2 Introduction
Trust in Politicians, Parliament,
and Politics
9. One of the aims of this inquiry has been to improve
confidence in the system: we do not underestimate the difficulty
of that task. Public trust in MPs is low, and it was at the least
not enhanced by the expenses scandal of 2009-10.[13]
Several witnesses addressed this question of confidence. Three
themes emerged: the difficulty of measuring "trust";
the perceived decline in "trust"; and the challenges
in increasing "trust".
10. The academics who gave evidence to the inquiry
were deeply sceptical about the value of trying to measure "trust",
whether in Parliament or in MPs, let alone of using it as an indicator
of the health of a democracy. Ruth Fox warned the inquiry:
Every year we [the Hansard Society] publish our
annual audit of political engagement. We rarely ask about trust,
because it is such an amorphous concept and means different things
to different people. In a lot of the research, when people talk
about trust they are actually talking about other things. Sometimes,
we might ask other survey questions that are much more about confidence,
honesty, reliability and effectiveness, rather than using the
word 'trust'.[14]
Liz Dávid-Barrett and Greg Power[15]
answered in similar terms. Other witnesses argued, like Melanie
Sully, that whatever the difficulties in measuring trust there
was a lack of trust or declining trust not just in Parliament
but in politics generally.[16]
Richard Thomas noted that the Committee on Standards in Public
Life's research "has revealed there is quite significant
public malaise and declining confidence and trust. I think we
would say that there is really quite an urgent need for swift,
demonstrable steps to be taken".[17]
11. Some of the witnesses, however, urged caution
in over-emphasising the decline in trust. For example, Jack Straw
argued that politicians were rarely trusted:
It is important that we do not get ourselves
into a gloom about this. Politicians have never been trusted.
In a sense, in a democracy that is quite healthy. [...] In the
middle of the [Second World] war, Gallup surveyed public trust
in politicians and it was pretty low.[18]
Ruth Fox and Greg Power noted that people hold MPs
and institutions in different levels of esteem, Greg Power saying:
In terms of ethics, ethical standards and the
behaviour of individual MPs, although trust in parliamentary institutions
is quite low, trust in individual Members of Parliament and especially
'your local MP' is quite high. You can see demand for constituency
service in particular increasing dramatically right around the
world. Therefore it is not a simple equation that people don't
trust Parliaments or politicians. They are expecting different
things from Parliaments.[19]
12. Most witnesses took a pessimistic view of the
likelihood that action by the House could improve the public standing
of MPs. Some, indeed, suggested the reverse. Jack Straw noted
that, compared with the time when he became an MP at the general
election of May 1979: "These days MPs are much more effective,
are much more likely to be full time and are certainly much more
subject to accountability to their constituents, yet apparently
they are held in less high esteem. It is complicated."[20]
Peter Riddell, in a similar vein, pointed out that, notwithstanding
the work of the Committee on Standards in Public Life over two
decades, "increased transparency has produced no increase
in public confidence at all."[21]
The implication of this for the current inquiry is, in Peter Riddell's
view:
You can make perfectly sensible, desirable suggestions
… but I remain sceptical about whether they will necessarily
make a difference to public confidence. There are some inherent
problems, some of which have just been raised, on the borderlines
of sanctions and also on some conduct that does not come within
your remit, but it does in the eyes of the public.[22]
Jack Straw's view was:
Over time, memories of the expenses scandal,
which completely consumed this place five or six years ago, will
gradually fade. As one colleague has already said, IPSA [the Independent
Parliamentary Standards Authority] will bed down; it is already
bedding down, and it is here to stay.[23]
13. It is ironic that despite public scepticism,
many observers believe the UK Parliament operates to high standards.
