5 The detail of the system
120. We turn now to some matters of detail. If any
system is going to work .
· Rules must be clear
· Reliable guidance should be available
to individuals in cases of doubt
· Investigations should be fair
· There should be an appropriate appeals
mechanisms
· Sanctions should be proportionate
In our view, the current system broadly meets these
requirements, but we have some suggestions for improvement.[114]
Clarity and availability of rules
and guidance
121. The percentage of serving MPs who were elected
before 1997 is only 21%. Therefore an overwhelming majority of
MPs have never known the House of Commons without the Code and
Commissioner. A third entered it in full knowledge of the expenses
scandal. Given that the vast majority of MPs have been subject
to the system for their entire parliamentary careers, it might
be expected that they would be familiar with it.
122. Peter Riddell could not understand why any MPs
might not be aware of the Code: the rules are long-standing, and
clear. "Indeed", he said, "the breaches that there
have been in this Parliament have been blatant." [115]
"I cannot see, of the cases we have had in the current Parliament,
that there is any ambiguity about any of them." [116]
The evidence is, indeed, that the great majority of MPs do comply
with the required standards. As Angela Eagle said:
We only hear about the ones that don't. Sometimes
I think it is important for us to remember that the vast majority
of Members of Parliament do.[117]
123. Angela Eagle believed that some issuese.g.
the ban on paid advocacywere very clear now, and that the
culture of compliance on these issues had improved over time;
but that an MP's involvement in public life threw up complexities
which need to be understood.[118]
124. Despite the publication of Code of Conduct and
Guide to the Rules in both hard copy and electronic format (which
is sent to all MPs after election), and the fact that that induction
is provided for MPs after election and that their attention is
also drawn to any revisions of the Code and Guide, we received
evidence that some MPs were unaware of the documents. [119]
125. Not all the rules are as accessible as the Code
and Guide. The Commissioner can investigate complaints about breaches
of certain rules drawn up by other House authorities, for instance
about the use of stationery and catering facilities. The rules
regarding the catering facilities are to be found on the parliamentary
intranet under 'catering and outlets', then 'banqueting' (sub-head
'House of Commons' and then as 'Conditions of hire' at the bottom
of the page). On the main parliamentary website they appear under
'Visiting Parliament'. The rules relating to stationery lie with
the Department of Facilities and can be found by searching the
indices of the external and internal websites. We share the Commissioner's
concern that the rules regarding use of stationery, refreshment
facilities and other matters are not as easily found as the Code
and Guide, and welcome her efforts to collate all the applicable
rules in one place. Modern technology should facilitate the provision
of them to all MPs as an app.
Guidance to individuals
126. To win the active assent of those subject to
it, any regulatory system must provide for reliable advice to
individuals seeking guidance in respect of particular circumstances.
Judging from the evidence of the MPs and former MPs to whom we
spoke, there is an un-met need for guidance to individual MPs,
both in respect of individual circumstances and when an MP is
the subject of a complaint. However, we also recognise that advance
guidance is always given on the basis of the precise language
of the question. The subsequent activity may not actually match
the original question and the original advice.
127. MPs who were unsure of the rules reported falling
back on a number of expedients. Concern about how behaviour might
be reported in the media was reported as being a powerful incentive
to good behaviour. Laura Sandys said:
I would say that the best form of individual
self-regulation is whether you are happy for what you are about
to do to appear on the front page of a newspaper. That happens
to be the ultimate code of conduct. Anything else is just words
that can be moved and spun in any way that the Express
or any other newspaper wants to.[120]
James Arbuthnot concurred: "Absolutely".[121]
MPs also reported falling back on what they knew to be right.[122]
And, though no witness mentioned them, the Speaker's Chaplain
and duty Roman Catholic priest, whose details appear on the parliamentary
website (a Methodist minister also attends once a month) list
pastoral work in the House as one of their duties. MPs also naturally
turn to their party whips for advice and absorb the ethos of Parliament
from more experienced colleagues; the latter may be risky if the
knowledge of the 'experienced colleague' concerned is out of date.
