chair:** Thank you. We will come back to the dual use list issue later. As you know, we very specifically and very clearly highlighted the issue of appeal delays in our last report.

We come now to EGAD’s website guidance. Adrian Bailey?

**Q50 Mr Bailey:** If I were a small business, I would really expect to go to a Government website, i.e. the Export Control Organisation website, to get this information. Why are you doing it, and not the Export Control Organisation?

**Bernadette Peers:** The Export Control Organisation are doing it, but there is a great deal of information there. ADS and EGAD, in particular, just supplement what the UK Government are doing. We work closely with them, we assist on events, but in certain areas of UK industry, it is not ECO’s role to give advice on US export controls, in particular. So EGAD, ADS, will fill in that gap, because UK industry needs to understand not just UK export controls but global export controls.

EGAD sees any outreach as a supplement rather than a replacement for ECO’s guidance. We have outreach sub-committees with the head of the outreach unit of ECO as the chair. So we

are in discussion with them about what kind of outreach they can provide, and how we can assist them. It is a mutually beneficial arrangement, we feel.

**Q51 Mr Bailey:** So you are effectively supplementing what I think you said was already—I am sorry if I am putting words into your mouth—a considerable raft of information. How can that make it easier?

**Paul Everitt:** We would like to think it is complementary. Fortunately, in our team in the individual businesses are people who have that understanding and expertise. The very nature of our kind of organisation is that by sharing that expertise, we can promote good practice, and sometimes make it easier for people to get the point of understanding than it is when they approach a governmental website.

For those who are comfortable and use the system often, the Government site is absolutely fine. For those who are perhaps new, or for whom it is a relatively new experience, the kind of help and information we provide helps them through the process.

**Q52 Mr Bailey:** If I were a small business applying to the Government website and I needed, say, supplementary or complementary information, would that website signpost your particular—

**David Wilson:** No, it does not.

**Mr Bailey:** That would seem a little odd, if you are providing specialist information.

**David Wilson:** It works the other way round, in that we point them to the darker recesses, if you like, of the Government's bits of the website, which are not always the easiest thing for a novice to navigate.

**Q53 Mr Bailey:** But, again, if I were a small business dealing with a Government regulatory agency, I would assume—I may have got this wrong—I would go to the Government website first. A website that did not signpost the additional information that EGAD could provide would seem, on the surface, to be a bit of a deficiency and potentially to undermine the role that it is trying to play.

**Paul Everitt:** We would obviously welcome that sort of recognition and we would welcome the ECO pointing people towards us. Equally, our job as a membership organisation is to support our members. That is the approach that we take. If others acknowledge and support it as well, all the better for us.

**Q54 Mr Bailey:** Did you have any assistance from the Export Control Organisation when you created your website?

**David Wilson:** I don't think so, no.

**Paul Everitt:** We would have said something on the website about the information we were using.

**Bernadette Peers:** There is a Cranfield University scheme that exporters can participate in. It was set up with the ECO, and the companies involved and EGAD were part of that. The

scheme runs online courses and a day's training. That was certainly done in conjunction with the ECO, but I don't think the website or our guidance was, no.

**Chair:** We come now the Export Control Organisation's performance.

**Q55 Ann McKechin:** You have already commented on how cuts are impacting on you, in terms of the staff in classification. More generally, you have spoken about the Department having a shortage of skilled and experienced staff and the number of applications that seem to be returned to companies.

**Paul Everitt:** There are a couple of points to make. First, we recognise that the squeeze on public sector resources is not focused solely on the ECO and that this is a general trend across the piece. I guess the issue for industry is more the hollowing out of expertise. It is not just a matter of people being there; it is necessary that those people have the requisite knowledge and experience of what can be quite a complex set of systems to operate and a complex industry to understand. It is more the expertise that is missing.

We understand that there is a high rate of returns or requests for further information and we have asked the ECO about that. Clearly you would expect us to undertake some root cause analysis, so if all the people who are applying are not applying appropriately, we need to understand why that is the case and what actions we can collectively take to address that. It is in nobody's interest to have a system that is not running smoothly or that does not process applications in a timely way.

**Q56 Ann McKechin:** Has any survey been carried out of your members of their reaction and their experiences over the past year?

**David Wilson:** We have asked the membership a number of questions, but I suppose inevitably individual companies are reluctant to put their head above the parapet.

**Q57 Ann McKechin:** Has the Government carried out a survey?

**Bernadette Peers:** I believe Ed Bell is undertaking an analysis of why there is such a high proportion. We would be very interested in finding out the details.

**Q58 Ann McKechin:** In previous years what was the normal rate of rejection of applications, and what is the current rate? Do you have any idea?

**David Wilson:** It has always been quite high, and we have worked with the Export Control Organisation for a number of years on a course called "Producing better licence applications". Of course, not everybody has attended that course before they put in a licence application. That is probably—we do not know—a fairly major cause of the problem. Everybody accepts that it is incumbent on the applicant to fill the form in properly and answer the questions properly.

**Q59 Ann McKechin:** I'm not trying to put words into your mouth, but if a proper analysis were carried out and you could then work out what the reason was—perhaps training, as you suggested, is the most obvious reason—that would hopefully reduce the time spent by your



members on the application process, and would also presumably keep costs down. I would have thought that all these cases being bounced back and forth and the correspondence emanating from it was not—

**David Wilson:** It wastes time and effort both in the companies applying and in the Export Control Organisation. If the analysis is carried out properly, it will show up any lack of training that is evident in the people doing the assessing. Do you want to give some anecdotal examples?

**Bernadette Peers:** In ECO's defence, they are actually looking at putting "Making better licence applications" online. It will be on the website in the future so more of industry can see it; but the other side of that is that it isn't always industry who are making the errors. We as a company have seen a string of completely nonsensical questions come back to us on a licence application, which resulted in us losing the business—we are a freight forwarder. We know that the goods got to where they were going, but they did not come through us legitimately—that is, with a licence application—because the application was bouncing back and forth, with questions that should not have been asked. So it is not always industry's fault, and that is why we are so keen to see the result of the analysis.

**Chair:** Thank you very much. We want now to deal with particular aspects of licence revocations and suspensions.

**Q60 Mike Gapes:** A number of licences have been revoked and reviewed in the last two and a half years—Argentina, Egypt, Ukraine, Russia, Thailand and Israel are some, and individual licences may also have been revoked. What is the impact of this revocation or suspension of licences on arms exporters?

**Paul Everitt:** I think the first thing to say is that the nature of the business we operate in and of the regulatory system means that those situations are always a possibility. By and large, people accept that that is a risk of the business they are in. Certainly I can say that the most recent cases, particularly during the course of the year, have not raised specific issues or concerns. I think people recognise the shift in the international situation and what appears to be a proportionate response from Government as a consequence.

**David Wilson:** People can read the papers, and they expect that applications for goods that are perhaps sensitive, to destinations that have become sensitive, will be subject to scrutiny, and the licences may be withdrawn. I think everybody accepts that that process is going to happen.

**Q61 Mike Gapes:** Are you telling me there are no issues or difficulties?

**David Wilson:** It will cost companies money, but I'm not sure whether there are going to be screams and wails of anguish, because people can read the papers. In particular, companies don't want to be the company that is sending sensitive goods to deeply sensitive locations, and they rely on the Government to give them advice on what should and should not be allowed.

**Q62 Mike Gapes:** So they won't make a public protest about it, even if they are very unhappy?

**David Wilson:** No. The French may.

**Sue Tooze:** The feedback we have had is that, often, it is not the military exporters who are greatly affected, because they aren't exporting to those destinations anyway. But there do seem to be some problems in the supply chain with importing goods, rather than exporting goods.

**Q63 Mike Gapes:** I see. So the components are coming from elsewhere.

**Sue Tooze:** Inwards, yes. And sometimes with dual-use exports, although that is not largely my field of expertise.

**Q64 Mike Gapes:** Thank you. What about the Wassenaar agreement? The EU dual-use control regime is supposed to have been updated, but it has been delayed. What is the impact of that?

**David Wilson:** That has been huge. As you are probably aware, the Wassenaar arrangement every year issues a new dual-use list, and every year the European Parliament and the Commission have had a sort of disagreement. That has resulted in EU dual-use regulation 428 of 2009 not being updated since 2011. There have been numbers of changes; some of them are increases in the capability of computers that are standard. Capability is increasing all the time, and the Wassenaar arrangement accepts that that is happening, as are increases in capability of encryption. As the security agencies gain capability in decrypting, the stuff that is controlled for export because it is difficult to crack should change. That hasn't changed in three years. We are told that that problem has now been resolved between the Commission and the Parliament, and the new list updating the EU dual-use list to include the Wassenaar changes made up to and including December 2013 will be published by Christmas. That is the information I had yesterday evening. Which Christmas they did not say, but they did say it would be published by Christmas.

**Q65 Mike Gapes:** Do you think that when that happens it will be of benefit to UK exporters, or will there be advantages for some competitors?

**David Wilson:** Most countries follow quite quickly on the changes, so I think the big issue is that it should become a level playing field. I referred earlier to the UK's uniquely hard line on cryptography export controls, and what should and should not be removed from those controls under what is called the mass market: stuff that you can go and buy fairly freely. The UK has taken a very, very firm line, which is causing great confusion, and that is causing a number of multinational companies to export from places other than the UK.

**Q66 Mike Gapes:** So the weakening of the requirements for the controls overall would make it easier for UK-based companies to export some of this quite sophisticated IT, but not necessarily stuff that would be regarded as militarily significant nowadays?

**David Wilson:** None of it, really, is militarily significant. Computers become cleverer and cleverer. Until fairly recently, very clever, very fast computers—for example, the computer that the Met Office has just bought, which comes from the States, needed an export licence from the States, because it is a very clever computer and it is very quick and it works very fast. So the levels change. Provided those levels stay broadly the same, which is the purpose of the



Wassenaar arrangement, fine; nobody has any complaints. We are caused difficulty when the UK takes a different line. It is a matter of interpretation—I will not go into the horrible detail of it, because it would make my head hurt.

**Mike Gapes:** No, I don't think we have time.

**David Wilson:** Differences in interpretation cause big changes in where material is exported from.

**Chair:** We now turn to the pre-licensing of brokers.

**Q67 Ann Clwyd:** As you know, for a number of years the Committees have been urging the Government to implement a register of arms brokers, and in April the Export Control Organisation issued a notice to exporters calling for evidence and seeking views. I think you were a bit opposed originally.

**Sue Tooze:** Yes.

**Paul Everitt:** Fundamentally, there were four points that we raised in the evidence that we provided. First, we all recognise that the current regime is very robust, and the question that we had was: "What improvement on the existing regime would be delivered by a pre-licensing or pre-registration system?" Secondly, we were still unclear about a specification of the problem that we were seeking to resolve in implementing that regime. Thirdly, there is no standardised definition of "arms broker" or of "arms brokering". As a consequence, the danger we perceive is of something that will impose a very significant additional burden on companies which are already compliant within the existing regime, without delivering any specific benefit of which we are aware to the broader and wider community.

**Q68 Ann Clwyd:** When will the review be published?

**Paul Everitt:** I am afraid we don't know. We answered the call promptly; it is for the Government to do its job and publish the responses.

**Q69 Ann Clwyd:** Have you asked the question?

**Paul Everitt:** Not specifically.

**Chair:** Now we come to transparency again.

**Q70 Ann McKechin:** You commented about the level of reporting. You may have heard our discussions with the UK working group on this issue earlier this afternoon. Are you as an industry now content with the level of reporting that is now required by the UK Government under its transparency initiative? On the additional announcement made by the Government about reporting, which was then withdrawn, if that was confined simply to those exports that have a military use only, rather than a dual use, would that be an onerous undertaking?

**David Wilson:** It would depend.

**Sue Tooze:** It would depend on what is to be reported.

**David Wilson:** One of the moans we had—if we could be said to be moaning—was that all of that information is already available to the Government now. That is particularly true—this is something that Oliver Sprague mentioned earlier—of the disconnect between what is licensed and what is actually exported. HM Revenue and Customs already have the information on what is exported—where to, under what licence, what the cost was and what the volume was.

**Bernadette Peers:** The difficulty with that, though, is that customers have always said that CHIEF—Customs Handling of Import and Export Freight, which is the data collector, if you like, at export—is old and struggling. Enabling it to draw that data off would be problematic; hence, it fell to industry to provide that data. There is a rewrite of CHIEF. We are hopeful that, when it is rewritten, it could perhaps collect that data.

**Q71 Ann McKechin:** It could incorporate it automatically.

**Bernadette Peers:** It would be useful to industry. Then, we would not have to do more reporting when the data is there in some form. The only problem with the collection of data is at export. An EU-to-EU transfer is not an export, so that data is not collected by Customs, unless it is under a standard individual export licence, not under open licences.

**David Wilson:** It is recorded and reported—

**Q72 Ann McKechin:** Perhaps I could suggest that if you want to come back to us with any more information, that would be helpful. You will appreciate that the Committees have indicated we would like to know what is being exported and the value, so that we are able better to scrutinise Government and so that, in turn, the public can know what is going on. If there is some technical problem you think could be overcome, and which would reduce the burden on industry, we would be interested to hear what that might be.

**David Wilson:** We can come back to you on that.

**Paul Everitt:** Our only concern is about transparency—it becomes increasingly burdensome. And, I suppose, there are a limited number of circumstances where there might be commercial confidentiality, when particular quantities of particular exports to particular countries might be viewed to be too identifiable and, therefore, this might pose a competitive risk. But I don't think we have a major issue; in fact, a greater understanding of what is going on would be to everyone's benefit.

**Q73 Ann McKechin:** Mr Wilson mentioned that some of this information was already available in the Government records. Could you possibly let us have a note of that in writing? That would, again, be very helpful to the Committees.

**David Wilson:** We certainly can.

**Q74 Chair:** If you could address that to the Clerk, we will make certain that it is circulated to all Members.

Finally, I want to come to a particular aspect of extraterritoriality you have raised with us. This is a very wide and long-standing policy issue as far as the Committees are concerned, and we have

fought a long battle of attrition with the previous Government and now with the present Government. We have got the Government position about 75% towards where we stand ourselves. You said that ECO's guidance on extraterritoriality had been found "wanting". Can you just spell out for us in what ways you consider it to be wanting?

**David Wilson:** I will take a very simple view on that. If exporters are calling the trade association and saying, "What on earth does all this lot mean?", there is something wanting in the guidance. Now, it is not my area of expertise.

**Sue Tooze:** I think it's quite difficult for companies when they have employees working abroad. It's easier for the larger companies, who can issue guidance and guidelines. Some of the smaller exporters, who perhaps have business marketing offices abroad, might find it quite difficult to make sure they are on the right side of the legislation, without having clear guidance on when it actually affects them. That is one of the messages that will be really important. It is also difficult to monitor legislation that is enacted extraterritorially. It is going to be a problem to understand how that is going to be monitored in the future.

**Chair:** Right. If you feel you can elaborate a bit further and more specifically in writing to the Committees on where you find this guidance wanting, that would be very helpful.

Mr Everitt, Mr Wilson, Miss Tooze and Miss Peers, thank you all very much indeed for your evidence. We appreciate it. That is the end of the session.

# Oral Evidence

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## Taken before the Committee on Arms Export Controls on Monday 1 December 2014

Members present:

Sir John Stanley (Chair)

Richard Benyon

Ann Clwyd

Mike Crockart

Mike Gapes

Fabian Hamilton

Dr Julian Lewis

Ann McKechin

Witnesses: **Rt Hon Vince Cable MP**, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, **Edward Bell**, Head, Export Control Organisation, and **Chris Chew**, Head of Policy, Export Control Organisation, gave evidence.

**Q75 Chair:** Secretary of State, thank you for coming to the Committees once again and for bringing your officials Mr Edward Bell and Mr Chris Chew. I would like to start with the issue of the export of arms from the UK that could be used for internal repression in relation to the consolidated criteria.

In your ministerial statement on 25 March, you said: “None of these amendments should be taken to mean that there has been any substantive change in policy.” Yet, one of the amendments you did make was the dropping of key wording—what we in the Committees call the “broad test”—in the previous Government’s consolidated criteria. That key wording was: “An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed...by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression”. It was the unanimous view of all four Committees that the wording which I just quoted did represent an important statement of policy. That was also the view of the Foreign Office Minister concerned in the previous Government, the right hon. Member for Neath, Peter Hain.

When we had a debate in Westminster Hall on 30 October, I said: “In the light of those facts, as far as the Committees are concerned—we made this clear in our report—only one, regrettable conclusion can be drawn from those important exchanges on arms exports and internal repression: the Government have made a significant change in policy, but have not been prepared to acknowledge that such a change has taken place. I put it formally to the Government that they should consider most carefully whether they should now offer an apology to the Committees and the House for making a change in policy without being prepared to acknowledge that to the Committees.” Secretary of State, do you wish to make an apology to the Committees and the House for your statement that there had been no material change of policy, notwithstanding the fact that, in the view of the Committees and the former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, the policy statement that was dropped was a significant one?

**Vince Cable:** Sir John, you raised this with me at the end of our last session. I have not come to offer an apology, because I am quite clear that we have not changed the policy. What you are referring to, I think, is the language in criterion 2, which is in relation to domestic repression and makes it clear that there should be a “clear risk”. That is the criterion that we have adopted in arms licensing. I know that you make a distinction between the narrow and the broad test—the broad test being in the preamble. But we have operated the narrow test, as I think you called it, that there should be a clear risk consistently. There has certainly been no conscious effort by me or my colleagues to change policy.

I am assured that, under the previous Administration, exactly the same set of principles were applied. There is one exception which we have formalised, which is in the case where risk is not clear and when there is rapid movement and uncertainty. That is why we brought in the suspension system, which was applied in the case of Egypt and, I think, elsewhere. That is where we stand. To answer your question directly: we are quite categorical that there has not been a change of policy.

**Q76 Chair:** Secretary of State, the words will have to rest as they are. In the Committees, we are quite clear that the wording of the broad test is separate from the wording of the clear risk test. It is much more widely drawn, and in the Committees’ view it represents a statement of policy as endorsed by the Minister responsible for the previous consolidated criteria. Once again, I point out to the Secretary of State that although he has used the word “preamble”, that word does not appear anywhere in the previous consolidated criteria of October 2000. However, you have given your response, and it will be for the House and those outside the House to draw their own conclusions. We are now going to move on to the issue of DSEi exhibitions and prosecutions.

**Q77 Dr Lewis:** Yes, this is a major exhibition. As the Secretary of State knows, it occurs every two years. At the last one, in 2013, there were over 1,300 exhibitors, so it is a big feat of organisation. You will recall that at the 2013 event a French firm and a Chinese firm were discovered to be offering in their catalogues equipment including leg irons and electric shock batons. After the matter was raised in Parliament by our colleague Caroline Lucas, the organisers did take action. They ordered the Chinese and French companies to dismantle their stalls and they kicked them out. Nevertheless, there is still some confusion as to whether or not simply displaying pictures of equipment in a brochure in itself amounts to a breach where we are dealing with category A items. The Government do not appear to accept that displaying brochures containing prohibited items at the arms fair breaches UK export controls. We would like to know whether the Government will review the appropriate legislation to ensure that companies that break the law—as we see it, at any rate—can be prosecuted in the future.

**Vince Cable:** Well, I think that your concluding question is a very fair one. Obviously, we are concerned when appalling material of that kind is displayed. I think that it is exceedingly infrequent, as your statistics suggest. There were 1,300 exhibitors and two of these examples. As you know, we have a memorandum of understanding with the organisers, Clarion, to make sure that this kind of thing does not happen, but it can. You are right that there have been these two very bad cases.

What happens in these instances is that the police look at it and there is an investigation into whether the offenders can be prosecuted. I think that in these cases and in previous ones, it

has not been possible to stand up a criminal case. Whether that was because of weakness of evidence or weaknesses in the legislation in the instances cited I do not know. You have asked a fair question in asking us to look at the legislation in order to make sure that these breaches cannot be tolerated, but maybe the officials can add some detail. I do not know.

**Chris Chew:** The law is quite clear. It says that what is prohibited is an act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of category A goods where the person knows that their actions will result in those goods being moved between two overseas countries. The question that the enforcement authorities and the Crown Prosecution Service have to address is whether the existence of a brochure at a trade fair is sufficient evidence to be able to prove a criminal offence in a court of law. In each case where this has arisen, they have decided that it is not strong enough evidence, and so they have not brought a prosecution. Whether changing the law would make it easier is obviously a question you will have to look at, but it comes down to the question of whether the evidence is strong enough to convince a court to convict.

**Q78 Dr Lewis:** Well, presumably, the point is that the evidence is absolutely conclusive that they advertised this banned equipment, because they did advertise it. The only question is whether the law needs to be tweaked so as to include the act of advertising in the concept of promoting, as you have described it. If you find that the law is inadequate to include the advertisement of banned items in this way, are you willing to consider changing it?

**Vince Cable:** Well, obviously, we would consider it, but we did not get advice back from the prosecutors that they were not able to proceed because of the weakness of the law, but if that is the case, the proposition is perfectly reasonable.

**Q79 Dr Lewis:** Thank you very much. Briefly, are you aware of any new procedures that have been put in place to ensure that this sort of material is not displayed at the next conference?

**Vince Cable:** There is a memorandum of understanding. My understanding is that officials are meeting to discuss the 2015 conference precisely to ensure that this does not happen again. Is that right?

**Edward Bell:** Yes. I have been in correspondence with Clarion today, so there will be a review, alongside looking at the legal mechanism, to see whether the existing memorandum of understanding could be strengthened to try to stop that kind of incident from happening again.

**Q80 Dr Lewis:** And you will let us know what the outcome of that is, presumably.

**Edward Bell:** Absolutely, and we would publish a copy of the memorandum for 2015 for the next DSEi, assuming that we put that same mechanism in place. We would publish that in the Libraries of both Houses.

**Q81 Dr Lewis:** Finally from me, there has been a suggestion that companies from countries that have not signed the relevant arms treaties, such as the Arms Trade Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, should not be invited to display or attend arms fairs in the United Kingdom in the future. Is that something that the Government are considering?

**Vince Cable:** There are very large numbers of countries that have not yet signed the treaty. Obviously, we want them to do so.

**Chris Chew:** Including Canada.

**Vince Cable:** I believe Canada is one. There have to be some wider criteria.

**Q82 Dr Lewis:** So you think that might be a step too far at the moment?

**Vince Cable:** It might be a step too far.

**Chair:** Order. I believe that we may be having some problems with the amplification; I would be grateful if witnesses would kindly project their voices as best they can, so that members of the public can hear the answers.

**Q83 Ann McKechin:** Secretary of State, you have mentioned that there are large numbers of sales at the exhibitions and that these are isolated incidents. Nevertheless, there have been five incidents in a nine-year period. I am stretched to think of any other trade exhibition where torture equipment has been found. The seriousness of the issue cannot be underestimated. Given that your own prosecutors have not been prepared even to test a case in the courts for any prosecution, surely by now there must be a prima facie argument: the law needs to change and, until it does, the risk of a repeat of the incident is very likely.

**Vince Cable:** Well, I completely accept that the display of torture equipment is utterly unacceptable and everything must be done to ensure that it does not happen again. That is absolutely right. On the basis of nine cases in eight years—

**Chris Chew:** Five in nine.

**Vince Cable:** Five in nine, each of which has more than 1,000 exhibitors; the incidence is quite low, but it should be zero. We have not yet established—I want to go back from this hearing and establish this—whether the problem is a failure of the law or of enforcement. We will report back to you on that. If it does require legal tightening, I accept the—

**Q84 Ann McKechin:** It is just that you wrote to the Chair in April on this very point and said that, “it may be necessary to prove a link between the display of literature and the eventual movement of the goods”. We are now seven months along. I had an e-mail today from Mr Porter, a managing director of Clarion Events, who says that his internal team conducts a series of tests to check that exhibitors are complying with the law. Could we have some kind of indication, before the Committees make their report, as to what that memorandum of understanding is and what enhanced internal checks Clarion is now proposing to make to ensure that there is no repeat?

**Edward Bell:** Yes, in time for the report; the next annual report of the Committees—

**Q85 Ann McKechin:** Yes, but obviously we need to report before the general election.

**Edward Bell:** When is that scheduled now?



**Q86 Chair:** Secretary of State, in following up Ann McKechin's question, we would be grateful for a letter with the information for which we asked by 15 December, please.

**Vince Cable:** Okay. We will endeavour to do that.

**Chair:** We now want to move on to the licences granted to private maritime companies for anti-piracy purposes.

**Q87 Mike Gapes:** Secretary of State, as you know, we have been pursuing this issue for some time. You wrote to the Chairman in June and pointed out that, although 181,708 individual items were licensed for anti-piracy operations over a two-year period, only 3,273 were actually shipped, which is 1.8%. What is the reason for that variation between the number of items licensed and the number actually sent?

**Vince Cable:** The reason, as I understand it, is that the company involved massively over-budgeted or overestimated the likely demand for their services, and they applied for a licence that was way in excess of the likely market involved.

**Q88 Mike Gapes:** This isn't just one company; it is many companies.

**Vince Cable:** Well, there are several; I can't give you an exact figure. It is clear that there is a serious disparity. It does not make a great deal of sense to be licensing on that scale. As I understand it, procedures have now been tightened up considerably, so that licences are issued only when they are considered to be realistic, quite apart from the propriety of the people involved.

**Q89 Mike Gapes:** How can you do that?

**Vince Cable:** Well, the propriety of the people involved is based on the fact that the people who do this anti-piracy work have to have a licence. That licence is based on compliance with some fairly tough international rules governing the operation of weapons, training and so on. There is a process here.

**Q90 Mike Gapes:** But the Export Control Organisation has therefore changed its procedures.

**Vince Cable:** Yes, I think it has tightened them up, but Edward can explain more.

**Edward Bell:** Yes, in terms of the supply of weapons, I was questioned on this when I appeared last year, and we looked at that in detail. Hence the letter back in June. A number of companies supply weapons to private marine security companies. It became clear following a dialogue with some of those companies that, when they apply for a licence for a two-year period, they are not clear at that stage how much equipment they are going to supply. The numbers represent a high level of ambition. Clearly, on looking at that, although we did not have any concerns about the licences, the huge disparity between what was licensed and what was shipped suggested that we needed to put stronger arrangements in place, and we have done that. We have moved from a position where we have companies holding numbers of licences to a company holding one licence with particular terms and conditions that we can monitor closely. One aspect there is that we are now insisting that the companies will report on shipments on a



quarterly basis. We will make that information available with the regular publication of quarterly data. It is now being monitored very closely in addition to the general case-by-case assessment of the licence.

**Q91 Mike Gapes:** Thank you. But when there is a shipment of arms of some kind, what happens in this example? A private maritime security company, the Gulf of Aden Group Transits Ltd, recently ceased trading. What happens to the arms that have been licensed and shipped by that company for anti-piracy operations?

**Edward Bell:** The anti-piracy operations are changing, for sure, and the sector is certainly contracting. One issue we have been looking at is the way that we license the private marine security companies, as opposed to the companies that supply weapons to those companies. Part of that dialogue this year has been focused on what happens when a company goes into administration. Just to be clear, if a private marine security company goes into administration, it is required by law to secure a trade licence in order to sell its weapons on to another company. When it applies for that licence, it will be subject to the same level of high scrutiny that the previous licence received.

**Q92 Mike Gapes:** As I understand it, and we have been informed by some experts in this area, private maritime security companies quite often share arms and equipment with other companies on a kind of floating armoury. The weaponry remains at the same point, but they transfer the ownership. Is that what you are referring to?

**Edward Bell:** No. There are floating armouries that are used by private marine security companies, but they must ensure that when they are using those facilities the weapons are stored properly. I have visited companies in the field—well, I have visited them in the UK—and have looked in detail at their record keeping and their arrangements. It is not a question of sharing. A floating armoury might be used by a number of companies, but each company must have a secure facility within that armoury.

**Q93 Mike Gapes:** So it could potentially be used by companies that we have licensed, but also by those that we, for whatever reason, have not licensed. Is that true?

**Chris Chew:** No, the licences that we grant to those companies only permit use of those weapons by that company. It does not allow them to pass—

**Q94 Mike Gapes:** But they could be on a floating armoury that has a different collection of companies.

**Chris Chew:** If they are passing their weapons on or allowing them to be used by someone else then that would be a breach of their licence condition. If there is evidence of that happening, then we would obviously want to see specific details and then we can take it up with the companies concerned.

**Q95 Mike Gapes:** Are you telling me that there are no cases where companies have supplied or shared arms and ammunition with companies that are not licensed by us?

**Chris Chew:** I'm not saying it has never happened; I'm saying that it would be a breach of the licence conditions and that if it is happening—

**Q96 Mike Gapes:** Are you aware of any circumstances where it has happened?

**Chris Chew:** I'm not personally, no.

**Edward Bell:** I'm not aware of any cases.

**Q97 Mike Gapes:** Have you investigated whether it is happening?

**Edward Bell:** I don't believe we have had a specific investigation on that point, but it is the sort of point that would come up during a post-licensing audit.

**Mike Gapes:** Perhaps you can update us and send us a note on the issue.

**Q98 Chair:** Could we have that by 15 December, please?

We now turn to arms export policy to countries of concern, starting with Israel. Secretary of State, I wrote to you on 14 August this year as follows: "Following your statement on 12 August that the Government would suspend 12 of its extant arms export licences to Israel in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities, please could you identify which are the 12 extant licences to which you were referring within the list of the 470 extant licences to Israel that you detailed in your reply to me of 12 May 2014?" In your reply to me of 3 September, you responded to my request as follows: "We do not feel it would be right at this stage to give public exposure to the licences." I have to say that that seems to us a flimsy and non-transparent reply to a straightforward request for information.

Given the terms in which you replied, the Committees are left wondering whether the real reason for your unwillingness to tell us the details of those 12 licences is to protect the Government from possible embarrassment—first because the Government have approved the 12 licences in question, which is why they are extant, and secondly because the Government have clearly identified those 12 licences and the arms, components and technology covered by them as items that could well be used for internal repression if there is a resumption of significant hostilities. As you have concluded that that could happen in the future, it would seem likely that those British items may already have been used by the Israel Defence Forces in the recent actions that they have taken in Gaza, resulting in the death of very substantial numbers of men, women and children who were not in any way Hamas militants. So, Secretary of State, I have to ask you: why are the Government not prepared to reveal the details of the 12 licences to this Committee?

**Vince Cable:** Let me take the second part of your question first and lead into the first one, which is the issue of transparency and declaration. The reason why we have not volunteered the detail is precisely the same reason that we have not volunteered that information to you on exports to Russia. It has nothing to do with the merits or otherwise of the country. It is to do with the fact that these are extant licences. They are open operational licences, and there is an assumption in the Government that any company that was exposed in this way could reasonably sue the Government. That is why we have not done it. What we have done in the past to try to

help you in your work—you will know this in relation to the exchanges we have on Syria—is that where material is confidential we are very happy to release it on a confidential basis, so that you can be clear yourselves on what is happening, but as for the public declaration of information on extant export licences, that is something we do not release, whether on Israel, Russia or any other country. That is the explanation.

With regard to the licences themselves, let me explain what was rather a complicated story over the summer. When the fighting broke out, it was very clear that issues of arms licensing would occur. An investigation was initiated into what equipment was involved. I think, in parenthesis, it is important to explain that our trade with Israel does not consist of selling tanks or aircraft to their defence services. Much of it covered by the licensing regime consists of the supply chains of complex electronic equipment. Because Israel is a very high-tech exporter, British companies are involved with those supply chains, so it is not a straightforward matter.

There was an investigation undertaken into, as you say, 400-plus items. Of those, it was identified that 40 could conceivably or potentially be used in a way that would be against the consolidated criteria in the Gaza conflict. Of those 40, 12 were identified as potentially presenting a risk. That is why the action was subsequently taken. That is the numerical explanation.

In terms of where we are going now—this answers both parts of your question—we have initiated an investigation into all of the extant licences to Israel—what they are, what potential risks they might pose, and whether an error was made in maintaining them—and we are going to present this report in full. We will make it available to you when it is ready, subject of course to the confidentiality proviso that I stated at the beginning. Is that a correct summary?

**Edward Bell:** Yes. A review of extant export licensing and the licensing of new applications for Israel is under way, and we will make the results of that review public.

**Q99 Chair:** Secretary of State, I found the first part of your answer completely extraordinary. You do reveal details of extant licences. May I refer you to annex 9 of our latest report, where there are 200 pages of details of extant licences to countries of concern, including Israel? With the greatest respect, it is absolute nonsense for you to say that you do not give details of extant licences. You do. You have given them to the Committee, and the Committee has published them. If you are referring to names of companies, I stress that in the original letter I sent to you, I did not ask for the names of the companies. I merely asked for the details of the extant licences.

**Vince Cable:** In that case, I misunderstood your original question. I thought that you wanted full information, rather along the lines of our previous correspondence on Syria. Information compatible with what we have done before is certainly not a problem—it shouldn't be a problem, and we will make it available.

**Q100 Chair:** Will you then very kindly tell us, by 15 December, to which 12 among the 470 extant licences to Israel you were referring in your reply to me? Can we have that information?

**Vince Cable:** Absolutely; that is not a problem. I thought that you were asking for the names of the companies, which is where it is difficult.

**Chair:** No; there was no reference to the names of the companies in my original letter, or in my question.

**Q101 Richard Benyon:** Secretary of State, in your announcement in August about the possibility of suspending and revoking arms export licences to Israel, you used the words “in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities”. It has been put to us that the phrase “significant hostilities” appears nowhere in existing transfer control criteria, nor in any user guides on the implementation of criteria currently used by licensing officials working across the EU. Can you or your officials tell me where the phrase “significant hostilities” comes from? There is concern that it demonstrates a weakening of UK arms export policy.

**Vince Cable:** Well, I think that that is a question you will have to put to the Foreign Secretary, because it came from his judgment. As you know, I do not run my own foreign or defence policy; we rely on the Foreign Office for advice on judgment of military situations, and he advised us that that would be an appropriate criteria.

**Q102 Richard Benyon:** Even though your Department has primary responsibility for the issuing of export licences?

**Vince Cable:** Yes. We rely on the Foreign Office for advice on the political, human rights and conflict elements within it.

**Q103 Richard Benyon:** But surely you govern the policy in these areas. If another Department tries to push a different agenda that would change your Department’s policy, would there not be a full and frank discussion, shall we say?

**Vince Cable:** There were full and frank discussions, and that was the outcome.

**Q104 Richard Benyon:** It was reported in *The Independent* on 23 November that Britain approved the sale of arms to Israel worth more than £7 million in the six months before the offensive in Gaza earlier this year, including components for drones, combat aircraft and helicopters, along with spare parts for sniper rifles. We have all been the victim of improper press reporting, but if that is true, that would suggest rather more than simply systems, although you are right to say that Israel is a very high-tech country with a very advanced economy, and there is a free flow of IT and related technologies between ourselves and them. This comes down to there being a clear risk that certain types of arms and their components have been used by Israel and could be used in future. Surely this is the point in time at which the licences should be revoked.

**Vince Cable:** Well, what I would say about that is that the Chairman has already asked for a list of the extant licences, and when that is available to you I think that that will answer your question. I would just make one other point: various groups have taken legal action in a judicial review on this particular set of issues, so there is obviously a limit to what we can say on the question that you have just asked without creating serious problems and compromising the Government’s position, much though I would love to be as open with you I can.

**Chair:** We are going to turn to the subject of Hong Kong.

**Q105 Mike Gapes:** As you know, Secretary of State, the Hong Kong police started to use tear gas against peaceful demonstrators in September. There has been a lot of concern that some of the tear gas canisters were supplied by the UK, and there has been some pressure for the revoking of licences. Your ministerial colleague from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr Swire, said in an answer last month that the Government have decided not to block the sale of tear gas to Hong Kong, yet on our televisions in the past two days, we have seen that the Hong Kong police have resumed the use of tear gas and have fired significant amounts into the demonstrators. Isn't it time for our Government to clarify that we do not wish to be complicit in the behaviour of the authoritarian regime in Beijing and its local representatives, who are using tear gas against peaceful protesters?

**Vince Cable:** We will hopefully get advice very quickly about whether the events of the past few days change the situation. On the judgment that was made earlier not to cancel the extant licence, tear gas was used once in the early stages of the demonstrations. Subsequently, a judgment was made by the people who give us advice about the foreign affairs aspect of it that the Hong Kong police were handling it in a proportionate way.

**Q106 Mike Gapes:** Do you agree that they are not handling it in a proportionate way now?

**Vince Cable:** Well, I'm not in Hong Kong, so I am not able to assess the situation myself. We will urgently seek and obtain advice about whether the position has changed, such that we need to review the decision.

**Chair:** I want to turn now to Russia.

**Q107 Mike Crockart:** My question really has been dealt with, to a large extent, by your answer to the questions about the extant licences with Israel. Perhaps we can deal with it quickly if you make a commitment to provide information to the Committee in the same way that you committed to providing details about the Israeli licences. My question relates to the request we made to you to provide information about extant arms export licences to Russia on a non-confidential basis, looking at end-user details, rather than company names. The reply that you gave to the Committee on 10 September stated that you were prepared to disclose the end users only on a confidential basis. From the answer that you gave a few moments ago about Israel, that seems no longer to be the case, perhaps relating to the exporting companies.

**Vince Cable:** Well, the end users are companies. Obviously, they are Russian rather than British in this case. The original point that your Chairman made is that there is no problem with releasing the licence data, as regards the material. However, when you start naming companies, you are in somewhat different territory. Perhaps you can clarify that, Edward.

**Edward Bell:** Certainly we are concerned that we would be laid open to challenge for breach of confidentiality by the exporters if we were simply to reveal those details. That would be different from revealing, in broad terms, what was covered by export licences. In fact, for Israel, in the 12 August statement about the Government's policy, we gave an indication of the types of equipment that are covered by the 12 licences. There is a distinction between information about what the licences contain and details about the names of end users, exporters and so on, which

for extant licences may lay us open to challenge on grounds of breach of confidentiality. That is the concern.

**Q108 Mike Crockart:** The argument that we made at the time is that you provided the names of end users for dual-use chemical exports to Syria.

*Edward Bell:* For licences that were no longer extant, and when sanctions prohibited the further granting of licences, but the vast majority of extant licences for Russia are not for items covered by sanctions. The information you are looking for does not concern items that are subject to sanction, so the circumstances are different.

**Q109 Mike Crockart:** So you would not draw any great difference between the end users and the companies doing the exporting?

*Edward Bell:* There is a difference, clearly, but—

**Q110 Mike Crockart:** Surely you should be able to give one and not the other.

*Chris Chew:* In either example, it could reveal commercially sensitive information, because there is already information about what the licences cover, which we have published. If you then match that with information about the end user, that could reveal sensitive information about specific contracts, because you know who the customer is and you know details of the licence. It would be the companies' concern that it may then be possible to infer who the supplier is, or what the commercial terms of the contract are. We need to take account of the concerns of exporters that each little bit of information we release adds up to a bigger picture that could itself be sensitive.

**Q111 Chair:** Secretary of State, this raises a wider issue that I think is very important for the Committees and the Government. The distinction that needs to be made is between disclosing the country of destination of an approved arms export and disclosing, in addition, the end user within that country. The British Government rightly disclose the country of destination. With respect, I disagree with your official: as far as the Syrian dual-use chemicals are concerned, those were very near-time end users, including the end user of the dual-use chemicals that the Government agreed in January 2012, just before the EU embargo went on.

I also remind you that you disclosed to the Committees, in response to our questions, the end users of export licences for sniper rifles to Ukraine. You have clearly been willing to disclose the end users in certain circumstances. I put it to you that this is critically important information, in terms of transparency and accountability to Parliament. I believe that it overrides the commercial sensitivities to which you have referred. What is critically important to put into the public domain is whether the export within a particular country has been approved to go to, say, a private sector company or to a state security organisation. That is particularly relevant for a country of human rights concern. I therefore put it to you for serious consideration that the Government should move its policy on and, as a matter of course, should be disclosing both the end users within countries and the country of destination.



**Vince Cable:** Well, we will obviously reflect on your thought. The obvious point is that when we are talking about exports to Russia, for example, the distinction between a commercial and a state operation may be a little bit blurred.

**Q112 Chair:** It is very important when it comes to a country like Israel. I think you would agree.

**Vince Cable:** That may also be true of Israel. It would be attractive from a of view of principle to make a hard and fast distinction, but the point that Mr Chew made a few moments ago is that you can build up a picture, at the end of which you have effectively announced publicly who the British company is, with all the implications that that has. There is an element of information striptease going on here, and the question is: where do you stop?

**Chair:** We will move on to deal with the very important issue of exports of surveillance technologies.

**Q113 Ann McKechin:** Secretary of State, you will be aware that new EU regulations are due to come into effect later this month. Can you confirm to the Committees what the new regulations cover and what impact they will have on UK exports of this type of technology?

**Vince Cable:** I will ask the officials to give you more detail, but there have been a lot of discussions within the context of the Wassenaar treaty about how exactly we handle surveillance. As you implied in your question, this is increasingly becoming an object of concern.

**Edward Bell:** I might ask my colleague Mr Chew, because he has been directly involved with the Wassenaar discussions.

**Chris Chew:** Specifically on the topic of surveillance, three new controls are relevant. One is on mobile phone intercept equipment. The second is on what is known as remote intrusion software, which is software that an attacker uses to gain access to someone's computer or mobile phone. The third is on a type of software which enables you to analyse telecommunications data and extract information about people, who they are communicating with and who is in their social networks. Those are the three specific controls which will be introduced.

**Q114 Ann McKechin:** Have you any idea of the scale of this technology, which is on the market and would be impacted by these regulations?

**Chris Chew:** Well, regarding the remote intrusion software, we know of one specific UK company, and there has been a great deal of media attention around the company Gamma and the FinFisher product. I think it would be fair to say that this new control is targeted very much at that type of product.

**Q115 Ann McKechin:** Will you have to amend UK legislation as a result of the EU directive?

**Chris Chew:** It will apply directly in the UK, so we do not have to do anything else.

**Q116 Ann McKechin:** So you will not require any additional processes. Will the UK be advocating the inclusion of further categories of surveillance technologies into the Wassenaar agreement? These are clearly very fast-changing technological developments and,



understandably, legislators are finding it difficult to keep up to speed. I wonder whether you have any concerns about any other type of equipment.

**Chris Chew:** This year we have been discussing within Wassenaar some possible new controls on what are referred to as forensic tools, which is where a law enforcement agency captures the data that are on your computer device. The Wassenaar arrangement is actually meeting tomorrow and Wednesday to either approve or not approve those controls, so I cannot tell you now what the outcome will be. We keep the situation under review. As you say, it is a very fast-moving and very complex area, so we keep an open mind on that.

**Q117 Ann McKechin:** Can I take it that the UK Government will be supporting the inclusion of these additional items tomorrow?

**Chris Chew:** Yes.

**Q118 Ann McKechin:** Secretary of State, you will be aware that Germany took unilateral action to tighten up its own regulations earlier this year. Does the UK have any plans to do likewise in the event, for example, that there was not agreement at the Wassenaar negotiations?

**Vince Cable:** Well, we do not have any plans at the moment.

**Chris Chew:** There are no plans at the moment.

**Vince Cable:** We will obviously look at the German model. If it sets a good example in this field, we would not want to be too far behind.

**Chair:** We come now to the Export Control Organisation's computer system.

**Q119 Mike Crockart:** The Committees visited the Department, had a tour and were shown the SPIRE system. We had a glowing show of how good it was and how well it was functioning. Unfortunately, about a week later we met the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence and they painted a rather different picture of what their experience had been over the previous few months. How did we get into the situation where there were such major problems with the SPIRE system?

**Vince Cable:** Well, I think there were several different issues. One is that there was a problem with the subcontractor or contractor which we used to install new software earlier in the year. That affected BIS, DECC and UKTI, and it affected the export control operation. There was some disruption, but as I understand it this did not affect in any radical way the ability of the organisation to meet its basic targets. I think that 99% are met within 60 working days, and we expect that target to be met and the performance standards to be improved overall. I think there is a separate point, which I know your Committees made, about the degree of staffing and therefore the ability to provide wider services to the exporting community. There are legitimate issues to be raised there, but there was a specific computer IT issue which caused quite serious disruption, which I think has now been remedied and caught up. Is that not correct?

**Edward Bell:** Yes, the SPIRE system was not the issue. The Department, along with several other Departments, cut over to a new departmental computer system, and the export

licensing staff accessed the SPIRE system through that portal. That is what was causing the problems.

**Q120 Mike Crockart:** This isn't something that could have been foreseen or tested before it happened.

**Edward Bell:** The degree of impact was certainly not expected. What I would say about the specific export control response is that we did move very quickly to put contingency measures in place. We communicated with exporters. We alerted them to the problem. We gave them access to a helpline so that they could tell us if they might lose exports because of delays to licensing. I am pleased to say that as a consequence, during the high summer months when we experienced problems, the problems were really ironed out by September-time. I have certainly had no reports of exporters losing business as a consequence of delays to licensing. We made a good recovery and now certainly the year-to-date figures show that we are on target. I am pleased to report that we did come back very well.

**Q121 Mike Crockart:** If we move on to particular things that were within the control of SPIRE, which is your Department's responsibility, the particular point which EGAD talked about was the withdrawal of the control classification service. They have reported that that one single thing has had a big impact on the industry users. That seems to me a fundamental flaw in the design of the new system, whereby the requirements of your end users were not taken into account and a piece of functionality that they used was removed without their knowledge. How did we get into that situation?

**Edward Bell:** Well, I took the decision and certainly informed Ministers that, as part of our response to the problems that we experienced with IT in the summer, we should suspend one of our advisory services in order to divert resources to protecting the core licensing service. Now that we have come through that period, I have reviewed the resources available and I remain concerned that we do not have sufficient resources to provide the kind of service that exporters are looking for. In fact, that service has changed over several years and the number of users of it has declined considerably over the last three or four years—it has gone from over 1,000 to more like 300 in the last year—but we have committed to work with industry, in the context of budget plans for 2015-16, to see whether a service could be established.

**Q122 Mike Crockart:** It sounds like you are saying to me that there are no real plans to replace that.

**Edward Bell:** No, we want to replace it but within the current resource that we have available, it is just not practical.

**Mike Crockart:** I'll let you off.

**Chair:** We now move on in the remaining minutes to the Export Control Organisation's performance.

**Q123 Fabian Hamilton:** Secretary of State, just further on what Mike Crockart said about EGAD. The other evidence that we received from them told us that a "very high proportion" of

export licences applications were being returned with requests for corrections or further information, but that the requests for further information were generally “trivial” or that the information had already been supplied. This had “caused instances where shipments have been delayed, impacting on customer confidence and their perceptions of the UK as a reliable supplier.” I wonder what the ECO is doing to reduce the number of applications being returned.

**Vince Cable:** Well, I do come across some of these examples because MPs write to me about them, but the question is whether they are proportionately very large in relation to the thousands of licences that are issued. Obviously, the response should be common-sensical rather than bureaucratic, and I am sure that is how our guys behave, isn't it?

**Edward Bell:** Yes. The two main reasons why we would go back to an exporter during the licensing application process for further information are, first, because there are insufficient end-user details—in other words, the exporter has not told us clearly about the end user for their products—and secondly, if they have provided insufficient technical information for a proper assessment to be made. This is an historic issue. I think from my conversations with EGAD—I go to their conferences and speak with them frequently—some of the things that they were saying to you were based on very old anecdotes. Certainly in the last year we have focused on how we can reduce the number of requests for further information. A lot of our training effort is put in to these very points of technical information and how to make better licence applications. We focus clearly on how we can reduce the numbers but I do remain concerned that EGAD are basing some of the statements they have made on some quite historical anecdotes. I don't believe that represents the position today.

**Q124 Fabian Hamilton:** So, Mr Bell, you would say that you are no longer requesting information that has already been supplied, for example. That is not the case anymore.

**Edward Bell:** No, no. We certainly should not. If we are, we should do something about it and we will.

**Q125 Fabian Hamilton:** One thing that EGAD told us, and I am sure they have told you when you have met at conferences, is that many problems encountered with the ECO are because staff need “the requisite knowledge and experience of what can be quite a complex set of systems to operate and a complex industry to understand” and that ECO staff lack that knowledge. Are you saying that is out-of-date information, that you no longer have that problem and your staff are now adequately trained?

**Edward Bell:** I believe so, yes. I think there is more we can do to ensure that staff are properly trained, and I am sure there are staff who require more training input than others. I believe that the situation described by EGAD is an historical one. We have worked with EGAD closely in the last year to move on from that. I am not saying it is a perfect position but I think we have moved on from the one that EGAD described.

**Chair:** We want to move now to the EU torture regulation.

**Q126 Dr Lewis:** In 2006, the EU introduced the world's first multilateral trade controls to prohibit the international trade in equipment that has no practical use other than for the

purposes of capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. We recently took oral evidence from Amnesty International who are concerned that there remain some loopholes in this system. They feel that, as the EU is currently reviewing that system, the Government ought to take the opportunity to try to close the loopholes. In particular, they talk about “torture end-use control”, which I take to mean knowing exactly what the equipment concerned will be used for.

Apparently, when we take these decisions at the moment, if something is not included in an annex specifically related to this document, it could slip through the system, whereas it might be caught if the applications relating to such equipment were forced to say exactly what it is going to be used for. According to Amnesty International, the Government have stepped back from a commitment to try to close that loophole by requesting this description of what the equipment will be used for. They feel, and we are inclined to agree with them, that now is a good time to try to close the loophole. Can you tell us exactly what recommendations the UK is making to tighten up the regulations in light of the representations made?

**Vince Cable:** I am familiar in broad terms with the regulations and how they can and cannot be applied, because I utilised them, if you remember, to stop the export of chemicals to the United States in respect of executions. That had a significant impact on the debate on capital punishment in the United States. So we are aware of the potential for working with those regulations. I was not aware of the loopholes that you describe, but you raise a legitimate issue that we have to investigate. I do not know if the officials can amplify that. Certainly, if there are holes that are unplugged we need to see how we could plug them.

**Chris Chew:** Discussions are continuing in Brussels about possible reform of the so-called torture regulation. There is no proposal on the table for an end-use control but we continue to discuss with the other member states and the European Commission what this amended regulation should look like. We are engaging constructively but there is no specific proposal on the table at the moment.

**Vince Cable:** And I think we would want to lead the debate and be positive on the issues that Dr Lewis is concerned about.

**Edward Bell:** Yes. On the whole we have favoured list-based controls as a better approach to controlling goods, but we are not closed to the idea of end-use controls, in principle, at all. I referred in my previous answer to the importance of having good end-use information, and that applies to any export licence application that we process. We need to know what the exports are going to be used for.

**Dr Lewis:** We will take that as a positive sign that you might at least raise the matter as these negotiations continue. Thank you.

**Q127 Chair:** I think the key issue that Julian Lewis has raised is, what are the specific proposals that the British Government are inputting into this review? That is of material interest to the Committees. I hope we can receive information in response to that question, Secretary of State, before our 15 December deadline, which relates to the timetable we set for getting our next report before the House.

**Vince Cable:** We will do our best.

**Chair:** Secretary of State, we are grateful to you and to Mr Chew and Mr Bell. Thank you very much for your evidence. If you could respond by 15 December with the additional written information that we requested, that would be very helpful to us. Thank you.

### Examination of Witnesses

**Witnesses:** **Rt Hon Philip Hammond**, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, **Jessica Hand**, Head, Arms Export Policy Department, and **Peter Jones**, Director, Defence and International Security, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.

**Q128 Chair:** Secretary of State, I welcome you and your officials, Mr Peter Jones and Ms Jessica Hand. Thank you for joining us today.

Foreign Secretary, we want to start with one of the key issues in the export policies that are being followed to countries of particular concern. I want to start with Russia. I wrote, as you know, to the Prime Minister on 23 July, and you replied with your letter to me of 19 August. In my letter to the Prime Minister, I specifically highlighted that there were no less than 285 extant British Government approved arms export licences to Russia. In addition, your parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Tobias Ellwood, in his letter to me of 13 November this year, revealed the scale of the open licences to Russia, as opposed to standard individual licences. He said: “In addition to this, Russia was removed”—that is following recent policy decisions—“as a permitted destination from 50 open-ended export licences and one open individual trade control licence, and was also removed as a permitted destination from the cryptography open-ended export licence, which affected 55 licences.” Foreign Secretary, given the well-established and deeply regrettable Russian track record of expanding its influence territorially, which we have seen in Moldova, Georgia and now Ukraine, plus the fact that Russia is one of the countries of top human rights concern—as designated by your own Department—it would seem that the Government’s arms export policy towards Russia has been extraordinarily lenient and, some might say, reckless. How do you respond to that?

**Mr Hammond:** I would respond by saying that our response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea has been pursued essentially through our EU engagement: trade sanctions and other measures, including restrictions on arms exports through the EU. The history is that, in March 2014, the UK introduced a series of national measures, including the suspension of extant licences and of consideration of new licences for goods for Russian military and military end users that could be used against Ukraine. The figures that you quoted from Mr Ellwood relate, I think, to that exercise.

Once the EU imposed sanctions in July—an exercise in which we would claim no little part; we have been the protagonists throughout in seeking comprehensive EU sanctions against Russia—we then swung in behind those comprehensive sanction measures to make sure that our response aligned with our European partners. It is very clear to us that we deliver maximum effect against Russia by having solidarity across Europe in responding. Licences that are then covered by the EU measures have now been revoked. For those that were not covered by the EU

measures, the suspension has been relaxed, so that we have symmetry across the European Union countries in their response.

**Q129 Chair:** But given the scale to which I referred of British Government-approved arms export licences to Russia, is not this yet another example of shutting the stable door after the arms have bolted?

**Mr Hammond:** No. Clearly, it is very easy to talk about arms licences to Russia, but, as you and members of the Committees will know very well, many of these licences are for components and dual-use items. It is not as if we are by and large exporting completed military systems to a country like Russia. It is important overall, in dealing with our response to Russia, that we calibrate that response. We needed to signal very clear disapproval of Russian behaviour. We needed to signal that Russia will pay a price for that unacceptable behaviour. We also needed to signal that if Russia starts to move into compliance, we will be able to recalibrate our response appropriately and that we have further steps we could take if Russia were to take further unacceptable measures and steps of aggression. That is very important. We have to be very careful that we do not play all the cards in our hand and leave ourselves in a position where further Russian escalation cannot be responded to within the scope of economic and trade sanctions of the type that we have already set out.

**Q130 Chair:** I hope, Foreign Secretary, that you would reflect further on the distinction you have made between a component of a lethal weapon and a complete lethal weapon. I would suggest that a critical component is every bit as much an arms export as a completed item.

**Mr Hammond:** Of course that is right, Chairman, but you will recognise that many such components will be dual use. It is often the case that components that are widely used in, for example, cellular telephone systems have military applications and may be subject to licensing because of those military applications. A significant volume of components exported will probably be used in civilian telecommunications, but because there is an application in military use, they will be controlled items none the less.

**Q131 Mike Gapes:** Secretary of State, can I take you to the actual words of your predecessor in a statement on 18 March? He said that this would apply to weaponry for “armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine.” Isn’t it a fact that virtually every weapon or component of a weapons system that we export to Russia, given the nature of the Russian state, could be used against Ukraine? Why was the revocation position so limited?

**Mr Hammond:** “Is likely to be” is probably—

**Q132 Mike Gapes:** I am quoting the exact words.

**Mr Hammond:** I am telling you the way I would look at it. It is a question of whether it is likely to be. We know what the Russians are doing in Ukraine, and we know how they are providing support to the separatists and the type of support that they are providing, the types of weapons systems involved and the types of Russian forces that have been involved in this conflict, and we can make a judgment on that basis. Again, the important thing to emphasise is that this is not now unilateral British action; this is action that we are taking together with our



European Union partners in order to make it more effective. Sometimes, when we do things at 28 that have to be agreed at 28, there is an element of compromise in order to get agreement at 28.

**Q133 Mike Gapes:** Since March, and since the Russian aggression over the summer, there has been an increase in incursions of Russian aircraft or naval vessels into the territorial waters and airspace of our partners in NATO, of our own country and of European Union partners who are not in NATO such as Sweden. Given that increased Russian aggression in Ukraine and that other Russian behaviour, shouldn't we be reviewing the whole policy with regards to arms exports to Russia? Over recent months, there has clearly been a significant change in the attitude of Putin and his Administration not only to the European Union but to NATO.

**Mr Hammond:** I understand the thrust of the question, but I imagine the Committees will jealously guard the principle that we should use the consolidated criteria when deciding how we should respond to arms export licensing questions. The extremely aggressive probing of our airspace by Russian aircraft is an issue that concerns us, but it does not, in my interpretation, engage any of the consolidated criteria, and therefore it would not be an appropriate use of the arms export licensing regime to respond to a behaviour that we didn't like but that didn't engage the consolidated criteria.

**Q134 Mike Gapes:** But, Secretary of State, virtually every country in the European Union is also in NATO. Isn't the reality that we are facing a consolidated Russian offensive against Europe and its interests, the NATO European partners and the European Union countries? Isn't it time that we had joined-up government internationally in terms of our collective response to that?

**Mr Hammond:** It is true that many of the European Union countries are in NATO, although of course Sweden—a country that has recently had a particular problem with unidentified foreign naval vessels in its waters—is not a NATO member. Of course it is entirely appropriate for NATO countries in particular to work together to respond to what is a change in the tone of Russia's dealings with NATO and, indeed, the non-NATO European countries. You are absolutely right that there is a distinct sense of a resetting of the relationship, and we have to be prepared to respond to that. My point is simply that the application of the consolidated criteria to applications by British businesses for licences to export their products is an established mechanism. Applying it consistently is important, because failure to apply it consistently would almost certainly lead to judicial challenge by companies that feel they have been disadvantaged.

**Q135 Mike Gapes:** May I take you a step further? Last week, France announced that it is suspending until further notice the delivery of the two Mistral helicopter carriers that had been agreed with Russia. President Hollande said at the G20 summit, "I will take my decision without any pressure, wherever it may come from, and based on two criteria—the interests of France and the appreciation I have of the situation." Shouldn't there have been a third criterion in President Hollande's remarks, which is precisely what you just said about the European Union's consolidated criteria and the European Union regulation? Shouldn't that also apply to France, as well as to the UK, given what you just said?

**Mr Hammond:** The complication in relation to the Mistral contract is that it is a historic contract—a contract already entered into. The European Union sanctions explicitly do not



include contracts already extant. They are forward-looking, in terms of new engagements and commitments to supply to Russia.

**Q136 Mike Gapes:** So in future, the UK, France and every other country should adopt a policy on exports revocation and suspensions entirely based on the European Union criteria?

**Mr Hammond:** In the case of the UK, the European Union guidance is incorporated into our own consolidated criteria. The current set of European Union sanctions against Russia are a specific Foreign Affairs Council-mandated set of sanctions, which include restrictions on arms exports that were put in place specifically in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, and therefore they sit outside the routine evaluation of export licence applications against the criteria. So there is an overriding body of EU law that now applies.

**Q137 Mike Gapes:** But UK policy will be to consider the criteria and the EU's common position before we make any decision.

**Mr Hammond:** The UK's position now is that, first, we will apply the EU sanctions. If an application for licensing is not caught by the EU sanctions, we will then apply the consolidated criteria and make a decision on a case-by-case basis according to the consolidated criteria.

**Q138 Dr Lewis:** Very briefly, I want to be absolutely clear about the last point that Mr Gapes pursued. Am I right in saying that your position is that, as part of the specific sanctions we apply against Russia because of its behaviour in Ukraine, we might include extra restrictions on arms exports, but we would be doing that under the separate issue of Russian aggression, not under the mantle of our specific criteria for dealing with arms exports?

**Mr Hammond:** That's right. We would apply the European sanctions first, and for anything that gets over that threshold, we would look at our own consolidated criteria.

**Q139 Dr Lewis:** So just because the consolidated criteria are not applied, that does not mean that we will not stop the particular arms export if it falls under the sanctions.

**Mr Hammond:** If it falls under the sanctions, it will be stopped. The sanctions effectively have the status of European law.

