4 The EU regulatory environment for
genetically modified organisms
EU GMO regulation
49. The import, processing and cultivation of genetically
modified organisms (GMOs) in European Union (EU) Member states
is closely regulated. This is achieved through four main pieces
of EU legislation:
· the Contained Use Directive (2009/41/EC),[162]
which lays down measures for the contained use of genetically
modified micro-organisms, for example, in research;
· the Deliberate Release Directive (2001/18/EC),[163]
which outlines the risk assessment required before any release
of GMOs to the environment; and
· two GM food and feed regulations which
set out the traceability and labelling (EC 1830/2003)[164]
and assessment and authorisation (EC 1829/2003)[165]
requirements for marketing of food or feed containing or derived
from GMOs.[166]
Under this legislation, all GMOs must undergo risk
assessment by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) before
they can be imported or grown in the EU. Once EFSA has delivered
its scientific opiniontypically stating whether or not
the assessed GMO is as safe as its conventionally-bred counterpartthe
European Commission formulates a draft decision on how to manage
any potential risks highlighted by EFSA and whether or not to
grant EU-wide permission to import or cultivate that GMO. This
draft authorisation decision is voted on by a Standing Committee
consisting of Member state representatives. In the event that
the required qualified majority[167]
is not achieved, the decision on whether or not to accept the
Commission's proposal is referred to an Appeal Committee, where
a second vote is taken. If the Appeal Committee vote is also indecisive,
the Commission is empowered to make a final authorisation decision.
50. To date, the EU has granted approval for the
import of over 40 genetically modified (GM) food and feed varieties,
including cotton, maize, oilseed rape, sugar beet, yeast and soybean,
which is widely used across Europe as poultry feed.[168]
However, according to the Government, "since 1998 every attempt
to reach an EU decision on [cultivation of] a GM crop has resulted
in an inconclusive vote, with no qualified majority for or against
the proposed authorisation".[169]
As a result, several applications for GMO cultivation have become
'stuck' in the regulatory system for many years while others have
been withdrawn. Only one GM crop is currently authorised for cultivation
in the EU: a variety of insect-resistant Bt maize (see paragraph
11) approved in 1998. This accounts for approximately 30% of Spain's
total maize production (more than 100,000 hectares) and is also
grown in Portugal, the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia.[170]
However, this product counters a pest not problematic in the UK
and is therefore not currently grown in this country.[171]
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
51. The current EU regulatory framework is generally
considered to have been heavily informed by the precautionary
principle. There is no single agreed definition of the precautionary
principle and "considerable debate" as to what it means
and how it can be implemented.[172]
However, a useful definition was offered in 2005 by the UN's World
Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology,
which described it as follows:
When human activities may lead to morally unacceptable
harm that is scientifically plausible but uncertain, actions shall
be taken to avoid or diminish that harm.[173]
The precautionary principle has its roots in environmental
law. It was first formally adopted in the German Clean Air Act
of 1974 and its application was later extended through the 1992
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.[174]
Having informed EU environmental policy for several years, in
2000 the principle was the subject of a European Commission 'Communication',
which outlined the Commission's "approach to using the precautionary
principle" and established "guidelines for applying
it", in an attempt to "avoid unwarranted recourse to
the precautionary principle, as a disguised form of protectionism".[175]
Its role in EU environmental policy was later enshrined in the
2007 Lisbon Treaty.[176]
52. The influence of the precautionary principle
on the EU's regulatory approach to GMOs is reflected in the language
of the current legislation. The Deliberate Release Directive,
2001/18/EC, states that the precautionary principle was "taken
into account" in its drafting and that it must also "be
taken into account" in its implementation, in relation to
both risk assessment and risk management.[177]
The final version of the recent amendment to this Directivediscussed
later in this chaptersimilarly includes a clause requiring
that the precautionary principle "always be taken into account
in the framework" of this Directive "and its subsequent
implementation".[178]
EC 1830/2003, on traceability and labelling, also stipulates that
legislation should "facilitate the implementation of risk
management measures in accordance with the precautionary principle"
and an online summary of legislation, published by the EU's publications
office, explicitly acknowledged that this legislation was adopted
"in accordance with the precautionary principle".[179]
Nevertheless, when questioned on the subject of the principle,
Eric Poudelet, Director of Safety of the Food Chain at the European
Commission, told us repeatedly that the Commission had "never
implemented the precautionary principle for the authorisation
of GMOs".[180]
53. It is clear
to us that an interpretation of the precautionary principle has
significantly influenced the EU's approach to GMO regulation and
we consider the claim, made by a representative of the European
Commission, that the principle has never been implemented for
GMO authorisation to be, at best, disingenuous. If the precautionary
principle is to avoid being used as a political tool, greater
clarity is needed regarding when, and how, it has been used. In
order to avoid future ambiguity, we recommend that the Commission
clearly and publicly state when it has drawn on the precautionary
principle in the policy formation process.
The precautionary principle is discussed further
in chapter 5.
Is the current regulatory system
fit for purpose?
54. According to the Government, the current EU legislative
framework for the cultivation of GMOs, "as written",
could provide for "a pragmatic assessment and authorisation
process".[181]
However:
In practice, the operation of the regime is very
dysfunctional because Member states do not share a common outlook
on this issue. The agreed regime should mean that GM crops are
cleared for planting if they pass the required safety assessment.
In practice, even if a crop has received a favourable EFSA [European
Food Safety Authority] assessment, a significant number of Member
states still object to proposed EU approvals due to their political
views on GM.[182]
This broadly reflects a widely held view. The
National Farmers' Union, for example, similarly described the
current regulatory process as "dysfunctional", claiming
that it was "strongly driven by politics and emotion rather
than sound science", in contradiction of "the EU's stated
policy goals of competitiveness, productivity and delivering a
knowledge-based bioeconomy".[183]
The James Hutton Institute agreed that "political rather
than safety issues" were to the fore in the EU regulatory
process, and that this was "inhibiting adoption of GM technology"
in Europe.[184] This
point was made particularly strongly by industry. Syngenta stated
that the current system's attempt "to integrate science and
politics" created the "ideal opportunity to create delays",
for example through politically-based "claims of 'scientific
uncertainty' which lead to further requests for data resulting
in further delays in approval".[185]
BASF agreed that the EU regulatory system was "frustratingly
slow" and "dysfunctional" and added that it was
"unduly influenced by political lobbyists without a scientific
evidence-based approach".[186]
55. Some of these issues were acknowledged by those
involved in the process itself. Professor Joe Perry, Chair of
EFSA's GMO panel, recognised that Member states tended to vote
"on political grounds, in many cases ignoring the [
]
scientific evidence" provided by EFSA, despite this being
against World Trade Organisation rules.[187]
He added that aspects of the system had been "abused by Member
states for political reasons that have nothing to do with science".[188]
Professor Perry also acknowledged the existence of long procedural
delays, although he attributed these to "political inertia
once the EFSA opinion has been received" by the European
Commission, rather than to flaws in the risk assessment process
itself.[189] Mr Poudelet
also appeared to recognise the system's weaknesses; however, like
the Government, he saw "no problem in the legislative framework"
and stated that "the problems" with the system came
through "the process of adoption, where member states have
to vote with the qualified majority system".[190]
Mr Poudelet admitted that the Commission was "guilty"
of failing to meet its statutory duty to adopt a draft decision
within three months of receiving EFSA's opinion, but stated that
this was a deliberate move to give it time to "find a solution
that commands the widest possible support from member states"
before forcing a vote.[191]
56. Although there was widespread agreement about
the inefficiency of the current regulatory system, not everyone
agreed that the politicisation of the decision-making process
facilitated by the European Commission made it dysfunctional.
The Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment (ACRE) drew
a distinction between risk assessment, as performed by EFSA, which
"should be based on objective scientific principals",
and subsequent decision-making about risk management, which might
be rightly "expected" to be "influenced by non-scientific
and often political considerations".[192]
This distinction was also highlighted by Mr Poudelet, who stated
that, as risk manager, the European Commission had to "take
into account other legitimate [non-scientific] factors, which
EFSA does not" "you call that politics".[193]
He continued:
For me, politics are not negative; they are the
way politiciansyou are politiciansdrive the rules
and lives of our citizens. We do not see politics as a negative
input. We see politics as a way that the regulation of particular
innovative products like GMOs could be accepted by our citizens.[194]
Mr Poudelet stated that "today, in most member
statesmaybe not the UKGMOs are not really accepted
for food".[195]
He therefore saw the EU's failure to authorise GMOs for cultivation
as a legitimate reflection of this position. In contrast, the
Government characterised the EU regime as "dysfunctional"
and argued that it imposed a "significant opportunity cost"
on the UK: a country in which "most people [
] are open-minded
or don't feel strongly about GM crops".[196]
Only eight cultivation applications now remain in the EU regulatory
system while, in contrast, nearly 100 genetically modified crops
have been approved for use in the US.[197]
According to Professor Rosemary Hails, Chair of the Advisory Committee
on Releases to the Environment, one of these applications has
"been there since 1996, I think", and "12 applications
have been withdrawn" because "those who submitted them
have now given up".[198]
Professor Sir David Baulcombe, University of Cambridge, stated
that, under the current system, "the opportunity for any
individual member state to take advantage of GM is being blocked
by the political agenda of other member states" and added
that "the decisions by Monsanto and BASF to reduce crop biotechnology
investment in Europe were a direct consequence" of the regulatory
regime.[199] BASF confirmed
that its decision to "halt development of GM crops for the
European market was to a large extent the result of the slow and
unpredictable nature of a European regulatory system" and
Syngenta stated that, because of the current "political impasse",
it considered "the possibility to translate agricultural
GM research into commercial products in the EU" to be "essentially
zero".[200] A
further "perverse political outcome" of the current
system, according to Professor Joyce Tait, Innogen Institute,
was that "the more onerous you make the regulatory system,
the more difficult it is for small companies to get through that
to the market", reinforcing the oligopolistic tendency that
underlies some people's concerns about the genetic modification.[201]
57. Several witnesses stated that the EU regime had
also damaged the UK research environment. The Government indicated
that "employment in the UK crop biotechnology industry sector
fell significantly" between 1996 and 2006 and highlighted
that, between 2005 and 2009, there were over 4000 trials of genetically
modified crops in the US, compared with just three in the UK.[202]
It estimated that if UK crop biotechnology research had progressed
in the way that is had done in the US, "there could have
been nearly 900 additional science jobs created, with an estimated
annual additional income (salaries) generated of £57 to £77
million".[203]
Professor Guy Poppy, Chief Scientific Adviser to the Food Standards
Agency, told us that regulatory issues were "having consequences
in terms of the willingness of industry and, to some extent, the
scientists in universities and research institutes to pursue work
in this area".[204]
The Agricultural Biotechnology Council agreed that current regulations
had "resulted in companies and scientists naturally focusing
investments and time in areas of the world with more predictable
and workable approval systems".[205]
It continued:
A recent Phillips McDougall report suggests that
30 years ago, nearly one third of the $6.5 billion that the major
agrochemical and seed companies invested in R&D was focussed
on products for the European market. Today, that figure is less
than 8%, with EU agriculture only benefiting from products that
are also relevant to other markets, a testament to the collapse
in confidence in the European regulatory system for pesticides,
seeds and traits.[206]
58. During the drafting of this report, the EU amended
the regulations with regard to GM crops. In essence, the changes
recognise the delays inherent in the system and there is now provision
for countries that do not wish for GM crops to be grown in their
countries to ban the growth of any crops approved on an EU wide
basis.
59. A regulatory
system under which it takes many yearssometimes decadesto
reach a decision cannot possibly be considered fit for purpose.
Evidence clearly shows that the current EU regulatory regime for
GMOs is not working, and has not worked for some time. We await
signs of whether the recent changes will significantly change
the outcome for companies seeking approval to grow GM crops in
Europe.
Issues of regulatory design
60. The operational problems underlying the current
stalemate in the EU stem from three fundamental issues of regulatory
design.