128. We are conscious that pressure of work leads
MPs to rely heavily on assistance from their staff. While it is
the case that MPs are responsible for the work done by their staff,
it is important that senior staff in particular are enabled to
understand and apply the standards expected of the MPs.
129. The Commissioner's Office is the main source
of official guidance in relation to the Code of Conduct and the
Guide to the Rules but the relevant House authorities are responsible
for giving advice on other sets of rules such as those relating
to stationery. As the Commissioner says, MPs seek advice mainly
in relation to specific issues. There is, however, an acknowledged
tension between the Commissioner's advice function and her investigatory
function (see paragraphs 131 and 132); to assuage this, the day-to-day
advice is given by the Registrar of Members' Financial Interests.[123]
Nonetheless the Commissioner is available to speak in confidence
to individual MPs and accepts such requests several times a year.
130. Some of the MPs and former MPs to whom we spoke
expressed concerns about the advice function of the Commissioner's
office. These concerns included apparent retrospective reinterpretation
of the rules and a perception that advice acted on in good faith
could be found to have been incorrect. As James Arbuthnot explained:
MPs have experienced the problem that if they
ask for advice, they get it and they take it, that proves not
to be conclusive. It is quite difficult to obey not only the rules
that exist but the rules that you ought to have known should have
existedand to do that retrospectively. If you are looking
for advice and you then cannot rely on it, it may tend to propel
you towards not bothering with taking that advice.[124]
David Howarth made a similar point:
To me, as someone now on the outside, it still
seems quite often unfair to offer advice but with the caveat that
you cannot rely on iteven the Electoral Commission does
thatand for the authorities then to turn round later and
say, "Well, you should have worked that out yourself".[125]
131. Of course, no advice system which separates
the advice function from the adjudicatory one can provide an absolute
guarantee that taking advice will protect the seeker from criticism:
at best it can provide a mitigation if a breach of the Code or
Rules is later identified. To that extent James Arbuthnot is right.
132. The tension between the Commissioner's advice
and investigatory functions becomes acute when a complaint arises,
and this has led to suggestions that they should be separated.
The Commissioner opposes such separation:
I consider that interpretation of the rules and
advice on ethical issues is a fundamental part of my role. It
is not unusual in complaints handling organisations for there
to be an advice-giving function alongside a responsibility to
investigate individual complaints, and with care the two roles
can be managed.
It is, I think, almost inevitable that Members
would still wish to consult with the Commissioner and his/her
team about how the Commissioner will interpret the rules in any
given set of circumstances, since it is the Commissioner who will
make the determination in the event of a complaint. That might
make it impractical to separate the roles on a day-to-day basis.
Without first-hand knowledge and experience of
complaints and Registration, an Ethics Officer would either have
to identify themes to pursue on the basis of what (s)he thinks
may be topical/interesting for Members or to rely on retrospective
data from the Complaints Team. Any educational function with Members
would require the Ethics Officer to have an effective working
knowledge of the existing rules and to be aware of precedent complaints,
making it difficult to achieve a separation from the rest of the
team.
The creation of a separate Ethics Officer role
is likely to be expensive. Even if the officer were to report
to the Commissioner (and it is doubtful that it should, if the
emphasis is on a separation of powers), the creation of sufficient
distance between the new role and that of the current team would
imply separate administrative arrangements, office space, etc.
all of which would come at a price. The Committee would also wish
to consider the relationship between an Ethics Officer and the
Committee itself.[126]
133. We agree with the Commissioner. Members of Parliament
who wish to receive advice on specific issues should approach
the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. If
they do so, and accept the advice offered, the Commissioner and
Committee should bear this in mind when considering any subsequent
complaints about their conduct. The same applies where the advice
sought and accepted came from other responsible House of Commons
authorities. MPs should always ask for advice to be confirmed
in writing.