**Q140 Chair:** Foreign Secretary, can we now turn to Hong Kong? The Business Secretary, Vince Cable, in his letter to me of 28 October, said, "The Foreign Secretary has advised me that the use of tear gas by the Hong Kong Police was an uncharacteristic response at an early stage of the protests, the scale of which caught the police by surprise, and was not indicative of a wider pattern of behaviour that would cross the threshold of Criterion 2. It is his view that, since that incident, the Hong Kong Police have generally approached the protests carefully and proportionately. I have accepted this advice." Foreign Secretary, what were your grounds for believing that the use of tear gas by the Hong Kong police against purely peaceful demonstrators was a one-off aberration?

**Mr Hammond:** First, if I may refer back to the session that you have just had with Dr Cable, which I was watching, I think that Mr Gapes suggested that tear gas has been used again in the past few days. Our assessment and understanding is that a different material—pepper

spray—has been used over the past few days. We are aware of only one incident in which CS gas has been used, which is 28 September. We believe that that was a single use of CS gas. Since then, statements by the Hong Kong police and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government about how they intend to manage these processes have reassured us that we do not expect to see inappropriate use of CS gas by the Hong Kong police.

However, I should say, Chairman, that CS gas is supplied as a public order policing tool. When we grant a licence for the supply of CS gas to a police force, we should expect that it may be deployed, in appropriate circumstances, in a public order policing situation. It is not the case that any use of CS gas would automatically lead to circumstances in which it would be appropriate to revoke or suspend a licence. It would be disingenuous of us to supply a product, the sole use of which is as a public order policing control tool, and then say that any use of it would be inappropriate. We would have to look at the circumstances of use to ensure that it was proportionate and appropriate.

I have seen words used in the media and elsewhere that I do not think are appropriate, so I would draw a distinction between public order policing and internal repression. Public order policing is a legitimate activity. If it is carried out properly, with proper restraint and proportionality, it is something that we would expect Governments to do. Internal repression is clearly a different issue. If any materials that were supplied for the purpose of public order policing were diverted to be used in internal repression, that would clearly give rise to the need to review the licence under which they had been exported.

**Q141 Chair:** Would you agree, Foreign Secretary, that the critical issue is whether the demonstrators are demonstrating purely peacefully or engaging in activities that could cause harm to members of the police forces or others? If you accept that that is the critical issue, is the Government's policy that British-exported tear gas should not be used against those who are exercising their right to demonstrate purely peacefully?

**Mr Hammond:** Our position on the demonstrations in Hong Kong is that it is very important that we preserve and protect the right of peaceful demonstration in Hong Kong. That is one of the characteristics of life in Hong Kong that is protected under the joint declaration to which we and the Government of the People's Republic of China were signatories. We would certainly not condone the use of CS gas, British-supplied or otherwise, in inappropriate circumstances. It would depend entirely on the circumstances.

As I have said, our understanding is that the use of CS gas on 28 September was an isolated incident. We have seen nothing to suggest that the Hong Kong police are going to make use of CS gas on a routine basis to deal with the current wave of demonstrations. If we were to see anything of that nature, we would obviously have to look very carefully at the circumstances of such use. At the moment, the question does not arise because we have seen nothing to indicate systematic use.

**Q142 Mike Gapes:** Secretary of State, are you saying that you are absolutely sure that tear gas has not been used? There were reports on Al Jazeera four hours ago and UPI—I am looking at the websites now—suggesting that pepper spray and tear gas have been used.

**Mr Hammond:** You may be ahead of me. I cannot claim to be studying this in real time.

**Q143 Mike Gapes:** The reports may not be true and the journalist may have written something inaccurate, but it is clear that the situation in Hong Kong is getting very tense. The Business Secretary referred to the possibility of a need to review urgently the position regarding the circumstances. Can you assure us that, if tear gas has been used, there will be a change of Government policy, because it will then become a systematic use rather than a one-off?

**Mr Hammond:** It would be inappropriate for me to give you that assurance in this forum. What I can assure you is that, if there is evidence that UK-sourced CS gas has been used, we will of course review again the extant licences. That would be entirely appropriate.

**Chair:** We now want to turn to Bahrain.

**Q144 Ann Clwyd:** Foreign Secretary, after 2011 the King set up a commission of inquiry. That commission made a number of recommendations, some of which have been followed but in the eyes of others, the most important ones have been ignored. We have heard frequently from Sir Nigel Rodley, who was on the commission of inquiry, about his disappointment at the slowness of reforms. Security forces have continued to arrest demonstrators arbitrarily on the streets. Some people have been given long prison sentences. Certainly, high-profile critics of the Government remain in jail on charges that relate solely to exercising their right of freedom of expression and assembly. Of course, the judicial system, headed by the royal family, has yet to hold to account any senior officials responsible for some of the events of 2011, particularly important violations such as torture-related deaths in detention.

Elections have just taken place, which were boycotted by the opposition, who dismissed the elections as a farce. Given Bahrain's continuing poor human rights record, why does it remain a priority arms export market for the UK?

**Mr Hammond:** I think those are two different questions. With respect, you would have to address the question about why it remains a priority arms export market to the DSO and perhaps the Business Secretary. That will relate, first, to opportunity. The Bahrainis have certain requirements for items such as sophisticated fighter jets—not something that we would judge likely to be used in internal repression. They are also an important partner in pursuing agendas that are strategically important to the UK, both against ISIL recently and longer term, ensuring freedom of navigation in the Gulf.

I recognise that Bahrain still has a distance to go in creating a proper and satisfactory human rights environment, but my judgment is that it is moving in the right direction. Steps that were taken after 2011 were positive, in contrast to what we have seen in many other countries where similar events have occurred and the response has been for the regime to turn its back on criticisms of its human rights record.

The regime in Bahrain has engaged; it set up the commission; it is responding and has implemented some of the measures recommended by the commission, not all of them. We are engaged with the Government of Bahrain in encouraging them to continue down that route,

providing them where we can with technical support and assistance to implement recommendations. I see Bahrain as a country where we should be hopeful that, with continued engagement and encouragement from the UK, it is heading and will continue to head in the right direction. I am afraid I think that disengagement would be rather more likely to lead to the triumph of those elements that do not wish to see Bahrain addressing these challenges and engaging with its international critics in a constructive way.

**Q145 Ann Clwyd:** You gave your view earlier that certain arms exports to Hong Kong have not been used. In the same way, can we be assured that arms exports to Bahrain are not being used against protestors? If you are sure, exactly how are they being monitored?

**Mr Hammond:** In the immediate aftermath of the events of 2011, we did review all licences, and we revoked a number of licences that we felt were not being used in accordance with the consolidated criteria. Twenty-three single licences and seven open licences to Bahrain were revoked at that time.

I was asked why Bahrain was a priority export market for the Defence Sales Organisation. I think I am right in saying—this is from my knowledge in my former role as Defence Secretary—that that relates to Bahrain's interest in acquiring a new fleet of high-sophistication fighter jets. We would obviously have to look at any proposal to export fighter jets to Bahrain in the context in which such an application was made, but my initial judgment would be that this is equipment highly unlikely to be used in internal repression—it is not equipment of a type that would be appropriate to be used in internal repression.

**Q146 Ann Clwyd:** I also sit on a committee in the Inter-Parliamentary Union that looks at the human rights of parliamentarians, and Bahrain frequently comes up before our committee—in fact, we are doing something on this in about two months' time. That is because a number of former Members of Parliament have had their nationality revoked. I think we are being too complacent towards Bahrain. As I said at the beginning, they have made progress, but not against high-level officials who are closely linked with the royal family and who were charged with the kind of behaviour that has been described and that is possibly linked to torture and other accusations. Lower-level officials have been charged, but not the higher ones, who presumably give the orders.

**Mr Hammond:** Bahrain remains a case study on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's annual human rights report and is reviewed bi-annually. There is an element of judgment involved in these calls, and I am simply expressing my judgment that, in a world in which there are very many regimes which are not compliant with what we would consider to be a full human rights regime, where countries are making an effort to move themselves towards compliance, it is appropriate that we should support them and encourage that move. There are many, many countries which are making no discernable effort to move towards compliance with what is generally accepted as a universal set of human rights, and I think we should reserve our more aggressive response for those countries, while seeking to encourage those that are willing to move in the right direction to go further and faster. That is exactly what we are doing. I shall be in Bahrain this coming weekend for the Manama dialogue, and I shall, again, encourage

everyone that I have the chance to talk to to continue down this road and remind them that the world is watching and that their status and reputation in the world depends on how quickly they are able to progress in implementing this agenda.

**Chair:** Foreign Secretary, we want now to move a little further down the Gulf to Qatar.

**Q147 Dr Lewis:** It is one thing to concentrate on whether weapons are being used for internal repression, but it is another to focus on whether they are being given to a country that is arming our deadliest enemies. In the case of Qatar, one is put in mind of Lenin's famous dictum that the capitalists will sell us the rope with which we shall hang them.

In September, the *Telegraph* did an in-depth report. Referring to Qatar, it stated: "The fabulously wealthy Gulf state, which owns an array of London landmarks and claims to be one of our best friends in the Middle East, is a prime sponsor of violent Islamists". It went on to detail not only the payments, believed to run at over \$2 million a month to al-Qaeda in Iraq from individuals within Qatar, but it referred to Qatari arms flights, which are landing in the city of Misrata where the Islamist militias have their stronghold, and this is long after the fall of the capital and the removal of Libya's Government. So how can we be in a position to justify continuing to export arms to Qatar while it is directly arming Islamist militias and/or turning a blind eye to wealthy individuals who are funding ISIL?

**Mr Hammond:** Let us first deal with the funding question. We are of course aware of reports that individual citizens from the region—not just Qatar, but from the region—may be providing or may have provided support to not only ISIL, but other militant organisations as well. We have determined that there is no evidence to suggest that the Government of Qatar, or any of the Governments that we engage with in the Gulf, is involved in this regime. We welcome the fact that Qatar has recently legislated to prevent terrorist funding by regulating charities that are involved in political movements or that send money abroad, and we are working with the Qataris to encourage the swift implementation of this legislation.

The Emir of Qatar was in London relatively recently. As we always do, we raised these issues and concerns with him, and he engaged very openly and frankly with us about the challenges of policing money flows. We know about those, because of course we have had to deal with them as well. But that confirmed his absolute determination to comply with the UN Security Council resolution that we were instrumental in bringing about, which seeks to cut off not only the flow of foreign fighters, but the flow of finance to ISIL in Iraq and Syria.

On the question of supply of weapons to Qatar—

**Dr Lewis:** To Libya.

**Mr Hammond:** It was concerning the supply of weapons to Qatar. Our sales of defence exports to Qatar are relatively modest, as you will know, but of course, any application for a licence for export of arms to Qatar will be assessed against the consolidated criteria. That will involve a look at the intended end-use destination of those weapons, if there is any evidence of re-export.

**Q148 Dr Lewis:** But as we know—this was why I briefly referred to Libya again—flights are taking arms from Qatar to Libya. Are you really confident that we can have any assurance that arms that go from this country to Qatar will not end up strengthening the hands of Libyan Islamists, who are not acting in any way in democratic interests in post-Gaddafi Libya?

**Mr Hammond:** That is a very generic question. Obviously, the assessment on an individual export depends on what the item is and what the type of equipment or componentry is. I have seen no evidence to suggest that any equipment exported from the UK has been re-exported. This would be in contravention of the export licence if the end-user destination was Qatar and it has been re-exported to Libya. If we were to become aware of any such breach of the terms of a licence, clearly, we would have to respond to that.

**Q149 Dr Lewis:** Are you satisfied, then, that these reported Qatari arms flights to Libya are being done without the knowledge and approval of the Qatari Government?

**Mr Hammond:** No, sorry; that's not what I was saying. I was saying that, in the case of any such flights, we have no evidence to suggest that any British-supplied equipment—the subject of an export licence with Qatar as the main destination—was involved in any such shipments.

**Q150 Dr Lewis:** Yes, but surely the point is that if the Qatari Government is providing arms to our Islamist enemies, that should have a bearing, should it not, on whether we permit arms exports to continue to that country?

**Mr Hammond:** Once again, I find myself being rather more purist than the Committees. My understanding is that the consolidated criteria are the test by which we must assess an application for an arms export licence. I think I can safely say that if we are confident that the UK supply in question is not going to be diverted, which would be in contravention of criterion 7, and is not going to be used in a way that is incompatible with or that triggers any of the other criteria, then, whether we like what that particular Government are doing elsewhere or with other equipment that it sources from other jurisdictions would not affect the way we apply the consolidated criteria. That is not to say that, in relation to any country, the UK Government could not decide to operate a more restrictive policy if they chose to do so for political reasons, but the application of the consolidated criteria to the arms export licensing regime is, I would suggest, quite straightforward and needs to be protected in the way it operates; otherwise, I think we will be subject to all sorts of legal challenge.

**Chair:** We now want to come to arms exports to Kurdish groups who are opposing ISIL.

**Q151 Ann Clwyd:** The Foreign Affairs Committee has recently been to Iraq and Kurdistan and saw some of those weapons which have been delivered to the Kurds. We saw them being trained in their use. The fear is that, after what happened in Mosul where the American-provided equipment was captured, something similar may happen to this equipment because of the involvement of Turkish and Syrian-based Kurdish groups now working in Iraq to try to defeat ISIL. What protection is there and what observation is being made to ensure that the same thing does not happen with the arms that are being gifted to the Kurds in Iraq?



**Mr Hammond:** First, I, too, went to Irbil and saw peshmerga training with the heavy machine guns that we had supplied. We have calibrated carefully the equipment that we have supplied to the peshmerga to respond to their operational needs, but with an awareness of the potential risk that inevitably exists. We have sought a series of assurances from the KRG that weapons will be used to meet urgent operational requirements, that they will remain in Iraq, that they will be used in fighting ISIL or for the defence of the civilian population only, that they will not be stockpiled for other purposes and that they will be used in accordance with international law including international humanitarian law. We have also satisfied ourselves that the peshmerga have a weapons management system in place that allows them to monitor compliance with those assurances, and that weapons are being used and stored securely. So a number of steps have been taken. It is also very important to note that all supplies of weapons to the Kurds have been at the request of the Government of Iraq. This delivery of weapons is at the request of the sovereign Government responsible for the territory to which the weapons have been delivered.

**Chair:** Foreign Secretary, we take a close interest not only in commercial exports from the UK, but also in equipment gifted by the British Government. We want to come now to gifted equipment going to opposition groups in Syria.

**Q152 Fabian Hamilton:** Your predecessor William Hague made a statement on 10 July 2013 in which he said that the UK Government, having “already provided more than £12 million in non-lethal assistance to the National Coalition, local councils and civil society” in Syria, would provide a further £20 million “in non-lethal assistance in the coming months, including communications support and training for the National Coalition”. Is it still Government policy to ship only non-lethal equipment to opposition groups that are opposing either the Syrian regime or ISIL—otherwise known as the Islamic State—in Syria?

**Mr Hammond:** It is.

**Q153 Fabian Hamilton:** You don't want to expand on that at all?

**Mr Hammond:** No. That is the Government's position. We have made it clear on multiple occasions in Parliament that our decision is that we will not at the present time supply lethal equipment to the Syrian opposition. We supply a range of non-lethal equipment, and we supply them with technical support. We have done quite a lot of work with them on civil policing and on civil defence response in areas of the country which are controlled by the moderate opposition, but we do not supply them with lethal equipment.

**Q154 Fabian Hamilton:** Given the onslaught against them by ISIL, is it not time to change that view?

**Mr Hammond:** The Government's judgment at the moment is that we do not wish to change that position. There are many others supplying lethal equipment to Syrian opposition fighters. Our judgment at the moment is that the complexities of monitoring and managing the supply of such equipment in such a complex situation on the ground make it something that we would find challenging. We do not feel that there is a necessity for this, given the substantial amounts of lethal equipment that are getting through to the Syrian opposition.



**Chair:** We come now to the Arms Trade Treaty.

**Q155 Ann McKechin:** Foreign Secretary, the Arms Trade Treaty comes into effect on 24 December, as you know. Could you describe briefly to the Committees what you think the impact will be on UK arms exports?

**Mr Hammond:** Because we have an export control regime that is already very transparent and very rigorous, the impact for the UK will be relatively limited. As you know, we changed the regime as we needed to through secondary legislation before we ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, in order to ensure that our arms export licensing regime is now fully compliant with the treaty. This treaty is not going to have a major behaviour-changing impact in the UK, because we already have a very rigorous regime. The purpose of promoting the treaty was to ensure similar levels of transparency and rigour in countries across the world.

**Q156 Ann McKechin:** May I just confirm that the secondary legislation to which your official pointed you is now in force?

**Mr Philip Hammond:** I imagine it must be, yes.

**Q157 Ann McKechin:** It is, thank you. May I also ask what action the UK Government are currently taking to encourage the permanent members of the UN Security Council which have not yet signed or ratified the Arms Trade Treaty to do so? Clearly, the more countries that join the treaty, the more effective it will actually be in practice.

**Mr Hammond:** We agree with that. We think that it would be a powerful signal if all the P5 states were to accede. You will know that France and the UK have ratified the treaty. The US has signed the treaty but not ratified it, and the truth is that internal domestic political issues with the gun lobby in the US are going to present great difficulties for the US in moving forward with ratification. Russia and China have neither signed nor ratified the treaty. We continue to press all three non-ratifying P5 members to move forward with this, because we believe that there is significant benefit in universality. A common P5 position will send a very strong signal to other states who have not yet signed. For those other states, where we can, we are seeking to offer technical support and assistance to move to a position to sign the treaty. And where people have signed, we are seeking to offer technical support and assistance to introduce compliant regimes to honour their obligations under the treaty.

**Q158 Ann McKechin:** As you know, the Committees very much welcome the approach that the Government has taken to date, but there have been calls for it now to start to consider excluding countries, and companies from countries, that have not yet ratified the treaty or other arms control treaties from attending or exhibiting at UK-based arms fairs, for it not to promote arms sales in those countries and for open licences not to be issued to those countries. In effect, that would be a step-by-step process to increase pressure over a period of time. Has the Government considered how we can try to increase pressure if its diplomacy through polite inquiries and requests does not prove to be effective?

**Mr Hammond:** The Government will pursue this agenda by pointing its partners—potential signatories—to the benefits of the Arms Trade Treaty and, in particular, to the benefit that the Arms Trade Treaty-compliant regimes can deliver in terms of slowing or halting the proliferation of weapons into the hands of terrorist groups and others who seek to disrupt international good order. But we do not judge that using the Arms Trade Treaty as a stick to beat non-signatory powers with in terms of our trading activity would be appropriate, certainly not at this stage.

**Q159 Ann McKechin:** Has there been any discussion at EU level about whether there should be a common EU approach to encourage other countries to join and ratify the treaty?

**Jessica Hand:** Yes, there has. It has come up repeatedly within the context of COARM, and European partners are working together to provide assistance and to reach out and encourage more and more countries to sign and ratify the treaty. That will continue, even beyond it entering into force.

**Chair:** Foreign Secretary, we want to come on to the meeting on the human consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

**Q160 Mike Gapes:** As you know, Foreign Secretary, there is a major conference in Vienna next week on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. One hundred and fifty countries will attend that conference and the United States recently announced that it would attend. So far, our Government has not committed to attend. I asked your predecessor last week in the business statement whether we were about to make any announcement, and he said that I would have to wait until this week. I ask you today: can we change our previous position and join the United States in attending this conference in Vienna?

**Mr Hammond:** It is clearly possible.

**Q161 Mike Gapes:** Is it likely?

**Mr Hammond:** This week has another four days left to run, but I can reconfirm that we will announce our decision during the course of this week. We are discussing it with our international partners. You have already said that the United States has broken with its previous practice in deciding to attend. France, another P5 power with whom we are closely aligned, has decided that it will not attend. Therefore, unfortunately, there will not be a united P5 position. So we now have to make a decision whether to attend or not, knowing that there will be a split position in the P5. We will make that position clear. I am going to Brussels tomorrow and I will be meeting with both the Americans and the French, and we will make our position clear imminently.

**Q162 Mike Gapes:** Are you going before Foreign Office questions or after?

**Mr Hammond:** I am going immediately after Foreign Office questions.

**Q163 Mike Gapes:** So we will not get an answer at Foreign Office questions either.

**Mr Hammond:** It doesn't sound likely, does it? You never know. It is worth a try.

**Q164 Mike Gapes:** Yes. Maybe it will be the business statement on Thursday.

**Mr Hammond:** It will be you or Mr Robertson, no doubt.

**Chair:** Foreign Secretary, I want to come to your dimension on an issue that we raised with the Business Secretary on surveillance technologies.

**Q165 Mike Crockart:** Obviously, the growing area at the moment is the UK licensing of surveillance technologies to countries of human rights concern. It is an area that I know the Department is live to. In the report “Good Business: Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights”, which came out last year, you said that you intended to “develop guidance to address the risks posed by exports of information and communications technology that are not subject to export control but which might have impacts on human rights including freedom of expression on line.” Can you update the Committees on how that is going?

**Mr Hammond:** Yes, I am happy to do so. On 26 November, techUK, which is a technology trade association, published new guidance for companies entitled “Assessing Cyber Security Export Risks”. It covers cyber-security and cyber-surveillance products. It focuses on human rights issues and is designed to help companies improve their due diligence processes in line with the UK’s business and human rights action plan. The guidance is owned by techUK on behalf of the UK technology industry, and it was produced with the assistance of HMG—the Foreign Office—as well as companies, industrial players and the Institute for Human Rights and Business, an NGO which acted as a bridge to consult other NGOs, including Human Rights Watch and Privacy International, in developing this guidance. That is now published and is there for the use of companies operating in the sector.

**Q166 Mike Crockart:** To my embarrassment, I have not read that yet.

**Mr Hammond:** I am glad to be able to convey a piece of information.

**Q167 Mike Crockart:** It will be my reading for later on today. What implications does that have for Government? Those are recommendations for business as to how they conduct their business, but there is equally a licensing implication here in that the UK Government should have a view on whether particular technologies should be able to be exported to particular countries of concern. What is the next step for the UK Government?

**Mr Hammond:** The Government do, indeed, have such a view, and it is enshrined in the consolidated criteria. The question in relation to any surveillance technology being exported to any particular country is: does it engage any of the consolidated criteria? Where it does, we will deal with it in exactly the same way as if it was an application to export fighter jets, machine guns or land mines.

**Q168 Mike Crockart:** Are you happy that that is a significant enough test, given the particular difficulties with this technology? Of course, the argument is often made that this technology is merely used to back up the legal regime in the country. But in some of the countries that we are talking about, the legal regime itself is open to question as to whether it is significantly free of Government. With that in mind, do you think that—

**Mr Hammond:** You might be raising a question that is a bigger one for the future about whether the criteria need to be reviewed from time to time as technologies evolve. That may be something that the Committees want to think about and express a view on, but our position is that we will apply the consolidated criteria as they exist to these proposed transfers. What you are perhaps highlighting is something that is self-evidently true—that it is much more challenging to apply the export control regime to dual-use goods than to pure military exports, where the end use is always fairly clear. In this case, there may be end uses that are entirely beneficial and other end uses that would be much less acceptable. A judgment has to be made about how the technologies in question are likely to be used in practice.

**Chair:** Foreign Secretary, lastly a question about export policy towards Israel, which the Business Secretary generously passed across to you.

**Q169 Richard Benyon:** Following public concern about events in Gaza, the Government announced the possibility of suspending and revoking arms exports licences to Israel and, “in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities”. It has been put to the Committees that the words “significant hostilities” appear in no user guides or any existing transfer control criteria. I put it to Dr Cable that this is a possible shift in policy and he said, “Not me, gov.” He said that the Foreign Secretary makes the decisions and his Department just implements the policy.

**Mr Hammond:** The Foreign Secretary provides advice to the Business Secretary, who makes the decision—*[Laughter.]* That is the legal position.

**Peter Jones:** That is absolutely correct.

**Mr Hammond:** The Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary provide advice. Export licensing decisions are made by the Business Secretary; he is the Secretary of State as provided for in the legislation. However, I am not seeking to hide behind that. I provide advice, and I will tell you how we arrived at the expression of that advice. The question of this came in the aftermath of Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, when we reviewed the extant licences and identified 12 licences that relate to technology or items that we believe might give rise, in the circumstances of renewed conflict, to a concern about their use in contravention of criterion 2c—the international humanitarian law criterion. Unless and until there is a resumption of significant hostility, we do not judge that the items delivered under those 12 licences give rise to that concern. If there was a context of a significant hostility, we judge that the precautionary principle would apply and the licences should be suspended.

**Q170 Richard Benyon:** I am sorry to be a pedant, but the phrase “significant hostility” potentially then shifts in terms of how policy is decided in these areas.

**Mr Hammond:** No. The issue is, where licences are extant and there is only turbulence in the situation and changing facts on the ground, we would expect to regularly review whether any of the consolidated criteria were engaged. In this case, we were under pressure to set out our views about these 12 licences. We have, gratuitously—there is no obligation on us to do this—expressed in advance what we think the situation would be. We have identified 12 licences and said that if a set of circumstances on the ground were to arise—that is, there were to be a resumption of significant hostility—the advice that I would expect to give to the Business

Secretary in those circumstances is that it would be appropriate to suspend those 12 licences. We have provided a forewarning of the advice that would likely be delivered in those circumstances.

**Q171 Fabian Hamilton:** A very simple question: can you reassure the Committees, Foreign Secretary, that there is not one rule for Israel, which is often in the headlines about its conflicts, and another rule for everybody else? Will what you apply to them apply to everybody else?

**Mr Hammond:** Yes, we use the same consolidated criteria, and in this case we have a slightly unusual situation because there has been period of intensive conflict, which has ended. That conflict is not continuing. We have looked at the systems and components that are licensed for export in the light of whether there is a risk that they would be used in breach of international humanitarian law. In the case of these 12 licences, we have judged that there would be such a risk if significant hostilities were to resume. That is why we have made the announcement that we have.

**Chair:** Foreign Secretary, Ms Hand, Mr Jones, thank you very much indeed.

# Written Evidence

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## Written evidence from the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) (AEC0001)

### 1. Introduction:

1.1 The Export Group for Aerospace & Defence (EGAD) is a UK-based not-for-profit-making special interest industry group, founded in September 2004, focusing exclusively on all aspects of export and trade control matters. EGAD is the only dedicated national industrial body in the UK dealing exclusively with export control issues. EGAD operates under the joint auspices of ADS Group Ltd, the British Maritime Federation (BMF), the British Naval Equipment Association (BNEA), the Society of Maritime Industries (SMI), and TechUK.

1.2 A dedicated website ([www.egad.org.uk](http://www.egad.org.uk)) has been created at the request of the group's Executive Committee and with guidance from its Awareness Outreach Activities Sub-Committee, that is intended to become the first port of call for companies as the source of user-friendly basic, initial guidance on all aspects of export and trade controls, created by like-minded people to help compliance staff within companies. It seeks to identify potential sources of help, and ideas for problem solving, and presents easy steps to "bite-sized compliance".

1.3 The website has been kept simple, and, in addition to providing information on EGAD, itself, seeks to present a practical and simple step-by-step guide on understanding export and trade controls, and addressing the fundamental questions which companies ask: when do I need an export licence and how do I go about trying to obtain and use one?

1.4 EGAD has also created, with Cranfield University, a series of externally-accredited training courses in export control compliance, at four levels, running from very basic awareness (appropriate for all company staff) up to a Master's equivalent course (for senior export control compliance managers within companies). For further information, details on these are available at: [www.strategicexportcontrols.org/index.cfm](http://www.strategicexportcontrols.org/index.cfm).

1.5 EGAD welcomes this opportunity to contribute to the open consultation around Strategic Export Controls; the CAEC invited comment on several specific areas, the response of EGAD to those areas, is detailed below:

### 2. Introduction

2.1 The UK export licensing system – which is widely recognised as one of the most stringent and transparent in the world – has received significant media and public attention in recent months, primarily due to events in Russia and the Middle East. As interest in the licensing

system increases, there is a renewed responsibility on industry groups such as EGAD, parliamentarians and government to promote public understanding of the system.

2.2 Questions have been raised about what the UK is exporting, where those products are exported to and who will use them. It is testament to the inherent transparency of the UK licensing system that it encourages important, open and public debate of these questions.

2.3 Indeed the openness of the UK's system facilitates an ongoing discussion about how continuously to improve the rigour and responsiveness of the system. EGAD is pleased to contribute to that debate through its submission to the Committee.

### 3. **General Comment:**

3.1 From the viewpoint of responsible and law-abiding UK companies, it is clear that we support the continuation of the current UK export licensing system, which operates on a strict "case-by-case" basis. It is our strongly-held contention that the continued retention of the current "case-by-case" basis is the most logical and rational way in which an export control system can function, offering, as it does, the flexibility to permit responsible trade, whilst preventing undesirable exports, sometimes to the same destinations, depending on the intended end-use and end-user of the goods.

3.2 This principle is enshrined in the current UK Open licensing system, which allows the Government to identify categories of "low-risk" goods which can be exported to certain low-risk destinations, with minimal intervention from the export licensing authorities and a minimal administrative burden on UK businesses.

3.3 We accept that the reasons that individual export licence applications often take so long to process is due to the scrutiny with which they are assessed and the time taken to determine clearly their intended end-use and end-user.

3.4 Responsibility, therefore, lies with UK industry to disclose all relevant information required in the full assessment of export license applications in a timely manner, not only to help speed up the application process but also to create as transparent an audit trail as possible for any subsequent enquiries that may take place. By requesting this information, UK Government officials are doing all they possibly can to try to ensure that the UK acts responsibly in its export activities. UK companies are advised to apply as early as possible and provide as much supporting information as possible to assist UK Government officials in assessing their applications.

3.5 We note that a very high proportion of applications for export licences continue to be returned with requests for corrections or further information. As SPIRE, the ECO's online export licensing system, itself, says "*the ECO has to return roughly half of all export license applications to the exporter, either for more information or because the application has been*



*completed wrongly. These incomplete or incorrect applications cause delays in processing.*" The delay in applications has caused instances where shipments have been delayed, impacting on customer confidence and their perceptions of the UK as a reliable supplier. That being said, we are aware of instances that have been reported to us where the requests for further information appear to be extremely trivial or where the requested information was actually already contained within the actual export licence application, which does cause much bewilderment.

3.6 EGAD is continuing to work to inform exporters better on how to complete licence applications more thoroughly and to ensure all necessary data is provided at the initial stage, in order to reduce delays in the process and prevent the current unacceptably high level of returned applications and delayed shipments. We also note that BIS' Export Control Organisation continues to run "How to Make Better Licensing Applications" courses, but have no visibility of how much effect either of these efforts are having on the rate of rejection, or its effect on the ECO's efficiency and responsiveness in a time of acute manpower pressure.

#### **4. Continuing Disconnect between Wassenaar Arrangement and European Union Dual-Use Control Lists:**

4.1 Around December of each year, the Wassenaar Arrangement ([www.wassenaar.org/](http://www.wassenaar.org/)) multilateral control regime publishes its revised list of Dual-Use items that are internationally agreed as warranting the application of export controls. As new technologies emerge and existing technologies progress, some new items are added each year, and some items are deleted from the Wassenaar control lists. Procedural problems between the European Commission and European Parliament in recent years have meant that the Wassenaar-driven amendments to the EU Dual-Use list (published in successive amendments to EC Regulation 428/2009) have (at the time of writing) not included the internationally-agreed changes for 2011, 2012 or 2013. Similar delays affect the internationally-agreed changes published periodically by the [Missile Technology Control Regime](#) (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

4.2 By contrast, other nations (notably the US and Singapore) implement the changes very quickly after they are published to allow their exporters to take advantage of the internationally-agreed relaxations.

4.3 The ECO makes laudable attempts to ameliorate the effects of this discrepancy by issuing (and updating) a UK Open General Export Licence (entitled OGEL: International Non-proliferation Regime De-controls: Dual-use Items) – at [www.gov.uk/dual-use-open-general-export-licences-explained#ogel-international-non-proliferation-regime-de-controls-dual-use-items](http://www.gov.uk/dual-use-open-general-export-licences-explained#ogel-international-non-proliferation-regime-de-controls-dual-use-items)). However, the huge difference in bureaucratic reporting and recording effort demanded of exporters to use "Open" licences, rather than being able to export goods without an export licence, means that larger, multinational companies with a global footprint choose to export these goods from countries that have implemented the de-controls promptly and in

full, with a consequent damaging effect on the UK's position as an exporter and the UK's balance of payments. This effect is particularly evident in the high-technology industries such as the manufacture and sale of computers and networking equipment, and software containing incidental cryptography, where consumers at all levels are demanding ever-faster and ever more secure equipment, making more sophisticated hardware and more built-in encryption the commercial norm rather than the exception.

4.4 The position for UK exporters is particularly difficult as the ECO and its advisers take a uniquely hard line on what equipment qualifies for the Wassenaar-agreed decontrol of so-called "mass market" commercially-available encryption. Again, this is driving exporters who can do so to export from other EU countries or the US, with consequential damage to the UK balance of payments.

## 5. HMG Staff Shortages

5.1 EGAD is becoming increasingly concerned that cost pressures have inadvertently resulted in the ECO and its advisory departments (especially the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the UK Ministry of Defence) experiencing a totally counter-productive shortage of skilled and experienced staff causing:

- Withdrawal of the ECO's rating advisory service, and the subsequent decision in June of this year to suspend (hopefully temporarily rather than permanently) the replacement Control List Classification Advice Service, which allowed exporters to obtain a Government view of the export control status of their goods before attempting to export them, which is the fundamental bedrock of any effective export control system;
- Long delays in responding to technical queries and appeals against apparently-illogical rating decisions (there are no metrics or targets for responding to appeals of this nature, so it appears that they take a low priority);
- An apparent perceived increase in the number of "requests for information" being raised by ECO licensing staff that a little technical understanding would have made unnecessary, but which the companies concerned readily perceive as being incomprehensible and possibly due to pressure on Government officials to meet licensing response time targets.

## 6. Brokering

6.1 British industry has long-standing concerns about the UK's brokering (ie, 'trade') controls. Their essentially indiscriminating nature seems to us to place more of a bureaucratic and compliance burden on perfectly responsible, law-abiding and bona fide British defence companies than it does to curb the activities of the actual "arms dealers" against whom it is primarily directed. We are also concerned that, as a result of the extraterritorial element of UK trade controls, British expatriate employees of perfectly

responsible and law-abiding overseas defence companies may be in breach of UK regulations of which they are wholly unaware.

6.2 These concerns have been exacerbated by two recent developments. First, as an alleged consequence of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), Category B (ie where extraterritorial controls apply) has been extended to the full range of platforms listed in the ATT. We do not agree that this action is a necessary consequence of the Treaty, which merely says (Article 16) “*Each state shall take measures, pursuant to its national laws, to regulate brokering taking place under its jurisdiction for conventional arms covered under Article 2(1).*” Nor was this raised as a consequence of the Treaty during the negotiations, at which UK Industry was represented.

6.3 Secondly, the BIS issued in April a consultative document on the pre-licensing of arms brokers, an idea which HMG has considered in the past and rejected, for what seem to us to be extremely cogent reasons. We hope that this idea is not pursued, except possibly in the context set out below.

6.4 EGAD has previously indicated that we are not implacably opposed either to further extension of extraterritorial controls, or to a requirement for preregistration, provided that they form part of a system for exempting bona fide and legitimate companies, and British expatriate employees of bona fide overseas companies, from the trade regulations. We continue to be ready to work with HMG to achieve that objective, if it is felt that this would be desirable.

6.5 Meanwhile, EGAD has been receiving a number of queries over recent months from enquirers around the World seeking information and assistance on whether they are impacted by the UK’s extraterritorial trade controls or not, as they have looked at the ECO’s published guidance on this, and found it wanting, not clearly, authoritatively and definitely covering their particular commercial circumstances. As a result, we believe that this guidance needs to be reviewed and updated.

## 7. **Transparency:**

7.1 Considerable effort has been expended over the course of the last 24 months on the Government’s “Transparency” initiative. After listening to Industry’s own concerns and issues on this, the ECO has sought to minimise the administrative effort required to meet the political imperatives of the BIS’ “Transparency” initiative which initially called for a much more onerous reporting regime than has actually been implemented. Nevertheless, there is still a not inconsiderable cost to Industry in the administrative effort required to meet the new reporting requirements and in amending IT systems to meet them, even though, as EGAD has already pointed out, the information required is already held on the ECO’s own IT systems or collected at the ECO’s routine audits or has been submitted to HM Revenue and Customs; indeed, HMRC has recently issued a consultative document about publishing relevant information on exports in the interests of transparency

([www.gov.uk/government/consultations/sharing-and-publishing-export-data-for-public-benefit](http://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/sharing-and-publishing-export-data-for-public-benefit)), which we believe certainly adds credibility to EGAD's case.

September 2014

**Written evidence from Paul Holtom and Ioannis Chapsos, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University (AEC0003)**

**Floating armouries in the Indian Ocean and the risk of diversion involving private maritime security companies**

1. Dr Paul Holtom is a senior research fellow and Ioannis Chapsos is a research fellow at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) at Coventry University. Dr Holtom and Mr Chapsos have conducted research in 2014 on the issue of floating armouries in the Indian Ocean for the Small Arms Survey. Their findings will be presented in a chapter that will appear in the Small Arms Survey yearbook: Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2015* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2015). Dr Holtom and Mr Chapsos wish to acknowledge the financial support provided by the Small Arms Survey in carrying out our research.
2. This submission, based on the forthcoming *Small Arms Survey 2015* chapter, presents material that addresses issues raised in the Committees on Arms Export Controls' 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 enquiries regarding 'Arms exports to counter piracy'. It focuses upon the use of floating armouries by private maritime security companies (PMSC) and consists of four sections: (a) overview of floating armouries operating in the Indian Ocean; (b) floating armoury safety and security concerns; (c) PMSC and the risk of diversion; and (d) options for regulating and monitoring the use of floating armouries. The fourth section consists of recommendations put forward by Dr Holtom and Mr Chapsos. These recommendations are not being made on behalf of the Small Arms Survey.

**Overview of floating armouries in the Indian Ocean**

1. A floating armoury, often referred to as a logistical support vessel for anti-piracy operations, is a ship that is located in international waters that provides services to privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) operating aboard commercial vessels (e.g. embark/disembark PCASP, arms and equipment between a commercial vessel or a port and storage on-board the floating armoury; storage, service or rental of arms, ammunition and other equipment; and/or provide accommodation for PCASP teams). The sharp increase in the number of floating armouries operating in the High Risk Area (HRA), coupled with the fact that they operate in a 'grey' legal area without established standards for the storage of arms and ammunition, has led to concerns that they could be exploited by 'unscrupulous and criminal actors',

transforming them from a maritime security solution into a ‘threat to regional peace and security’.<sup>1</sup>

3. There is currently a lack of information regarding the number of floating armouries, their use, the number of arms stored and physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) practices. In 2012 and 2013 it was estimated that between 12 and 20 floating armouries operated in the HRA.<sup>2</sup> Interviews and open source materials identify around 30 vessels that are used as floating armouries or provide support for floating armouries in the HRA in 2014. It remains a dynamic market, with plans for new floating armouries to be deployed in the region.<sup>3</sup>
4. One of the challenges for identifying and monitoring floating armouries is that classification societies have not designated any vessel as a ‘floating armoury’, nor have any flag states registered a vessel as such. A variety of vessel types are known to be utilized as floating armouries in 2014, including: offshore supply ships, patrol vessels, diving support vessels, anchor handling vessels, research/survey vessels, pleasure craft, trawlers and general cargo ships.
5. Avant Garde Maritime Services (AGMS) operates the MV Mahanuwara, a Mongolian and Sri Lankan registered anchor handling vessel, which is the only floating armoury authorised by the Sri Lankan government to operate in waters off the coast of Sri Lanka.<sup>4</sup> One of the justifications for its monopoly status is that there is a need for strict control and monitoring of arms in and around Sri Lanka following the recent civil war. The MV Mahanuwara is used to store up to 1,000 weapons, associated ammunition and night vision devices.<sup>5</sup> All other PMSC equipment is stored on land in the Sri Lankan naval base’s warehouses in Galle port. The MV Mahanuwara is often moored next to Galle’s naval base in order to avoid the rough sea. The MV Mahanuwara operates strictly as a ‘floating armoury’ and does not provide accommodation for PCASP. However, many UK-owned or registered PMSCs provide accommodation for their teams in Galle and use the services provided by the floating armoury.

### **Floating armoury safety and security**

6. PMSCs interviewed during 2014 were generally satisfied with the physical stockpile and security management (PSSM) standards on the floating armouries that they used.

<sup>1</sup> UN. 2012. *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011)*. S/2012/544. 13 July, Para. 73; UN. 2013. *Report of the Secretary-General: Small arms*. UN Document: S/2013/503. 22 August, Para. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Houreld, K. 2012. ‘Piracy fighters use floating armouries.’ *Associated Press*. 22 March; Rickett, Oscar. 2013. ‘Piracy fears over ships laden with weapons in international waters.’ *The Guardian*. 10 January.

<sup>3</sup> Interviews with PMSCs, 21 and 22 May 2014

<sup>4</sup> Avant Garde Maritime Services (PVT) Ltd (AGMS) website 2014. ‘Weapons’. <<http://avantmaritime.com>>.

<sup>5</sup> AGMS website. 2014. ‘Floating armoury off Port of Galle’. <<http://avantmaritime.com/>>.

However, each floating armoury has its own guidelines, standards, rules of operation and business model. There are concerns relating to lack of proper storage or space for weapons and inadequate security provisions on a number of floating armouries.<sup>6</sup>

7. Some floating armouries have inadequate storage space allocated for weapons, ammunition and equipment. The vessels currently used are not designed to serve as armouries, and demand can exceed storage capacity. In some cases, pelican cases containing arms are simply chained to the deck of a floating armoury. One could argue that such an approach could be seen as advertising the status of the vessel as a floating armoury, which could attract an attack by pirates or terrorists.<sup>7</sup>
8. The documentation on the number, type and other details of arms stored on board the floating armoury can be easily verified by a physical check. However, not all floating armoury personnel are willing or interested in conducting a physical check against declared volumes of ammunition. Verbal confirmation of the number of rounds to be stored can be sufficient. It is thanks to such approaches that one company's ammunition boxes were subsequently found in pirate skiffs.<sup>8</sup>
9. Some floating armouries maintain a sufficient number of armed guards on 24 hour watch.<sup>9</sup> In other cases, PMSC teams are expected to protect the floating armoury from attack. In such cases there are no specific plans, procedures, rules on the use of force, or even a specific and designated person in command of the situation.<sup>10</sup> Poor security provisions are behind fears that floating armouries could be hijacked or captured by pirates or terrorists.<sup>11</sup>

### **PMSC and the risk of diversion**

10. Companies based in Canada, Germany, Greece, Malta, South Africa and the UK describe their activities as including the supply of arms, ammunition and other equipment for PMSCs.<sup>12</sup> Few countries have produced specific guidance or licences and authorization procedures specifically for the export of small arms and light weapons (SALW), ammunition or other controlled items (e.g. night vision equipment) for PMSCs that provide PCASP for commercial vessels and that use floating armouries.

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<sup>6</sup> Seacurus Insurance Bulletin. 2012. 'Floating fortresses.' Issue 13, March, p. 11.

<sup>7</sup> Interview with a PMSC, 22 May 2014.

<sup>8</sup> Interview with a PMSC, 21 May 2014

<sup>9</sup> Badam, Ramola Talwar. 2012. 'UAE coastguard detains floating weapons arsenal off Fujairah'. *The National*. 17 October.

<sup>10</sup> Interview with a company operating a floating armoury, UK, 23 May 2014

<sup>11</sup> PTI. 2013. 'Floating armouries can lead to 26/11-type attack: Navy chief'. *The Times of India*. 3 December.

<sup>12</sup> ICoC. 2013. The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers Signatory Companies. Complete List as of 1 August 2013 – Version with Company Details. <[http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/Signatory\\_Companies\\_-\\_August\\_2013\\_-\\_Composite\\_List2.pdf](http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/Signatory_Companies_-_August_2013_-_Composite_List2.pdf)>



11. The UK and Germany both maintain licensing systems that specifically deal with arms transfers to PMSCs, and also address the use of floating armouries. Licensing assessments take into account the risk of diversion before issuing a licence and oblige PMSC to keep records of their transit and storage of arms and ammunition. However, the German system is more prescriptive in terms of the conditions to be met and more restrictive in its approach to the use of floating armouries than the UK approach. Other European States take a different approach. For example, the Dutch government has publicly reported denying authorizations for the transfer of SALW to PMSCs because it considered the risk of diversion to be high and more generally the 'Government is not in favour of the presence of armed guards on board seagoing vessels'.<sup>13</sup> Has the issue of arms transfers to PMSC and floating armouries been addressed in the intergovernmental exchanges of information conducted within the Wassenaar Arrangement or the European Union Council working group on arms export controls (COARM)?
  
12. The UK government is confident that arms delivered to PMSCs have not been misused or diverted, as evidence of diversion has not been presented to the government.<sup>14</sup> The conditions of the UK-issued open general trade control licence (maritime anti-piracy) (OGTCL-MAP) include a commitment not to transfer arms to any other entity. PMSCs increasingly share arms and equipment with other PMSCs, using floating armouries to carry out such practices.<sup>15</sup> For example, if PMSC 'X' has arms stored on board a floating armoury and PMSC 'Z' has a team in need of arms to conduct a transit, then PMSC 'X' will simply complete a 'Transfer Request Form' and sign an employment contract with PMSC 'Z's' team and then PMSC 'X' will formally transfer the arms to PMSC 'Z'. The transfer can take place with or without the knowledge of the owners of the floating armoury, even though the arms are loaded onto the floating armoury as the property of PMSC 'X' and taken off by PMSC 'Z'. Is the UK government aware of such practices? Is this considered a serious violation of the terms of OGTCL-MAP or an understandable operational necessity?

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<sup>13</sup> Netherlands. 2012. *Annual Report on the Netherlands Arms Export Policy in 2011*. Letter to Parliament, The Hague, 31 October. <[www.government.nl/issues/export-controls-of-strategic-goods](http://www.government.nl/issues/export-controls-of-strategic-goods)>. The Netherlands only authorises the use of Dutch military personnel – Vessel Protection Detachments – on Dutch-flagged vessels. However, there are 12 Dutch PMSC that are licensed to provide security for vessels that are not registered in the Netherlands (ICoC, 2013)

<sup>14</sup> UK House of Commons (UKHC). 2014. Committees on Arms Export Controls, Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Controls. Scrutiny of the Government's UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012, the Government's Quarterly Reports from October 2012 to September 2013, and the Government's policies on arms exports and international arms control issues. First Joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees of Session 2014–15, Volume I, Published on 23 July 2014, Para. 382.

<sup>15</sup> Interview with a PMSC, 20 May 2014.



13. What happens to the arms, ammunition and controlled items belonging to PMSCs that go out of business while PCASP are sitting on floating armouries in the Indian Ocean? In July 2014, Gulf of Aden Group Transits (GoAGT), one of the world's top ten PMSCs in terms of employees and number of transits, ceased to exist.<sup>16</sup> The company ceased to operate, but it left PCASP and their arms and ammunition on board vessels and floating armouries in and around the HRA. Can the UK government provide information on what happened to GoAGT's arms and ammunition? In particular, what happened to the arms and ammunition in the possession of GoAGT PCASP sitting on floating armouries in the Indian Ocean?

### **Options for regulating and monitoring the use of floating armouries**

14. A variety of approaches have been proposed for regulating floating armouries, to increase controls and monitoring possibilities. The UN Security Council has been called upon to 'consider options for the establishment of an international regulatory authority that regulates, monitors and inspects the activities of private maritime security companies operating floating armouries and providing armed protection to vessels in international waters'.<sup>17</sup> The Security Council has not addressed this call, but there have been other proposals for measures to be undertaken at the international level.
15. Indian Admiral D K Joshi has called for the IMO to regulate floating armouries and ensure that all littoral states are aware of the identity of floating armouries, and the number of PCASP and arms on-board.<sup>18</sup> The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has provided recommendations and guidelines that address the issue of commercial vessels carrying PCASP and arms in international and territorial waters, but has not to date specifically addressed the issue of floating armouries. IMO guidelines and recommendations for standards for floating armouries and practices to increase awareness seem like steps that could promote confidence and reassurance around the HRA. This would require greater interest in the issue of floating armouries by flag states.
16. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not define the status of vessels carrying arms in international waters and therefore the responsibility and jurisdiction in this case lies only with the vessel's flag state. However, many of the floating armouries in operation today fly flags of convenience, such as Panama or Sierra Leone.<sup>19</sup> Djibouti, Mongolia and St Kitts and Nevis all reportedly recognise the particularities of floating armouries when issuing flag state approval for vessels used

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<sup>16</sup> Gallagher, Paul and Owen, Jonathon. 2014. 'Exclusive: Anti-pirate security staff all at sea after major firm suddenly goes bust.' *The Independent*. 29 July.

<sup>17</sup> UN 2012, Para. 116.

<sup>18</sup> PTI 2013.

<sup>19</sup> Houreld 2012.

for this purpose. The St Kitts and Nevis registry has declared it has not formulated regulations for floating armouries but has rather elaborated a set of minimum requirements for vessel registration.<sup>20</sup> One of the provisions is that the operators hold a licence or permit to carry out storage, import/export, purchasing and use of arms and ammunition stored on the vessel (e.g. the operator holds a UK-issued OTGCL-MAP). This means that the UK-issued licenses are utilised by flag states as an assurance.

17. UK PMSCs have stressed that they control their arms and ammunition in accordance with UK licensing requirements, including on authorized floating armouries, and they are able to exercise control and prevent diversion.<sup>21</sup> Some UK PMSCs desire clearly agreed standards for floating armouries. These could be related to UK licensing requirements or subject to the international ISO/PAS 28007, which sets some basic standards for their operations, training and qualifications.<sup>22</sup> One UK based company that is ISO/PAS 28007 certified has noted these standards only apply to the armed guards it carries on board its own floating armoury for security purposes and not to the floating armoury as a whole.<sup>23</sup>
18. One can question the emphasis on self-regulation for floating armouries. The market for floating armouries is competitive. In an attempt to entice customers, new floating armouries tend to offer lower prices than those charged by well-established floating armouries. New entrants to the market can push down prices across the board, with the result that floating armouries with good safety and security standards might begin to cut corners on security and safety.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, there is still a need for oversight and monitoring of floating armouries by entities located outside the PMSC industry.
19. The lack of regulation and oversight has prompted concerns with the security and safety of PCASP, arms and ammunition on board floating armouries. It has also limited efforts to understand the scale of the floating armoury issue, map their location and monitor their use, as well as investigate suspicious activities and lax standards that could provide conditions for diversion of arms and ammunition or increase the likelihood of an attack by pirates or terrorists. At present, it seems that it will take a terrible incident or disaster involving a successful attack on a floating armoury for the international community to pay attention to the issue and push for common standards and regulation. Indeed, the current approach by governments to floating armouries has been entirely reactive, rather than seeking to undertake

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<sup>20</sup> Communication with St. Kitts and Nevis International Ship Registry, 9 September 2014.

<sup>21</sup> McMahon, Liz. 2013. 'Unwanted weapons pile up at Mombasa as pirate attacks fall'. *Lloyds Loading List*. 17 July.

<sup>22</sup> See ISO (International Organization for Standardization). 2013. 'ISO/PAS 28007:2012 - Ships and marine technology -- Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) providing privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) on board ships (and pro forma contract)'. 7 January. <[http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue\\_detail?csnumber=42146](http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=42146)>

<sup>23</sup> Interview with a company operating a floating armoury, UK, 23 May 2014

<sup>24</sup> Interviews with PMSCs, 21 and 22 May 2014

measures to prevent such a disaster. Floating armouries currently appear responsive primarily to demand for their services – i.e. market forces – and poorly secured floating armouries could therefore thrive in an environment in which some PMSCs utilise price as a key criterion for selection.

20. There are currently very different approaches to the issue of arms transfers to PMSC and the use of floating armouries. However, it is worth noting that UK policy and practices appear to have a significant influence and impact upon the approaches of other states on regulating and monitoring arms transfers to PMSC and the use of floating armouries. The issue of strengthening regulation and monitoring of floating armouries is an issue that merits consideration in an international setting, via an exchange of information or considerations on common minimum standards. Considering the leading role played by UK PMSCs and government in the development and use of floating armouries, it seems fitting that a responsible UK government should be among the first to take the necessary steps in advancing such a process.

September 2014

### **Written evidence from the Campaign Against Arms Trade (AEC0004)**

The Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) in the UK is working to end the international arms trade. This has a devastating impact on human rights and security, and damages economic development. CAAT believes that large scale military procurement and arms exports only reinforce a militaristic approach to international problems.

1. This submission looks at the conflict situations where the UK government has reviewed its export licences over the past year; the priority given to export promotion including the UK Trade and Investment Defence and Security Organisation (UKTI DSO) "priority markets"; and the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills about turn on the transparency initiative.

#### **Conflict situations**

2. The UK government reviewed, or announced the results of a review, of export licences in response to three conflict situations since your Committees' last deadline for submissions in September 2013. These were with respect to Egypt following the overthrow by the army of elected President Morsi in July 2013; Russia after its annexation of Crimea in March 2014 following the ousting of Ukraine's elected President the previous month; and Israel in July 2014 as it bombed Gaza.

#### **Egypt**

3. In the case of Egypt, after some licences had already been revoked, the Export Control Organisation (ECO) implemented a European Union Foreign Ministers' agreement by

suspending, on 28th August 2013, 49 existing licences as well as the processing of new licence applications for the Egyptian Army, Air Force and Internal Security Forces or Ministry of the Interior until further notice. After assessing the suspended licences in greater detail, on 25th October 2013 the ECO announced that 24 licences would have the suspension lifted as it did not judge the goods might be used for internal repression, seven would be revoked as there was a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression, and the remaining 16 would remain suspended because the goods might be used for internal repression.

## **Russia**

4. Prime Minister David Cameron announced on 10th March 2014 that, following a European Council meeting, he had ordered a review of arms export licences to Russia. A week later, on 18th March 2014, then UK Foreign Secretary William Hague made a statement to the House of Commons announcing that the UK would “with immediate effect suspend all extant licences and application processing for licences for direct export to Russia for military and dual use items destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine.”

5. Licences were also to be suspended “for exports to third countries for incorporation into equipment for export to Russia where there is a clear risk that the end product will be used against Ukraine.” This was a limited suspension, arms exports which were judged not for use against Ukraine could continue. CAAT has had sight of the response from the ECO to a Freedom of information request that shows that, while 28 standard licences (to a value of almost £37 million) were suspended and Russia was removed as a possible destination for a further six ‘open’ licences, 246 permanent standard licences (to a value of £142,545,186) and 49 ‘open’ licences remained extant. However, many people thought there was an arms embargo and the Government was happy for this impression to continue.

6. The shooting down of a Malaysian passenger plane over eastern Ukraine on 17th July 2014, reportedly by pro-Russian fighters, prompted an EU “arms embargo” though export licences could still be issued if the contract was agreed before 1st August 2014. Further sanctions were imposed on dual-use goods on 12th September 2014.

## **Israel**

7. The military action by Israel against Gaza in July and August 2014 led to the deaths of over 2,000 Palestinians and the destruction of many homes as well as hospitals and other vital infrastructure. However, the many calls to the UK government for an end to the arms trade and military collaboration with Israel went unheeded. However, it did lead the Prime Minister to say on 4th August 2014 that all export licences would be reviewed.

8. On 12th August 2014 the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) announced the results of the review. CAAT was amazed to learn that even twelve licences “identified for components which could be part of equipment used by the Israel Defence Forces in Gaza” were to be suspended only if the fighting started again. Fighting did resume on 20th August 2014, but the UK government did not consider it a “resumption of significant hostilities” so the licences

were not suspended. There is now, thankfully, a ceasefire. Giving evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 9th September 2014, Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond cited Hamas rocket attacks on Israel as a justification for UK government inaction.

9. There was no review of the wider military relationship with Israel. For example, Israeli drone manufacturer Elbit Systems is working with Thales UK on a UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) contract worth nearly £1 billion.

### **Arms company interests always put first**

10. In all these cases, the UK government and European Union actions seem designed to do the absolute minimum possible to appease public feeling. Whether deliberate or merely convenient for the Government, the impression was conveyed that the restrictions were further reaching than they were.

11. While Prime Minister David Cameron, in, for instance, his speech to the House of Commons on 10th March 2014 (Hansard, col 25), emphasised the need for a united EU message to Russia, in practice this has meant EU sanctions are limited to those acceptable to the Member State least willing to act. France did not want to stop its deal with Russia to provide two Mistral-class helicopter assault ships that were under construction. Even after the downing of the plane, the EU sanctions did not affect deals agreed before 1st August 2014 to allow the French ships contract to proceed.

12. The Russia and Israel cases also highlight the global nature of the arms industry and the consequent challenges for national government export licensing. Before the crisis over Ukraine the military-industrial relationship between Russia and the UK was booming. The two countries were finalising a Military Technical Cooperation Agreement. According to the *Daily Telegraph* on 26th January 2014, the agreement would allow their companies to share information with, and buy components from, one another. As this Agreement was not signed, it did not, on this occasion, impede any licensing considerations.

13. However, the military-industrial relationships with Israel were long-standing. In 2002 then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw allowed "the importance of the UK's defence and security relationship with the incorporating country" (Hansard, 8.7.02, col653w) to be taken into account when making decisions against the export licensing criteria. This change was made to allow head-up displays for F-16 aircraft ultimately destined for Israel to be exported to the United States.

14. The letter dated 19th August 2014 from Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond to your Chair mentions that, of the twelve licences that have been identified where there is a "risk they could be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law", eight were for items to be incorporated into equipment manufactured in the US and Germany. CAAT's lawyers, Leigh Day, received a letter from Edward Bell, Head of the ECO, dated 15th September 2014. Leigh Day had asked for details of the twelve licences including their dates and what the licences were for. The ECO cited Freedom of Information exemptions to withhold most of the information asked for, but did provide the dates when the twelve applications were granted.

15. Ten of the dates were prior to 31st March 2014, the latest date for which the usual ECO data is in the public domain. Checking the licence dates against the disaggregated ECO data, CAAT thinks the Foreign Secretary should have included Italy in the list of incorporating countries as, on two of the dates, that would appear to be the only relevant licence.

16. Assuming this is the case, the details of the ten licences follow.

\*07/03/13 is one of  
 imaging cameras (Israel direct)  
 components for military parachutes (US incorporation)  
 military airborne equipment (Germany incorporation)  
 military training aircraft components (Italy incorporation)  
<http://bit.ly/1unwfdm>

\* 13/03/13 is one of  
 equipment employing cryptography (Israel direct)  
 components for combat helicopters (Italy incorporation)  
<http://bit.ly/1vbF9c2>

\* 17/06/13  
 military helicopter components (Italy incorporation)  
<http://bit.ly/ZLH7oN>

\* 26/06/13  
 products for military support aircraft (Italy incorporation)  
<http://bit.ly/1spRIm8>

\* 26/07/13 is one of  
 components for military targeting equipment (Israel direct)  
 products for combat aircraft (Italy incorporation)  
<http://bit.ly/1sXNXi3>

\* 23/09/13 two licences issued on this date so *two* of  
 components for military aero engines / military aero engines (Israel direct)  
 equipment employing cryptography (Israel direct)  
 components for military aircraft (US incorporation )  
<http://bit.ly/1wLvjom>

\* 06/12/13  
 components for military radar (Germany incorporation)  
<http://bit.ly/1tZcp72>

\* 23/01/14 is one of  
components for combat helicopters (Italy incorporation)  
 corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment (Israel direct)

components for electronic warfare equipment (Israel direct)

components for targeting equipment (Israel direct)

<http://bit.ly/Y74bgx>

\*12.2.14 is one of

components for combat helicopters (Italy incorporation)

components for targeting equipment (Israel direct)

components for submarines and tanks (Germany incorporation)

<http://bit.ly/1tZcHe8>

17. The incorporation licences involve sales from the Germany, Italy and the United States to many countries besides Israel. Concern about military-industrial relationships is likely to have played a role in the decision to leave these licences extant. No analysis has (yet) been published on the use UK weaponry by Israel, as was done by then Foreign Secretary David Miliband on 21st April 2009 (Hansard, col 9ws) after Operation Cast Lead. It is impossible, therefore, to know what UK equipment might have been used. However, providing parts for combat aircraft and military helicopters certainly gives cause for concern.

