Departmental annexes
36. In the annexes to this Report, we outline what
progress the Government has made in addressing the issues highlighted
in our reports and in the Government's responses to those reports.
These annexes are not intended to be a comprehensive update on
all of the Committee's reports, nor do they repeat the detailed
background or context to each individual issue that is available
in our original reports. Instead they capture the current state
of what we consider to be important policy areas and make recommendations
to the Government with regards to those.
Cabinet Office
The census and social science
37. In our report The census and social science,
we were concerned that social science could suffer if the census
was to be discontinued without serious consideration as to how
this data would be replaced.[58]
The Government and the Office for National Statistics[59]
recognised the unique value of the census whilst also appreciating
the need to use innovative sources and methods for collecting
and using social data.[60]
The Right Honourable Francis Maude MP, Minister for the Cabinet
Office and Paymaster General, told us that "the Government
has accepted the National Statistician's recommendation to conduct
a census in 2021, where possible online, and that alongside this
there should be greater use of administrative data and survey".[61]
In 2014, the Government established the Administrative Data Research
Network and associated research centres. In its official response
to our report, the Government "noted" our recommendation
that there should be specific ministerial oversight of the use
social science in government policymaking. We
welcome the Administrative Data Research Network and the associated
research centres but note the lack of any commitment to allocating
ministerial oversight to the use of social science. It remains
our position that both the commission and utilisation of social
science by Government would benefit from direct Ministerial responsibility.
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills
Science in government and the Government Office
for Science
38. As Minister of State for Universities, Science
and Cities (and, unlike his predecessor, with a role in both the
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) and the
Cabinet Office) we wanted to understand whether the Right Honourable
Greg Clark MP considered that his ministerial responsibility extended
beyond science policy and into the use of scientific evidence
and advice in wider government policymaking. He told us that "the
Science Minister should have an interest in making sure […]
that the whole of Government benefits from the best quality of
scientific advice".[62]
We agree with the Minister
and urge that this same view continues within Government to ensure
that scientific evidence and advice is at the heart of policymaking.
39. During the last Parliament, both our predecessor
committee[63] and the
Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee[64]
recommended[65] that
the Government Office for Science (GO-Science) should sit within
the Cabinet Office. We have continued to champion this change[66]
and there has been a notable evolution of the Government's stance
on this matter: unlike his predecessor, Greg Clark has responsibilities
both in BIS and the Cabinet Office; the Government's new horizon
scanning programme is a joint Cabinet Office and GO-Science programme;
following the resignation of the Government's most senior science
policy official in November 2014 from his director general role
in BIS, the role was split so that the higher education element
of the brief moved to a different directorate general in BIS and
the science and innovation responsibilities initially moved to
the Cabinet Office's chief economist who, in February 2015, was
then appointed director general for knowledge and innovation in
BIS. Although, in his short time as Science Minister, Greg Clark
had "not found any deficiency with the present arrangement"[67],
his view was that "the role of the Government's chief scientist
[…] is unambiguously for the Government and informs the Government
collectively"[68].
40. We note
the piecemeal relocation of roles and responsibilities from the
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills to the Cabinet
Office and vice-versa and consider that it dilutes the source
of scientific advice in government. We,
again, strongly re-iterate our recommendation that GO-Science
should sit within the Cabinet Office so that it benefits from
scientific advice and evidence being at the centre of government.
Science funding
41. Greg Clark explained to us that he regarded investment
in science as "an investment in our future. It is a good
investment"[69]
and that he would be "making the strongest possible case
in advance of the [2015] spending review"[70]
to protect science funding. We note that the Government's science
and innovation strategy states that the Government:
will examine how to ensure that R&D spending
by departments is properly prioritised against other capital investment
spending, for example by considering controls that can be placed
on this spending to ensure that valuable R&D is not unduly
deprioritised in favour of short-term pressures. We will report
on this by the next Spending Review.[71]
42. We strongly
support the Minister's position regarding science funding and
urge this Government and its successor to deliver on the Minister's
commitments. Science funding and the 2015 spending review will
undoubtedly interest our successor committee.
The commercialisation of research
43. In our reports on the commercialisation of research[72]
and technology and innovation centres[73],
we considered the challenges of turning research into commercial
success, and the Government's plans to establish the necessary
innovation infrastructure to support this. The national academies
have recently published their key priorities and actions for the
next government "to make the UK the best place in which to
do research and innovation". Greg Clark told us that our
report on commercialising research "was particularly influential
when drafting the Science and Innovation strategy"[74]
and that the UK's ability to commercialise research "is improving"[75].
He explained that:
the British Business Bank has been established,
not least to bring together what your report said was sometimes
a confusing array of different initiatives available to business.
It is still early days, but the signs are promising. In the first
12 months, 21,000 small and medium sized businesses have been
helped by the British Business Bank. The recommendation has been
adopted, it is being implemented.[76]
44. As Greg Clark stated, Catapult centres,[77]
knowledge transfer partnerships[78]
and "growth hubs"[79]
all form part of the innovation infrastructure. We note that because
the "high value manufacturing Catapult […] was oversubscribed
in terms of the number of projects in which it can participate"[80]
it will receive £61 million of additional government funding.[81]
Greg Clark stated that "early indications suggest that, where
you have these instances of public funding, it brings in—it
attracts; it crowds in—about 30% of additional private funding".[82]
We welcome the additional
funding that the high value manufacturing Catapult will receive
from the Government. At the same time we remind the Government
that one of the intrinsic values of the Catapult centres is that
they operate independently from other government research and
commercialisation initiatives and higher education institutions,
and should continue to do so.
45. We have previously expressed concerns that small
and innovative companies have difficulty accessing equity finance:[83]
Greg Clark explained that he had held conversations with the London
Stock Exchange about facilitating small companies' access to equity
markets and that "not only is it very much on people's agenda
but it is being acted upon".[84]
The innovation infrastructure
developed by this Government is a solid starting ground for progress
to be realised. We agree with Greg Clark that it will take time
to judge the success of the Government's policies to assist businesses
to commercialise research and to grow.
46. We recommend that the Government set out,
in its response to this Report, what work is being done to increase
small and innovative companies' access to equity markets and to
measure the impact of Catapult centres on increasing the finance
available to SMEs, as we mention in paragraph 23 of this Report.
Government procurement
47. In our report on the commercialisation of research,[85]
we highlighted that Government is in a unique position to act
as lead customer for SMEs and innovative businesses. The potential
benefits are clear: SMEs win valuable custom from a large client;
innovative technology could dramatically improve public services;
and investors are attracted to businesses with government contracts.
48. From a low base, government contracts allotted
under the Government's Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI)
are up 75% compared with 2010.[86]
Greg Clark did not think that was good enough and that the Government
has "further to go on it",[87]
and he told us that, in BIS, the "use of the SBRI is at 42%
from SMEs, so we are making progress"[88]
and "BIS currently spends 30.8% of its budget on SMEs. We
want to raise that. Across Government, it is just short of 20%".[89]
49. Although
there has been some progress in the proportion of Government contracts
awarded to SMEs and innovative businesses, there is still much
progress to be made to ensure that these businesses have equal
access to public sector contracts. There is an added incentive
for government to procure from small businesses that it has indirectly
funded, for example through Catapult centres, to ensure a positive
return on the public investment.
Diversity in higher education and Catapult
centres
Higher education
50. In our report on women in scientific careers[90],
we expressed our concern at the under-representation of women
and other minority groups in academic scientific careers. Greg Clark
believes that the Government does "have a responsibility"
to increase diversity in the higher education sector and that
he takes "that responsibility directly and personally".[91]
The higher education sector is independent of government, but
Greg Clark told us that this does not mean that he "cannot
make some pretty pertinent observations"[92]
and that:
the leadership of our universities […] is
still lagging way behind what we would expect of a set of organisations
and institutions that want to promote opportunity not only for
women and others who are under-represented but those whose very
existence depends on excellence.[93]
51. When asked about the uncertainty offered by post-doctoral
positions which tend to coincide with a time when some people
may be considering starting a family, Greg Clark stated that:
it stands there for universities to reflect on.