134. We understand why some MPs would like to see
the advice function separated from the investigation one, but
there is a question of proportionality and cost. The system is
designed to cover 650 people, and we believe that to introduce
a separate advice function would be disproportionate.
Fairness
THE PROCESS
135. If an MP is investigated, it is important that
the system for investigation is fair. The House has thought it
appropriate to adopt an investigatory rather than an adversarial
process. The Commissioner investigates and presents her findings
to the Committee. The Commissioner's note 'Procedure for Inquiries'
(which is sent to the MP when the Commissioner has accepted a
complaint) explains the process:
Members will be informed about allegations against
them when the Commissioner has decided there is sufficient evidence
to justify initiating an inquiry. The Commissioner will write
to the Member concerned. In this letter the Commissioner will:
tell the Member the nature of the allegation; set out the relevant
rules of the House; provide the Member with the evidence supporting
that allegation; and ask the Member for their response. What is
asked of the Member is to give a full and truthful account of
the matters which have given rise to the allegation.
In the course of the inquiry the Commissioner
may ask the Member follow-up questions, seek evidence from any
witnesses, including any identified by the Member, and consult
authorities such as the relevant Department of the House of Commons,
or the Registrar of Members' Financial Interests. The Commissioner
may interview the Member in the course of the inquiry, and will
always see or speak to the Member if the Member so requests. When
interviewing the Member, the Commissioner will normally make a
record of the interview and subsequently clear that record with
the Member to ensure its accuracy.
Under paragraph 19 of the Code of Conduct Members
are required to cooperate, at all stages, with any inquiry. The
Committee may also exercise its power to summon persons, papers
and records, either independently or at the Commissioner's request.
A Member has the right at any time to provide
any evidence he or she wishes to the Commissioner, including drawing
attention to the names of any witnesses which he or she believes
to be material to the consideration of the allegation. Except
where an Investigatory Panel has been appointed, the Member does
not have the right to cross-examine directly witnesses who may
have given evidence in support of the allegation. However the
Commissioner will put to the Member all material evidence in support
of the allegation so that the Member may have an opportunity to
challenge it if he or she so wishes.
Any evidence which a Member supplies can be expected
to become public, although the Commissioner and the Committee
are ready to consider requests for the deletion of confidential
and personal information which is not relevant to the resolution
of the inquiry.
The role of the Commissioner as an investigator
is to report the facts as found and offer the Commissioner's own
conclusion on whether the Code has been breached. Paragraph 3
above sets out the normal outcomes of an inquiry. Before reaching
his or her conclusions, the Commissioner will share the draft
factual sections of any report to the Committee with the Member
so that the Member has an opportunity to comment on them. The
Commissioner will include in this report the Member's evidence,
both in the body of the report and as annexes. [127]
136. When the Commissioner has concluded a Memorandum,
she sends it to the MP, currently minus her analysis and conclusions.
The Member is given time to comment on it; when the Commissioner
has considered any points the Member makes she adds her conclusions
and sends it to the Committee for consideration. It is open to
the Committee to ask her to seek further information, it may seek
further evidence itself.
137. The MP who is the subject of the inquiry may
ask to appear before the Committee for an evidence session. This
is held in private, but a transcript is subsequently published.
Richard Caborn and Bill Wiggin told us that they would prefer
hearings to be held in public,[128]
and we return to this question when discussing media matters.
They have also told us that they are discouraged from asking to
appear in person to explain their side of things.[129]
We would deplore any suggestion that any MP should be dissuaded
from providing any evidence to the Commissioner or to the Committee
that would assist in resolving a case.