18. Making the "resumption of significant hostilities" a requirement for licence suspension, as with the case of Israel, is also a worrying development. Israel's action in Gaza is not a one-off; in Egypt there have been two coups; while Russia has previously invaded Georgia. The presumption should surely be that any military equipment exported to the military and security forces in these countries must stand a good chance of being used, even if not immediately, in actions most people in the UK would not support. Such licences should never have been issued.

19. The responses to all three situations were also unsatisfactory in that all exports of military equipment, whether or not they can directly be used in repression, send a message of UK support to the recipient government, undermining calls to respect human rights and end conflict. The interests of the arms industry must not be put first.

### **Treaty makes no difference as promotion is priority**

20. The UK ratified the Arms Trade Treaty in April 2014. CAAT has always been sceptical about the Treaty. If it was in force during the past year, it would seem most unlikely that it would have led to any reduction even in the transfers that have been the subject of most controversy and concern over the past year.

21. Time and again the UK government claims the UK operates some of the most "rigorous" arms export controls in the world (see [rigorousrepetition.tumblr.com](http://rigorousrepetition.tumblr.com)). In reality, however, it is at best a policy of "arms control by embarrassment," with the UK supplying weapons with little regard for the record of the buyer country and only, sometimes, revoking licences at times of crisis when it is already too late.

22. CAAT agrees with your Committees when, in your July 2014 report, you say: "the Government's arms export policy is essentially one of reacting to events and not taking sufficient account of the nature of the regimes concerned at the point when the decision is made to approve the export licence or not." This is unlikely to change while the priority is arms export promotion, not control.



### **Priority markets for UK arms exports**

23. The 130 civil servants working for the UKTI DSO promote military and security equipment sales around the world, working on behalf of private arms companies, but paid for by the UK taxpayer. It is good that knowledge of, and interest in, the UKTI DSO priority markets list has grown since CAAT raised the matter with your Committees in December 2010. That the Business Secretary wrote pro-actively to the Chairs of the Foreign Affairs Committee and your Committees with the 2014/5 list, together with an explanation as to why each country was included, is welcome.

24. In summary, however, the explanations are that these countries provide good opportunities for the export of UK military and security equipment. An accompanying note by the Business Secretary dismisses concerns about Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

25. CAAT fully supports your Chair's recommendation that "the Government explain to Parliament and the wider public more fully why Saudi Arabia is listed by the Business Department as a Priority Market for arms exports whilst simultaneously being listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as being a country of major human rights concern, and also why Bahrain has now been added to the Business Department's Priority Markets List notwithstanding the continuing concerns about human rights in that country."

26. Military exports should not be viewed solely on a case-by-case basis, but the overall impact of the UK government support they convey to the recipient country should also be very much taken into consideration. For instance, the support shown the Saudi and Bahraini governments by continuing sales efforts is an affront to all working for human rights in those countries. The use of the royal family, for example Prince Charles' trip to Saudi Arabia in February 2014 to secure the Eurofighter Typhoon deal for BAE Systems, reinforces the message of support that accompanies arms sales. The promotion of arms sales is muting the UK's criticism of human rights abuses.

27. Reuters reported on 21st July 2014 that, referring to Russia and the Russian separatists in Ukraine, the Foreign Secretary said: "They have been supplying them, they have been supporting them, they have been providing them with succour. They cannot deny their responsibility for the acts that these people are carrying out." The same should be said of UK with respect to arms sales into areas of conflict or repression.

28. Besides Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, the inclusion on the priority list of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates raises concerns. As well as being authoritarian regimes, these countries are among those alleged to have supplied military equipment to, and supported different sides in, the armed struggles raging in the Middle East and North Africa. UK-produced equipment could well end up being used in these terrible conflicts, with their dire humanitarian consequences. Introducing more weaponry into the area is the last thing the civilians living there need.

29. It is good that Libya was dropped as UKTI DSO priority market in April 2014, given that by September 2014 factional fighting has forced the Libyan government to flee to a car ferry off Tobruk. That it should have been on the priority market list in 2013/14, as well as earlier, should raise questions about the Government promotion of military exports to conflict zones and the dangers of viewing conflict as an opportunity for arms sales.

30. Arms fairs have continued to be used to promote military and security exports to the most repressive regimes. In 2014 such exhibitions have included Security and Policing in March, the Farnborough Airshow in July and the NATO Summit in September. Even where there were no official visitor delegations, such as with Russia at Farnborough, the UK government allows the commercial organisers of the event to decide on the exhibitors. The Russian state-owned Rosoboronexport was present at the Airshow and able to promote its wares.

#### **About turn on export licensing transparency**

31. CAAT had welcomed much in the July 2012 Government Response to the BIS Transparency in Export Licensing Consultation and was dismayed to read of the retreat from greater transparency as described in the Notice to Exporters 2013/18 issued on 31st July 2013 with regard to Open Licences. In our September 2013 submission to your Committees, CAAT said this represented a major step back from the greater transparency promised by Business Secretary Vince Cable, and was not in line with the July 2012 Response. If the published information was not to include ratings / goods description nor, as it appeared, the value, it would be almost meaningless, especially as Open Licences often cover an extremely wide range of equipment.

32. Questioned on 18th December 2013 at a meeting of your Committees about this apparent about turn, Edward Bell of the ECO talked of "strong representations of EGAD [Export Group for Aerospace & Defence] .. and [trade association] ADS, as well." CAAT followed this up by making a Freedom of Information request for copies of documents of these communications.

33. The documents CAAT was given are not explicit about what changed and company names were redacted but it is clear that:

a) there were a lot of technical problems, for example a company asking how its systems which capitalise everything could be made compatible with the ECO system which did not, or asking if 1.2.c.3 is the same as 12C3;

b) a major problem occurred during a big test in June 2013 which resulted in information being sent to the wrong companies.

34. Having read these documents, CAAT suspects that the apparent technical problems caused Ministers to retreat from providing the public with more information about Open Licences. CAAT hopes these technical difficulties will not be allowed to derail an important point of principle. Events of the past year have shown that the transparency agenda needs to be extended, not curtailed. There may need to be some adjustments to the process and/or extra time taken to implement an effective solution, but such a rapid, ragged retreat indicates a weakness of political will.

#### **Work of your Committees**

35. Finally, CAAT would like to thank your Committees for the work you have done since 2010. The consistent questioning of the Government about its arms export policies and decisions has done much to shed light on the issue during a period of upheaval in many of the countries which are recipients of the arms and other strategic equipment licensed by the UK government. Without doubt, your Committees have done a great deal to hold the Government accountable and this is much appreciated.

September 2014

### Written Evidence from Privacy International (AEC0005)

1. Founded in 1990, Privacy International (PI) is a registered UK charity that campaigns on the right to privacy at an international level. Our work aims to fight against unlawful surveillance and other intrusions into private life by governments and corporations and seeks to ensure that technological developments strengthen rather than undermine every individual's right to a private life. PI has developed particular expertise in the trade of surveillance systems given the devastating impact this unregulated trade has had on the basic right to privacy as well as fundamental political and civil freedoms across the world. PI has been at the forefront of international efforts to introduce oversight to the surveillance industry and to put to an end the current situation that allows private, including UK based, companies to sell surveillance systems to repressive regimes where it is used to maintain a stranglehold over free expression, smother political dissent and target individuals for arrest, torture and execution.
2. The focus of this submission on the sale and export of surveillance technologies, is also supported by Human Rights Watch, Reporters sans frontieres, Digitale Gesellschaft, and Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'Homme (FIDH) who urgently call upon the UK Government to take action and address the growing human rights concerns relating to their continued unchecked proliferation.
3. This submission covers: (1) General background and policy (2) the Wassenaar Arrangement, (3) UK Export Credit guarantees for surveillance technology, (4) Proliferation of surveillance technologies, (5) HMRC's investigation into potentially illegal exports

#### General background and policy

4. Surveillance industry experts value the global trade of surveillance technology at approximately \$5 billion a year<sup>25</sup>. Privacy International has documented how surveillance equipment has been used to track the activities of dissidents, human rights activists, journalists, those living under and fleeing from authoritarian governments. New technologies allow the communications, daily activity, and geographic movements of millions of people to be captured, analysed and stored both cheaply and efficiently. The emerging information and communications infrastructures are being hijacked for the purpose of surveillance, and the

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<sup>25</sup> Bloomberg, 22 November 2011; <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-22/spies-fail-to-escape-spyware-in-5-billion-bazaar-for-cyber-arms.html>

information thereby collected is facilitating a wide variety of human rights violations including unlawful interrogation practices, torture and extrajudicial executions.

5. Privacy International welcomes the Committee's previous focus on this issue, and its scrutiny of UK Government policy regarding exports of surveillance technologies. The profile of the use and export of surveillance technologies, particularly to countries with poor human rights records, has risen substantially in the last 12 months and PI along with members of the "Coalition Against Unlawful Surveillance Exports", strongly urge the Committee to continue its scrutiny of UK policy on this topic, especially as the technologies in question are often used to assist in internal repression, and commit human rights abuses.
6. Privacy International<sup>26</sup> is pleased to be part of the Steering Committee of the Coalition Against Unlawful Surveillance Exports (CAUSE<sup>27</sup>) alongside Human Rights Watch<sup>28</sup>, Amnesty International<sup>29</sup>, Reporters sans frontieres<sup>30</sup>, the New America Foundation's 'Open Technology Institute'<sup>31</sup>, Digitale Gesellschaft<sup>32</sup>, and the Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'Homme (FIDH)<sup>33</sup>. Launched in April 2014, CAUSE is calling on governments to take coordinated international action to halt the proliferation of surveillance technologies; to update their export regulations; and to prevent these technologies from being used to violate fundamental human rights. CAUSE has attracted additional support from Index on Censorship, Omega Research, Campaign Against the Arms Trade, Big Brother Watch, Article 36, Global Witness, Bahrain Watch, the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, and Free Press Unlimited amongst others.
7. The purveyors of surveillance technology claim that such equipment is necessary for legitimate law enforcement investigations, but do not acknowledge there is usually an absence of a legal framework that would allow a clear lawful basis for the operation of these systems. Sellers of such equipment also attempt to deflect human rights criticism by denying any responsibility for the use of the technologies as it is the 'client' and not the company, that operates the software in the course of any investigation<sup>34</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> <https://www.privacyinternational.org/>

<sup>27</sup> Coalition Against Unlawful Surveillance Exports: (CAUSE) <http://www.globalcause.net/>

<sup>28</sup> <http://www.hrw.org/>

<sup>29</sup> <http://amnesty.org/>

<sup>30</sup> <http://en.rsf.org/>

<sup>31</sup> <http://oti.newamerica.net/>

<sup>32</sup> <https://digitalegesellschaft.de/>

<sup>33</sup> <http://www.fidh.org/>

<sup>34</sup> Response from 'Hacking Team' to HRW Ethiopia Report 2014 p.134:  
[http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia0314\\_ForUpload\\_1.pdf](http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia0314_ForUpload_1.pdf)

8. PI also believes this is a contravention of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights<sup>35</sup> and the UK's adherence via the Good Business Implementation Guide<sup>36</sup>, which establishes a corporate responsibility to respect human rights, specifically to "seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business relationships"<sup>37</sup>. Similarly, the Guiding Principles declare that a State "should set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory ... respect human rights throughout their operations".<sup>38</sup>
  9. Privacy International believes that surveillance technology companies are failing to meet the standards set in these guidelines, and in line with their own obligations, the UK Government must ensure that those companies operating from the UK adhere to their human rights obligations. PI notes that the UK Government intends to "develop guidance to address the risks posed by exports of information and communications technology that are not subject to export control but which might have impact on human rights including freedom of expression on line"<sup>39</sup>.
  10. Despite international regulatory developments, there currently remains limited licensing requirements for the export of the wide range of surveillance equipment from the UK. Regulatory oversight in the form of updated export controls, and establishing human rights as a high priority when considering these exports is urgently required if the UK wants to meet its human rights commitments and foreign policy objectives.
- **Recommendations:**
11. PI recommends that the UK Government is proactive in seeking input and expertise from civil society and NGOs working in the area of human rights and technology, and proceeds without delay in placing a stronger emphasis on human rights and the end user actions in the export of surveillance technologies, including within broader ICT categories.

### The Wassenaar Arrangement

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<sup>35</sup> [http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR\\_EN.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf)

<sup>36</sup> HMG, Good Business: Implementing the UNGP on Business & Human Rights, September 2013: [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/236901/BHR\\_Action\\_Plan\\_-\\_final\\_online\\_version\\_1.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/236901/BHR_Action_Plan_-_final_online_version_1.pdf)

<sup>37</sup> [http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR\\_EN.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf) - 13(b)

<sup>38</sup> [http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR\\_EN.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf) - 2

<sup>39</sup> HMG, Good Business: Implementing the UNGP on Business and Human Rights, September 2013, p.11 [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/236901/BHR\\_Action\\_Plan\\_-\\_final\\_online\\_version\\_1.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/236901/BHR_Action_Plan_-_final_online_version_1.pdf)

12. PI agrees that coordinated international action is more effective than unilateral controls of surveillance technologies, as it narrows international regulatory imbalance. However, while international level changes to export regulations progress via the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), it is of increasing concern that due to complications of adoption at EU level, the domestic framework of EU member states including the UK, is falling behind non-EU member states, creating an imbalanced, exploitable international regulatory regime.
13. PI welcomes the adoption at the WA Plenary of December 2013 of two categories of surveillance technology, including software and technology that is used to create and control malicious software, or what the UK Government has termed "Advanced Persistent Threat Software and related equipment" (i.e. 4.A5, 4.D4, 4.E1.c<sup>40</sup>) as well as "IP network communications surveillance systems" (i.e. 5.A1.j). Privacy International is hopeful that the UK will continue to push for inclusion of further categories of surveillance technology at forthcoming WA Plenaries.
14. While PI believes that WA is an appropriate forum for international harmonization of dual use regulations, this does not preclude other avenues from producing results. PI notes that Germany, a major exporter of conventional arms and surveillance technologies, has recognised the problem of the lack of appropriate export controls for surveillance technologies and has decided to take interim measures in this area. In May 2014, the German Minister for Economics Sigmar Gabriel indicated a unilateral change regarding the export of surveillance technologies to countries that "suppress civil rights and do not accept human rights"<sup>41</sup>. The Minister gave indications that Russia and Turkey<sup>42</sup> would be two countries affected by the restrictions.
15. PI encourages the UK Government, in light of unilateral action by a European ally, to adopt similar export policies relating to surveillance technologies. The UK Government should make human rights in the end user country a high priority when approving or overseeing their export, and therefore bring UK policy in line with Germany as, at a minimum, an interim measure prior to any adoption of a new EU Dual Use Regulation.
16. The WA is the sole international regulatory body concerned with the trade of surveillance technologies, yet the scope of the discussions relating to export controls do not and are not likely to include human rights concerns, despite their increasing use to assist internal repression and surveillance of human rights defenders inside and

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<sup>40</sup> Wassenaar Arrangement 04 December 2013: <http://www.wassenaar.org/controllists/2013/WA-LIST%20%2813%29%201/WA-LIST%20%2813%29%201.pdf>

<sup>41</sup> <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/internetueberwachung-gabriel-plant-exportstopp-von-spaeh-software-1.1969189>

<sup>42</sup> <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/germany-clamps-down-on-spy-tech-exports-to-turkey-citing-human-rights-deficiencies-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=66756&NewsCatID=510>



beyond their domestic borders. The closed nature of the WA Plenary remains a concern for PI and other NGOs with no avenue for the inclusion of outside expertise, evidence, or subsequent transparency mechanisms surrounding the discussions.

- **Recommendations:**

17. At WA discussions, the Government, in conjunction with leading allies, should continue to advocate for the adoption of further controls of surveillance technology which can be used for internal repression.
18. The Government should, without delay, bring UK export policy in line with Germany, a major exporter of surveillance technology, ahead of any changes / updates to the EU Dual Use legislation. This should include placing a stronger emphasis on the human rights history of the end user when considering an export of surveillance technologies that can be used to assist in internal repression, or violate fundamental human rights.
19. The UK Government should strongly advocate for mechanisms to allow for greater and regular civil society inclusion and external expertise in export control discussions at a national, EU and international / WA level.
20. Privacy International strongly suggests a full review by the UK Government, in consultation with civil society, of technologies that can be used to violate fundamental rights and assist internal repression.

#### UK Export Credit guarantees for surveillance technology

21. PI is deeply concerned at continued UK exports of surveillance technology to countries with internationally criticised human rights records. This includes Indonesia, where several months prior to crucial legislative (April) and Presidential (July) elections in 2014, a purchase of surveillance equipment was made using export credit guarantees provided by the UK Government.
22. Through the Indonesian Ministry of Defence, the Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS) of the Indonesian Military (TNI) purchased £4.2 million worth of unspecified but sophisticated “wiretapping equipment” in September 2013, in an effort to “boost its eavesdropping capability”<sup>43</sup>. The equipment in question was sold by the UK registered company “Gamma TSE Ltd.” a member of the Gamma Group of companies which includes “Gamma International”, previously a supplier of the intrusion software ‘FinFisher’ (now divested to a German company FinFisher GmbH) which

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<sup>43</sup> The Jakarta Post, “TNI to step up surveillance”, September 23, 2013, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/09/23/tni-step-surveillance.html>



evidence suggests has been discovered in Egypt<sup>44</sup>; Bahrain<sup>45</sup>; Ethiopia<sup>46</sup>; Turkmenistan<sup>47</sup>; Malaysia and others<sup>48</sup>. According to sources in Indonesia, while it was unknown what equipment the TNI purchased, the “sale of the surveillance company’s equipment to military organisations was rare”<sup>49</sup>. The export in question was procured using export credit guarantees from the UK Government.

23. The Indonesian House of Representatives expressed “concern that the equipment, especially the wiretapping devices, could easily be abused during the run-up to the 2014 general election”<sup>50</sup>. Similarly, five leading Indonesian civil society groups warned against the “bugging of activist and civilians’ e-mail and phones”<sup>51</sup>, noting that Gamma TSE had supplied surveillance equipment to Bahrain, Bangladesh, and Mexico. They raised concerns over the discovery of FinFisher software in Malaysia, connected to that country’s general election in March 2013<sup>52</sup>.

24. Human rights organisations have detailed a continuation of abuses and human rights violations perpetrated by the Indonesian security services. Evidence from Amnesty International<sup>53</sup>, Human Rights Watch<sup>54</sup> and the Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme (FIDH)<sup>55</sup> highlights excessive use of force, arbitrary detention, beatings, torture and other forms of ill-treatment against political activists and

<sup>44</sup> F-Secure, “Egypt, FinFisher Intrusion Tools and Ethics” March 8, 2011: <http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002114.html>

<sup>45</sup> Bloomberg, “Cyber Attacks on Activists Traced to FinFisher Spyware of Gamma” July 25, 2012: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-25/cyber-attacks-on-activists-traced-to-finfisher-spyware-of-gamma.html>

<sup>46</sup> The Independent, “Ethiopian political refugee living in London alleges he was victim of ‘unprecedented example of espionage on British soil’” February 17, 2014: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/ethiopian-political-refugee-living-in-london-alleges-he-was-victim-of-unprecedented-example-of-espionage-on-british-soil-9134523.html>

<sup>47</sup> Spyfiles; “FinFisher: FinFly ISP Project “Turkmenistan”” 2011: [https://wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/GAMMA\\_2011\\_TMFinFinF\\_en.html](https://wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/GAMMA_2011_TMFinFinF_en.html)

<sup>48</sup> ‘Citizen Lab’ Report, University of Toronto, “For Their Eyes Only”, original May 2013, updated September 2013: <https://citizenlab.org/storage/finfisher/final/fortheireyesonly.pdf>

<sup>49</sup> The Jakarta Globe, “TNI surveillance purchases triggers concerns in Indonesia”, September 24, 2013, <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/tni-surveillance-purchase-triggers-concern-in-indonesia/>

<sup>50</sup> The Jakarta Post, “TNI to step up surveillance”, September 23, 2013, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/09/23/tni-step-surveillance.html>

<sup>51</sup> The Jakarta Post, “New Intelligence devices not for surveillance”, September 27, 2013, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/09/27/new-intelligence-devices-not-surveillance.html>

<sup>52</sup> The Jakarta Post, “Time for greater transparency in surveillance” December 14, 2013, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/12/14/time-greater-transparency-surveillance.html>

<sup>53</sup> Amnesty International Annual Report 2013 – Indonesia, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/indonesia/report-2013>

<sup>54</sup> Human Rights Watch World Report 2013 – Indonesia, <http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/indonesia>

<sup>55</sup> FIDH, [http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/parallel\\_report\\_fidh-kontras.pdf](http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/parallel_report_fidh-kontras.pdf)

peaceful demonstrators. In Papua, security forces enjoy virtual impunity for abuses<sup>56</sup> and at times use lethal force against peaceful proponents of independence<sup>57</sup>.

25. Privacy International wrote (30 September 2013) to both the UK Export Control Organisation (ECO) within the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, and UK Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) / UK Export Finance regarding the licensing requirements for this export, and what human rights assessments were carried out regarding Indonesia. In their response (30 October 2013), ECO confirmed that it was not aware of the information reported in the Jakarta Globe or Jakarta Post and it had “not received an export licence application for this export” and “therefore no assessment against the Consolidated Criteria” could be made. As no export licence was applied for, ECO was unable to provide assurance that the transfer did not include FinFisher.
26. ECGD confirmed<sup>58</sup> (30 October 2013) that “as the overall transactional value was below 10 million SDR [Special Drawing Rights, approximately £9.5million], it fell below the eligibility threshold for assessment under OECD Common Approaches”, relating to assessments on environmental, social and human rights grounds. ECGD would not release information on the content of the shipment, as disclosure would “reveal details of commercially sensitive information” and that the public interest in withholding that information outweighed the public interest in releasing it.
27. Similarly, in a Parliamentary answer of 6 March 2014, the Minister of State for Business and Enterprise confirmed that no export licence application was received and no assessment was made regarding the potential human rights violations associated with use of the technology<sup>59</sup>.
28. Privacy International is deeply concerned with the current policy which permits the government supported export of goods without an export licence or human rights impact assessment, from a UK based supplier closely associated with sellers of malicious software which can be used to assist internal repression, to a military end-user and known violator of human rights, and allowing for confidentially concerns to outweigh legitimate human rights concerns. Privacy International is also concerned at

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<sup>56</sup> Amnesty International Annual Report 2012 – Indonesia, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/indonesia/report-2012>

<sup>57</sup> Human Rights Watch World Report 2014 – Indonesia, <http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/indonesia>

<sup>58</sup> Letter from UK Export Finance to Privacy International, 30 October 2013, [https://www.privacyinternational.org:4443/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/file-downloads/foi1391\\_response\\_letter\\_30.10.13.pdf](https://www.privacyinternational.org:4443/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/file-downloads/foi1391_response_letter_30.10.13.pdf)

<sup>59</sup> Hansard, 6 March 2014: [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm140306/text/140306w0003.htm#140306w0003.htm\\_wqn35](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm140306/text/140306w0003.htm#140306w0003.htm_wqn35)

the apparent lack of inter-departmental communication regarding the need for, and approval of, export licences of technologies if supported by export credit guarantees.

- **Recommendations:**

29. Privacy International urges the Government to give priority to human rights concerns when assessing exporting surveillance technology through Export Credit guarantees.
30. Crucially, Privacy International believes it is imperative the UK Government halt exports of such goods if the end user is a recognised human rights abuser.

### Proliferation of surveillance technologies

31. Mounting evidence from Privacy International, Reporters sans frontières<sup>60</sup>, FIDH<sup>61</sup>, Human Rights Watch<sup>62</sup>, academic research<sup>63</sup> and others clearly show that foreign governments are increasingly using surveillance technologies to assist in internal repression, unlawful violations of privacy, crackdown on free speech and journalism, restrict political participation, target opponents at home and abroad, and violate fundamental human rights.
32. Evidence continues to show that human rights activists and political refugees, including UK residents, have been actively targeted by surveillance technologies provided by UK companies to foreign governments. 40GB of documents released from the hacking of a Gamma International support server in August 2014<sup>64</sup>, appears to indicate the Bahraini Government targeted 77 computers belonging to prominent human rights lawyers, opposition politicians, activists and journalists amongst others<sup>65</sup>. Gamma International has previously stated they had never sold their products to the Bahraini Government, instead claiming the Government was possibly using a stolen demonstration copy<sup>66</sup>. However, support logs released from the server show multiple requests purportedly from Bahraini officials to Gamma International,

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<sup>60</sup> Reporters sans frontières, Enemies of the Internet 2014: <http://12mars.rsf.org/2014-en/>

<sup>61</sup> FIDH: "Opening of a judicial investigation targeting Qosmos for complicity in acts of torture in Syria" <http://www.fidh.org/en/europe/france/15116-france-opening-of-a-judicial-investigation-targeting-qosmos-for-complicity> 11 April 2014

<sup>62</sup> Human Rights Watch Ethiopia Report – "They Know Everything We Do: Telecom and Internet Surveillance in Ethiopia" <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2014/03/25/they-know-everything-we-do> 25 March 2014

<sup>63</sup> "When Governments Hack Opponents: A Look at Actors and Technology" – July 2014 - W. Marczak, J. Scott-Railton, M. Marquis-Boire, V. Paxon - <http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/govhack.ussec14.pdf>

<sup>64</sup> Netzpolitik, 6 August 2014, <https://netzpolitik.org/2014/gamma-finfisher-hacked-40-gb-of-internal-documents-and-source-code-of-government-malware-published/>

<sup>65</sup> Bahrain Watch, 7 August 2014, <https://bahrainwatch.org/blog/2014/08/07/uk-spyware-used-to-hack-bahrain-lawyers-activists/>

<sup>66</sup> Bloomberg, July 27 2012, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-27/gamma-says-no-spyware-sold-to-bahrain-may-be-stolen-copy.html>

asking for technical support in the use of the FinSpy software due to technical failures in targeting key individuals.

33. Other documents released from the same server, confirms the provision of FinIntrusion Kit support, where an "annual support contract is required to receive[d] such upgrades and updates" and up to 5 years of "After Sales Support & Update" licenses is offered. This highlights that not only are UK based surveillance companies offering sophisticated surveillance capabilities to governments with internationally criticised human rights records, but there is a continued provision of IT support and customer care after the purchase.
34. Further information from the documents revealed that FinFisher has also been found in use in Pakistan<sup>67</sup>, a country on the Foreign & Commonwealth Office list of "Countries of Concern"<sup>68</sup>. As with the Bahrain evidence, information reveals requests for assistance were made from Pakistan to the FinFisher Customer support team in 2011 with various complaints<sup>69</sup> that the "*trojan can not be integrated with powerpoint*", and that it was a "*real annoyance*" that the Pakistani services can only secretly infect the user with some interaction required on the users part. Human rights abuses in Pakistan are well documented, with continuous reports of unlawful killings, torture and extrajudicial executions by the security forces<sup>70</sup> targeting of human rights defenders, killings of journalists, and various counterterrorism abuses<sup>71</sup>. Reporters sans frontieres ranks Pakistan 158 in the world for Press Freedom<sup>72</sup>, as the widespread censorship of internet sites, social media, and the use of network filtering tools dramatically affects free expression and privacy.
35. In February 2014, Privacy International called on the UK National Cyber Crime Unit to investigate the alleged contravention of Section 1 of RIPA and the unlawful interception of communications of an Ethiopian political refugee, resident in the UK since 2009<sup>73</sup>. Tadesse Kersmo fled years of surveillance and harassment in Ethiopia following his activities with the political opposition. While in the UK, Mr. Kersmo became active with an Ethiopian opposition group in exile, and initial forensic examination of Mr. Kersmo's computer suggests it has been targeted by FinFisher malware. Similarly, in February 2014 the US advocacy group, the Electronic Frontier

<sup>68</sup> Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Countries of Concern 2013-14, <http://www.hrdreport.fco.gov.uk/>

<sup>69</sup> Digital Rights Foundation, 22 August 2014, <http://digitalrightsfoundation.pk/2014/08/pakistan-is-a-finfisher-customer-leak-confirms/>

<sup>70</sup> Amnesty International, Annual Report 2013 <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/pakistan/report-2013>

<sup>71</sup> Human Rights Watch World Report, 2014 <http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/pakistan?page=2>

<sup>72</sup> Reporters sans frontieres, World Press Freedom Index 2014 <http://rsf.org/index2014/en-index2014.php>

<sup>73</sup> Privacy International, 17 February 2014 <https://www.privacyinternational.org/resources/legal-action/criminal-complaint-to-national-cyber-crime-unit-on-behalf-of-tadesse-kersmo>

Foundation (EFF), filed suit against the Ethiopian Government on behalf of an Ethiopian-US citizen, after the discovery of Gamma's FinSpy on his laptop at his US home, citing a breach of Maryland state law and the US Wiretap Act<sup>74</sup>.

36. Privacy International and other NGOs have previously warned of the dangers posed by the global proliferation of these technologies. This development shows UK residents are susceptible to surreptitious surveillance by foreign governments using surveillance technologies. The placing of human rights defenders, and political refugees granted asylum in the UK under secret surveillance is a worrying development. Furthermore, there is currently little avenue for legal remedy or recourse for victims of this surveillance if carried out by foreign governments.

#### HMRC's investigation into potentially illegal exports

37. Since 2012, Privacy International has been seeking clarification from the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and HMRC regarding the need for surveillance technologies such as FinFisher to require export licences. BIS confirmed that technologies such as FinFisher would require a licence for export, however HMRC had repeatedly refused to provide information on its ongoing investigation into alleged breaches of export control law, after being presented with evidence that the technology was being used in Bahrain, Egypt and Turkmenistan – including the targeting of UK residents.
38. Parliamentary Answers showed a blanket refusal to comment or provide information on any potential investigation of these exports by HMRC stating "HMRC cannot comment on individual cases", that it works under a "strict rule of confidentiality", and it would "neither confirm nor deny" it was conducting an investigation<sup>75</sup>.
39. Following legal action and a Judicial Review in May 2014, over 18 months after Privacy International lodged its complaint, the UK High Court declared that HMRC acted unlawfully and "irrationally", and its actions had been "simply inconsistent with the legislation" by issuing blanket refusals into the status of any investigation<sup>76</sup>. The ruling showed that the public is entitled to know if HMRC is undertaking an investigation into the potentially illegal export of Gamma's FinFisher to repressive regimes. In the ruling, the High Court ordered HMRC to re-take its decision.

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<sup>74</sup> EFF, <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/08/eff-ethiopia-illegal-wiretapping-illegal-even-governments>

<sup>75</sup> Hansard, 23 January 2013; 28 January 2013; 16 October 2013;  
[http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm130123/text/130123w0001.htm#130123w0001.htm\\_wqn38](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm130123/text/130123w0001.htm#130123w0001.htm_wqn38)  
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm130128/text/130128w0004.htm#1301293001502>  
[http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm131016/text/131016w0001.htm#131016w0001.htm\\_wqn12](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm131016/text/131016w0001.htm#131016w0001.htm_wqn12)

<sup>76</sup> Privacy International 12 May 2014, <https://www.privacyinternational.org/news/press-releases/high-court-slams-hmrc-for-unlawful-concealing-of-information-surrounding-export>

40. Privacy International welcomes the findings of the Judicial Review, but remains seriously concerned at the continued slow progress of the Government investigating potential unlawful exports of technology that can be used to assist governments in internal repression. Privacy International is deeply concerned by the practice of HMRC in refusing to provide answers to legitimate questions by bodies which the Judicial Review claimed "can act as guardians of the public conscience"<sup>77</sup>.

**Recommendations:**

41. Privacy International strongly urges the UK Government to be fully transparent in its investigations to interested parties, regarding breaches of export controls of surveillance technology, especially when presented with evidence of its use to violate human rights.

September 2014

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<sup>77</sup> High Court Judgment, paragraph 77,  
[https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/downloads/press-releases/privacy\\_international\\_v\\_hmrc\\_approved\\_judgment\\_12\\_05\\_14.pdf](https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/downloads/press-releases/privacy_international_v_hmrc_approved_judgment_12_05_14.pdf)

## Written evidence from the UK Working Group on Arms (UKWG) (AEC0006)

### Recommendations

1. The UKWG recommends the following:

#### *Arms export licensing to Israel in relation to the Gaza Crisis*

2. The UK Government should immediately suspend and/or revoke any licence that its own review identified as at risk of being used by the Israeli military in Gaza. This must include all licence types, including items exported that risk being ‘incorporated’ and re-exported to Israel. This should remain in place until there is no longer a substantial risk that these items could be used in breach of Criterion 2 of the UK’s national transfer control guidelines or Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT. The Government should urgently and publicly state that a “resumption of significant hostilities” will not be a threshold by which export licences are assessed in future, particularly in relation to the application of Criterion 2 of the UK national export control guidelines or the criteria contained within the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

3. The Government should continue to apply the lessons of the review of export licences promoted by the Arab Spring uprisings, which concluded that in areas of unfolding crisis where it was impossible to make meaningful risk assessments against the national criteria, the default position should be to suspend and/or revoke licences.

4. The CAEC should examine current Government user-guidance issued to officials on the application of UK transfer licensing policy, especially in relation to Criterion 2 of the national transfer criteria. That should include any guidance related to the implementation of the guidance issued on ‘incorporation’ of UK-supplied components and in particular how the decisions on incorporation cases to Israel are made in relation to the application of the national transfer criteria or obligations under Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT.

#### *Russia*

5. Whenever the UK Government makes a substantial change to arms transfer policy, it should publish detailed information regarding amended, suspended and/or revoked and still-extant licences to any country so affected, and ensure that any public misconceptions are addressed without delay.

6. The Government should apply arms embargoes to all relevant transfers including those arranged before the embargo was put in place.



*The provision of arms to Kurdish groups in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)*

7. Given the previous issues surrounding the transfers of arms and ammunition into the Middle East region, the UK Government should provide further information on the following questions relating to the transfer of arms to Kurdish groups in Iraq:

- How does the UK Government intend to ensure that any weapons supplied to forces fighting in Iraq are not diverted to groups in Iran, Syria or Turkey or elsewhere?
- How will the Government ensure that stockpile security of transferred arms and ammunition will be maintained?
- How does the UK Government intend to monitor end-users and recipients?
- How has the Government addressed the potential conflict between the transfers authorised and Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Consolidated Criteria for export licences?
- Given that the transfer of such weapons is already public knowledge, and that other governments have made public detailed lists of the types and quantities of equipment being transferred, can the UK Government give information on the types and quantities and end-users of weapons transferred?
- Is it the Government's intention to continue to transfer arms and ammunition to Kurdish groups until the stated aim of defeating ISIL is completed, or is this intention more limited in nature? If the former, what quantities, time frame and number of shipments are envisaged?
- How has the Government established that the recipients of transferred arms and ammunition have the necessary command-and-control structures in place to ensure that the end-users are sufficiently trained and accountable for their actions?
- To what extent is the Government co-ordinating its actions with other states that are also transferring arms and ammunition? How are states ensuring that the needs of certain groups are met without contributing to a significant (further destabilising) arms build-up?

*Open licences and transparency initiative*

8. The CAEC should seek urgent clarification from the Government as to the source of the industry opposition that prompted the sudden decision to scale back the previously announced proposals under the Transparency Initiative.

9. The Government should reverse its decision to scale back its commitments made under the Transparency Initiative in order that meaningful transparency and scrutiny of these licences can take place. At a minimum, this must include provision of information including a description or rating of all items exported under open licences, and details of the quantity or value. In addition, all licences detailed in the Government's reports on

strategic exports – including open licences, standard individual export licences and trade licences – should be accompanied by specific information that would identify whether the end-user was army, navy, air force, police or other government end-user in the destination country, including any foreign government end-user.

10. The Government should now report on exact quantities of SALW exported under open licences. Indeed, without a requirement to report on the quantities of small arms exported, given the heightened proliferation concerns associated with these items, SALW should not be eligible for open licensing.

#### *Variability of Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs)*

11. The UK Government should examine the feasibility of publishing additional information on OIELs such that external observers are able to better understand their implications and potential consequences. As a first step, the Government should provide meaningful information to interested parties regarding the frequency, extent and type of conditions applied to OIELs, and then consult on the type of information that would be useful, the circumstances where extra transparency would be of real value, and how it could be provided.

#### *New consolidated criteria*

12. The Government should explain how the difference between the introductory language of the original Consolidated Criteria—i.e. where there is “concern that the goods might be used for internal repression or international aggression”—and the language of criteria 2 and 4—i.e. where there is a “clear risk that the items might be used” for internal repression or international aggression—is applied in practice. The Government should further explain how it proposes to reconcile its position between the two in future.

#### *Conflict analysis*

13. The CAEC should seek clarification on whether and how conflict analysis undertaken by other agencies or departments of the UK Government engages with the arms transfer licensing process.

#### *Arms fairs: advertising activities and compliance*

14. The Government should clarify in writing to the CAEC that promotion and advertising of Category A goods are fully captured by existing export control legislation relating to brokering and trafficking activities and should commit to fully investigate and prosecute any future allegations of promoting Category A goods at arms fairs. Given there have been no prosecutions in this area to date, the Government should amend and strengthen secondary legislation to make it clear that any promotional or advertising

material for Category A goods on display at UK arms fairs would constitute a criminal offence.

15. The Government should, as a matter of urgency, clarify whether the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Clarion Defence and Security Ltd and the Export Control Organisation laying out the compliance requirements for Defence and Security Equipment International 2015 (DSEi) has been revisited and signed. The MoU should also be published, or at the very least, provided to the CAEC to allow timely scrutiny.

16. Given repeated breaches of UK trade control regulations at UK trade events, the UK Government should put in place more robust procedures to prevent further breaches, including a requirement for all companies to submit all of their promotional literature to organisers/the Government for approval in advance and a compulsory ban on any future activity in the UK (including trade fair attendance) of a company found to be promoting prohibited equipment.

17. Any state that has not signed and ratified the Cluster Munitions Convention, and any company that has not signed a written guarantee that it (or any subsidiary or partner) does not produce cluster munitions or their components, should be prohibited from attending any trade event in the UK.

*Arms fairs: attendance*

18. The Government should restrict invitations to arms fairs in the UK to delegations or exhibitors from or representing states that have ratified or at least signed the ATT.

*Strengthening Council Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005*

19. The UKWG recommends that the UK Government ensure that effective measures are introduced to fully implement Commission Implementing Regulation EU No. 775/2014 and that adequate outreach measures are put in place to ensure that UK companies are informed of the extended scope of goods whose trade is either controlled or prohibited.

20. The UK Government plays an active and constructive role through the WPTQ to strengthen the Commission proposals, prior to their adoption, to include the following elements in the Regulation:

- Effective controls on companies brokering deals potentially resulting in the trade in goods covered by the Regulation;

- Prohibition of companies promoting in their commercial marketing, as well as through exhibitions and trade fairs in EU countries, the sale of equipment the trade in which is banned under the Regulation;
- A clause to effectively regulate the provision of technical assistance by EU companies, specifically prohibiting training in techniques that facilitate torture and ill-treatment;
- A provision to effectively prevent the trade in pharmaceutical chemicals when intended for use in lethal injections, without endangering the legitimate trade in such chemicals for medical purposes;
- A 'catch all' clause allowing all Member States to immediately prohibit the trade in goods where it is known that the items are likely to be used for torture, ill-treatment or the death penalty, even if they are not specifically listed under the Regulation. Such a measure, to which the UK Government has previously committed itself, would bring controls on torture and death penalty goods in line with similar end-use provisions in place for weapons of mass destruction and arms embargoes.

#### *Arms Trade Treaty*

21. The UK Government should use development funds allocated for security sector reform to support universalisation, ratification and implementation of the ATT; it should prioritise support for ATT implementation as part of its security and justice sector programming; and it should provide technical as well as financial assistance.

22. The UK Government should support the continued full participation of States Signatories and supportive civil society during the preparatory meetings for the Conference of States Parties, while ensuring that decision-making powers lie solely with the States Parties, as is usual for Treaty regimes.

23. In order to ensure the stability and sustainability of the ATT, the UK Government should support the highest possible proportion of ATT-regime costs being met through mandatory, or 'assessed', contributions.

#### *Arms export licensing to Israel in relation to the current Gaza Crisis.*

24. In relation to arms exports to Israel during the current crisis in Gaza, the UK Working Group on Arms (UKWG) is concerned that the Government has not followed its own existing export licensing criteria, including its obligations under Articles 6 and 7 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).<sup>78</sup> In the UKWG's view, these obligations are clear, and require the UK to not supply military equipment where there is a clear risk that such equipment might be used in the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights

<sup>78</sup> Although the ATT will not enter into force until 24 December 2014, the UK Government when depositing its instrument of ratification (2 April 2014) declared that it would apply provisionally Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty pending its entry into force.

law, including violence against women and children. The Government's own internal review identified 12 specific licences covering a range of military equipment including components for military radar systems, combat aircraft and tanks, “which could be part of equipment used by the Israel Defence Forces in Gaza”, yet it decided not to suspend or revoke any of these licenses unless there was a resumption of “significant hostilities”<sup>79</sup>. It has since been established that eight of these 12 licences related to equipment due to be incorporated and re-exported to Israel from third countries.<sup>80</sup>

25. The UK remains a small but significant supplier of military equipment to Israel, including some equipment destined for use by the Israeli military. While details of these specific licences have not been published to date, the UK has licensed a range of military equipment to Israel, including components for air-to-surface missiles and surface-to-surface missiles, combat aircraft, military combat vehicles, unmanned air vehicles, combat naval vessels, targeting equipment and electronic warfare equipment, small arms ammunition and sniper rifles, military aero engines and targeting equipment.<sup>81</sup> In this context, it should be noted that previous government investigations have concluded that components of UK origin have almost certainly been used in previous armed attacks by the Israeli military in Gaza. This included components for combat aircraft exported to the US and incorporated into systems that were subsequently re-exported to Israel.<sup>82</sup>

26. The July 2014 escalation of violence during Israel's Protective Edge military campaign once again saw Hamas fire rockets indiscriminately into Israel, while the Israeli military action in Gaza, which has included attacks on schools and hospitals, has been widely condemned as disproportionate and contrary to international humanitarian law. As at 25 August 2014, according to the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the total number of casualties stood at 2,076 Palestinians, 67 Israelis and one foreign national. The conflict has left at least 470,100 people internally displaced and destroyed or seriously damaged an estimated 17,000 buildings.<sup>83</sup> In response to these long-established concerns over the conduct of hostilities on all sides to this conflict, members of the UKWG including Amnesty International UK, Action on Armed Violence, Article 36, the Omega Research Foundation, Saferworld and the United National Association-UK called for a full arms embargo to be imposed on all sides to the current conflict.

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<sup>79</sup> Announcement by Vince Cable, Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills on UK arms exports to Israel, 12 August 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-announces-findings-of-review-of-licensed-exports-to-israel>.

<sup>80</sup> See for example, Letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Committee on Arms Exports, dated 19 August 2014, <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/Arms-export-controls/140819-Philip-Hammond-Israel-Arms-Exports.pdf>.

<sup>81</sup> See ‘UK Working Group on Arms calls for full arms embargoes on Hamas and Israel’, *Saferworld*, 12 August, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/news-and-views/news-article/660-uk-working-group-on-arms-calls-for-full-arms-embargoes-on-hamas-and-israel>.

<sup>82</sup> See for example, the written ministerial statement to Parliament of 21 April 2009 by the-then Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, on UK exports to Israel, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090421/wmstext/90421m0001.htm>.

<sup>83</sup> Occupied Palestinian Territory: Gaza Emergency Situation Report (as of 25 August 2014, 0800 hrs), *The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*, [http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha\\_opt\\_sitrep\\_25\\_08\\_2014.pdf](http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_sitrep_25_08_2014.pdf).

27. The UKWG believes that by linking the suspension of licences to an arbitrary and subjective threshold such as resumption of “significant hostilities” the Government has set a fundamentally dangerous and alarming precedent for the future application of UK arms export policy. In doing so, we believe that it has essentially re-written existing rules in place which state that “the Government will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression [or] ... in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law.”<sup>84</sup>

28. The phrase “significant hostilities” appears nowhere in the existing transfer control criteria, nor in any user guides on implementation of criteria that we are aware of currently in use by licensing officials working across the EU. The term “significant hostilities” is not an objective standard recognised by Amnesty International for use in applying human rights considerations to export licensing decisions, nor by the Intentional Committee of the Red Cross in applying similar considerations relating to international humanitarian law. Under Criterion 2 of the existing transfer control guidelines, or indeed Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT, Government policy requires it to deny any export licences that risk being used for serious human rights violations, or violations of international humanitarian law, including the particular risks associated with violence against women and children. When assessing the likelihood that UK-supplied equipment could be used, that risk assessment must take into account previous evidence of the use of that (or similar) equipment in previous violations and whether those violations form part of an established pattern. In relation to conflict in Gaza the UKWG believe this threshold has already clearly been reached, which should have triggered an immediate cancelling of all export licences that risked being used in the current conflict.

**29. On this basis, the UKWG recommends that:**

- **The UK Government immediately suspends and/or revokes any licence that its own review had identified as at risk of being used by the Israeli military in Gaza. This must include all licence types, including items exported that risk being ‘incorporated’ and re-exported to Israel. This should remain in place until there is no longer a substantial risk that these items could be used in breach of Criterion 2 of the UK’s national transfer control guidelines or Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT.**
- **The Government urgently and publicly states that a “resumption of significant hostilities” will not be a threshold by which export licences are assessed in future, particularly in relation the application of Criterion 2 of our national export control guidelines or the criteria contained within the ATT.**

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<sup>84</sup> The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, *Hansard, Written Statements*, 25 March 2014, col. 9WS, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm140325/wmstext/140325m0001.htm#14032566000018>.

- The Government continues to apply the lessons of the review of export licences promoted by the Arab Spring uprisings, which concluded that in areas of unfolding crisis where it was impossible to make meaningful risk assessments against the national criteria, the default position should be to suspend and/or revoke licences.
- The CAEC examines current Government user-guidance issued to officials on the application of UK transfer licensing policy, especially in relation to Criterion 2 of the national transfer criteria. That should include any guidance related to the implementation of the guidance issued on ‘incorporation’ of UK-supplied components and in particular how the decisions on incorporation cases to Israel are made in relation to the application of the national transfer criteria or our obligations under Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT.

### *Russia*

30. The UKWG notes that in light of developments in Ukraine, over the course of this year the UK Government has introduced successive measures to restrict the transfer of military and dual-use goods to Russia, both unilaterally and as a member of the EU, including:

- A decision on 18 March to “suspend all extant licences and application processing for licences for direct export to Russia for military and dual use items destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine”, and to “suspend licences for exports to third countries for incorporation into equipment for export to Russia where there is a clear risk that the end product will be used against Ukraine”.<sup>85</sup>
- Progressive addition of Russia to the lists of prohibited destinations for a range of Open General Export Licences.
- The imposition on 1 August of an EU arms embargo and a prohibition on supply of dual-use items which are or may be intended for military end-use or for a military end-user in Russia.

31. While we support these measures, we still have a number of concerns regarding the extent and nature of their application and the way they were communicated.

32. The decision of 18 March to suspend some licences was seen by many as the Government in effect embargoing all arms sales to Russia.<sup>86</sup> This was, however, far from the case. According to information provided in response to a freedom-of-information (FoI) request

<sup>85</sup> Statement by Foreign Secretary, William Hague, to Parliament, 18 March 2014, published on the Foreign & Commonwealth Office website, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/russias-actions-in-crimea>.

<sup>86</sup> See, for example, Tony Paterson, ‘Germany halts weapons exports to Russia’, *The Telegraph*, 24 April 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/10785658/Germany-halts-weapons-exports-to-Russia.html>; ‘Britain suspends all arms exports to Russia as fears grow of military escalation in Ukraine’, *Liverpool Echo*, 18 March 2014, <http://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/britain-suspends-arms-exports-russia-6846702>.



immediately following the Foreign Secretary's statement, of 333 extant permanent standard and open individual licences for transfers to Russia, only 34 were suspended. The value of standard licences suspended was almost £37 million, while more than £142 million worth of licences was still in place.<sup>87</sup> In such circumstances, the UKWG believes it is the responsibility of Government to set the record straight, by providing more detailed information regarding which licences have been suspended and/or revoked, and which have not. However, not only did the Government take no such action, in July 2014 Secretary of State for Defence Michael Fallon stated—incorrectly—that “[the UK has] suspended all export licences to Russia—that has been the position since March.”<sup>88</sup>

33. The 18-March statement implies that decisions whether to suspend licences were taken at least in part on the basis of the identity of the end-user (i.e. licences were suspended for items “destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine”<sup>89</sup>). It is unclear, however, on what the Government bases its confidence that so many exports to Russia are not at risk of being used in Ukraine. In this context, further information would be welcome regarding the steps taken by the Government to identify who the (likely) end-user would be for each licence. Is the Government relying on end-use undertakings from Russia, or are independent assessments being made? As time and the conflict in Ukraine has gone on, the Government has made it clear that it places little faith in Russian statements regarding its conduct, for example with regard to the presence of Russian forces in Ukraine and the circumstances of the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines flight MH-17.<sup>90</sup> The Government should clarify whether this lack of trust has always and/or now extends to arms transfer end-use undertakings, and how this might impact upon future arms transfer licensing decisions.

34. The EU arms embargo of 1 August made a clear distinction between new deals, which are prohibited under the terms of the embargo, and existing contracts or licences, which may still proceed. It would seem that this was largely at the insistence of France, which has an existing contract to the value of approximately €1.2 billion to supply Russia with two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships.<sup>91</sup> This creates the situation whereby a transfer of the exact same item to the exact same end-user on the exact same date which would be prohibited as a matter of course if arranged post-1 August may be transferred if the deal was done earlier in the year. Such an anomaly throws into doubt the value and purpose of the embargo.

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<sup>87</sup> See Annex 2 for the relevant Freedom of Information request – BIS reference: 14/0495

<sup>88</sup> Christopher Hope, ‘Britain to review all its arms deals with Russia, David Cameron says’, *The Telegraph*, 23 July 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10986718/Britain-to-review-all-of-its-arms-deals-with-Russia-David-Cameron-says.html>.

<sup>89</sup> Statement by Foreign Secretary, William Hague, to Parliament, 18 March 2014, published on the Foreign & Commonwealth Office website, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/russias-actions-in-crimea>.

<sup>90</sup> ‘PM statement on Russia's actions in Ukraine’, *Prime Minister's Office*, 28 August 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-statement-on-russias-actions-in-ukraine>; ‘Britain says highly likely MH17 shot down by Russian-supplied missile’, *Reuters*, 26 July 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/26/us-ukraine-crisis-britain-idUSKBN0FV0IB20140726>.

<sup>91</sup> Cahal Milmo, ‘Malaysia Airlines MH17 crash: EU prepares tough sanctions package targeting Russian economy’, *The Independent*, 24 July 2014, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/malaysia-airlines-mh17-crash-eu-prepares-tough-sanctions-package-targeting-russian-economy-9627172.html>.

35. EU Member State Governments do however have the option of using their national discretion to apply the embargo to contracts previously agreed but not yet completed. Germany has shown leadership in this regard with the cancellation of a pre-existing €120 million contract held by German company Rheinmetall to build a new training facility for Russian infantry. The UKWG believes that as a matter of standard good practice the UK should apply the embargo to all transfers regardless of the date on which the contract and/or arms transfer licence was agreed. Furthermore, the Government should explain the process for agreeing the EU arms embargo on Russia and the rationale for excluding licences agreed prior to 1 August.

36. The UKWG believes that developments over the year with regard to arms transfers to Russia have highlighted several problems with UK arms transfer control policy more broadly.

**37. As a consequence, the UKWG recommends that in future the Government:**

- **Publish detailed information regarding amended, suspended and/or revoked and still-extant licences to any country where there is a substantial change on arms transfer policy, and ensure that any public misconceptions are addressed without delay;**
- **Apply arms embargoes to all relevant transfers including those arranged before the embargo was put in place.**

***The provision of arms to Kurdish groups in the fight against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)***

38. The threat posed by The Islamic State in both Iraq and the Levant region has been well documented. Kurdish resistance to ISIL in northern Iraq has come under significant pressure.<sup>92</sup> In response to pleas for support from Kurdish officials in the north, Western nations including the UK have started to provide military support, including small arms and light weapons (such as heavy machine guns and anti-tank missile launchers).<sup>93</sup>

39. There is a clear rationale behind the immediate support for Kurdish forces: to stop the spread of ISIL into strategically important zones, such as the Kirkuk oil field; the protection of civilians and displaced persons; and to provide support to the Iraqi army. However such transfers do raise questions which the UKWG feels require a Government response.

40. The history of arming third-party groups whose stated aims are broadly in line with those of Western governments (in this case the defeat of ISIL) is not a happy one. Transfers authorised for one stated purpose may be diverted for other uses to other groups whose aims

<sup>92</sup> Ruth Sherlock, 'Iraq: Islamic State leaves behind fear and humiliation in Kurdish settlement', *The Telegraph*, 13 August 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11031002/Iraq-Islamic-State-leaves-behind-fear-and-humiliation-in-Kurdish-settlement.html>

<sup>93</sup> Nigel Morris, 'Isis crisis: UK Government donating heavy machine guns and ammunition to Kurdish Peshmerga fighting Islamic State', *The Independent*, 9 September 2014, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/isis-crisis-uk-government-donating-heavy-machine-guns-and-ammunition-to-kurdish-peshmerga-fighting-islamic-state-9721397.html>; 'UK gifts arms and ammunition to Kurdish regional government', *Ministry of Defence*, 9 September 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-gifts-arms-and-ammunition-to-kurdish-regional-government>

are not compatible with the terms of the original transfer, or to groups who may share similar goals but whose behaviour in pursuit of those goals is unacceptable. There is evidence of problems of this nature occurring recently in Iraq<sup>94</sup> and Syria, where modern military hardware is now in the hands of human rights abusers.<sup>95</sup> ISIL has itself seized large quantities of Western-sourced equipment from defeated Iraqi forces. There are also regional sensibilities and security issues that need to be considered, including Turkey's relationship to Kurdish groups (and populations) in both Turkey and Northern Iraq. Kurdish groups are also active in Iran and Syria.<sup>96</sup> Members of Syrian-based Kurdish groups have reportedly been brought into Iraq to aid Kurdish forces there in the conflict with ISIL.<sup>97</sup> Given this context, it is clearly incumbent upon the UK Government to make a very careful assessment of the risks of diversion of any arms shipments into the conflict.

**41. Given the previous issues surrounding the transfers of arms and ammunition into the region, the UKWG recommends the UK Government provides further information on the following questions relating to the transfer of arms to Kurdish groups:**

- 1. How does the UK government intend to ensure that any weapons supplied to forces fighting in Iraq are not diverted to groups in Iran, Syria or Turkey?**
- 2. How will the government ensure that stockpile security of transferred arms and ammunition will be maintained?**
- 3. How does the UK government intend to monitor the end-users and recipients?**
- 4. How has the government addressed the potential conflict between the transfers authorised and Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Consolidated Criteria for export licences?<sup>98</sup>**
- 5. Given that the transfer of such weapons is already public knowledge, and that other governments have made public detailed lists of the types and quantities of equipment being transferred<sup>99</sup>, can the UK Government give information on the types and quantities and end-users of weapons transferred?**
- 6. Is it the Government's intention to continue to transfer arms and ammunition to Kurdish groups until the stated aim of defeating ISIL is completed, or is this intention more limited in nature? If the former—what quantities, time frame and number of shipments are envisaged?**

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<sup>94</sup> Martin Chulov, 'Islamic State has exposed Peshmerga's military vulnerability,' *The Guardian*, 12 August 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/12/islamic-state-peshmerga-vulnerability-kurdish-isis>.

<sup>95</sup> Ken Sengupta, Letter from the Defence Correspondent: American weapons are giving Islamist fighters the edge against the Kurds. *The Independent*, 19 August 2014, <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/letter-from-the-defence-correspondent-american-weapons-are-giving-islamist-fighters-the-edge-against-the-kurds-9677211.html>.

<sup>96</sup> 'Syrian Kurds provide Iraq's Peshmerga support against ISIS', *Middle East Monitor*, 4 August 2014, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/13236-syrian-kurds-provide-iraqs-peshmerga-support-against-isis>.

<sup>97</sup> Hannah Lucinda Smith, 'Syrian Kurds to help fight militants in Iraq', *The Times*, 5 August 2014, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/syrian-kurds-to-help-fight-militants-in-iraq/story-fnb64oi6-1227013324343>.

<sup>98</sup> 'Guidance: Assessment of export licence applications: criteria and policy', *Department of Business, Innovation and Skills*, first published 10 September 2012, <https://www.gov.uk/assessment-of-export-licence-applications-criteria-and-policy>.

<sup>99</sup> For example the German defence ministry published a list of equipment being transferred.

7. **How has the Government established that the recipients of transferred arms and ammunition have the necessary command and control structures in place to ensure that the end-users are sufficiently trained and accountable for their actions?**
8. **To what extent is the Government co-ordinating its actions with other states who are also transferring arms and ammunition? How are states ensuring that the needs of certain groups are met without contributing to a significant (further destabilising) arms build-up?**

*Open licences and transparency initiative*

42. The UKWG remains deeply concerned that the Government's decision to scale back on its commitment to improve reporting on open licences has significantly compromised any meaningful improvements in transparency over these types of licences. This has worrying implications for the ability of Parliament and civil society to scrutinise Government decision-making and whether it is meeting its obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) or national arms transfer licensing criteria.

43. In July 2013 it was announced that planned improvements would be significantly scaled back, including a reversal of previous commitments to publish more information on types and value or quantity of equipment transferred under open licences. Instead, the Government has committed only to provide information on the number of times per year that each open licence has been used and some limited information on the end-user. The frequency of reporting was also significantly scaled back, from the proposed quarterly to annually. The UKWG therefore has a number of specific concerns relating to the revised reporting requirements for open licences that exporters have been required to submit since January 2014.

44. Firstly, the failure to provide information on the volume or value of UK exports of controlled goods under specific open licences means that Parliament and the public will continue to be deprived of access to key information on the scale of UK arms transfers. As we noted in our 2013 submission, it is difficult to understand why the Government itself no longer wishes exporters to provide regular information relating to exports and transfers under open licences when timely access to such information could assist the Government in making informed decisions on future licence applications.

45. A second consequence of the transparency reversal is that exporters are now required to provide only very limited end-user information as per the generic categories of "government", "private individual", "commercial" or "other";<sup>100</sup> the UKWG is concerned that this does not address some of the most acute transparency concerns around the use of open licences. For example, the UKWG is aware that many OIELs, especially those covering a very broad range of lethal equipment, are essentially licences enabling exporters to repair or

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<sup>100</sup> See for example, 'Government user guidance on reporting against open licences', <https://www.spire.bis.gov.uk/docs/OpenLicenceReturnsGuidance.pdf>.

maintain equipment for a particular foreign government's armed forces, such as the navy, that maybe stationed or visiting the stated end-use destination on the licence (for more on this see paragraphs 53-54). In such cases the end-user of these licences would not be the government of the stated end-use destination in UK Government reports; rather, the actual end-user would be the government-owner of the equipment in question. The UKWG therefore sees an urgent need to rectify the current potential for misrepresenting the end-users of open licences and believes that the current intention to add information specifying "government", "private individual", "commercial", or "other" end-user of open licences would do little to address this concern. Failure to address this situation will perpetuate the current situation whereby Parliament and the public may be misinformed as regards even the country end-user of licences for a potentially wide range of offensive military equipment. Aside from the potential for misplaced suspicions and enquiries, it could also allow problematic transfers to go unchallenged in situations where end-user data suggests a 'safe' destination.

46. Building on practice emerging via the increased use of explanatory footnotes in the Government's own reports on strategic exports, the UKWG believes that all licences detailed therein – including open licences, standard individual export licences and trade licences – should be accompanied by a clear statement of the actual end-user. In the example used above, the end-user would be reported as the named foreign navy visiting the stated end-user destination. In this regard it is worth noting that in assessing licence applications the Government bases its decision *inter alia* on the actual military or security units stated as the end-user. It is established licensing practice that the UK may license the transfer of equipment to some but not other end-users within a state's security forces, for example, where there are significant concerns over human rights violations within a specific police or internal security unit, but no such concerns over exports of similar equipment to the navy or other sections of the armed forces. Therefore to be able to scrutinise Government policy in this area, it is important that information is reported on the types of "government" end-user within any specific country, for example if it is the "police, army, navy or air force".

