9th Report - Smaller airports - Transport Contents


2  Levelling the playing field

10. We expect the Government to maintain a fiscal and regulatory regime that encourages investment, allows fair and open competition between airlines and airports, supports regional connectivity and addresses damaging market distortions. This chapter examines how the Government is addressing those issues.

Air Passenger Duty

11. Air Passenger Duty (APD) is an excise duty which is charged on nearly all passenger flights departing from airports in the UK and the Isle of Man.[15] The rate of duty varies according to passenger destination and class of travel. Darren Caplan, Chief Executive, AOA, highlighted the impact of APD on smaller airports:

    Before I came here today I asked several small airports, "What is the single biggest issue? You can say anything. Surface access? Planning?" APD comes back again and again. It is the airlines that are being charged, and they are saying that APD is the thing affecting their growth. It is a big issue.[16]

APD directly affects the growth and viability of smaller airports. We heard that several airlines decided either not to route to the UK or to fly less frequently because of the impact of APD.[17]

12. Because APD is a departure tax, it is currently applied to both the inbound and outbound legs of domestic return flights in the UK. Such domestic flights might involve travelling point to point or transferring to/from further flights at a hub airport in the UK. Domestic return flights are core business for airlines operating from regional smaller airports. The double-charging of APD disproportionately affects passengers travelling from UK smaller airports in addition to placing all UK airports at a disadvantage compared with their EU competitors. For example, a passenger who took a return flight from Leeds-Bradford airport to New York via Heathrow would be charged APD on the outbound flights from Leeds-Bradford to Heathrow and from Heathrow to New York. In addition, they would be charged APD on the return inbound flight from Heathrow to Leeds-Bradford. In comparison, a passenger who flew from Leeds-Bradford airport to New York via Paris Charles de Gaulle would only be charged APD on the outbound flight from Leeds-Bradford to Paris.

13. Following its introduction in 1994, the disproportionate effect of APD was recognised by an APD exemption on the return leg of domestic flights. In June 1998, the European Commission ruled that that exemption for domestic flights was legally defective, because it did not provide the same effective tax treatment for all EU flights.[18] The APD exemption for the return leg of domestic flights was subsequently scrapped in the Budget 2000.[19]

14. In addition to its effect on domestic flights, APD curbs demand for international tourism to the UK. World Economic Forum data places the UK 139th out of 140 countries in terms of tourism competitiveness with respect to air taxes and charges. Only Chad operates a less competitive air taxation regime than the UK.[20]

15. In the autumn statement 2014, the Treasury attempted to mitigate the effect of APD on airports and airlines by scrapping APD for children under 12 from May 2015, with the revision being extended to children under 16 in 2016. Larger airports host the majority of international family holiday traffic. Indeed, many smaller airports do not have long enough runways to land the large jets that are used to run long-haul holiday flights. We welcome the acknowledgement of the negative impact of APD on the aviation sector in the autumn statement 2014. However, exempting children from APD was a marginal change which did nothing for business travellers and little for smaller airports.

16. Following the Scottish independence referendum, the Smith Commission was set up to examine the further devolution of powers to Scotland. In November 2014, it recommended devolving APD to the Scottish Parliament.[21] In line with the Smith Commission recommendation, clause 14 of the draft Scotland Bill would disapply APD from passengers departing from Scottish airports and allow the Scottish Parliament to set a tax for passengers departing from Scottish airports.[22] It is, of course, conceivable that the Scottish Government would set a tax at the same rate as APD in England, in which case this devolutionary measure would have no effect beyond increasing tax revenues to the Scottish Government.

17. Northern Ireland is currently the only part of the UK to share a land border with another state—in this case, the Republic of Ireland—which applies lower rates of aviation tax. Belfast International Airport explained how the variation in aviation taxes between Belfast and Dublin has affected its operations:

    The imposition of such a costly 'penalty' creates significant price advantage for competitor airlines operating out of Dublin Airport. It is estimated that Northern Ireland is losing 1.5 million passenger journeys to Dublin which translates into the loss of 1,500 jobs capable of generating £30 million approximately in wages and salaries coupled with the creation of new downstream enterprises … For the foreseeable future, Dublin will continue to 'poach' passengers from Northern Ireland, something that will continue to have a deleterious effect on both profitability and route development. In confidential talks we have had with a number of prospective carriers, they have indicated that APD is preventing them from making favourable decisions which, when added up, would amount to an additional 3 million passengers or 3,000 new jobs.[23]

APD prevents airports in Northern Ireland competing on a level playing field with airports in the Republic of Ireland. This has cost Northern Ireland jobs, growth and connectivity.