138. While Bill Wiggin was concerned that he felt
that he was expected to incriminate himself,[130]
we consider that the system gives MPs safeguards even before the
matter reaches the Committee. MPs may produce to the Commissioner
any evidence they consider relevant and are given the opportunity
to comment on the factual sections of her Memorandum before it
goes to the Committee. A further safeguard could be introduced
if the Commissioner were to provide investigated MPs with her
analysis, and we understand that she would not object to doing
so. We expect our successor Committee and the Commissioner to
consider how this might be done.
139. We have discussed above (paragraph 141) the
propriety of the Commissioner being present in the Committee room
when the Committee are discussing memoranda.
140. When the Committee has considered the Commissioner's
memorandum, an agreed Report is made to the House. When the Committee
is at variance with the Commissioner, the publication of the Commissioner's
memorandum with the Report means that they are obliged to explain
the reasons for the difference of opinion.
STANDARD OF PROOF
141. The Commissioner uses a civil standard of proof.
Her note on the procedure for inquiries says:
When considering allegations against Members,
the Commissioner and the Committee normally require allegations
to be proved on the balance of probabilities, namely, that they
are more likely than not to be true. Where the Commissioner and
the Committee deem the allegations to be sufficiently serious,
a higher standard of proof will be applied, namely, that the allegations
are significantly more likely than not to be true. [131]
Gordon Downey had used a similar approach when he
was Commissioner, writing:
One issue the Committee might like to consider
is the question of standard of proof. Since there are not criminal
matters, I took the view that the civil standard of "balance
of evidence" was generally appropriate. However, where serious
misdemeanours were alleged on which a verdict could ruin an MP's
career, I felt the standard needed to be pretty close to "beyond
reasonable doubt".[132]
142. Bill Wiggin argued that making of judgements
based on probabilities was one of the reasons why the adjudication
process could not be fair:
It is a code but it does not stack up at all.
You are making judgments on probability. You are using principles.
You are not giving people proper rules and yet, here we are, making
rules for the rest of the country."[133]
He therefore advocated MPs being held accountable
to a contract of employment rather than a Code of Conduct. Since,
as we have explored, MPs are not in an employment process, we
cannot see how this would work. Moreover, employers might take
disciplinary action based on the civil rather than the criminal
standard of proof, and most professional conduct bodies, such
as the Solicitor's Regulation Authority, use the civil standard
of proof, and the Law Commission has recently recommended that
the civil standard of proof should continue to apply to all fitness
to practice hearings in the health and social care professions.[134]
143. The civil standard is a single one; in principle
the same standard, of balance of probabilities applies regardless
of the seriousness of the allegations. But case law also makes
clear that certain types of conduct, may be regarded as intrinsically
less probable than others, [135]
and those adjudicating will bear this in mind. In practical
outcomes, there is likely to be little difference between the
current formulation used by the Committee and Commissioner and
the practice of the courts. The standard used by Commissioners
has in effect been the normal civil standard tempered by the view
that some things are inherently implausible. We consider that
the wording in the Procedure for Investigations is more readily
understandable by those who are not legal practitioners. We conclude
that the standard of proof used by the Commissioner and Committee
is appropriate.
144. We are confirmed in our belief in the essential
fairness of the process by the recent decision of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the case of Geoffrey William
Hoon against the United Kingdom. Mr Hoon, a former MP, had been
found by the Commissioner and Committee to have breached the Code
while still serving as an MP. Mr Hoon applied to the ECtHR on
the grounds that there had been a number of violations of the
Convention on Human Rights, that he had been denied access to
a court to appeal against the legality of the parliamentary proceedings
and the sanctions imposed, that his right to private life had
been violated and that he could not bring judicial proceedings
to challenge the decisions of the Commissioner, Committee or House.
The ECtHR unanimously declared Mr Hoon's application inadmissible.