In other walks of life, employers have adjusted their practices
in order to be able to accommodate people of talent who otherwise
would not be able to work there, and that applies to universities
and research institutions.[94]
52. Greg Clark explained that he had set up a "steering
group for diversity in appointments across the science and university
sector"[95] and
that, although government has "influence", it is for
universities "to take it further themselves. It is in their
interests to improve it, and I hope and expect that they will".[96]
Catapult centres
53. When we pointed out to Greg Clark that all of
the chief executives and chairmen of the Catapult centres are
currently men, he agreed "very strongly" with our observation
that the Government did not appear to be practising what it preached.
Greg Clark told us that, although he does not control appointments
to Catapult centres, he had "been very clear that [he] will
not accept being presented with lists that consist entirely of
men" for appointments to the board of Innovate UK, that he
had held an event in the Cabinet Office to encourage "more
people from diverse backgrounds to apply for these posts"
and that the Government needed to "positively […] go
out and talent spot".[97]
54. There is
still a long way to go until women and minority groups are adequately
represented in higher education institutions and on the management
boards of Catapult centres. We were encouraged
by the Minister's strong statements on this matter and the Government
should set out, in its response to this Report, what action it
is taking to address this issue, what progress is being made and
how it will monitor progress going forward. We note that none
of the six preferred candidates chosen during this Parliament
for us to consider at pre-appointment have been women. In the
interests of transparency, we recommend that each Government Department
publish suitably aggregated equality data on candidates shortlisted
for appointment to posts subject to pre-appointment hearings by
Parliament.
Space sector
55. The space sector is a success story for the UK,
and our report on the UK and European space agencies[98]
made recommendations on how to increase that success. Greg Clark
told us that the public sector is "more intelligent than
in the past"[99]
in respect of the opportunities that space technology offers and
that "it is very much on the cross-Government agenda".[100]
The Government has set up the Space for Smarter Government Programme
to increase the public sector use of space technology. The
Government's Space for Smarter Government Programme is a welcome
initiative and we encourage the next Government to harness the
opportunities that space technology offers the public sector.
56. During our inquiry, we heard of the value of
having a UK national at director-level in the European Space Agency.
We are comforted by Greg
Clark's view that the UK having a director-level representative
at the European Space Agency (ESA) has been understood and well
taken by the leadership of ESA. We hope that this will result
in an actual UK appointment at the upcoming reshuffle of the ESA's
management.
Astronomy and particle physics
57. Our report on astronomy and particle physics[101]
highlighted the dramatic cuts in capital budgets that these areas
of science were subject to between 2010 and 2015. Greg Clark
told us that he agreed with us that these are "area[s] of
UK excellence"[102]
and that the Government wanted to "continue that position
of eminence in this field".[103]
58. While we
welcome the Government's investment in the Square Kilometre Array,
the Science & Technology Facilities Council's withdrawal from
a number of northern hemisphere research-grade telescopes remains
of great concern. We note that the drop in astronomy and particle
physics funding following the 2007 reorganisation of the Particle
Physics and Astronomy Research Council has been perpetuated. We
ask that the Government re-examine the funding decisions made
in these areas of science. Our successor Committee should be informed
as to any change in policy in this regard.
Department for Education
Chief Scientific Adviser and the use of evidence
59. In January 2013, in our report on educating tomorrow's
engineers,[104] we
expressed grave concerns over the Department for Education's use
of evidence in policymaking and the planning of research spending
by the department's then Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA). In 2014
the department appointed a new chief analyst who, in his own words,
"ticked the box"[105]
of also wanting to be departmental CSA. He dedicates approximately
one day a week to his CSA duties.[106]
Following the explanation we received from the department's Permanent
Secretary and the Government Chief Scientific Adviser regarding
his appointment,[107]
we wrote to the Right Honourable Francis Maude MP, Minister for
the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General, Cabinet Office.[108]
In his response to our letter, the Right Honourable Oliver Letwin
MP, Minister for Government Policy and Chancellor of the Duchy
of Lancaster, Cabinet Office, told us that he "recognises
the important contribution" that many CSAs have made and
that he would "write to each of the departments that you
have highlighted in your letter to seek clarification on their
intentions in regard to this important post".[109]
Oliver Letwin also told us that he proposed working "with
the Government's Chief Scientific Advisor […] and the Government
Office for Science to clarify the guidance around government departments
appointing Chief Scientific Advisors".[110]
We welcome Oliver Letwin's
response and request that the Government update us on the action
it is taking on this matter and its outcomes.
60. Our experience with the Department for Education
in respect of reforms of ALevel practical science examination
reforms (see below) did not give us any confidence that the department
heeded our advice in early 2013 that "greater focus needs
to be placed on evidence before future changes are made, and [the
department] needs to leave sufficient time for evidence to be
gathered on the effectiveness of its proposed changes before introducing
further change".[111]
This is despite the department's apparent acknowledgement[112]
that it needed to improve its policymaking practices. Nick Gibb
MP, Minister of State for School Reform, told us that the department's
new CSA "is determined to make sure that in the Department
we use rigorous evidence in making policy decisions"[113].
We hope that Nick Gibb's
assertion that the department's new CSA will ensure that the department
uses rigorous evidence in policymaking proves true and that the
CSA is able to achieve this in just one day a week.
61. Following up on our previous recommendation regarding
the department's research budget, Nick Gibb told us that:
The peak was in 2008-09, when we were spending
£31.1 million […] Since 2011-12, research expenditure
has been stable at about £11.6 million a year, and last year
we saw a slight increase of about £1.2 million. It is still
substantial, but it is less than it was in 2008-09.[114]
62. We accept
that the public finances have faced cuts under this Government,
however a 63% cut in the department's research spending between
2008-09 and 2011-12, and a 59% cut in 2013-14 against the 2008-09
baseline, is drastic by any measure. What is more, the department
has pushed through radical reforms to the education system under
this Government: although the Government recognises the importance
of research in the context of education in its Science and Innovation
Strategy, we conclude that evidence is still not as central to
the department's policymaking as it should be.
63. The Department for Education has, throughout
this Parliament, professed to be pursuing a policy of "exhortation
and facilitation", without ever clearly and simply explaining
what the phrase actually means in practice. Nick Gibb told us,
however, that "exhortation is working"[115],
that "all we can do from the centre is exhortation"[116]
and that schools "are exhorting us about the importance of
practicals".[117]
Despite the apparent popularity
of "exhortation" at the Department for Education, at
the expense, it appears, of Government "facilitation",
and despite our numerous interactions with the department during
this Parliament, we are none the wiser as to what "exhortation
and facilitation" means in practice and what benefits result
from it. Furthermore, we are not convinced that Ministers are
unable to pursue their policy aims by means other than "exhortation
and facilitation". We recommend that
Ministers exercise their authority to ensure that the policies
they support are delivered by the relevant agencies.
Practical science
64. We have taken a keen interest in the delivery
and assessment of practical science in schools,[118]
most recently in relation to the Office of Qualifications and
Examinations Regulation's (Ofqual's) proposed reforms of A-Level
practical science exams. Amongst other changes, Ofqual recommended
that the practical science element of the A-Level examination
be graded separately by a 'pass/fail' grade. In December 2014
we published a 'video letter' to Nick Gibb[119]
following a roundtable event with a variety of stakeholders. We
received evidence from a variety of stakeholders in the science
education community on a number of recurring concerns, including:
· Ofqual's reforms will devalue practical
science;[120]
· the reforms will fail to discriminate
between pupils' practical skills;[121]
· the proposed reforms were being rushed;[122]
and
· Ofqual had not properly engaged with the
science education community.[123]
65. Nick Gibb told us that Ofqual's position was
that the previous method of assessing practical science "did
not discriminate properly"[124]
and suggested that a 'pass/fail' grade would achieve that discrimination
whilst hoping "that all young people will pass their practicals
if that is the approach taken, whether it is at GCSE or at A-Level".[125]
66. When we referred to our previous engagement with
experts in science education on this topic, Nick Gibb explained
that "they are not necessarily experts in what motivates
schools and they are not necessarily experts in assessment"[126].
This view of the science
education community reflects a flawed approach to engaging with
science education experts throughout the reforms process. We continue
to be highly concerned about how evidence is collated and used
to inform policy in the Department for Education.