1. REGULATORY TRIGGER
61. The current EU regulatory system for novel crop
plants is technology-specific; genetically modified crops are
regulated because of the method by which they were created rather
than because of the traits that they display. Several influential
UK and European bodiesincluding the European Academies
Science Advisory Council (EASAC),[207]
the Prime Minister's Council for Science and Technology,[208]
the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC)[209]
and the Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment (ACRE)[210]have
advocated a move to a trait-based regulatory system, as is currently
operated in Canada (see box 4). They have made this recommendation
on the basis of two professed flaws of the current process-based
system:
i) lack of evidence to support the underlying
premise that genetically modified crops present higher risk than
their conventionally bred counterparts; and
ii) the failure of process-based regulation to
cope with advances in technology.Box 4: The
Canadian regulatory system for plants with novel traits
In Canada, genetically modified and conventionally bred plants are all regulated under the same 'trait-based' system. Under this system, crops are subject to full risk assessment and regulation only if they are defined as being a 'plant with a novel trait' (a 'PNT'). In order to be classified as a PNT, a plant must display a characteristic not seen in any previously approved product. However, the system does not distinguish between technologies: a PNT may be produced by conventional breeding, mutagenesis, genetic modification or any other technique, and not all genetically modified plants will necessarily be defined as PNTs.[211]
According to the European Academies Science Advisory Council, "this approach acknowledges the fact that it is the product, and not the process, that warrants regulation because it is the presence of novel traits in a plant that potentially pose an environmental or health risk, and not how the traits were specifically introduced".[212] It added that "a key strength of the Canadian regulatory system is that while the techniques used by plant breeders continue to evolve, the regulatory trigger for PNTs will remain current and consistent".[213]
Canada is the fourth-largest global producer of genetically modified crops and has so far approved over 120 GM crop/trait combinations through this system.[214]
|
The relative safety of genetically modified and conventionally
bred crops
62. Professor Sir David Baulcombe, University of
Cambridge, explained that the EU regulatory system was initially
based on process rather than trait in order to accommodate particular
"concerns about hazards associated with GM" which arose
when the regulation was first developed in 1990.[215]
According to Professor Baulcombe, at this time "little was
known about plant genomes and the mechanisms of GM" and "there
were features of the GM plants that were either surprising or
difficult to monitor".[216]
However, he argued, "in 2014, the situation has changed"
and we can now "be confident" that "the risk associated
with GM crops is negligible".[217]
The Society of Biology agreed and pointed out that:
Worldwide, over 175 million hectares are dedicated
to GM crop cultivation, accounting for 12 percent of arable land,
and no inherent risks have so far been identified to human or
animal health from this consumption or to the environment from
their cultivation.[218]
63. The conclusion that genetically modified crops
pose no greater risk than their conventionally bred counterparts
is supported by what the Science Council referred to as an "increasingly
strong international body of scientific research which says that
GM crops are safe for human and animal consumption".[219]
A 2010 European Commission report, looking back on 130 EU-funded
research projects, concluded that GMOs were not inherently any
more risky than conventionally bred crops and EASAC, "the
collective voice of European science", stated in 2013 that
"the scientific literature shows no compelling evidence"
linking genetically modified crops "with risks to the environment
or with safety hazards for food and animal feed greater than might
be expected from conventionally bred varieties of the same crop".[220]
According to the Royal Society, "no evidence exists that
GM methods, as defined in current legislation, are intrinsically
more dangerous than other less regulated approaches".[221]
This conclusion has been strongly echoed by voices operating within
the EU establishment. Professor Anne Glover, former Chief Scientific
Adviser to the President of the European Commission, has stated
publicly her confidence "in saying that there is no more
risk in eating GMO food than eating conventionally farmed food".[222]
Professor Joe Perry, European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), also
stressed his confidence in saying that those GMOs that had received
a positive opinion from EFSA were "as safe as their conventional
counterparts".[223]
In light of such statements, Dr Paul Burrows, BBSRC, judged that
"the scientific consensus" on this matter appeared "quite
sound".[224] Nevertheless,
Dr Doug Parr, Greenpeace UK, stated that there was "plenty
of scientific opinion out there that takes a different view",
citing a recent statement issued by the European Network of Scientists
for Social and Environmental Responsibility, signed by 297 scientists,
which contends that there is "no scientific consensus on
GMO safety".[225]
Peter Melchett, Soil Association, acknowledged that "the
majority of scientists think it [GM] is safe" but highlighted
"a relatively small amount of peer-reviewed, published science
on long-term health effects of GM food" which he suggested
offered "grounds for concern".[226]
64. In setting out their inherent concerns about
the safety of genetic modification, several witnesses portrayed
gene insertion as a random process with potentially unexpected
effects. Mr Melchett, for example, characterised genetic engineering
as "disruption of the genome, with unknown consequences"
and made a link between this and the "inherent uncertainty"
of the technology.[227]
Dr Parr similarly portrayed the insertion process as a source
of inherent risk and stated that this produced "unpredictable
outcomes" that could "potentially lead to unpredictable
effects when released into the environment".[228]
GM Freeze agreed that gene insertion could produce "potentially
dangerous effects".[229]
65. However, these arguments were rejected by other
expert witnesses. Professor Baulcombe explained that "gene
silencing", one of the "unpredictable outcomes"
suggested by Dr Parr, was "now well understood as an avoidable
complication" of first generation transgenic techniques.[230]
"Additionally", he explained, "with advances in
DNA sequencing technology, the second level of uncertainty is
eliminated because it is now relatively easy to characterize the
complete genome sequence and the transgene insertion sites in
the recipient genome".[231]
Professor Ottoline Leyser, Royal Society, stated that gene insertion
happened regularly in nature and highlighted that not all genetic
crop improvement techniques involved introducing genes from outside
the normal gene pool.[232]
According to Professor Leyser:
The idea that [genetic modification] is inherently
more risky compared with what we now know about all the conventional
approaches that we use is not tenable based on the current science.
I am not saying that it is risk free, but nor is conventional
breeding.[233]
66. Aside from the "inherent" risk posed
by the process of genetic modification, Liz O'Neill, GM Freeze,
highlighted her organisation's concern about a number of specific
consequences.[234]
She stated, for example, that "in north and south America,
where a large amount of GM is grown, we have seen a huge growth
in pesticide-resistant weeds, a massive decline in the monarch
butterfly, and a large number of serious contamination incidents".[235]
In response to Ms O'Neill, Professor Leyser stated that "all
the things that you mentioned, absolutely all of them" were
not to do with the technology itself, but "the trait that
has been introduced".[236]
She explained:
If one takes herbicide tolerance, for example,
and all the issues about weed resistance and so on and so forth,
there are non-GM, single gene, herbicide-tolerant crops out there.
[
] They have exactly the same, or possibly slightly worse,
issues associated with them. This is exactly the point. If one
is concerned about particular environmental issues, such as the
spread of herbicide tolerance, campaigning against GM is the wrong
way to go, because it is not caused by GM. It is caused by herbicide
resistance. If your concerns are those environmental issues, you
should be campaigning against herbicide resistance, however it
is introduced.[237]
The Royal Society explained that process-based regulation
inevitably resulted in these types of "inconsistencies",
because the same phenotypic trait, for example herbicide resistance,
"may fall in or out of the scope of the regulations [
]
simply because of the way it was introduced".[238]
As a consequence, according to Professor Leyser, conventionally-bred
herbicide-tolerant crops undergo "no scrutiny whatsoever
before they are put in the field", despite them producing
the same type of potentially harmful effects as those listed by
Ms O'Neill.[239]
67. Given the balance of evidence, the Science Council
stated that the Government needed "to display confidence
in the scientific consensus around the safety of GM foods".[240]
We saw limited evidence of this happening. In its evidence to
us, the Government made clear its support for genetic crop improvement
but stopped short of explicitly acknowledging that crops produced
via these technologies posed no greater risk than conventionally
bred crops. There is no statement to this end on the relevant
policy pages on GOV.UK and it has not been a feature of recent
speeches on the topic, such as that made by the Secretary of State
in January 2015.[241]
The Minister did acknowledge to us that the EU risk assessment
process was "more than robust enough to ensure that authorised
GM products will be as safe as their non-GM counterparts",
but made no more generalised comment about the scientific consensus
that genetically modified crops pose no inherent risk.[242]
68. The current
EU legislative framework for novel plants is founded on the premise
that genetically modified plants pose inherently greater risk
than their conventional counterparts. The weight of peer-reviewed
scientific evidence, collected over many years, has shown this
to be unjustified. Where genetically modified crops have been
shown to pose a risk, this has invariably been a result of the
trait displayedfor example, herbicide tolerancerather
than the technology itself. We are disappointed that the Government
has not more publicly argued this fact. We
recommend that the Government publicly acknowledge that genetically
modified crops pose no greater inherent risk than their conventional
counterparts. A statement recognising this fact should be included
in the Government's response to this report and relevant areas
of GOV.UK should be updated to reflect this.
