6 Conclusion
55. Helicopter transfer across the North Sea has
inherent risks but remains the most practical mode of transport
for the offshore oil and gas industry. Five accidents since 2009
have led to a loss of confidence from the offshore work force
in helicopter transport that will be difficult to remedy. Industry
safety groups and operators have worked to rebuild confidence
but more needs to be done. We were disheartened to learn of instances
that reflect a "macho bullying culture"[89]
in the industry and wish to be reassured that the flawed EBS safety
briefing in not indicative of complacency toward safety.
56. We welcome the CAA review into offshore helicopter
safety. This document set out detailed recommendations for improving
the survivability of helicopter crashes. We highlighted areas
of the review that we think require additional work, particularly
concerning occurrence reporting, the standardisation of customer
requirements and the implementation of seating restrictions. The
CAA now needs the co-operation of the oil and gas industry, helicopter
operators and EASA to ensure its recommendations are carried through
to conclusion. We have called on the DfT to use its influence
to ensure EASA has prioritised that important work.
57. The CAA review did not look in sufficient detail
at two key areas of offshore helicopter operations. The first
was the offshore industry's highly competitive environment. Commercial
sensitivities ensure that it is difficult for external reviews
to examine the contractual obligations set by industry. The second
was the role and effectiveness of the CAA itself. Those who work
in the hazardous conditions of the North Sea deserve to know those
issues have been properly evaluated. We believe only a full, independent
public inquiry would have the resources, remit and power to do
this.
89 RMT (HCS0015) para 4.5 Back
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