67. Nick Gibb agreed to "go away and look at
it again and re-challenge Ofqual on those issues both for A-Level
and, more importantly now, for GCSE".[127]
In follow-up evidence to us in December 2014, Nick Gibb stated
that he had been "assured that the arrangements proposed
by Ofqual will mean that students can undertake considerably more
practical science as part of their A-Level studies than they do
currently and that the problem of differentiating between students
has been addressed".[128]
Nick Gibb told us that the reforms "will result in young
people leaving school with better skills than they would have
had if we had retained the assessed practical skills in the previous
A-Levels"[129]
and that Ofqual is currently "considering the responses to
those consultations [reforms of GCSE science practical examinations],
and also their own position as a result of the research and evidence
on the A-Level. We are waiting to hear from Ofqual what they have
decided for the GCSE, so that question is still open".[130]
68. Less than two months after Nick Gibb's evidence
to us, the Right Honourable Nicky Morgan MP, Secretary of State
for Education, stated in a speech on 27 January 2015 that she
was "concerned that a decision to remove practical assessment
from science qualifications is in danger of holding back the next
generation of scientists" and that she feared that "such
a move could inadvertently downgrade the importance of these practical
skills".[131]
On 2 March, the Secretary of State published a formal letter to
the Chief Regulator of Ofqual, Glenys Stacey, indicating her continuing
concern and indicating that the changes should be closely monitored
and decisions revisited "if the evidence shows the approach
to have had a detrimental effect".
69. The Government and Ofqual should update our
successor Committee on developments in this area.
School science facilities
70. Nick Gibb told us that all schools should have
fit-for-purpose science facilities and that he believed "very
strongly that […] all secondary schools should have very
good quality science laboratories".[132]
Furthermore, Nick Gibb considered laboratory technicians to be
"very important. I do not know how any secondary school would
be able to function and provide good quality teaching in the three
sciences if they did not have well-motivated and skilled technicians
ensuring that the laboratories are properly equipped".[133]
71. Notwithstanding the Minister's assurances, research
by the Scientific Community Representing Education (SCORE) found
that, amongst other things, "many primary schools lack sufficient
appropriate resources to teach practical science effectively;
facilities in many primary schools are not adequate for practical
science"[134]
and that, in secondary schools,
many state-funded secondary schools and sixth
form colleges lack sufficient equipment for basic practical work;
inadequate facilities are limiting the practical work that can
take place in schools and sixth form colleges; good technician
support is being lost because of poor working conditions.[135]
Written evidence from SCORE[136]
and the Royal Society supports this assessment, the
latter telling us that "it is clear that the changes needed
to improve student's access to high quality practical work will
take time. However initial progress is not reassuring".[137]
72. According to Nick Gibb:
All we can do from the centre is exhortation,
but we also provide the capital for schools to improve the fabric
of their buildings and facilities, and a considerable amount of
money has been allocated for that over the last four years, despite
all the public financial constraints in the public sector.[138]
73. Regarding laboratory technicians, Nick Gibb added
"again, this is not a terribly satisfactory answer from your
point of view. Technicians' pay is a matter for the school"[139].
74. The Government's
approach to science facilities in schools is wholly unsatisfactory.
Whether it be practical science examinations, science field work
and field trips, laboratory apparatus, technicians or school buildings,
there is a chronic failure by the Government to create an effective
environment for practical science in schools. We
strongly recommend that this is pursued during the next Parliament.
Teaching schools
75. The Government told us in November 2011 that
"the network of Teaching Schools, many of which will lead
on science, is about enabling the best schools to support other
schools around them"[140]
and that, because "Teaching Schools are a recent innovation",[141]
he could not offer any explanation of how they are, or might be,
used to improve the skills and knowledge of science teachers.
Nick Gibb did, however, tell us that "there is a higher proportion
of 2.1s and first-class degrees coming into teacher training now"[142]
and the Government "will be training 17,500 maths and science
teachers over the next five years [which] is a reflection of the
priority we attach to this objective".[143]
Although the Government promised
to upskill the country's science teachers, evidence from the Royal
Society, Field Studies Council and SCORE suggests there is still
significant work to do.
Careers advice
76. For our report on educating tomorrow's engineers,
we received evidence from The Royal Academy of Engineering that
around 820,000 science, engineering and technology (SET) professionals
will be required by 2020, with 80 per cent of these required in
engineering.[144] In
our report we made a number of recommendations regarding the provision
of careers advice[145]
so that more children pursue engineering careers. Nick Gibb explained
that "we have to get it across that engineering is a lucrative,
interesting and demanding world, and we want to encourage more
young people, particularly girls, to go into it" and that
this country's shortage of engineers is a "messaging issue".[146]
77. The Government placed schools under a duty to
secure access to independent and impartial careers guidance for
their pupils from September 2012. In September 2013, Ofsted published
a report[147] showing
that the new statutory duty was not being implemented well enough
and that only one in five schools were effective in ensuring that
all its students in years 9, 10 and 11 were receiving the level
of information, advice and guidance they needed to support decision-making.
Nick Gibb explained that "the Secretary of State [for Education]
wants to do more" to ensure that careers advice "is
of proper quality and that it is available"[148],
adding that "there is more to do, and that is something the
Secretary of State [for Education] understands".[149]
78. We agree
with the Government that there is much work to be done to ensure
that young people receive high quality careers advice that will
enthuse them to pursue a career in engineering. Unlike the Minister,
we consider this country's shortage of engineers to be more than
just a "messaging issue".
Schools and research councils
79. Our report on astronomy and particle physics[150]
highlighted the value that could be gained from the Department
for Education and Research Councils UK fostering relationships
between research councils, local education authorities and schools
undertaking outreach activities on a more systematic and coordinated
basis in primary and secondary education. We also highlighted
the importance of the National Schools' Observatory to science
education, and our concern that it was falling between two stools
of government departmental responsibility.[151]
80. Nick Gibb explained that "there is a working
party called the space education and skills working group that
brings in those elements both in DFE [Department for Education]
and BIS [Department for Business, Innovation & Skills] to
ensure that precisely what you are worried about does not happen".[152]
81. The Minister
did not give us confidence that research councils carry out outreach
activities in schools to inspire children to study the sciences.
He did, however, agree that the National Schools' Observatory
carries out valuable work in enthusing children about science:
we recommend that our successor committee ensure that it is sufficiently
funded to continue doing so.
Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs
Marine science
82. During our inquiry into marine science,[153]
we received evidence that the Government lacked an implementation
plan to deliver the potential benefits offered by its marine science
strategy.[154] We recommended
that it produce an implementation plan, to include a timetable
articulating expected outcomes over the next ten years, and update
it annually. When we asked George Eustice MP, Parliamentary Under
Secretary of State for Farming, Food and Marine Environment, Department
for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, whether a formal implementation
plan now existed, he told us that "working groups [of the
Marine Science Co-ordination Committee] have been looking at the
implementation of strategy in recent months. We expect them to
come forward with an agreed plan in about March 2015".[155]
Five years after publication
of its marine science strategy, and nearly two years after we
made recommendations on this issue, we are dismayed that the Government
is yet to have a formal implementation plan for its marine science
strategy.
Marine conservation zones
83. In 2011, the Joint Nature Conservation Committee
and Natural England put forward 127 sites for designation as marine
conservation zone (MCZs). In 2013, the Government designated 27
of those sites as MCZs and, in January 2015, commenced a consultation
on a further 23 sites proposed for designation. The Government
plans to designate a third and final 'tranche' of MCZs in 2016.