18. If APD were scrapped in Scotland, airports in England would be subject to a similar competitive disadvantage to that currently experienced in Northern Ireland. The further devolution of APD to, for example, north-east England or Wales would ultimately serve to extend a patchwork of APD-derived market distortions across the UK and drive a race to the bottom on regional APD rates. We would prefer the Government to act strategically and in the national interest to address APD.

19. The DfT acknowledged smaller airports' concerns about APD in its written evidence to this inquiry, but balanced that observation by highlighting the contribution APD makes to Exchequer revenues.[24] We acknowledge the importance of maintaining tax revenues but question whether APD is an efficient means of achieving that end. In 2013, a report by PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Economic Impact of APD, found that abolition of APD could provide an initial short-term boost to UK GDP of around 0.45 % in the first 12 months, averaging at just under 0.3 % in subsequent years. In addition, it found that abolition would result in an increase in investment and exports, arguing that investment might rise by 6% in total between 2013 and 2015, with exports rising by 5% in the same period. The report argued that almost 60,000 jobs could be created between 2013 and 2020 if APD were axed. PricewaterhouseCoopers concluded that the abolition of APD would more than pay for itself through increased tax revenues from other sources due to the consequent increase in economic activity.[25]

20. The way in which APD is double-charged on domestic return flights is damaging to UK smaller airports. In effect, it incentivises airlines and passengers to fly from airports located in other EU member states. It cannot be revised to allow UK airports to compete on a level playing field in the European marketplace because of the operation of EU competition law. The proposed devolution of APD to Scotland threatens to create further market distortions which could severely disadvantage airports in England. It is disappointing that the concerns we raised previously about APD in our First Report of Session 2013-14 on Aviation strategy were ignored by the Treasury.[26] We urge Transport Ministers to pursue those recommendations and the important concerns raised by smaller airports with the Treasury.

Public Service Obligations

21. A Public Service Obligation (PSO) is an arrangement by which a governing body or other authority runs an auction for subsidies which allows the winning company a monopoly to operate an air service for a period of time for the given subsidy. PSOs are used in cases where there is insufficient revenue for routes to be profitable in a free market, but where it is socially, economically and/or politically desirable to maintain the transport link. In short, PSOs allow the state to subsidise air travel that is not commercially viable.

22. PSOs must be offered for tender in the Official Journal of the European Union and bidding is open to any transport operator registered in an EU member state. The winning tenderer usually receives a monopoly on the route, but they may have to conform to one or more conditions of service, such as the type and size of aircraft, the timing of services, maximum fares or service quality.

23. In 2014, the Government introduced a policy to promote the use of PSOs to maintain routes from smaller airports to London which might otherwise be lost. The funding stream for that policy is known as the Regional Air Connectivity Fund. In June 2014, the Government announced support from the Regional Air Connectivity Fund to maintain the air link between Dundee airport and London Stansted until 2016 through a PSO agreed with Dundee City Council.[27] In October 2014, the Government announced a second new PSO to maintain the Newquay to London Gatwick air link, which was agreed with Cornwall County Council.[28]

24. On 22 January 2015, the Government extended its PSO policy to include state support for new air routes rather than simply supporting existing routes at risk of closure. It made £56 million available over the next three years to fund PSOs that support new air routes. Airports and airlines were invited to bid for this funding, with the first round of applications closing on 25 February 2015.[29] The DfT should regularly report on the number of applicants and of successful applications to the Regional Air Connectivity Fund to support new air routes and publish this information on its website.

25. State support for air transport is governed by European Commission aviation state aid guidelines. PSOs can only be implemented with the agreement of the European Commission. The DfT has submitted a "Draft protocol for UK start-up aid for airports handling fewer than 3 million passengers per annum" for clearance by the European Commission.[30] If the European Commission agrees this protocol, the DfT will be able to award start-up aid for air transport to airports handling fewer than 3 million passengers per annum without further reference to the European Commission. The DfT should set out a timetable for negotiations with the European Commission on its "Draft Protocol for UK start-up aid for airports handling fewer than 3 million passengers per annum" to allow smaller airports and local authorities that are considering accessing the Regional Air Connectivity Fund to plan effectively.