New techniques for genetic crop improvement
69. Current EU legislation defines a GMO as "an
organism, with the exception of human beings,[243]
in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does
not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination".[244]
As a result of its focus on process rather than trait, a list
of particular techniques considered to meet this definition are
specifically included in the legislation (for example, the typical
first generation process of transgenic insertion) while others
are expressly excluded (for example, in vitro fertilisation and
the induction of polyploidy,[245]
a technique commonly used in plant breeding). In a 2013 report
on new plant breeding techniques, the Advisory Committee on Releases
to the Environment (ACRE) stated that it had been experiencing
an increased number of enquiries "as to whether organisms
produced by certain techniques are captured by the EU's GMO legislation".[246]
Professor Rosemary Hails, Chair of ACRE, stated that this was
leading to "a necessary but nonsensical debate" about
whether particular new methods should be considered 'GM'.[247]
In recognition of this issue, the Biotechnology and Biological
Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) recently issued a position statement
on new techniques for genetic crop improvement. This stated that
"novel genetic techniques" were "advancing rapidly"
and that "the boundaries between established GM and non-GM
techniques" would, in the future, "become increasingly
blurred", placing "even more emphasis on the advantages
of a trait-based [regulatory] system".[248]
It concluded that "a regulatory system based on the characteristics
of a novel crop, by whatever method it has been produced, would
provide more effective and robust regulation than current EU processes".[249]
Professor Joe Perry, European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), stated
that current EU legislation was "less and less apt"
to deal with emerging genetic crop modification techniques and
that the Commission was aware of this problem.[250]
The Commission also acknowledged this, but was not able to tell
us how it intended to resolve this issue or when a solution was
likely to be found.[251]
70. The EU's
process-based regulatory system for novel crops is increasingly
proving itself to be incapable of dealing with advances in technology.
This raises the prospect that potentially important agricultural
innovations will be hindered, or even halted, by inappropriate
regulation, while potentially harmful crops may escape appropriate
control if they are produced using techniques not captured by
GMO regulations.
71. We consider
the current process-based EU legislative framework for GMOs to
be fundamentally flawed and unfit for purpose.
Government policy on process- versus trait-based
regulation
72. George Freeman MP, Minister for Life Sciences,
expressed concern at what appeared to be "a dangerous trend
towards regulating by process rather than product" and stated
that his "strong preference" was "that we regulate
by product".[252]
However, Lord de Mauley stated that if a move was to be made towards
trait-based novel crop regulation, there was "a very real
possibility of ending up with the unsatisfactory GM regime simply
being applied more generally to any novel crop".[253]
He stated that the Government therefore needed to "tread
very carefully with this idea" and explained that its "immediate
focus" was "on trying to improve the existing GM regime".[254]
Professor Guy Poppy, Chief Scientific Adviser to the Food Standards
Agency, also pointed out that while trait-based regulation might
represent an improvement to the current framework, "if the
member states, through block vote, decide to vote against"
genetically modified products for political reasons, "you
will end up in exactly the same situation".[255]
73. We acknowledge
that there is a need to "tread carefully" with regard
to trait-based regulation and recognise that a change in UK policy
on this issue is unlikely to pay immediate dividends. However,
we consider it likely that a move to trait-based regulation at
EU-level will eventually be forced by technological progress and
suggest that the Government would be wise to prepare for such
a change. We recommend that the Government
formally adopt a move to trait-based novel plant regulation as
a long-term policy goal and begin to develop its preferred framework
for such a system so that this can inform EU discussions. The
Government should provide our successor committee with an update
on this work by the end of 2015.
74. In the meantime, we urge the European Commission
to take a pragmatic and evidence-based approach to its development
of policy regarding emerging techniques for genetic crop improvement.
We remind it that such techniques are likely to be vital to ensuring
future global food security and that inappropriate regulation
may have significant negative consequences for both the UK and
the EU as a whole.
2. CONSIDERATION OF RISKS AND POTENTIAL
BENEFITS
75. We have seen strong evidence that the use of
first generation genetically modified crops can deliver significant
benefits, both to farmers and to the environment (see paragraph
13).[256] However,
as many witnesses pointed out, while risks are comprehensively
assessed under the EU regulatory system, potential benefits are
not currently accounted for, leading to what the John Innes Centre
called "a very one-sided decision making process".[257]
The Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment (ACRE) described
this as a "fundamental problem with the current regulatory
framework" and several witnesses agreed that "a more
explicit risk/ benefit analysis, taking compensatory measures
into account, would allow decision-makers to take more informed
decisions".[258]
76. Professor Joe Perry, European Food Safety Authority
(EFSA), confirmed that, at present, EFSA could not, "according
to the legislation covering regulation of GMOs [
] consider
benefits, only adverse effects".[259]
Consideration of both the benefits of action, and the risks of
inaction, is a widely accepted principle of good risk management[260]
and Professor Perry explained that "the risk managers",
the European Commission and the member states, were "meant
to do a detailed analysis of benefit".[261]
However, he continued, whether due to "lack of resources
or expertise", "quite clearly this is not being done".[262]
As a consequence, he said, "potential benefits such as the
possible reduction in carbon emissions associated with reduced
tillage in herbicide-tolerant systems, are not formally assessed
at any point in the regulatory system".[263]
Eric Poudelet, European Commission, agreed that it was the Commission's
role, as risk manager, to introduce "other legitimate factors"
for consideration following scientific risk assessment, and stated
that the Commission had "established an organisation"
with this in mind.[264]
He described this as:
a bureau of cost benefit where 18 member states
have been asked to deliver expertise. They will issue a report,
probably next year, about the cost of cultivation in particular,
and whether the cultivation of GM in Europe brings some benefit
for the farmer, the environment and citizens.[265]
The body to which Mr Poudelet refers is the European
GMO Socio-Economics Bureau (ESEB), a technical working group of
the European Commission's Joint Research Centre. ESEB's objective
is to:
define methodological tools to investigate the
crop/trait or product-specific ex-ante and ex-post socio-economic
implications, on users and non-users of GMOs, of the cultivation
and processing of GMOs along the seed-to-shelves chain in Europe.[266]
ESEB is currently only considering one productgenetically
modified insect-resistant ('Bt') maizeand it is not clear
whether or not it will include within its scope the potential
environmental benefits offered by GMOs. A "final reference
document" on Bt maize is due for publication in December
2015.[267]
77. Good risk
management requires the potential benefits of an action to be
thoroughly considered alongside the risks. It also requires a
consideration of the risk of failing to act. Current GMO legislation
fails to adequately recognise this point and the European Commission,
as risk manager, has proved itself incapable of taking (or unwilling
to take) these factors into account on a discretionary basis.