Particularly relevant is their statement that "the Court
considers that the procedure followed gave the applicant a fair
opportunity to put his case and defend his interests, as regards
both his status as a public office-holder and as regards his private
reputation". The judgement also found that "the interference
with his private life was not disproportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued".[136]
SUPPORT FOR MPS
145. Even though we are confident the system is broadly
fair, we believe MPs who are the subject of a complaint need some
additional support and advice. A specific concern was that once
the Commissioner has received a complaint, her office will not
give the MP advice, other than purely procedural advice. Bill
Wiggin said:
In my experience there is no help, support or
advice of any sort for a Member of Parliament who is being investigated.
If you were to have an external process you could perhaps get
legal advice, but because our system does not fall under the law
you cannot consult a solicitor or a barrister. You cannot get
any help of any sort from anyone. The Committee are not allowed
to speak to you. The Clerks' department are not allowed to speak
to you. You are completely isolated and you have no idea what
is going on. I would prefer that this job be treated like any
other job and that if you do something wrong you go to court.[137]
146. MPs may be accompanied during interviews with
the Commissioner, including by a lawyer,[138]
but may not be represented. The same applies at Committee hearings,
although the right to be accompanied is rarely used. The process
is designed to investigate an apparent problem based on the evidence
found, without introducing an adversarial element. To allow legal
representation, as some would wish, would change the system fundamentally.
There is also the question of where the costs of support would
fall. They could be borne by public funds but, despite the argument
that no price should be put on justice, it is arguable whether
this would be justifiable when the client group is so small and
the actual breaches of the rules are frequently so minor. Alternatively
the MP could pay, but then there arises the question of equality
of access. (Whether or not a system of professional indemnity
insurance as used in the professions would be proportionate in
view of the numbers involved is questionable.)
147. The House's regulatory system needs to be robust
and proportionate. It should not attempt to replicate court proceedings
and MPs themselves should be capable of presenting arguments to
the Commissioner. The current practice whereby an MP may be accompanied,
but not represented, by a colleague or adviser is appropriate.
148. We have considered whether the system of assistance
and support could be formalised. There is, we believe, scope for
a cadre of MPs, interested in and informed about standard matters,
who could advise MPs on ethical conduct and advise and assist
them when they are the subject of a complaint. They might also
play a role in the further development and understanding of parliamentary
standards. A practical problem arises, however, in that the most
suitable MPs for this role would probably be those with experience
of the system and these would be likely to be former members of
this Committee. The most common reason for MPs to leave the Committee
is that they are leaving the House (in which case they might not
be available) or promotion to ministerial or equivalent opposition
rank, in which case the party allegiance which serving MP members
of the Committee successfully 'leave at the door' might well once
again become a factor. Nonetheless, it would no doubt be of benefit
to MPs who find themselves the subject of a complaint to have
a source of support and advice, and if MPs wished to volunteer
for such a role we would expect the Commissioner's office to give
them such advance advice and assistance as would serve them if
they were called upon. This might mitigate the tendency of MPs
to seek informal advice 'in the tearoom'.
APPEAL
149. We have considered whether there are sufficient
opportunities for the MP to challenge the findings of an inquiry.
The MP may, in effect, appeal from the Commissioner to the Committee.
The Committee's role is to scrutinise the outcome of the Commissioner's
inquiry. The Member may then appeal to the House, which may amend
the recommendation of the Committee. The advantages of any appeal
mechanism from the Committee's findings before a matter reached
the House would need to be balanced against the consequent delay
(see paragraph 165 for the timescale of inquiries).
Sanctions
150. Just as it is important that the process is
seen to be fair and proportionate, if the public is to develop
confidence in in the system for identifying and punishing breaches
of the Code or Rules by MPs the sanctions must be seen to be sufficient
and defensible. The penalties are not clearly understood outside
the House, as is shown by the GRECO recommendation that the penalties
should be reviewed.[139]
151. The penalties at the Committee's disposal range
from simply reporting that a breach has occurred, to, in principle
at least, recommending expulsion from the House. Criminal investigations
and legal proceedings will take precedence over the disciplinary
procedures of the House.