In our report on marine science, we criticised the Government
for apparently "moving the goalposts" relating to what
level of evidence was required to designate an area as a MCZ.[156]
Following his oral evidence to us in October 2014, the Right Honourable
Greg Clark MP, Minister of State for Universities, Science and
Cities, Department for Business, Innovation & Skills and Cabinet
Office, consulted with George Eustice and wrote to us explaining
that "for [a MCZ] to be proposed, and subsequently designated,
there needs to be reasonable certainty that the feature (habitat
or species) of interest is present on the site and of its extent".[157]
84. In oral evidence, George Eustice explained that
"in the last four years we have spent around £12 million
on surveys of the seabed to check what features are there and
to verify that some of those [MCZ] proposals […] were checked
and verified […] to help get the evidence that we need for
the sites that we intend to consult on".[158]
George Eustice added that the Government also carries "out
an impact assessment on all of the sites that we seek to designate,
and that looks at some of the economic costs of designation".[159]
85. While we
would normally applaud the efforts made by the Government to compile
a better evidence base for marine conservation zones (MCZs), in
this case the Government has muddied the water. Does designation
of an area as a MCZ require the 'best available evidence', 'robust
evidence' or evidence that provides 'reasonable certainty'? In
conservation terms, the delay caused by evidence collections means
a greater risk that the marine feature will become more degraded:
MCZs should be designated ahead of any 'further analysis', as
was intended by the original legislation. As part of developing
a coherent network of marine protected areas there may also be
value in protecting areas where significant features no longer
exist but have done previously.
86. We have previously expressed concern at the lack
of explanation and planning of how MCZs, once designated, would
be managed and the uncertainty this created for interested stakeholders
and local communities.[160]
George Eustice explained that:
We have learned the lesson even earlier than
I thought. So we are proposing, when we go to the formal consultation
on the second tranche, to give an outline of the type of management
measures that we think might be necessary. It is very good to
see that the Department has picked that up. It was one of the
lessons I learned, after we had a few meetings on this, that we
needed to provide that scope, so we will have an element of that
in both the second and third tranche.[161]
87. Marine conservation
zones are a prime example of why the Government needed an implementation
plan for its marine science strategy. Although its approach does
seem to be slowly improving, the Government continues to muddle
through the marine conservation zone process and needs to make
a greater effort to involve all stakeholders from the early stages
of the designation process.
88. The process
of designating marine conservation zones has endured significant
delays. The department went to consultation on the second tranche
of MCZs at the end of January 2015; it is hugely optimistic for
the Government to think that it will complete designation of their
third, and final, tranche in 2016.
Strategic research
89. The MCZ designation process exposed the lack
of data that the UK holds on the marine environment and we have
expressed our concerns that long-term strategic data collection
is threatened by budget cuts and more high profile marine research.[162]
Although research bodies make efforts to "share their data
[and] prioritise the observations that they really think are important"[163]
there remains a risk that the value of long-term, low profile
data collection can be too easily overlooked. George Eustice told
us that "some [oceanography science] is looking at much longer-term
impacts of climate change. So they need some security of funding
in the long term".[164]
We agree with the Minister
that long-term research and data collection requires security
of funding in the long term.
90. In its response to our April 2013 report, the
Government explained that it was commissioning "a thematic
review of scientific observations needed to meet the UK's requirements
for environmental data to inform and support research, operational
needs, and policy-making".[165]
We were told that "the National Oceanography Centre is part
of the team that oversees the project" and that the review
is "due to be published in another month or two".[166]
In our evidence session with Professor Sir Mark Walport, Government
Chief Scientific Adviser, he agreed[167]
on the importance of long-term data collection and "of collections
of organisations like Kew".[168]
We welcome the Government
Chief Scientific Adviser's recognition of the importance of long-term
data collection and the National Oceanography Centre's involvement
in the Government's thematic review, although we remain disappointed
by the time it has taken to conduct the review. We
recommend that the Government conclude and publish its thematic
review urgently.
91. One way of improving the evidence base on marine
life, at negligible public cost, is to work with the marine industries
to utilise the enormous amounts of data that they have already
collected, and we recommended that such data sharing should form
part of licensing conditions for the marine industry.[169]
Terence Ilott, Deputy Director, Marine Environment Strategy, Department
for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, told us that "the
Marine Management Organisation has been working with several industries"
and that a monitoring and industry sub-group of the Marine Science
Co-ordination Committee (MSCC) "are now commissioning a cross-cutting
study on learning from that and what more could be done […]
so it is gradually moving forward".[170]
92. When we asked George Eustice whether the Government
had the right balance in having only one representative of the
marine industries on the MSCC, in contrast to approximately 25
representatives of public sector organisations,[171]
he felt that the under-representation of industry was "rectified"
[172] by including
one industry representative on the MSSC.
93. We are disappointed
that more progress has not been made since our report and that
the use of industry data is only "gradually moving forward".
We remind the Government of the lack of data it holds on the marine
environment, highlighted only too well by its designation process
for marine conservation zones, and urge it to step up its collaboration
with industry in this area.
94. In contrast
to the Government, we do not think that having only one representative
of industry sitting on the Marine Science Co-ordination Committee
is sufficient. More direct engagement with the marine industry
may encourage more rapid progress in data sharing.
Antimicrobial resistance
95. In our report, Ensuring access to working
antimicrobials, we highlighted the information gap that exists
relating to the environmental drivers of antimicrobial resistance
and the potential for transmission of antimicrobial resistance
between animal pathogens and human pathogens.[173]
Paul Green, Operations Director in the Veterinary Medicines Directorate,
told us of the "piece of work going on at the moment to look
at the most cost-effective way of getting more accurate usage
data […] We have been working closely with the British Poultry
Council, the British Pig Executive and others to design the right
kind of protocols in terms of the data that would be useful and
least burdensome to collect".[174]
Mr Green also explained the UK's involvement in a European "pilot
project, led by the European Medicines Agency, to start the process
of designing the protocols in terms of what you can collect in
terms of usage, because collecting data can be quite expensive
and difficult to do, in order to get it on a consistent and coherent
basis".[175] Although
we acknowledge the importance of ensuring data is collected on
a consistent and coherent basis, we note that both initiatives
Mr Green refers to are about designing protocols rather than actually
collecting data.
96. George Eustice referred to a group that his fellow
DEFRA Minister, Dan Rogerson MP, had "set up to look at the
impact of pharmaceuticals on the environment"[176]
and told us that "in the veterinary profession […] there
is less evidence of resistance developing".[177]
We find George Eustice's
assertion particularly troubling. In the absence of an evidence
base, taking comfort from "less evidence of resistance developing"
in the veterinary profession verges on recklessness.
97. We are not
convinced that the department has made any real progress since
our original report on plugging its antimicrobial resistance evidence
gap, nor do we feel that it has a firm grasp on the extent of
the work it has to do and the time it will take. This may be an
area of interest for our successor committee.
Water quality
98. In our report on water quality, we made recommendations
to increase the information relating to the environmental impact
of pharmaceuticals on the aquatic environment and innovation in
the water industry, whilst touching on the issue of water security.[178]
George Eustice told us that "there is an evidence gap
here. There is more work to be done",[179]
and, in a written update to us, Dan Rogerson told us that "the
evidence base needed improving in a number of areas, including
ecotoxicological data; quality of research; and access to data
(e.g. those owned by pharmaceutical companies)".[180]
We recommend the Government fill the evidence gap that has
been identified and, early in the new Parliament, report to our
successor Committee on how it has acted on the findings set out
in the Minister's update to us.
99. During our inquiry, the then Government Chief
Scientific Adviser sought to highlight the importance of water
security in the "perfect storm" of food security, energy
security and climate change.[181]
George Eustice recognised that "water in many parts of the
world is going to become the first constraining and limiting resource
on food production".[182]
Innovation in the water industry
and its effect on water security may be an area of interest for
our successor committee.
Department of Health
Scientific advice structures
100. Government departments often establish scientific
advisory committees (SACs) that provide independent scientific
advice on defined policy areas. SACs are expected to conduct themselves
according to the Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees.[183]
The Code states that "for departments who are significant
users of science and/or have a large number of expert scientific
committees or other science advisory bodies", it is "good
practice to have an overarching departmental Science Advisory
Council with oversight of all such scientific advice bodies".[184]
The Department of Health has the largest number of scientific
advisory bodies of any government department but does not have
a departmental scientific advisory council.
101. In oral evidence, George Freeman MP, Parliamentary
Under Secretary of State for Life Sciences, explained that "possibly
the reason why there is not one central science council is that
there is already such an extensive range of existing organisations".[185]
Jane Ellison MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Public
Health, explained that "the main reason" why a science
advisory council had not been constituted "is partly a desire
to remain flexible to whatever is the particular area of scientific
challenge […] it would be very unlikely that you could form
a committee that encompassed every discipline and expertise in
every area".[186]
We were surprised that neither
Minister appeared to appreciate the role of a science advisory
council. It is precisely because the Department of Health has
so many science advisory bodies that, under the Code of Practice
for Scientific Advisory Committees, it would be good practice
for it to have a science advisory council co-ordinating the work
of the department's science advisory bodies and their advice to
the Government.