This has led to a one-sided decision-making process and has sent
a misleading message to the public about the potential value of
these products, to the economy, society and the environment. We
urge the Commission to give greater recognition to the full array
of potential social, economic and environmental benefits offered
by GMOs and the potential consequences of failing to adopt these
products during EU risk assessment and risk management processes.
3. NATIONAL VERSUS COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING
78. European GMO regulation is currently prescribed
through a series of EU Directives (see paragraph 47). The Science
Council noted that while such instruments could be effective in
harmonising response across member states, they "do little
to recognise individual member states' scientific and political
cultures, and public attitudes to the adoption and application
of new science and technologies".[268]
Evidence suggests that these attitudes vary widely across the
EU, particularly in relation to agricultural biotechnology. A
2010 Eurobarometer survey found that, in general, Europeans did
"not see benefits" of genetically modified foods and
were "not in favour" of their development.[269]
However, it noted that EU citizens were "divided in their
optimism about biotechnology and genetic engineering" and
that UK citizens were markedly more enthusiastic about the field
than those from other member states.[270]
According to the Government, "the available evidence suggests
that most people in the UK are open-minded or don't feel strongly
about GM crops".[271]
Sense about Science highlighted the British public's greater appreciation
of "public sector research" and the potential "non-commercial
benefits" offered by GMOs compared to that of other member
states, and stated that while discussion about genetic crop improvement
in the UK was "now relatively balanced and evidence-related",
this discussion had "not progressed in the same way [
]
at European level".[272]
Professor Brian Wynne, University of Lancaster, downplayed these
differences, stating that his own research had indicated a high
degree of convergence in public attitudes across the UK, Spain,
Italy, Germany and France with regard to "the factors lying
behind opinions and attitudes".[273]
However, he acknowledged that this was not necessarily reflected
in the widely differing positions of these countries' respective
governments.[274]
79. Several witnesses pointed out that these differences
of political opinion had led to issues in the operation of the
centralised regulatory process, both at the risk assessment and
risk management stages. The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA),
the organisation responsible for GMO risk assessment, is "an
independent European agency" intended to operate "separately
from the European Commission, European Parliament and EU Member
states".[275]
However, some witnesses considered its work in this area to have
become increasingly influenced by EU politics. The Agricultural
Biotechnology Council stated that there were "increasing
concerns over a proliferation of new regulatory requirements which
are a political response to anti-GM campaigns without any scientific
basis addressing legitimate safety concerns".[276]
It cited the example of compulsory 90-day rodent feeding studies,
which were recently made a mandatory requirement through Regulation
503/2013.[277] Professor
Perry, EFSA, agreed that these studies were made compulsory "for
political reasons", despite his panel's "repeated advice"
that there was "no good scientific reason to do so".[278]
According to Food Standards Agency, "the Regulation was not
supported by the UK and a number of other Member states who saw
it as an unjustified increase in animal testing, contrary to agreed
policies on reducing animal experimentation".[279]
However, "the majority of Member states voted in favour of
the Regulation and it subsequently came into effect in June 2013".[280]
80. Several witnesses argued that exaggerated claims
of 'scientific uncertainty' had also been used as a political
tool, both during risk assessment and risk management. Professor
Perry stated that "those with an agenda against GMOs"
frequently attempted to "overemphasise uncertainty for their
own ends", particularly through the misuse of safeguard clauses,
which he stated were often used as "a purely political ploy,
containing no scientific content of any merit".[281]
Syngenta agreed that "political opposition to GM products"
had given rise to unjustified "claims of 'scientific uncertainty'"
and offered several examples in which this tactic had been effective
in delaying or preventing authorisation (see, for example, box
5).[282] Professor
Joyce Tait, Innogen Institute, indicated that this was to be expected,
as it was "part of the political process" for those
who opposed a technology on ideological grounds to "seek
to maximise the level of uncertainty in order to make a political
case".[283] She
contrasted this with the scientific process, which "seeks
to minimise the uncertainty by doing more experiments", and
argued that these two processes should therefore, as far as possible,
be kept separate.[284]Box
5: Maize 1507
Maize 1507 is a herbicide- and insect-resistant crop developed by DuPont-Pioneer. It was first submitted to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) for risk assessment in 2000 and, following "substantial delay" due to a change in GMO legislation and requests for additional data, received its first positive safety opinion from EFSA in early 2005.[285]
In response to concerns raised during a technical meeting between the European Commission, member states, EFSA and DuPont-Pioneer, in July 2006 the Commission asked EFSA to deliver a further scientific opinion. Over the following years, maize 1507 was assessed and re-assessed multiple times, eventually receiving a total of seven positive EFSA opinions.[286] The European Commission is legally obliged to prepare a draft authorisation opinion within three months of receiving an opinion from EFSA; however, it continually failed to do so and, as a result, in 2010 DuPont-Pioneer launched a legal action against the Commission. This was successful and in a September 2013 ruling, the European Court of Justice found that the Commission had "failed to fulfil its obligations" under the relevant legislation "by failing to submit to the Council" a draft authorisation decision on maize 1507.[287]
In November 2013, thirteen years after the product first entered the regulatory process, the European Commission passed a draft opinion on maize 1507. This recommended that the product be authorised for cultivation. However, in February 2014 the European Parliament approved a Resolution calling on the Council of the European Union to "reject the Commission proposal" on the basis that "the long-term effects of GMO cultivation and the effects on non-target organisms have, thus far, not been adequately taken into account in the risk assessment framework".[288] It further called on the Commission "not to propose to authorise any new GMO variety and not to renew old ones until the risk assessment methods have been significantly improved".[289] A final authorisation decision on maize 1507 remains outstanding.