152. At the lowest level, the Committee's sanctions
will affect an MP's reputation. The fact a written apology has
been required will be a matter of public record. Apologies on
the floor of the House by personal statement must normally be
made immediately after Question Time, when the House is full,
and the matter prominent. MPs who apologise in form alone can
be strongly criticised, and may face political consequences.
153. The Committee may also recommend financial penalties,
such as withholding of salary for a period, suspension for a period
(which carries automatic loss of pay and pension rights) or, ultimately,
expulsion. In these last cases the House will debate the Committee's
Report and may amend the suggested penalty.
154. Expulsion has not been used for over sixty years,
but on two recent occasions when a long suspension has been recommended
the MP has resigned by 'taking the Chiltern Hundreds'a
de facto expulsion. If the MP concerned wished to defend
his or her reputation, expulsion would not be a final judgement:
it would in theory be possible for the individual to appeal to
the constituency by standing in the subsequent by-election, and
the constituency would be free to return him or her. The voters
would have the last say.
155. The general view of the witnesses was that the
range of sanctions is very wide, and that this is appropriate.
There was some concern that sanctions were inconsistently applied
and that there are no guidelines. In this context Bill Wiggin
suggested that tariffs might be published.[140]
This would be difficult because no two cases are the same; failure
to register an interest may spring from a desire to conceal something
significant, or from simple oversight. In the case of sanctions
imposed by parliament in criminal law, a range of sentences is
generally allowed to the courts on the basis that there are always
degrees of culpability and different mitigating or aggravating
circumstances. A table of tariffs would in our view have so wide
a series of ranges as to be wholly unhelpful. However, consistency
is a guard against favouritism or inappropriate severity, and
the Committee should maintain and publish its table of sanctions
imposed. It would be possible to make available a digest of cases,
and we note that the RCVS does so.
156. Concerns were also expressed about the possible
impact of a finding of a minor misdemeanour on an MP's career
and prospects;[141]
but such concerns are not unique to MPs.[142]
Questions were also raised about the interplay between any sanctions
imposed by the Committee and any Act which results from the Recall
Bill. The Committee has said that it will work to implement whatever
Parliament decides on recall.[143]
157. We find the range of available sanctions
to be appropriate and sufficient, but the Committee (in recommending
sanctions), and the House (in imposing them), should be aware
of how similar breaches of the relevant Code would be treated
elsewhere.
Administration of the process
RECEIPT OF COMPLAINTS
158. Unlike in some of the countries we have looked
at, there are no restrictions on who may submit a complaint, and
we believe this to be healthy. Complaints must be signed and give
a postal address. They must also be accompanied by evidence. Currently
the Commissioner does not formally accept complaints submitted
by email, though she will assist a complainant submitting in this
way if she is of the opinion that the complaint is material. This
insistence on hard copy is out of step both with public opinion
and general House of Commons policy, and we recommend that
(subject to appropriate checks on the identity of the complainant)
the Commissioner should continue to accept only those complaints
which are made in writing, but should make no distinction as to
the format of that written complainti.e. that she should
be enabled to accept complaints made by e-mail or via her website.
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN COMMISSIONER AND MP
159. When the Commissioner has decided to open an
inquiry, she writes to the MP concerned. Sir Bob Russell said
that this letter arrived without a 'confidential' marking, but
this would have been contrary to the Commissioner's practice.
We believe that the Commissioner's office makes every effort to
ensure that communications with MPs are confidential and timely
but would ask the Commissioner to review her practices to see
if any improvement can be made.
160. In this context we note that Chapter 4 of the
Guide to the Rules makes explicit the duty on an MP to co-operate
with the Commissioner in any investigation. The Committee has
regarded failure to co-operate as an aggravating factor when considering
memoranda. Nonetheless, for the avoidance of doubt, we put on
record that should a Commissioner, in our view, make unreasonable
demands on an MP we believe that this Committee would not hesitate
to say so. The same would apply to a complainant.
