Conclusions and recommendations
In this list, conclusions are set out in plain type
and recommendations, to which the Government is required to respond,
are set out in italic type.
Call for an independent review
1. We
recommend that DWP commission a broad independent review of benefit
conditionality and sanctions, to investigate whether sanctions
are being applied appropriately, fairly and proportionately, in
accordance with the relevant Regulations and guidance, across
the Jobcentre Plus network. This review should be established
and report as soon as is practicable in the next Parliament.
(Paragraph 9)
Information and communications
2. We
welcome DWP's acceptance of the Oakley Review's findings, and
the steps that it has taken towards implementation of the Review's
recommendations. In particular, we welcome changes made to improve
the clarity of letters to claimants and to provide clearer information
on the benefit sanctions system to claimants of all out-of-work
benefits. We believe that a continued focus on the clarity of
sanctions-related communications and information will go some
way towards improving claimants' understanding of their obligations
and the sanctioning process. But we recognise that communication
and information is only one aspect of the sanctions regime that
needs to be addressed, and does not address concerns about sanctions
implementation and a target-driven culture. (Paragraph 22)
Providers' ability to accept "good reason"
3. We
accept that allowing contracted Work Programme providers formally
to accept "good reason" for a claimant not fulfilling
a benefit condition will require both legislative change and contractual
negotiations. However, we believe that DWP should take more urgent
steps to ensure that a more common-sense approach is set out in
guidance. We recommend that DWP's guidance to contracted providers
makes clear that discretion can be applied where providers' staff
are confident that a claimant's failure to meet a mandatory condition
was due to extenuating circumstances beyond the claimant's control.
We further recommend that negotiations with Work Programme prime
providers, ahead of the re-letting of prime contracts in 2017,
prioritise the development of a more flexible approach to "mandation".
(Paragraph 29)
Pre-sanction written warnings and non-financial sanctions
4. We
note that the Department considers that piloting of pre-sanction
written warnings and non-financial sanctions for first-time Work
Programme failures where the claimant has a previously good record
of compliance with benefit conditionality would require legislative
change. We believe that there would be considerable value in piloting
these approaches urgently; we therefore urge DWP either to reconsider
its position, and conduct small scale pilots prior to making legislative
changes, or to bring forward the necessary secondary legislation,
and conduct the pilots, as soon as is practicable in the next
Parliament. We also recommend that DWP pilot pre-sanction written
warnings and non-financial sanctions in relation to claimants'
first-time failures within the Jobcentre Plus conditionality system.
(Paragraph 33)
Impact of sanctions on Housing Benefit
5. We
recommend that DWP clarify, in its response to this Report: the
extent to which Housing Benefit payments have been incorrectly
impacted by Jobseekers Allowance sanctions, as identified by the
Oakley Review; the steps it has takenbeyond advising claimants
themselves to inform their local authority when they are sanctionedto
address the issue; and whether robust systems are now in place
to ensure that the issue no longer arises.
(Paragraph 38)
Helping claimants to comply
6. We
agree that benefit conditionality is appropriate and necessary
but reiterate our view that it is important that conditionality
is balanced by effective employment advice and support for claimants.
We recommend that DWP ensure that the relevant guidance to JCP
Work Coaches includes that sanctioned claimants should be offered
additional, tailored support, to help them meet their benefit
conditions and improve their employment prospects, including attending
a specific meeting after a sanction has been applied to discuss
how to improve compliance and ensure that the Claimant Commitment
fairly reflects the individual's needs and abilities.
(Paragraph 51)
In-work conditionality
7. We
recommend that the Government does not proceed with in-work sanctions
beyond the existing pilots until robust evidence is available
from the pilots to demonstrate that in-work conditionality can
be effectively applied.