|
81. While Professor Tait saw a need to maintain a
distinction between the scientific and political aspects of risk
governance, she, and several other witnesses, acknowledged that
both processes relied on subjective, value-based judgements as
well as objective evidence.[290]
According to Professor Andy Stirling, University of Sussex, "in
order to interpret a risk assessment", for example, "even
if we assume it is complete, you still have to know what level
of safety you are going to require. That is a value judgment".[291]
The notion of 'harm' is also a value-based concept central to
the process of scientific risk assessment. The Advisory Committee
on Releases to the Environment (ACRE) highlighted that environmental
harm was not defined in current GMO legislation and argued that
this had led to risk assessments becoming generalised "data
gathering exercises" rather than focused tests of plausible
risk hypotheses.[292]
Professor C J Pollock, ex-Chair of ACRE, argued that, in the absence
of any "formal definition of harm", "impact"
was increasingly being used as a substitute"not a
sensible way to proceed", in his view, as "all agricultural
systems impact on the receiving environment".[293]
Professor Perry, EFSA, disputed this claim, stating that change
was "not equivalent to harm" and was not treated as
such by EFSA.[294]
However, he acknowledged that it was often difficult to establish
what level of change was likely to lead to biologically relevant
effects and suggested that deciding where this line should be
drawn was "probably the responsibility of the risk manager"
rather than the risk assessor.[295]
82. Value-based considerations are also key to risk
management. Professor Paul Nightingale, University of Sussex,
explained that while scientific experiments such as those considered
during risk assessment could "provide convincing evidence
that something causes harm", they could never "fully
establish [that] something is safe", so "what counts
as safe is the result of a negotiated and often contested process".[296]
Professor Nightingale argued that "uncertainty about safety"
provided "a legal route to address non-health concerns"
which were "difficult to articulate" elsewhere in the
regulatory process and therefore saw the "high regulatory
standards" that GMOs were required to meet as "a reflection
of the operation of democracy, not a failing of science".[297]
However, Professor Sir Mark Walport, the Government Chief Scientific
Adviser, stated that there was a need for society to "be
a bit more honest about when we are talking about science and
when we are talking about values".[298]
He continued:
The broader European point is that, inevitably,
values about individual innovations vary between nation states.
The question is: should the values of one group of countries trump
the values of another? That brings us to the principle of subsidiarity
on GM, which I hope we are moving to, where GM foods can be regulated
at European level but individual countries can choose to opt out
of growing them.[299]
The Minister stated that the Government "strongly
support[ed]" decisions about whether or not to cultivate
EU-approved GM crops being taken "at member state level".[300]
83. The principle of subsidiarity is defined in Article
5 of the Lisbon Treaty. This states that:
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas
which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall
act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at
central level or at regional and local level, but can rather,
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved at Union level.[301]
According to a lay summary published by the EU, the
principle of subsidiarity "ensures that decisions are taken
as closely as possible to the citizen and that constant checks
are made to verify that action at Union level is justified in
light of the possibilities available at national, regional or
local level".[302]
It requires that "the Union does not take action [
]
unless it is more effective than action taken at national, regional
or local level".[303]
84. Science
and politics each have a role to play in both risk assessment
and risk management. However, while risk management is rightly
a politically-led process, risk assessment must be led by science
if it is to effectively contribute to evidence-based policy-making.
This distinction has not been sufficiently observed in the EU's
regulation of GMOs.
85. In attempting
to centralise decision-making about risk management, the current
EU regulatory system limits the ability of member states to take
local political factors into account. The result is undue politicisation
of the risk assessment process. Those opposed to genetic modification
seek to exaggerate scientific uncertainty in order to block or
delay authorisation. This, in turn, leads to stalemate at the
voting stage, where strongly conflicting political positions inevitably
prevent agreement from being reached. To resolve this, decision-making
about risk management, including the decision whether or not to
cultivate an authorised GMO, must be repatriated to member states.
We consider the current EU regime to be
at variance with the principle of subsidiarity. We remind the
Council, the Commission and the Parliament of their responsibility
to observe this principle.
Recent developments
86. In October 2014, Vytenis Andriukaitis, the new
Commissioner to the European Commission's Directorate General
for Health and Consumers ('DG Sanco'), stated that he would "review
the legislation applicable to the authorisation of genetically
modified organisms" within "the first six months"
of his tenure.[304]
This followed an earlier pledge by the new President of the European
Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, to "make sure that the procedural
rules governing the various authorisations for GMOs are reviewed".[305]
In apparent reference to a February 2014 request by the European
Parliament for the Commission "not to propose to authorise
any new GMO variety and not to renew old ones until the risk assessment
methods have been significantly improved",[306]
he continued:
I would not want the Commission to be able to
take a decision [on GMO authorisation] when a majority of Member
states has not encouraged it to do so.[307]
Eric Poudelet, Director, Safety of the Food Chain
at DG Sanco, confirmed to us that Mr Juncker intended to
"review the [GMO] decision-making process, to avoid taking
decisions that are against a clear majority of member states"
and that the Commission would prepare a proposal to this end by
April 2015.[308]
87. In addition to these planned changes to the decision-making
process, an amendment to the Deliberate Release Directive, passed
by the European Parliament in January 2015, is due to come into
effect this spring.[309]
As initially drafted by the Commission in 2010, this proposal
acknowledged that GMO cultivation was "an issue with a strong
local/regional dimension" and granted member states greater
power to make decisions at a national level.[310]
However, some of these powers were rescinded in later drafts and
while the final version allows member states to prohibit cultivation
of authorised GMOs on non-scientific grounds, it provides no assurance
that authorisation will be granted to those crops that have received
a positive safety opinion.[311]
In the words of the Minister: "There is discretion to member
states to stop the process. There is not the discretion to individual
member states to proceed".[312]
88. Eric Poudelet, European Commission, acknowledged
that the final text of this amendment "substantially modifies
the proposal we made in 2011", but appeared to remain optimistic
about its potential impact.[313]
He explained that because those Member states opposed to GMO cultivation
would now have confidence that they could prohibit cultivation
in their own territories, "we expect that they will not abstain
or that they will give a favourable vote when we present the [authorisation]
decision to be voted on".[314]
Others, however, were less confident. Dr Julian Little, Agricultural
Biotechnology Council, stated that he "really doubt[ed]"
that this legislation would "allow UK farmers to access GM"
and expressed concern that:
this is going to be more a licence to ban than
a licence to operate. Our concern is that it will give cover for
countries that want to ban the use of these products, but very
little for countries that want to move forward.[315]
Dr Mike Bushell, Principal Scientific Adviser at
Syngenta, praised the Government's "leadership" in supporting
this amendment but stated that there was "uncertainty"
about its "ability to unblock the regulatory process".[316]
He added that the change "rather risks damaging the principles
of a single market and bringing in all sorts of intra-common market
trade issues".[317]
89. The Government initially described the amendment
to us as a "breakthrough" which could "unblock
the EU system" by allowing "more national self-determination".[318]
However, the Minister later stated that he was "disappointed"
with the eventual outcome of negotiations and was concerned that
it would "stifle our ability to benefit from GM technology".[319]
He explained:
It will mean that decisions on whether or not
to cultivate EU-approved GM crops can now be taken at member state
level. That is something we strongly support, and so it should
undo the logjam in EU approvals and allow applications to be authorised
quicker than hitherto. Our concern is that we still need GM crops
to be authorised at EU level before they can be grown here, and
because the proposal will allow other member states to implement
GM bans not based on scientific evidence it may deter companies
from making applications for EU approval.[320]
The Minister acknowledged that the final position
was "not what the UK would ideally have liked" but stated
that the Government must move on and "consider what we do
now".[321] He
stated that there were "several strands" to this, including
continuing to "engage strongly with the three pillars of
the EU institution", "pressing for the outstanding applications
for EU approval to be authorised as soon as possible" and
speaking to the agricultural biotechnology industry "to gauge
its view on the prospects for GM developments in the UK and EU"
in light of the amendment.[322]
90. The hard
won amendment to the Deliberate Release Directive is intended
to ease problems with the operation of the regulatory system by
ceding more power to Member states. However, it does nothing to
resolve underlying weaknesses in the regulations or to prevent
those hostile to GMOs from voting against authorisation in order
to maintain the current EU-wide 'ban' on GMO cultivation. It may
also do little to attract the agricultural biotechnology industry
back to Europe. We commend those Governments that have provided
leadership in attempting to secure more fundamental legislative
change but share their view that the agreed amendment is far from
satisfactory.