47. The UKWG urges the CAEC to seek clarification from the Government as to the source of the opposition that prompted the sudden decision to scale back on the previously announced proposals under the transparency initiative. Having been involved in the stakeholder consultative process jointly with defence industry representatives, we believe that there was widespread agreement on the need to improve reporting of open licences for military-list equipment. It is possible that companies representing the dual-use sector that might have raised specific additional concerns. If this was indeed the case, given the primary focus for the review was always military-list items, we are confident that a working compromise for the dual-use sector to address any additional administrative burdens could be found without compromising on the necessary improvements to reporting on military-list items.

48. Since 2000, the Government has provided specific information on the quantities of small arms and light weapons (SALW) exported under Standard Individual Export Licences

(SIELs). This is largely due to heightened international concerns over the particular proliferation risks associated with transfers of SALW. This has provided considerable additional transparency and oversight of these particular exports over the last 14 years. The lack of any requirement to report on quantities of SALW exported under open licences is of particular concern given the number of open licences recently issued to private military and security companies (PMSCs) working in maritime anti-piracy. These open licences now cover an extremely wide range of SALW including assault rifles, machine guns, pistols, rifles, sniper rifles, sporting guns and ammunition. Given many of the stated end-use destinations for these items include countries such as Egypt, Madagascar, the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Yemen, it is in our view essential that quantities of SALW exported to these PMSCs are accurately reported and sufficiently scrutinised.<sup>101</sup>

#### 49. Recommendations:

- **The CAEC should seek urgent clarification from the Government as to the source of the opposition that prompted the sudden decision to scale back on the previously announced proposals under the transparency initiative.**
- **The Government should reverse its decision to scale back its commitments made under the Transparency Initiative in order that meaningful transparency and scrutiny of these licences can take place. At a minimum, this must include provision of information including a description or rating of all items exported under open licences, and details of the quantity or value. In addition, all licences detailed in the Government's reports on strategic exports – including open licences, standard individual export licences and trade licences – should be accompanied by specific information that would identify whether the end-user was army, navy, air force, police or other government end-user in the destination country, including any foreign government end-user.**
- **The Government should now report on exact quantities of SALW exported under open licences. Indeed, without a requirement to report on the quantities of small arms exported, given the heightened proliferations concerns associated with these items, SALW should not be eligible for open licensing.**

#### *Variability of OIELs*

50. The developments with regard to Russia this year (see paragraphs 30-35 above) have raised questions about the conditions that are applied to different OIELs, and how more information about these conditions could be made available so as to deliver a real increase in transparency without creating an unreasonable additional bureaucratic burden.

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<sup>101</sup> As of 9 June, 2014, there were 90 companies registered to use the maritime anti-piracy Open General Export Licence (see [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/325135/14-944-ogtel-maritime-registered-companies.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/325135/14-944-ogtel-maritime-registered-companies.pdf)). There is also an Open Individual Trade Control Licence currently in force for a number of destinations for vessels and platforms operating in international waters.



51. The UKWG has long understood that OIELs “allow a named exporter to export multiple shipments of specific goods to specific destinations, subject to meeting detailed terms and conditions.”<sup>102</sup> It was also known that on occasions additional conditions might apply, e.g. a licence might stipulate a named end-user, rather than permit transfers to any end-user within the territory of the destinations listed, though the UKWG believed that this was very much the exception and not the rule.

52. However, questions asked regarding still extant licences for exports to Russia (after it was announced that the UK was suspending *inter alia* “all extant licences and application processing for licences for direct export to Russia for military and dual use items destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine”<sup>103</sup>) have suggested the use of additional conditionality with regard to OIELs may be more common and more variable than the UKWG had understood.

53. Questions were asked of the Government in particular regarding one still-extant OIEL for transfers to Russia, details of which were obtained in response to a freedom of information request (for the full answer to the FOI request, see Annex 2). The licence permitted the transfer to Russia of the following equipment:

Aircraft cannons, components for air launched rockets, components for air-to-air missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft carriers, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for command communications control and intelligence software, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for depth charges, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for machine guns, components for military aero-engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval guns, components for naval mines, components for periscopes, components for sensor integration equipment, components for submarines, components for surface launched rockets, components for surface-to-surface missiles, components for targeting equipment, components for torpedoes, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon

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<sup>102</sup> ‘Guidance: Open Individual Export Licences’, 14 August 2012, <https://www.gov.uk/open-individual-export-licences>.

<sup>103</sup> Statement by Foreign Secretary, William Hague, to Parliament, 18 March 2014, published on the Foreign & Commonwealth Office website, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/russias-actions-in-crimea>.



mountings, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, machine guns, military aero-engines, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval engines, naval guns, technology for air launched rockets, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for depth charges, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for machine guns, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military radars, technology for torpedoes, torpedoes

54. In response to enquiries a Government spokesperson explained that this licence was for transfers of items exclusively for the use of “the Brazilian navy which enables their vessels to be repaired in 23 countries around the world, including Russia.”<sup>104</sup>

55. In subsequent discussions with officials, UKWG members suggested it would be in the Government’s interest to proactively share information regarding end-use and end-users where the lack of such information could create a misleading impression, as was the case on this occasion. This already happens in certain contexts on an *ad hoc* basis. For example, the listing for Israel in the Strategic Export Controls Country Pivot Report for calendar-year 2013 includes 64 “case and goods footnotes”, which provide additional information on, for the most part, end-use or end-user. These footnotes relate to both SIELs and OIELs.<sup>105</sup>

56. Government officials acknowledged the potential value in providing extra information across a wider range of licences. However they also expressed some scepticism on the grounds that the use of conditions is widespread while the nature of those conditions is highly variable, to the point where it may be difficult to do this on a systemic level but could prove unduly resource-intensive to extend the current *ad hoc* approach.

**57. The UKWG recommends that the Government examine the feasibility of publishing additional information on OIELs such that external observers are able to better understand their implications and potential consequences. As a first step, the Government should provide meaningful information to interested parties regarding the frequency, extent and type of conditions applied to OIELs, and then consult on the type of**

<sup>104</sup> Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘UK arms export licences for Russia still in place despite claims of embargo—report’, *The Guardian*, 23 July 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/23/arms-export-licences-russia-pm-embargo-report>.

<sup>105</sup> ‘Strategic Export Controls Country Pivot Report 1 January 2013-31 December 2013’, *Export Control Organisation*, <https://www.exportcontroldb.bis.gov.uk/sdb/fox>.

**information that would be useful, the circumstances where extra transparency would be of real value, and how it could be provided. This might be managed most efficiently as part of a broader package of measures that should be employed to reinstate the outcomes of the 2012 Transparency Initiative (see paragraphs 42-48 above).**

*New consolidated criteria*

58. On 25 March 2014, Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, announced revised Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria (Consolidated Criteria), which update the original Consolidated Criteria in light of subsequent developments, such as the passage of the UK Export Control Act 2002, the 2008 adoption of EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, and the 2013 adoption of the ATT.<sup>106</sup> The UKWG considered such an update to be long overdue.

59. The UKWG produced an analysis of the new Consolidated Criteria in July 2014 (for the full analysis see Annex 1).

60. In general terms and for the most part, the UKWG considers that the amendments to the Consolidated Criteria are welcome and served their purpose of bringing the Consolidated Criteria more into line with the EU Common Position; most discrepancies now are due to the fact that the update also provides for other relevant external changes that have occurred since the EU Common Position was agreed.

61. Nevertheless, a number of issues remain outstanding that the UKWG believe merit further explanation from the Government.

62. It would, for example, be helpful if the Government could give an assurance that there is no substantive difference between the instructions in the Consolidated Criteria to ‘not grant a licence’ and in the Common Position to ‘deny a licence’ in the event that a transfer would breach the criteria? The *act of denial* required under the Common Position creates a follow-on obligation on the part of the denying state to circulate information to other EU Member States and to consult in the event that a similar licence application is then received by another Member State; by contrast a failure to grant a licence, which could involve a passive lack of action, could be interpreted as involving no such obligation.

63. The UKWG would also urge the Government to explain the rationale behind the removal under criterion 1 of a reference to the 1991 P5 Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers?

64. The “other factors” section of the Consolidated Criteria continues to refer to giving “full weight” to the UK national interest (which is described in terms of *inter alia* economic, financial and commercial interests, collaborative defence production or procurement

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<sup>106</sup> The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, *Hansard, Written Statements*, 25 March 2014, col. 9WS, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm140325/wmstext/140325m0001.htm#14032566000018>.

projects, and protecting the UK's essential strategic industrial base). There is no parallel to this in the Common Position. Can the Government give a clear detailed explanation of exactly what is meant by “full weight” in this context and why it is still regarded as necessary to go beyond the language of the Common Position on this point?

65. The UKWG notes the concern expressed by the CAEC in its 2014 report that “the omission of the wording in the previous Consolidated Criteria that: ‘An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by [...] concern that the goods might be used for internal repression’ does constitute a substantive change of policy.”

66. We note also the Egypt case study of the UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 which states:

Following the increased instability during the summer of 2013 the EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) introduced a suspension on arms exports for Egypt—goods are suspended if we judge that they might be used for internal repression. This is a lower threshold than Criterion 2 which requires a ‘clear risk’ that the goods might be used for internal repression. ...

We continue to assess each licence on a case-by-case basis and closely monitor the security situation. When the FAC decides to lift the suspension we will revert to our longstanding policy for all licences and we will revoke any licence that is not consistent with that policy.<sup>107</sup>

67. We agree that this supports the CAEC assertion that there is a qualitative distinction between the introductory language of the original Consolidated Criteria and the Egypt case study quoted above, and the language of criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria which asserts “the Government will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression.”

**68. The UKWG recommends that the Government explains how these differing standards are applied in practice, and how it proposes to reconcile its position in this regard in future.**

### ***Conflict analysis***

69. The *Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria* contain obligations to refuse arms transfers in certain circumstances related to conflict, e.g. in light of risks that the items to be transferred would be used to provoke or prolong armed conflicts, or aggressively against another country.

70. It is unclear however, how officials establish the level of conflict risk associated with particular UK arms transfers, and how this impacts on decision-making processes when

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<sup>107</sup> ‘UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013’, HC480, 17 July 2014, p. 16. This explanation was confirmed in the letter of 6 January 2014 from the then Foreign Secretary William Hague to the CAEC Chair (‘Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2014): Volume III: Oral and written evidence’, *Committees on Arms Export Controls*, 23 July 2014, EV w194, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmquad/186/186iii08.htm#a36>).

granting a licence. There are several mechanisms within Government that could be used to assist with an assessment of conflict risk, such as the Cabinet Office's early warning and horizon scanning system, or cross-departmental conflict analyses (Joint Analyses on Conflict and Stability—JACS) carried out by the Stabilisation Unit. However, it is unclear which contexts are covered by these systems, whether they consider the potential impact of arms transfers, or how widely or to what extent they are used in arms transfer licensing decision-making. This raises the question of the extent to which decisions on arms exports are considered against any systematic conflict analysis at all.

**71. The CAEC should seek clarification on whether and how conflict analysis undertaken by other agencies or departments of the UK Government engages with the arms transfer licensing process.**

*Arms fairs: advertising activities and compliance*

72. The UKWG welcomes the publication of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Clarion Defence and Security Ltd (Clarion) and the Export Control Organisation (ECO) laying out the compliance requirements for Defence and Security Equipment International 2013 (DSEi).<sup>108</sup> However we are concerned that the MoU was only signed on 5 September 2013 when DSEi began on 10 September 2013 – leaving only 2 working days for Clarion to put the MoU into operation.

73. The compliance requirements detailed include stipulations such as:

- Ensuring relevant government agencies are represented at any pre-planning meetings related to compliance
- Putting in place a robust vetting regime in advance of and during the event
- Sharing all information on potential and actual licensable exhibits with relevant government licensing authorities

We are therefore surprised that the MoU was signed so close to the event and ask the CAEC to ascertain how the Government monitored and evaluated the implementation of the MoU in this timescale. Requesting the publication of details of, and minutes from all meetings between officials from the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS), Clarion Events and any other stakeholders relating to compliance issues may give some information.

74. The MoU between Clarion and the ECO states that Clarion is responsible for putting in place “a robust vetting regime in advance and during the open period of the show to identify companies who will/may/have previously engaged in promotion of the above licensable items, with a view to informing them of the requirement for licensing and, if necessary, preventing their attendance.”<sup>109</sup> Due to the failure to identify the prohibited goods before or

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<sup>108</sup> Memorandum of Understanding between Clarion Defence and Security Ltd and the Export Control Organisation on the issue of compliance with UK Export Control Legislation in relation to activities of all UK and international exhibitors at DSEi, 5 September 2013.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

during the event, the UKWG questions how robust the vetting regime was and what changes have been made to the vetting procedure to ensure that Category A goods are not promoted at future exhibitions. In 2013 Michael Fallon, the Minister of State for Business and Enterprise, stated that the MoU would be revisited before the 2015 exhibition to see if any alternations should be made.<sup>110</sup> Clarion is currently advertising DSEi 2015 to potential exhibitors and participants. The Government should urgently clarify whether the MoU for the 2015 exhibition has yet been revisited and signed. The MoU should also be published, or at the very least, provided to the CAEC to allow timely scrutiny.

75. We are disappointed that Her Majesties Revenue & Customs (HMRC) and the Crown Prosecution Service decided not to prosecute the two companies that were ejected from DSEi 2013 for promoting Category A goods—which includes cluster munitions and certain paramilitary goods that can be used for internal repression or torture. In this case Tianjin Myway International Trading Co (China) and Magforce International (France) were advertising electric-shock weapons and leg-cuffs in company brochures available to visitors.

76. In addition we are concerned that following the ejection of these two companies from DSEi the Government does not appear to accept that displaying brochures containing prohibited items at arms fairs breaches UK export controls despite this being clearly stated in Article 21 of the Export Control Order 2008. Moreover, the MoU between Clarion and the ECO regarding compliance at DSEi states that “Clarion will ensure that exhibitors are made aware that any material relating to the trade of Category A goods is prohibited unless specifically authorised by a valid Standard Individual Trade Control Licence.”<sup>111</sup> This shows that at the time of writing the MoU the ECO accepted that promotional materials are covered under export control legislation and therefore companies advertising these brochures are breaking the law. The Government should confirm to the CAEC that this is still the case and should commit to fully investigate any future allegations of promoting Category A goods at arms fairs with a view to prosecuting such activity wherever possible.

77. Although promotional literature pertaining to cluster munitions was not found at DSEi 2013 or the Farnborough International Airshow in 2014, companies have been found to be promoting these weapons at previous UK arms exhibitions, namely DSEi 2007, 2009 and 2011 and Farnborough International Airshow 2010. To prevent future promotion of cluster munitions, the Government should prohibit any state that has not signed and ratified the Cluster Munitions Convention, and any company that has not signed a written guarantee that it (or any subsidiary or partner) does not produce cluster munitions or their components, from attending any military or defence trade event in the UK.

#### **78. The UKWG recommends that:**

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<sup>110</sup> HC Deb, 26 February 2014, Cols 347—348W.

<sup>111</sup> Memorandum of Understanding between Clarion Defence and Security Ltd and the Export Control Organisation on the issue of compliance with UK Export Control Legislation in relation to activities of all UK and international exhibitors at DSEi, 5 September 2013.

- **The Government should clarify in writing to the CAEC that promotion and advertising of Category A goods are fully captured by existing export control legislation relating to brokering and trafficking activities and should commit to fully investigate and prosecute any future allegations of promoting Category A goods at arms fairs. Given there have been no prosecutions in this area to date, the Government should amend and strengthen secondary legislation to make it clear that any promotional or advertising material for Category A goods on display at UK arms fairs would constitute a criminal offence.**
- **The Government should, as a matter of urgency, clarify whether the MoU for DSEi 2015 has been revisited and signed. The MoU should also be published, or at the very least, provided to the CAEC to allow timely scrutiny.**
- **Given repeated breaches of UK trade control regulations at UK trade events, the UK Government should put in place more robust procedures to prevent further breaches, including a requirement for all companies to submit all of their promotional literature to organisers/the Government for approval in advance and a compulsory ban on any future activity in the UK (including trade fair attendance) of a company found to be promoting prohibited equipment.**
- **Any State that has not signed and ratified the Cluster Munitions Convention, and any company that has not signed a written guarantee that it (or any subsidiary or partner) does not produce cluster munitions or their components, should be prohibited from attending any trade event in the UK.**

### *Arms fairs: attendance*

79. In 2013 the UKWG raised concerns that Rostec, the parent company of Rosenboronexport was exhibiting at DSEi 2013. Similarly at the Farnborough International Airshow 2014 (14-20 July) Rosoboronexport, Rostec and the United Aircraft Corporation were exhibiting at a time when the UK had suspended military cooperation with Russia. Prior to the Farnborough International Airshow the UK Government stipulated that Russian companies were no longer eligible to use the Open General Export Licence (Export After Exhibition or Demonstration: Military Goods) and any Russian military equipment exhibited at Farnborough would require a SIEL for return of any equipment to Russia.<sup>112</sup> In addition the UK reportedly refused visas for some Russian government officials, industry leaders and

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<sup>112</sup> Notice to Exporters 2014/15: more changes to OGELs following suspension of all licences and licence applications for export to Russian military that could be used against Ukraine, 11 June 2014, <http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/open-licensing/httpblogs-bis-gov-ukexportcontroluncategorizednotice-to-exporters-201415-uk-suspends-all-licences-and-licence-applications-for-export-to-russian-military-that-could-be-used-against-ukraine/>



aerospace technicians thereby preventing them from attending the airshow, although Farnborough organisers stated that 75 per cent of the 400 registered individuals from Russia received UK visas.<sup>113</sup>

80. The UKWG welcomes the steps the UK Government took to discourage Russian attendance at Farnborough International Airshow when its military activities were drawing widespread condemnation. We would encourage the Government to adopt this approach more broadly and consider the international obligations and standing of all states represented at UK arms fairs.

81. In this regard we recommend that a company from any state that has not signed the ATT should be prohibited from attending any UK arms fair. At a minimum, any OGELs issued to allow companies to automatically participate at DSEi, Farnborough or any other UK arms fair should exclude companies originating from non-signatory states. Of the 35 countries to receive invitations from the UK Government to send official delegations to the Farnborough Airshow<sup>114</sup>, six were countries that abstained from the UN General Assembly vote on the ATT and have not yet signed the Treaty.<sup>115</sup> In addition, six were from states listed as Countries of Concern in the FCO 2013 Human Rights and Democracy Report.<sup>116</sup> The UKWG fails to see how the Government can justify inviting to an international arms fair representatives from countries that are not committed to the principles of the ATT or which the Government itself has deemed to have serious human rights issues.

**82. Invitations to arms fairs in the UK should be restricted to delegations or exhibitors from or representing States that have at least signed the ATT.**

### ***Strengthening Council Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005***

83. In 2006, the EU introduced the world's first multilateral trade controls to prohibit the international trade in equipment which has no practical use other than for the purposes of capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and to control the trade in a range of policing and security equipment misused for such violations of human rights. *Council Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005 of 27 June 2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment*<sup>117</sup> fills a major gap in human-rights-based export controls. It introduced unprecedented, binding trade controls on a range of equipment which is often used in capital punishment, torture and other ill treatment, but which has not usually been included on EU Member States' military, dual-use or strategic transfer control lists.

<sup>113</sup> 'Russia Fumes at UK Visa Ban', *Flight Daily News: Farnborough International Airshow Day 1*, 14 July 2014.

<sup>114</sup> 'UKTI DSO invitations to FIA 2014', *UK Trade & Investment Defence & Security Organisation*, updated as at 17 July 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukti-dso-invitations-to-fia-2014>

<sup>115</sup> These are India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

<sup>116</sup> These countries are Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Vietnam.

<sup>117</sup> 'Council Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005 of 27 June 2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment', *Official Journal of the EU*, L 200/1, 30 June 2005, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:200:0001:0019:EN:PDF>.



84. In July 2014, following a comprehensive review, the European Commission introduced *Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 775/2014*<sup>118</sup> which significantly expanded the lists of prohibited and controlled goods covered by Council Regulation 1236/2005. These changes are legally binding and directly applicable now in all 28 EU Member States. This expansion of scope is an important first step in an ongoing comprehensive overhaul of Council Regulation 1236/2005.

85. The European Commission, Council and Parliament are now engaged in a substantive review of the operation of Council Regulation 1236/2005. In January 2014 the Commission presented proposals for strengthening the operative mechanisms, including the annexes of controlled items.<sup>119</sup> The Commission proposals are now being considered by the Council of the EU within its Working Party of Trade Questions (WPTQ); the European Parliament will also start discussions this year on the Commission proposals within its Foreign Affairs Committee.

**86. The UKWG recommends that the UK Government ensure that effective measures are introduced to fully implement Commission Implementing Regulation EU No. 775/2014 and that adequate outreach measures are put in place to ensure that UK companies are informed of the extended scope of goods whose trade is either controlled or prohibited.**

**87. The UK Government plays an active and constructive role through the WPTQ to strengthen the Commission proposals, prior to their adoption, to include the following elements in the Regulation:**

- **Effective controls on companies brokering deals potentially resulting in the trade in goods covered by the Regulation;**
- **Prohibition of companies promoting in their commercial marketing, as well as through exhibitions and trade fairs in EU countries, the sale of equipment the trade in which is banned under the Regulation;**
- **A clause to effectively regulate the provision of technical assistance by EU companies, specifically prohibiting training in techniques that facilitate torture and ill-treatment;**
- **A provision to effectively prevent the trade in pharmaceutical chemicals when intended for use in lethal injections, without endangering the legitimate trade in such chemicals for medical purposes;**
- **A 'catch all' clause allowing all Member States to immediately prohibit the trade in goods where it is known that the items are likely to be used for torture, ill-**

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<sup>118</sup>Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 775/2014 of 16 July 2014 amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment', *Official Journal of the EU*, 17 July 2014, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L\\_.2014.210.01.0001.01.ENG](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.210.01.0001.01.ENG).

<sup>119</sup> 'European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005 concerning the trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, COM (2014) 1 final', 2014/0005 (COD), 14 January 2014.

**treatment or the death penalty, even if they are not specifically listed under the Regulation. Such a measure, to which the UK Government has previously committed itself, would bring controls on torture and death penalty goods in line with similar end-use provisions in place for weapons of mass destruction and arms embargoes.**

### *Arms Trade Treaty*

#### *Support for ATT ratification and implementation*

88. The fiftieth ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was tabled on 25 September 2014. As a result, the ATT will enter into force on 24 December this year. This is likely to lead to the first Conference of States Parties (CSP) being held between June and November 2015.

89. The UK's swift ratification of the ATT, together with necessary changes to national regulations and procedures (including revision of the Consolidated Criteria governing arms exports) is welcome. The current UK Government played an active role in negotiating the ATT, and the UKWG hopes that it will be equally active in pursuing its universalisation and full implementation such that a high normative standard is established. In this context it is important that a strong lead is taken at Ministerial level, through public statements and bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, in support of the ATT.

90. It is therefore unfortunate that recent comments by the Foreign Secretary, about selling tear gas to Hong Kong, send a very different message. The implications of his comments, that the canisters being used by the Chinese riot police were a legitimate export and that "CS gas is available from large numbers of sources around the world", are that he was endorsing an approach to arms transfers—"if we don't sell, someone else will"—which was thoroughly discredited in the 1990s and which if widely followed would seriously undermine the intent and potential benefits of the ATT.<sup>120</sup> **The UKWG urges the Government to explain its position over the transfer to and use of tear gas in Hong Kong and to make it clear that no violations of the ATT are acceptable.**

91. There are also several concrete steps the UK Government, along with other States Parties, should take to encourage participation in the ATT and adherence to its articles by other states. Those who remain outside the regime should not expect to be regarded similarly to those who by signing and/or ratified the Treaty are obliging themselves to place human rights and humanitarian law at the heart of their arms transfer controls. Such steps could include the following:

- Prior to entering into defence co-operation partnerships and, indeed, as part of the arms export licence assessment process, the UK Government should give full consideration to the recipient State's attitude to the ATT. If a State has not signed the ATT or consistently acts in a manner that is contrary to the object and purpose of the

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<sup>120</sup> Richard Norton-Taylor, 'UK firm that sold teargas to Hong Kong to review sales policy', *The Guardian*, 30 September 2014, [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/30/uk-firm-sold-teargas-hong-kong-review-sales-policy?CMP=tw\\_t\\_gu](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/30/uk-firm-sold-teargas-hong-kong-review-sales-policy?CMP=tw_t_gu).

Treaty, this should be taken into account at an early stage and should have a material bearing upon any decision involving the potential transfer or joint/licensed production of conventional arms.

- Those States that have not at least signed the ATT should be removed as permitted destinations on all open general licences.
- Promotion by the UK Government of the ATT should take precedence over its promotion of arms exports, especially in those circumstances where the commitment of the potential buyer-government to the ATT is unclear or absent.
- Invitations to arms fairs in the UK, and permission for UK companies to exhibit at or attend arms fairs in other countries, should be dependent on the attitude of the relevant States to the ATT (see paragraph 82).

**92. The UKWG also urges the UK Government to support ATT universalisation and implementation through the provision of significant financial and technical assistance programmes.** Many countries, particularly in Africa, need substantial technical, legal and financial assistance to allow them to ratify and effectively implement the ATT. We welcome the FCO's engagement through the UN to provide such assistance, especially in West Africa. However, UKWG is concerned that the FCO has only allocated a total of £350,000 for ATT support for the current financial year.

**93. The UKWG recommends that, in line with the Building Stability Overseas strategy, the UK Government should be encouraged to use development funds allocated for security sector reform to support ratification and implementation of the ATT, consistent with OECD-DAC guidelines on overseas development assistance expenditure. We note that the Government has said it will allocate at least 30 per cent of development aid to conflict-affected countries, and that US\$287 million has been spent by the UK in the past decade to support security and justice programmes.<sup>121</sup> The UKWG urges the Government to prioritise support for ATT implementation as part of its security and justice sector programming; this will have the effect of enhancing the Treaty's effectiveness while adding incentive to states to join the Treaty.**

#### *Strict Interpretation of ATT principles*

94. The impending entry-into-force of the ATT means that there is a renewed focus on the need for states that have signed and ratified the Treaty to uphold robust standards for arms export control. This is particularly relevant in the UK context given its position as one of the world's major arms exporters and the leading role that successive Governments have played in the establishment of the ATT.

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<sup>121</sup> Statement delivered by UK Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant To the UN Security Council debate on Security Sector Reform, 28 April 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-will-continue-to-support-security-sector-reform-around-the-world>.

**95. Accordingly, the UKWG believes the UK Government needs to improve its own practice if it is to stand as a strong example to others of how to implement the ATT.** Examples of inadequate practice highlighted in this Memorandum include recent transfer decisions with regard to Israel (as discussed in paragraphs 24-29). By setting a high standard itself the Government is then best-placed to promote effective implementation by others.

*Conference of States Parties process*

96. The preparatory process towards the first ATT CSP has made a positive start, with the first informal consultations held in Mexico City on 8 & 9 September. The discussions, which covered a range of issues including financing, rules of procedure for the CSP and the establishment of a provisional and a permanent Secretariat, took place in a positive spirit with significant common ground among participants. Much of this positivity could be attributed to the nature of the delegations present, with only States Parties, States Signatories and civil society that has been active in promoting the Treaty, in attendance.

97. It is imperative that this positive start continues throughout the remainder of the CSP preparatory process; this will only be assured if participation continues to be restricted to those states and civil society that have shown commitment to the ATT through signature/ratification and promotion of the ATT, respectively. On the linked issue of decision-making procedures, there was widespread support for the view that States Signatories and supportive civil society should be allowed to participate in the discussions of the preparatory meetings and of the CSP itself, but that decision-making power should lie solely with the States Parties, as is usual for Treaty regimes. **The UKWG recommends that the UK Government goes on the record in support of this approach regardless of any pressure that may be exerted by powerful signatory States.**

98. Finally, the issue of financing the ATT regime—including the operation of the CSP and the establishment and functioning of the provisional and permanent Secretariat—is likely to be one of the more complex issues facing the States Parties. Discussions in Mexico suggested there is significant support for the adoption of a ‘hybrid mechanism’, i.e. a combination of mandatory and voluntary contributions. **The UKWG recommends that the UK Government, in order to ensure the stability and sustainability of the ATT, should support the highest possible proportion of ATT-regime costs being met through mandatory, or ‘assessed’, contributions. Where voluntary contributions are utilised these should be un-earmarked funds, made available in support of the overall intentions and wishes of the States Parties. They should not be used to set up ‘pet-projects’ and potentially skew Treaty priorities at the behest of one or two wealthy States.**

## Annex 1:

### **The updated (2014) UK Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria: comparison with the original Consolidated Criteria and with the EU Common Position**

#### **UK Working Group on Arms, July 2014.**

The table below sets out in detail the language of the new Consolidated Criteria, how each of these differ from the previous incarnation and where there are still differences with the [EU Common Position](#) criteria. The first section below ('General') deals with several changes or differences—for the most part terminological—that are not specific to one criterion but that recur throughout. This is followed by a criterion-by-criterion analysis. Note that the general terminological points are not raised in the individual criterion analysis. Such changes may therefore exist even where the individual-criterion analysis records 'no change' or 'no difference'.

In general terms and for the most part, the amendments to the Consolidated Criteria are welcome (if overdue). They bring the Consolidated Criteria much more into line with the EU Common Position; most discrepancies now are due to the fact that the update also provides for other relevant external changes that have occurred since the EU Common Position was agreed (2008).

However, considering questions around consistency with the Common Position, subsequent developments and notions of best practice, further work would be welcome in several respects.

- The instruction to 'not grant a licence' is disappointing in comparison to the more active language of the Common Position, which calls upon Member States to 'deny a licence'. The *act of denial* obliges EU Member States to share information and to consult in the event that a similar licence application is then received by another Member State, whereas a failure to grant a licence involves no such obligation.
- The rationale behind the removal under criterion 1 of a reference to the P5 Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers should be explained.
- The UK NGO Working Group on Arms (UKWG) questions the continued references in the 'other factors' section of the Consolidated Criteria to "give full weight" to the UK national interest (which is described in terms of *inter alia* economic, financial and commercial interests, collaborative defence production or procurement projects, and protecting the UK's essential strategic industrial base). There is no parallel to this in the Common Position; the Government should give a clear detailed explanation of exactly what is meant by "full weight" in this context and why it is still regarded as necessary to go beyond the language of the Common Position on this point.

With regard to national standards and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), it is noteworthy that although the Consolidated Criteria have been updated in light of Treaty language on gender-based violence and violence against women or children, the same cannot be said for transnational organised crime. While the Consolidated Criteria (and the Common Position) do consider crime, the approach in the ATT is very different. In the Consolidated Criteria, in this context it is the general behaviour of the recipient state that is assessed, i.e. the Government is instructed to “take into account ... the record of the buyer country with regard to its support for or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime”. Under the ATT, in contrast, decisions are made on a transfer-specific basis, i.e. on whether items to be transferred “could be used to ... commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to transnational organised crime to which the exporting State is a Party.” We recommend that additional language be introduced to the Consolidated Criteria consistent with that in the ATT, to make it clear that licences can be refused under the rubric of transnational organised crime without requiring the recipient state to be regarded as supporting organised crime.

Finally, note that the analysis below considers only whether the changes meet the objectives set for them by the Government, i.e. have the UK’s national criteria been brought into line with other obligations and commitments, in particular the EU Common Position. The UKWG believes there are other changes that should be made to further strengthen UK arms transfer controls, however these go beyond the remit of this analysis and are therefore not discussed herein.

Language of new Consolidated Criteria	Change from previous Consolidated Criteria	Differences from EU Common Position criteria	Significance of change and of difference from Common Position
<b>General</b>	<p>References at various points in the original Consolidated Criteria to “will not issue a ... licence” have been changed to “will not <i>grant</i> a ... licence” (emphasis added).</p> <p>Previous references to “export licence” have been changed to “licence”.</p>	<p>Whereas at various points the Common Position calls on states to “deny a ... licence”, the Consolidated Criteria state that the Government “will not <i>grant</i> a ... licence” (emphasis added).</p> <p>The Consolidated Criteria use the generic “licence” as opposed to the more limited “export licence” in the Common Position (similar to difference noted between old and new Consolidated</p>	<p>Here the Consolidated Criteria are weaker than the Common Position, in that they speak of the <i>inaction</i> of not granting compared to the action of denying in the Common Position. This has negative implications for the functioning of the EU denial notifications and consultation mechanisms, as these can be activated only upon denial of a licence.</p> <p>This is an improvement in that it allows for the fact that the Consolidated Criteria are to be applied to other types of licences as well, e.g. trade control licences.</p>



	<p>Previous references to “equipment”, “technology”, “export”, etc. have in general been replaced with the term “item”. There are however exceptions to this rule, e.g. under criteria 2b and 4d, though this may be a result of oversight rather than intent.</p>	<p>Criteria).</p> <p>Whereas the Common Position refers to “equipment”, “technology”, “export”, etc., the Consolidated Criteria use the term “item” (similar to difference noted between old and new Consolidated Criteria).</p>	
<p><b>New criterion 1</b></p> <p><i>Respect for the UK’s international obligations and commitments, in particular sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations.</i></p> <p>The Government will not grant a licence if to do so would be inconsistent with, inter alia:</p> <p>a) the UK’s obligations and its commitments to</p>	<p><b>Change from previous</b></p> <p>Added explicit references to the following laws, obligations or commitments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Arms Trade Treaty</li> <li>▪ Zangger Committee</li> <li>▪ The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation</li> <li>▪ Convention on Cluster</li> </ul>	<p><b>Differences from Common Position</b></p> <p>The references to the following in the new Consolidated Criteria are additional to those contained in the Common Position:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Arms Trade Treaty</li> <li>▪ Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons</li> <li>▪ Convention on Cluster Munitions (the Oslo</li> </ul>	<p><b>Significance of change/difference</b></p> <p>The new Consolidated Criteria are largely an improvement over the old and are more comprehensive than those of the Common Position, however the removal of the previous reference to the Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers agreed by</p>

<p>enforce United Nations, European Union and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) arms embargoes, as well as national embargoes observed by the UK and other commitments regarding the application of strategic export controls;</p> <p>b) the UK's obligations under the United Nations arms trade treaty;</p> <p>c) the UK's obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the biological and toxin weapons convention and the chemical weapons convention;</p> <p>d) the UK's obligations under the United Nations convention on certain conventional weapons, the convention on cluster munitions (the Oslo convention), the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010, and the convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction (the Ottawa convention) and the Land Mines Act 1998;</p> <p>e) the UK's commitments in the framework of the Australia Group, the missile technology</p>	<p>Munitions (the Oslo convention)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010</li> </ul> <p>Changed the reference to EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports to EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP</p> <p>Deleted the previous reference to Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers agreed by the P5 members of the UN Security Council.</p>	<p>convention)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (the Ottawa convention)</li> <li>▪ OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers</li> </ul>	<p>the P5 members of the UN Security Council is noteworthy. The concepts contained therein are largely contained either in the Consolidated Criteria directly or in other documents referenced therein, such as the OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers, nevertheless an explanation for this removal would be welcome.</p>
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<p>control regime, the Zangger committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar arrangement and The Hague code of conduct against ballistic missile proliferation;</p> <p>f) the OSCE principles governing conventional arms transfers and the European Union common position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.</p>			
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<b>New criterion 2</b>	<b>Change from previous</b>	<b>Differences from Common Position</b>	<b>Significance of change/difference</b>
<p><i>The respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country for international humanitarian law.</i></p> <p>Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by</p>	<p>Added an explicit reference to respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) in the chapeau and a requirement to not grant a licence if there is a clear risk</p>	<p>The chapeau of the Common Position does not refer to respect for fundamental freedoms, though these are mentioned in the body of the Common Position criteria</p>	<p>All these changes are improvements.</p> <p>The Consolidated Criteria are now as strong as the Common Position on IHL.</p>

<p>international human rights instruments, the Government will:</p> <p>a. Not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression;</p> <p>b. Exercise special caution and vigilance in granting licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or by the European Union;</p> <p>c. Not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law.</p> <p>For these purposes items which might be used for internal repression will include, inter alia, items where there is evidence of the use of these or similar items for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the items will be diverted from their stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression.</p>	<p>that the items might be used in the commission of a serious violation of IHL in the body of the criterion.</p> <p>Added an explicit obligation to take account of the risk that items might be used to commit gender-based violence (GBV) or serious violence against women or children.</p> <p>Removed an observation that use of force by a government within its own borders in accordance with international human rights standards need not constitute internal repression.</p>	<p>The Common Position does not require consideration of risk that items might be used to commit GBV or serious violence against women or children.</p>	<p>They are also now broadly in line with the ATT (and better than the Common Position) on GBV and violence against women or children. It should be noted however that in this context where the ATT refers to a risk of items being used to commit <i>or facilitate</i> violence [emphasis added], the Consolidated Criteria refer only to committing, and not facilitating, violence.</p>
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The nature of the items to be transferred will be considered carefully, particularly if they are intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; summary or arbitrary executions; disappearances; arbitrary detentions; and other major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

In considering the risk that items might be used for internal repression or in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law, the Government will also take account of the risk that the items might be used to commit gender-based violence or serious violence against women or children.

<b>New criterion 3</b>	<b>Change from previous</b>	<b>Differences from Common Position</b>	<b>Significance of change/difference</b>
<p data-bbox="188 304 824 424"><i>The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.</i></p> <p data-bbox="188 480 824 639">The Government will not grant a licence for items which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.</p>	<p data-bbox="844 304 992 336">No change.</p>	<p data-bbox="1240 344 1646 424">Effectively the same as the Common Position.</p>	

<b>New criterion 4</b>	<b>Change from previous</b>	<b>Differences from Common Position</b>	<b>Significance of change/difference</b>
<p data-bbox="188 304 817 379"><i>Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.</i></p> <p data-bbox="188 435 817 596">The Government will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the items aggressively against another country, or to assert by force a territorial claim.</p> <p data-bbox="188 652 817 727">When considering these risks, the Government will take into account, <i>inter alia</i>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="188 783 817 858">a. The existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;</li> <li data-bbox="188 914 817 1034">b. A claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;</li> <li data-bbox="188 1090 817 1209">c. The likelihood of the items being used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient;</li> <li data-bbox="188 1265 817 1385">d. The need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way, taking into account the balance of forces between the states</li> </ul>	<p data-bbox="844 304 1214 683">The <i>caveat</i> from the original Consolidated Criteria that ‘a purely theoretical possibility that the items concerned might be used in the future against another state will not of itself lead to a licence being refused’ has been removed.</p>	<p data-bbox="1240 347 1648 512">The final point (d) under the Common Position is not elaborated as is the case in the Consolidated Criteria.</p>	<p data-bbox="1673 347 2049 596">The removal of the <i>caveat</i> is welcome in that this <i>caveat</i> could have been seen as creating considerable leeway for approving licences on dubious grounds.</p>



<p>of the region concerned, their relative expenditure on defence, the potential for the equipment significantly to enhance the effectiveness of existing capabilities or to improve force projection, and the need not to introduce into the region new capabilities which would be likely to lead to increased tension</p>			
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<b>New criterion 5</b>	<b>Change from previous</b>	<b>Differences from Common Position</b>	<b>Significance of change/difference</b>
<p><i>The national security of the UK and territories whose external relations are the UK's responsibility, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.</i></p> <p>The Government will take into account:</p> <p>a. The potential effect of the proposed transfer on the UK's defence and security interests or on those of other territories and countries as described above, while recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the criteria on respect of human rights and on regional peace, security and stability;</p> <p>b. The risk of the items being used against UK</p>	<p>A previous reference to risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer has been relocated to criterion 7 (in keeping with the organisation of the Common Position).</p>	<p>The Common Position says nothing about the need to protect military classified information and capabilities.</p>	<p>The impact of the requirement to protect military classified information and capabilities is unclear. Further explication would be welcome.</p>

<p>forces or against those of other territories and countries as described above;</p> <p>c. The need to protect UK military classified information and capabilities.</p>			
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<b>New criterion 6</b>	<b>Change from previous</b>	<b>Differences from Common Position</b>	<b>Significance of change/difference</b>
<p><i>The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law.</i></p> <p>The Government will take into account, <i>inter alia</i>, the record of the buyer country with regard to:</p> <p>a. Its support for or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;</p> <p>b. Its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and</p>	<p>New explicit reference to all of the relevant arms control and disarmament instruments referred to in criterion 1, whereas previously only the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) were name-checked.</p>	<p>The Consolidated Criteria are explicit in stating that the buyer country’s behaviour with regard to IHL applies to both international and non-international conflicts, whereas this is not stated in the Common Position.</p> <p>The Common Position is similar to the original Consolidated Criteria in that only the NPT, the BTWC and the CWC are referred to explicitly in the context of c.</p>	<p>The explicit statement in the Consolidated Criteria that the IHL provisions apply to non-international as well as international conflicts is welcome, as is the increased scope of c.</p>

<p>non-international conflicts;</p> <p>c. Its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament instruments referred to in criterion one.</p>			
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<b>New criterion 7</b>	<b>Change from previous</b>	<b>Differences from Common Position</b>	<b>Significance of change/difference</b>
<p><i>The existence of a risk that the items will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.</i></p> <p>In assessing the impact of the proposed transfer on the recipient country and the risk that the items might be diverted to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end-use, the Government will consider:</p> <p>a. The legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any involvement in United Nations or other peace-</p>	<p>Added a reference to undesirable end-use alongside the original reference to undesirable end-user.</p> <p>Added a reference (d) to risk of re-export in the context of states' record in honouring explicit re-export commitments.</p> <p>Previous reference to</p>	<p>No difference</p>	<p>The changes bring the Consolidated Criteria into line with the Common Position.</p> <p>This involves two substantive improvements: the new reference to undesirable end-use; and point d referring to respecting re-export obligations.</p>

<p>keeping activity;</p> <p>b. The technical capability of the recipient country to use the items;</p> <p>c. The capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls;</p> <p>d. The risk of re-export to undesirable destinations and, as appropriate, the record of the recipient country in respecting re-export provisions or consent prior to re-export;</p> <p>e. The risk of diversion to terrorist organisations or to individual terrorists;</p> <p>f. The risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer.</p>	<p>diversion risks in the context of terrorist activity has been moved/reorganised from a general closing sentence to be included in the list of issues (e).</p> <p>Reference to risks associated with reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer (f) was previously located under criterion 5.</p>		
<p><b>New criterion 8</b></p> <p><i>The compatibility of the transfer with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for</i></p>	<p><b>Change from previous</b></p> <p>No change</p>	<p><b>Differences from Common Position</b></p> <p>The reference to the economic factors in the recipient country to be taken into account are more elaborated under the</p>	<p><b>Significance of change/difference</b></p> <p>The substantive effect of the difference between the Consolidated Criteria and the Common Position is</p>

<p><i>armaments of human and economic resources</i></p> <p>The Government will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, IMF and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reports, whether the proposed transfer would seriously undermine the economy or seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country.</p> <p>The Government will consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid, and its public finances, balance of payments, external debt, economic and social development and any IMF- or World Bank-sponsored economic reform programme.</p>		<p>Consolidated Criteria than the Common Position, i.e. only the Consolidated Criteria refers to the recipient country's public finances, balance of payments, external debt, economic and social development and any IMF- or World Bank-sponsored economic reform programme.</p>	<p>unclear.</p>
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<p><b>New 'Other factors'</b></p>	<p><b>Change from previous</b></p>	<p><b>Differences from Common Position</b></p>	<p><b>Significance of change/difference</b></p>
<p>Article 10 of the EU common position specifies that member states may, where appropriate, also</p>	<p>Almost no change, apart from under b., where</p>	<p>Everything beyond the first</p>	<p>This section is considerably</p>

<p>take into account the effect of proposed exports on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, but that these factors will not affect the application of the criteria in the common position.</p> <p>The Government will thus continue when considering licence applications to give full weight to the UK's national interest, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. the potential effect on the UK's economic, financial and commercial interests, including our long-term interests in having stable, democratic trading partners;</li> <li>b. the potential effect on the UK's international relations;</li> <li>c. the potential effect on any collaborative defence production or procurement project with allies or EU partners;</li> <li>d. the protection of the UK's essential strategic industrial base.</li> </ul> <p>In the application of the above criteria, account will be taken of reliable evidence, including for</p>	<p>previously consideration was given to potential effects on the UK's relations with the recipient country but now it is given to potential effect on the UK's international relations as a whole.</p>	<p>paragraph is an explanation of how the Government interprets article 10 of the Common Position and has no parallel therein.</p>	<p>weaker than the Common Position. The term "full weight" implies that the UK attaches significance and primary importance to the UK's national interest.</p> <p>(It is understood that in a legal context, "full weight" is a term given to evidence weighting, and attributes primary significance and importance to this type of evidence.)</p> <p>Whereas the Common Position clearly places less significance on these factors by making it an optional set of factors that "may" be considered by Member States.</p> <p>The UKWG urges the government to clarify the use of the term "full weight" in this context.</p>
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<p>example, reporting from diplomatic posts, relevant reports by international bodies, intelligence and information from open sources and non-governmental organisations.</p>			
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**Annex 2:**

Dear Mr Isbister

Thank you for your email of 18 March 2014, in which you requested the following information relating to export licences (I quote):

**“.....Can we please have a list of the suspended and, importantly, still unsuspended Extant Licences”.**

Your request is in response to Notice to Exporters 2014/06 titled **“UK suspends all licences and licence applications for export to Russian military that could be used against Ukraine”**, which was forwarded as part of your email.

Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“the Act”) you have the right to:

- know whether we hold the information you require;
- be provided with that information (subject to any exemptions under the Act which may apply).

Your request (to the point referred to above in bold) has been considered under the Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) and I am writing to advise you that we do hold information falling within scope of your request.

Details of the licences which can be disclosed are attached in a spreadsheet at Annex A. You should note the following about the information provided:

- The information is based on information as at the date we received your request (as stated above) and some information is likely to have changed. Examples may be extant licences either expiring or becoming exhausted if all items have since been shipped against the licence(s), or a decision has been since made to revoke some licences (see reference to one of the worksheets within the spreadsheet below);
- There are six worksheets within the spreadsheet at Annex A, split into:
  1. “SIELs Direct - Extant” – these are Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) that remain extant for direct export to Russia. Note that one licence (for “general naval vessel components”) is for incorporation into larger items and subsequent supply to a third country.;
  2. “SIELs Suspended – Direct” – these are SIELs that have been suspended and were for direct export to Russia;

3. “SIELs Incorporation – Extant” – these are SIELs that remain extant and are for export to the stated “end-user countries” for incorporation into larger items which are for subsequent re-export to ultimate end-user countries including Russia;
4. “SIELs Suspended – Incorporation” – these are suspended SIELs that were for export to the stated “end-user countries” for incorporation into larger items which were for subsequent re-export to ultimate end-user countries including Russia;
5. “OIELs Extant” - these are Open Individual Export Licences (SIELs) that remain extant for direct export to Russia;
6. “OIELs Suspended or Revoked” – there are six OIELs, which at the time of your request had been suspended. However, since then three of the six licences have been revoked (because Russia was the only permitted destination on the licence) and the other three have been re-issued without Russia as a permitted destination. These have been identified within this worksheet.

### **Appeals Procedure**

If you are dissatisfied with the handling of your request, you have the right to ask for an internal review. Internal review requests should be submitted within two months of the date of receipt of the response to your original letter and should be sent to the Information Rights Unit at:

Information Rights Unit  
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills  
1 Victoria Street  
London  
SW1H 0ET  
E-mail: [foi.requests@bis.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:foi.requests@bis.gsi.gov.uk)

Please remember to quote the reference number above in any future communications.

If you are not content with the outcome of the internal review, you have the right to apply directly to the Information Commissioner for a decision. The Information Commissioner can be contacted at: Information Commissioner’s Office, Wycliffe House, Water Lane, Wilmslow, Cheshire, SK9 5AF

Yours Sincerely

Chris Chew  
Head of Policy Unit

**SIELs Direct - Extant” – these are Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) that remain extant for direct export to Russia. Note that one licence (for “general naval vessel components”) is for incorporation into larger items and subsequent supply to a third country.;**

Application Type	Goods Annual Report Summary	Goods Rating	Total Goods Value
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2B350i7	9000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	16105
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	2760
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (17), components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun mountings, sniper rifles (19)	ML1a, ML1d, PL5017	123200
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	17026
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	ML13d	150
SIEL (Permanent)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	ML10	2585
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	7A003d	50000
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	5D002a	11260
SIEL (Permanent)	fibre prepregs	1C010e1	440615.38
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	2490
SIEL	weapon sights	ML1d	22035

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2B350d7, 2B350g2	48000
SIEL (Permanent)	military trailers	ML6a	340000
SIEL (Permanent)	military helicopters	ML10b	195000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	11700
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	7A103a1	150000
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	1C232	32567
SIEL (Permanent)	components for assault rifles	ML1a	630
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	ML13d	150
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	1E001, 1E201, 1E202	3
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	102.95
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits	ML13d	14000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	7A103a1	550000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	6000
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	ML3a	1600000

SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	12300000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	6152.25
SIEL (Permanent)	unmanned air vehicles	ML10c	8500
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	ML13d	100
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	6000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	6E001	1000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	10796.88
SIEL (Permanent)	military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11a	330000
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	190.9
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	1E001, 1E201, 1E202	3
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite structures	1E001, 1E201, 1E202	3
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	3665885
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	2B352d1	380000
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	2B352d2	16432.25

SIEL (Permanent)	magnetometers	6A006a3	2277
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	3C001d	75000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	5000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2B350i9	241773
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	225.95
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	2B001a	290000
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	3B001b2	21101.62
SIEL (Permanent)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	2B226a	1650000
SIEL (Permanent)	animal pathogens	1C352a3	10
SIEL (Permanent)	unmanned air vehicles	ML10c	17000
SIEL (Permanent)	unmanned air vehicles	ML10c	17000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for biotechnology equipment	2B352d2	4500
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	2B352d2	3500
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	7A103a1	2231236
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	7A003d	12000

SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	2B006b1c	7336
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	ML3a	121080
SIEL (Permanent)	high acceleration centrifuges	2B122	214410
SIEL (Permanent)	tungsten in particulate form	1C117	181500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4c	23100
SIEL (Permanent)	military helicopters	ML10b	195000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, sniper rifles (6)	ML1a, ML1d	27650
SIEL (Permanent)	radiation hardened integrated circuits	3A001a1b	208000
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	33550
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2B350g2	12740.81
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for general military aircraft components	ML22a	0
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	19188
SIEL (Permanent)	sniper rifles (1)	ML1a	3145
SIEL (Permanent)	sniper rifles (1)	ML1a	3145
SIEL (Permanent)	unmanned air vehicles	ML10c1	17900



SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	1250000
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	ML13d	10010
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	2B006b1c	21000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4c	68400
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	2B352d2	8000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	ML9a1	2022463
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	62.99
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	262.95
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	1C010b	64350
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	6000
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	8A001c1, 8A002a2, 8A002a3, 8A002c	382539
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	ML13d	150
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	2B352d2	4000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4c	9972
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2B350g2	2962.05

SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4c	23100
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	385000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military communications equipment	ML11a	27320
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	121.94
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	143.94
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4a	15351
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, sniper rifles (30), weapon cleaning equipment	ML1a, PL5017	136500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4c	24000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	7A103a1	3000000
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	2B006b1c	8000
SIEL (Permanent)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	2B226a	1784000
SIEL (Permanent)	zirconium alloys	1C234	2670
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	ML13d	400
SIEL (Permanent)	components for body armour	ML13d	220
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	79868

SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	3A001a2c	375
SIEL (Permanent)	space qualified solar devices	3A001e4	75800
SIEL (Permanent)	components for small arms ammunition	ML3a	210000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	162500
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	1C010b	137269.93
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	150000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4c	13343.84
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	143.94
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	1C350.43	140445
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	7A103a1	25000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4c	23100
SIEL (Permanent)	rebreathing swimming equipment	8A002q1	6260.87
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	299.95
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	3A001a5b2b	316.95
SIEL (Permanent)	millimetric wave components, signal analysers	3A001b7, 3A002c2	93390

SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	1C010b	2540131.5
SIEL (Permanent)	military aircraft ground equipment	ML10f	13660
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	1539683
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	60600
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	9B001b	2000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	9B001b	5295
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	1C450b4	42000
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	164.94
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	5000
SIEL (Permanent)	hydrophones	6A001a2a5	14200000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	3500
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	3B001a3	450000
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	2B006b1c	175000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	4500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	5000

SIEL (Permanent)	composite materials production equipment	1B001a	178010
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools, numerical control software, software for machine tools	2B001d, 2D001, 2D002	662727.76
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	237.94
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2B350i4	8245
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	microwave components	3A001b2f	1500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4c	9972
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	6A002a3f	1760000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4a	15351
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	148.94
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sporting guns	ML1a	3435

SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition, sporting guns (1), weapon sights	ML1a, ML1d, ML3a	24200
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (5)	ML1b	5700
SIEL (Permanent)	hydrophones	6A001a2a5	12000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	980666
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for combat helicopters	ML22a	10
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	1693150
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b3	44028
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	1C010b	8154.84
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun mountings, sniper rifles (42), weapon cleaning equipment	ML1a, ML1d, PL5017	155989
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	157500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4c	6900
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment, civil NBC protection clothing	1A004b3, 2B352f1	4499.58
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (6)	ML1a	4724
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	78.94

SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	13535.51
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	6000
SIEL (Temporary)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment	1A004a1, 1A004a3, 1A004a4, ML7f1	15290
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	2B352f1	9063.4
SIEL (Permanent)	global positioning satellite receivers	7A105b1	1095660
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	78.94
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	134.94
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	7A103a1	450000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	7A103a1	450000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	7A103a1	250000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	7A103a1	250000
SIEL (Permanent)	zirconium alloys	1C234	200650
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	16355000
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	164.94



SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	35822.04
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	58481.31
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	239600
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	7A003d	26852
SIEL (Permanent)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	4A003e	15600
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment	1A004a1, 1A004a3, 1A004a4, ML7f1	13
SIEL (Permanent)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment, software for computer analogue-to-digital equipment	4A003e, 4D001a	20400
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4a	26975
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	17969636
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	software for semiconductor device manufacturing processes	3D003	4150
SIEL (Permanent)	neutron generators	3A231	8800000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	51961.29

SIEL (Permanent)	radiation hardened integrated circuits	3A001a1b	456000
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	ML9a1	454.5
SIEL (Permanent)	animal pathogens	1C352a3	10
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras, weapon night sights	6A002c1, 6A002c2, 6A003b4b, ML1d	39265
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	22126.26
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4a	115000
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium solutions	0C003	103.5
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4c	11242
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	2B352f1	448.44
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon night sights, weapon sights	ML1d	103213
SIEL (Permanent)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	2B226a	420000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	581980
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4c	22500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	4000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing	5A002a1a, 5D002a	573228

	cryptography		
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	1885.28
SIEL (Permanent)	accelerometers	7A001a2	2000
SIEL (Permanent)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	2B226a	830000
SIEL (Permanent)	guidance/navigation equipment, inertial equipment	7A003d, 7A103a1	49550
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	ML9a1	71005
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	ML9a1	309840
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	ML9a1	430500
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	ML1d	60.98
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	2B006b1c	12000
SIEL (Temporary)	imaging cameras	6A003b4c	23100
SIEL (Permanent)	radiation hardened TV camera lenses	6A203c	3550
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	3520000
SIEL (Temporary)	imaging cameras	6A003b4c	5765
SIEL (Temporary)	imaging cameras	6A003b4a	15351

SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	3C003a	480
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	1534181
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	5269650
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	7A003d	218521.02
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	1C450b4	38750
SIEL (Permanent)	microwave components	3A001b2b	400
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	15000
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (66)	ML1a, ML2a	24124
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	8359450
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	ML3a	75000
SIEL (Permanent)	microwave components	3A001b4a	44039
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4c	18900
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	2B006b1c	12000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	925000

**“SIELs Suspended – Direct” – these are SIELs that have been suspended and were for direct export to Russia;**

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Goods Rating</b>	<b>Total Goods Value</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for the use of combat aircraft	ML10a, ML11a, ML22a	275,051.98
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	ML6a	296,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	ML17h	7,513,132.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	ML6a	21,379.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	ML6a	28,240.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	ML6a	228,120.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	ML9a1	22,472.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	636,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	ML4b1, ML4b2	12,640.63

SIEL (Permanent)	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	ML17h	7,513,132.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	6A002a3c	11,040,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	ML17h	7,513,132.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	ML13d	7,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	6A002a3c	389,389.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	6A002a3c	96,000.00

**“SIELs Incorporation – Extant”– these are SIELs that remain extant and are for export to the stated “end-user countries” for incorporation into larger items which are for subsequent re-export to ultimate end-user countries including Russia;**

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>End User Countries</b>	<b>Third Party Countries</b>	<b>Goods Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Goods Rating</b>	<b>Total Goods Value</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	France	Russia	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	ML11a, ML12a, ML21a, ML22a	2791040
SIEL (Permanent)	Korea, South	Russia, United States	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2B350g 6	112254.3 7

SIEL (Permanent)	France	France, Russia	components for military auxiliary/support vessels, technology for military auxiliary/support vessels	ML22a, ML9a1	2857231
SIEL (Permanent)	France	France, Netherlands, Russia	components for military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11a	110870
SIEL (Permanent)	France	France, Russia	general naval vessel components	ML9a1	146705.96
SIEL (Permanent)	United States	Russia	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	652871
SIEL (Permanent)	France	Russia	components for combat naval vessels	ML9a1	39984
SIEL (Permanent)	France	France, Russia	components for military radars	ML5b	2876
SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Australia, Brazil, India, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, South, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands,	components for military helicopters	ML10b	5250



		Nigeria, Oman, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkmenist an, Ukraine			
SIEL (Permane nt)	Italy	Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Australia, Brazil, India, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, South, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine	components for military helicopters	ML10b	4210.97
SIEL (Permane nt)	Korea, South	Russia, United Kingdom	accelerometers	7A001a 2	25000
SIEL (Permane nt)	Italy	Russia	components for military helicopters	ML10b	917.4

SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	Russia	military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11a	22794.39
SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	Russia	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	1191.07
SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	Russia	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11a	7146.43
SIEL (Permanent)	France	Russia	military communications equipment	ML11a	4892321
SIEL (Permanent)	France	Russia	general naval vessel components	ML9a1	4775
SIEL (Permanent)	France	Russia	general naval vessel components	ML9a1	4775
SIEL (Permanent)	Hong Kong	Australia, Azerbaijan, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Russia, United Kingdom	components for military aero-engines	ML10d	15000
SIEL (Permanent)	Spain	Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Russia, Spain, United Kingdom	components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets	ML4b1	10220

SIEL (Permanent)	Singapore	Russia	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a 1a	15685.51
SIEL (Permanent)	Netherlands	Australia, Austria, Brazil, Congo, Democratic Republic of, Denmark, Dubai, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Montenegro, , Netherlands, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Vietnam	components for combat aircraft	ML10a	676208.88
SIEL (Permanent)	France	France, Netherlands, Russia	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11a	5884.91

**“SIELs Suspended – Incorporation” – these are suspended SIELs that were for export to the stated “end-user countries” for incorporation into larger items which were for subsequent re-export to ultimate end-user countries including Russia;**

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>End User Countries</b>	<b>Third Party Countries</b>	<b>Goods Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Goods Rating</b>	<b>Total Goods Value</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	France	Russia	components for military aircraft head-up/down displays	ML10	£216,050.44
SIEL (Permanent)	France	Russia	components for military aero-engines	ML10d	£99,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	Russia	general military vehicle components	ML6a	£80,189.00
SIEL (Permanent)	France	Russia	components for military aircrew protective equipment	ML10g	£51,950.00
SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	Russia	general military vehicle components	ML6a	£265,644.00
SIEL (Permanent)	France	Russia	military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11a	£148,566.00
SIEL (Permanent)	France	Russia	military aircraft head-up/down displays	ML10a	£330,620.96
SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	Russia	general military vehicle components	ML6a	£4,743.60
SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	Russia	general military vehicle components	ML6a	£230.00
SIEL (Permanent)	France	Russia	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11a	£132,164.00
SIEL (Permanent)	France	Russia	targeting equipment	ML5b	£20,000.00

SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	Russia	military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11a	£22,315.67
SIEL (Permanent)	South Africa	Russia, South Africa	components for military helicopters	ML10a	£20,480.00

**“OIELs Extant” - these are Open Individual Export Licences (SIELs) that remain extant for direct export to Russia;**

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Goods Rating</b>
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	biotechnology equipment, components for biotechnology equipment	2B352d1, 2B352d2
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of cryptographic software, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software	5D002a, 5D002c1, 5E002
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for the production of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5A002a1b1, 5A002a1b2, 5A002a1b3, 5D002a, 5D002c1, 5E002
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	6A001a2a2, 6A001a2b7
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5A002a1b1, 5A002a1b2, 5A002a1b3

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	air guns	ML1a
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	7A003d, 7A103a1
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	non-military detonators	1A007b4
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	6A001a2d
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	animal pathogens	1C352a1, 1C352a10, 1C352a11, 1C352a13, 1C352a15, 1C352a16, 1C352a3, 1C352a4, 1C352a5
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	fibrous/filamentary materials	1C010b
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1a, ML1b, ML1d, ML2a, ML2c, ML3a
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	7A003a1, 7A003a2, 7A003b, 7A003c1, 7A003c2, 7A003d, 7A103a1, 7E101
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for rifles, components for sporting guns, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1a, ML1b, ML1d, ML2a, ML3a
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems	1A002b1, 1C202a, 3A201a2, 6A001a2d, 6A003b4c, 8A002a2, 8A002a3, 8A002a4, 8A002c, 8A002f1, 8A002f2, 8A002i2, 8C001



OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5A002a1b1, 5A002a1b2, 5A002a1b3, 5B002a, 5B002b, 5D002a, 5E002
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for military communications equipment	ML22a
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	1A001a, 1A001c, 7A103a1
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets	1A007a, 1A007b2, 3A231
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a, 5D002c1, 5E002
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	7A003a1, 7A103a2
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	biotechnology equipment, components for biotechnology equipment	2B352d1, 2B352d2
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002c1
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support	1A001c, ML10, ML10b, ML10d, ML10f, ML10g, ML11a, ML15d, ML22a, ML5b, PL5017
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	7A103a1

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for underwater telecommunications systems, components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	5A001b1a, 6A001a1d
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	7A101, 7A102, 7A103a1, 7A103a2, 7A103d
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5E002b, NLR
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5A002a1b, 5D002c1, 5D002d, 5E002b
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a, 5D002c1, 5E002a
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	lasers	6A005a6a1, 6A005a6a2, 6A005b6c1b, 6A005b6c1c
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	7A103a1, 7E101
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5E002a
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	acoustic seabed survey equipment, equipment employing cryptography, guidance/navigation equipment, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles, underwater sonar navigation systems	5A002a1a, 6A001a1a1, 6A001a1a2, 6A001a1a3, 6A001a1d, 6A001a2d, 6A001b1, 6A001b2, 6A003b4a, 6A003b4b, 6A006a2, 6A006a3, 7A003a1, 7A003c1, 7A003d, 7A008, 7A103a, 8A001c1, 8A001c2, 8A001d1, 8A001d2, 8A001d3, 8A002c
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for inertial equipment	7D101
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	towed hydrophone arrays	6A001a2b1, 6A001a2b2
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters	ML10a, ML10f, ML11a, ML22a, PL5017
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a, 5D002c1, 5E002a

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft cannons, components for air launched rockets, components for air-to-air missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft carriers, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for command communications control and intelligence software, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for depth charges, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for machine guns, components for military aero-engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval guns, components for naval mines, components for periscopes, components for sensor integration equipment, components for submarines, components for surface launched rockets, components for surface-to-surface missiles, components for targeting equipment, components for torpedoes, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon	ML10, ML10a, ML10d, ML10f, ML11, ML11a, ML1a, ML21b4, ML22a, ML2a, ML2d, ML4a, ML4b1, ML5a, ML5b, ML5d, ML9a1
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	<p>mountings, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, machine guns, military aero-engines, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval engines, naval guns, technology for air launched rockets, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for depth charges, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for machine guns, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military radars, technology for torpedoes, torpedoes</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	imaging cameras	6A003b4b
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for inertial equipment, guidance/navigation equipment, inertial equipment	7A103a1, 7A103a2

“OIELs Suspended or Revoked” – there are six OIELs, which at the time of your request had been suspended. However, since then three of the six licences have been revoked (because Russia was the only permitted destination on the licence) and the other three have been re-issued without Russia as a permitted destination. These have been identified within this worksheet.