(Paragraph 56)
Evaluating the Welfare Reform Act 2012 changes
8. There
is evidence that active and conditional unemployment benefit regimes,
in which financial sanctions play a part, are relatively effective,
but there is very limited evidence, from the UK or overseas, on
the relative impacts of the three parts of the overall approach:
the benefit conditions themselves; the accompanying employment
support; and the application, or deterrent threat, of financial
sanctions. We accept that any sanctions regime must be "credible"
if it is to influence claimant behaviour; however, it is not possible
from the available evidence to come to a view on the relative
efficacy and impacts of longer minimum sanction periods compared
to shorter ones. We believe that it is important that the Government
conduct evaluations to enhance the evidence base in this policy
area, to demonstrate that the use of sanctions is not purely punitive.
(Paragraph 59)
9. We recommend
that DWP evaluate, by testing different approaches, the relative
impacts on movements off out-of-work benefits and into work of:
benefit conditions themselves; the level of accompanying employment
support; and the application, or deterrent threat, of financial
sanctions. We further recommend that DWP evaluate the efficacy
and impacts of four-week minimum sanction periods, as introduced
following the Welfare Reform Act 2012, compared to minimum sanction
periods of one week. (Paragraph 60)
Monitoring the destinations of sanctioned claimants
10. Recently
published research emphasises the importance of developing more
effective systems for monitoring the destinations of claimants
leaving benefit in general and, in particular, the destinations
of claimants leaving benefit following a sanction. The introduction
of Universal Credit affords the Department considerable opportunities
to develop new and more effective systems. We recommend that DWP
develop systems, using RTI data, to track shorter and longer term
employment outcomes and earnings progress for sanctioned benefit
claimants within Universal Credit, as part of its ongoing evaluation
of the efficacy and impacts of benefit sanctions policy.
(Paragraph 66)
Setting appropriate JSA job-searching conditions
11. We
recommend that DWP's evaluation of the Claimant Commitment includes
an assessment of: whether claimants are fully involved in the
process of developing a suitable job-searching strategy and in
setting realistic and achievable targets; and whether reasonable
conditions are being set for all groups of JSA claimants, including
those with physical and mental health conditions, learning disabilities
and caring responsibilities. We also believe that more than another
year before the findings of this evaluation are published is too
long a wait for an assessment of new benefit conditions affecting
so many claimants. We therefore further recommend that DWP expedite
its evaluation and publish initial findings as early as possible
in the next Parliament, and certainly before the end of 2015.
We believe that there is a specific need to review whether the
conditionality applied to those claiming JSA while a decision
on ESA eligibility is being reconsidered or appealed should be
altered to reflect this, and the individual's specific circumstances.
(Paragraph 74)
12. DWP's new Vulnerability
Guidance is a welcome step forward in trying to more routinely
identify claimants who are vulnerable and require support to "enable
them to access DWP benefits and services". However, we are
concerned that, while the guidance we have seen is a good, general
purpose document, which includes helpful definitions of what might
constitute vulnerability, it does not give clear guidance on the
level of support vulnerable groups would need in order to fulfil
their benefit conditionality. There remains a danger that some
vulnerable individuals are being "set up to fail". (Paragraph
79)
13. We recommend
that DWP, drawing on specialist advice from health experts, develop
guidance on vulnerability which is specifically intended to assist
JCP staff in identifying vulnerable JSA claimants, including those
with mental health problems and learning disabilities, who may
face difficulties in understanding and/or complying with benefit
conditionality. This guidance should include examples or case
studies to illustrate how conditionality can be tailored in a
range of circumstances. We further recommend that the Department
amalgamate this guidance into the broader Claimant Commitment
guidance, so that it becomes part of the routine process of developing
appropriate and tailored JSA conditionality.
(Paragraph 80)
Use of Jobseeker Directions
14. We
note the concern expressed by some witnesses that use of Jobseeker
Directions has increased in some JCP offices in recent years.
While we appreciate that there may be circumstances in which it
might be appropriate for JCP staff to mandate a JSA claimant to
undertake a very specific type of work-related activity, such
as particular skills training, it is not immediately clear why
such activities could not invariably be included in Claimant Commitments.