91. In our view,
decisions about access to and use of safe products should be made
by national governments on behalf of the populations that elected
them, not by the EU. The most significant flaw in the current
EU regulatory system for GMOs is its continued failure to enable
Member states to make such decisions without prejudice. We
remind those in the EU who are opposed to GMO cultivation that
the purpose of shared regulation should be to ensure mutual protection
from unsafe products, not to unjustifiably restrict the choices
available to other elected governments and the citizens whom they
represent. We encourage all member states to vote in favour of
authorising those products that have been deemed safe by the European
Food Safety Authority so that national governments can make their
own decisions about how best to act in their electorate's interests.
92. We also encourage the new President of the
European Commission, Mr Jean-Claude Juncker, and the new Health
and Consumers Commissioner, Mr Vytenis Andriukaitis, to bear this
point in mind in their planned review of the procedural rules
governing GMO authorisation.
Conclusion: the need for regulatory
reform
93. This chapter has explored several significant
flaws in the design and operation of the current EU regulatory
process for genetically modified organisms (GMOs). These have
long been recognised by the Government and it has made laudable
efforts to try and resolve them, primarily by "trying to
improve the current system" through small, incremental changes.[323]
The Government was receptive to more wholescale changes, such
as those recently supported by the Council for Science and Technology,
but told us that it considered it "unlikely that in the foreseeable
future EU agreement could be secured to implement such a fundamental
departure from the existing GM control regime". It maintained
that its "immediate focus" was on "trying to improve
the existing GM regime".[324]
Other witnesses challenged this approach. The Advisory Committee
on Releases to the Environment acknowledged that short term solutions
based on the current system may be attractive, but stated that
they would "perpetuate an approach that is not consistent
with the scientific evidence and that will continue to cause problems
in the future".[325]
The Council for Science and Technology similarly stated that the
EU regulatory process needed to be "rebalanced to reflect
the evidence" and stressed that "we need the right regulatory
framework that will encourage continued research into solutions
to current and future problems facing UK agriculture".[326]
In its recent report on food security, the Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs Committee stated that "the Government must
continue to work within the EU to argue for a system which is
more flexible for those member states that wish to take advantage
of GM technology, while still ensuring that all EU consumers are
protected, in the same way it does with non-GM technologies".[327]
It added: "Progress towards this objective must be research
and science-led".[328]
94. We understand
the challenge of securing major legislative change in the EUparticularly
in relation to this subjectand therefore the Government's
inclination towards delivering small improvements to the current
regime rather than attempting a more significant overhaul. However,
fundamental flaws in the design of this legislative framework
have created a regulatory process that is not fit for purpose,
has driven research activity out of the EU and which is putting
the UK's agricultural future at risk. Substantial regulatory reform
is no longer merely an option, it is a necessity. We
recommend that the Government publicly state its long-term commitment
to major reform of the EU legislative framework for genetically
modified organisms and other novel crops.
95. This Committee scrutinises the actions of the
UK Government and the UK Government is therefore the target of
most of our recommendations. However, much of the power to bring
about the changes that we, and many others, advise, lies in the
hands of the European Commission and its leadership. We urge
the European Commission to consider the conclusions and recommendations
set out in this report and provide our successor committee with
a formal response, by the end of 2015, to those issues for which
it has responsibility.
162 Council Directive 2009/41/EC Back
163
Council Directive 2001/18/EC Back
164
Council Regulation 1830/2003 Back
165
Council Regulation 1829/2003 Back
166
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, GM crops and
regulation, POSTnote 482, October 2014. Note, the Contained
Use Directive (90/219/EEC) referred to in this document was repealed
and replaced by Directive 2009/41/EC as of 6 May 2009 Back
167
Under a qualified majority, any decision must be voted for by
Member states representing at least 72% of the population of the
European Union (232 votes from a possible 321). The UK has been
allocated approximately 9% of these votes (29 in total). See Europa,
The Council of the European Union, accessed 16 December
2014. Back
168
See the EU register of authorised GMOs, accessed 26 January 2015.