Application Type	Action	Goods Annual Report Summary	Goods Rating
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Revoked	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Re-issued	imaging cameras	6A003b4b
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Re-issued	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	ML11a, ML17d, ML22a, ML4b1, ML6a
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Revoked	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Revoked	technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for anti-armour missiles, technology for anti-ship missiles, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for fire control equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for general military vehicle components, technology for guided missile decoying equipment, technology for laser rangefinders, technology for laser warning detectors, technology for military combat vehicles, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for optical target acquisition equipment, technology for optical target surveillance equipment, technology for periscopes, technology for tanks, technology for turrets, technology for weapon night sights, technology for weapon sights	ML22a
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Re-issued	components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment	1C202a, 3A201a1, 6A001a2d, 8A002a2, 8A002a3, 8A002a4, 8A002c, 8A002i2





**Supplementary written evidence from the Campaign Against Arms Trade  
(AEC0007)**

1. The Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) made a submission to your Committees' Inquiry last month. In the light of the use of UK-made tear gas by the Hong Kong police on 28th September, CAAT hopes your Committees will accept this supplementary submission.
2. All arms sales convey to the recipient a message of international acceptance and respectability. Successive UK governments, however, have looked at export licence applications on a case-by-case basis. They have only been refused where it considered there was a "clear risk" the particular equipment to be exported might directly be used for internal repression. Recently, the Coalition government appears to be moving away from even the loosest possible interpretation of this test, effectively abandoning it.
3. The Hong Kong police used tear gas against protesters on 28th September 2014. The UK had granted eight licences for tear and CS gas, as well as associated training products, to Hong Kong since 2010, the most recent in January 2014. (<http://bitly.com/1skaZUI>) The total value of the seven individual licences was £180,000. The value of the Open Individual Export Licence is not known.
4. Manufacturer Chemring confirmed that it had supplied the tear gas. It told the *Guardian* (30.9.14) its sales were "ultimately controlled by the UK government through the issue of export licences, and end-user certificates", but said it would review its sales policy. A UK government official also said that it would "take the current Hong Kong disturbances into account in assessing further export licence applications."
5. However, on 30th September 2014, Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond told the BBC's Daily Politics Show the canisters being used by the riot police in Hong Kong were a legitimate export: "CS gas is available from large numbers of sources around the world. ... They could buy CS gas from the US."
6. This is a totally unacceptable statement from a UK government minister, especially from the head of the department responsible for promoting human rights overseas and for checking export licence application compliance with the human rights criteria. It is a long time since a UK government has publicly used the excuse that "if we didn't sell, someone else would" and it is deplorable that the Foreign Secretary has done so now.
7. In its original submission, CAAT explained the case of Israel. On 12th August 2014, Business Secretary Vince Cable had said that twelve licences had been "identified for components which could be part of equipment used by the Israel Defence Forces in Gaza". These licences were to be suspended only if the fighting started again. CAAT would have expected the twelve licences to be revoked immediately and was amazed that they were not even suspended.

8. It has long appeared that UK governments have put arms sales before human rights. However, from the lack of action over the twelve Israel licences taken together with the Foreign Secretary's comment about the tear gas exports to Hong Kong, it seems as though the Coalition government has stopped even pretending it cares about human rights.

October 2014

**SUPPLEMENTARY EVIDENCE FROM THE EXPORT GROUP FOR  
AEROSPACE AND DEFENCE (EGAD) (AEC0009)**

Thank you for inviting our team to give evidence to the Committees earlier this month (Monday 10<sup>th</sup> November 2014).

During the evidence session, the Committees asked for some further information to support our oral evidence. This is attached, together with some additional comments relating to the questions posed during the preceding evidence session of the UK Working Group on Arms.

We hope that the attached comments are helpful.

**The EGAD Website:**

- 1.1 The Export Group for Aerospace & Defence (EGAD) has worked closely with the Export Control Organisation (ECO) in general, and its Business Awareness Unit, in particular, on trying to maximise the effectiveness of the ECO's own awareness-raising activities. To that end, we have sought to provide the ECO with Industry feedback and testing of its website, and suggestions for how it could be further improved, as well as actively supporting, when requested, its training activities. The ECO has, itself, provided many of the links provided on the EGAD website (at: [www.adsgroup.org.uk/pages/39750307.asp](http://www.adsgroup.org.uk/pages/39750307.asp)).
- 1.2 There is a general perception that the [www.gov.uk](http://www.gov.uk) website is less than intuitive and user-friendly; consequently we feel it is useful to replicate some of the most important aspects of the export controls guidance it contains, so that it is more readily available and accessible to novices, who may have problems tracking down the information that they are seeking on the Government's own website. We also accept queries from our Members, and send the enquirers the direct links to those parts of the [www.gov.uk](http://www.gov.uk) website which will be most relevant to their queries.

1.3 The ECO views the EGAD website as a valuable complementary service to their own, and continue to offer assistance, not only with the of the EGAD site but also with the creation of EGAD's joint (with Cranfield University) "Strategic Export Controls" training courses ([www.strategicexportcontrols.org/](http://www.strategicexportcontrols.org/)), and have provided links to it on their own website (at [www.gov.uk/strategic-export-control-training-for-exporters](http://www.gov.uk/strategic-export-control-training-for-exporters)). The ECO also works with other organisations such as King's College London's Project Alpha ([www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/csss/alpha/hub.aspx](http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/csss/alpha/hub.aspx)), where it perceives that their activities will be helpful and complementary to their own.

### **The Transparency Initiative:**

2.1 As EGAD has stated previously in evidence to the Committees, Industry's primary concern with the UK Government's "Transparency Initiative" would be the potential for nugatory duplication of effort, and subsequent potential for inefficient usage of resources. The information required is already available to Government agencies on its own IT systems. A more efficient solution would be for Government to modify and extract information it already holds. As stated in our oral evidence, our issue in this regard is primarily focused on the HM Revenue & Customs' "Customs Handling of Import and Export Freight (*CHIEF*)" system ([www.gov.uk/chief-trader-import-and-export-processing-system](http://www.gov.uk/chief-trader-import-and-export-processing-system)), into which exporters input the details of shipments which are being made, and of the relevant export licences used.

2.2 According to the best available Industry estimates, the resource cost to UK exporters of such duplicate reporting would be approximately £20 per entry. With a conservative estimate of some 100,000 submissions per annum, the annual cost to UK Industry would be some £2million, with the attendant reduction in global competitiveness. As we understand that the HMRC CHIEF system is scheduled to be overhauled and reworked, we feel that Government should give serious consideration to including the transparency reporting requirements into that system rather than placing the reporting burden on industry.

### **Guidance on Extra-territorial Controls:**

3.1 As we reported to the Committees, EGAD is currently experiencing a high volume of questions from companies and individuals who are confused by the ECO's existing guidance on the UK's extraterritorial trade controls at [www.gov.uk/extraterritorial-trade-controls](http://www.gov.uk/extraterritorial-trade-controls). This confusion has been exacerbated by reports of ECO helpline staff issuing incorrect verbal guidance when contacted by companies endeavouring to comply with the legislation by ensuring that they have all necessary trade control licences in place.

3.2 One particular example relates to an overseas-based subsidiary of a UK firm, which is currently working closely with the UK MoD on a particular project to supply materiel to an overseas government. EGAD is corresponding with this firm to assist them in gaining a better understanding on the breadth and scope of the UK's trade control system, but this is still unresolved. A particular issue is the question of whether the UK's trade control system "catches" transfers of technology between overseas nations. The existing guidance clearly states, under the title Goods Subject to Trade Controls: "*With the exception of software (categorised as 'ML21') and **technology (categorised as 'ML22')**, all goods included on the UK Military and Torture Lists are subject to the Trade Controls.*" [our emphasis added], which would seem to imply that it does not catch technology. However, we are aware that the ECO has been offering verbal advice to the contrary.

3.3 Another instance of confusion is over the scope of our extraterritorial trade controls – again, contrary to some advice which has reportedly been given to enquiring firms by ECO staff, these should only relate to:

- 1) the movement of Category A Goods – the details of which are at: <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/3231/schedule/1/made>;
  - 2) the movement of Category B Goods (the details of which are at the above plus those listed at: <http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/uncategorized/notice-to-exporters-201407-amendment-to-the-export-control-order-2008-the-main-order-concerning-category-b-goods-trade-controls/> )
- or
- 3) movements of any Military List goods to embargoed destinations

3.4 EGAD will, therefore, be seeking to work with the ECO on the refreshing of the existing published guidance to try to ensure that it is more consistent and better covers the likely queries of affected companies and individuals.

### **“Arms Fairs”:**

4.1 The Committees also took evidence from the NGOs constituting the UK Working Group on Arms concerning “arms fairs”, during which it was suggested that any relevant exhibition organisers should be responsible for checking all of the material and promotional literature that an exhibitor was going to be displaying at the event for compliance with the legislation. While we recognise the logic behind the principle, we feel that it would be unreasonable to place the responsibility and liability on the exhibition organisers for making such complex and contentious technical decisions when they do not have the technical knowledge or design background to do so. EGAD considers that the onus for checking should remain with Government agencies and the liability for any breach of the legislation should remain with the exhibitor.

4.2 EGAD also has concerns over the suggestion that companies from countries which have not signed (or ratified) the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) should not be allowed to exhibit at exhibitions and that such countries should not be invited to send purchasing delegations. That policy would cause difficulties for multi-national companies that happened to have a presence in a country that was not an ATT signatory. It would also appear to exclude participation by the USA, which, although a signatory of the ATT, has not actually ratified it, but has in place one of the world's most effective and resilient export control systems, and remains the largest single export and import market for military equipment.

4.3 We have supported efforts to promote the ATT since its inception and have assisted in raising awareness of the ATT amongst overseas governments and industries. We are committed to its effective implementation by as many nations around the world as possible.

November 2014

# Ministerial Correspondence

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## **Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

*21 July 2014*

On the World At One yesterday, you said that the UK's arms exports to Russia is something we must look at.

In his reply of 12 May to my letter to him of 10 April, the Business Secretary stated that as at May 2014 there were 285 Government approved extant arms export licences to Russia, and that those which were Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) were valued at £131.5 million. The Government does not provide values for Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) because of their open nature.

Your predecessor, William Hague, stated in the House on 18 March: "The UK will now, with immediate effect, suspend all extant licences and application processing for licences for direct export to Russia for military and dual-use items destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine. We will also suspend licences for exports to third countries for incorporation into equipment for export to Russia where there is a clear risk that the end product will be used against Ukraine."

On 24 April I wrote to William Hague asking for details of all licence suspensions, and of any subsequent revocations or re-instatements, to Russia in the period 10 March 2014 to the present.

The information I received from the Business Secretary in his reply to me of 14 May, and which is published in full in our 2014 Report, at Ev 218 of Volume II, showed that of the 285 extant licences to Russia only a relatively small number, 34, had been suspended, revoked or re-issued without Russia.

Please could you state in your reply:

1. Whether the Government will be suspending, revoking or re-issuing without Russia all or some of the remaining extant arms export licences to Russia. If so, please provide the details in the same format as in Annex 4, "Licences Suspended for Russia" of the Business Secretary's reply of 14 May.

2. Whether the Government will be suspending the processing of all applications for arms export licences to Russia regardless of whether the military or dual-use items concerned could be or are being deployed against Ukraine. If so, please state what conditions Russia will have to fulfil for the UK Government's suspension of the processing of arms export licence applications to Russia to be lifted.
3. What specific steps the UK Government is taking to persuade NATO and EU Member States to adopt the same policies on arms exports to Russia as the UK.

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**Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon David Cameron, MP,  
Prime Minister**

*23 July 2014*

I should be grateful for your clarification of what is now the Government's policy on arms exports to Russia following the answers you gave to 2 questions after your statement on Ukraine (Flight MH17) and Gaza in the House of Commons on 21 July.

In your reply to Harriet Harman you said: "It is time to start to go into the tier 3 sanctions. For instance, future military sales from any country in Europe should not be going ahead. We have already stopped them from Britain." (Col. 1153).

In your reply to Liam Fox you said: "On the issue of defence equipment, we already unilaterally said – as did the US – that we would not sell further arms to Russia." (Col 1156).

Please could you tell me in the light of your replies:

- a) whether all, or only some, of the UK Government's approved 285 extant arms export licences to Russia (as detailed in Evidence pages 498–510 of Volume II of our Report published today) have now been revoked, suspended, or re-issued without Russia as a permitted destination;
- b) if only some, what is the Government's policy for deciding which of these 285 extant licences should be revoked, suspended or re-issued without Russia as a permitted destination, and which should be left extant; and

- c) again, if only some, please could you state precisely – licence-by-licence – which of these 285 extant arms export licences have been revoked, suspended or re-issued without Russia as a permitted destination, and which not.

Please could you also tell me:

- a) whether the Government has now suspended all, or only some, application processing of licences for direct export to Russia of military and dual-use items, and of licences for exports to third countries of military and dual-use goods for incorporation into equipment for indirect export to Russia; and
- b) if only some, what is the Government’s policy for deciding which new licence applications for direct or indirect military and dual-use exports to Russia should be processed or not.

Finally, in the debate on Ukraine on 18 March this year, the then Foreign Secretary, William Hague, announced the Government’s policy on the export of military and dual-use items to Russia as follows:

“We believe that in the current circumstances there is a compelling case for EU member states to act on defence export licences. The UK will now, with immediate effect, suspend all extant licences and application processing for licences for direct export to Russia for military and dual-use items destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine. We will also suspend licences for exports to third countries for incorporation into equipment for export to Russia where there is a clear risk that the end product will be used against Ukraine. All such licences were reviewed following the Prime Minister’s statement on 10 March, and so we are able to act immediately. We encourage other European nations to take similar action.” (Col 658).

Please could you tell me whether there has been any change of this policy. If so, what is the change of policy, and what was the date on which that change of policy took place.

I should be grateful for your reply at an early date.

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**Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills**

*23 July 2014*



In your letter to me of 12 May 2014 you provide the information I had requested about the extant arms export licences to each of the Government's 28 Countries of Human Rights Concern, one of which is Russia. Your reply gave details of the 285 licences to Russia that were extant in May. Those details are reproduced at Evidence pages 498–510 in Volume II of the Committees' Report published today.

In view of the concern about British Government arms exports to Russia, I should be grateful if you would re-submit the details of the 285 arms export licences to Russia that were extant in May adding an extra column stating the end-user for each licence. You will remember that you also provided this information to the Committees in respect of the licences approved for the export of dual-use chemicals to Syria.

I should be grateful for your reply by 22 August.

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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, MP,  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

*24 July 2014*

I am writing to update the Committees on a change in the Government's policy towards arms export licences to Ukraine.

On 22 July, I attended the EU Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels which unanimously agreed through the Council minutes that:

“In light of developments in Ukraine since 20 February and of increased EU engagement in support of Ukraine including in the field of civilian security sector reform, the Council took note that

- Member States agreed to discontinue the application of their agreement of 20 February 2014 on export licences;
- The Common Position 2008/944 continues to apply.”

This new agreement removes the blanket approach to all licences for the Ukrainian internal security forces and enables states to consider licence applications on a case-by-case basis against the EU and relevant national Arms Export licensing Criteria.

From a UK perspective, I can assure you that all new licence applications for Ukraine will be rigorously assessed, taking into account all relevant factors including end user and end-use details. Those licences which we were previously suspended will also be re-assessed against the EU and National Consolidated Criteria. Any licences which are inconsistent with the Criteria will be revoked.

I am copying this letter to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills.

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**Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, MP,  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

*7 August 2014*

The Committees on Arms Export Controls are considering the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480).

Questions relating to that Report are set out in the Annex to this letter.

Please may the Committees have the Government's answers to these questions by 30 September.

I am copying this letter and the Annex to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for International Development.

**ANNEX – Questions relating to the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export  
Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)**

The paragraph numbers follow those in the Government's Report.

**Ministerial Foreword**

In his Written Ministerial Statement of 25 March 2014 the Business Secretary announced the Government's revised Consolidated Criteria for arms exports from which the previous Government's broad test of refusing arms exports "which might be used for internal repression" was dropped, leaving only the very much narrower test of refusing arms exports "if there is a clear risk that items might be used for internal repression." How does the Government justify applying only the narrow clear risk test to the generality of UK arms exports whilst continuing, rightly, to apply the broad test of refusing arms exports "which might be used for internal repression" when suspending existing licences, for example to Egypt as set out in the Case Study on Egypt on page 16 of the Government's Report?

**Section 1: UK and EU Policy Developments in 2013**

**1.1 Legislation**

- a) Will the Government detail the additions to, and any deletions from, the Common Military List of the EU brought into force in the UK by The Export Control (Amendment) Order 2013?
- b)
- c) In respect of the EU Commission's proposals for amendments to the EU system of exports controls for dual-use items, will the Government state for each proposal whether it wishes to amend it and, if so, in what way, or whether it opposes it and, if so, why?
- d)
- e) Will Council Regulation (EU) 258/2012 establishing "export authorisation, import and transit measures for "civilian" firearms, their parts and components and ammunition in respect of export from the customs territory of the Union to or through third countries" require UK national legislation in order to achieve UK compliance with this Regulation, and, if so, when will that legislation be introduced?

### 1.2 Policy Developments – Cyber equipment, software and technology

- a) Does the Government's definition of cyber equipment, software and technology include cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components?
- b) Will the Government be implementing in full the exports controls adopted by the Wassenaar Arrangement in December 2013 over both tools (equipment and software) for creating, delivering and controlling "intrusion software", and "tools for extracting message content and metadata from a carrier class Internet Protocol network and using that data to map the relational networks of individuals or groups"? If so, when will both that legislation be introduced, and also the relevant legislation to ensure UK compliance with the forthcoming related amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation coming into force in the second half of 2014?
- c) Why is the Government working only with industry "to develop guidance to address the risks posed by exports of information and communications technology that are not subject to export control but which might have impacts on human rights including freedom of expression online" and not also with those concerned with human rights and freedom of expression?

### 1.2 Policy Developments – Gifting equipment currently in Afghanistan

Why is the Government assessing proposals to gift equipment currently in Afghanistan against the narrow test in the Consolidated Criteria, as revised in May 2014, as to whether "there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression" rather

than against the broad test of whether the items “might be used for internal repression” which the Government is, rightly, continuing to apply when deciding whether or not to suspend existing licences?

### 1.3 Transparency and Accountability

Will the Government in the data it publishes quarterly on the Strategic Export Controls: Reports and Statistics website on individual export and trade licences granted, refused and revoked add the end-user stated for each licence as the Government has already done for the licences for the export of dual-use chemicals to Syria between 2004 and 2012 and for Gifted Equipment?

### 1.4 Awareness: Dedicated Training Courses for Business

What is the specific advice that the Government gives on its Dedicated Training Courses for Business “on how to make the best of open licences”?

### 1.4 Awareness: Cross-Departmental Working

Which are the specific countries of concern on which the Government is currently providing updates and what are the specific concerns, for example potential weapons of mass destruction (WMD) end-use, that relate to each of those countries?

### 1.5 Advisory Services

Approximately how many complaints has the Government received about its replacement of the Rating Enquiry Service with the Control List Classification Advice Service and the End-User Advice Service, and what have been the main grounds of such complaints?

## **Section 2: International Policy in 2013**

### 2.1 Arms Trade Treaty

- a) Does the Government see any prospect in the foreseeable future of any of the 3 of the 5 Permanent Members of the UN Security Council who have not ratified the Arms Trade Treaty to date, namely China, Russia and the USA, doing so?
- b) What additional legislation will be required by the Government to ensure full compliance by the UK with the terms of the Arms Trade Treaty, and when will that legislation be introduced?

### 2.3 UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

- a) What are the categories of weapons that fall within the description “Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems”?
- b) Was the UK represented at the Convention’s informal discussions on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems in May this year, and what was the outcome of those discussions?

#### 2.4 The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

What specific steps for further action were agreed at the 13<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention in December 2013 and what role has the UK played in the implementation of those steps?

#### 2.5 The Convention on Cluster Munitions

What specific steps for further action were agreed at the fourth Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention in September 2013 and what role has the UK played in the implementation of those steps?

#### 2.6 The UN Register of Conventional Arms

- a) Does the Government include in its annual report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms its national holdings of Small Arms and Light Weapons? If so, why are these holdings not included in Annex C of the Government’s Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013?
- b) Which countries currently include in their annual report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms their national holdings of Small Arms and Light Weapons?
- c) Will the Government adopt a policy of making the submission of an annual report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms obligatory for UN member states?

#### 2.7 Export Control Regimes – Nuclear Suppliers Group

- a) Do any of the 54 changes to the Nuclear Suppliers Group control lists made at the Group’s Plenary Meeting in June 2013 require corresponding changes to either the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List, and, if so, have these changes been made?
- b) Is the UK represented on the Nuclear Supplier Group’s Technical Experts Group established at the Plenary Meeting in June 2013?

- c) What are the specific areas requiring further investigation in relation to the prospect of Indian membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and by what date is Indian membership likely to be achieved?

### 2.9 Export Control Regimes – Missile Technology Control Regime

Do any of the technical changes to the Missile Technology Control Regime's export control list agreed via the Technical Experts Meeting require corresponding changes to either the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List, and, if so, have those changes been made?

### 2.10 Export Control Regimes – Wassenaar Arrangement

- a) Will the Government provide the Committees, and make public, its latest report to the Wassenaar group of its exports of controlled arms, goods and technologies to non-Wassenaar members?
- b) Do any of the 122 amendments to the Wassenaar Export Control Lists approved at the December 2013 Plenary Meeting – other than those relating to cyber equipment, software and technology which have been dealt with at Paragraph 1.2 above – require corresponding changes to either the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List, and, if so, have those changes been made?

### 2.11 UK Activities. Academic Technology Approval Scheme

In which countries were the 739 foreign students, who have been denied clearance under the Academic Technology Approval Scheme since 2007 to study in the UK sensitive technologies relating to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, resident, and how many of these students were resident in each of the countries concerned?

## **Section 3: Export Licensing Case Studies**

What are the criteria that the Government is using to decide which countries and issues (for example Anti Piracy) are selected to be case studies in its Strategic Export Controls Annual Report?

### Pakistan

The Case Study of Pakistan states: “We also refused a £6.5 million export of several thousand small arms and ammunition for sporting purposes due to concerns that they might contribute to repression and conflict in the region.” Since the beginning of 2014

which other exports of small arms and ammunition for sporting purpose have been refused to countries worldwide because of similar concerns? Please state the value of the export, the quantity of small arms and ammunition involved and the country of destination in each case.

#### Anti Piracy

- a) What is the specific evidence the Government looks for in anti-piracy export licence applications by Private Maritime Security Companies that the weapons and ammunition concerned will not be sold on to third parties?
- b) Whether the Government will make it a contractual condition when approving anti-piracy export licence applications by Private Maritime Security Companies that the weapons and ammunition concerned will not be sold on to third parties?

### **Section 4: Export Licensing Data and Performance Against Targets During 2013**

#### 4.1 Information on licences processed during 2013

Please provide the information for Open General Export Licences (OGELs), Open General Trade Control Licences (OGTCLs) and Open General Transshipment Licences (OGTLs) as has been provided in Table 4.I for Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs), in Table 4.II for Standard Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCLs), in Table 4.III for Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs), in Table 4.IV for Standard Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCLs), and Table 4.V for Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs).

#### 4.2 Information on SIELs, SITLs, OIELs, SITCLs and OITCLs

In furtherance of its policy of Transparency will the Government ask licence applicants for SITLs, OIELs, SITCLs and OITCLs to provide an estimate of the value of the goods they propose to ship, tranship or trade, and will the Government include the estimated value for each licence in its Quarterly Reports?

#### 4.3 Technical Assistance Licences

Will the Government provide details in its Quarterly Reports of licence applications required under Article 19 of the Export Control Order 2008, as amended, for the provision of technical assistance for anything with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) purposes, and the Government's decision on each such application?

#### 4.4 Refusals and revocations

Will the Government provide in two separate Tables for the 168 refusals or revocations of SIELs in 2013 the following information for each refusal or revocation:

- i) End User Country;
- ii) Annual Report Summary  
(Description of goods);
- iii) Rating; and
- iv) Reasons for refusal or revocation

#### 4.6 Open General Export Licences (OGELs)

Rather than OGELs remaining in force until they are revoked, will the Government introduce a time limit for such licences?

### **Section 5: Compliance and Enforcement**

#### 5.1 Compliance

- a) Following the finding of the compliance review team “that there were unacceptable levels of non-compliance by first time users of open licences”, what evidence is there, if any, thus far that the new processes introduced by the Government have resulted in significantly improved compliance by first time users of open licences?
- b) Has the Government considered introducing a penalty if companies cancel their scheduled compliance audit at the last moment, thus reducing the efficiency of the Export Control Organisation’s compliance team?

#### 5.2 Enforcement activity undertaken by HMRC, Border Force and the Crown

##### Prosecution Service

What is the Government’s explanation for the very significant rise in Strategic Export and Sanctions Seizures – up from 141 in 2011-12, to 280 in 2012-13, and to 450 in 2013-14?

### **Annex A Export Controls: Process and Responsibilities**

#### A.4 Assessment of Export Licence Applications



- a) Why has the Government misleadingly described the text that preceded the listing of the 8 Criteria for arms exports in the Written Statement made on 26 October 200 by the then Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Rt Hon Peter Hain MP, as the “preamble” when that description was never used by the then Minister and the text in question contains a substantive statement of policy?
- b) Will the Government discontinue using the word “preamble” in this context?

#### A.6 Types of Licences

What is the period during which Open General Trade Control Licences (OGTCLs) remain in force?

#### **Annex C Information Required for the UN Register of Conventional Arms**

##### UK Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons in 2013

Why, when Sri Lanka is listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as one of the Government’s 28 Countries of Human Rights Concern, were the Government approved exports to Sri Lanka of:

- revolvers and self-loading pistols the largest in quantity to any country;
- rifles and carbines the largest in quantity to any country;
- shotguns the second largest in quantity, after South Africa, to any country;
- sniper rifles the second largest in quantity, after the USA, to any country; and
- assault rifles the second largest in quantity, after South Africa, to any country?

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#### **Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

*7 August 2014*

The Government has stated that it is reviewing its approved arms export licences to Israel.

Please could you tell me by what date you expect this review to be completed both for exports on the Military List and on the Dual-Use List.

Please could you confirm that the Committees on Arms Export Controls will be informed of the results of this review as soon as Ministers have reached their conclusions.

Finally, please could you in your reply to this letter list all the controlled goods, including components, technologies and software, that have received British Government approval for export to Israel which the Government has reason to believe may have been used by the Israelis in the course of Operation Protective Edge either from within Israel or in Gaza itself.

Please may I have your reply by 29 August.

I am copying this letter to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills.

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**Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills**

*14 August 2014*

Following your statement on August 12 that the Government would suspend 12 of its extant arms export licences to Israel in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities, please could you identify which are the 12 extant licences to which you were referring within the list of the 470 extant licences to Israel that you detailed in your reply to me of 12 May 2014.

I should be grateful for your reply by August 29.

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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

*19 August 2014*

Thank you for your letter of 7 August about the Government's review of extant licences for Israel.

I am sure you appreciate that this is a complex and delicate issue and I have considered it carefully in the context of our obligations under the EU and National Export Licensing Criteria in order to ensure that the Criteria are applied rigorously and appropriately.

The situation in Gaza is unpredictable and there have been several points at which it seemed that a ceasefire might be possible. Although none of these has yet led to a lasting cessation of hostilities, we now have another in place that should be given every chance of success.

Officials have scrutinised extant licences and identified those relating to items most likely to be part of equipment used by the Israeli Defence Forces in Gaza. In making this assessment, officials have judged it unlikely that many of the components that were the subject of extant licences were for incorporation into systems that would be likely to be used offensively in Gaza, for example: imaging cameras or decoy and counter-measures.

However, 12 licences have been identified (8 for items to be incorporated into equipment manufactured in the US and Germany, and 4 for items to be exported directly to Israel) where, in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities, and on the basis of information currently available to us, there could be a risk that the items might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law. Therefore, the Government has concluded that, in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities, these 12 licences should be suspended.

Whilst the Government is committed to full and open provision of information to the CAEC, I would ask you to consider and respect the extreme sensitivities of the current situation and understand that I am not willing to release the list of licences for possible suspension at this stage. Should suspension become necessary, the Government will then release the list to the CAEC.

The findings of the review are summarised in the attached press release which issued from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills on 12 August.

I am copying my letter to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills.

Attached Press Release

#### GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES FINDINGS OF REVIEW OF LICENSED EXPORTS TO ISRAEL (12 August 2014)

The government has today announced the findings of a review of licensed exports to Israel. It has found that the vast majority of exports currently licensed for Israel are not for items that could be used by Israeli forces in operations in Gaza in response to attacks by Hamas.

Twelve licences have now been identified for components which could be part of equipment used by the Israel Defence Forces in Gaza. Currently there is a ceasefire in

place and the government continues to urge both sides to respect this and to secure a lasting end to hostilities through the negotiations taking place in Cairo. However, in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities, the government is concerned that it would not be able to clarify if the export licence criteria are being met. It would therefore suspend these licences as a precautionary step.

Business Secretary Vince Cable said:

“We welcome the current ceasefire in Gaza and hope that it will lead to a peaceful resolution. However the UK government has not been able to clarify if the export licence criteria are being met. In light of that uncertainty we have taken the decision to suspend these existing export licences in the event of a resumption of significant hostilities.

“No new licences of military equipment have been issued for use by the Israeli Defence Force during the review period and as a precautionary measure this approach will continue until hostilities cease.

The UK aims to have one of the most rigorous and transparent export licence regimes in the world with strict criteria governing the provision of licences. In the event of the renewal of significant hostilities, the government’s concern is that it may not have sufficient information to determine whether the licence assessment criteria have been contravened, for example, whether a serious violation of international humanitarian law has occurred and whether equipment containing UK components has been used. It therefore would suspend licences while it establishes more information.

The government continues to monitor closely the situation in Israel and Gaza, and if existing licences are found to be no longer consistent with the criteria, those licences will be revoked.

The priority remains lasting peace in the region that allows both Israelis and Palestinians to live alongside one another securely and peacefully. The UK government will continue to work closely with colleagues in the EU and the US to help achieve this.

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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, MP,  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

*19 August 2014*

Thank you for your letters of 21 July to me and 23 July to the Prime Minister about the Government's policy on arms exports to Russia. This reply will address all the issues raised in both letters.

1. You asked me:

“whether the Government will be suspending, revoking or re-issuing without Russia all or some of extant export licences for Russia. If so, please provide the details in the same format as in Annex 4, “Licences Suspended for Russia” of the Business Secretary’s reply of 14 May”.

And you asked the Prime Minister:

“a) whether all, or only some, of the UK Government’s approved 285 extant arms export licences to Russia (as detailed in Evidence pages 498-510 of Volume II of our Report published today) have now been revoked, suspended, or re-issued without Russia as a permitted destination.”

b) if only some, what is the Government’s policy for deciding which of these 285 extant licences should be revoked, suspended or re-issued without Russia as a permitted destination, and which should be left extant;”

c) again, if only some, please could you state precisely – licence-by-licence – which of these 285 extant arms export licences have been revoked, suspended or re-issued without Russia as a permitted destination, and which not.”

On 31 July the European Union adopted restrictive measures (sanctions) against Russia, including an arms embargo (applying to import and export) and a prohibition on the export of dual-use equipment to Russia for military use or for military end-users, and on the provision of related services. These measures are set out in Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014, which came into force on 1 August. I attach copies of both for ease of reference.

The Government has decided that the EU embargo will supersede its national suspension of licences, announced on 18 March by my predecessor, both for clarity of application, but also because we took national action in the absence of concerted EU measures. We welcome the new EU measures which go beyond our suspension.

As a result, the Government has revoked 25 extant licences that were previously suspended under the UK national measures announced on 18 March (note: 28 licences were originally suspended, but 3 expired during the period of suspension). Officials are working through the remaining extant licences to bring all licences for Russia in line

with the EU restrictive measures. Once this work is complete, my officials will provide the Committees with a further update.

In addition, on 12 May one Standard Individual Export Licence for components for combat helicopters was revoked. On 13 June, prior to the Farnborough Air Show, the Government removed Russia from the Open General Export Licence (Military Goods: for Demonstration). This meant that all military goods exhibited by Russia at the event would require a Standard Individual Export Licence in order to be returned to Russia. On 14 August, the Government removed Russia as a permitted destination for the following Open General Licences:

- Access Overseas to Software and Technology for Military Use
- Historic Military Goods
- Military Surplus Vehicles
- International Non-Proliferation Regime Decontrol: Military Items
- Military and Dual-Use Goods: UK Forces deployed in non-embargoed destinations
- Transshipment Licence (Sporting Guns)
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Category C Goods)
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Trade and Transshipment: Small Arms and Light Weapons)
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Maritime Anti-Piracy)

The Notice to Exporters announcing these changes above is available on the gov.uk website.

The EU sanctions provide exemptions for transactions which concern “the execution of an obligation arising from a contract or an agreement concluded before 1 August”. There is also an exemption for the “provision of spare parts and services necessary to the maintenance and safety of existing capabilities within the EU”. Anyone seeking to take advantage of these exemptions will have to submit a new licence application to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. Any such applications will be assessed against EU Council Regulation 833/2014 and, in the case of exports, the EU and National Consolidated Criteria.

2. You asked me:

“Whether the Government will be suspending the processing of all applications for arms export licences to Russia regardless of whether the military or dual-use items concerned could be or are being deployed against Ukraine. If so, please state what conditions

Russia will have to fulfil for the UK Government's suspension of the processing of arms export licence applications to Russia to be lifted.

And you asked the Prime Minister:

a) whether the Government has now suspended all, or only some, application processing of licences for direct export to Russia of military and dual-use items, and of licences for exports to third countries of military and dual-use goods for incorporation into equipment for indirect export to Russia; and

b) if only some, what is the Government's policy for deciding which new licence applications for direct or indirect military and dual-use exports to Russia should be processed or not.

Finally, you asked the Prime Minister (and I paraphrase) whether there has been any change of the policy outlined in the (then) Foreign Secretary's announcement on 18 March this year during the debate on Ukraine, and "If so, what is the change of policy, and what was the date on which that change of policy took place".

With respect to the Government's policy on applications for export licences to Russia, the EU restrictive measures adopted on 31 July supersede the UK national measures announced on 18 March. All new licence applications are being assessed against EU Council Regulation 833/2014 and the EU and National Consolidated Criteria. The Council Decision requires constant review, and "shall be renewed, or amended as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met." The Council Decision also makes clear that the restrictive measures will be reviewed no later than 31 October 2014.

The Government has condemned Russian action against Ukraine, and continues to urge the Russian Government to desist from its policies to destabilise Ukraine and support separatists in the East. The EU restrictive measures adopted on 31 July are designed to impose a cost on Russia for its behaviour, and encourage it to change course; to stop fuelling the conflict and to engage constructively with Ukraine and the international community, including stopping the flow of weapons across the Russian border into Ukraine.

Finally, you asked me:

"What specific steps the UK Government is taking to persuade NATO and EU Member States to adopt the same policies on arms exports to Russia as the UK".

Since the introduction of the UK suspension of exports of military and dual-use items to the Russian military on 18 March, the UK has been at the forefront of efforts to persuade its EU Partners to agree a robust set of measures against Russia (the so-called

Tier III measures), including an arms embargo and restrictive measures on the export of dual-use goods to the Russian military and military end-users. The European Council's Decision and EU Regulation announced on 31 July secured this outcome.

With respect to action within NATO, the Government's focus has been on securing a robust set of binding EU measures – largely economic and trade-related, focused on defence, finance and energy – where we have judged the levers of influence over Russian behaviour are strongest. NATO is playing a supportive role in this respect. The Government is, of course, in close touch with the US Government, which has taken similar measures against Russia to those introduced by the EU on 31 July. The Government will continue to align its approach to Russia closely with the US. Non-EU countries including EU candidate countries, countries of the EU's Stabilisation and Association Process, EFTA countries, and members of the EEA are encouraged to associate themselves with the Council Decision. Some, such as Norway, have announced that they are likely to do so; we expect other countries to follow suit.

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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, MP,  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

*20 August 2014*

I am writing to update the Committees on a change in the Government's policy on arms export licensing for Russia.

On 31 July the European Union adopted restrictive measures (sanctions) against Russia, including an arms embargo (applying to import and export) and a prohibition on the export of dual-use equipment to Russia for military use or for military end-users, and on the provision of related services. These measures are set out in Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014, which came into force on 1 August. The UK both welcomes and is bound to apply these measures, which have superseded the national suspension announced by the Foreign Secretary on 18 March this year. Officials carefully reviewed the terms of the embargo alongside those of the suspension and concluded that the embargo goes further than our national measures and therefore negates the need to maintain them.

Officials are now reviewing all remaining extant licences for exports to Russia. Any extant licences that breach the new EU sanctions will be revoked. All new licence applications for Russia will be rigorously assessed against the sanctions measures (under Criterion 1) and all other relevant EU and National Consolidated Criteria. Any new licences which are inconsistent with the Criteria will be refused.



The Council Decision prohibits the ‘direct or indirect sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related materiel of all types’ to Russia. The UK interprets this prohibition as applying to all items on the UK Military List. The Council Regulation stipulates that it is prohibited ‘to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance related to the goods and technology listed in the Common Military List, or related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of goods included in that list, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia; and ‘to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, dual-use goods and technology, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia, if those items are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for military use or for a military end. Where the end-user is the Russian military, any dual-use goods and technology procured by it shall be deemed to be for military use.’

The Council Decision prohibits EU Member States from inter alia importing, purchasing or transporting weapons, ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and related spares – but with the second exception below.

The new measures contain exceptions for:

- (i) An obligation arising from a contract or an agreement concluded before 1 August 2014,
- (ii) and to the provision of assistance necessary to the maintenance and safety of existing capabilities within the EU.

I am copying this letter to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills.

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**Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, MP,  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

*2 September 2014*

I was concerned to see that Jonathan Layfield in his e-mail of 18 August to the Clerk of the Committees on Arms Export Controls, Keith Neary, says: “I can also confirm that all the questions asked in the Chair’s letter to the Foreign Secretary, relating to the Government’s Annual Report (HC 480), will be answered in the Command Paper response.” This would not be acceptable to the Committees as it would blur the important distinction between the latest Report by the Committees (HC 186) and the Government’s own annual report on strategic exports.

I should be grateful for your assurance therefore that the Government will adhere to the well-established procedure of replying in a Command Paper to each of the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendations in their latest Report, and will be answering separately by letter each of the Committees' questions on the Government's Annual Report as was done by William Hague in his letter to me of 29 October 2013.

I am copying this letter to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for International Development.

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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills**

*3 September 2014*

Thank you for your letter of 14 August asking me to identify the 12 licences to be suspended should there be a resumption of significant hostilities in Gaza.

The Government is committed to full and open provision of information to the Committees as far as we possibly can. We do not feel it would be right at this stage to give public exposure to the licences. Should suspension become necessary, the Government will provide the list of licences to the Committees.

You should also be aware that we have received a request for disclosure of this information from Leigh Day & Co. solicitors acting on behalf of Campaign Against the Arms Trade, which we are treating as a request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, and two separate requests for disclosure under the Act. We have not yet reached a decision in these cases if we decide we must disclose the information under the Act then I will of course also provide it to the Committees.

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**Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

*3 September 2014*

Following the statements made by US State Department officials and press reports that Russia may be in violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in respect of certain missile flight tests, I should be grateful for your answers to the following questions:

- 1) When did the US Government first make the British Government aware, either bilaterally or as a NATO ally, of its concerns about a possible INF violation by Russia in respect of these tests?
- 2) Are the US concerns in relation to Russian testing of the RS-26 missile or the R-500 missile derived from the land-based Iskander-K, or in relation to the testing of both?
- 3) Is it the case that the flight tests of concern commenced in 2008 or even in 2007? If not, when did they commence?
- 4) Has the British Government expressed any concerns itself to the Russian Government that these tests may be in violation of the INF Treaty and, if so, when were those concerns first conveyed?
- 5) Why have the Committees on Arms Export Controls who scrutinize the Government's policy across the entire range of international arms control issues not received any communication from the Government to date with regard to possible Russian violation of the INF Treaty?

Please may I have your reply by 24 September.

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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills**

*10 September 2014*

Thank you for your letter of 23 July.

We previously agreed terms of disclosure of licence information on a confidential basis (company names relating to Syria chemicals) and, I think it would be appropriate to explore the possibility of disclosure on a confidential basis again, in response to your request for names of end-users relating to the licences for exports to Russia. If the terms of disclosure on this basis remain unchanged, I would be happy to proceed in this way. If you agree, the names of the end-users will be provided in relation to the Standard Individual Export licences only because end-users are not specified on Open Individual Export Licences.

Please be aware that we are currently assessing which licences are not consistent with the terms of the EU sanctions and those licences that are not have been or will shortly be revoked where the exemption for pre-existing contracts does not apply.

Finally, please note that we have identified one licence that was suspended (date of suspension 18 March 2014) at the time of my original response to you. This licence was subsequently revoked on 6 August. This licence is listed at line 2381 in the spreadsheet that was provided to you on 12 May. It was for the supply of focal plane arrays with a total value of £96000.

I am copying this letter to the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for defence and the Secretary of State for International Development.

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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, MP,  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

*10 September 2014*

Thank you for your letter of 2 September about the Government's handling of the Committees' on Arms Export Control's work. I am sorry for any confusion that has arisen.

I can confirm that the Government will respond by letter to the Committees' questions of 7 August on the UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC480).

I can also confirm that the Government will publish separately as a Command Paper its response to the Conclusions and Recommendations in the latest Report by the Committees (HC186).

I am copying my letter to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary and State for International Development.

*10 September 2014*

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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, MP,  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

*30 September 2014*

Thank you for your letter of 3 September requesting information about the US reports of Russia's violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

The US formally shared its concerns with NATO Allies in January 2014 that Russia was developing and testing a missile that would fall within a prohibited treaty category. The

US subsequently concluded that Russia is in breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty and senior US Government officials briefed the North Atlantic Council of this conclusion on 29 July 2014.

The US State Department's recent annual 'compliance' report (Adherence to and compliance with arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements and commitments) states that 'the United States has determined that the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles'. The US has not declared publically when it believes any flight tests of concern first commenced.

As a bilateral US-Russia treaty, the UK is not a party to the INF, but the UK fully supports the NATO Secretary General's statement of 30 July that Russia should work constructively to resolve this critical Treaty issue and preserve the viability of the INF Treaty by returning to full compliance in a verifiable manner. The Alliance's call on Russia to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty through ensuring full and verifiable compliance was repeated in the NATO Wales Summit Communiqué of 5 September.

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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, MP,  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

*6 October 2014*

Thank you for your letter of 07 August enclosing questions on the UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480). I now attach the response, agreed with other relevant Departments, which addresses the questions in the annex to your letter.

I am copying this letter and the annex to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Secretary of State for Defence, and the Secretary of State for International Development.

Annex

**Answers to the Committees' Questions relating to the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 (HC 480)**

The paragraph numbers follow those in the Government's Report.

**Ministerial Foreword**

In his Written Ministerial Statement of 25 March 2014 the Business Secretary announced the Government's revised Consolidated Criteria for arms exports from which the previous Government's broad test of refusing arms exports "which might be used for internal repression" was dropped, leaving only the very much narrower test of refusing arms exports "if there is a clear risk that items might be used for internal repression." How does the Government justify applying only the narrow clear risk test to the generality of UK arms exports whilst continuing, rightly, to apply the broad test of refusing arms exports "which might be used for internal repression" when suspending existing licences, for example to Egypt as set out in the Case Study on Egypt on page 16 of the Government's Report?

**Criterion 2a of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria (known as the Consolidated Criteria) announced to Parliament in October 2000 states clearly that "[the Government will] not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression." This commitment is repeated in the updated version of the Consolidated Criteria announced by the Business Secretary on 25 March 2014. As the Government has pointed out on a number of occasions, there has been no change in policy in respect of the application of Criterion 2a.**

**Egypt is a special case. At the EU Foreign Affairs Council on 21 August 2013 the "Member States agreed to suspend export licences on equipment which might be used for internal repression and reassess export licences for equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP." This is a lower threshold than that set out in the Consolidated Criteria ("might be used" rather than "clear risk") and that is the basis on which licences for Egypt were suspended.**

## **Section 1: UK and EU Policy Developments in 2013**

### **1.1 Legislation**

- a) Will the Government detail the additions to, and any deletions from, the Common Military List of the EU brought into force in the UK by The Export Control (Amendment) Order 2013?

**Details of additions to, and any deletions from, the EU Common Military List brought into force in the UK are listed in Notice to Exporters 2013/13) issued at the time of the Amendment Order (which covers the 2012 Wassenaar Arrangement changes).**

- b) In respect of the EU Commission's proposals for amendments to the EU system of exports controls for dual-use items, will the Government state for each proposal whether it wishes to amend it and, if so, in what way, or whether it opposes it and, if so, why?

**The European Commission's Communication – available here: [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/april/tradoc\\_152446.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/april/tradoc_152446.pdf) - does not contain concrete proposals to amend export controls for dual-use items.**

- c) Will Council Regulation (EU) 258/2012 establishing “export authorisation, import and transit measures for “civilian” firearms, their parts and components and ammunition in respect of export from the customs territory of the Union to or through third countries” require UK national legislation in order to achieve UK compliance with this Regulation, and, if so, when will that legislation be introduced?

**The provisions of Council Regulation (EU) 258/2012 are directly applicable in UK law and there is no additional requirement for separate national legislation.**

#### 1.2 Policy Developments – Cyber equipment, software and technology

- a) Does the Government's definition of cyber equipment, software and technology include cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components?

**The Government has not formally defined “cyber equipment” but the term is widely used by NGOs and in the media. The UK Cyber Security Strategy, published in November 2011, defined “cyber space” as “an interactive domain made up of digital networks that store, modify and communicate information. It includes the internet, but also the other networked information systems that support businesses, infrastructure and services.” Within this space there are a range of products and services which provide a protective security function for information assets, or which may have security implications for the users of the networked systems. It is the latter category of products on which this work has focussed.**

**Not all of these products will have an encryption capability, which is why we have worked hard to agree specific controls. On the other hand, only a small proportion of cryptographic equipment, software and technology will fall into this category.**

- b) Will the Government be implementing in full the exports controls adopted by the Wassenaar Arrangement in December 2013 over both tools (equipment and software) for creating, delivering and controlling “intrusion software”, and “tools for extracting message content and metadata from a carrier class Internet Protocol network and using that data to map the relational networks of individuals or groups”? If so, when will both that legislation be introduced, and

also the relevant legislation to ensure UK compliance with the forthcoming related amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation coming into force in the second half of 2014?

**The new controls adopted by the Wassenaar Arrangement in December 2013 will be implemented in full through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation. No other legislation is necessary to implement these changes.**

- c) Why is the Government working only with industry “to develop guidance to address the risks posed by exports of information and communications technology that are not subject to export control but which might have impacts on human rights including freedom of expression online” and not also with those concerned with human rights and freedom of expression?

**The guidance is intended to be produced *by industry for industry*. However, the relevant industry trade association has been working closely with the Institute for Business and Human Rights on those aspects of the guidance dealing specifically with human rights issues.**

### 1.2 Policy Developments – Gifting equipment currently in Afghanistan

Why is the Government assessing proposals to gift equipment currently in Afghanistan against the narrow test in the Consolidated Criteria, as revised in May 2014, as to whether “there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression” rather than against the broad test of whether the items “might be used for internal repression” which the Government is, rightly, continuing to apply when deciding whether or not to suspend existing licences?

**All proposals to gift export controlled goods and technology are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria. This is the all-encompassing set of Criteria which is used by Government in the assessment of exports, regardless of whether they are in relation to the pursuance of an export licence by industry or by Government when proposing to gift controlled goods to foreign entities.**

**As set out in the (former) Foreign Secretary’s letter of 6 January 2014, Criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria deals with human rights and internal repression. This states that, having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, the Government will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression. This applies equally to the assessment of a proposed gift of controlled goods.**



### 1.3 Transparency and Accountability

Will the Government in the data it publishes quarterly on the Strategic Export Controls: Reports and Statistics website on individual export and trade licences granted, refused and revoked add the end-user stated for each licence as the Government has already done for the licences for the export of dual-use chemicals to Syria between 2004 and 2012 and for Gifted Equipment?

**The Government is actively considering ways in which we can make available more information about types of end-users. However, for reasons of confidentiality and commercial sensitivity, we currently have no plans to routinely identify actual end-users.**

### 1.4 Awareness: Dedicated Training Courses for Business

What is the specific advice that the Government gives on its Dedicated Training Courses for Business “on how to make the best of open licences”?

**The current Open Licence and Compliance workshops for business focus on the range of Open General Licences (OGLs) and Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) that are available. Specific modules on open licence use are also incorporated in the Beginners and Intermediate training events, as well as in on-site training. The modules are developed to provide guidance for business to determine:**

- **which OIELs and OGLs are most appropriate for specific exports**
- **how to read an OGL to determine permitted control list entries and destinations**
- **what other terms and conditions apply**
- **the on-line tools available to facilitate their choice of which licence to register for**
- **specific information about how to remain compliant in using open licences**

**Following the launch of the new OIEL service, there will be targeted training for regular users of Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs), who will be the main beneficiaries of the service.**

### 1.4 Awareness: Cross-Departmental Working

Which are the specific countries of concern on which the Government is currently providing updates and what are the specific concerns, for example potential weapons of mass destruction (WMD) end-use, that relate to each of those countries?

**The Government’s countries of concern are those which feature in the FCO’s Annual Human Rights and Democracy Report.**

**When making export licensing decisions for goods destined for a country of concern, the Government examines the political and security conditions in the destination country, the nature of the equipment to be exported, the organisation or unit which will ultimately be the user of the equipment, and all available information about how similar equipment has been used in the past and how it is likely to be used in the future. Commercial relationships do not, and will not, prevent the Government from speaking frankly and openly to governments about issues of concern (including human rights).**

### 1.5 Advisory Services

Approximately how many complaints has the Government received about its replacement of the Rating Enquiry Service with the Control List Classification Advice Service and the End-User Advice Service, and what have been the main grounds of such complaints?

**The Control List Classification Advice Service and the End-User Advice Service were launched in June 2011 to replace the Rating Enquiry Service. The ECO has no record of receiving any specific complaints about this change since the launch of the new services.**

## Section 2: International Policy in 2013

### 2.1 Arms Trade Treaty

- a) Does the Government see any prospect in the foreseeable future of any of the 3 of the 5 Permanent Members of the UN Security Council who have not ratified the Arms Trade Treaty to date, namely China, Russia and the USA, doing so?

**The Government has, directly or indirectly, lobbied non-ratifying P5 countries among other states this year to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and intends to continue this work. Signature or ratification of the Treaty is, of course, a matter for individual governments to decide.**

- b) What additional legislation will be required by the Government to ensure full compliance by the UK with the terms of the Arms Trade Treaty, and when will that legislation be introduced?

**The Export Control (Amendment) Order 2014 (S.I. 2014 No. 702), which came into force on 9 April, completed all the legislative changes necessary to ensure full compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty.**

### 2.3 UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

- a) What are the categories of weapons that fall within the description “Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems”?

**There is no internationally agreed definition on what may constitute a lethal autonomous weapons system. Informal discussions under the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW) aim to build understanding and inform further work as necessary. For the UK, it is our understanding that such systems, which are able to comprehend higher level intent and which, once activated, may choose from a range of options to deliver lethal force, do not and are unlikely ever to exist. The UK has no plans to develop or acquire lethal autonomous weapons systems. Should there be development of an internationally agreed definition, it is important to note that it is the understanding of the UN CCW that this does not include existing and emerging remotely piloted capabilities.**

- b) Was the UK represented at the Convention's informal discussions on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems in May this year, and what was the outcome of those discussions?

**The UK was represented at this meeting. The report on the informal discussions, to be submitted to the November UN CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties, indicates many states' wish for further informal discussions.**

#### 2.4 The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

What specific steps for further action were agreed at the 13<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention in December 2013 and what role has the UK played in the implementation of those steps?

**The 13th Meeting of States Parties (MSP) of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention: assessed the implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan in advance of the 3rd Review Conference in Mozambique (which took place in June 2014); appointed new co-chairs of coordinating committees; heard requests for extensions under Article 5; agreed the work plan and budget of the Implementation Support Unit; considered the Geneva Progress Report. The UK played a full part in this meeting. Following the 13th MSP, the UK mine action programme for 2014-17 continued to be developed, at the same time as the UK was progressing the fulfilment of all of its other obligations under the convention.**

#### 2.5 The Convention on Cluster Munitions

What specific steps for further action were agreed at the fourth Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention in September 2013 and what role has the UK played in the implementation of those steps?

**The 4th Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions considered the operation and status of the convention, including: universalisation; stockpile destruction; international cooperation and assistance; victim assistance; transparency measures; and national implementation measures. The UK continued to pursue its obligations in the wake of the MSP, including completing in December 2013 the obligation to destroy the national stockpile of cluster munitions.**

#### 2.6 The UN Register of Conventional Arms

- a) Does the Government include in its annual report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms its national holdings of Small Arms and Light Weapons? If so, why are these holdings not included in Annex C of the Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013?
- b) Which countries currently include in their annual report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms their national holdings of Small Arms and Light Weapons?
- c) Will the Government adopt a policy of making the submission of an annual report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms obligatory for UN member states?

**The UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013 includes a copy of the Government's 2013 report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.**

**The UN's Report on International Conventional Arms Transfers (exports/imports) is produced according to UN General Assembly Resolutions 46/36 L and 58/34 and each Member State must provide the information required.**

#### 2.7 Export Control Regimes – Nuclear Suppliers Group

- a) Do any of the 54 changes to the Nuclear Suppliers Group control lists made at the Group's Plenary Meeting in June 2013 require corresponding changes to either the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List, and, if so, have these changes been made?

**The changes to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) control lists will be implemented in full through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation. No changes to the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List are required.**

- b) Is the UK represented on the Nuclear Supplier Group's Technical Experts Group established at the Plenary Meeting in June 2013?

**The UK has maintained a full representation from across Government on the NSG's Technical Experts Group since it was established in June 2013.**

- c) What are the specific areas requiring further investigation in relation to the prospect of Indian membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and by what date is Indian membership likely to be achieved?

**The NSG needs to further consider how a nuclear armed state that is not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, such as India, can be incorporated into the NSG. The NSG will also continue to work with India to ensure that its export control lists and guidelines are harmonised with those of the Group. It would not be useful to speculate on when membership might be achieved.**

#### 2.9 Export Control Regimes – Missile Technology Control Regime

Do any of the technical changes to the Missile Technology Control Regime's export control list agreed via the Technical Experts Meeting require corresponding changes to either the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List, and, if so, have those changes been made?

**The changes to the Missile Technology Control Regime control lists will be implemented in full through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation. No changes to the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List are required.**

#### 2.10 Export Control Regimes – Wassenaar Arrangement

- a) Will the Government provide the Committees, and make public, its latest report to the Wassenaar group of its exports of controlled arms, goods and technologies to non-Wassenaar members?

**The Government reports to the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) using the organisation's secure online system. The data submitted to the WA in this way is not provided in a single report. However, the information is also available to the Committees and the public in the published quarterly and annual reports.**

- b) Do any of the 122 amendments to the Wassenaar Export Control Lists approved at the December 2013 Plenary Meeting – other than those relating to cyber equipment, software and technology which have been dealt with at Paragraph 1.2 above – require corresponding changes to either the UK Military List or the UK Dual-Use List, and, if so, have those changes been made?

**The changes to the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List (WA ML) will be implemented through an amendment to the UK Military List. We will make these changes as soon as the EU Common Military List has been amended in line with the WA ML. The changes to the Wassenaar Arrangement dual-use control lists**

**will be implemented in full through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation. No changes to the UK Dual-Use List are necessary.**

#### 2.11 UK Activities. Academic Technology Approval Scheme

In which countries were the 739 foreign students, who have been denied clearance under the Academic Technology Approval Scheme since 2007 to study in the UK sensitive technologies relating to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, resident, and how many of these students were resident in each of the countries concerned?