PUBLICITY
161. MPs have suggested that they are subject to
an undue level of reputational risk. and that there
is no praise for MPs found to have behaved properly.[144]
This is not unique to MPs: it is common to all regulated professions,
although MPs are exposed to greater, and more persistent, levels
of media attention than many.
162. The Commissioner is careful to avoid exposing
MPs and their families unnecessarily to media attention, and she
does not disclose the names of MPs against whom she has received
a complaint unless and until she is satisfied that there is sufficient
evidence to warrant her opening an inquiry, at which that stage
she puts the name of the MPthough not of the complainanton
her website. It is not unusual, however, for the complainant to
publicise the complaint, and the Commissioner's staff will always
confirm, if asked, whether she has received a complaint; if she
has not decided whether to open an inquiry they will say she is
considering the complaint.
163. The name of the complainant is made public only
when the Commissioner has prepared a memorandum for the Committee
or made a rectification decision. The decision to withhold the
complainant's name was originally made at the request of MPs,
who felt that to release it would only increase the publicity
accorded to a complaint which had not at that stage been upheld.
We appreciate that some complainants might be deterred by the
fear of publicity. However, we believe that equity would be served
by publishing the complainant's name. We recommend that unless
the Committee, after discussion with the Commissioner, decides
otherwise, and subject to the usual protection against harassment
and victimisation, the name of the complainant be made public
at the same time as that of the MP. We recommend that this should
be done unless in particular circumstances the Committee, or a
sub-committee, agree that this should not happen.
TIME-SCALES
164. Not only do MPs have to deal with the publicity
surrounding a case but cases can take a considerable length of
time to resolve. The time taken by the Commissioner to complete
an inquiry varies. In 2013-14, the range was from 30 to 408 days.[145]
Some MPs complained about this, but it does not compare unfavourably
with the time taken in some other systems.[146]
We note also that an appeal system (see para 150) could only extend
the length of time taken. In some cases, examination of the evidence
appended to the Commissioner's memoranda shows extended intervals
between the sending of and response to her letters, so in some
cases the remedy may be in the MP's own hands.
114 Q2 Back
115
Q12 Back
116
Q13 Back
117
Q60 Back
118
Q60 Back
119
e.g. Laura Sandys (Q149) stated that: "The first time I have
seen or have been conscious of the code of conduct has been in
preparation for this meeting, so I am not sure that it is embedded
anywhere." Back
120
Q149 Back
121
ibid Back
122
' your own education, upbringing and background 'Q149 Back
123
SSC0022 Back
124
Q149 Back
125
ibid Back
126
SSC0022 Back
127
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/Procedural-Note-April-2012.pdf
(version in force at time of writing) Back
128
Qi89 Back
129
Q174 Back
130
Q164 Back
131
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/Procedural-Note-April-2012.pdf Back
132
SSC0008 Back
133
Q191 Back
134
The report considers the regulation of healthcare professionals
within the nations of the UK, and the regulation of social care
professionals in England: http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc345_regulation_of_healthcare_professionals.pdf.
Back
135
This has been confirmed by case law eg Re B (Children) [2008]
UKHL 35 and Re Doherty [2008] UKHL Back
136
Hoon v. the United Kingdom (application no. 14832/11) Back
137
Q163 Back
138
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/documents/Procedural-Note-April-2012.pdf
Back
139
See Committee on Standards, Third Report of Session 2014-15, The
Code of Conduct and Guide to the Rules, HC772, Appendix2 Back
140
Q169 Back
141
Q166 Back
142
Q212 Back
143
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/Standards-Committee/Correspondence-with-the-Leader-of-the-House-relating-to-the-Recall-of-MPs-Bill.pdf Back
144
SSC0018 Back
145
Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards Annual Report for
2013-14, HC 354 Back
146
Eg Q213 Back
|