102. The role of a departmental Chief Scientific
Adviser (CSA) is to ensure that departmental decisions are informed
by the best science and engineering advice. An important part
of the CSA role is to provide independent advice and challenge
to the government's decision making process. The Department of
Health is the only department to also have a Chief Medical Officer
(CMO). The CMO acts as the government's principal medical adviser
and, as such, is not intended to exercise the same independence
or scrutiny of Government. In the Department of Health, the role
of CSA and CMO is filled by the same person.
103. George Freeman explained "from [my] point
of view in terms of research, I think it is a strength that the
two functions of the chief medical officer and chief scientific
officer within the Department are unified. There is huge strength
from that".[187]
The Minister continued: "the chief medical officer being
also the chief scientific officer enables us to put that [the
patient voice and patient benefit] absolutely at the heart of
policy".[188]
Jane Ellison agreed with George Freeman that "it was very
helpful to have that meeting with the chief medical officer who
could speak to the research and the science, in exactly the way
George spoke about looking at it from a patient perspective".[189]
Professor Walker, Deputy Chief Medical Officer, informed us that
"the current arrangement whereby the CMO is also the chief
scientific adviser has not always been the case. It is the case
for this CMO but it was not for the previous one".[190]
104. We do not
disagree that patient benefit should be at the heart of the healthcare
system, but we are concerned that the Ministers do not appreciate
the different functions of a CSA and CMO. Filling the posts of
CSA and CMO with the same person deprives the government of having
two leading scientific voices in the department.
105. We recommend that the department ensures
that filling the roles of Chief Medical Officer and Chief Scientific
Adviser with the same person does not limit the potential challenge
of policy through rigorous scientific advice. We further recommend
that the department review its structures for the provision of
scientific advice to ensure that they are as effective as possible
and reflect good practice.
Technological innovation and research
106. In our report on UK blood safety and the risk
of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease,[191]
we received evidence that the National Health Service (NHS) could
do more to facilitate the trialling and use of innovative technology
in the healthcare system. In oral evidence, George Freeman explained
that "we have created within the Department [of Health] a
new directorate of innovation, technology and growth. The central
mission is to further the use of innovation in the delivery of
21st century health care and the embracing of science and innovation".[192]
George Freeman also referred to the Innovative Medicines and MedTech
Review launched by the Government in November 2014 which is "a
review of our landscape—our system—for assessing innovative
medicines and medical technologies"[193]
which "will consider how to speed up access for NHS patients
to cost-effective new diagnostics, medicines and devices and ensure
that we are well-placed to capitalise on the growing body of technological
devices […] the review will start early in 2015 and its Terms
of Reference will be published at this point".[194]
He told us that looking for new systems and approaches "is
utterly central to my role".[195]
107. George Freeman explained that the Innovative
Medicines and MedTech Review "is looking at how we can better
align our landscape for bringing innovative medicines into the
health service for patient benefit, and use our profound global
advantage through the jewel that is the NHS—an integrated
health system with an NIHR platform at the heart of it".
The review seeks to "move away from what I call a 20th century
model of development" so that medical research and technology
moves into "the new landscape" which:
allow[s] us to do heavily supervised research
medicine with volunteer patients and research clinicians through
the NIHR, to put innovations into patient groups — small
cohorts of highly monitored and supervised patient studies —
and use those insights to work out with NICE and MHRA what the
appropriate roll-out would be into wider cohorts. It is a different
model of research. We are genuinely hoping that industry, big
and small, and charities and patient groups will come to the table
with us.[196]
108. As our work during this Parliament has highlighted,[197]
the role of the NHS in developing and utilising innovative technology
is hugely important and Jane Ellison highlighted that its:
recent "Five Year Forward View" […]
put innovation and bringing quickly into use things that can be
of benefit, particularly things that can both benefit patient
safety and save the NHS money, right at the heart of that forward
view for the NHS. There is significant recognition that, where
innovation can drive both of those twin goals, the NHS needs to
do more, but the fact that they have put it as a central part
of their vision for our future NHS is encouraging and important.
It is right at the heart of that strategy.[198]
109. Despite this, and in contrast to some government
departments, we have seen no evidence of the Department of Health's
or the NHS' use of Government procurement schemes, such as the
Small Business Research Initiative, to procure cutting-edge technology
from innovative businesses.
110. Although
we are not as convinced as the Minister that innovation is "right
at the heart" of the NHS' forward view, we are comforted
that the Government recognises the opportunity offered by innovative
technology in our healthcare system and now appears to be taking
proactive steps to exploit that opportunity. We
recommend that the Government update our successor committee on
the progress of the Innovative Medicines and MedTech Review, the
work of the Department of Health's new directorate of innovation,
technology and growth and the department's involvement in the
Small Business Research Initiative within six months of this Report
and explain how it intends to implement the recommendations of
that review.
111. Our report on UK blood safety and the risk of
variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease[199]
also highlighted concerns with the allocation of research funding
by the Department of Health. George Freeman explained that "the
CMO [Chief Medical Officer] and NIHR [National Institute for Health
Research] process […] contains within it a series of mechanisms
to make sure we are spending that research budget within the Department
on appropriate priorities"[200]
and mentioned the immediate, medium-term and long-term priorities
the department has to consider. Jane Ellison referred to the department's
desire to "retain the flexibility to back the best bids for
research funding and the best science"[201].
George Freeman added that "Transparency in the setting of
those research priorities is a really interesting question. I
myself asked NIHR on a number of points how they determined some
of the shorter-term priorities that appear. I think it would be
a very helpful line of inquiry for the Committee".[202]
112. When asked why the Department of Health's appraisal
alignment working group, which is responsible for reviewing research
appraisals, is led by the department's chief economist without,
as far as the Committee is aware, receiving any input from the
CMO or their team, George Freeman "was not aware, and am
quite surprised to hear, that there is no input"[203]
from the CMO. In subsequent written evidence, George Freeman referred
back to a previous explanation given to the Committee that "it
is about the methodological approach to evaluation, not about
the science itself" and promised to provide the Committee,
in early 2015, "following discussion with CMO and CSA [Chief
Scientific Adviser]" an "update together with an explanation
of if and how the membership of the AAWG [appraisal alignment
working group] is to be enhanced. It will directly address the
pros and cons of greater scientific and medical expertise on the
Working group" .[204]
113. We have
seen no evidence that the Department of Health has effective processes
and advisory structures in place to ensure that the allocation
of research funding is best aligned with the most valuable science.
This is even more relevant given the "new landscape"
referred to by the Minister and the Government's Science and Innovation
Strategy. We recommend that the department
review how it currently allocates research funding, whether this
is fit for future needs, and report to our successor committee
on both the findings of this review and the changes to be made
as a result.
Antimicrobial resistance
114. Our report, Ensuring access to working antimicrobials,
highlighted the profound challenges facing the UK and the global
community as a result of the growing resistance of microbial populations
to current drugs and the need to control infection. While the
Committee was drafting its report on antimicrobial resistance
in the summer of 2014, the Prime Minister announced an independent
review of "the economic issues surrounding antimicrobial
resistance". [205]
115. George Freeman explained that "there are
two parts" to antimicrobial resistance that the Department
is tackling: making sure that "we prescribe smarter and that
we reduce the overuse of antibiotics" and to "accelerate
the landscape for the generation of new treatments and tackle
some of the problems in that landscape".[206]
116. Public Health England reported that the 6% increase
in the use of antibiotics in England between 2010 and 2013 "is
an under-estimate of total consumption"[207]
and Jane Ellison recognised that this "is a concerning
picture and we have to do better from here"[208].
The Government now has "a baseline from which to move forward"[209]
and Jane Ellison noted that "there is quite granular
work to do on that"[210].