Tellingly, Greg Power observed that a delegation from the Middle
East found the response to the expenses scandal out of proportion:
It [the scandal] was so piddling by international
standards. There was clearly wrongdoing by certain individual
MPs, but the coverage was way out of proportion to the level of
wrongdoing discovered here. There was no buying of influence in
the way that is commonly found in many other countries.[24]
Greg Power and Melanie Sully each suggested that
there was an argument that the more work was done on creating
Codes of Conduct and carrying on investigations the more the likelihood
was that people would assume there was a problem.[25]
The importance of perception may be seen in Lord Bew's remark
that the Committee on Standards in Public Life's "polling
shows [...] that the British are 20% more likely than the Dutch
to believe in corruption in their public life, although their
actual experience of it is the same as that of the Dutch".[26]
14. Whatever the complexities in public trust, the
expenses scandal was clearly hugely damaging. Moreover, we accept
Lord Bew's assessment that, though not fully fair or accurate
in its representation of how the standards system works, the perception
that MPs "mark their own homework" is damaging to public
confidence in the system, and therefore to the standing of MPs
and of the House. .But a knee jerk reaction "to improve public
trust" will not, in itself, be effective. Indeed it could
be counterproductive. Ruth Fox thought that the focus should be
on building the efficacy of Parliament (and its MPs) rather than
focusing on "trust" as an end in itself.[27]
Our aim is to improve the efficacy and knowledge of the standards
system. We will recommend changes where we believe them to be
necessary and right. Our work is intended to improve confidence
in the system, which will increase over time.
15. Notwithstanding the difficulties, some witnesses
were keen to advocate ways in which they believed that public
trust in Parliament and politicians could be improved. "The
key thing for public trust", Angela Eagle told the inquiry,
"is not only the involvement of lay members, with their right
to have a say if they want to draw the attention of the public
to something nefarious, something they disapprove of or some insider
thing, but that there should be no Government majority."[28]
Laura Sandys told us:
There is a very big problem. First, your confusion
issue is a huge one. I want to be able to knock on a door and
to have a conversation with a constituent in two sentences, telling
them how my conduct is being so-called monitored, what I am complying
with and how that works. What we had recently was absolute confusion,
from everybody's perspective, about who was in control of what.
There was no ability for me to make that message clear on the
doorstep. We need clarity.[29]
16. Laura Sandys's comment drew our attention to
a problem, also mentioned in the Report of the lay members and
by Angela Eagle, who said:
We have to be careful about the proliferation
of bodies and arrangements that have a locus in this area. We
have already talked about the Electoral Commission, which has
a partially overlapping locus with different expectations and
rules—IPSA, the Standards Commissioner, the Commissioner
for Standards in Public Life. We have to be careful about the
proliferation of bodies and arrangements that have a locus in
this area.[30]
In addition, MPs and Members of the House of Lords
who are government ministers are subject to the Ministerial Code.
Although these bodies perform different functions, the distinctions
between them are not necessarily clear to the general public.
While addressing this is beyond the scope of the current Committee,
we believe that a key to increasing public confidence is clearer
information to the public about who is accountable for what. There
must also be a question as to whether there would be merit in
combining some of the functions.
The current House of Commons standards
system
17. In view of the wide-spread ignorance, spreading
to the highest level of Parliament and Government[31]
about the existing House of Commons standards system.
we give a brief account of it here, returning as necessary to
its components in later chapters. It is no part of our role to
consider the separate provisions in force in the House of Lords.[32]
We note also that behaviour in the Chamber is regulated by the
Speaker.
BACKGROUND: FROM PURE SELF-REGULATION TO INDEPENDENT
AND EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT
18. For hundreds of years before the Nolan Committee
and the creation of the role of the Commissioner, the House of
Commons and its MPs were entirely self-regulating. Indeed, for
most of that time there was little to regulate: the House started
actively to codify its rules—though still under a system
of pure self-regulation—in 1975, when the Register of MPs'
Interests was introduced in response to the Poulson affair.[33]
This system of registration was, though, substantially undermined
by the persistent refusal of some MPs, most notably Enoch Powell
MP, to comply with its requirements.[34]
19. Following the 1987 general election and a scandal
involving John Browne MP in 1990, the operation of the rules was
tightened. That tightening was not enough to prevent further scandals,
and cases of "cash for questions" in the mid-1990s precipitated
the invention of the Commissioner's office. Since 1995 the core
of the system has been that investigations are conducted by an
independent officer, who receives all complaints, and who decides
which merit investigation, without reference to the Committee.