Back
169
GMC051 [Gov] para 8 Back
170
David Baulcombe, Jim Dunwell, Jonathan Jones, John Pickett and
Pere Puigdomenech, GM science update: a report to the Council
for Science and Technology, March 2014, p.9. See also GMC029
[SCIMAC] para 34 Back
171
GMC029 [SCIMAC] para 34; GMC051 [Gov] para 12 Back
172
European Environment Agency, Late lessons from early warnings:
the precautionary principle 1896-2000, 2001, p.12. Back
173
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology,
The Precautionary Principle, March 2005, p.14 Back
174
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states: "In order to
protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation". United Nations
Environment Programme, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
June 1992. See also European Environment Agency, Late lessons
from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896-2000,
2001, p.13. Back
175
European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the
precautionary principle, COM(2000)1, February 2000, para 2 Back
176
Article 191 (2) of Lisbon Treaty states: "Union policy on
the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking
into account the diversity of situations in the various regions
of the Union. It shall be based on the precautionary principle
and on the principles that preventive action should be taken,
that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at
source and that the polluter should pay". Back
177
Council Directive 2001/18/EC. Note, this Directive also stipulates
(in article 4 and annex II) that both risk management and environmental
risk assessment of GMOs should be carried out "in accordance
with the precautionary principle". See article 4 and annex
II. Back
178
Amendment to Council Directive 2001/18/EC, 'Position of the European
Parliament adopted at second reading on 13 January 2015', P8_TC2-COD(2010)0208 Back
179
Council Regulation 1830/2003; EUR-Lex, 'Deliberate release of
genetically modified organisms (GMOs)', Summary of EU legislation,
accessed 26 January 2015. Back
180
Q367; Q381 Back
181
GMC051 [Gov] para 8 Back
182
GMC051 [Gov] para 8 Back
183
GMC022 [NFU] para 3.4; 4.1 Back
184
GMC009 [James Hutton Institute] exec summary Back
185
GMC036 [Syngenta] para 3 Back
186
GMC019 [BASF]para 4; GMC052 [Innogen] para 5 Back
187
GMC016 [Professor Perry]. See also GMC029 [SCIMAC] para 29 (iv) Back
188
GMC016 [Professor Perry] Back
189
GMC016 [Professor Perry] para 9 Back
190
Q352 Back
191
Q362 Back
192
GMC030 [ACRE] para 11 Back
193
Q354 Back
194
Q360 Back
195
Q360 Back
196
GMC051 [Gov] paras 13, 16 & 20 Back
197
See the EU register of authorised GMOs, accessed 26 January 2015;
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, GM crops and
regulation, POSTnote 482, October 2014 Back
198
Q430 Back
199
GMC027 [Professor Baulcombe] paras 23 & 13 Back
200
GMC019 [BASF] para 7; GMC036 [Syngenta] para 10 Back
201
Q239 [Professor Tait] Back
202
GMC051 [Gov] para 13 Back
203
GMC051 [Gov] para 13 Back
204
Q430 [Professor Hails] Back
205
GMC031 [ABC] para 12 Back
206
GMC031 [ABC] para 12 Back
207
European Academies Science Advisory Council, Planting the
future: final report, June 2013, p.37 Back
208
Council for Science and Technology, Letter to the Prime Minister:
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209
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council, New techniques
for genetic crop improvement: position statement, September 2014,
accessed 26 January 2015. Back
210
Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment, Report
2: Why a modern understanding of genomes demonstrates the need
for a new regulatory system for GMOs, August 2013, p.1 Back
211
European Academies Science Advisory Council, Planting the
future: final report, June 2013, p.17 Back
212
European Academies Science Advisory Council, Planting the
future: final report, June 2013, p.17 Back
213
European Academies Science Advisory Council, Planting the
future: final report, June 2013, p.17 Back
214
European Academies Science Advisory Council, Planting the
future: final report, June 2013, p.50 Back
215
GMC027 [Professor Baulcombe] para 7 Back
216
GMC027 [Professor Baulcombe] para 7 Back
217
GMC027 [Professor Baulcombe] para 8 Back
218
GMC046 [Society of Biology] para 4 Back
219
GMC046 [Society of Biology] para 4; GMC047 [Science Council]
para 5,2 Back
220
European Academies Science Advisory Council, 'What is EASAC',
accessed 26 January 2015. European Academies Science Advisory
Council, Planting the future: non-technical summary, June
2013, p.5 Back
221
GMC044 [Royal Society] para 10 Back
222
"No risk with GMO food, says EU chief scientific advisor",
Euractiv, 24 July 2012, accessed 26 January 2015. Back
223
Q327 Back
224
Q165 Back
225
Q9 [Dr Parr] Back
226
Q123 Back
227
Q123 Back
228
Q20 Back
229
GMC020 [GM Freeze] para 6.3 Back
230
GMC027 [Professor Baulcombe] para 8 Back
231
GMC027 [Professor Baulcombe] para 8 Back
232
Q9 Back
233
Q9 Back
234
Q14 Back
235
Q21 Back
236
Q22 Back
237
Q22 Back
238
GMC044 [Royal Society] para 11 Back
239
Q22 Back
240
GMC047 [Science Council] para 5.3 Back
241
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Environment
Secretary speech at the Oxford farming conference, published
7 January 2015, accessed 26 January 2015 Back
242
Q475 Back
243
If humans were not excluded from this definition, the Deliberate
Release Directive would effectively ban the 'release' of individuals
who had undergone gene therapy. Back
244
Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council,
Definitions (2), 12 March 2011. Back
245
A polyploid plant is one that contains more than two sets of
chromosomes. Polyploid plants are "often larger and more
vigorous" than diploid plants and artificially induced polyploidy
is therefore a relatively common breeding technique. Noel Kingsbury,
Hybrid: The history and science of plant breeding, (Chicago,
2009) p.258; p.422. Back
246
Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment, ACRE advice:
new techniques used in plant breeding, August 2013, p.1. Back
247
Q423 Back
248
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council, New techniques
for genetic crop improvement: position statement, September 2014,
accessed 26 January 2015. Back
249
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council, New techniques
for genetic crop improvement: position statement, September 2014,
accessed 26 January 2015. Back
250
GMC016 [Professor Perry]; Q333 Back
251
Q399 Back
252
Q453 Back
253
Q453 Back
254
Q453 Back
255
Q424 Back
256
Wilhelm Klümper and Matin Qaim, "A Meta-Analysis of
the Impacts of Genetically Modified Crops",
PLOSOne, November 3 2014.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0111629. Back
257
GMC012 [John Innes Centre] para 10 Back
258
GMC030 [ACRE] para 8; exec summary Back
259
GMC016 [Professor Perry] section 5 Back
260
See, for example, European Commission, Communication from the
Commission on the precautionary principle, COM(2000)1, February
2000 Back
261
Q325 Back
262
Q325 Back
263
GMC016 [Professor Perry] section 5 Back
264
Q377 Back
265
Q377 Back
266
Joint Research Centre/European GMO Socio-Economics Bureau, Terms
of reference, no date provided. Back
267
Joint Research Centre/ European GMO Socio-Economics Bureau, no
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268
GMC047 [Science Council] para 3.2 Back
269
European Commission, Eurobarometer: biotechnology, Special
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270
European Commission, Eurobarometer: biotechnology, Special
Eurobarometer 341, Wave 73.1, October 2010, p.7. Back
271
GMC051 [Gov] para 20 Back
272
GMC015 [Sense about Science] Back
273
Qq62-63. See also Claire Marris, Brian Wynne, Peter Simmons and
Sue Weldon, Public Perceptions of Agricultural Biotechnologies
in Europe: Final Report of the PABE research project, December
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274
Qq63-64 Back
275
European Food Safety Authority, 'Who are we', accessed 26 January
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276
GMC031 [ABC] para 5 Back
277
GMC031 [ABC] para 5; para 29. See also GMC016 [Perry]; GMC015
[Sense about Science] para 1.4 Back
278
GMC016 [Perry] Back
279
GMC048 [FSA] Back
280
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