She told the Committee that "a number of pieces of work are
under way to look at prescribing practices. They are very variable"
[211]. In her
follow-up written evidence, Jane Ellison referred, amongst other
initiatives, to a "literature review and behavioural analysis
exploring the key features that affect prescribing of antibiotics"
being undertaken by the Department of Health and Public Health
England, and a pilot letter from the Chief Medical Officer to
general practitioners regarding "their antimicrobial prescribing
rates compared to other local GPs"[212].
In its 2014 annual progress report and implementation plan[213]
for its Antimicrobial Resistance Strategy 2013-2018 one of the
Government's seven key areas for future action is 'Optimising
prescribing practice'.
117. Based on
our previous discussions with the Government on antimicrobial
resistance, we are satisfied that the Government appreciates the
scale of the challenges ahead. Although we are reassured that
the Government recognises the importance of responsible prescribing
of antimicrobial drugs, the Government has significant work to
do to reverse the recent trend of increased antimicrobial prescribing.
118. George Freeman highlighted that the Office for
Life Sciences, for which he has ministerial responsibility, "is
now running as a joint BIS and DH organisation partly for this
sort of initiative, to make sure we are developing joined-up policy.
We set up a working group to pull together the key stakeholders
in the antimicrobial field".[214]
George Freeman explained that "there are some real challenges
in this sector. Not only is the science hard but it is a particularly
challenging business model".[215]
However, despite George Freeman "pulling together this group
at the Office for Life Sciences to look at whether […] there
is anything we can do to support long-term investment"[216]
and Jane Ellison "pulling together key industry stakeholders
and other people to look at what more can be done in the interim",[217]
we received evidence from the Association of the British Pharmaceutical
Industry (ABPI) that "the level of engagement is not yet
adequate or frequent enough to advance concrete work in a meaningful
way" .[218]
119. Although Jane Ellison told us that the Government
is working to address the challenges of antimicrobial resistance
and that "it is not just a case of waiting for the O'Neill
review to report",[219]
evidence from the ABPI stated that it was "awaiting information
on how this work [on any pricing alternatives] can be carried
out and accelerated" and that it "would welcome opportunities
to discuss the industry's part in delivering this".[220]
The ABPI "look[s] forward to working more closely with the
Department of Health to make progress on several fronts, issues
particularly in finding more innovative ways of pricing and reimbursement
which reward innovation and at the same time support careful prescribing".[221]
It explained that if "the Government should work with industry
to develop pricing alternatives in the near term, this has the
potential to influence investment decisions".[222]
120. We welcome
the Government's fledgling efforts to develop joined-up policy
in this area but they do not yet appear to be translating into
meaningful engagement with the pharmaceuticals industry. We
recommend that the Office for Life Sciences immediately and directly
engages with the pharmaceutical industry to ensure that industry's
interests are effectively incorporated into Government policy
on antimicrobial resistance.
121. We remind
the Government that the development of new antimicrobial drugs
is not sufficient in itself. Responsible husbandry of existing
and future drugs is essential to ensure that the UK successfully
manages the challenge of antimicrobial resistance. This may almost
certainly mean a new pricing policy.
Medical implants
122. In our report, Regulation of medical implants
in the EU and UK,[223]
we expressed concern at the reliance on "equivalence data"
for medical implants, inadequate post-market surveillance and
reporting by healthcare professionals and a lack of transparency
regarding the safety and performance of implants.
123. Although George Freeman told us that "equivalence
data should be the exception rather than the rule when it comes
to approving medical implants",[224]
he explained that "the single most important issue to address
is to ensure that notified bodies are adequately assessing a manufacturer's
clinical evidence before a device is placed on the market".[225]
124. During our inquiry, we were told of the evidential
value of analysing explanted medical implants. George Freeman
explained that "there is active work going on to make sure
that we are doing that, and I will happily write to you with the
detail of where we have got to".[226]
The Government told us that "it would not be feasible to
undertake the routine analysis of explanted joints"[227]and,
in its follow-up evidence for this Report, the Government explained
that "explanted joints can provide valuable evidence but
we consider that this is more appropriately undertaken on a targeted
basis".[228] Given
the lack of explanation of the work that the Government tells
us is currently being conducted, we can only assume that very
little analysis of explanted medical implants is actually taking
place.
125. The Government explained how the reporting,
by healthcare professionals, of incidents with medical implants
was improving. These included improved General Medical Council
guidance and the appointment of a "board-level director with
responsibility for medical device incident reporting" in
"every NHS Trust".[229]
126. The Government
has made improvements to the regulation of medical implants without
addressing one of the key risks associated with them, namely the
lack of primary data relating to new and updated devices. This
poses a public health risk. Our successor committee may wish to
revisit this topic in light of the changing regulatory regime.
Government Office for Science
Science advice in government
127. Professor Sir Mark Walport, Government Chief
Scientific Adviser, Government Office for Science (GO-Science),
told us that the independence of scientific advice depended "significantly
[on] the quality of the individual".[230]
Sir Mark added that "the independent-mindedness of the individual
and their ability to speak in an untrammelled fashion"[231]
are also vital components of independent advice.
128. Sir Mark told us that in respect of the actual
structural arrangements for providing scientific advice, "fundamentally,
they work quite well"[232],
although he continued that:
there are different sorts of scientific advisory
councils and there are different types of scientific advisers
in Government Departments. The challenge is always to improve
the quality and the quantity. Some Departments are more open to
it than others. It is a constant drive to raise the game.[233]
129. In respect of departmental Chief Scientific
Advisers (CSAs), Sir Mark explained that "there are some
Departments where, probably, both you and I would like more scientific
input […] Are there a couple of Departments where there is
more to do? Yes."[234]
Despite this, he told us that "while my role is to encourage,
ultimately I am not accountable and I can't force Departments
to have a chief scientist, but it is a constant discussion".[235]
However, as Government Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Mark is directly
involved in the appointment of departmental CSAs, a fact borne
out recently by the letter we received from Sir Mark and the Department
for Education's Permanent Secretary that stated that "CSA
appointments are a matter for the relevant Permanent Secretary
and the Government's Chief Scientific Advisor and so we are replying
on the Secretary of State's behalf".[236]
130. The Government
Chief Scientific Adviser is directly involved in the appointment
of departmental Chief Scientific Advisers. We
strongly recommend that he ensures that those departments without
CSAs fill the post as soon as practicable with suitably qualified
independent individuals who will dedicate at least three days
a week to the role, as recommended by the House of Lords Science
and Technology Committee.[237]
We further recommend that the Government Chief Scientific Adviser
works with government departments to ensure their scientific advisory
structures are fit for purpose.
Horizon scanning
131. Following our report on government horizon scanning[238],
the Government's new Horizon Scanning Programme Team (announced
in May 2013) published its first outputs in December 2014.[239]
Each publication clearly states on its first page that "THIS
ANALYSIS WAS COMPLETED IN 2013 AND HAS NOT BEEN UPDATED WITH MORE
RECENT DATA BUT SENSITIVE INFORMATION, SUCH AS POLICY IMPLICATIONS
HAVE BEEN REMOVED".[240]
Publishing the outputs of
the Government's Horizon Scanning Programme Team at least a year
after they have been completed is simply not good enough. We
recommend the government publish horizon scanning papers within
a month of completion.
132. The topics covered by the Horizon Scanning Programme
Team's first published papers include "Big Data" and
"Resource Nationalism". We asked Sir Mark whether these
are future issues or current ones and he told us that "they
are a bit of both"[241]
and that government "need[s] to be imaginative — and
you can always be more imaginative".[242]
He added that "there is also a lot of other futures work
that is going on" and referred to work of GO-Science's Foresight
Unit which is conducting "a lot of very far-sighted work
as well. Horizon scanning has got to be a mixture of scanning
short-term horizons and long-term horizons"[243].
Sir Mark explained that "the transmission mechanisms within
Government for the work are much more effective than they used
to be".[244] When
discussing knowledge and 'intelligence' about pandemic diseases,
be they human, animal or plant, he noted that "we need very
good horizon scanning on the things we know about".[245]
133. Sir Mark told us that the Government "is
bringing in outsiders"[246],
conducts "widespread external consultation"[247]
and that "the bottom line is that we consult widely".[248]
134. Putting
aside the fact that we prefer the term "futures analysis"
to horizon scanning, we are deeply concerned that the Government's
Horizon Scanning Programme team is not looking to the future at
all and that, by the time its work is published, it may be outdated.
