7 Resilience
61. Storms at Dawlish on 4 and 14 February 2014 caused
a 100m breach in the sea wall, exacerbated by a 25,000 tonne landslip
at Teignmouth and a further landslip on 4 March. The railway line,
which ran just behind the sea wall, was closed for eight weeks
while 300 engineers repaired the line at a cost of £35 million.
Mark Carne, Network Rail Chief Executive, told us in June that
around half of the money spent to repair Dawlish was met from
insurance, and the other half was from Network Rail's own resources.[215]
Network Rail told us that it thought the rail network had "performed
well" during the 2013/14 winter, but argued that the weather
during the last control period (2009-2014) was "far worse
and caused far more delays than expected".[216]
Network Rail has stressed that while investment will make
the railway more resilient to weather, it cannot make it weather
proof.[217] There is
no specific fund for weather-related contingencies for CP5.[218]
62. Paul Plummer described Dawlish as "an extraordinary
situation" which, despite the site being on the agenda of
Network Rail, nobody had expected "to happen in that extreme
way".[219] The
closure of the line has been estimated to cost the economy in
Plymouth alone over £600,000 a day.[220]
Tracey Lee argued that it should be "a basic right to have
a railway line that is not severed", and that keeping the
line through Dawlish open through future winters would cost "at
least £350 million" in resilience work.[221]
The Minister said there was a "question" around whether
the investment in resilience could be delivered in CP6 or during
CP5.[222] In July Network
Rail published a West of Exeter Route Resilience Study
looking at sustainable routes between Exeter and Plymouth. The
study proposed five options, including continuing the current
maintenance regime, strengthening the existing railway, and three
alternative routes costing between £470 million and £3.10
billion.[223] The study
estimated the benefits and costs of the alternative routes. The
DfT assessment criteria rank investment proposals with a benefit-cost
ratio (BCR) of greater than 4.0 as offering very high value for
money; schemes with a BCR of less than 1.0 are considered to offer
poor value for money. None of the alternative routes received
a BCR of higher than 0.29.[224]
63. Witnesses questioned whether these assessment
criteria were correct. The Peninsula Rail Task Force told us that
Network Rail had "not prioritised wisely" when allocating
investment on resilience.[225]
Isabel Dedring told us that TfL had struggled to get Network Rail
to accept its case for investment in resilience, as it was not
valued correctly through Network Rail's current business case
assessment process.[226]
64. We commend the work of the "Orange Army"
of Network Rail engineers who rebuilt the seawall and re-opened
the railway line at Dawlish, following the devastating storms.
While the tireless work of the engineers limited the length of
the closure of the line, the economic impact on the region was
still severe. It is not clear whether the Treasury's cost-benefit
assessments take the cost of such closures, or the cost of doing
nothing, into account, when prioritising investment on resilience
or alternative lines. We call on the Department to state whether
it is prepared to fund schemes which do not meet the required
cost-benefit ratio, if the alternative is a closed line. Where
lines are closed, as in the case of Dawlish, the necessary costs
incurred in re-opening the line should not jeopardise or delay
the long-term work to improve the resilience of the network or
deliver promised enhancements.
215 Evidence taken on 9 June 2014, HC (2013-14) 255,
Q 30 Back
216
Network Rail (IRW0051) Back
217
Network Rail (IRW0051) Back
218
Qq28,30 Back
219
Q96 Back
220
Q275 Back
221
Q279 Back
222
Q496 Back
223
Network Rail West of Exeter Route Resilience Study (July
2014) Back
224
Network Rail West of Exeter Route Resilience Study (July
2014) Back
225
Peninsula Rail Task Force (IRW0027) para 12 Back
226
Q281 Back
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