26. European Commission guidelines allow start-up aid to be provided for air routes involving airports that handle between 3 million to 5 million passengers per annum in "duly substantiated exceptional cases".[31] Such cases must be individually notified to the European Commission and require individual clearance from the European Commission before funding can be made available. The DfT stated:

    Discussions with the Commission have not identified what evidence would need to be provided but have indicated that the bar is likely to be set very high. Therefore application for routes from airports of between 3-5 million passengers per annum will need to submit as part of the initial application stage very strong evidence to demonstrate that funding of the route is a 'duly substantiated exceptional case'.[32]

The DfT should work with the European Commission to clarify what a "duly substantiated exceptional case" means in practice. Certainty on that point will allow UK smaller airports handling between 3 million and 5 million passengers a year to engage with the DfT's PSO policy, which could play an important role in facilitating regional air connectivity.

27. We welcome the DfT's policy of promoting PSOs both to support existing air routes and to start up new air routes. As currently implemented and given its current level of funding, however, this policy represents a marginal change to the smaller airports market rather than a strategic intervention. For example, although the maintenance of air routes from Dundee to London Stansted and from Newquay to London Gatwick may be desirable, it is unclear why those air routes should attract public subsidy while others do not. PSOs could become strategically significant if they were used to facilitate regional connectivity to an expanded hub airport in the south-east.

Airports Commission

28. The Airports Commission is currently examining the need for additional airport capacity in the UK. In its interim report, the Airports Commission concluded that one additional runway is needed in the south-east by 2030 and that a second new runway will probably be required in the south-east by 2050 if the UK is to retain international connectivity. The Airports Commission has identified two options at London Heathrow and one option at London Gatwick where new runways might be constructed.[33] It will make its final report and recommendations to the next Government in summer 2015.

29. The UK is currently suffering from a shortage of hub airport capacity rather than a shortage of airport capacity per se. We discussed the nature and importance of hub airports in detail in our Aviation strategy report.[34] Hub airports serve both their own catchment areas and incoming traffic from other airports. The volume of traffic handled by hub airports enables them to serve additional destinations and to maintain high service volumes. The UK currently has one hub airport, Heathrow, which has been short of capacity for a decade and which is currently operating at full capacity. Constrained capacity has damaged domestic air connectivity from smaller airports to Heathrow, and the number of UK destinations served from Heathrow has steadily declined over the past decade. In 2015, the only smaller airports with an air route to Heathrow are Aberdeen, Belfast City, Leeds-Bradford and Newcastle.[35]

30. Many smaller airports have replaced withdrawn flights to Heathrow with flights to European hub airports. While airport hubs in northern Europe—in particular, Amsterdam-Schiphol, Frankfurt and Paris Charles de Gaulle—are attracting more transfer traffic from the UK, Heathrow remains a key access point to international and long-haul travel for many passengers from smaller airports. In its interim report, the Airports Commission identified that connections to other European airport hubs enhance connectivity from the UK's regional airports but are not an adequate replacement for links to Heathrow.[36] Heathrow offers strong connectivity to a number of important markets, notably North America, which is not replicated at other hub airports. The value of regional links to Heathrow is demonstrated by the fall in passenger numbers at smaller airports where such services were withdrawn. For example, Durham Tees Valley airport experienced a 75% reduction in passenger numbers following the withdrawal of its Heathrow service in 2009.[37]

31. If the next Government were to implement a recommendation by the Airports Commission to construct a new runway at either Heathrow or Gatwick regional connectivity could be hugely increased. Such a step change in regional connectivity would only occur, however, if smaller airports were able to link to enhanced hub capacity by securing slots at the expanded airport.

32. The CAA explained why airlines have withdrawn services from UK smaller airports to Heathrow:

    The lack of runway capacity at Heathrow … has probably priced off services that generate a smaller profit per slot. Since domestic services tend to be served with smaller aircraft and cover shorter distances than other routes, they are likely to generate a smaller profit per slot to airlines.[38]

Although an increase in hub capacity in the south-east would deliver more slots for airlines, the economic barrier to regional connectivity to smaller airports highlighted by the CAA would still apply, because the slots would be released in tranches to maintain demand. This means that the market alone may never deliver sufficient slots to facilitate regional connectivity.