Furthermore, its work and operations are not transparent and,
although the Government tells us that it is consulting widely
as part of its horizon scanning activities, we are disappointed
that there is no external representation on the Horizon Scanning
Oversight Group. We are also confused as to why the Government's
professed 'horizon scanning' takes place separately from the work
of the Foresight Unit and see benefits from the two working in
a more integrated way. We recommend that
the Foresight Unit and the Horizon Scanning Programme Team form
one central source of government horizon scanning. Locating GO-Science
in the Cabinet Office would facilitate this.
Scientific advice and evidence in emergencies
135. In our report on scientific advice and evidence
in emergencies,[249]
we were concerned at the apparent lack of involvement of the Government
Chief Scientific Adviser in developing the national risk assessment
(NRA). Sir Mark explained that he "has been quite closely
involved in meetings and discussions" in the most recent
update of the NRA and that "we speak to our colleagues in
the United States about what should be included in the risk register
[…] there is a good process for looking and seeing"[250].
He added that a "big review is going on for next year"[251].
Although Ebola, and other haemorrhagic diseases, are included
on the Government's national risk assessment, it has not been
explained to us how the Government's emergency apparatus was triggered
for the Ebola outbreak in West Africa and why it took so long.
We are encouraged that Sir
Mark has been directly involved in this year's update of the national
risk assessment and that a review of the assessment process is
ongoing. We remind the Government of our
recommendations regarding the input of scientific advice and evidence
into the national risk assessment. We recommend that the Government
sets out, in its response to this Report, its process for gathering
and assessing the information that is involved in the national
risk assessment as well as when and how a risk on the national
risk assessment is triggered.
136. We previously recommended[252]
the publication of enhanced guidance for the operation of the
scientific advisory group in emergencies (SAGE). In 2012 the Government
published its Enhanced SAGE Guidance[253]
and the Government recognised our input in this area.[254]
We also recommended that the Government improve its ability to
communicate scientific advice and evidence to the public in emergency
situations.[255] The
Enhanced SAGE Guidance includes provisions regarding SAGE communications.
Sir Mark told us that "we have specifically had a SAGE
rehearsal around communications alone. We have brought in people
with expertise […] the scenario was all about communications.
It was not about the science; it was about how we communicated".[256]
137. The minutes for the SAGE established for the
Ebola outbreak have not yet been published; Sir Mark told us that
"the minutes will be published" but, in contrast, explained
that, in respect of other papers and outputs of SAGE meetings,
"a lot of that material will come into the public domain
by other routes".[257]
The Government's Enhanced SAGE Guidance states that "the
SAGE secretariat should also act as the information manager for
all SAGE products, storing and circulating them and publishing
them as and when appropriate".[258]
138. Since the publication of our report, Scientific
advice and evidence in emergencies, SAGE has been constituted
for the Fukushima nuclear disaster, the 2013-2014 winter floods
and the Ebola outbreak. Sir Mark told us that "ultimately
it is [his] responsibility"[259]
to ensure that SAGE complies with the Government Enhanced SAGE
Guidance and in follow-up evidence to us, Sir Mark wrote that
one of the lessons learned following the 2013-14 winter floods
SAGE was "Providing more challenge to the Government process
on when and how to provide scientific advice during an incident".[260]
Sir Mark also told us that our successor committee could expect
recent SAGE operations to be reviewed because "it is the
job of any well-functioning committee to review its own function
from time to time".[261]
139. The Government
has made progress in how scientific advice is incorporated into
the national risk assessment and in SAGE guidance. We do, however,
remind the Government of the need for SAGE to be as transparent
as possible. We recommend that all of
the output of SAGE meetings, minutes and other papers, be published
as soon as possible after an emergency situation ends. We also
recommend that the Government formally review the effectiveness
of recent SAGEs and their compliance with the Government's Enhanced
SAGE Guidance and publish the findings of this review.
Communicating climate science
140. In our report, Communicating climate science,
we expressed concern that a failure of Government to properly
communicate the state of the science could lead to a loss of public
support for climate policies.[262]
Sir Mark was reassured by a recent survey about public attitudes
to science; he told us that of the public "78% felt informed
and 99%, at least, had heard of"[263]
climate change. The Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC)
told us that it is "establishing an expert science communications
group to improve the way climate science is communicated by HMG
and agencies and organisations such as the Met Office Committee
on Climate Change and learned societies. We are currently working
out the details of the strategic role that this group will have,
and its terms of reference"[264]
and that it had recently held an all-day 'tweetathon' on climate
change.[265] The Government
has also informed us of a "cross Whitehall communications
capability review"[266]
that is underway.
141. We do not
dispute that the public is aware of climate change; however, our
inquiry focused on how climate science is communicated and the
content of that communication, which can have a dramatic effect
on the public's understanding and perception of the issue. Although
we welcome DECC's use of social media, we do not feel that climate
science can be effectively communicated in 140 characters. Organisations
such as the Science Media Centre and media fellowships at the
British Science Association may provide opportunities for government
collaboration with media professionals.
142. The Committee
has also been concerned that in order to communicate climate change
effectively the whole of government should use one agreed definition.
When this was put to Sir Mark Walport we were surprised at his
answer "… if you look at any dictionary definition,
you will mostly find three or four related ways of expressing
it. There is no single biblical legislative definition, and all
of these things need to be framed".
143. The Government
has made little progress in improving its communication of science.
Science is neither lexicography nor scripture and for it to be
communicated effectively there should be an agreed scientific
definition of climate change. We are disappointed that nearly
a year after our report on communicating climate science, DECC
has not even agreed the terms of reference for its climate change
communications group. We urge the next Government to systematically
review how it can best communicate science to the public. This
may be an area of interest for our successor committee.
144. Sciencewise is "the UK's national centre
for public dialogue in policy making involving science and technology
issues".[267]
Sir Mark's view was that "the public funding of science engagement
is important and, therefore, the programme that Sciencewise does
is important"[268]
and that "on the broad principle of whether the Government
as part of their funding should be funding public engagement work,
the answer to that is yes".[269]
We were encouraged that the
Government Chief Scientific Adviser recognises the value of funding
public engagement. We recommend that the
Government protect Sciencewise's funding and consider using Sciencewise
as a channel through which scientific advice and evidence is communicated
to the public, even where that evidence and advice is contrary
to government policy.
Home Office
Chief Scientific Adviser and the use of evidence
145. During our first inquiry into the Government's
decision to close the Forensic Science Service, we expressed our
deep concerns at the CSA's exclusion from the decision-making
process, and his apparent satisfaction at that exclusion.[270]
We were staggered that the department's official response to our
report still did not recognise the scientific consequences of
closing the Forensic Science Service nor that the department's
CSA should have provided science advice from the outset. When
we asked Lord Bates, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for
Criminal Information, whether this was a mistake, he stated that
"there is a strong scientific element to it" and that
"as a matter of routine, of course, that would be something
that the chief scientific adviser should be involved in and advising
on".[271] Alan
Pratt, Director of Science, Engineering and Technology in the
Home Office, added that "given the strength of feeling of
the Committee, had we our time again, perhaps we would have done
things slightly differently".[272]
146. The division of the forensics market into a
police "in-house" market and a private market has raised
concerns that there is a strong chance of losing the contextual
analysis of individual forensic evidence provided by a range of
different forensic practices. A police officer asking for a single
forensic test may not necessarily be aware of the potential of
this contextual analysis. Lord Bates told us that:
There is no evidence that that has been a problem.
If it were, as you suggest, then that would certainly be something
which the forensic science board and the scientific advisers would
be expressing a major concern about and demanding action, and
rightly so, but they are not saying that.[273]
147. Lord Bates added that "we cannot detect
that there has been any diminution of the overall forensic science
capability in the country. If anything, it has probably been enhanced
by plugging it into a broader network internationally".[274]
The Government should, in its response to this Report, set
out the evidence on which the Minister based this statement.
148. Given the
department's previous approach to using scientific advice and
evidence, we are concerned that Ministers in the department are
still not receiving the level of scientific advice and evidence
on this matter that they require. We recommend
that the Home Office reviews its governance structures for ensuring
scientific advice and evidence is fully integrated into policymaking
and ensures that scientific advice and evidence is effectively
incorporated into government policy.
