1 Appendix A: Summary of meeting with
Sumburgh crash survivors
1. On 10 April, 6 survivors of the August 2013, Sumburgh
helicopter crash met with Members of the Transport Committee to
discuss their experiences. The survivors described the accident
itself and their involvement with the subsequent AAIB investigation.
Poor maintenance of safety equipment
2. Attendees began by describing the design flaws
of the Super Puma helicopter and the poor condition of safety
equipment on board. It was said that the Super Puma helicopter
cannot carry both its full capacity of passengers and a full fuel
load at the same time. This means Super Pumas are required to
refuel more during operations. As helicopter crashes are more
likely to occur during take-off and landing, additional refuelling
inevitably leads to more risk.
3. There was strong agreement that the safety equipment
on board was poorly maintained and not up to standard. This quickly
became apparent when the helicopter impacted with the sea. Survival
suits were poor quality and in some cases became a danger to life
when they filled with water. Life jackets did not inflate correctly
and straws designed for manual inflation were missing. The survivors
stated that only two of the six flotation devices on the helicopter
inflated.
4. One survivor, who at the time of the crash was
seated next to a window, described his attempt to escape the aircraft.
The tab designed to remove the window disintegrated in his hands.
To remove the window he had to punch the window until it popped
out. Only then were he and several others able to evacuate.
5. There was scepticism that safety equipment was
regularly checked for weaknesses. The attendees did not know who
should be held accountable for maintaining safety equipment or
who they could report concerns to, although there was agreement
that speaking out could undermine future work prospects. One cause
of this is the relatively small size of the sector which adds
pressure on workers not to speak out. The widely reported account
of a Total boss and CHC pilot dismissing workers concerns about
Super Pumas by telling passengers to "put on their big-boy
pants" or leave the industry[90]
was highlighted as evidence of a poor reporting culture. Some
of the attendees had been present during this incident.
Emergency Breathing Systems
On 23 January the AAIB published a Special Bulletin
on the Emergency Breathing System (EBS) supplied to the victims
of the Sumburgh crash. The Bulletin revealed that the pre-flight
safety briefing was not fully representative of the functionality
of the EBS supplied. The briefing video suggested that individuals
were required to breathe into the rebreather bag before the system
could be used once submerged. However, the actual EBS supplied
did not require this. Instead the EBS came with its own air supply
which could be automatically discharged. The AAIB found that the
mismatch between the safety video and EBS "may […] influence
a passenger's decision on whether or not to use the EBS in an
emergency situation."[91]
6. The attendees expressed anger at this discovery,
with several describing its aftermath as a period of heavy psychological
stress. Many of the survivors said that they had ignored the EBSs
as there was not time to breathe into them before being submerged.
If they had known this was not necessary the survivors felt confident
the EBSs would have been used.
7. The attendees were pleased the Committee had opened
its evidence session in Aberdeen with a line of questioning on
this subject but were disappointed by the answers given by helicopter
operators.[92] It was
felt that a fundamental safety flaw had been brushed aside without
serious consideration. It was also felt that the operators' temporary
measure to correct the error was inadequate. After the AAIB's
Special Bulletin was published, operators supplemented the flawed
briefing video with a short paper outlining how the supplied EBS
actually worked.
AAIB investigation and post-crash
support
8. Following the crash, the AAIB had been in touch
with each of the survivors and had taken statements. However,
there was a perception that aside from this, survivors had been
"left in the dark" as far as the rest of the investigation
was concerned. They expressed distress at having to read latest
AAIB findings in the media rather than being contacted directly
and forewarned. Survivors said they had been told that they would
be kept abreast of developments yet this had not happened and
their telephone messages had not been returned.
9. There was also a concern that the AAIB's inquiry
is not addressing several important issues. Survivors believe
the investigation is too focussed on technical or mechanical causes
and is ignoring a wider complacency amongst operators towards
safety standards. Attendees also stated that soon after the crash
there had been personnel changes amongst CHC's engineers. They
suggested this may have lead the AAIB to take statements from
engineers who were not responsible for the crash helicopter before
the accident. To rectify omissions in current investigations,
the attendees said a full public inquiry was the only way to restore
confidence amongst the offshore work force.
10. Most of the attendees spoke of ongoing psychological
trauma and episodes of depression, although they do have access
to professional psychological help. Financial support is more
patchy with some survivors still receiving a wage while not able
to work and others not. This depends on employment status and
contractual arrangements. Contractors have little or no financial
support.
Measures to improve offshore
helicopter safety
11. The attendees had a number of practical suggestions
for improving safety following a crash at sea in conditions with
poor visibility. It was suggested that LED lights surrounding
egress windows would make it easier to escape quickly. They recommended
red LEDs could indicate a closed window which could then change
to green once the window had been removed. They stated older variants
of the Super Puma helicopter had a similar feature but this had
been removed in subsequent models. They also said that their survival
suits were too dark making it difficult to identify each other.
The addition of luminous tape around rescue ropes and other equipment
would have helped significantly.
12. When asked about the adequacy of their training
for North Sea conditions, the survivors viewed it as insufficient,
especially when compared to Norwegian standards. They explained
that training in a heated swimming pool, in an aircraft model
with large windows for escape, bears no relation to actual conditions.
They stated this has not always been the case; in the past training
was conducted in sea temperatures at -6 degrees. In Norway, training
is significantly more demanding and is conducted at sea.
90 Daily Mail, If you can't live with the risk don't work offshore': Oil workers were told to put on their 'big-boy pants' at safety meeting just weeks before Shetland helicopter crash,
accessed 2 July 2014 Back
91
AAIB, S1/2014 (January 2014), page 3 Back
92
Qq 2-9 Back
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