20. Over the past two decades, external organisations
have added to the accountability of MPs. There are two bodies
independent of the House of Commons involved in regulating matters
relating to MPs: MPs' expenses are regulated by the Independent
Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA) and donations to MPs
and their parties are regulated by the Electoral Commission. Criminal
matters are the remit of the police in conjunction with the Crown
Prosecution Service. There are arrangements in place to ensure
that the Committee and the Commissioner refer matters to the police
if appropriate, and to ensure that matters can be referred to
the Commissioner by IPSA or the police. MPs are not exempt from
prosecution for criminal conduct; their electoral conduct is regulated
by the Electoral Commission and their expenses (and therefore
the sensitive matter of taxpayer funds) are regulated by the Independent
Parliamentary Standards Authority. Any consideration of the Commons
system has to take this into account.
21. The current Commons system is one of self-regulation
with strong independent elements in the shape of the Parliamentary
Commissioner for Standards and the lay members of the Committee
on Standards. The authority ultimately responsible for setting
and maintaining standards in the House of Commons is the House
itself. The other elements of the formal system are the Code of
Conduct and guide to the Rules relating to the conduct of Members,[35]
the Commissioner for Standards, and the Standards Committee.
THE CODE OF CONDUCT
22. The Code of Conduct is based on the Seven Principles
of Public Life, formulated by the Committee on Standards in Public
Life in 1995, to which everyone holding public office is expected
to adhere. These principles (also known as the 'Nolan Principles'
after the first Chair of that Committee) are: selflessness, integrity,
objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership.
The Code is part of the rules the House makes to govern its own
proceedings. These rules can be broadly divided into two sorts.
In the first place there are the rules which govern the orderliness
of proceedings, which range from the rules about the permissible
content of Parliamentary Questions to the way in which MPs should
conduct themselves in the Chamber. The sanctions for breaches
of these rules are ultimately in the hands of the Speaker, who
may, for example, rule a Question out of order or may, in extreme
cases, invite the House to suspend an MP who seriously disrupts
proceedings. Rules of the second type relate to ethical matters,
and are largely contained in the Code of Conduct and the related
Guide to the Rules relating to the conduct of MPs, although some
guidance is also found in other rules relating to the use of resources.[36]
Allegations that these rules have been breached are investigated
by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards and, if she considers
there may have been a breach, are considered by the Committee
on Standards. It is the system for dealing with these rules which
we consider in this report.
THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER FOR STANDARDS
23. The Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards
('the Commissioner') is an independent official appointed by the
House and from outside the House, with no previous connection
with the House, following open competition. Her independence is
the core of the system, and is strengthened by appointment on
a five year, non-renewable contract.
24. The Commissioner's current functions as set out
in Standing Order No 150 are: to maintain the various Registers
of Interests, to give confidential advice to those required to
register, to advise the Committee on the interpretation of the
Code and on questions of propriety, to monitor and make suggestions
about the operation of the Code and Registers, and to investigate
and report to the Committee on specific matters relating to the
conduct of MPs. This last function relates essentially to complaints
that individuals have breached the Code or Rules.
25. The bulk of the inquiries conducted by the Commissioner
result from complaints received by her Office. Only if a complaint
is within remit and supported by appropriate and sufficient evidence
will the Commissioner open an inquiry. She can, however, undertake
inquiries on her own initiative, and sometimes MPs refer themselves
to her. It is for the Commissioner to decide whether or not an
inquiry is merited and whether or not to submit a memorandum to
the Committee. There is no political interference in the process.
26. The Commissioner's current establishment is
5.5 (full-time equivalent) staff broadly divided between a registration
and advice team and a complaints-related team, with some overlap
in roles.[37] The annual
cost of the office is a little under £450,000.[38]
27. In 2013-14 the Commissioner received some 93
formal complaints, though the majority of them were outside her
remit. As with any complaints system, complaints range from the
well-founded to the misconceived and even mischievous.
28. If the Commissioner finds that the Code or Rules
have been breached, and the matter is not serious, she may agree
that the MP concerned may rectify the matter by repayment (if
resources have been misapplied), apology or, if interests have
not been declared, an apology for the failure to declare by a
point of order on the floor of the House. If, in her opinion,
the matter is more serious or raises general questions, she will
prepare a memorandum for the House of Commons Committee on Standards,
which oversees her work. The system is designed to ensure transparency.