149. We request that the Home Office's Chief Scientific
Adviser writes to our successor committee to reassure it that
he is aware of the scientific risks posed by the changing forensic
science landscape and that he is actively engaged with the policy
development in this matter.
Forensics strategy
150. In both our first report in 2011 on the Forensic
Science Service[275]
and our follow-up report on forensic science in 2013, we were
clear that the Government needed a forensic science strategy and
set out, in the latter report, key areas that the strategy should
cover.[276] In its
response to our 2013 report, the Government told us that it was
"drawing up a biometric and forensic strategy to be completed
by the end of the year [2013]".[277]
151. No biometric and forensic strategy has been
produced. Lord Bates was "sorry that we have not been able
to meet those commitments" and explained that "what
we have just undertaken to do now is to commission some further
collection of data to see if we can find a way through what should
be focused on" because "if you can't agree with the
territory that you are seeking to come up with a strategy for,
then it is very difficult to agree the strategy".[278]
In follow-up evidence to our inquiry into current and future uses
of biometric data and technologies, Lord Bates anticipated that
this further data collection "should be complete within three
months"[279] and
that "that should be the end of it"[280]
and that "the strategy itself [would] follow".[281]
152. Research and development was one of the keys
areas that we recommended should be covered by the Government's
strategy.[282] The
Government needs to ensure that forensic science providers are
able to capitalise on innovative research and technologies to
support the criminal justice system. This research and development
should not simply be confined to higher education institutes.
Despite the existence of Innovate UK's Forensic Science Knowledge
Transfer Network[283],
we are not aware of any Government policies or initiatives to
improve the landscape for forensic science research and development.
153. Over recent months, the forensic science landscape
has received increasing attention, for example at the Royal Society's
two day event in February 2015 entitled 'The paradigm shift for
UK forensic science' and in BBC Radio 5 Live's 30 minute discussion
of the topic on 4 February 2015.
154. The Home
Office's lack of progress in producing a forensic science strategy
is symptomatic of its failure to oversee responsibly the changing
forensic science landscape. Forensic science is a key element
of the criminal justice system: a Government forensic science
strategy, covering issues such as research and development, is
desperately needed to ensure that the criminal justice system
is not adversely affected in the future.
155. A wide range of stakeholders has an interest
in forensic science and biometrics and Mr Pratt, Director of Science,
Engineering and Technology in the Home Office, told us that many
of those stakeholders are represented in the department's forensic
and biometric policy group.[284]
We note, however, from Mr Pratt's evidence, that the Ministry
of Justice itself does not appear to be represented on the forensic
and biometric policy group. It
is imperative that forensic science receives ministerial oversight
from the Ministry of Justice as well as the Home Office. Such
ministerial oversight should, ideally, sit with one individual
to ensure that the criminal justice system is not prejudiced by
the changing forensic science landscape.
We recommend that the Government, in its response to this report,
explain where ministerial responsibility for forensic science
lies within the Ministry for Justice and what steps are being
taken to protect the integrity of forensic evidence submitted
to the courts.
156. In follow-up written evidence, Lord Bates explained
that he is "not proposing to publish the minutes" of
the Forensic and Biometric Policy Group's meetings because "the
focus of the Group has shifted, over time, towards ongoing policy
discussion".[285]
We remind the Home Office of the Government's transparency
aims and recommend that minutes of all meetings of the Forensic
and Biometric Policy Group are published.
Forensics market
157. Our second inquiry into forensic science in
2013 underlined the lack of information that is available on the
total size of the forensic science market, and in particular police
"in-house" spending on forensic services,[286]
and the risk this poses to the stability of the market. Lord Bates
told us that the Government "recognise[s] that we could get
better in arriving at that data if there was more transparency
in how police forces accounted for in-house provision of forensics".[287]
Despite this, the Minister was "quietly confident"[288]
about the health of the forensic science market.
158. In preparation for this Report, we requested
that the National Audit Office (NAO) produce a short paper on
the Home Office's oversight of the forensic science market.[289]
Two of the NAO's key findings were that:
· The data available publicly on forensics
spending is limited. The information that is available is incomplete,
inconsistent and/or difficult to access.
· Police forces are undertaking more forensics
work internally and this could undermine the market.[290]
159. The NAO quoted figures from the Chartered Institute
of Public Finance and Accountancy that estimate the police "in-house"
market, in 2014-15, to be one and half times the size of the private
sector market (£122 million versus £81 million).[291]
The NAO reasoned that "if suppliers did pull out of the market
this could present a risk of service interruption, and lack of
capacity could hold up criminal cases or cause them to collapse".[292]
160. The NAO's warning echoes oral evidence provided
by Dr Gillian Tully in 2011, then in her role as Research and
Development Manager, Forensic Science Service, and who is now
the Forensic Science Regulator. When asked whether there was a
risk of murderers and rapists escaping justice because of the
closure of the Forensic Science Service, Dr Tully gave an example
of the expertise of the Forensic Science Service leading to an
individual, initially acquitted of a stabbing, being convicted
at a retrial. Dr Tully added that "many years can be saved
and justice can be brought about more quickly and efficiently"
where forensic science services are provided by experienced experts
who have the opportunity to undertake a holistic analysis of criminal
evidence.[293]
161. We are
disappointed that the Government has not made any progress in
improving the quality of police spending data since our last report.
Unlike the Minister, we are not "quietly confident"
about the health of the forensic science market; we believe that
the Government's and police procurement processes need a complete
overhaul.
Forensic service regulator's powers
162. In 2011 we urged the Government to bring forward
proposals to provide the regulator with statutory powers "immediately".[294]
In November 2013, the Government eventually launched a consultation
on 'New statutory powers for the Forensic Science Regulator'.[295]
The consultation closed on 3 January 2014 and no further information
has been published since. Alan Pratt, Director of Science, Engineering
and Technology in the Home Office, explained that "there
was a strong view from the people we consulted that there is merit
in having a statutory basis for regulatory powers in this area
[enforcement of quality standards]".[296]
He also explained that, with a new regulator coming into post
in November 2014, it was felt that she should have the opportunity
"to consult widely with the network of people whom she will
be regulating and to consider the range of options that were coming
out of the public consultation. That is happening now and it is
the intention, as I understand it, to publish".[297]
Lord Bates added that these were "more conversations to make
sure that these are exactly the powers that she wants".[298]
In follow-up written evidence, he explained that the consultation
indicated "a general view that the Regulator should have
statutory powers in relation to traditional forensic areas such
as DNA, fingerprints, fibres and the presence of drugs. However,
there is a range of views on whether other areas such as facial
identification, CCTV analysis and several other disciplines should
be included".[299]
163. Private sector forensic service providers have
repeatedly told us that one advantage police "in-house"
providers enjoy is that they do not have to be accredited to the
relevant international quality standards. Lord Bates told us that
"32 [out of 43] forces are accredited for DNA, 13 for fingerprint
enhancement and 16 have applications in progress for fingerprint
enhancement".[300]
The Forensic Science Regulator's Codes of Practice and Conduct
for forensic science providers and practitioners in the Criminal
Justice System[301]
sets out the standards to which all providers of forensic
science services should be accredited. We note that accreditation
standards are cited in the NAO's paper as one cause of the "unequal
playing field" between police "in-house" and private
sector forensic service providers.[302]
164. The Government
has made poor progress in ensuring that all police
"in-house" forensic service providers are accredited
to the same standards as private sector providers for all
of the services that they provide.
165. The Home
Office's discussions to make sure the new powers are exactly what
the new regulator wants are an example of the Home Office's unusual
approach to policy making: private conversations undermine the
value and credibility of the department's previous consultation
exercise. We recommend that the Home Office
publishes minutes of the meetings it holds with the new forensic
science regulator regarding this issue.
166. The Government's
continued delay in giving the Forensic Science Regulator statutory
powers is inexcusable. It is one of the Government's many failings
in forensic science and one which they could have remedied by
laying legislation before Parliament.
167. We strongly recommend that our successor
committee pursue the matter of forensic science with the next
government as we remain concerned that cases will emerge where
injustices have occurred.
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