4 Regulation
39. Aviation regulation within the UK is evolving
from a national model under the CAA to a pan-European
model under EASA. In the areas for which EASA is responsible,
such as aircraft certification, continued airworthiness and aircrew
regulation, the CAA serves as EASA's local office to implement
regulations. In areas for which EASA is not responsible, the CAA
serves as the primary regulator. From 28 October 2014, Commission
Regulation (EU) 965/2012 will apply to the UK. That regulation
will supersede national regulations on safety requirements during
offshore helicopter operations. The CAA stated that that change
will implement a standardised regulatory framework for all Member
States removing any differences in application of the rules.[57]
EASA
40. Transferring responsibility for aviation to a
European level has advantages as helicopter operators become more
multinational. The British Airline Pilots Association (BALPA)
told us that there is an incentive for operators to base themselves
in countries where the regulatory authorities cannot effectively
police them. BALPA proposed harmonising Europe-wide rules to reduce
that risk.[58]
However, BALPA and others
pointed out that one possible disadvantage to that approach is
that it might lead to the "averaging down" of standards
in the UK.[59] Trevor
Woods, Approvals and Standardisation Director at EASA, disputed
that argument and referred to the stringency of the operations
rules that will be implemented in October 2014.[60]
The Aviation Minister, Robert Goodwill MP, told us that he had
discussed that matter with the CAA and that he was satisfied that
UK safety standards have not been diluted because of EASA.[61]
41. We share the concerns expressed by the trade
unions and by Oil & Gas UK that transferring power to a European
level has undermined the CAA's ability to be a strong regulator
for the UK sector. BALPA and Oil & Gas UK observed that the
CAA has the local expertise effectively to regulate the North
Sea sector. As more responsibility is transferred to the European
level, the CAA may become a mere "regional policeman"[62]
while EASA designs broad rules for different sizes of helicopter
fleets and without a fixed focus on the North Sea's particular
hazards.[63]
42. We note that the offshore industry has little
appetite for transferring more responsibility for helicopter operations
to a European level. As EASA accumulates more power over helicopter
operations, the Government must uphold and entrench the CAA's
ability to act quickly and unilaterally.
43. EASA has been criticised for being insufficiently
responsive to safety recommendations from the AAIB. Step Change
in Safety described EASA as "distant".[64]
Keith Conradi of the AAIB agreed that EASA had been slow to respond
to recommendations but pointed out that Patrick Ky, EASA's new
Executive Director, had stated that there will be "more action,
more swiftly"[65].
That assurance is, as yet, unproven. EASA told us that it would
respond to the CAA's actions and recommendations on offshore helicopter
safety in "exactly the same way as any recommendation addressed
to the Agency by an official accident investigation board"
and that it would do so by early April.[66]
It is disappointing that that official response has not yet been
placed in the public domain. [67]
44. Regulatory inertia results in unnecessary
risk for the offshore work force. At the moment, it is difficult
to discern whether EASA is prioritising CAA recommendations. We
note the Agency's assurance that it will swiftly implement recommendations
from national aviation authorities and investigation boards. In
future, EASA must respond quickly and transparently to the CAA
and the AAIB. The DfT must push EASA to improve its response
and implementation times. We recommend that the DfT issues a formal
response to the CAA review that addresses all 14 points relating
to EASA. In addition, the DfT must ascertain what practical steps
EASA is taking to speed up the implementation of recommendations
derived from national aviation authorities and investigation boards.
Additional industry requirements
45. As well as CAA and EASA regulations, operators
are subject to additional rules defined by their customers. Operators
told us that considered in isolation those extra customer requirements
do not erode safety.[68]
However, the cumulative effect is an increase in complexity and
therefore in risk for pilots. We heard that an operator with 10
clients might operate flights to 10 different standards.[69]
The CAA found that "Pilot experience levels, different passenger
loads and different weather minima for airborne radar approaches
are examples of where there are differences between customer requirements".[70]
46. We are disappointed that the CAA did
not want to take the lead on standardising customer requirements.
Instead, the CAA recommended that operators
"identify a set of 'best practice' standard procedures and
engage with their customers to agree how these may be incorporated
into contractual requirements".[71]
The CAA told us that while standardisation would be examined by
the Offshore Helicopter Safety Action Group, operators should
"lead on this because, at the end of the day, they are responsible
for letting the contracts."[72]
However Mike Imlach, Director, Bristow Helicopters, said that
customer requirements are significantly more standardised in Norway,
in part due to the grip displayed by the Norwegian CAA.[73]
47. It is unclear how much influence operators have
in standardising the numerous rules demanded of them by their
customers. BALPA believed that the financial clout of the oil
and gas companies gave them the whip hand over operators in contract
negotiations.[74] Oil
and gas companies have begun work on standardisation but the limited
progress to date suggests that operators are not best placed to
achieve reform.[75] Operators
told us that the CAA should be responsible for that task. [76]
- The CAA must use its chairmanship of the Offshore
Helicopter Safety Action Group to lead the standardisation of
customer requirements for helicopter operators. This is as an
opportunity for the CAA to demonstrate its ability and willingness
to stand up and lead industry in reducing risk during helicopter
operations.
57 CAA, Safety review of offshore public transport helicopter operations in support of the exploitation of oil and gas
(February 2014), para 2.15 Back
58
Q37 Back
59
Q80 Back
60
Q111 Back
61
Q143 Back
62
Q37 Back
63
ibid Back
64
Step Change in Safety (HCS0009) para 5.4 Back
65
Q119 Back
66
EASA (HCS0029) page 2 Back
67
As at 30 June 2014 Back
68
Bond , Bristow, CHC (HCS0001) para 3.4 Back
69
Bond, Bristow, CHC (HCS0001) para 3.3 Back
70
CAA, Safety review of offshore public transport helicopter operations in support of the exploitation of oil and gas
(February 2014), para 13.3 Back
71
CAA, Safety review of offshore public transport helicopter operations in support of the exploitation of oil and gas
(February 2014), R10 Back
72
Q121 Back
73
Q42 Back
74
BALPA (HCS0012) para 5.2 Back
75
Oil & Gas UK (HCS0028) page 1 Back
76
Bond, Bristow, CHC (HCS0001) para 3.4 Back
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