Correspondence relating to rectifications is published on the
Commissioner's website, complainants are always informed of the
outcome of a complaint and the Commissioner's memorandum is always
published with the Committee's reports, which must always explain
the reasons for any difference of views between the Committee
and the Commissioner.
THE COMMITTEE
29. The Committee on Standards is set up under Standing
Order No 149. Its functions are:
· to oversee the work of the Parliamentary
Commissioner for Standards; to examine the arrangements proposed
by the Commissioner for the compilation, maintenance and accessibility
of the Register of MPs' Financial Interests and any other registers
of interest established by the House; to review from time to time
the form and content of those registers; and to consider any specific
complaints made in relation to the registering or declaring of
interests referred to it by the Commissioner; and
· to consider any matter relating to the
conduct of MPs, including specific complaints in relation to alleged
breaches in any code of conduct to which the House has agreed
and which have been drawn to the committee's attention by the
Commissioner; and to recommend any modifications to such code
of conduct as may from time to time appear to be necessary.[39]
30. The Committee comprises ten MPs and three lay
members. The Committee cannot meet without at least one lay member
being present. Lay members cannot vote in divisions or move motions
or amendments but they participate fully in all discussions leading
up to these points and can and do suggest changes to draft Reports.
Those lay members present are entitled to append an opinion to
any Committee report and, if they do so, the report cannot be
published without that opinion. No such opinion has yet been necessary.
31. The Committee may seek additional evidence itself
or ask the Commissioner to do so. It may require the MP to give
evidence and the Member may also ask to be heard.
THE HOUSE
32. If the Committee finds, following discussion
of a memorandum from the Commissioner, that a breach of Code or
Rules has been committed, it reports accordingly to the House.
Penalties range from an apology in the House through repayment
of any moneys wrongly claimed, or withholding of salary for a
period, to suspension for a number of sitting days (which results
in withdrawal of salary with knock-on effect of pension rights),
to expulsion. The MP has the right to be heard in the House. If
the Committee proposes a penalty which goes beyond apology to
the House, the House itself considers the Committee's report—i.e.,
it is for the Committee, not the Commissioner, to recommend any
penalty, and for the House to impose it. While the House may,
in principle, amend any penalty recommended, it has not done so
in any recent cases.
33. This system is likely to be affected by any Act
resulting from the Recall Bill, currently passing through Parliament,
which proposes to allow an MP's constituents, in certain circumstances,
to institute a petition for his or her recall. At present this
will apply if an MP is suspended from the House for more than
ten days. The Bill has not yet completed its passage and this
may change.
34. A number of criticisms are levelled at the House
of Commons disciplinary system both by outside observers and parliamentary
insiders: MPs sit in judgement on themselves; the Commissioner
is not truly independent; there is incomplete separation of powers
with the Commissioner acting as investigator, prosecutor and to
some extent adjudicator; the system is disproportionate; the rules
are not clear; MPs cannot get advice; the sanctions are insufficient.
It is these criticisms which this Report considers and, where
appropriate, makes recommendation for addressing.
13 Q68 Back
14
ibid Back
15
ibid Back
16
ibid Back
17
Q5 Back
18
Q148 Back
19
Q68 Back
20
Q156 Back
21
Q44 Back
22
Q44 Back
23
Q157 Back
24
Q70 Back
25
Q68 Back
26
Q5 Back
27
Q68 Back
28
Q53 Back
29
Q145 Back
30
Q66 Back
31
The Prime Minister was apparently unaware in April 2014 that the
lay members on the Committee on Standards had a vote. Back
32
SSC0023 Back
33
The same affair led to the imposition of a Code of Conduct for
elected Members of local authorities; but not for MPs. Back
34
See also Select Committee on Member's Interests, Third Report,
Session 1987-88, on the actions of Keith Best MP and Eric Cockeram
MP in relation to the BT share issue. Back
35
The Code of Conduct together with The Guide to the Rules relating
to the conduct of Members, HC1885 Back
36
Eg Rules for the use of stationery and postage-paid envelopes
provided by the House, and for the use of the Crowned Portcullis Back
37
SSC0022 Back
38
Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards Annual Report 2013-14,
HC354 Back
39
Standing Orders of the House of Commons, No 149 Back
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