33. The CAA explained how new slots at an expanded hub airport in the south-east would be released:

    There is a collaborative process between airports, NATS and the airlines to decide who is going to get the slots. If the role is left with the airports, I would have thought that capacity—slots—will be released at a pace that sustains the overall economics, because it is not in any of the commercial players' interests to drive down values.[39]

It seems likely that new slots at an expanded hub airport in the south-east would be released in timed tranches to maintain demand, which would underpin any bonds issued to finance airport expansion.

34. The Minister set out his view that the market would deliver sufficient slots to support regional connectivity from smaller airports:

    I am confident that the airlines based in our UK major airports will see the opportunity of increased slots being made available to get passengers who are currently going to Schiphol, Charles de Gaulle, Frankfurt or Brussels into airports in the London area. I think they will rise to that challenge.[40]

Paul Le Blond, Chair, Aviation Forum, Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport, was less confident that the market would deliver services to smaller airports. He proposed ring-fencing a certain number of new slots at an expanded hub airport for services to smaller airports. He argued that ring-fencing "a double daily service to a reasonable number of small airports would be a very small proportion of any additional capacity created."[41] John Spooner, Chairman, Regional and Business Airports Group, stated that he had discussed with both Heathrow and Gatwick the question whether slots for services to regional airports should be ring-fenced.[42] He added that the time at which flights arrive at a hub airport in crucial in developing regional connectivity to support business growth.[43]

35. The whole country will be able to share in the economic benefits of an expanded hub airport in the south-east only if that expansion entails airlines securing sufficient slots to maintain services to smaller airports in the English regions, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The way in which new slots at an expanded hub airport in the south-east might be allocated is currently opaque. The DfT should assess (a) how new slots might be allocated; (b) whether some of those slots could be ring-fenced for domestic services to smaller airports; (c) whether the Public Service Obligation mechanism could be applied to new services using any such new slots; and (d) what proportion of new slots would need to be allocated to flights to UK smaller airports to support regional connectivity effectively.

36. We recognise that the Airports Commission has carefully defined the scope of its inquiry. Nevertheless, we note that it has on occasion considered the role of smaller airports. We encourage the Airports Commission to reflect on the role of smaller airports in its final report. In particular, it should consider how new slots at an expanded hub airport in the south-east might be allocated to services to smaller airports in the UK.


15   APD is not charged on flights involving aircraft with fewer than 20 seats or on flights from airports in the Scottish Highlands and Islands. Back

16   Q37 Back

17   Q37 Back

18   HC Deb 26 May 1999 col 183W [Commons written answer] Back

19   Finance Act 2000, section 18 Back

20   ABTA (SMA 057) para 22 Back

21   The Smith Commission, Report of the Smith Commission for further devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament, November 2014 Back

22   Cabinet Office, Scotland in the United Kingdom: An enduring settlement, Cm 8990, January 2015 Back

23   Belfast International Airport (SMA 069) Back

24   Department for Transport (SMA 039) para 14 Back

25   PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Economic Impact of APD, February 2013 Back

26   Transport Committee, Sixth Special Report of Session 2013-14, Aviation strategy: Government Response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2013-14, HC 78, recommendation 29 Back

27   Department for Transport, UK government funding for Dundee to London Stansted air link, 6 June 2014 Back

28   Department for Transport, Government funding secures Cornwall to London air link, 27 October 2014 Back

29   Department for Transport, Regional airports asked to bid for up to £56 million funding for new routes over next 3 years, 22 January 2015 Back

30   Department for Transport, Airports with fewer than 5 million passengers per year: start-up aid, 22 January 2015 Back

31   Department for Transport, Start-up aid for airports with fewer than 5 million passengers per annum (January 2015), para 1.6 Back

32   Department for Transport, Start-up aid for airports with fewer than 5 million passengers per annum (January 2015), para 1.10 Back

33   Airports Commission, Interim Report (December 2013) Back

34   Transport Committee, First Report of Session 2013-14, Aviation strategy, HC 78-I, chapter 4 Back

35   Department for Transport (SMA 039) para 30 Back

36   Airports Commission, Interim Report (December 2013) Back

37   Department for Transport (SMA 039) para 9 Back

38   Civil Aviation Authority (SMA 024) para 2.17 Back

39   Q42 Back

40   Q256 Back

41   Q42 Back

42   Q44 Back

43   Q44 Back


 
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Prepared 13 March 2015