**The Academic Technology Approval Scheme applies to students who are not nationals of a European Economic Area state. The FCO does not publish detailed statistics on denials. The release of such information would undermine the effective operation of the Scheme, adversely impacting on the UK's security and its international relations.**

#### Section 3: Export Licensing Case Studies

What are the criteria that the Government is using to decide which countries and issues (for example Anti Piracy) are selected to be case studies in its Strategic Export Controls Annual Report?

**The Government selected countries and issues likely to be of interest to the Committees and other readers of the Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013, and that showed different aspects of export licensing.**

#### Pakistan

The Case Study of Pakistan states: "We also refused a £6.5 million export of several thousand small arms and ammunition for sporting purposes due to concerns that they might contribute to repression and conflict in the region." Since the beginning of 2014 which other exports of small arms and ammunition for sporting purpose have been refused to countries worldwide because of similar concerns? Please state the value of the export, the quantity of small arms and ammunition involved and the country of destination in each case.

**The Government does not currently analyse all refused worldwide licences to such a level of detail. The Committees have highlighted that it may be useful to apply our approach to case studies more widely. The Government will investigate how the requested information can be provided and revert to the Committees once this has been done.**

#### Anti Piracy

- a) What is the specific evidence the Government looks for in anti-piracy export licence applications by Private Maritime Security Companies that the weapons and ammunition concerned will not be sold on to third parties?

**Section 2, iii of the Open General Trade Control (Maritime Anti-Piracy) licence notes “controlled goods transferred under this licence must not be made available for use, on either a temporary or permanent basis, to any other person or entity.” This means that Private Maritime and Security Companies (PMSCs) holding that licence cannot use it to sell controlled goods to third parties. In order to sell controlled goods, a UK company would need a separate trade licence from the ECO.**

- b) Whether the Government will make it a contractual condition when approving anti-piracy export licence applications by Private Maritime Security Companies that the weapons and ammunition concerned will not be sold on to third parties?

**Section 2, iii of the Open General Trade Control (Maritime Anti-Piracy) licence notes “controlled goods transferred under this licence must not be made available for use, on either a temporary or permanent basis, to any other person or entity.” This means that PMSCs holding that licence cannot use it to sell controlled goods to third parties. In order to sell controlled goods, a UK company would need a separate trade licence from the ECO.**

#### **Section 4: Export Licensing Data and Performance Against Targets During 2013**

##### **4.1 Information on licences processed during 2013**

Please provide the information for Open General Export Licences (OGELs), Open General Trade Control Licences (OGTCLs) and Open General Transshipment Licences (OGTLs) as has been provided in Table 4.I for Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs), in Table 4.II for Standard Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCLs), in Table 4.III for Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs), in Table 4.IV for Standard Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCLs), and Table 4.V for Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs).

Number of businesses registering for Open Licences:	
Applying for the first time*	227

Number of OGEL registrations	
Issued	1172
Deregistrations	23
Revoked	1

Number of OGTCLs registrations	
Issued	91
Surrendered	9
Revoked	0

Number of Transhipments registrations	
Issued	5
Surrendered	1
Revoked	0

\*businesses which have no record of having been previously registered on SPIRE

#### 4.2 Information on SIELs, SITLs, OIELs, SITCLs and OITCLs

In furtherance of its policy of Transparency will the Government ask licence applicants for SITLs, OIELs, SITCLs and OITCLs to provide an estimate of the value of the goods they propose to ship, tranship or trade, and will the Government include the estimated value for each licence in its Quarterly Reports?

**Exporters already provide an estimate of the value of the goods they propose to ship against SITL licences and these are available in the published quarterly and annual reports. The Government will consider the feasibility of seeking and reporting on estimates for SITCLs.**

**The Government has asked exporters to provide usage returns for OIELs and OITCLs on an annual basis from 2015. There are no plans to seek usage returns from exporters on SIELs, SITLs and SITCLs.**

#### 4.3 Technical Assistance Licences

Will the Government provide details in its Quarterly Reports of licence applications required under Article 19 of the Export Control Order 2008, as amended, for the provision of technical assistance for anything with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) purposes, and the Government's decision on each such application?

**The Government can provide numbers of WMD technical assistance licences issued and refused each quarter, subject to an upgrade being implemented to enable the information to be made available via the online searchable database. Due to the small numbers of such licences, providing any details other than numbers might compromise confidentiality.**

#### 4.4 Refusals and revocations



Will the Government provide in two separate Tables for the 168 refusals or revocations of SIELs in 2013 the following information for each refusal or revocation:

- i) End User Country;
- ii) Annual Report Summary  
(Description of goods);
- iii) Rating; and
- iv) Reasons for refusal or revocation

**Please find this information in the spreadsheet below.**

#### 4.6 Open General Export Licences (OGELs)

Rather than OGELs remaining in force until they are revoked, will the Government introduce a time limit for such licences?

**The Government has no plans to introduce a fixed validity period for OGELs.**

### **Section 5: Compliance and Enforcement**

#### 5.1 Compliance

- a) Following the finding of the compliance review team “that there were unacceptable levels of non-compliance by first time users of open licences”, what evidence is there, if any, thus far that the new processes introduced by the Government have resulted in significantly improved compliance by first time users of open licences?

**The new policy has only recently been introduced and therefore there is insufficient data as yet, to undertake analysis of the impact of such changes.**

- b) Has the Government considered introducing a penalty if companies cancel their scheduled compliance audit at the last moment, thus reducing the efficiency of the Export Control Organisation’s compliance team?

**Proportionally, the late cancellation of audits although not ideal, is relatively small, less than 3% of all audits undertaken. Systems that were introduced two years ago have significantly reduced the number of audits being cancelled at short notice, with the majority of the remaining cancellations being outside the control of the companies. In these instances it would not be appropriate for a penalty to be incurred. We have, however, issued warning letters to companies in instances where no substantive reason has been given as to why an audit cannot take place.**

#### 5.2 Enforcement activity undertaken by HMRC, Border Force and the Crown Prosecution Service

What is the Government's explanation for the very significant rise in Strategic Export and Sanctions Seizures – up from 141 in 2011-12, to 280 in 2012-13, and to 450 in 2013-14?

**The increase in seizures is partly due to a large increase in seizures of portable devices designed for the purpose of riot control or self-protection (for example, pepper sprays, CS gas sprays, electric shock devices and stun guns.) These items are controlled under EU Regulation No 1236/2005 “The Torture Regulation.” Prior to entry into force of the Torture Regulation, these items were controlled under PL5001 on the UK Military List.**

**There were 30 seizures of such items in 2011-12, compared with 78 seizures in 2012-13 and 186 seizures in 2013-14. Invariably, these were individual portable devices being carried for the personal protection of the owner. These seizures have had a disproportionate impact on the seizure statistics.**

**The EU export controls on these goods are primarily intended to prevent misuse of such devices by police, paramilitary or law enforcement bodies, or to prevent their use in torture. Whilst individual devices will still be seized under UK national legislation (since they are considered to be offensive weapons in the UK), HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) believes that it might present a misleading picture of export control compliance to continue to report these seizures in the strategic export control statistics. Therefore, in future, HMRC will not include seizures of individual self-protection devices in the statistics when the devices are in the possession of their user for the user's own personal protection.**

**However, HMRC will continue to include commercial seizures of portable riot control or self-protection devices in the statistics. This is consistent with the EU Regulation, which includes an exemption for individual devices carried for the user's personal protection.**

**In addition to that, in financial years 2013-14 and 2012-13 there were significant increases in the number of seizures of controlled computer equipment, communications and information technology systems, and equipment employing cryptography. There were 78 seizures of such equipment in 2013-14, and 69 seizures in 2012-13, compared to only 11 seizures in 2011-12.**

**Another factor that has led to an increase in seizures is an overall increase in defence and dual-use exports. The majority of customs export seizures are the result of mistakes on the part of UK exporters, rather than deliberate attempts to evade export controls or sanctions. The volume of trade in military and dual-use goods has increased significantly over the last few years, as evidenced by corresponding**

**increases in export licence applications. The rapid increase in the volume of trade increases the likelihood and frequency of unlicensed exports being seized.**

**Analysis of the seizure statistics does not reveal any other significant trends, or point towards any particular cause that might underlie the general increase in seizure totals.**

### **Annex A Export Controls: Process and Responsibilities**

#### **A.4 Assessment of Export Licence Applications**

- a) Why has the Government misleadingly described the text that preceded the listing of the 8 Criteria for arms exports in the Written Statement made on 26 October 2000 by the then Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Rt Hon Peter Hain MP, as the “preamble” when that description was never used by the then Minister and the text in question contains a substantive statement of policy?
- b) Will the Government discontinue using the word “preamble” in this context?

**The text that preceded the listing of the 8 Criteria for arms exports in the Written Statement made on 26 October 2000 served as a preliminary or introductory statement, explaining in general terms the object and purpose of the Criteria. That is why it was referred to as a “preamble.” The text in question did not contain any substantive statement of policy – the policy was set out in the statement of the 8 Criteria themselves.**

#### **A.6 Types of Licences**

What is the period during which Open General Trade Control Licences (OGTCLs) remain in force?

**OGTCLs remain in force until they are revoked.**

### **Annex C Information Required for the UN Register of Conventional Arms**

#### **UK Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons in 2013**

Why, when Sri Lanka is listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as one of the Government’s 28 Countries of Human Rights Concern, were the Government approved exports to Sri Lanka of:

- revolvers and self-loading pistols the largest in quantity to any country;
- rifles and carbines the largest in quantity to any country;
- shotguns the second largest in quantity, after South Africa, to any country;
- sniper rifles the second largest in quantity, after the USA, to any country; and
- assault rifles the second largest in quantity, after South Africa, to any country?
-

These licences were for counter-piracy operations.

It is clear from contacts with exporters that they have routinely been applying for licences to cover volumes of exports vastly in excess of what is actually exported. This is because they have no firm estimate of likely exports over the two year validity period of each licence at the time when they apply for licences.

The volumes listed in many of these licences are not therefore an accurate prediction of the eventual level of exports. Although the overall volume shipped is proportionate to the activities of British Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) - and there is no evidence of diversion - this is not a satisfactory situation. Government officials are working with the suppliers of automatic weapons and small arms to PMSCs to put new licensing arrangements in place to closely align the volumes licensed and actual exported volumes. These arrangements, which should be fully implemented by the end of the year, will enable the UK Government to exercise greater supervision of these exports and will include regular reporting of volumes exported to be included in the routine quarterly publication of export licensing data.

#### 4.4 Refusals and revocations (Spreadsheet)

<b>4.4 Refusals and revocations</b>					
<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Country Name</b>	<b>Case Summary List</b>	<b>Rating List</b>	<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Reason for Refusal</b>
PERMANENT	Argentina	components for military training aircraft	ML10	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Argentina	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	1,7
PERMANENT	Argentina	space qualified solar devices	3A001	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Armenia	sporting guns (1), weapon sights	ML1	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Azerbaijan	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	ML6	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Azerbaijan	weapon sights	ML1	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Bahrain	general military vehicle components	ML6	REFUSAL	2,3

TEMPORARY	Bahrain	weapon night sights	ML1	REFUSAL	2,3
PERMANENT	Chad	anti-riot/ballistic shields	PL5001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	China	civil body armour	1A005	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	China	components for radar equipment	6A008	REFUSAL	5,7
PERMANENT	China	components for radar equipment, software for the use of radar equipment, technology for the use of radar equipment	6A008, 6D002, 6E101	REVOKE	5,7
PERMANENT	China	focal plane arrays	6A002	REFUSAL	5,7
PERMANENT	China	focal plane arrays	6A002	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	China	focal plane arrays	6A002	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	China	general industrial production equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	China	general military vehicle components	ML6	REFUSAL	1,2
PERMANENT	China	general purpose integrated circuits, microwave components	3A001	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	China	imaging cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	China	imaging cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	1,2,7
PERMANENT	China	imaging cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	2,7
PERMANENT	China	imaging cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	5,7
PERMANENT	China	imaging cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	China	machine tools	2B001	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	China	radio jamming equipment, telecommunications software	5A001, 5D001	REFUSAL	1,2
PERMANENT	China	Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating weapon systems, technology for Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating weapon systems	ML21, ML22	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	China	software for optimising equipment design	ML21	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	China	technology for general military vehicle components	ML22	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	China	technology for weapon cleaning equipment, weapon	ML22, PL5017	REFUSAL	2

		cleaning equipment			
PERMANENT	China	test equipment for global positioning satellite receivers	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	China	test equipment for pressure monitoring equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Congo, Democratic Republic of	anti-riot/ballistic shields	PL5001	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Congo, Democratic Republic of	military construction equipment	ML17	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Egypt	components for machine guns	ML1	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Egypt	components for machine guns	ML1	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Egypt	components for military combat vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Egypt	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002, 5D002	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Egypt	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Egypt	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Ethiopia	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	5A001, 5D001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Ethiopia	software for radio jamming equipment	5D001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	France	components for military training aircraft	ML10	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Germany	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Germany	components for military training aircraft	ML10	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region	technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22	REFUSAL	5,7

PERMANENT	India	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, technology for accelerometers	7A001, 7E001	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	India	accessories for instrumentation cameras, instrumentation cameras	6A003, End Use	REFUSAL	1,7
PERMANENT	India	instrumentation cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	India	instrumentation cameras	6A203	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	India	materials analysis equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	India	materials analysis equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	accessories for power supplies	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	ML6	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	components for biotechnology equipment, components for filtration equipment	2B352, End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	components for flow forming machines	2B109	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	components for general industrial production equipment, electric motors	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	components for industrial gas turbines	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	gaskets	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	gaskets	IRN	REFUSAL	IRAN
PERMANENT	Iran	non-ferrous alloys	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	non-ferrous alloys	IRN	REFUSAL	1, IRAN
PERMANENT	Iran	oil and gas industry	IRN	REFUSAL	1

		equipment/materials			
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1, IRAN
PERMANENT	Iran	seals	IRN	REFUSAL	1, IRAN
PERMANENT	Iran	toxic gas monitoring equipment	IRN	REFUSAL	IRAN
PERMANENT	Iraq	accessories for materials analysis equipment, materials analysis equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Iraq	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Iraq	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Iraq	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Iraq	software for equipment employing cryptography	5D002	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Iraq	spectrophotometers	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Israel	bismuth	1C229	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Israel	bismuth	1C229	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Israel	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	1C450	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Israel	components for military aero-engines	ML10	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Israel	components for military radars	ML5	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Israel	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Israel	equipment employing cryptography	5A002	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Israel	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment, technology for radio jamming equipment	5A001, 5D001, 5E001	REFUSAL	2



PERMANENT	Kenya	pistols (20)	ML1	REFUSAL	7
TEMPORARY	Korea, North	luxury goods	PRK	REFUSAL	1
TEMPORARY	Korea, North	luxury goods, magnetometers	6A006, PRK	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Liberia	military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Libya	anti-riot helmets, body armour, civil body armour, civil unmanned air vehicles, components for body armour, military helmets, military image intensifier equipment, projectile launchers, unmanned air vehicles	1A005, 9A012, LBY, ML2, ML10, ML13, ML15	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Libya	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	ML13	REFUSAL	3,7
PERMANENT	Libya	body armour, military helmets	ML13	REFUSAL	2,3,7
PERMANENT	Libya	imaging cameras	6A003	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Maldives	body armour, components for body armour, components for sniper rifles, imaging cameras, military helmets, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (5), weapon sights	6A003, ML1, ML3, ML13	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Mauritius	assault rifles (175), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	6A002, ML1, ML3, ML13	REVOKE	7
PERMANENT	Mozambique	rifles (2), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (3)	ML1, ML3	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Namibia	components for sniper rifles, weapon sight mounts	ML1, PL5017	REFUSAL	7

PERMANENT	Nigeria	components for tanks	ML6	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Nigeria	military field generators, military support vehicles	ML6, ML17	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Nigeria	radio jamming equipment	5A001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Nigeria	radio jamming equipment	5A001	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Nigeria	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	5A001, 5D001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Nigeria	radio jamming equipment, software replicating controlled telecommunications equipment	5A001, 5D001	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Oman	assault rifles (175), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	6A002, ML1, ML3, ML13	REVOKE	7
PERMANENT	Oman	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	6A002, ML1, ML3, ML13	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Oman	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	6A002, ML1, ML3, ML13	REVOKE	7

PERMANENT	Pakistan	accessories for pumps, components for pumps, electric motors, pumps, seals	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Pakistan	anti-friction bearings	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Pakistan	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2B350	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Pakistan	drilling/mining equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Pakistan	equipment for the use of general industrial production equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Pakistan	military electronic equipment, software for military electronic equipment	ML11, ML21	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	Pakistan	non-ferrous alloys	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Pakistan	process control equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Romania	valves	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Russia	components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters	ML10, PL5017	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	Russia	fibrous/filamentary materials	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Russia	focal plane arrays	6A002	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	Russia	machine tools	2B001	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	Senegal	military patrol/assault craft	ML9	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Singapore	components for fire location equipment	ML5	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Singapore	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, NBC protective/defensive equipment	ML7	REFUSAL	5
TEMPORARY	Somalia	components for military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1
TEMPORARY	Somalia	military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1

TEMPORARY	Somalia	military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1
TEMPORARY	Somalia	military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	South Africa	aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, military communications equipment	ML10, ML11	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	South Africa	assault rifles (175), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	6A002, ML1, ML3, ML13	REVOKE	7
PERMANENT	South Africa	body armour	ML13	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	South Africa	general military aircraft components	ML10	REFUSAL	1,7
PERMANENT	South Africa	small arms ammunition	ML3	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	Sri Lanka	components for military patrol/assault craft	ML9	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Sudan, South	body armour	ML13	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Syria	accessories for inspection equipment, equipment for the use of inspection equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Syria	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, NBC protective/defensive equipment	ML7	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Syria	inspection equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Taiwan	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, NBC protective/defensive equipment	ML7	REFUSAL	5
PERMANENT	Turkey	armoured plate	ML13	REFUSAL	2,3
PERMANENT	Turkey	body armour, components	ML13	REFUSAL	2

		for body armour, military helmets			
PERMANENT	Turkey	components for military combat vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	2,3
PERMANENT	Turkey	components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML15	REFUSAL	5,7
PERMANENT	Turkey	CS hand grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition	ML3, ML4	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Turkey	spectrometers	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	Turkmenistan	components for rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, sniper rifles (2), weapon sight mounts	ML1, PL5017	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	United Arab Emirates	accessories for electron microscopes, components for electron microscopes, electron microscopes	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	United Arab Emirates	accessories for valves	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	United Arab Emirates	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	1C350	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	United Arab Emirates	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	1C350	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	United Arab Emirates	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	1C450	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	United Arab Emirates	components for surface coating equipment, pumps, surface coating equipment	End Use	REFUSAL	1
PERMANENT	United States of America	components for combat helicopters	ML10	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	United States of America	components for combat helicopters	ML10	REVOKE	2
PERMANENT	United States of America	components for military training aircraft	ML10	REFUSAL	7
PERMANENT	United States of America	small arms ammunition	ML3	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Vietnam	military communications	ML11	REFUSAL	2

		equipment			
PERMANENT	Vietnam	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	5A001, 5D001	REFUSAL	2
PERMANENT	Zambia	military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1,7
PERMANENT	Zimbabwe	military support vehicles	ML6	REFUSAL	1

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**Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary  
of State for Business, Innovations and Skills**

*21 October 2014*

I attach the Committees on Arms Export Controls' analysis "Licence approvals for arms exports to Hong Kong that could be used for internal repression" from 2012 Q1 to 2014 Q1, the data for which has been taken from your Department's Quarterly Reports on UK arms export licence approvals published on the BIS website.

Following the widespread reports of tear gas and pepper spray being used against those demonstrating peacefully in Hong Kong, please may I have your answers to the following questions:

1. Is pepper spray included in the "tear gas/irritant ammunition" listed in the Quarterly licence approvals of arms exports to Hong Kong?
2. Does the Government agree that tear gas manufactured in the UK may have been used against peaceful demonstrators in Hong Kong, and that, as reported, tear gas canisters with "Made in the UK" written on them have been seen on the streets in Hong Kong?
3. Will the Government confirm, as has been reported, that it has given export licence approval to the UK company Chemring to export tear gas to Hong Kong?
4. Since 2012 Q4 a significant number of the Government approved exports on the BIS website of both lethal and non-lethal equipment have had "see note below" attached. The note reads "Indicated as licence granted for use by a law enforcement agency" or "for end use by a law enforcement agency". What is the name of the law enforcement agency or agencies in each case where this note is entered?

5. Have any extant Government approved export licences to Hong Kong been revoked or suspended? If so, what was the date of revocation or suspension and the description of the controlled goods in each case?
6. What is the Government's present policy on approving new licences for the export of arms and equipment to Hong Kong that could be used for internal repression?

I should be grateful for your answers to these questions before the debate on the Committees' latest Report and the Government's Response on 30 October.

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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills**

*28 October 2014*

**HONG KONG EXPORT LICENCES**

Thank you for your letter of 21 October 2014 regarding the Committees on Arms Export Controls' analysis of export licences covering Q1 2012 to Q1 2014. I will respond by taking each point in turn from your letter to me:

1. Pepper sprays are not included in the "tear gas/irritant ammunition" annual report summary. Pepper sprays are controlled under item 3.1 of Annex III to Council Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The control entry we apply is HR AIII 3.1 with annual report summary "pepper sprays for self-protection".

We have not identified any licences for pepper spray being applied for or approved for Hong Kong.

2. It appears from public images that some of the tear gas canisters used during the protests in Hong Kong on 28 September were manufactured by Chemring Ltd (a UK company), but Hong Kong Police have not verified this and we have no independent confirmation.

3. I can confirm that the Government granted an export licence approval to Chemring for export of tear gas to Hong Kong on August 2010.

4. In general "law enforcement agency" will refer to the police, customs, border security, internal security forces or other similar bodies responsible for the maintenance of law

and order of the country in question. In respect of Hong Kong the law enforcement agency referred to is the Hong Kong Police Force. However in three of the Annual Report Summaries you listed in your letter, for Quarter 1 2013 (namely “combat shotguns”, “machine guns” & “pistols”) the export licences were for a movie film production company and not a law enforcement agency.

5. No licences for Hong Kong have been revoked, suspended, or had Hong Kong removed from a multiple destination open licence. The Foreign Secretary has advised me that the use of tear gas by the Hong Kong Police was an uncharacteristic response at an early stage of the protests, the scale of which caught the police by surprise, and was not indicative of a wider pattern of behaviour that would cross the threshold of Criterion 2. It is his view that, since that incident, the Hong Kong Police have generally approached the protests carefully and proportionately. I have accepted this advice.

6. The UK Government assesses all export licence applications on a case by case basis in light of prevailing circumstances and in accordance with the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. In particular, Criterion 2 deals with “The respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country for international humanitarian law.” A licence would not be granted if there was a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression. In making these assessments we will take full account of the recent disturbances in Hong Kong.

I hope you find this information helpful.

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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from Tobias Ellwood, MP, Parliamentary  
Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office**

*13 November 2014*

It was a pleasure to respond for the Government at the Westminster Hall Debate on 30 October. I committed to revert to you with more information to clarify the extent of the recent export licensing restrictions in relation to Russia.

Restrictive measures have been put in place against Russia with a view to increasing the costs of Russia’s action to undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as to promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis. In the absence of agreement among EU Partners to take concerted action against Russia, the UK took the initiative in reacting to the deterioration in events in Ukraine by announcing a national suspension on 18 March. Consequently, the UK suspended all extant licences, and applications for export licences, for direct export to Russia of military and dual-use items destined for



units of the Russian armed forces, or other state agencies which could be, or were being, deployed against Ukraine. We also suspended licences for exports to third countries for incorporation into equipment for export to Russia, where there was a clear risk that the end product would be used against Ukraine. In parallel, we encouraged other EU Member States to adopt similar measures against Russia.

As a consequence of this national suspension, twenty-eight Standard Individual Export licences (SIELs) were suspended in March, with a further three suspended in May. I should add that three Open Individual Export licences (OIELs) for Russia were revoked in March, with Russia also removed from three multi-destination OIELs. In May, one additional SIEL was revoked.

The national suspension was superseded by sanctions against Russia introduced by the EU on 31 July. This package included an arms embargo, a prohibition on the export of certain technologies suited to the oil industry, a prohibition on the export of dual-use equipment to Russia for military end-use, and on the provision of related services. These measures are set out in Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014, which came into force on 1 August. We welcomed the new EU measures, which the UK was instrumental in bringing about and which go beyond the national suspension.

Of the thirty-one SIELs suspended under the UK national measures detailed above, four licences had expired during the period of suspension and one was voluntarily surrendered by the licensee. One other licence was found to have been fully exhausted.

As a result of the EU sanctions, the Government revoked the remaining 22 licences. Officials then worked through other extant licences to bring all licences for Russia in line with the EU sanctions.

The review of extant licences identified 77 SIELs and one Standard Individual Trade Control Licence (SITCL) for goods falling within the scope of the sanctions, i.e. military goods, or dual-use items for military end-users or military end-use.

There is an exemption in the sanctions for transactions which concern the execution of an obligation arising from a contract or an agreement concluded before 1 August. In order to ensure that only those licences for transactions covered by a contract concluded before 1 August remained extant, the Export Control Organisation wrote to licence holders asking the to: (i) provide evidence of a relevant contract, or (ii) surrender the licence. It was made clear that failure to respond would result in the licence being revoked.

As a result of this exercise, 50 were surrendered (49 SIELs and one SITCL) and 10 were revoked. Two licences expired during this period, and five had been exhausted. The remaining eleven continue to be extant as the licensee was able to provide sufficient evidence of a prior contract.

In addition to this, Russia was removed as a permitted destination from the fifty OIELs and one Open Individual Trade Control Licence (OITCL), and was also removed as a permitted destination from the Cryptography OIEL, which affected fifty-five licences.

No licences for military goods, or dual-use items for military end-use or military end-users, will be granted unless the proposed export meets the terms of the exemptions in the sanctions, namely prior contract as described above or for the maintenance of existing capabilities in the EU. Licences not falling within the scope of the sanctions, i.e. dual-use items for commercial/civil end-uses and end-users, are not affected. New licence applications will continue to be assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria in the usual way.

I hope you find this information useful. Please be assured that the Government will continue to monitor conditions in Ukraine and we will keep export licensing restrictions under review.

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**Letter to Ann McKechin MP from Tobias Ellwood, MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office**

*13 November 2014*

It was a pleasure to respond on behalf of the Government at the Westminster Hall Debate on arms export controls on 30 October. During the debate, you raised the issue of surveillance equipment and requested confirmation as to whether the timetable for implementation by the EU of controls adopted by the Wassenaar Arrangement would definitely be adhered to.

I can confirm that the agreed changes will be implemented through the forthcoming amendment to Annex I of the Dual-Use regulation.

As per standard EU procedures, the EU Commission adopted the Commission Delegated Regulation amending Annex 1 on 22 October. The regulation is now subject to a two month silence procedure, during which either the EU Council or the European Parliament can raise any objections. In the absence of objections from either organisation during this timeframe, the regulation is expected to be published in the

Official Journal of the European Union on 30 December and to come into force the next day.

A draft copy of the updated Regulation and Control List is published on the EU Commission website at: <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/import-and-export-rules/export-from-eu/dual-use-controls/>.

We continue to work with industry and civil society groups, such as Privacy International, to ensure that exports of surveillance technology are controlled effectively while minimising administrative burdens on legitimate business. As with all other categories of goods, software and technology, licence applications for newly controlled items will be assessed on a case by case basis against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. However, we currently have no plans to introduce national controls in this area.

I trust this information is helpful.

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**Letter to Jeremy Corbyn MP from Tobias Ellwood, MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office**

*13 November 2014*

It was a pleasure to respond on behalf of the Government at the Westminster Hall Debate on arms export controls on 30 October. During the debate, you raised your concerns about Sri Lanka, and in particular, asked for an update on the Government's current thinking about the supply of arms to the country.

The Government assesses all export licences to Sri Lanka on a case by case basis in light of the prevailing circumstances, and in accordance with the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. Arms export licensing decisions for Sri Lanka take into account alleged violations of international humanitarian and human rights law during the military conflict which ended in 2009, as well as the nature of the equipment and whether it might be used in a manner inconsistent with the Criteria. A licence will not be issued where there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression.

Arms exports to Sri Lanka appear to have increased recently, as we have granted a number of licences for weapons and other equipment that will be used by maritime security companies undertaking commercial anti-piracy work. These ongoing efforts to

fight piracy are important for international trade and security. Our assessment of these applications has taken into account the fact that the weapons will be held in secure storage whilst in Sri Lanka, and that the companies are signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times.

I must emphasise that these particular licences do not permit supply to the government of Sri Lanka, and we have seen no evidence that this equipment has been diverted for government use.

I trust this information is helpful.

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**Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills**

*17 November 2014*

I should be grateful for an update of the information you provided to the Committees in your reply of 12 May 2014 on extant export licences to Countries of concern and adding Hong Kong.

**1) Extant licences for the FCO Countries of Human Rights concern**

Please could you state which UK strategic export control licences are currently extant, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence, to each of the 28 countries listed as Countries of Human Rights concern in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's 2013 Human Rights and Democracy Report namely:

Afghanistan

Belarus

Burma

Central African Republic (CAR)

China

Colombia

Cuba

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Eritrea

Fiji

Iran

Iraq

Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories  
Libya  
Pakistan  
Russia  
Saudi Arabia  
Somalia  
South Sudan  
Sri Lanka  
Sudan  
Syria  
Turkmenistan  
Uzbekistan  
Vietnam  
Yemen  
Zimbabwe

**2) Extant licences for other countries**

Please could you state which UK strategic export control licences are currently extant, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence, to each of the six following countries:

Argentina  
Bahrain  
Egypt  
Hong Kong  
Tunisia  
Ukraine

I should be grateful for the reply by 15 December.

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**Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary  
of State for Business, Innovations and Skills**

*17 November 2014*

I refer you to the attached article in the Guardian of 6 November headed "SPYWARE EXPORTS WILL NEED A LICENCE UNDER NEW EU RULES; 'INTRUSION SOFTWARE' JOINS NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ROCKET FUEL

ON THE EU'S LIST OF TECHNOLOGIES THAT MAY HAVE MILITARY APPLICATIONS”.

Please could you tell me on what date the new EU Regulations referred to will come into effect.

Please could you also tell me by what legislation instrument(s) these regulations will be brought into legal effect in all parts of the UK and from what date.

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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills**

*25 November 2014*

#### **EXPORT LICENCES FOR EGYPT**

You will be aware that the EU Foreign Affairs Council imposed a restriction on exports to Egypt in August 2013. This EU-wide suspension remains in place and as a consequence we will not grant licences for Egypt for equipment which might be used for internal repression. This is a different test to that set out in Criterion 2 of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria (that we will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that items might be used for internal repression).

A range of export licences for Egypt was suspended following the EU announcement, including a number of helicopters and helicopter components. This was because of concerns about the way helicopters were being used to police public demonstrations.

The Foreign Secretary has advised me that the situation in Egypt has been changed since August 2013. The political situation has become more stable and we no longer see large-scale confrontations between demonstrators and the security services. At the same time it has become increasingly clear that Egypt faces a serious and growing threat from extreme terrorist groups, not only in Sinai but across the country as a whole.

In the light of these changed circumstances – and based on advice from the Foreign Secretary – I am now willing to consider licence applications to export helicopters and helicopter components to Egypt. Specifically, in relation to the use of Apache helicopters in Sinai counter terrorism operations. I am content that their use does not meet the threshold for refusal under the EU restrictions.

Having said this there will be a continuing presumption of denial of equipment for crowd control policing. I would need to see credible evidence of a significant change in crowd control policing in Egypt before reconsidering this position.

I know that you remain concerned that the Government considers clear risk when assessing the potential of exports to be used for internal repression. Clear risk has been a feature of Criterion 2 since the Consolidated Criteria were introduced in 2000 and remains so today. This criterion, with its clear risk test, has been applied consistently to licensing decisions for fourteen years and there has been no change to this particular aspect of our policy during the lifetime of this Government. There are exceptions to this rule, such as an EU suspension of export licensing, or where the UK initiates suspension as precautionary measure in cases where there is not enough information to assess whether the Consolidated Criteria are met because of a rapid deterioration in security or stability in the export destination.

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**Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, MP,  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

*25 November 2014*

There have been a number of reports including from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that chlorine chemical weapons have been used in Syria subsequent to the Assad regime's commitment to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and to destroy its own chemical weapon stocks.

Please could you state:

1. whether the Government agrees that these reports are correct;
2. whether the chlorine was weaponised in Syria and, if so, where and by whom;
3. whether the chlorine weapon attacks were by the Assad regime's armed forces and, if not, by whom; and
4. the estimated number of deaths and serious injuries as a result of these chlorine weapon attacks.

I should be grateful for your reply by December 15.

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**Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary  
of State for Business, Innovations and Skills**

*2 December 2014*

Thank you for providing oral evidence to the Committees on Arms Export Controls yesterday.

Due to time constraints, with the Foreign Secretary following your evidence, the Committees were unable to ask all of the questions they wished to in the evidence session. Therefore could you provide answers to the following questions:

### **Revocations reporting by the Export Control Organisation**

In your letter to the Committees on 30 June, recognising errors in reporting revocations on the quarterly reports, you said that further work was required to identify the exact causes of the error and that changes may need to be made to SPIRE. Have those causes been identified and fixed?

Were any changes to SPIRE necessary?

What was the impact of the errors and any corrections that had to be made?

Why were these errors not identified by ECO staff?

How confident can the Committees be in the accuracy of the data contained in the quarterly reports?

### **Uniformity of arms export licensing between countries**

The Committees have been told that UK companies are losing sales because the UK is applying stricter rules about whether goods require a licence than other countries, especially for computer equipment. Are you aware of this problem and are you planning to harmonise the application of the rules?

### **The Transparency Initiative**

There was widespread disappointment when the Government announced a reduction from the original terms for reporting Open Individual Export Licences under the Transparency Initiative last year. The Committees have been told that improvements in transparency are now “only marginal at best” and that the generic level of end-user information is “going to throw up many more questions than it answers”.

Are there any plans to have a review to further increase transparency of Open Individual Export Licences in the future under the Transparency Initiative?



If so, what are they and when will they be implemented, and if not, why not?

### **Pre-licence registration of arms brokers and extra-territoriality**

When will the results of the consultation on the pre-licence registration of arms brokers be published?

Are there any plans for the Government to extend the range of goods licensed for arms exports covered by extra-territorial legislation?

I should be grateful for the reply by 15 December.

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### **Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, MP Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

*10 December 2014*

Thank you for your letter of 25 November about the use of chlorine in Syria.

The Government believes that the Assad regime's armed forces have used chlorine as a chemical weapon on several occasions. There is no reason to believe that the chlorine used in these attacks had been subject to any specialist processing. The evidence suggests that chlorine cylinders were placed inside crude barrel bombs and delivered to targets in Syria.

The OPCW Fact Finding Mission (FFM) confirmed the use of chlorine in Syria in its second report, published on 10 September. Following that report I issued a statement confirming the Government's view that the findings of the FFM corroborate allegations that the Assad regime continues to use chemical weapons in Syria, in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The systematic and repeated use of chlorine in northern Syria and the consistent reports from witnesses of the presence of helicopters at the times of the attacks leave little doubt as to responsibility. Only the Assad regime's armed forces were able to fly helicopters over the relevant territory at the time.

Whilst the number of allegations of chemical attacks continues to rise, without access to individuals on the ground it is not possible to give a reliable estimate of the number of deaths or serious injuries caused. Media reporting suggests that since September 2013 the use of chemical weapons has killed at least 50 people and injured more than 1,100 including women and children.

The Government remains concerned over the accuracy and completeness of Syria's declarations to the OPCW and considers that Syria is failing to comply with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Government fully supports the ongoing work led by the OPCW to address these issues and continues to work to bring the perpetrators of these and other atrocities in Syria to account.

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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills**

*15 December 2014*

Thank you for the opportunity to provide oral evidence to the Committees on 1 December. I am writing to follow up on a number of points raised during the course of the evidence session relating to Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI), maritime anti-piracy, the "EU Torture Regulation" and licences for Israel, I am also taking the opportunity to respond to your letter of 2 December on additional issues that time did not allow the Committees to raise on the day, and your letters of 17 November on surveillance technology and extant licences for various countries.

**Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI)**

The Committees asked whether I would consider amending legislation in the light of the fact that the display of information relating to 'Category A' goods at DSEI (or other such exhibitions) may not in itself lead to a criminal prosecution. The Committees have raised this matter with me previously; a copy of my letter to the Committees of 26 March 2012 is attached at Annex A for ease of reference.

I am in principle open to the idea of a law change. But there are two practical considerations: firstly, it is necessary to prove a link between the display of the information, and the eventual movement of the goods between two overseas countries; and secondly, HMRC must act in a way that is proportionate and in the best interests of law enforcement when deciding what, if any, action to take. In all cases of this type that have come to light, HMRC have concluded that closure of the exhibitor's stand by the event organiser was proportionate and that no further action was appropriate. We could legislate to widen the scope of the controls on advertising and promotion, in order to remove the link between the act of promotion and the movement of goods between overseas countries, but the additional test of whether a criminal prosecution is in the public interest would still need to be met. My view is that legislating could be merited if the problem persists and is a regular occurrence.

So far the problem has been very limited. The Committees noted that there have been five such incidents in nine years. Given that DSEI attracts around 1,300 exhibitors, this is a relatively limited problem. However, as I said in the evidence session, the figure should be zero. That is why officials from the Export Control Organisation (ECO) and other Government departments will be working with the organisers of DSEI (Clarion Events) in the run up to the next exhibition in order to re-double our efforts to maximise the compliance of exhibitors with UK export controls at the next event.

Indeed officials have started preliminary work in preparation for DESI 2015. In the New Year officials will review the 2013 memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Clarion Events and the ECO to see how it might be strengthened. The Committees requested a copy of the MoU in advance of the general Election in 2015. As the next DSEI is scheduled to take place in September next year, we are not likely to finalise the MoU before the General Election but it is our intention that copies of the updated MoU, once agreed and signed, should be placed in the Libraries of both Houses of Parliament. The Committees should review the legislative option in the light of the experience of the 2015 exhibition.

### **Maritime Anti-Piracy**

The Committees raised a concern about allegations of private maritime Security Companies sharing arms. The Open general Trade Control Licence for Maritime Anti-Piracy (OGTCL MA-P) states that “controlled goods transferred under this licence must not be made available for use, on either a temporary or permanent basis, to any other person or entity”. This means that the controlled goods covered by this licence are not to be shared with people outside the company that owns them and we will test this point during compliance audits after the licence has been granted.

The OGTCL MA-P was first introduced in spring 2012, and it is currently being reviewed. The review will further tighten the language used in the licence so as to eliminate any possible confusion on this point. The Export Control Organisation (ECO) is working closely with the Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG) – the trade body for the MP-A sector – to ensure that the revised licence is fit for purpose. It will be ready by the end of the first quarter 2015 and will be publicised via circulation to members of SCEG and also through an ECO Notice to Exporters.

### **EU Torture Regulation**

The Government is supportive of measures that strengthen EU-wide controls in the trade in equipment that could be used for capital punishment or to abuse human rights, while not impeding legitimate trade.

The European Commission's proposals to amend Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 (Which is known as the "EU Torture Regulation") were published in January 2014 and are publically available at the following link, alongside an Explanatory memorandum issued by the UK Government: <http://european-memoranda.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/memorandum/proposal-for-regulation-of-the-european-parliament-of-the-council-amending-ec-no-1394109635>.

The Committees asked for information on the UK's input to the review. The Explanatory memorandum accurately summarises the Government's position on the Commission's proposals; the UK has so far submitted written comments on the proposals to introduce controls on brokering and technical assistance related to items listed in Annex III and Annex IIIa. The discussions at the EU Council are ongoing. Please be assured that, as I indicated at the evidence session, the UK will continue to engage positively in this process.

The Committees specifically raised the idea of a torture and capital punishment end-use control. The Committees continue to believe that list-based controls are more likely to be effective than end-use controls, which can be problematic to enforce. However, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. It is important to reiterate that the Commission has the lead role in this area and it has not included an end-use control in its wide-ranging package of proposed amendments. We intend to raise the issue as discussions progress and we remain ready to engage positively with the Commission should they seek to consider a potential torture and capital punishment end-use control.

### **Reporting on revocations**

Turning to matters raised in your letter of 2 December, I can tell you that we have now completed our investigations into the discrepancies between the revocations reported in the Quarterly Reports and those reported in response to specific requests from the Committees.

These discrepancies have arisen as a direct result of the original design of the public reporting database in 2008. The database was set up to report as "revoked" not only those licences that were revoked in full but also those licences that were amended by the removal of a destination or a goods line, including where that amendment was at the exporter's request. In responding to queries from the Committees my officials searched for information only on those licences that were revoked in full or were amended at the Government's initiative, e.g. as a result of changed circumstances in that destination or the imposition of sanctions. They did not include information on licences that were amended at the exporter's request. These discrepancies were not identified by ECO staff because they did not cross-reference the data provided to the Committees with the data available in the Quarterly Reports.

We are currently assessing the feasibility and cost of modifying the reporting database so that licences amended at the exporter's request are reported separately from those revoked or amended at the Government's initiative. I should stress that no exporter has suffered any loss as a result of these differences in reporting. It is purely of the way changes to certain licences have been reported in the Quarterly Reports.

I am confident that the data in Quarterly Reports is accurate. It is clear, however, that the way data is presented in those reports may lead to discrepancies when compared to data obtained in response to specific queries. It is, of course, of the utmost importance that Parliament and the public have confidence in the accuracy and veracity of the published data. In the New Year my officials will commence a project to classify export licensing data as "Official Statistics" under The Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007. As a result, the data will be produced and published according to the requirements of the Code of Practice for Official Statistics and be subject to oversight by the Independent Statistics Authority. The project will take around 6 months to complete.

### **Uniformity in export licensing systems**

We maintain a regular dialogue with other EU member States through the relevant EU working groups, and we maintain a wider dialogue through the international export control regimes that underpin our system of export controls. If there are differences of interpretation concerning the wording of the text in either the EU Common Position or the EU Dual-Use List, we use the EU working groups to seek agreement on a common understanding. Where the differences arise because the control text is ambiguous we seek to amend the text through the appropriate international regime. We are not aware of a widespread or significant problem but there are always likely to be occasional differences in interpretation of the control texts, or in making individual licensing decisions, whilst strategic export licensing remains under the competence of individual Member States.

### **Transparency Initiative**

The Government remains committed to greater openness and the Transparency Initiative will make more information available than is currently the case. We will be publishing new information about the use of open export licences alongside the Government's annual report on strategic export controls in 2015. For the first time the public will have information about the number of times these licences are being used and about the countries and types of end user to which goods are being exported.

However, as I have said previously to the Committees, when the final arrangements were being made to launch the initiative I became concerned that we had not struck the right balance between increasing transparency and avoiding heavy bureaucratic burdens on business. I decided to revise the scope of the initiative – by moving to annual rather

than quarterly reporting and not insisting on descriptions of the specific goods in each shipment – following representations by business. Trade associations raised similar concerns with my officials.

It is important that we allow any initiative like this to bed in before considering changes. We will review the Transparency Initiative in the first quarter of 2015 to consider whether changes are necessary or justified. Again, we will need to ensure a proper balance between a desire for greater openness and ensuring the bureaucratic burden does not put UK exporters at a disadvantage over those based overseas.

### **Register of Arms Brokers**

We are now concluding the process of analysing the results of our ‘call for evidence’ on the idea of introducing a pre-licensing register of arm brokers and are discussing them with colleagues across Government. I hope to be in a position to publish the results with a Government response by the end of 2014 or, at the latest, in January 2015.

### **Extraterritoriality**

The Government currently has no further plans to extend the extra-territorial scope of the controls on arms brokering beyond those additional items covered by the Arms Trade Treaty, namely main battle tanks and armoured fighting vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, large calibre artillery, certain missile systems and warships.

### **Surveillance technology**

In response to your letter of 17 November on surveillance technology, I would reiterate comments made in the evidence session that new controls on equipment for the monitoring or interception of the internet or of mobile telecommunications are due to be implemented by the end of 2014 through an update to Annex I of Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 (which is known as the “EU Dual-Use Regulation”).

As per standard EU procedures, the EU Commission adopted the Commission Delegated Regulation amending Annex I on 22 October. The Regulation is now subject to a two month silence procedure during which either the EU Council or the European Parliament can raise any objections from either organisation during this timeframe, the Regulation is now expected to be published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 31 December and to come onto force on 1 January. Regulation 428/2009 is directly applicable in all EU countries therefore no further legislation will be needed in the UK to implement the Regulation.

### **Israel licences & Extant licences to various countries**

Annex B provides information on the twelve export licences for Israel that were cited in our statement of 12 August 2014 concerning our review of licensed exports to Israel, which was undertaken at the time of the recent Israel./Gaza conflict. The Committees requested this information initially in its letter of 14 August 2014, and reiterated this in the evidence session. The Committees may wish to note that the information on extant licences provided by the ECO in May, which was cited in your letter of 14 August 2014 and in the evidence session, covered direct exports to Israel. Of the twelve licences listed in Annex A, four licences are for direct export to Israel. The additional eight were issued for other countries (in this case USA and Germany) but are included in the list as Israel is noted in those cases as a third party ultimate end-user.

Annex C provides information on extant licences for various countries, as requested in your letter of 17 November.

I hope you find this response useful.

Annex A

26 March 2012

#### **FURTHER FOLLOW UP TO ORAL EVIDENCE TO THE COMMITTEES ON ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS**

In my letter to you of 13 February, which followed up on points made about Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) 2011 during my oral evidence to the Committees on 7 February, I said that I would write further on the issue of whether the fact that the display of brochures related to 'Category A' goods was not necessarily illegal represented a 'loophole' in the law. I have looked into the matter and would like to take this opportunity to report back to you.

As things stand, I am not persuaded that the law should be changed. The Government's intention is to work through the organisers of the DSEi conference to make clear to all exhibitors, especially those who have displayed unacceptable material in the past, that we will not permit them to exhibit material relating to 'Category A' goods. If unacceptable material is found on display, we will ensure that the exhibition stand in question is closed down. I think that this, and not criminal prosecution, is a fair and proportionate response.

As I said in my previous letter, there are two issues: firstly, it is necessary to prove a link between the display of the brochure, and the eventual movement of the goods between two overseas countries; and secondly, the fact that HMRC must act in a way that is proportionate and in the best interests of law enforcement when deciding what, if any,



action to take. In all the cases of this type that have come to light, HMRC have concluded that a closure of the exhibitor's stand by the event organiser was proportionate and that no further action was appropriate. We could legislate to widen the scope of the controls on advertising and promotion, in order to remove the link between the act of promotion and the movement of goods between overseas countries, but the additional test of whether a criminal prosecution was in the public interest would still need to be met, and I am not convinced that in practice it could be.

It is important to consider the scale of the problem. DSEi attracts around 1300 exhibitors. Despite the best efforts of officials from several Departments and of the organisers in ensuring that exhibitors are aware of relevant UK law, it is of course a matter for regret that one or two exhibitors simply do not get the message. But it must be emphasised that such infringements have been relatively limited, with only one or two incidents of this kind occurring at each event.

As an alternative to regulation, I have however asked my officials in the Export Control Organisation to work even more closely, alongside colleagues in other Government Departments, with the organisers of DSEi event in 2013 in order to prevent such occurrences and to be even more diligent in our policing of the event.

#### Annex B

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Country Outcome (Direct Export)</b>	<b>Goods Summary</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military aero-engines	3187.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	16000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	18000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Country Outcome (For Incorporation)</b>	<b>Goods Summary</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	Germany	components for military radars	6210
SIEL (Permanent)	United States	technology for military aero-engines, technology for naval engines	100
SIEL (Permanent)	United States	components for combat aircraft	49797.6
SIEL (Permanent)	Germany	components for military radars	6831
SIEL	Germany	components for tanks	330000



(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	United States	components for military radars	2388.44
SIEL (Permanent)	United States	components for combat aircraft	45000
SIEL (Permanent)	United States	launching/handling/control equipment for munitions	104000

Annex C

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Search Countries Outcome</b>	<b>Goods Summary</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Transshipment)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for combat helicopters	451636.97
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	body armour	350
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, equipment for the use of military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	34643.18
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	equipment employing cryptography	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment	26498
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	equipment employing cryptography	26654.84
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	equipment employing cryptography	27809.12
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for electronic warfare equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment	554838.12
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	imaging cameras	73200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	5086
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	body armour, components for body armour	1360
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	small arms ammunition	81180
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	equipment employing cryptography	400000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	assault rifles (32), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, pistols (17)	56223
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	178568
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	119962
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	83933.77
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	125603.34
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military helicopters	23693.23
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	5912739.16

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	military support vehicles	62718.41
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military bridges/pontoons/ferries	104525.16
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	16053.28
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	equipment employing cryptography	1577581.73
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	75000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment	308078
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for body armour, military helmets	44252.64
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	small arms ammunition	101790
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	small arms ammunition	10269
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military combat vehicles	655910.26
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for machine guns, components for pistols, machine guns (25), pistols (25)	38275
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	208.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	1427443.3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	equipment employing cryptography	19500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	5500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for assault rifles	500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	body armour, components for body armour	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1520061
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	100000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	technology for electronic warfare equipment	40800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	67000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	82500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	general military aircraft components, military aircrew life support equipment	40739.18
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, equipment for the use of military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	340000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	assault rifles (4), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, training small arms ammunition	9596.58

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	assault rifles (5), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, pistols (3)	8838
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	150000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	equipment employing cryptography	287
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military aero-engines, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military support aircraft, military guidance/navigation equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for combat aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for signalling devices, technology for test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems	

		specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MNs; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed of modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (Burma), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Cuba), ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Somalia), ISSUE (Sri Lanka), ISSUE (Sudan), ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (Burma), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Eritrea), ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE (Somalia), ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (Central African Republic), ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Somalia), ISSUE (Sudan), ISSUE (Syria)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Vietnam)	technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Tunisia)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (Iraq)	components for ejector seats, components for military parachutes, components for military training aircraft, ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military distress signalling equipment, military parachutes, technology for the development of ejector seats, technology for the development of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the development of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the development of military parachutes, technology for the development of military training aircraft, technology for the production of ejector seats, technology for the production of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the production of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the production of military parachutes, technology for the production of military training aircraft, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes, technology for the use of military training aircraft	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, devices for initiating explosives, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	equipment employing cryptography	
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	components for sporting guns, sporting guns (2)	9800
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (1)	10000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting shotguns (1)	7000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting shotguns (2)	6000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting shotguns (2)	4000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting shotguns (2)	8000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting shotguns (1)	3500
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting shotguns (2)	95000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting shotguns (1)	8000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (3)	70000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting shotguns (2)	14000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (2)	1500
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting shotguns (2)	2000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting shotguns (2)	3000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	31520.12
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1232871
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	submersible equipment	109210
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	human pathogens	300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (15)	12992.2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	equipment employing cryptography	50700

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	equipment employing cryptography	805.41
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	imaging cameras	9750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (600)	210000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	imaging cameras	31578
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	small arms ammunition	100000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	9861331
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	metal alloy powder production equipment	437385
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	9861331
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	components for military helmets	1668
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	semiconductor process equipment	666937
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (1), weapon sights	8066
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	equipment employing cryptography	6000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting shotguns (2)	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	2376.84
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	products containing radium-226, products containing thorium	2716
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	7552080
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina)	animal pathogens	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina)	triggered spark gaps	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Belarus), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Hong Kong)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	



OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Cuba), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Ukraine)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Fiji), ISSUE (Hong Kong)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Belarus), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Central African Republic), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Colombia)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Israel)	towed hydrophone arrays	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Vietnam)	equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Ukraine)	lasers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Cuba), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Eritrea)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Vietnam)	equipment employing cryptography	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Israel)	artillery ammunition, components for NBC detection equipment, components for artillery, components for combat naval vessels, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, signalling devices, smoke canisters, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, technology for NBC detection equipment, technology for artillery, technology for combat naval vessels, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for general naval vessel components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military radars, technology for naval communications equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval engines, technology for naval gun installations/mountings, technology for naval guns, technology for signalling devices, technology for smoke canisters, technology for weapon control equipment, training artillery ammunition, weapon control equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	sporting guns	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE	pressure transducers, software for semiconductor process equipment, technology	

Use)	(Ukraine)	for semiconductor process equipment	
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights	20000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	machine guns (1), sniper rifles (1)	13000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, improvised explosive device jamming equipment	70000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	software for telecommunications jamming equipment, telecommunications jamming equipment	51272.54
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	379960
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (1), weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sights	11110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	67500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	general military vehicle components	2428
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for sporting guns, sporting guns (3), weapon sights	3657
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	321830
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	military communications equipment	24806
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment	24620
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	accessories for materials analysis equipment	6000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	sporting guns (2)	3345
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography	594.91
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	gun silencers, sporting guns (1), weapon sights	4735
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment	369.72
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	inertial equipment	31990
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for naval guns, components for weapon mountings, equipment for the use of naval guns, naval guns, technology for naval guns, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon mountings, weapon sight mounts	1517000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	inertial equipment	3000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment	369.72
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography	4895

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	small arms ammunition	4600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	616
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	assault rifles (5000), components for assault rifles, equipment for the use of assault rifles, weapon cleaning equipment	6538537.8
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for sporting guns, gun silencers, pistols (1), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (4)	35837
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	inertial equipment	250000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military bridges/pontoons/ferries	3389954.44
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	inertial equipment	38407.2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	2280500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	246718.91
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	185700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	military helmets	400000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography	7231100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5875950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	machine tools	153483.02
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography	52804.33
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	425
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	general military aircraft components	6357.6
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	4036.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for gun mountings, components for machine guns, equipment for the use of machine guns, gun mountings, machine guns (50)	484875
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	7745545
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5875950

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	hand grenades, training devices containing military pyrotechnic materials	335000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military aero-engines	13057.68
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military training aircraft	2926
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography	480205.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography	182300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military training aircraft	7694.24
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for combat aircraft	1152.93
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	high performance air traffic control software	100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	15000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military training aircraft	8289
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military training aircraft	5854
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	gun silencers, sporting guns (6)	81800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	small arms ammunition	2000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military training aircraft	2962.3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	tear gas/riot control agents	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	signalling devices	16384
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	245769.49
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for body armour	80650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	sporting guns (2)	185000
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	aircraft cannons, components for aircraft cannons	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for recognition/identification equipment, software for recognition/identification equipment, technology for recognition/identification equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military training aircraft, military guidance/navigation equipment	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
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OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	accessories for military cameras/photographic equipment, accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, aircraft military communications equipment, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for ejector seats, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military containers, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military parachutes and equipment, components for military radars, components for military scenario simulation equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military training equipment, components for rangefinding equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, ejector seats, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military airborne equipment, equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of military aircraft head-up/down displays, equipment for the use of military aircraft pressure refuellers, equipment for the use	
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of military aircrew breathing equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the use of military cameras/photographic equipment, equipment for the use of military containers, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military parachutes and equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of military scenario simulation equipment, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training equipment, equipment for the use of rangefinding equipment, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, equipment for the use of targeting equipment, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, general military aircraft components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, military aero-engines, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft head-up/down displays, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military cameras/photographic equipment, military communications equipment, military containers, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military parachutes and equipment, military radars, military scenario simulation equipment, military training equipment, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for ejector seats, software for electronic countermeasure equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, software for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, software for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, software for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, software for military aero-engines, software for military airborne equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft head-up/down displays, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military aircrew breathing equipment, software for military aircrew protective equipment, software for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for military containers, software for military electronic equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military image recording/processing

equipment, software for military parachutes and equipment, software for military radars, software for military scenario simulation equipment, software for military training aircraft, software for military training equipment, software for rangefinding equipment, software for targeting equipment, software for weapon control equipment, targeting equipment, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for ejector seats, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military airborne equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft head-up/down displays, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military containers, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military parachutes and equipment, technology for military radars, technology for military scenario simulation equipment, technology for military training aircraft, technology for military training equipment, technology for rangefinding equipment, technology for targeting equipment, technology for weapon control equipment, weapon control equipment

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Burma), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Ukraine)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Burma), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Syria), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Yemen)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Pakistan)	military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military utility vehicles	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Uzbekistan), ISSUE (Vietnam)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Sri Lanka), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Yemen)	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for combat aircraft, components for military support aircraft	

<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Sri Lanka), ISSUE (Tunisia)</p>	<p>components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of military helicopters, equipment for the development of military support aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military</p>	
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		helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, test models for military support aircraft, test models for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military radars, components for weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, software for military radars, software for weapon control equipment, technology for military radars, technology for weapon control equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Sri Lanka), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Yemen)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	

	(Yemen)		
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for aircraft carriers, components for combat naval vessels, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military patrol/assault craft, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	software for the use of test equipment for inertial equipment, test equipment for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for tanker aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for small arms ammunition, small arms ammunition	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	accessories for military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Vietnam), ISSUE (Yemen)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for military training equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, military training equipment, software for aerial target equipment, software for military training equipment, technology for aerial target equipment, technology for military training	

		equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, components for equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the use of military training aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for test equipment for aerial target equipment, components for test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for training airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, military training aircraft, technology for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of training airborne electronic warfare equipment, test equipment for aerial target equipment, test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, training airborne electronic warfare equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, aircraft radars, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military video recording equipment, components for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, components for weapons simulators, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft radars, equipment for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military video recording equipment, equipment for the use of training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, equipment for the use of weapons simulators, military aircraft navigation equipment, military training aircraft, military video recording equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of aircraft radars,	



		technology for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military video recording equipment, technology for the use of training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of weapons simulators, test equipment for aerial target equipment, test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, test equipment for aircraft radars, test equipment for military aircraft navigation equipment, test equipment for military video recording equipment, test equipment for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, test equipment for weapons simulators, training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, weapons simulators	
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OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	<p>accessories for airborne targeting equipment, accessories for bombing computers, accessories for film processing equipment, accessories for imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, accessories for imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, accessories for imaging countermeasures equipment, accessories for military cameras, accessories for military image intensifier equipment, accessories for military imaging radar equipment, accessories for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, accessories for military photographic equipment, accessories for military video processing equipment, accessories for military video recording equipment, accessories for night vision goggles, accessories for optical target acquisition equipment, accessories for optical target designator equipment, accessories for optical target surveillance equipment, accessories for optical target tracking equipment, accessories for sensor data recorders, accessories for sensor integration equipment, accessories for simulators for military training aircraft, accessories for training equipment for military training aircraft, accessories for weapon control systems, airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne refuelling equipment, airborne targeting equipment, aircraft radars, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, bomb handling equipment, bombing computers, chaff equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for airborne targeting equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for aircrew protective masks, components for anti-g/pressure suits, components for automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, components for bombing computers, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for equipment for the use of military training aircraft, components for film processing equipment, components for helmet mounted display equipment, components for imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, components for imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, components for imaging countermeasures equipment, components for liquid oxygen converters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military cameras, components for military containers,</p>	
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components for military flying helmets, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military imaging radar equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military parachutes, components for military parachutist equipment, components for military photographic equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military video processing equipment, components for military video recording equipment, components for night vision goggles, components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for optical target designator equipment, components for optical target surveillance equipment, components for optical target tracking equipment, components for sensor data recorders, components for sensor integration equipment, components for simulators for military training aircraft, components for training equipment for military training aircraft, components for weapon control systems, control equipment for air-to-air missiles, control equipment for bombs, control equipment for decoy flares, control equipment for fragmentation rockets, control equipment for practice bombs, ejector seats, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, film processing equipment, handling equipment for air-to-air missiles, handling equipment for bombs, handling equipment for decoy flares, handling equipment for fragmentation rockets, handling equipment for practice bombs, helmet mounted display equipment, imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, imaging countermeasures equipment, launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, launching equipment for bombs, launching equipment for decoy flares, launching equipment for fragmentation rockets, launching equipment for practice bombs, liquid oxygen converters, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft navigation equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military cameras, military containers, military flying helmets, military image intensifier equipment, military imaging radar equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes, military parachutist equipment, military parametric technical databases, military photographic equipment, military video processing equipment, military video recording equipment, night vision goggles, optical target acquisition equipment, optical target designator equipment, optical target surveillance equipment, optical

