Conclusions and recommendations
Sumburgh crash
1. Pre-flight
briefing material must accurately describe how to use safety equipment.
It is deeply disturbing that it took a fatal accident before the
flawed EBS briefing was identified. The CAA must ensure that helicopter
operators regularly review all safety briefing material to ensure
that it is up to date. In addition, the CAA must consult the offshore
work force to ensure that safety briefing material is easily understood
and fit for purpose. (Paragraph 16)
2. AAIB findings have
a significant impact on survivors and their families, who deserve
to be briefed on upcoming announcements. The AAIB must keep crash
survivors informed on the progress of investigations. The CAA
could learn a great deal by meeting survivors and considering
their experiences. For example, survivors' suggestions on enhancing
the visibility of equipment are compelling and are drawn from
personal experience. More widely, the oil and gas industry must
examine the experiences of crash survivors. In particular, more
must be done to address the financial and psychological anxiety
of survivors who cannot work. (Paragraph 19)
3. We find it unacceptable
that offshore workers were told by an operations manager that
they should leave the industry if they were concerned about helicopter
safety. In an inherently hazardous industry, operations managers
must prioritise safety, which means facilitating a culture of
approachability and openness at all levels. (Paragraph 24)
Super Pumas
4. Super
Puma variants make up some 60% of the offshore helicopter fleet,
which means that it is unsurprising that they are involved in
more accidents than other models. We heard no conclusive evidence
that Super Puma variants are less safe than other helicopters
used in the UK offshore sector. We welcome the work by operators,
manufacturers and industry safety groups to engage with the offshore
work force to address their concerns about Super Pumas. (Paragraph
27)
CAA Review
5. We
welcome the CAA review of offshore helicopter safety and congratulate
it on quickly establishing the Offshore Helicopter Safety Action
Group to implement its recommendations. At the same time, the
CAA must be mindful of the effect of its actions and recommendations
on the offshore work force and should consult with industry to
ensure its demands are realistic and implemented in a way which
continues to allow for "maximising economic recovery"
as per the Wood Review. We were extremely concerned to hear about
how crash survivors wearing safety equipment struggled to evacuate
through egress windows after helicopters capsized in the sea.
The CAA must set out how it will address that key issue as a matter
urgency. (Paragraph 31)
6. The CAA identified
a worrying difference between Norway and the UK in occurrence
reporting, but it acknowledged that more work is required to explain
it. The CAA must undertake a joint review with its Norwegian counterparts
to uncover why more occurrences are reported in Norway, despite
its smaller fleet, and publish its findings within 12 months.
(Paragraph 38)
EASA
7. We
note that the offshore industry has little appetite for transferring
more responsibility for helicopter operations to a European level.
As EASA accumulates more power over helicopter operations, the
Government must uphold and entrench the CAA's ability to act quickly
and unilaterally. (Paragraph 42)
8. Regulatory inertia
results in unnecessary risk for the offshore work force. At the
moment, it is difficult to discern whether EASA is prioritising
CAA recommendations. We note the Agency's assurance that it will
swiftly implement recommendations from national aviation authorities
and investigation boards. In future, EASA must respond quickly
and transparently to the CAA and the AAIB. The DfT must push EASA
to improve its response and implementation times. We recommend
that the DfT issues a formal response to the CAA review that addresses
all 14 points relating to EASA. In addition, the DfT must ascertain
what practical steps EASA is taking to speed up the implementation
of recommendations derived from national aviation authorities
and investigation boards. (Paragraph 44)
Standardisation of customer requirements
9. The
CAA must use its chairmanship of the Offshore Helicopter Safety
Action Group to lead the standardisation of customer requirements
for helicopter operators. This is as an opportunity for the CAA
to demonstrate its ability and willingness to stand up and lead
industry in reducing risk during helicopter operations.
Public inquiry
10. The
CAA review did not consider the evidence that commercial pressure
impacts on helicopter safety in sufficient depth. The Government
must convene a full, independent public inquiry to investigate
commercial pressures on helicopter safety in the North Sea operating
environment. That inquiry must also examine the role and effectiveness
of the CAA. In addition, the DfT must commission ongoing independent
research similar to the SINTEF reports in Norway to examine improvements
and threats to offshore helicopter safety. Once published, this
research should be laid before Parliament for consideration. (Paragraph
54)
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