The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: no doubt-no currency union - Scottish Affairs Committee Contents


Conclusions and recommendations


Currency options

1.  The choice of currency has major economic consequences for the future prosperity of Scotland and its people. The Scottish Government's preferred option of a currency union with the continuing UK would require an agreement to be negotiated between the Governments of a separate Scotland and the continuing UK. This has been categorically ruled out by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and the Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer. A separate Scotland cannot unilaterally impose a shared currency upon the UK and therefore we believe it is essential that the Scottish Government reconsider its position and make public its 'plan B' as a matter of urgency. (Paragraph 43)

2.  Even if we leave aside the fact that a shared currency is not in the interests of the continuing UK it is equally clear that the Scottish Government's case for a currency union owes much more to politics than to economics. A formal currency union would mean that there would be substantial and ongoing restrictions on the Scottish Government's levels of Government borrowing and debt, and that Scotland would not have control over its own monetary policy. This is a very strange aspiration for the Scottish Government, which states that the most important decisions about the Scottish economy should be taken by the people of Scotland. This would clearly not be the case in the event of entering a formal currency union with the continuing UK. (Paragraph 44)

3.  It is clear from the evidence that we have received, that the Scottish Government's proposal to maintain a currency union while undoing the necessary conditions of fiscal, banking and political union which sustain it, masks the fact that separation would be a hugely significant step that would have major adverse consequences for Scotland and its economy. (Paragraph 45)

4.  A separate Scotland could not be prevented from unilaterally adopting sterling. However, sterlingisation would have very serious consequences for Scotland's sophisticated financial services industry, and cannot be presented as being in Scotland's interest. While sterlingisation is therefore not a credible option, it appears to be the Scottish Government's current 'plan B'. We recommend that the Scottish Government should commission and publish work on what sterlingisation would mean in practice. Expert advice, together with the views of the banking and financial services industry, needs to be sought to clarify for Scottish voters the likely impact of any unilateral use of sterling. (Paragraph 51)

5.  In the event of separation, a new Scottish State would not be able to satisfy the conditions for membership of the Euro. However, given that a currency union with the continuing UK has been ruled out, a separate Scotland will have to consider seeking to join the Euro and may be obliged to make a commitment to do so as a condition of EU membership. The Scottish Government should therefore clearly set out how it would deal with this conundrum and indicate how and when the convergence criteria are likely to be met. (Paragraph 57)

6.  Despite the inherent risks involved, a new Scottish currency would give the Scottish Government the maximum economic leverage required to pursue a separate economic policy-the stated aim of separation. The Scottish Government should therefore explain why a separate currency is not its preferred option, and commission and publish new work on how, and at what cost, a separate currency could be created and the implications for Scotland's fiscal policy. (Paragraph 61)

7.  In considering all the advantages and disadvantages of the potential currency options for a separate Scotland, it is clear beyond all doubt that none of the options is as good for Scotland as remaining in the UK, as part of the existing formal currency union as currently configured within the UK state. (Paragraph 63)

Financial services

8.  The creation of an international border between Scotland and the continuing UK would put the success of the financial services industry in Scotland at significant risk. We have already seen evidence that significant Scottish financial services companies are preparing to relocate their headquarters, with the consequent effect on Scottish jobs and the Scottish economy, in the event of separation. It is clear from the evidence of contingency planning being undertaken by major finance companies, that the referendum on separation has created uncertainty in the financial services industry. This uncertainty is now unavoidable. However, the more serious effects which may follow in the event of separation can still be avoided. It is important that voters are fully aware of these potential consequences when making their decision. (Paragraph 78)

9.  We recommend that the Scottish Government responds to HM Treasury's analysis on regulation of financial services in a separate Scotland and outline how it proposes to address the issues identified, notably how in the absence of a currency union a Scottish system of prudential regulation would work. Otherwise, in the event of a vote for separation, there could be very serious consequences as Scottish firms seek the regulatory certainty they understandably want. We also recommend the Scottish Government details how it would ensure a smooth transition period so as to minimise the impact on business and consumers. (Paragraph 90)

10.  The Scottish Government's existing proposals for financial services regulation, and for safeguarding the customers of the financial services industry are unsatisfactory. At present the United Kingdom has a single financial services compensation scheme, which safeguards the savings of Scottish people and those elsewhere in the United Kingdom. This ultimately depends on the resources of the UK taxpayer, and taxpayers' money was used to ensure that the UK Financial Services Compensation Scheme was able to safeguard the savings of all consumers in the recent financial crisis. Given the scale of the Scottish banking sector in relation to the size of Scotland's economy, it is inconceivable that a separate Scotland would be able to offer this degree of security. (Paragraph 94)

  1. The Scottish Government should conduct a full impact assessment of the impact of separation on the consumers of financial services in a separate Scotland and the continuing UK, including a quantification of the costs and benefits arising from separation. (Paragraph 95)



 
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Prepared 21 July 2014