		<p>target tracking equipment, sensor data recorders, sensor integration equipment, simulators for military training aircraft, software enabling equipment to function as military training aircraft, software for military training aircraft, software for the evaluation of weapon systems, software for the modelling of military operation scenarios, software for the modelling of weapon systems, software for the simulation of military operation scenarios, software for the simulation of weapon systems, software for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military training aircraft, test equipment for military training aircraft, test models for the development of military training aircraft, training equipment for military training aircraft, weapon control systems</p>	
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OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for aircraft cannons, equipment for the use of aircraft cannons, software for aircraft cannons, technology for aircraft cannons	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military containers, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines, unfinished products for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	acoustic seabed survey equipment, guidance/navigation equipment, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Vietnam)	command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Yemen)	software for inertial equipment	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Belarus)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	9988
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Belarus)	components for equipment employing cryptography	120000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Belarus)	imaging cameras	8500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Belarus)	X-ray accelerators	1692011.62
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Belarus)	laser optical components	2700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Belarus)	X-ray generators	2018653
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Belarus)	imaging cameras	18304
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Belarus)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	114804

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Belarus), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Ukraine)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Belarus), ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Belarus), ISSUE (Ukraine)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Burma)	inertial equipment	3200000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Burma)	general laboratory equipment	9194
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Burma)	equipment employing cryptography	636868
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Burma), ISSUE (Eritrea), ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Somalia), ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Burma), ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE (Vietnam)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Burma), ISSUE (Vietnam)	acoustic seabed survey equipment, equipment employing cryptography, guidance/navigation equipment, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles, underwater sonar navigation systems	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Central African Republic)	components for body armour, military helmets	19050
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Central African Republic)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	168750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Central African Republic)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	9200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Central African Republic)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	33966
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Central African Republic)	body armour, bomb suits, components for devices for initiating explosives, devices for initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disruptors	47000

SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	120000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	military communications equipment	2000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	400
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	198000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	54094.81
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	115000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	87000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	15000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	components for military communications equipment	146.66
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	general military aircraft components	200
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	acoustic seabed survey equipment	11662
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	military communications equipment	500
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	92585
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	15351
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	rebreathing swimming equipment	15000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	40000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of chemical agent detection equipment, military electronic equipment, software for NBC detection equipment	540656.8
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	25000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	uranium isotope separation equipment	1500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for nuclear reactors, technology for nuclear reactors	42936
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	880000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for nuclear reactors	3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	705000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for nuclear reactors	73108
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	numerical control software	1500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for instrumentation cameras	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for instrumentation cameras	8140

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for military helicopters	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for nuclear reactors	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5850000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	mass spectrometers	344099
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	970110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	520625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military radars	1476000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	2776150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	970110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment	3300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, magnetometers	3333
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	12582
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	16800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	small arms ammunition	2000000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	42600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for the production of civil aero-engines	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	high speed pulse generators	17793
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for imaging cameras	100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	4000000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	5174.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	15000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	4535
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	29600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, magnetometers	7038
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	accessories for digital computers, accessories for vibration test equipment, components for vibration test equipment, digital computers, software for vibration test equipment	45000



SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	114000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	55301.6
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	2000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military electronic equipment	10
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	43411.2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	laser optical components	8560
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	300000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for NBC detection equipment	500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for chemical agent detection equipment, software for chemical agent detection equipment, technology for chemical agent detection equipment	471150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	600000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	25001
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	submersible vehicles	1736777
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	20900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1095000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	881250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	21750000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	2000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1138.58
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	17400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	41887.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	3430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	3430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	3430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	3430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	9972

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	200000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	625000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	19625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	general purpose integrated circuits	37455
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	423087.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	253175.89
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy tubes	14995.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	92575
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	528150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	137170
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	165434.78
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	12104.83
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	19917
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	RF direction finding equipment	25188
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	pressure transducers	1867.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	1367.52
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	dimensional inspection equipment	120000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	rebreathing swimming equipment	25043.48
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	3596
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	19625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	28000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	74050
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for the development of space qualified focal plane arrays	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment, marine position fixing equipment	264325
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	127740
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	30400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1888100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	192800

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1955000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	606250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1043750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor process equipment	1705142
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	74050
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	521.82
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	25001
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	173900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	40622
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	32710
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19394
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	600.92
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for combat aircraft	418000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	12903.23
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	516384
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	5148
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	39000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	41025
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	355525
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	12781.92
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	10222.56

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	37300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	46100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	68400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	96000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	2615
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	biotechnology equipment	6814.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	pressure transducers	502.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	476250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	606250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4325000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	thorium	743
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	19625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	27539
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1846350
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	59850000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for the production of military communications equipment	500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	47600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	55200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1195400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	7959
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military communications equipment	190
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	3000720
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	6757.7
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	military electronic equipment	2510.03
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	9972
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	15830
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	civil NBC protection equipment	3982

		components for chemical agent detection equipment, equipment for the use of chemical agent detection equipment, software for chemical agent detection equipment, technology for chemical agent detection equipment	50661170.85
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	80000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	94195
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	146.46
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	25600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	24645
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	48349
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	107120
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	nuclear grade graphite	10300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	6314
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	14600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for equipment employing cryptography	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for equipment employing cryptography	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military helicopters	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	370000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	565000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	submersible equipment	53040
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	530900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1607450
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	618900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	0.01
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	418250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1131.79
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	24411

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for instrumentation cameras	46000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	guidance/navigation equipment	26250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	320000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	19719
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	1852
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	60683.6
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	250000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	4000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	300000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military communications equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, military communications equipment	5276.36
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment	31658.16
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	submersible equipment	3380.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	40045
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5400720
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	27295
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1925000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	128000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	general naval vessel components	19844.56
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	320.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2507.68
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	20500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	magnetometers	3366
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	960000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	143040
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	900000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	45000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	226840
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	181618.36

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	51250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1650000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4867500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1061.58
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1345000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for combat aircraft	299200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1968750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5050000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	970110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	410900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	262500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	general purpose integrated circuits	2100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2525000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	2254
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military electronic equipment	0.01
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	36000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	213250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	44654
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	690550
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1184500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1529
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	11850
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for computer analogue to digital equipment, technology for computer analogue to digital equipment	2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	118539
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	76344.02
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	239540

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for civil aero-engines	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	35448
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	electronics cooling fluids	55000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	300000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1311535
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	72000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	11000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1943
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	27200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	laser optical components	24234.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	190
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	2000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1229
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	31600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	3792
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	general purpose integrated circuits	168.95
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	21500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	24411
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	24900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	280000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	175000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	187590
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	519700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	437000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	7310
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	laser optical components, lasers	456504.48
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	24688



SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1755
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	pressure transducers	1353.55
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	225000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	magnetometers	3986
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1061.58
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	75000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	350000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	99000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	150000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	44930
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	72255
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	203050
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	249030
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1016200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	33156
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	general purpose integrated circuits	91000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	28400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	22262.8
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	730000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	chemicals used for chemical/materials production	27634.1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	100024
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1308575
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	65772
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1869800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1087500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1043750

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	35600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	22400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	22848.29
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1396
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	110000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	25620
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3850
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	38000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19210.52
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1061.58
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	military aircraft ground equipment	14470
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	5265
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military patrol/assault craft	72100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	18900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	639600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	general purpose integrated circuits	34180
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	107120
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19424
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	28943
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	24900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	22000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	2460659.23
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	128.06
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	44295
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	2169.22

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor process equipment	975000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	61957.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	150000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	mass spectrometers	330000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	441580
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	195493.33
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	17164
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	72969.74
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	71250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1687500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1100000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military helicopters	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	military aircraft head-up/down displays, software for military aircraft head-up/down displays, technology for military aircraft head-up/down displays	27854.32
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for combat aircraft	310000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	206727.47
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	84000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	44430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	9900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	97650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	99000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	15995
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for periscopes	17
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of military aero-engines	2527
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	biotechnology equipment	66095
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	7725
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	97650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	120000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	11976
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	14121

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2462500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4575000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	737500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	19256
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2558.86
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers, technology for semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1610000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1749
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	5247
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	852562
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	35600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	12228
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	79863.6
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	760000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	44735
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1462500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	737500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	7125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	318806
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	55125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military aero-engines	15000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	27176.95
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	26413
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	4010
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	327883
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1955
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for metal alloy materials	200

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor process equipment	1095000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	105000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	11048
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	374999.88
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	36309
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	11002
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	19496
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	4000000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2925000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1231250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1475000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	455000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	8937500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1462500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1256111
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	50000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military aero-engines	37200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	22520
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	27300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	140000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for weapon cleaning equipment, weapon cleaning equipment	1934200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	20514
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	17606.64
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military electronic equipment	50
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	991.94
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1608
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1843.59

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	53726.64
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for equipment for the production of gas turbines, technology for military aero-engines	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for equipment for the production of gas turbines, technology for military aero-engines	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	biotechnology equipment	2635
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	15540
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for combat naval vessels	132960
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	32300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	38400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	968676
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	21500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	382.3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1738
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment	281269.45
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1933
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	342671.02
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5134.05
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	19104
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	5429.56
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	11767
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military radars	260000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	civil NBC detection software, civil NBC detection systems, components for civil NBC detection systems	1018342
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	208014
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	516250

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	294.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1558
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	32761.02
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	electronics cooling fluids	15000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1270000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	5847
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	84000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	17606.64
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	896.03
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures	2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1411
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	8373.84
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1955
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	22664.82
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1462500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	12787500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	392500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	2000000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	392500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	392500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	893750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	893750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1644
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	17140
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	military aero-engines	60000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	67294
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	19400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military radars	6900996
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	pyrotechnics/fuels and related substances	562500

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2925000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	13162500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for imaging cameras	1000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	military aero-engines	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	30151.46
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	5789.7
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	185000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	general purpose integrated circuits	135530
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	15601440
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	71160
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	general purpose integrated circuits	468040
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	13570
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	6002.8
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	1240985.92
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	23625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for lasers	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	27468
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	magnetometers	9974
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	84000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	27356.25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	25481.93
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	25481.93
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for equipment employing cryptography	20
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1040000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for equipment employing cryptography	1315
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1834



SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	120000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	1000000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	2398681.64
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	3006
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	39970
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	388044
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	970110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1294871
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	37662
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	292000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of military aero-engines	4707.6
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	7279.36
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	224.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	8500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	12500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1790
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	336250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	16875000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	13125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	1680
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	8500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	84000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	66610
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	16604
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	206000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7380
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for mass spectrometers, mass spectrometers	475710

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	600000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	70221
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	65650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	9525000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	242500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	61875
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5725000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	11425000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2925000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1010000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military patrol/assault craft, unfinished products for military patrol/assault craft	755000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	6200480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	21645.16
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for equipment employing cryptography	3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	797562
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	19353.64
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	932607.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	24100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	932607.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	932607.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	857998.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	895303.2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	820694.6
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	932607.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	857998.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	857998.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	932607.5

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	919871.76
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	20065
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	41846
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	submersible equipment	311407
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	200000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1339
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	11110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	13860
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	bomb suits	75000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	1600000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	33887500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2900000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	760000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	260000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	30380
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	7435
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	chemicals used for chemical/materials production	124623.45
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	17281
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	13861
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	16764
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	9775
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	9527.59
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	84000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8701.98
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	2398681.64
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military helicopters	52360
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	20320
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	15000000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military aero-engines	60000

		components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)		68650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1464.52
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	105432.29
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	40000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloys in powder form	2231.6
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	163551.12
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1949
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	high speed pulse generators, instrumentation cameras	30760
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	high speed pulse generators	19050
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	9425000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1043750
		equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, general naval vessel components, military guidance/navigation equipment, radar equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)		93778.35
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	microwave components	100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1462500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	14625000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5850000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	21417.1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	25412500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	20320
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8425.49
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	4176.56
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	submersible equipment	92395
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	62000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for combat aircraft	299200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	26000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1000000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	63000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software	8500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, military training equipment	20610
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military patrol/assault craft	1000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	6000480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	11000480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	8190
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	836600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for equipment employing cryptography	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	2166865
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	467300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1597317
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1597317
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1214600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	1214600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for combat naval vessels	9112.47
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for combat naval vessels	2748.02
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	dimensional inspection equipment, dimensional measuring equipment, machine tools	5052410
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	3810.76
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	29645
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	29060
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	760424
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	123962
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	2916608
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	2916608
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	28437

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	22162000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	3172712.24
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for lasers	3172712
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for submersible equipment, submersible equipment	472860
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	118579
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	18942
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	44430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	9480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	784848
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software	62000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	12300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	calibration equipment for guidance/navigation equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, magnetometers	26947
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	30937
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	44430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military training aircraft	9006
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1978791
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	400000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	gravity gradiometers	2500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	1160000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	6450048
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military patrol/assault craft	2000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	44208
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	26181.03
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	257584
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	69360
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5800000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	21110

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1830862.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	aromatic polyamide-imides	600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	5210
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	174000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	3975
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	2760000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1140000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	1561.06
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	17812
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	145500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	9000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	20625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	582612
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	21000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for equipment for the production of military electronic equipment	300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	23229
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	300000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	28226
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	space qualified focal plane arrays	250000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	30030
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	2100000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	15523.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	900002
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	29312500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	27912500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	108680
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	27325000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	33887500

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2925000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	2000000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	588000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for semiconductor process equipment, semiconductor process equipment	12429.55
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	582612
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	34000960
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	4482
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2074.21
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	12560
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military support aircraft	4610
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for lasers	5053
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	19800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	4500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	30500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	37037
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	704000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military aero-engines	146112.69
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for military communications equipment	9000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	13760
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	22319
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	electronics cooling fluids	40000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	11653.95
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	60000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1414721
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy materials	22500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	414860
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	11953.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	magnetometers	23265



SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	442.47
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	50324.1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for equipment employing cryptography	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	272625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	440
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment	144.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	bomb suits, military helmets	73500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	6686.1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	750000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	300000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	20
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4450000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	3887500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	19600000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	25350000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	190
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	394500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	52750000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	X-ray accelerators	165000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	21417.1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	300000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	6280.43
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	32300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	160000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military training aircraft	1300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	2718.28

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	325000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	1200000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	20115
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	320000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military aero-engines	39420
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	33555
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military electronic equipment	0.01
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	mass spectrometers	898000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	1100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for cryptographic software	4100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	mass spectrometers	450000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	44430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	laser optical components	6483
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military radars, radar equipment, technology for military radars	93778.35
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	numerical control software, optics finishing machines, software for optics finishing machines	1100000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	11495.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	400000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for advanced telecommunications equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	1054250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	general purpose integrated circuits	27000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7200.23
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1124.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	hafnium	398

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for advanced telecommunications equipment	1000000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	56250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6702.92
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military aero-engines	174370
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	69360
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	58956
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for imaging cameras	1000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	electronics cooling fluids	500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	94195
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	45631.25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	144660.23
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	43290.32
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military aero-engines	839.1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	330000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	16787.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	194045.62
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	4049
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	464967
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	525000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	87750000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	27437500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	29375000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1462500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	controlled atmosphere furnaces, nuclear grade graphite	130183
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	837.69
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	65731
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military support aircraft	9220

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	15353
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	28325
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	7522.84
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	55000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	350000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5050
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1213800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4423.33
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	15793
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25180
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	1052.77
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	1052.88
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	1052.75
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	22573.62
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	65082.43
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	radiation hardened TV camera lenses, radiation hardened TV cameras	33900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	150000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1955
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	7500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	2360000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	7500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	2360000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for combat aircraft	327.55
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for equipment employing cryptography	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, magnetometers	3384
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing	1044.21

		cryptography	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	438.42
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	1039.91
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	21570
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	23650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	14250000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	72500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for combat naval vessels	155538.14
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	17450
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	40000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for equipment employing cryptography	63.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1896
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	63.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1343.43
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of equipment employing cryptography	5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	642.81
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	bomb suits, military helmets	39310
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	882.72
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	13.6
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	7500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	microwave components	13450
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	magnetometers	13829
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	318.01

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	X-ray generators	160000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	1300000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	11600500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	46120
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy materials	250000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	30740
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	29
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	106889.73
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1014905.2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	50000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5822
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor process equipment	604500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	360000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	226.25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor process equipment	210000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for semiconductor process equipment, semiconductor process equipment	604500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	217.37
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	315.25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	50
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	81340.55
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	59322
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	43750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	magnetometers	5664
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military patrol/assault craft	1000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	315.5

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	176500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibre prepregs	580000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	24090.56
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	430.42
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	2175.8
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for lasers	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for lasers	9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	63333
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	84000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	12300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	14140
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	20200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	11560
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	19800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2889.46
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	17020
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	45000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools, numerical control software	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	35000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	60000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	22837.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	22837.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	38470.55
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	22837.5

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	150570
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	14480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for instrumentation cameras	27300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	400000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	180000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	34000480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloys in powder form, propellants	6445.79
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	319.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	19030
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	23000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	126698
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	63333
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for equipment employing cryptography	3115
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1239.6
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2889.46
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	394
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment, radar equipment	39495.36
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	mass spectrometers	340000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	14616
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	13600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	7308
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	29336
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4000000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	submersible equipment	207000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	rebreathing swimming equipment	1231719
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	14616
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	small arms ammunition	100000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	8070



SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	4515
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	12873
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	215.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	3961.3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1140108
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals, pyrotechnics/fuels and related substances	1300000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	600000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	9400000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for imaging cameras	1000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	502.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	2763.03
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	RF direction finding equipment	1220000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras, technology for instrumentation cameras	161676
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	322
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	88115.29
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	13600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	443.07
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	323
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	marine position fixing equipment	125084
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	32448
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	magnetometers, military electronic equipment	5839
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	84000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for NBC detection equipment	2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	44125
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	29460.24
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3289

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	60000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	23000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	33257
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	238400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	military aero-engines	87000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	military aero-engines	43500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	28200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military support aircraft	20953.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	11500480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8378.31
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	11500480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	217500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	18732.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	650268.75
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	942075
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	magnetometers	28965
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	magnetometers	6165
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	29480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	1060000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	320.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	15081
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	1500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	4406.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	15000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military aero-engines	86575
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	31562.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	158900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	microwave components	39852
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	668.5

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for submarines	23686.32
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	320.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	672761
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	20341.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	27759.58
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	mass spectrometers	477937.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	mass spectrometers	305750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for equipment employing cryptography	290
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	17256.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	318400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	448.82
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	448.78
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	military communications equipment	69280
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	toxic gas detectors	11247.51
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	14812500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	37500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military electronic equipment	25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	13593
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	11623
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	13833
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	35312
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for focal plane arrays	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	15380
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for equipment employing cryptography	23700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	16364.17

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, military electronic equipment	25877.61
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1558
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	108657
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, military electronic equipment	11501.16
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	140
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	74252.75
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	14850
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	769.23
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	769.23
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	13833
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	17626
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	18132
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	15968
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	35800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3913.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	16068600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	60100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	30050
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	25800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	9.74
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	microwave components	55346
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1783.08
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	13000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	17110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for civil NBC detection systems, technology for civil NBC detection systems	100610

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	19030
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	7300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	15000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	19762
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	8000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	769.23
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	769.23
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	31500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	5500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	4597.7
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of military aero-engines	2490
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of military aero-engines	1442
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	58956
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	22837.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	19262
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	740000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	4756
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	8500480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4687.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	26090
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	submersible equipment	207000
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	technology for the production of military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology	

		for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	components for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	accessories for semiconductor process equipment, components for semiconductor process equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	technology for NBC detection equipment	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of digital cellular radio system, technology for the development of frequency agility techniques, technology for the development of spread spectrum techniques	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of digital cellular radio system, technology for the development of frequency agility techniques, technology for the development of spread spectrum techniques	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military radars, equipment for the use of military radars, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military radars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Egypt)	components for marine position fixing equipment	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Vietnam), ISSUE (Yemen)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Vietnam)	accessories for underwater telecommunications systems, components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Fiji), ISSUE (Vietnam)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Hong Kong)	cryptographic software, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, frequency synthesisers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Hong Kong)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for periscopes, components for weapon night sights, periscopes, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for periscopes, technology for weapon night sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	



Use)	(Hong Kong)		
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Hong Kong)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for equipment for the use of military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Israel)	accessories for semiconductor process equipment, components for semiconductor process equipment, software for the use of semiconductor process equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Pakistan)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for military utility helicopters, equipment for the production of military utility helicopters, equipment for the use of military utility helicopters, technology for the development of military utility helicopters, technology for the production of military utility helicopters, technology for the use of military utility helicopters, test equipment for military utility helicopters, unfinished products for military utility helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Vietnam)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Israel)	software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE	equipment employing cryptography	

Use)	(Saudi Arabia)		
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	diver location sonars, software for diver location sonars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	components for body armour, components for military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the production of body armour, equipment for the production of goods treated for signature suppression for military use, equipment for the production of military aircrew protective equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for body armour, technology for goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for military aircrew protective equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Vietnam)	lasers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Vietnam)	technology for civil aero-engines	
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Colombia)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	56423.45
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Colombia)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	24349.32
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Colombia)	military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	185540
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Colombia)	radio jamming equipment	40000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Colombia)	equipment employing cryptography	12352
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Colombia)	targeting equipment	50000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Colombia)	equipment employing cryptography	69088
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Colombia)	military cameras/photographic equipment, military electronic equipment, military image recording/processing equipment	2350
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	telecommunications software	18000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	imaging cameras	32000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	military helmets	243.72
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	inertial equipment	3750000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	components for military aero-engines	1476
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	components for military training aircraft	371.46
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	25000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	military guidance/navigation equipment	974628
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment	8637.2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	equipment employing cryptography	5738
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	equipment employing cryptography	5738
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	equipment employing cryptography	2516.38
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	body armour	2450
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	instrumentation cameras	40676
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	military patrol/assault craft	11200637
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	body armour, civil body armour	20150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	cryptographic software	40000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	body armour	324405
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	578000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	components for military support aircraft	2950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	components for assault rifles, components for machine guns, components for pistols, equipment for the use of machine guns, training small arms ammunition	430263
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	161000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	components for artillery	10737.18
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	military aero-engines	93764.38
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	high performance air traffic control software	80
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	14570
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	equipment employing cryptography	2918
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	military helmets	235000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	equipment employing cryptography	6000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	equipment employing cryptography	6050
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	body armour, components for devices for initiating explosives, devices for initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disruptors	304100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	technology for military communications equipment	280
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	toxins	285
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	civil unmanned air vehicles	63000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	equipment employing cryptography	6800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	components for military support aircraft	2922.81
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	telecommunications jamming equipment	185000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	equipment employing cryptography	3000
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the production of ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for signalling devices, components for test models for ejector seats, components for test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for test models for military aircrew protective equipment, ejector seats, equipment for the production of ejector seats, equipment for the production of military aircrew protective equipment, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for signalling devices, test models for ejector seats, test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, test models for military aircrew protective equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia)	technology for unmanned air vehicles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military	

		guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia)	military guidance/navigation equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia)	aircraft cannons, components for air launched rockets, components for air-to-air missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft carriers, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for command communications control and intelligence software, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for depth charges, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for machine guns, components for military aero-engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval guns, components for naval mines, components for periscopes, components for sensor integration equipment, components for submarines, components for surface launched rockets, components for surface-to-surface missiles, components for targeting equipment, components for torpedoes, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control	

		equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, machine guns, military aero-engines, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval engines, naval guns, technology for air launched rockets, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for depth charges, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for machine guns, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military radars, technology for torpedoes, torpedoes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia)	components for military aero-engines, military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia)	components for military electronic equipment, components for military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Cuba), ISSUE (Egypt)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of artillery, components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of artillery, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Sri Lanka), ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military transport aircraft	
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	751000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	118600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, military equipment for initiating explosives	13005.3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	1376
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	software for equipment employing cryptography	300000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	1376
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1520061
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	9566
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	79631
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	987
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	1652.5

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	3471.74
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	military support vehicles	32500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	6238.75
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	75847
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	2291
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	8500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	59538
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, magnetometers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, magnetometers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	



OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	underwater television cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment	3000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Egypt)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	168000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Egypt)	weapon cleaning equipment	19000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Egypt)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras	4600
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Egypt)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	40000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Egypt)	telecommunications jamming equipment	100000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military radars	545541.7
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	assault rifles (600), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (200), sporting guns (150), weapon sights	1758000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	1400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, components for body armour, military	1162225

		helmets	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	33150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military support aircraft	463.36
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (200), weapon sights	1771000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military support aircraft	3762
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for submersible vehicles	1744.39
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	military aero-engines	50000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	9114.7
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military helicopters, military guidance/navigation equipment	43428430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	21978.78
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military helicopters	1761870.8
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	39211.99
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10168
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	general military vehicle components	12657
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	assault rifles (100), components for assault rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon sights	230500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	8000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	software for equipment employing cryptography	99711
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	assault rifles (600), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (350), weapon sights	1713000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military training aircraft	859.6
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	2937
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	imaging cameras	35000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	16336.62
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment	32785

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6089.25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	general military aircraft components	1535
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	12750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	543.23
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	540.45
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military helicopters	371997
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	inertial equipment	2239
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for ballistic test equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	submersible equipment	324000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	submersible equipment	324000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	2152
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment	49999
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1483602
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	5235920
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	8520
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	materials testing equipment	2133
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	6000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	submersible equipment	694890
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	60000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	1625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	machine tools	71706
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	cryptographic software	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	3675
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military aero-engines	67435.63
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	1625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	36557
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	constituents of propellants, deuterium compounds	271.12

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	18986
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	12580
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, military helmets	987225
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	37600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	2481
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	military combat vehicles, military support vehicles	120000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	machine tools	85370
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	toxic gas monitoring equipment	901.2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for combat aircraft	21334.32
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for ballistic test equipment	3114.6
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23472
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3620
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military helicopters	276496
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	imaging cameras	39200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	devices for initiating explosives	4500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military radars	380402
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt)	NBC filters, chaff, chaff equipment, command communications control and intelligence equipment, components for chaff equipment, components for command communications control and intelligence equipment, components for corvettes, components for defensive systems against NBC agents, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for fast attack craft, components for frigates, components for heavy machine guns, components for military distress signalling equipment, components for military inflatable craft, components for military navigation equipment, components for naval acoustic equipment, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun mountings, components for naval radars, components for naval sonar equipment, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for surface-to-air missiles, components for surface-to-surface missiles, control equipment for surface-to-air missiles, control equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, defensive systems against NBC agents, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of corvettes, equipment for the use of fast attack craft, equipment for the use of	

		frigates, equipment for the use of naval radars, equipment for the use of surface-to-air missiles, general naval vessel components, handling equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, heavy machine guns, launching equipment for surface-to-air missiles, launching equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, military distress signalling equipment, military inflatable craft, military navigation equipment, naval acoustic equipment, naval communications equipment, naval electrical equipment, naval electronic equipment, naval engines, naval gun mountings, naval radars, naval sonar equipment, semi-automatic pistols, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, test equipment for military communications equipment, test equipment for naval radars, test equipment for surface-to-air missiles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt)	accessories for ground based radars, accessories for naval radars, components for ground based radars, components for naval radars, equipment for the use of ground based radars, equipment for the use of naval radars, software for ground based radars, software for naval radars, technology for ground based radars, technology for naval radars, test equipment for ground based radars, test equipment for naval radars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military electronic equipment, ejector seats, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector seats, technology for general military aircraft components, test models for ejector seats, test models for general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt)	imaging cameras	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt)	<p>aircraft cannons, components for air launched rockets, components for air-to-air missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft carriers, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for command communications control and intelligence software, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for depth charges, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for machine guns, components for military aero-engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval guns, components for naval mines, components for periscopes, components for sensor integration equipment, components for submarines, components for surface launched rockets, components for surface-to-surface missiles, components for targeting equipment, components for torpedoes, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, machine guns, military aero-engines, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval engines, naval guns, technology for air launched rockets, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for depth charges, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for</p>	
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		launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for machine guns, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military radars, technology for torpedoes, torpedoes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military training equipment, equipment for the use of military training equipment, software for military training equipment, technology for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt)	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for military training equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, military training equipment, software for aerial target equipment, software for military training equipment, technology for aerial target equipment, technology for military training equipment	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt)	airborne refuelling equipment, aircraft cannons, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, chaff equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military imaging radar sensor equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for weapon control equipment, countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, guided missile decoying equipment, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military cameras/photographic equipment, military containers, military electronic equipment, military flying helmets, military image intensifier equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military imaging radar sensor equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes and equipment, military paragliders, software for airborne refuelling equipment, software for aircraft cannons, software for aircrew protective masks, software for anti-g/pressure suits, software for chaff equipment, software for combat aircraft, software for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas,	
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		<p>software for guided missile decoying equipment, software for military aero-engines, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for military containers, software for military flying helmets, software for military image intensifier equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, software for military imaging radar sensor equipment, software for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for military parachutes and equipment, software for military paragliders, software for weapon control equipment, technology for airborne refuelling equipment, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for aircrew protective masks, technology for anti-g/pressure suits, technology for chaff equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for guided missile decoying equipment, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military containers, technology for military flying helmets, technology for military image intensifier equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military imaging radar sensor equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military parachutes and equipment, technology for military paragliders, technology for weapon control equipment, weapon control equipment</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Eritrea), ISSUE (Somalia), ISSUE (Tunisia)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Vietnam), ISSUE (Yemen)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Somalia)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE (Tunisia)	underwater television cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE (Tunisia)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, software for aircraft missile protection systems, technology for aircraft missile protection systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	imaging cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia)	fibrous/filamentary materials	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for sporting guns, military helmets, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, sporting shotgun ammunition	

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Eritrea)	inertial equipment	960000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Eritrea)	body armour, military helmets	8640
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Eritrea), ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Fiji)	devices for initiating explosives	37720
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Fiji), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	targeting equipment	50000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	RF direction finding equipment	10495
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	explosives detection equipment	42000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	inertial equipment	87000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	focal plane arrays	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for military electronic equipment	11130.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	214000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	195000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	human pathogens	900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	weapon night sights	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	2997

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	17500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	40050000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	8829.32
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	human pathogens	900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	7765.92
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	1447.22
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for small arms training equipment, equipment for the use of small arms training equipment, small arms training equipment, software for small arms training equipment	55216
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	815
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for military small arms training equipment, components for small arms training equipment, equipment for the use of small arms training equipment, military small arms training equipment, small arms training equipment	13265
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	6836
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	3957
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for military electronic equipment	3500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	small arms ammunition	2570
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	biotechnology equipment	6937.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	cryptographic software	255.74
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	technology for military electronic equipment	0.01
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	weapon sights	175.94
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	semiconductor process equipment	658081
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography, software enabling equipment to function as equipment employing cryptography	37478.33
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	37478.33
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	general purpose integrated circuits	4261.2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	inertial equipment	53600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	imaging cameras	18400

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	300000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	3510
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	45729.75
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	7559
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	515785.63
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	3169
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	10308.14
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	29289.51
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	imaging cameras	18000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	49418.88
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	9311.28
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	imaging cameras	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	technology for civil aero-engines, technology for fibrous materials production equipment, technology for machine tools, technology for materials processing equipment, technology for metal-working manufacturing processes	2000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	imaging cameras	19750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	imaging cameras	22135
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	224257.7
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	68366
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	73266
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	650560
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	5247
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for military aero-engines	15000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	2500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	hydrophones	1500100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	27172

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	imaging cameras	1100000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1162.8
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	NBC detection equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	2996
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment for the use of military helicopters	523.87
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	handcuffs	9434.75
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	47500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for military communications equipment	4231
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment for the use of military equipment for initiating explosives, military equipment for initiating explosives	9963.75
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	23940.79
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	23729.78
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	focal plane arrays, imaging cameras, special support components for optical sensor	281596
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	focal plane arrays	214200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	88000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	focal plane arrays	240000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	86210.6
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	technology for FADEC	1000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	3753.36
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	23591.13
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	88021.68
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	7231100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	29289.51
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for radar equipment, radar equipment, software for radar equipment, technology for radar equipment	731100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	66557
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	focal plane arrays	270000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	7525

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	9200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	software for cryptographic software	8100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	24400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	18675
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	3216
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	550000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	4135
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	4895.1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	2984
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for military support aircraft	75
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	constituents of propellants	1750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	952
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	6558.39
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	6450048
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	weapon sights	1385
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for military aero-engines	2500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	body armour	480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	3439.45
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for naval engines	5357
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	29269.82
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	technology for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	3600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	460
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	hand grenades	19900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	weapon sights	235
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	710100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	military equipment for initiating explosives	11400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	imaging cameras	21250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	2056.99



SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	462
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	gun mountings	2279.55
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	625000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	15000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	1500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	sporting shotgun ammunition	12700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	7500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	cryptographic software	3430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	200000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	5286.04
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	35
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography	561
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	5047
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	16577
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	721.72
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	315.6
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	1183617.8
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	18605000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1418400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	2146
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	4515
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	5512
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	imaging cameras	104040
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for military aero-engines	37200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	6900



SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1149750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	25455000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	handcuffs	17127.7
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	15920000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	3244
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	448.78
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	683.78
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	656.73
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	220
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	10.17
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	14610
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for military small arms training equipment, components for small arms training equipment, equipment for the use of military small arms training equipment, small arms training equipment, software for small arms training equipment	27880
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment	622.43
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for military small arms training equipment, equipment for the use of military small arms training equipment, equipment for the use of small arms training equipment, military small arms training equipment, small arms training equipment, software for small arms training equipment	28010
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	285000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	non-certified aero-engines	12000000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	42750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	gun silencers	498.99
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	imaging cameras	10094
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	232.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography	693.5
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	CS hand grenades, demolition charges, demolition devices, exploding simulation devices, fire simulation equipment for small arms ammunition, illuminators, military devices for initiating explosives, signal flares, signal hand grenades, smoke	

		ammunition, smoke canisters, smoke generators, smoke hand grenades, stun grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, thunderflashes, training anti-aircraft ammunition, training hand grenades	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for ballistic shields, components for body armour, components for bomb suits, components for civil body armour, components for military helmets, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military helmets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	anti-riot/ballistic shields, components for anti-riot/ballistic shields	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	sporting guns	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	sporting guns	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Hong Kong)	toxins	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, military helmets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Vietnam)	direct view imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights, imaging cameras, weapon night sights, weapon sights	1355013
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Hong Kong), ISSUE (Vietnam)	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Hong Kong),	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	

Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)		
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for electronic measurement equipment	24546.17
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	64778.68
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	55036.33
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	32133.74
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for petrochemical plant, components for pneumatic systems, seals	4604
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	59389.7
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	30893.6
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	85575.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	41969.66
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	205514.24
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	79929.56
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	299587.69
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	534161.01
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	793900.63
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	5077.44
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	402518.15
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	materials analysis equipment	49382
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for civil aircraft	862000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	biochemicals	15658.69
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	biochemicals	1147.3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	biochemicals, general laboratory equipment	15278.03
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	biochemicals, general laboratory equipment	8856.96
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	chemicals	677952
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	biochemicals	991.14
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	chemicals, components for filtration equipment, general laboratory equipment	20510.01
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	biochemicals	3266.87
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for civil aircraft	611000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for civil aircraft	1632000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	civil aero-engines	10000000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for civil aircraft	1244500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for civil aircraft	625500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for equipment for the use of industrial gas turbines, equipment for the use of industrial gas turbines	40178.45
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	valves	2894036
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for civil aircraft	3691650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for civil aircraft	2043466
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for civil aircraft	556320
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	civil NBC protection clothing	1050
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for civil aircraft	49373.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	civil aircraft	281700000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for civil aircraft	850000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	process control equipment	95000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	civil aero-engines	3125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	civil aero-engines	3125000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Iraq)	bomb suits, components for demolition charges, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	9055
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Iraq)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment, military communications equipment, military laser protection equipment	17090
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Iraq)	cryptographic software	2000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Iraq)	inertial equipment, technology for gyroscopes	751000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Iraq)	direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights	122327
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights	23790
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	5226
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for military support aircraft	577835
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment	26498
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	body armour, components for body armour	22500

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	blank/inert ammunition, components for blank/inert ammunition, components for naval guns, equipment for the use of naval guns, technology for equipment for the use of naval guns, technology for naval guns	1181290
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	296904.57
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	software for spectrophotometers, spectrophotometers	5076
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	294783.82
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	35040
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	1800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	100000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	4602
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	technology for military training aircraft	100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1455500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	1373505
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	2484.86
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	11451
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	software for equipment for the use of naval guns	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for naval gun installations/mountings, inertial equipment	3746981.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings	3466981.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	2100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	42514
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	civil NBC protection equipment	108000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, civil body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	45520
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for body armour	320
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	7329
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	X-ray generators	5321590
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	24983.02
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	technology for anti-riot/ballistic shields, technology for body armour, technology for	50000

		military helmets	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	X-ray generators	1435270
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment for the production of military helmets	369500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	inertial equipment	100000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	inertial equipment	25000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	457570
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	ballistic test equipment	140273
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1309205
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	X-ray generators	2168101.32
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for body armour	292800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for body armour	597800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography, high performance air traffic control software	667900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	4500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	bomb suits, military helmets	469907
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	165514.05
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for weapon mountings	17324
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	26235
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	civil NBC protection equipment	14400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	X-ray generators, software for X-ray generators	5975033
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment for the use of weapon sights	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	392575
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	2182
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	33428.43
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	assault rifles (37), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, pistols (15)	63214.8
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for military image recording/processing equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment	2855319.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	22026
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	8498

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	676471
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	17124.7
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	281006
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment, radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq)	devices for initiating explosives, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, technology for test models for military training aircraft, test models for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq)	cable systems sensitive to eavesdropping, components for equipment employing cryptography, components for equipment for generating hopping codes, components for equipment for generating spreading codes, components for impulse radio equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for generating hopping codes, equipment for generating spreading codes, equipment with reduced electromagnetic emanations, impulse radio equipment, non-cryptographic information security equipment, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq)	X-ray generators	



Use)			
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Libya)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for military transport aircraft	
SIEL (Transshipment)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for small arms ammunition	2395
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military helicopters	10000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	laser radar equipment	3200000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	high power RF weapon systems	600000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	10000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras	12500
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	8274
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	5000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment, software for computer analogue-to-digital equipment	10388
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	signal generators	18000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	signal generators	68800
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military helicopters	7480.87
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	general military vehicle components	42069.8
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	software enabling equipment to function as military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	2000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	towed hydrophone arrays	420000



SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	RF direction finding equipment	10495
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	military guidance/navigation equipment	44000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	aerial target equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment	1355778
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	RF direction finding equipment	75000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military helicopters	11000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for air-to-surface missiles	17927
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for unmanned air vehicles	73070
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	9000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military electronic equipment	3891.18
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	16212
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	100000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	13000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	13755691.8
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	11500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	gyroscopes	14000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	28000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	650000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for civil aero-engines	1000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	lasers	113295
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	200000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	13875
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	5224.58
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10015.45
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	47276.32
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	electronics cooling fluids	81101.03
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	unfinished products for military support aircraft	11926.43
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	pressure transducers	11163.77

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	7648
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	22300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for aircraft missile protection systems	9906
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	gyroscopes	460000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	nickel powders	3000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1750200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	constituents of propellants	51.29
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	4593.47
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	600500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	gyroscopes	37000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	2425000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	4500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military aircraft head-up/down displays	120939.16
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	12000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	6000000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	190000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	helium-3	43245
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	lasers	80000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military communications equipment	23545.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military support aircraft	22500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for surface-to-surface missiles	21133.21
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloys in powder form	200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	150000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	10664
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	3026
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	25200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	100000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	2262.66
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	130997.24

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment	15000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military support aircraft	2677.32
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for surface launched rockets, test models for surface launched rockets	34797
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	627.57
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, pressure transducers	505292.33
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, electronics cooling fluids, pressure transducers	987140.08
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for unmanned air vehicles	300000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	nickel powders	9661.84
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	nuclear grade graphite	9300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment	420000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	755000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	110000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military support vehicles	34800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	106778
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general purpose integrated circuits	50000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	604264
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, pressure transducers	738369.58
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	596.25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software	3400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, pressure transducers	364995.13
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for equipment employing cryptography	14500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1313.95
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	8458.53
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military aero-engines	92456
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	550000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1450
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	inertial equipment	53600

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	132573.18
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4197.57
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military support aircraft	505100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military electronic equipment	266000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	9064
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	accelerometers	2886
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military aero-engines	3187.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	83200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general naval vessel components	6619.33
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	765000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	678.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1177000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	133323.08
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	2250000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for unmanned air vehicles	65392.94
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	266663.07
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	18118.81
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	300100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	21335.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	12500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	rebreathing swimming equipment	17759.85
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	4254
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	small arms ammunition	80000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloys in particulate form	1316
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment for the use of military electronic equipment	23277.73

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for unmanned air vehicles	300000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	163485
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military communications equipment	5600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment for the use of decoying/countermeasure equipment	66000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	16000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment for the use of weapon sights	8170
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general naval vessel components	8888.63
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general purpose integrated circuits	1500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	11250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military parametric technical databases, software for equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment	2400.01
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military airborne equipment	4000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general military vehicle components	19006
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software	210
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for body armour, components for military support vehicles	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	200000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for small arms ammunition	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	7500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloys in powder form	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	25000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	24000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for air-to-surface missiles, test models for air-to-surface missiles	45100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military support aircraft	2080
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	34591
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	42099.62
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	17500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military communications equipment	33990
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general naval vessel components	13973.71

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	525000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software	26000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	973013
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	4645.2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general purpose integrated circuits	330000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	3318
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	11600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic countermeasure equipment	11800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	software for equipment employing cryptography	13000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	triggered spark gaps	360000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	4172
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	55000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	pressure transducers	500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	108674.95
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	5660
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	33750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	biotechnology equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general naval vessel components	20040
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	beryllium alloys, beryllium manufactures	3065.8
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	2931805
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general naval vessel components	78140
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	gyroscopes	13200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general naval vessel components	3468
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	23270
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	15500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloys in powder form	11347.45
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for civil aero-engines	40
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for submarines	9000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	324950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1150000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military communications equipment	9800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	35455
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general purpose integrated circuits	75000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	25807.63
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for unmanned air vehicles	58125
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	15098
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for small arms ammunition	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	5800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	197550
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	22350
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	180000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military communications equipment	180000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	5000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1060000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	74000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	15000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military combat vehicles	2497.2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	biotechnology equipment	35750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	armoured plate	11000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	lasers	188825
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	3900000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military electronic equipment, military electronic equipment	38241.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	pressure transducers	740
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	53643.93
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	102625.86



SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	350000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	350000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	118600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	instrumentation cameras	21000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	anti-friction bearings	42025
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	machine tools	117765.55
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	325000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	anti-armour ammunition	8600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23105.17
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	377.55
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for submarines	7105
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	aircraft military communications equipment	67328
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	18000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	65000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	15000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	9000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	5000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	547537
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	125475
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software	6250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	2300000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for combat naval vessels	6260.76
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for combat naval vessels	10309.74
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, military electronic equipment	235838
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for combat aircraft	5196
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	machine tools	155015.15
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	18200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	5600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military support aircraft	415895



SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	948
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	218333.54
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	20738.8
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	52700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for combat naval vessels	10957.32
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for equipment employing cryptography	3300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	28113.6
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	11000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	19760
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	water cannons	67187.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	105000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment	154077
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	100000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	15000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	8650000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military aircraft head-up/down displays	219000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	lasers	306250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	25824
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	20086
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for unmanned air vehicles	79606.86
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for submarines	7105
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for civil NBC protection equipment	40000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras, weapon night sights	1913406.88
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military equipment for initiating explosives	400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	46017.48
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for unmanned air vehicles	5000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	520

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for submarines	2400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	31752.76
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	255000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	dimensional measuring equipment	4002167
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	dimensional measuring equipment	1305970
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	165000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	targeting equipment, technology for targeting equipment	8759
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	288270
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	4495
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	14062.74
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	weapon sights	224250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	43750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	5346.41
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	direct view imaging equipment	8000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	21228
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	10600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	1706.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	39278
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for command/control equipment for unmanned air vehicles, technology for command/control equipment for unmanned air vehicles	10408
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for gas turbine engines	1000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	4147
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	52600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	28000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	6500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	60698.76
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for submarines	112.16
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for submarines	885.68
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for submarines	112.16
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for surface-to-air missiles	2806

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for combat aircraft, components for military training aircraft	168300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	35000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	targeting equipment	58752
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	805000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for submarines	112.23
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for surface-to-air missiles	2989.52
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for submarines	956.89
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7360
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	493.34
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military aircraft navigation equipment	41901.87
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for unmanned air vehicles	2862.3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military spacecraft	140000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	bismuth	700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	19000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	pathogenic genetic elements	20
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	98233
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	targeting equipment	61182
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	5000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	250000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	275000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	calcium	85.32
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	triggered spark gaps	250000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	software for attack alerting/warning equipment	15200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	71453.96
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	70000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	15175
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general naval vessel components	25654

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	14684
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	609559
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military communications equipment	12470.97
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	24500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	80500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	13668
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars, military radars, software for military radars, technology for military radars	412320
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	50000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military aero-engines	22700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	1500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	4134
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	4555.32
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	314220
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	108000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	246000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	instrumentation cameras	49355
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment	11375
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	enriched boron	100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	140275
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military combat vehicles, equipment for the use of military combat vehicles	78509.96
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	2000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	rebreathing swimming equipment	19259.85
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	biotechnology equipment, components for biotechnology equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for the development of corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for the production of corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for the use of corrosion resistant chemical	

		manufacturing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the production of ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, ejector seats, equipment for the production of ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for ejector seats, technology for equipment for the production of ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, test models for ejector seats, test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, test models for military aircrew protective equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military parachutes and equipment, components for military training equipment, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, general military aircraft components, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military parachutes and equipment, military training equipment, software for combat aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for production installations for combat aircraft, test models for combat aircraft, unfinished products for combat aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, software for aerial target equipment,	

		technology for aerial target equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for naval communications equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of naval communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, naval communications equipment, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for naval communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military training aircraft, test models for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military support aircraft,	

		components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Libya)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Tunisia)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Vietnam)	equipment for the use of weapon sights, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights	8410
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Libya)	cryptographic software	2000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Libya)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	10400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	body armour, components for body armour	5220
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	components for combat aircraft	52866
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour	1528800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	targeting equipment	25000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	accessories for improvised explosive device disposal remotely operated vehicles, bomb suits, civil explosive detection/identification equipment, gun mountings, improvised explosive device disposal remotely operated vehicles, military helmets, sporting guns (9)	1833980.76
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	50000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	472.3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	501771
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	38875
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	assault rifles (35), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, hand	76847

		grenades, pistols (21), small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	400000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	inertial equipment	9000000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	military support vehicles	11000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	17940
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	combat shotguns (5)	4600.56
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	improvised explosive device jamming equipment	255000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	2763.66
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	6873
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	NBC detection equipment	78460
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment	11822
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	pistols, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition	38850
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	961.88
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	232954
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	693.13
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	4389.38
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6460.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	1366.88
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	X-ray accelerators	1994756.67
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	imaging cameras	21080
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	57000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	25012.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, military equipment for	24303.7



		initiating explosives	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	13812.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	civil body armour, components for body armour	1137.88
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	X-ray accelerators, technology for X-ray accelerators	13341333.36
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	X-ray accelerators, components for X-ray accelerators, software for X-ray accelerators, technology for X-ray accelerators	5012666.66
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	27.26
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	14390
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	49743.75
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	4707.07
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	3892500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	6724.06
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	2501250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, smooth-bore weapons	21709.28
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Libya)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE (Tunisia)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
SIEL (Transshipment)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	exploding grenade ammunition	24000

SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	radio jamming equipment	50000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	radio jamming equipment	80000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	2000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, sniper rifles (1), weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sights	8000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	assault rifles (2), components for assault rifles	1950
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, sniper rifles (6), weapon sights	33050
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	radio jamming equipment	236157.81
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	accessories for materials analysis equipment, components for materials analysis equipment, materials analysis equipment, technology for materials analysis equipment	17277
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military radars	342540
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun mountings, sniper rifles (5), technology for sniper rifles, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	53128.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	technology for combat aircraft	214250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	1890078.24
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	49100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	397
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment	12000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	2079.92
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	32966.15
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for sporting guns, sporting guns (1)	500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military support aircraft	66.98
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	pistols (1)	750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	pistols (1)	750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for gas processing equipment	42866
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1117
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for general industrial production equipment	217.45

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	26639
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	13133.34
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	11829.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	14493.92
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for general industrial production equipment	201.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military radars	103428.33
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	accessories for materials processing equipment	1550
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	imaging cameras	6000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	16909.49
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	2472333
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	body armour	400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	2079.92
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	32966.15
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for pumps	3464.85
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	2014.15
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	196.69
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	valves	261
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	sporting guns (8), weapon sights	6313.44
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	6435040
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military radars, equipment for the use of military radars, technology for equipment for the use of military radars, technology for military radars	2967464.98
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	1390
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	weapon night sights	24034
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	2688.92
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	4163.93
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	3650.52
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	13558.13
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	662.4

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	3916
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military radars	96333.33
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military helmets	1300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft	6487.98
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	anti-armour ammunition	2500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	2342
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military radars	568291.66
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft	26315.63
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the use of military airborne equipment, technology for equipment for the use of military airborne equipment	1141.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military radars	929726.67
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat helicopters	4227
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	cryptographic software	18157.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general military aircraft components	1450
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	1564.93
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	529.68
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for naval electrical/electronic equipment	34000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	unfinished products for assault rifles	56814.63
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	416.56
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars	6375332
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military radars	310285.78
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the use of pressure monitoring equipment	4125
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general naval vessel components	2642.43
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	31977.42
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	small arms ammunition	600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	9449.71
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	9670.49
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	10643.73
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	7445.76

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military support aircraft	112.74
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military communications equipment	35544.34
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	22279.87
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military guidance/navigation equipment	5400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for naval guns	43
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aircrew breathing equipment	15291.26
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	353.86
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military helmets	59655
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general naval vessel components	1249.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	128.21
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for unmanned air vehicles	3626
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	13110.43
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	98.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general laboratory equipment	1632
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	610000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for machine tools, machine tools	1701938
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	inertial equipment	2532.47
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat naval vessels	7888
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	4665
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the production of artillery ammunition	3100000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	25484.72
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	materials testing equipment	3489
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military support aircraft	10750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general laboratory equipment	5034.55
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	2286.8
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat helicopters	1879
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	lubricants, non-ferrous metals	8061
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	software for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment	215

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	small arms ammunition	25000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military radars	389509.96
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft	1608.65
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	decoying/countermeasure equipment	235500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	52
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	10164.66
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	anti-armour ammunition	3477
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	small arms ammunition	1560
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7216
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	naval engines	420000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	188
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	730.83
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	1625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	442
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	11755
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military support aircraft	342176.56
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	5235920
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general military aircraft components	1829.14
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft	25615.19
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general military aircraft components	4073.96
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	539
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	14377.7
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	442.1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	6000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	power supplies	68960
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	small arms ammunition	60000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	aircraft military communications equipment	13471.07
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	animal pathogens	1287.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	3819.39

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft	41580
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for gas processing equipment	28816
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft	170952
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights	152000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the production of pistols, equipment for the production of rifles	4483.3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	sporting guns (30), weapon sights	28290.48
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the production of rifles	25412
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment	135869
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military electronic equipment, technology for military electronic equipment	5194
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military parachutes and equipment, military parachutes and equipment	140699
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	small arms ammunition	50000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	5820
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	accessories for temperature measurement equipment, temperature measurement equipment	2155.15
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	temperature measurement equipment	8780
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	body armour, components for body armour	20736
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	sporting guns (1)	5500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	6524.57
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general naval vessel components	37017
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military training aircraft	104206.2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for pistols, components for sporting guns, pistols (1), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (4)	8500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat helicopters	162.3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	3388.22
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	1142.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for electronic warfare equipment	31488
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	launching/handling/control equipment for missiles	9076.98
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military guidance/navigation equipment	106000



SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the production of artillery ammunition	643789
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	cryptographic software	1022.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	ferrous metals	21773.7
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military cameras/photographic equipment	75000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	imaging cameras	42860
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military guidance/navigation equipment	2700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft	169.75
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	3613.86
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	pressure transducers	22463.59
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	1734
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military image recording/processing equipment	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	181342.79
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the production of assault rifles	7957
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	targeting equipment, technology for targeting equipment	16000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military support vehicles	5000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for gas processing equipment	34417
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military electronic equipment	1455
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military electronic equipment	39007.98
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	industrial generators	1215853000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general naval vessel components	43000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	accessories for valves, valves	19152
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military helmets	25950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military helmets	42500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines	6800000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	27550
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	direct view imaging equipment	110950.11
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	ballistic test equipment, components for ballistic test equipment	27929.93
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	civil NBC detection systems, technology for civil explosive detection/identification equipment	42750.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	civil NBC detection systems, technology for civil explosive detection/identification	42750.5



		equipment	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general military aircraft components	17098.49
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military helmets	46169.76
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for sniper rifles, small arms ammunition	2415
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	11371.22
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military support aircraft	18729.85
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	sniper rifles (1), weapon sights	126750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	pressure monitoring equipment	8699.98
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment	20
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas	274425.06
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft	155.62
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general laboratory equipment	350
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for pistols, pistols (1), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (2), sporting shotguns (1)	10200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for pistols, components for rifles, pistols (1), rifles (2), small arms ammunition, sporting shotguns (1)	10500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat naval vessels	7744.25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military support aircraft	525
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general laboratory equipment	350
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	362900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aircraft head-up/down displays	71230
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	temperature measurement equipment	513.75
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military support aircraft	420
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military radars	7652.35
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military guidance/navigation equipment	2700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military guidance/navigation equipment	96000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4224.32
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	363100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military communications equipment	28305

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for electronic warfare equipment	38304
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general industrial production equipment	11200.45
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment	6730
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	naval engines	140000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	13050.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general naval vessel components	5521.6
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	284
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military guidance/navigation equipment	47000
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft, components for frigates, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat helicopters, devices containing military pyrotechnic materials, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, pyrotechnic signalling devices, software for the use of combat helicopters, software for the use of equipment for the use of combat helicopters, technology for the use of combat helicopters, technology for the use of devices containing military pyrotechnic materials, technology for the use of equipment for the use of combat helicopters, technology for the use of pyrotechnic signalling devices, unfinished products for combat helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general naval vessel components, technology for the use of general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the use of general naval vessel components, general naval vessel components, technology for the use of equipment for the use of general naval vessel components, technology for the use of general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military electronic equipment, components for naval navigation equipment, components for naval radars, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment, naval navigation equipment, naval radars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines, technology for the production of military aero-	

Use)		engines, technology for the use of military aero-engines, unfinished products for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military parachutes, ejector seats, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military distress signalling equipment, military parachutes, technology for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of general military aircraft components, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for artillery, components for mortars, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for turrets, components for weapon control equipment	

<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Pakistan)</p>	<p>anti-aircraft guns, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for counter-countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for counter-countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, components for counter-countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, components for counter-countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for fire location equipment, components for general naval vessel components, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military imaging radar sensor equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for naval hull penetrators/connectors, components for periscopes, components for projectile launchers, components for rangefinding equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for sensor integration equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, counter-countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, counter-</p>	
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countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, counter-countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, counter-countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of fire location equipment, equipment for the use of general naval vessel components, equipment for the use of military cameras/photographic equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military imaging radar sensor equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of naval communications equipment, equipment for the use of naval electrical/electronic equipment, equipment for the use of naval gun installations/mountings, equipment for the use of naval hull penetrators/connectors, equipment for the use of periscopes, equipment for the use of rangefinding equipment, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, equipment for the use of sensor integration equipment, equipment for the use of targeting equipment, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, fire location equipment, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military cameras/photographic equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military imaging radar sensor equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment,

military radars, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, naval gun installations/mountings, naval guns, naval hull penetrators/connectors, periscopes, projectile launchers, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment, sensor integration equipment, targeting equipment, technology for anti-aircraft guns, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for fire location equipment, technology for general naval vessel components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image intensifier equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military imaging radar sensor equipment, technology for military radars, technology for naval communications equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval gun installations/mountings, technology for naval guns, technology for naval hull penetrators/connectors, technology for periscopes, technology for projectile launchers, technology for rangefinding equipment, technology for recognition/identification equipment, technology for sensor integration equipment, technology for targeting equipment, technology for weapon control equipment, technology for weapon night sights, technology for weapon sights, weapon control equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military electronic equipment, ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for combat aircraft, technology for ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for ejector seats, test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, test models for military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the production of ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for signalling devices, ejector seats, equipment for the production of ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for combat aircraft, technology for ejector seats, technology for equipment for the production of ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, test models for ejector seats, test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, test models for military aircrew protective equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, signalling devices, technology for combat aircraft, technology for devices containing military pyrotechnic materials, technology for ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology	

		for military aircrew protective equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for aircraft carriers, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for military aero-engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military combat vehicles, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military support aircraft, components for military support vehicles, components for military training aircraft, components for military underwater remotely operated vehicles, components for naval engines, components for submarines, components for tanks, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for aircraft carriers, components for combat naval vessels, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military electronic equipment, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for submarines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general naval vessel components, technology for general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for air defence systems, components for aircraft carriers, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for military communications equipment, components for military radars, components for military	



		support vehicles, components for military trailers, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for submarines, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of air defence systems, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military radars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for naval engines, equipment for the use of naval engines, military containers, naval engines, software for naval engines, technology for naval engines, unfinished products for naval engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military electronic equipment, components for signalling devices, ejector seats, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of general military aircraft components, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector seats, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for signalling devices, test models for ejector seats, test models for general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Ukraine)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for military aero-engines, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for military electronic equipment, components for military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military electronic equipment	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography	
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	23100
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	5765
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	15351
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	15000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Russia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	2
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Russia)	towed hydrophone arrays	1200000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Russia)	towed hydrophone arrays	8900
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for marine position fixing equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	5932305
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	337415.51
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	radiation hardened integrated circuits	208000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	1250000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	23100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	15351
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	24000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	3000000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	dimensional measuring equipment	8000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	zirconium alloys	2670
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	375
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	space qualified solar devices	75800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	small arms ammunition	210000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	162500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	fibrous/filamentary materials	137269.93
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	150000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	13343.84

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	140445
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	25000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	23100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	rebreathing swimming equipment	6260.87
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	general purpose integrated circuits	316.95
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	millimetric wave components, signal analysers	93390
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	fibrous/filamentary materials	2540131.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	60600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	2000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	5295
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	42000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	5000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	hydrophones	14200000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	3500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	semiconductor process equipment	450000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	dimensional measuring equipment	175000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	4500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	5000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	machine tools, numerical control software, software for machine tools	662727.76
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	microwave components	1500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	9972
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	focal plane arrays	1760000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	15351
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	hydrophones	12000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	980666
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1693150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	44028
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	fibrous/filamentary materials	8154.84
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	157500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	6900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	biotechnology equipment, civil NBC protection clothing	4499.58
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	13535.51
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	6000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	biotechnology equipment	9063.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	global positioning satellite receivers	1095660
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	450000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	450000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	250000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	250000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	zirconium alloys	200650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	35822.04
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	58481.31
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	26852
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	21050
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment, software for computer analogue-to-digital equipment	23650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	26975
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	17969636
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	software for semiconductor device manufacturing processes	4150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	51961.29
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	radiation hardened integrated circuits	456000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	animal pathogens	10

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	115000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	deuterium solutions	103.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	11242
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	biotechnology equipment	448.44
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	420000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	581980
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	22500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	573228
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	accelerometers	2000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	guidance/navigation equipment, inertial equipment	49550
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	5235920
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	radiation hardened TV camera lenses	3550
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	3520000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1534181
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	5269650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	218521.02
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	gyro-astro compasses	333000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	microwave components	400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	8359450
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters	937695
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	18900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	dimensional measuring equipment	12000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	rotary position encoders	4600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	925000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicle control systems, submersible vehicles	1211454.35
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	beryllium manufactures	2750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	47757.5

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	4500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	submersible equipment	63807
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for composite tubes, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1534181
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	160476
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	civil NBC protection equipment	20880
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters	479685
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	submersible equipment	225390
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	9686.7
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	150000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	126000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1534181
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	350000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	high energy capacitors	15526.35
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	fibrous/filamentary materials	20665
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	fibrous/filamentary materials	37603
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	58.26
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	technology for gas turbine engines	1000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	submersible equipment	86160
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	semiconductor process equipment	1584256
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	submersible vehicles	922373.45
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	submersible equipment	6620
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	2000000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	50000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	dimensional measuring equipment	51000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	sporting guns (8)	36000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	instrumentation cameras	141913.77
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	22985.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	1750000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	5900000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	90688
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	metal alloy powder production equipment	361432.17
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	34001
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	160000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	animal pathogens	10
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	35800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	215.02
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	159135.78
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	machine tools	177300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	metal alloys in powder form	51135.51
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	1000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	software for submersible vehicles, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	812928.13
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	fibrous/filamentary materials	372800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	biotechnology equipment	176818
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	biotechnology equipment	318091
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	enriched uranium	36000000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	global positioning satellite receivers	500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	enriched uranium	1200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	5418360
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	346148
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	950000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	950000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	950000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	1832243.81
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	19100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	1750000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	38711.33
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	11805
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil industry equipment/materials	22184.3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	211902
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	276807
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	8479.14
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	4254.99
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	487
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	35852
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	11624
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	18012
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	microwave components	500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	10800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for submersible vehicles	4508.35
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	6094
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	920000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	10399
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	20778.77
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	19158
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	11582.96
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	2995
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	10588.6
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	4927
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	12637
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	5357



SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	12890
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	23929.22
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	38649.93
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	600000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	4486
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	8375
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	480000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	7344.65
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for semiconductor process equipment	622.44
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	539.32
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	23840
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	guidance/navigation equipment	450000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	40621.07
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil industry equipment/materials	134911.16
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil industry equipment/materials	3739595.74
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	1283.09
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	5524
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	195000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	97500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	8885
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	125
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	5361
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	90
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	22500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	29935
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	metal alloy powder production equipment	1900000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	4291
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	biotechnology equipment	5461.32
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	7579.53

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	4000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	603
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	91472
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	2825029
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	electronic measurement equipment	10055
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	2309
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	7176.7
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	4332
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	3337
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for machine tools, software for machine tools	25000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	22000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	6223
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	12500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	10154.48
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	59965
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	97500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	14210
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	780
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	3270
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	190
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	magnetometers	2055
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	oil and gas industry equipment/materials	4007
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	110500
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for oil industry equipment/materials, technology for oil industry equipment/materials	
SIEL (Transshipment)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	periscopes	2143218
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military electronic equipment	7700
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	32074.13

SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367560
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367560
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	1000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	fire location equipment, recognition/identification equipment, software for fire location equipment, software for recognition/identification equipment	19000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	radio jamming equipment	45000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment, components for civil riot control agent protection equipment, military communications equipment, rebreathing swimming equipment, technology for military communications equipment	12350
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military image intensifier equipment, weapon night sights	85500
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	weapon night sights	85500
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	51000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military communications equipment	190000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment, military laser protection equipment	18090
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	14000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	targeting equipment	23000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military cameras/photographic equipment, weapon night sights	3717
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	60300.06
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	direct view imaging equipment	18954
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	crowd control ammunition, hand grenades, illuminators, signalling devices, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training crowd control ammunition	3809075.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software	30085.6
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	30085.6

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for unmanned air vehicles	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military combat vehicles	100000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for air-to-surface missiles	5000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	366.18
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military combat vehicles	3622.15
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	1000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	913.67
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	447.03
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	1133.13
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military aircraft ground equipment	2751.55
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	243605
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military combat vehicles	41500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	software for ground vehicle military communications equipment, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment	13000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	illuminators	74371.2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for naval communications equipment	51444
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft	2930
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	pressure transducers	9690
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	9742
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	biotechnology equipment	9415.15
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	7500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	78583
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	400000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	524235.37
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	2525.94
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	5000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4261.3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	476957
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	graphite materials, nuclear grade graphite	18497

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for machine guns	21744
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	tear gas/irritant ammunition	215712
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military communications equipment	2000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	imaging cameras	140200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4375
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	370000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6817.2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aircraft ground equipment	1964
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3980
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	441375.68
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1313392
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	4122.71
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	471460
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for turrets	3750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for turrets	1250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for electronic warfare equipment	537766.58
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1675
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	315
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	223
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military communications equipment	5000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	gun silencers	600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3060
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23036.7
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	software for semiconductor process equipment	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium solutions	110.84
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1052
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	68963.86
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	combat aircraft, military airborne equipment	1582666650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	695830

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military radars	79000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1248
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military combat vehicles	51820
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8918.92
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	1234972.48
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	bomb suits, components for military equipment for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of improvised explosive device disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disruptors, military equipment for initiating explosives, military helmets, night vision goggles	2189215
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat naval vessels	47700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	blank/inert ammunition	196500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	931.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	sporting guns	5400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aircraft ground equipment	1247.54
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	submersible equipment	675973
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	direct view imaging equipment	9000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour	959.84
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	11465
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	imaging cameras	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	software for equipment employing cryptography	247541.44
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23114.71
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	42892.97
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	18751.97
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10415.45
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10434.55
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	ballistic test equipment	26380.85

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights	136584
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	56382
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	52682
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	12976.29
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	160663.27
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military communications equipment	4726.25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military communications equipment	215
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military communications equipment	4726.25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	non-military firing sets	6620757
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	2716.66
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	biotechnology equipment, civil NBC protection clothing	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	materials analysis equipment	10950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	94809.36
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	CS hand grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition	970001
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	gun silencers	400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	toxic gas monitoring equipment	344.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	26921.28
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for civil unmanned air vehicles	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	205508.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	417741.98
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	95.83
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	60.03
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	119.36
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	286837.83
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	200.8
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	73.27
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat naval vessels	7022



SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19114.64
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1876416.53
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	239719
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	781.25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	software for military aero-engines	200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	105000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	bomb suits, military helmets	96000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for naval communications equipment	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	body armour, components for body armour	2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	100006
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	submersible equipment	33020
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment for the production of machine guns	12760
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	576
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	gun silencers, sporting guns (20)	10360
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aero-engines	175299.05
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	1045.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	501.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	anti-armour ammunition, blank/inert ammunition, crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition	20510
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military helicopters	580000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	59121
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for weapon sight mounts, equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts	27923
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	bomb suits, civil NBC detection systems, components for improvised explosive device disposal remotely operated vehicles, equipment for the use of civil NBC detection systems, equipment for the use of military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, improvised explosive device	2841079



		detection equipment, military communications equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military support vehicles	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	227
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	toxins	87840
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	4742.77
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	7575.26
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	757.53
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	137199.59
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	12178.66
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	1110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	122004
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	small arms ammunition	100000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	33842.25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	imaging cameras	26000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	969.49
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	891.93
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	2326.78
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	1308.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for naval communications equipment	18889.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for naval communications equipment	80166.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	667
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	frequency changers	375.7
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military communications equipment, targeting equipment	261372
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	54174
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	552
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	20940
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5221
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	9405
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	weapon night sights	6178373

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	11574.79
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	12038.33
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	weapon night sights	161280
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for submersible equipment, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	342854
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	32000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4644.83
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, technology for improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	93852
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	130773.19
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	580
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	381
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for improvised explosive device disruptors	42286
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	1475.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	66343
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	body armour	309677
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	569900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	anti-armour ammunition, small arms ammunition	1349840
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	36468.96
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	software for software for military guidance/navigation equipment	50
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	778681.64
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military combat vehicles	13422
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	acoustic seabed survey equipment	90000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2421.56
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	31144.95
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	electronics cooling fluids	31000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	96057.57

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	138011.69
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	weapon sights	69.99
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	29955
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	570523.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	161.79
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment	545283.87
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	9861331
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military communications equipment	9600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	18300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	12536
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	instrumentation cameras	138100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	24097
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military communications equipment	1785.05
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23009
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, technology for improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	295294
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	non-military firing sets	20955
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3989
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	379
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	imaging cameras	21000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	ballistic test equipment	119677
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	ballistic test equipment, technology for ballistic test equipment, weapon cleaning equipment	49839.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for bombs	8254258.16
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	12475.87
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aircraft ground equipment	615000.68
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	21670.96
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1027
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment,	2790

		components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, military laser protection equipment	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	16313.7
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	weapon night sights, weapon sights	17553
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	radio jamming equipment	104000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military combat vehicles	1066560
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military combat vehicles	76
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software	1141.8
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8397.16
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	imaging cameras	20800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	instrumentation cameras	69000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software	1013879
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military airborne equipment	1927.16
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aircraft ground equipment	6551.24
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8529
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	17058
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5640
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1520061
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1516
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aero-engines	3600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7258.59
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment	1638.7
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	7172.02
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	general military aircraft components	21675
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	non-military firing sets	25898
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	57565
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	combat aircraft	38750000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	software for military aircraft ground equipment	4000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	imaging cameras	17400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment,	25827.13

		munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10288.08
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1956485
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1008
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1160
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	307
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	2250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	5154
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	4312.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	6000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	574756
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	355230.01
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft	3849.38
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aircraft ground equipment	1613.95
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for naval communications equipment	3750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for naval communications equipment	26200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military radars, software for military radars	2699670
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, technology for weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts	201974.41
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	97015.57
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4329.2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment	68000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aero-engines	102770
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft	1020
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	9201789
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	98300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	862.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1840
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	765

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	765
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	765
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	765
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5267
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft	886.17
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft	3969.08
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3263
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	17675
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	general military vehicle components	164195.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	103.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, sniper rifles (60), weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	294403.67
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	3770700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	28746.8
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	81960
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	12141.4
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	3155180
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23588.61
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for naval communications equipment	5484
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment	3831280
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3393
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	476510
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	X-ray accelerators	16986529.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military training aircraft	15000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	948215
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	469.38
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4408.41
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	106000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	command communications control and intelligence software	120000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for pistols, gun silencers	600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	29680
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	176750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft	300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment for the use of military communications equipment	25666.75
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1776
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	civil NBC protection clothing	635000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	chemicals used for chemical/materials production	20700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, sniper rifles (50), weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	338507.34
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	326200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1299
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	instrumentation cameras	18777.21
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	913.15
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	321.49
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1749.78
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military helmets	10
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment	10500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	565.25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	634.33
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military communications equipment	18896.2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	command communications control and intelligence software	120000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1703.25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military training aircraft	118910
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	180100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military field generators	279
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, technology for improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	55834.64



SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military training equipment	44750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for military training equipment	1000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for machine guns, machine guns, weapon cleaning equipment	501000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military communications equipment	26000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	4761890.86
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	software for equipment employing cryptography	88.79
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	320900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military communications equipment	6250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military communications equipment	11555
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft	871.98
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat naval vessels	1419
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat naval vessels	6000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for submersible equipment, submersible equipment	183790
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	83750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	106439
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	37812.42
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	software for semiconductor process equipment	21.38
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military support vehicles	2184



OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne surveillance equipment, airborne targeting equipment, aircraft cannons, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft missile protection systems, aircraft radars, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, attack alerting/warning equipment, chaff, chaff equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for airborne surveillance equipment, components for airborne targeting equipment, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft missile protection systems, components for aircraft radars, components for aircrew protective masks, components for anti-g/pressure suits, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for chaff equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for electronic countermeasures equipment, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the use of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the use of ejector seats, components for guided missile decoying equipment, components for imaging countermeasures equipment, components for laser rangefinders, components for laser warning detectors, components for liquid oxygen converters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft head-up displays, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military flying helmets, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military imaging radar equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military video processing equipment, components for military video recording equipment, components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for sensor data recorders, components for test equipment for combat aircraft, components for weapon control systems, components for weapon sights, decoy flares, ejector seats, electronic countermeasures equipment, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of ejector seats, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, guided missile decoying equipment, guided missile detection equipment, imaging countermeasures equipment, laser rangefinders, laser warning detectors, launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, launching equipment for bombs, liquid oxygen converters, materials for reduced electromagnetic reflectivity for military use, military aero-engines, military aircraft	
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flight data recorders, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft head-up displays, military aircraft navigation equipment, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military containers, military field generators, military flying helmets, military image intensifier equipment, military imaging radar equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes, military parametric technical databases, military video processing equipment, military video recording equipment, optical target acquisition equipment, production technology for combat aircraft, recognition/identification equipment, sensor data recorders, signature suppression coatings for military use, signature suppression fittings for military use, signature suppression treatments for military use, software for the production of airborne electronic warfare equipment, software for the production of airborne surveillance equipment, software for the production of airborne targeting equipment, software for the production of aircraft cannons, software for the production of aircraft missile protection systems, software for the production of aircraft radars, software for the production of aircrew protective masks, software for the production of anti-g/pressure suits, software for the production of chaff, software for the production of chaff equipment, software for the production of combat aircraft, software for the production of decoy flares, software for the production of ejector seats, software for the production of equipment for the production of combat aircraft, software for the production of equipment for the use of combat aircraft, software for the production of equipment for the use of ejector seats, software for the production of guided missile decoying equipment, software for the production of guided missile detection equipment, software for the production of imaging countermeasures equipment, software for the production of laser rangefinders, software for the production of launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, software for the production of launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, software for the production of launching equipment for bombs, software for the production of liquid oxygen converters, software for the production of military aero-engines, software for the production of military aircraft flight data recorders, software for the production of military aircraft ground equipment, software for the production of military aircraft head-up displays, software for the production of military aircraft navigation equipment, software for the production of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, software for the production of military containers, software for the production of military field generators, software for the production of military flying helmets, software for the

production of military image intensifier equipment, software for the production of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for the production of military parachutes, software for the production of military parametric technical databases, software for the production of military video processing equipment, software for the production of military video recording equipment, software for the production of optical target acquisition equipment, software for the production of recognition/identification equipment, software for the production of signature suppression fittings for military use, software for the production of signature suppression treatments for military use, software for the production of test equipment for combat aircraft, software for the production of test equipment for military aero-engines, software for the production of unfinished products for combat aircraft, software for the production of weapon control systems, software for the production of weapon sights, software for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, software for the use of airborne surveillance equipment, software for the use of airborne targeting equipment, software for the use of aircraft cannons, software for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, software for the use of aircraft radars, software for the use of anti-g/pressure suits, software for the use of chaff equipment, software for the use of combat aircraft, software for the use of ejector seats, software for the use of equipment for the production of combat aircraft, software for the use of equipment for the use of combat aircraft, software for the use of equipment for the use of ejector seats, software for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, software for the use of guided missile detection equipment, software for the use of imaging countermeasures equipment, software for the use of laser rangefinders, software for the use of launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, software for the use of launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, software for the use of launching equipment for bombs,

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for landing craft, components for military search and rescue aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, equipment for the production of airborne refuelling equipment, equipment for the production of landing craft, equipment for the production of military search and rescue aircraft, equipment for the production of military transport aircraft, equipment for the production of military utility aircraft, equipment for the use of airborne refuelling equipment, equipment for the use of landing craft, equipment for the use of military search and rescue aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, equipment for the use of military utility aircraft, technology for the use of airborne refuelling equipment, technology for the use of landing craft, technology for the use of military search and rescue aircraft, technology for the use of military transport aircraft, technology for the use of military utility aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	airborne refuelling equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for ground based radars, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft head-down displays, components for military aircraft head-up displays, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military cameras, components for military communications equipment, components for military transport aircraft, components for tanker aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aircraft navigation equipment, military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, military communications equipment, simulators for military communications equipment, software for the use of equipment for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of simulators for military communications equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military	

		communications equipment, technology for the use of goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of simulators for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	ballistic test equipment, components for ballistic test equipment, software for the use of ballistic test equipment, technology for the use of ballistic test equipment, test equipment for armoured plate, test equipment for body armour, test equipment for constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, test equipment for military helmets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aero-engines, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for gun laying equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, gun laying equipment, military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of gun laying equipment, technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sight mounts, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	command and control vehicles, command communications control and intelligence equipment, command communications control and intelligence software, software for the use of command and control vehicles, technology for the use of command and control vehicles, technology for the use of command communications control and intelligence equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	assault rifles, blank ammunition, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, training small arms ammunition	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for the development of civil unmanned air vehicle engines, technology for the development of civil unmanned air vehicles, technology for the development of control equipment for unmanned air vehicles, technology for the development of	

		guidance equipment for unmanned air vehicles, technology for the development of remote control equipment for unmanned air vehicles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, components for test equipment for combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of combat aircraft, test equipment for combat aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for the development of air-to-surface missiles, technology for the production of air-to-surface missiles, technology for the use of air-to-surface missiles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aero-engines, components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military radars, components for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for ejector seats, components for military parachutes and equipment, components for military training aircraft, military parachutes and equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, software for the use of military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	<p>Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating weapon systems, aerial target equipment, aircraft cannon ammunition, aircraft cannons, aircraft military communications equipment, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for aircraft cannon ammunition, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for ejector seats, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for fire location equipment, components for fuze setting devices, components for general military aircraft components, components for global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for military containers, components for military field generators, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military training equipment, components for rangefinding equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for sensor integration equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for</p>
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weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings, components for weapon sights, countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, ejector seats, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft cannon ammunition, equipment for the use of aircraft cannons, equipment for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, equipment for the use of countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the use of decoying/countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of fire location equipment, equipment for the use of fuze setting devices, equipment for the use of global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military airborne equipment, equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of military aircraft head-up/down displays, equipment for the use of military aircraft pressure refuellers, equipment for the use of military aircrew breathing equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the use of military cameras/photographic equipment, equipment for the use of military containers, equipment for the use of military field generators, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image intensifier



equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the use of military mobile repair shops and related equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training equipment, equipment for the use of rangefinding equipment, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, equipment for the use of sensor integration equipment, equipment for the use of targeting equipment, equipment for the use of test models for combat aircraft, equipment for the use of test models for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of test models for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of weapon mountings, equipment for the use of weapon sights, fire location equipment, fuze setting devices, general military aircraft components, global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, military aero-engines, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft head-up/down displays, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military cameras/photographic equipment, military containers, military field generators, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military mobile repair shops and related equipment, military parametric technical databases, military radars, military training equipment, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment, sensor integration equipment, signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, software for aerial target equipment, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for combat aircraft, software for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for decoying/countermeasure equipment, software for

determining the effects of weapons, software for electronic countermeasure equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, software for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, software for fire location equipment, software for fuze setting devices, software for global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, software for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, software for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, software for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, software for military aero-engines, software for military airborne equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft head-up/down displays, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military image intensifier equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, software for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, software for military radars, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, software for military training equipment, software for rangefinding equipment, software for recognition/identification equipment, software for sensor integration equipment, software for targeting equipment, software for weapon control equipment, targeting equipment, technology for Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating weapon systems, technology for aircraft cannon ammunition, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for ejector seats, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for fire location equipment, technology for fuze setting devices, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for

		<p>launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military airborne equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft head-up/down displays, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military containers, technology for military field generators, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image intensifier equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, technology for military radars, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for military training equipment, technology for rangefinding equipment, technology for recognition/identification equipment, technology for sensor integration equipment, technology for software for determining the effects of weapons, technology for targeting equipment, technology for test models for combat aircraft, technology for test models for military support aircraft, technology for test models for military training aircraft, technology for weapon control equipment, technology for weapon mountings, technology for weapon sights, test models for combat aircraft, test models for military support aircraft, test models for military training aircraft, unfinished products for combat aircraft, unfinished products for military support aircraft, unfinished products for military training aircraft, weapon control equipment, weapon mountings, weapon sights</p>	
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OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military support aircraft, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military aircrew breathing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, aerial target equipment, components for accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military radars, components for military training aircraft, components for military training equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training equipment, military aero-engines, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military radars, military training aircraft, military training equipment, technology for accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for aerial target equipment, technology	

		for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military radars, technology for military training aircraft, technology for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military parachutes and equipment, signalling devices, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for equipment for the use of military helicopters, software for military aero-engines, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military helicopters, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for equipment for the use of military helicopters, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military parachutes and equipment, technology for signalling devices, technology for software for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for software for equipment for the use of military helicopters, technology for software for military aero-engines, technology for software for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for software for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for software for military helicopters	

<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)</p>	<p>Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating military operation scenarios, Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating weapon systems, armoured plate, artillery ammunition, attack alerting/warning equipment, command communications control and intelligence software, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for fire location equipment, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military containers, components for military field generators, components for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, components for military radars, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, components for naval guns, components for pistols, components for rangefinding equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for sensor integration equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, environmental test facilities for military auxiliary/support vessels, equipment for the production of military auxiliary/support vessels, equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of fire location equipment, equipment for the use of military auxiliary/support vessels, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of rangefinding equipment, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, equipment for the use of sensor integration equipment, equipment for the use of targeting equipment, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, explosives, fire location equipment, general naval vessel components, global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, military auxiliary/support vessels, military communications equipment, military containers, military diving apparatus, military electronic equipment, military field generators, military guidance/navigation equipment, military imaging radar sensor equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military mobile repair shops and related equipment, military parametric technical databases, military radars, military scenario simulation equipment, military software, military training equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, naval engines, naval gun installations/mountings, naval guns, pistols, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment,</p>
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		sensor integration equipment, signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, small arms ammunition, small arms training equipment, software for determining the effects of weapons, software for electronic warfare equipment, software for military communications equipment, targeting equipment, tear gas/riot control agents, technology for military auxiliary/support vessels, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for production installations for military auxiliary/support vessels, test models for military auxiliary/support vessels, weapon control equipment, weapon mountings, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for software for air-to-surface missiles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	air-to-surface missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for equipment for the use of air-to-surface missiles, components for inert air-to-surface missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military training equipment, components for test equipment for air-to-surface missiles, equipment for the use of air-to-surface missiles, inert air-to-surface missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military training equipment, software for air-to-surface missiles, software for inert air-to-surface missiles, software for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, software for military	

		communications equipment, software for military electronic equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military training equipment, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for inert air-to-surface missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military training equipment, technology for replica air-to-surface missiles, test equipment for air-to-surface missiles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	aircraft military communications equipment, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military containers, components for military field generators, components for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, electronic warfare equipment, environmental test facilities for combat aircraft, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, general military aircraft components, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, military aero-engines, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military cameras/photographic equipment, military containers, military electronic equipment, military field generators, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military imaging radar sensor equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military mobile repair shops and related equipment, military parametric technical databases, military radars, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment, signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for combat aircraft, software for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, software for general military aircraft components, software	



for goods treated for signature suppression for military use, software for military aero-engines, software for military airborne equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for military containers, software for military field generators, software for military image intensifier equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, software for military imaging radar sensor equipment, software for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, software for military parametric technical databases, software for military radars, software for rangefinding equipment, software for recognition/identification equipment, software for signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, software for targeting equipment, software for test models for combat aircraft, software for weapon control equipment, targeting equipment, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military airborne equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military containers, technology for military image intensifier equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military imaging radar sensor equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, technology for military parametric technical databases, technology for military radars, technology for rangefinding equipment, technology for recognition/identification equipment, technology for signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, technology for targeting equipment, technology for test models for combat aircraft, technology for weapon control equipment, test models for combat aircraft, weapon control equipment

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	<p>aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft missile protection systems, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft missile protection systems, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for sensor integration equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military airborne equipment, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft head-up/down displays, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military cameras/photographic equipment, military communications equipment, military containers, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parametric technical databases, military radars, sensor integration equipment, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for aircraft missile protection systems, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for decoying/countermeasure equipment, software for electronic countermeasure equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, software for military airborne equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft head-up/down displays, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for military communications equipment, software for military electronic equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military image</p>
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		intensifier equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, software for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for military radars, software for sensor integration equipment, software for targeting equipment, software for weapon control equipment, targeting equipment, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for aircraft missile protection systems, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for military airborne equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft head-up/down displays, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military containers, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image intensifier equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military radars, technology for sensor integration equipment, technology for targeting equipment, technology for weapon control equipment, weapon control equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, aerial target equipment, components for accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military radars, components for military training aircraft, components for military training equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training equipment, military aero-engines, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military radars, military training aircraft, military training equipment, technology for accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for aerial target equipment, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military radars, technology for military training aircraft, technology for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military electronic equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the use of combat aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft,	

		military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military containers, components for military training equipment, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, military aircraft ground equipment, military containers, military parametric technical databases, military training equipment, software for air-to-air missiles, software for combat aircraft, software for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for combat aircraft, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military training equipment, technology for training air-to-air missiles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military containers, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines, unfinished products for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for equipment for the production of military aero-engines, components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military aero-	

		engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military containers, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines, technology for software for military aero-engines, test equipment for military aero-engines, unfinished products for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	airborne refuelling equipment, aircraft cannons, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, attack alerting/warning equipment, chaff equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for fire control equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, fire control equipment, guided missile decoying equipment, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military containers, military electronic equipment, military flying helmets, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes and equipment, software for airborne refuelling equipment, software for aircraft cannons, software for aircrew protective masks, software for anti-g/pressure suits, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for chaff equipment, software for combat aircraft, software for ejector seats, software for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, software for fire control equipment, software for guided missile decoying equipment, software for military aero-engines, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military containers, software for military flying helmets, software for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for military parachutes and equipment, technology for airborne refuelling equipment, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for aircrew protective masks, technology for anti-g/pressure suits, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment,	

		<p>technology for chaff equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for ejector seats, technology for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for fire control equipment, technology for guided missile decoying equipment, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military containers, technology for military flying helmets, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military parachutes and equipment</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	<p>air launched rockets, air-to-air missiles, air-to-surface missiles, bombs, components for air launched rockets, components for air-to-air missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for bombs, components for explosive charges/devices, components for illuminators, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for military containers, components for military training aircraft, components for multi-role missiles, components for signalling devices, components for surface-to-air missiles, components for surface-to-surface missiles, components for torpedoes, decoying/countermeasure equipment, explosive charges/devices, illuminators, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, military containers, military parametric technical databases, multi-role missiles, signalling devices, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, technology for air launched rockets, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for bombs, technology for explosive charges/devices, technology for illuminators, technology for multi-role missiles, technology for production installations for air launched rockets, technology for production installations for air-to-air missiles, technology for production installations for air-to-surface missiles, technology for production installations for bombs, technology for</p>	

		production installations for explosive charges/devices, technology for production installations for illuminators, technology for production installations for multi-role missiles, technology for production installations for signalling devices, technology for production installations for surface-to-air missiles, technology for production installations for surface-to-surface missiles, technology for production installations for torpedoes, technology for signalling devices, technology for surface-to-air missiles, technology for surface-to-surface missiles, technology for torpedoes, torpedoes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military training aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	accessories for military training equipment, components for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, equipment for the use of munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, software for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	bombs, components for bombs, components for military containers, equipment for the use of bombs, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, military containers, military parametric technical databases, military software, military training equipment, software for bombs, technology for bombs, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the use of bombs	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for equipment for the use of air-to-surface missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for air-to-surface missiles, components for military training equipment, equipment for the use of air-to-surface missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, military software, military training equipment, software for air-to-surface missiles, technology for equipment for the	



		use of air-to-surface missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for air-to-surface missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	airborne refuelling equipment, aircraft cannons, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, chaff equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for combat aircraft, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, guided missile decoying equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military containers, military electronic equipment, military flying helmets, technology for airborne refuelling equipment, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for aircrew protective masks, technology for anti-g/pressure suits, technology for chaff equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for guided missile decoying equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military containers, technology for military flying helmets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military radars, equipment for the use of military radars, software for military radars, technology for military radars	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	mixtures containing chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Sri Lanka), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Uzbekistan), ISSUE (Vietnam)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for military radars, military software, technology for military radars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for naval engines, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew breathing equipment, equipment for the use of military helicopters, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of naval engines, general military aircraft components, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for naval engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal	

		imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew protective equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	27810
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	military helmets	712
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	158000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	14858.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	military helmets	4304.25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	decoying/countermeasure equipment	122700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	military equipment for initiating explosives, non-military firing sets	950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	body armour, components for body armour	19800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	military support vehicles	45800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	military support vehicles	268385
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	military support vehicles	464750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	equipment employing cryptography	11962
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	components for military support vehicles, military support vehicles	1218850
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	equipment employing cryptography	338835.31
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	108664.67
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	body armour, improvised explosive device disruptors	21100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	45500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	software for equipment employing cryptography	10

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, technology for improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	230700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	devices for initiating explosives	4100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	body armour, military helmets	13972.8
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	6163
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Somalia)	equipment employing cryptography	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	technology for military training aircraft	150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	4000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	body armour, military helmets	3228
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	2006000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (100), weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (160), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, military helmets, rifles (160), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	788000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (300), body armour, components for assault rifles (100), components for pistols, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1713000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (300), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1707500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (250), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1309500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	technology for military airborne equipment	20
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon night sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	equipment employing cryptography	3428.28
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	fibrous/filamentary materials	207000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	fibrous/filamentary materials	950500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition,	1125000

		weapon sights	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	fibrous/filamentary materials	214500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (200), weapon sights	1788000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (200), weapon sights	1788000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1788000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (175), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	987225
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	190750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (600), combat shotguns (300), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (200), weapon sights	1779000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (300), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	components for pistols, pistols (100), small arms ammunition	135000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (250), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (100), weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	body armour, military helmets	24336
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	combat shotguns (97), components for combat shotguns, components for rifles, rifles (247), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	430598
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	small arms ammunition	2774.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	small arms ammunition	4311.04
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	components for assault rifles	3600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1797000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	weapon sights	64.85
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns (100), components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for rifles, components for weapon sights, military helmets, rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1501475
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	4200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	components for military airborne equipment, technology for military airborne equipment	300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1315969
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1744500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000



SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (200), sporting shotgun ammunition, weapon sights	1797600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (200), sporting shotgun ammunition, weapon sights	1797600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	3500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (200), sporting shotgun ammunition, weapon sights	1797600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1125000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	software for cryptographic software	53600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	fibrous/filamentary materials	302000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	fibrous/filamentary materials	333000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	aircraft military communications equipment	2844.38
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (100), weapon sights	1464500

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	components for military airborne cargo handling equipment, military airborne cargo handling equipment, technology for the production of military airborne cargo handling equipment, unfinished products for military airborne cargo handling equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	body armour, components for body armour, equipment employing cryptography, military helmets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka), ISSUE (Tunisia)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka), ISSUE (Vietnam)	bomb suits, civil body armour, components for bomb suits, components for civil body armour, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, demolition devices, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military helmets, mine detection equipment, non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka), ISSUE (Vietnam)	towed hydrophone arrays	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	7382500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan)	chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	2700000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan)	software for equipment employing cryptography	15492.65
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Sudan)	bomb suits, components for bomb suits, components for devices for initiating explosives, components for improvised explosive device disposal equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, devices for initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military helmets, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, non-military firing sets	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan, South)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	142500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan, South)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	33750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan, South)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	38500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan, South)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	2008.36
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan, South)	software for equipment employing cryptography	30
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan, South)	software for equipment employing cryptography	44.82



SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Syria)	cryptographic software	800
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Syria)	cryptographic software	800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Syria)	body armour, military helmets	126000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Syria)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	47500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Syria)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	43384
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Syria)	components for body armour	45000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Syria)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	14778
SIEL (Transshipment)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	anti-armour ammunition, small arms ammunition	272232.87
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	body armour, imaging cameras, military communications equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	264200
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for body armour, imaging cameras, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	506700
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	software for radio jamming equipment, telecommunications jamming equipment	32074.13
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	189000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil riot control agent protection equipment	72065.01
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	equipment employing cryptography	6849.69
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	equipment employing cryptography	600000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	equipment employing cryptography	31819.02
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	equipment employing cryptography	5472
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	cryptographic software	5000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	equipment employing cryptography	570000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for naval guns	46863.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment	26642.72
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	body armour, components for body armour	805.9
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	13634
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	general naval vessel components, technology for general naval vessel components	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military helicopters, military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Ukraine)	small arms ammunition	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Ukraine)	neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets	
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	components for aerial target equipment	376328
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	software for diver location sonars	8000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	9326
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	diver location sonars, software for diver location sonars	1228000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	equipment employing cryptography	3216
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	equipment employing cryptography	57299.62
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	high performance air traffic control software	32880
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	components for military helicopters	3616
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	equipment employing cryptography	10846
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	equipment employing cryptography	83739
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	equipment employing cryptography	9709.98
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	components for assault rifles, components for pistols, training small arms ammunition	166463
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	equipment employing cryptography, high performance air traffic control software	578000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	equipment employing cryptography, high performance air traffic control software	628000

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, inertial equipment, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military parachutes and equipment, signalling devices, software for equipment for the use of military helicopters, software for military aero-engines, software for military helicopters, software for the use of inertial equipment, technology for equipment for the use of military helicopters, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military helicopters, technology for military parachutes and equipment, technology for signalling devices, technology for the use of inertial equipment, unfinished products for military helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Ukraine)	non-military detonators	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	military training equipment	25030
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	military electronic equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	202640
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	military electronic equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	202640
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras, weapon night sights, weapon sights	202940
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	lasers	31000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	gun silencers	140000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	sniper rifles (3)	16000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for sniper rifles, sniper rifles (3)	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-air missiles	714000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for military helicopters	547700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	sporting guns (33)	37500

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	weapon sights	4267.02
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	machine tools	104450
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	weapon sights	80000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	rifles (10)	19588
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	rebreathing swimming equipment	3507
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	sniper rifles (5)	22500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	small arms ammunition	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for military helicopters	407600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	equipment employing cryptography	937.81
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	imaging cameras	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	imaging cameras	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	imaging cameras	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	weapon sights	7500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	gun silencers, sporting guns (65)	19200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	technology for imaging cameras	600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	small arms ammunition	150000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	weapon sights	217.94
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	404189
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	equipment employing cryptography	98833
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	equipment employing cryptography	17969636
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	sporting guns (1)	69805
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	sniper rifles (3), sporting guns (11)	36500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	body armour	7000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	346000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	gun silencers	80000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for sporting guns	15000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon sights	100000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for sniper rifles	8400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	15053
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	rebreathing swimming equipment	3507
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	equipment employing cryptography	1300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	inertial equipment	2850
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for military support aircraft	22828
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures	3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	machine tools, software for machine tools	880314
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	focal plane arrays	6000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	511000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	technology for combat naval vessels	31700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for aircraft missile protection systems	100154.46
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	1551640
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	1117694
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	rebreathing swimming equipment	17759.85
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	imaging cameras	4325152
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	1405120
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	equipment employing cryptography	2146
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	37
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	technology for attack alerting/warning equipment	200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	X-ray generators	165000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	military containers, military support vehicles, military trailers	124000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	2981.63
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	220000
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	americium-241, devices for initiating explosives, hydrophones, linear cutting explosive charges, materials containing natural uranium, materials containing thorium, neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets, oxidisers, radioactive sources, technology for the use of devices for initiating	



		explosives, technology for the use of linear cutting explosive charges, technology for the use of non-military detonators, technology for the use of non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	air guns	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment, components for civil riot control agent protection equipment, military communications equipment, rebreathing swimming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	imaging cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	X-ray accelerators	3141190
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	inertial equipment	28500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1534181
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	small arms ammunition	30000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	imaging cameras	96000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	targeting equipment	160000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	RF direction finding equipment	70490
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	radio jamming equipment	28950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	biotechnology equipment	99.22
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	human pathogens	25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	civil NBC protection clothing	152750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	radio jamming equipment	28950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	small arms training equipment, software enabling equipment to function as small arms training equipment	336223
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	small arms training equipment, software enabling equipment to function as small arms training equipment	665767
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	lasers	796850

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels, technology for military auxiliary/support vessels	1080000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	equipment employing cryptography	3000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military equipment for initiating explosives	30302.05
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	zirconium	200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	towed hydrophone arrays	22400000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	weapon night sights	173973.25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	imaging cameras	89250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	civil NBC protection equipment	100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	75000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	marine position fixing equipment	20850
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	4217.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for military helicopters	13365
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	131258
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	imaging cameras	70000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	technology for military patrol/assault craft	2500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	imaging cameras	5000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	equipment employing cryptography	25417.2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection clothing	29457.32
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment	10953.56
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	8315
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	ballistic test equipment, components for ballistic test equipment, software for ballistic test equipment, technology for ballistic test equipment	17718
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	1002.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	bismuth	800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicle control systems, submersible vehicles	872000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection clothing	44423.2

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs	2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	toxic gas detectors	305.8
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, radio jamming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	equipment employing cryptography, radio jamming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	cable systems sensitive to eavesdropping, components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for generating hopping codes, equipment for generating spreading codes, equipment with reduced electromagnetic emanations, impulse radio equipment, non-cryptographic information security equipment, software for cable systems sensitive to eavesdropping, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment for generating hopping codes, software for equipment for generating spreading codes, software for equipment with reduced electromagnetic emanations, software for impulse radio equipment, software for non-cryptographic information security equipment, technology for cable systems sensitive to eavesdropping, technology for cryptographic software, technology for digital cellular radio system, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment for generating hopping codes, technology for equipment for generating spreading codes, technology for equipment with reduced electromagnetic emanations, technology for impulse radio equipment, technology for non-cryptographic information security equipment, technology for software for cable systems sensitive to eavesdropping, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment for generating hopping codes, technology for software for equipment for generating spreading codes, technology for software for equipment with reduced electromagnetic emanations, technology for software for impulse radio equipment, technology for	

		software for non-cryptographic information security equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for military diving apparatus, military diving apparatus, rebreathing swimming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	technology for NBC detection equipment, technology for software for NBC detection equipment	
SIEL (Transshipment)	ISSUE (Yemen)	assault rifles (400), components for assault rifles, weapon cleaning equipment	570125
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Yemen)	components for military support aircraft	20407.97
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Yemen)	acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	987225
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Yemen)	body armour, components for body armour	1830
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	20000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	27809
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	3452
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	15414
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	6265
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	33961.38
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	1834
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	100000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	500000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	96504
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	31155.13
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	2530

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	336500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	3021
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	devices for initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disruptors	19200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	15143
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	2230
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software	1362
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	1699
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software	732
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	33836
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	4593
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	4534.69
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	1325
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	3755
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software	1080
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software	990
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software	4200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	1166.25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	1821.25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	1142.5
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	45700.72
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	8000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	1376
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	2216
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	765
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	1878.28
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software	480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	1878.28

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	5000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	3141
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	5288
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	biotechnology equipment	13945
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	

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**Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, MP,  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

*6 January 2015*

Following your letter to me of 24 July 2014 about the Government's policy towards arms exports to Ukraine, please could you tell me:

1. the results of the re-assessment against the EU and National Consolidated Criteria of those licences which the Government previously suspended – licence by licence; and
2. the details – licence by licence – of any licences which have been revoked as being inconsistent with the Criteria.

I should be grateful for this information by 23 January.

I am copying this letter to the Business Secretary, Vince Cable.

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**Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary  
of State for Business, Innovations and Skills**

*6 January 2015*

**Arms export licence revocations for the period 7 June 2014 to the present**

Please could you provide details of all licence revocations made in the period 7 June 2014 to the present, by country.

Please could you provide the information in the same format as in Annex 1 of Cm 8079 (SIELS/OIELS/etc., End User Country, Annual Report Summary, Rating, Reason for Revocation). Please could you also include the date of revocation in each case.

I should be grateful for this information by 23 January.

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**Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary  
of State for Business, Innovations and Skills**

8 January 2015

In the Government's Response (Cm8935) to the Committee's 2014 Report (HC 186) on page 12 there was no response provided to the Committees' recommendation that the Government states in its Response when it will be providing the Committees with its update on the EU User's Guide following the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty.

I should be grateful for this information by 23 January.

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**Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills**

12 January 2015

Please could you state which UK strategic export control licences are currently extant, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence, for Qatar.

I should be grateful for the reply by 23 January.

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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

16 January 2015

Thank you for your letter of 8 January to the Secretary of State for BIS, about the updating of the EU User's Guide following the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty.

The EU User's Guide is being updated in the EU working group COARM. Efforts have been underway for some months now and will continue. The EU User's Guide will be updated in line with the Arms Trade Treaty, an essential component given its recent Entry into Force on 24 December 2014.

The UK will be maintaining its participation as part of the process and will continue to support efforts by the Member States and the EEAS. However, as work is still underway I cannot divulge further details.

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**Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills**



19 January 2015

In the Government's Response (Cm8935) to the Committee's 2014 Report (HC 186) on page 15 it states that: "OIELs are granted to individual exporters, usually for three or five years [...]". However, in the quarterly "Country Pivot Reports" the definition of an OIEL states that "OIELs covering the export of items entered on the Military List are generally valid for two years [...]".

Would you please clarify the apparent contradiction of the two statements above and confirm to me the duration of an OIEL.

I should be grateful for this information by 30 January.

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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills**

21 January 2015

#### **EXTANT LICENCES FOR QATAR**

Thank you for your letters dated 6 January 2015 concerning revocations for the period 7 June 2014 to the present and 12 January 2015 concerning extant licences for Qatar. I am replying here to both letters.

#### **Revocations for the period 7 June 2014 to the present**

I have attached these in Annex A. The excel spreadsheet contains two worksheets. The first contains licences that have been revoked in full.

Please note that this data includes 8 licences that were revoked in June 2014 and were reported to you in my letter dated 30 June 2014. One of the licences for "components for body armour" was previously reported as "body armour". This was an error in reporting and the relevant Quarterly Report (Q1 2014 covering January – March 2014 licences) will be republished at the same time as when we publish Q3 2014 licences covering July-September 2014. The licence itself was not affected by this reporting error. It was granted with a full and accurate list of approved goods.

Annex A also includes 9 licences for the Ukraine that were revoked on 16 January 2015. This followed a review of the 20 extant export licences for Ukraine that had been suspended in February 2014. The Foreign Secretary is writing to you separately about these licences.

The second worksheet covers all multi-destination Open Individual licences where a country (namely Russia in all cases was removed and each licence was subsequently reissued.

### Extant licences for Qatar

Annex B contains a complete list of extant licences for direct export to Qatar.

I trust you find this information helpful.

### Annex A

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Revoke Date	Revoke Reason
SIEL	military support vehicles, components for military support vehicles	ML6a	Central African Republic	11/06/2014	Licence was converted from a licence for export to Latvia to a licence for export to CAR
SIEL	tear gas/irritant ammunition	ML3a	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	components for body armour	ML13d2	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	anti-riot/ballistic shields	PL5001b	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	components for body armour	ML13d2	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	civil body armour	1A005	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	civil body armour, body armour, components for body armour	1A005, ML13d	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	small arms ammunition	ML3a	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	components for military aircrew protective equipment	ML10g	France	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11a	France	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11a	France	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	targeting equipment	ML5b	France	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	military aircraft head-up/down displays	ML10a	France	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Italy	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Italy	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Italy	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11a	Italy	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

SIEL	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	ML4b2, ML4b1	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, sniper rifles (15), weapon cleaning equipment	ML1a, PL5017	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	focal plane arrays	6A002a3c	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	focal plane arrays	6A002a3c	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	focal plane arrays	6A002a3c	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	sniper rifles (3), gun mountings, components for sniper rifles	ML1a, ML1d	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	sniper rifles (42), gun mountings, components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, weapon cleaning equipment	ML1a, ML1d, PL5017	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	ML17h	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	ML17h	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	ML17h	Russia	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	components for military helicopters	ML10a	South Africa	06/08/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for inertial equipment, guidance/navigation equipment, inertial equipment	7A103a1, 7A103a2	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

OIEL	small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1a, ML2a, ML3a, ML1b, ML1d, ML2c	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5A002a1b, 5D002c1, 5D002d, 5E002b	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	technology for the production of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	civil NBC protection equipment, NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment	1A004a3, 1A004a4, ML7f1, 1A004a1	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	components for sporting guns	ML1a	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	components for sporting guns	ML1a	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	body armour, components for body armour	ML13d	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	submersible equipment	8A002c, 8A002i2, 8A002a3	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	sniper rifles (1)	ML1a	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	sniper rifles (1)	ML1a	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	sporting guns (1), weapon sights, small arms ammunition	ML1a, ML1d, ML3a	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	military aircraft ground equipment	ML10f	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	equipment for the use of military communications equipment	ML11a	Russia	22/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
SIEL	mass spectrometers	3A233c	India	05/11/2014	1
SIEL	sporting guns (33)	ML1a	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	rifles (10)	ML1a	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	sniper rifles (5)	ML1a	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	sporting guns (1)	ML1b	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	sniper rifles (3), sporting guns (11)	ML1a	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	ML13c, ML13d1, ML13d2	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	gun silencers	ML1d	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7

SIEL	components for sporting guns	ML1a	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7
SIEL	components for sniper rifles	ML1a	Ukraine	16/01/2015	3,7

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Removal Date	Review Reason
OIEL	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	1A001a, 1A001c, 7A103a1	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters	ML10a, ML10f, ML11a, ML22a, PL5017	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	inertial equipment	7A103a1	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5E002a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	acoustic seabed survey equipment, equipment employing cryptography, guidance/navigation equipment, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles, underwater sonar navigation systems	5A002a1a, 6A001a1a1, 6A001a1a2, 6A001a1a3, 6A001a1d, 6A001a2d, 6A001b1, 6A001b2, 6A003b4a, 6A003b4b, 6A006a2, 6A006a3, 7A003a1, 7A003c1, 7A003d, 7A008, 7A103a, 8A001c1, 8A001c2, 8A001d1, 8A001d2, 8A001d3, 8A002c	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	technology for military communications equipment	ML22a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

OIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets	1A007a, 1A007b2, 3A231	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	1A001c, ML10, ML10b, ML10d, ML10f, ML10g, ML11a, ML15d, ML22a, ML5b, PL5017	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	aircraft cannons, components for air launched rockets, components for air-to-air missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft carriers, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for command communications control and intelligence software, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for depth charges, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment	ML10, ML10a, ML10d, ML10f, ML11, ML11a, ML1a, ML21b4, ML22a, ML2a, ML2d, ML4a, ML4b1, ML5a, ML5b, ML5d, ML9a1	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

<p>for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for machine guns, components for military aero-engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval guns, components for naval mines, components for periscopes, components for sensor integration equipment, components for submarines, components for surface launched rockets, components for surface-to-surface missiles, components for targeting equipment, components for torpedoes, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, machine guns, military aero-engines, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval engines, naval guns, technology for air launched rockets, technology for air-launched missiles, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for depth charges, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for machine guns, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military radars, technology for torpedoes, torpedoes</p>				
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OIEL	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	1A001c, ML10, ML10b, ML10d, ML10f, ML10g, ML11a, ML15d, ML22a, ML5b, PL5017	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5E002b, NLR	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a, 5D002c1, 5E002	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5A002a1b1, 5A002a1b2, 5A002a1b3, 5D002a, 5D002c1, 5E002	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	Fibrous/filamentary materials	1C010b	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	towed hydrophone arrays	6A001a2b1, 6A001a2b2	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	towed hydrophone arrays	6A001a2b1, 6A001a2b2	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	7A103a1, 7E101	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OITCL	gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1a, ML1d, ML3a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a, 5D002c1, 5E002a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	6A001a2d	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia



OIEL	components for rifles, components for sporting guns, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1a, ML1b, ML1d, ML2a, ML3a	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	inertial equipment	7A003d, 7A103a1	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a, 5D002c1, 5E002a	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5A002a1b1, 5A002a1b2, 5A002a1b3	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	air guns	ML1a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002c1	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	inertial equipment	7A003a1, 7A103a2	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	pressure transducers, software for semiconductor process equipment, technology for semiconductor process equipment	2B230, 3D002, 3E001	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	software for inertial equipment	7D101	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	software for inertial equipment	7D101	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	biotechnology equipment, components for biotechnology equipment	2B352d1, 2B352d2	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems	1A002b1, 1C202a, 3A201a2, 6A001a2d, 6A003b4c, 8A002a2, 8A002a3, 8A002a4, 8A002c, 8A002f1,	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

		8A002f2, 8A002i2, 8C001			
OIEL	non-military detonators	1A007b4	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	6A001a1a1, 6A001a1d, 6A001b1, 6A001b2, 6A006a2, 7A003a1, 7A003d, 7A103a1, 7A103a2, 8A002i1a, 8A002i1b, 8A002i2	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	accessories for underwater telecommunications systems, components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	1C352a1, 1C352a10, 1C352a11, 1C352a13, 1C352a15, 1C352a16, 1C352a3, 1C352a4, 1C352a5	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	lasers	6A005a6a1, 6A005a6a2, 6A005b6c1b, 6A005b6c1c	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	7A101, 7A102, 7A103a1, 7A103a2, 7A103d	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	6A001a2a2, 6A001a2b7	Russia	05/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	animal pathogens	1C352a1, 1C352a10, 1C352a11, 1C352a13, 1C352a15, 1C352a16, 1C352a3, 1C352a4, 1C352a5	Russia	11/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia
OIEL	equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5A002a1b1, 5A002a1b2, 5A002a1b3, 5B002a, 5B002b, 5D002a, 5E002	Russia	08/09/2014	EU Sanctions imposed on Russia

## Annex B

Application Type Formatted	Countries Outcome	Goods Summary	Total Goods Value
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	CS hand grenades, demolition charges, demolition devices, exploding simulation devices, fire simulation equipment for small arms ammunition, illuminators, military devices for initiating explosives, signal flares, signal hand grenades, smoke ammunition, smoke canisters, smoke generators, smoke hand grenades, stun grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, thunderflashes, training anti-aircraft ammunition, training hand grenades	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	NBC filters, chaff, chaff equipment, command communications control and intelligence equipment, components for chaff equipment, components for command communications control and intelligence equipment, components for corvettes, components for defensive systems against NBC agents, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for fast attack craft, components for frigates, components for heavy machine guns, components for military distress signalling equipment, components for military inflatable craft, components for military navigation equipment, components for naval acoustic equipment, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun mountings, components for naval radars, components for naval sonar equipment, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for surface-to-air missiles, components for surface-to-surface missiles, control equipment for surface-to-air missiles, control equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, defensive systems against NBC agents, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of corvettes, equipment for the use of fast attack craft, equipment for the use of frigates, equipment for the use of naval radars, equipment for the use of surface-to-air missiles, general naval vessel components, handling equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, heavy machine guns, launching equipment for surface-to-air missiles, launching equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, military distress signalling equipment, military inflatable craft, military navigation equipment, naval acoustic equipment, naval communications equipment, naval electrical equipment, naval electronic equipment, naval engines, naval gun mountings, naval radars, naval sonar equipment, semi-automatic pistols, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, test equipment for military communications equipment, test equipment for naval radars, test equipment for surface-to-air missiles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for ejector seats, components for military parachutes, components for military training aircraft, ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military distress signalling equipment, military parachutes, technology for the development of ejector seats, technology for the development of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the development of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the development of military parachutes, technology for the development of military training aircraft, technology for the production of ejector seats, technology for the production of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the production of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the production of military parachutes, technology for the production of military training aircraft, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes, technology for the use of military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military utility helicopters, equipment for the production of military utility helicopters, equipment for the use of military utility helicopters, technology for the development of military utility helicopters, technology for the production of military utility helicopters, technology for the use of military utility helicopters, test equipment for military utility helicopters, unfinished products for military utility helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	software for the use of test equipment for inertial equipment, test equipment for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, military helmets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for gun laying equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, gun laying equipment, military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of gun laying equipment, technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sight mounts, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MN; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed of modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	combination rifle-shotguns, components for combination rifle-shotguns, components for shotguns, components for sporting rifles, shotguns, small arms ammunition, sporting rifles, weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	assault rifles, blank ammunition, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, training small arms ammunition	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	general naval vessel components, technology for general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	fibrous/filamentary materials	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the development of military helicopters, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military parachutes and equipment, signalling devices, software for combat helicopters, software for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, software for equipment for the production of military helicopters, software for military helicopters, technology for combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military helicopters, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military parachutes and equipment, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, unfinished products for combat helicopters, unfinished products for military aero-engines, unfinished products for military helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for small arms ammunition, small arms ammunition	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of artillery, components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of artillery, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	



OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	accessories for underwater telecommunications systems, components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, software for aircraft missile protection systems, technology for aircraft missile protection systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	software for inertial equipment	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of military helicopters, equipment for the development of military support aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, test models for military support aircraft, test models for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for combat aircraft, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military /	ISSUE (Qatar)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling	



Dual Use)		equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, equipment for the use of NBC protective/defensive equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	accessories for military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military transport aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	acoustic seabed survey equipment, guidance/navigation equipment, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for military training equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, military training equipment, software for aerial target equipment, software for military training equipment, technology for aerial target equipment, technology for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military support aircraft, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military radars, equipment for the use of military radars, software for military radars, technology for military radars	
OITCL	ISSUE (Qatar)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	
OITCL	ISSUE (Qatar)	bomb suits, components for bomb suits, military helmets	
OITCL	ISSUE (Qatar)	military helmets	

OITCL	ISSUE (Qatar)	bomb suits, military helmets	
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	civil NBC protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment	19012.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	22.36
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	body armour, components for body armour	121500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography	1900.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	deuterium compounds	2240.48
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5194.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	civil NBC protection equipment	4687.50
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	86147.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	toxins	1425.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography	27319.14
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	military guidance/navigation equipment	6634.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	922.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	329.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	assault rifles (1526), components for assault rifles, components for machine guns, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of grenade launchers, grenade launchers, machine guns (2), technology for assault rifles, technology for machine guns, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sights	3387675.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military combat vehicles	1204.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	anti-armour ammunition, small arms ammunition	2800.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	military airborne equipment	3576.20
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	12700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography	58500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	37.45
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1490.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for machine guns, equipment for the use of machine guns, gun mountings, machine guns (1), technology for machine guns	8041.92
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	submersible equipment	277000.00

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	401.04
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography	30752.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7316.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for machine guns, machine guns (100), technology for machine guns	162100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for machine guns, gun silencers, machine guns (40), technology for weapon cleaning equipment, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sights	118613.70
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	assault rifles (5), grenade launchers, small arms ammunition, training small arms ammunition	116600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	inertial equipment	26852.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	23175.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	2330000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for sporting guns, components for weapon night sights, gun mountings, gun silencers, rangefinding equipment, sporting guns (12), weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	522000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	366.40
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	23444.50
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	cryptographic software	80000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	weapon cleaning equipment	28000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367560.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367560.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367560.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367560.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	366.40
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	civil unmanned air vehicles	150000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7611.45

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography	436900.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367560.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography	1939000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	body armour, civil unmanned air vehicles, components for body armour, components for civil body armour, military helmets, projectile launchers, unmanned air vehicles	419186.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	diver location sonars, software for diver location sonars	301000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	submersible equipment	9353.60
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography	753.52
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment	27383.90
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	130200.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367560.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367560.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography	185955.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for military communications equipment	303370.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for turrets, equipment for the use of weapon sights, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, turrets	1365637.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of artillery, training small calibre artillery ammunition, turrets	405000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	imaging cameras	13000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, weapon night sights	200600.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military radars	958552.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for machine guns, gun silencers, machine guns (35)	53373.52
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	355980.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military radars	338175.00

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	565494.15
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	accelerometers	10000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for turrets	1764.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography, imaging cameras	14559.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1033.20
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	civil NBC protection equipment	3537200.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	civil NBC protection equipment	159000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines	7500000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	425.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	355980.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	355980.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	software for radio jamming equipment, telecommunications jamming equipment	60144.13
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	782.30
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography	331100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	space qualified solar devices	11200.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography	204352.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	body armour, civil unmanned air vehicles, components for body armour, military helmets, projectile launchers, unmanned air vehicles	419186.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military helicopters	470.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of sniper rifles	1000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for combat aircraft	6850.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography	300.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	48540.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography	16000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	271.20

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	flash suppressers, gun mountings, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (4), weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	29539.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	civil NBC protection equipment	9700.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	human pathogens	1200.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	Software for modelling/simulating military operation scenarios	1.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography	207051.72
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	imaging cameras	6000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for combat aircraft	11544.18
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	civil NBC detection systems	123566.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	384.59
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	14852.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas	48568.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10592.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6772.97
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	13269.66
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	57353.37
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	20731.95
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	159232.11
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19002.86
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1194240.80
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6476.99
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	18688.46
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	small arms ammunition	380000.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	direct view imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts	29592.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	civil NBC protection equipment	987500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	sporting guns (3), sporting shotguns (1), weapon sights	165100.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	292.88



SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	348.29
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	signalling devices	6309.90
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	projectile launchers	127000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	26903.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography	207051.72
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	364740.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography	25571.00

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	components for military helicopters	22412.25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	equipment employing cryptography	4500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Qatar)	civil NBC protection equipment	90000.00
SITCL	ISSUE (Qatar)	artillery ammunition	30128.00
SITCL	ISSUE (Qatar)	explosive ordnance disposal equipment	15338.00

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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from the Rt Hon Philip Hammond, MP,  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

*27 January 2015*

Thank you for your letter of 6 January 2015. You asked me about arms exports to Ukraine, specifically:

1. the results of the reassessments against the EU and National Consolidated Criteria of those licences which the Government previously suspended, licence by licence; and
2. the details, licence by licence, of any licences which have been revoked as being inconsistent with the Criteria.

Officials reviewed 20 suspended extant export licences for Ukraine. Following this review, 6 licences for low calibre air weapons and hunting rifles for pest control and sporting and leisure markets were reinstated. Of the remaining 14 licences for large calibre sporting shot guns, sound moderators for hunting rifles and body armour, some of which were for stock rather than a named end user, 9 were revoked as officials assessed the export posed a sufficient risk under Criteria 3 and 7. The remaining 5 were not revoked because they had expired during the period of suspension.

BIS are in contact with the relevant exporters to inform them about the 6 licences that have been reinstated following the review. Of those, extensions have been granted for licences that expired during the suspension, where the business requirement remains.

Current licence applications for Ukraine continue to be assessed on a case by case basis against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. Officials continue to monitor conditions in Ukraine and take account of these in the consideration of Export License applications.

I am copying this reply to the Business Secretary.



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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary  
of State for Business, Innovations and Skills**

*4 February 2015*

**VALIDITY PERIOD FOR OPEN INDIVIDUAL EXPORT LICENCES**

Thank you for your letter dated 19 January 2015 concerning the validity period for Open Individual Export Licences. Generally open licences are valid for five years, however, Dealer to Dealer OIELs and military OIELs to EU destinations are issued for up to three years.

In fact this statement had already been identified for amendment and the correct OIEL validity period is reflected in the latest data report covering Q3 (July – September) 2014. This report has just been released and is available at <https://www.exportcontroldb.bis.gov.uk/sdb/fox>

I trust you find this information helpful.

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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from Tobias Ellwood, MP, Minister of State  
for International Development**

*4 February 2015*

I have pleasure in enclosing the United Kingdom's revised national report to the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. I have also arranged for a copy to be made available in the Library of the House.

This report has been revised in response to consultations with other states and civil society and we believe strikes the right balance between further transparency and protecting our national security interests. It will be presented by the UK delegation at the London P5 Conference on the 5<sup>th</sup> of February and then circulated as an official document at the Review Conference.

I am also sending a copy of the report to Sir Richard Ottaway.

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**Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from Desmond Swayne, MP, Parliamentary  
Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office**

*19 February 2015*

I am writing to update you on progress in DFID's scrutiny of the UK's arms export licencing process, in particular Criterion 8 (C8). My predecessor, the Rt Hon Alan Duncan MP wrote to you on 4th June 2014 indicating that a methodology for strengthening the application of Criterion 8 was to be implemented with immediate effect. In particular, he said that DFID would strengthen its application of Criterion 8 by:

1. Improving the data and indicators used to calculate the C8 thresholds;
2. Focusing our analysis on the least developed countries and those where C8 is most relevant;
3. Ensuring the cumulative value of licences to each country is included in our assessment;
4. Involving DFID country offices more closely in C8 decisions regarding open licences.

DFID has implemented points 1 and 2 since the beginning of August 2014. Points 3 and 4 have been implemented since the beginning of February 2015. This delay was due to technical challenges in calculating the cumulative value and agreeing the point at which DFID should apply extra scrutiny of open licences with other Government departments involved.

My predecessor committed to updating the Committee on the effectiveness of the revised approach after 12 months of implementation. Given the delay in implementation of the two points above, I suggest that DFID provides you with the full update in December 2015.