Intuitively we would expect there to be minimal, if any, use made
of Jobseeker Directions, as the Claimant Commitment becomes more
firmly established. We recommend that DWP's evaluation of the
Claimant Commitment include an assessment of the appropriate use
of Jobseeker Directions and their interaction with the Claimant
Commitment process.
(Paragraph 84)
Single parent conditionality
15. There
is evidence that single parent JSA claimants are more likely to
receive a non-adverse JSA sanction decision than the general JSA
claimant population. Whilst not necessarily causing individual
financial hardship, it should be recognised that the raising of
a "doubt" in itself can cause distress. Notwithstanding
the fact that many do successfully offer "good reason",
there may still be some claimants who experience an adverse decision
if they are not enabled and encouraged to offer "good reason".
We also note concern from those representing single parents that
claimants and JCP Work Coaches may be insufficiently aware of
the statutory flexibilities designed to protect single parents
from inappropriate conditionality, and that this may be leading
to unnecessary sanction referrals which are subsequently overturned
by Decision Makers. (Paragraph 87)
16. We recommend
that DWP increase training for JCP Work Coaches on the regulatory
flexibilities which should be applied to the benefit conditions
of single parent JSA claimants. We also recommend that DWP produce
a straightforward, plain English guide to the flexibilities, which
should be given to all single parent JSA claimants. We further
recommend that DWP review the regulatory flexibilities afforded
to single parent Universal Credit claimants, with a view to ensuring
that they are offered the same level of protection from inappropriate
conditionality and sanctioning as JSA claimants.
(Paragraph 88)
Testing a more targeted approach to conditionality
and sanctioning
17. Employment
services professionals believe that strict conditionality, backed
up by financial sanctions, is necessary in only a small minority
of circumstances, in particular where claimants have a history
of poor engagement with employment support, and where their lack
of engagement is "motivational or attitudinal". If the
intention of sanctioning is to change behaviour, we believe that
it is important to identify and focus on those claimants whose
attitudes towards job-seeking and work the Department seeks to
change. We believe that an effective targeted approach to strict
conditionality, which focuses on this group of claimants, would
have the benefit of protecting more determined jobseekers, and
the vulnerable, from inappropriate, and potentially counter-productive,
sanctions. We recommend that DWP draw on its 2011 research into
the attitudes of unemployed people towards job-seeking and work,
and consider whether its insights could inform a more targeted
approach to benefit conditionality and sanctioning. We recommend
that DWP establish a small-scale pilot to test the efficacy of
a targeted approach based on segmentation of claimants by their
attitudes and motivations.
(Paragraph 93)
Categories of JSA "sanction"
18. We
recommend that DWP make a clear distinctionin its processes,
its communications with claimants, and in the official databetween
claimants who are not meeting the underlying conditions of entitlement,
in particular those who are genuinely "not actively seeking
employment" and may therefore be abusing the system, and
those who have not fully complied with the precise terms of a
Claimant Commitment. At the moment, both receive the same penalty.
(Paragraph 101)
19. We recommend
that the Government confirm the steps it has taken to ensure that
suspensions of JSA payments where the JCP Work Coach believes
that the claimant has not been "actively seeking employment"
do not occur before good reason can be considered, and a decision
made, by a Decision Maker detached from the employment support
process. DWP should set out the steps it has taken to address
this issue, to provide assurance that the newly instituted procedure
of making decisions in these circumstances within two days of
referral is sufficiently robust to ensure that the decision has
in fact been made, and the claimant notified, before the JSA payment
is suspended. We also believe that notification should be by either
written or telephone communication, depending on the claimant's
preferences as previously expressed to JCP staff when signing
the Claimant Commitment, or subsequent to this.
(Paragraph 108)
Review of the legislative framework for sanctioning
20. Given
the complexity of the existing legislation, there is a strong
case for a review of the underpinning legislative framework for
conditionality and sanctions, to ensure that the basis for sanctioning
is clearly defined, and safeguards to protect vulnerable groups
clearly set out. We recommend that the clarity and coherence of
the legislative framework for benefit sanctions policy be included
in the terms of reference of the full independent review which
we have recommended.
(Paragraph 112)
ESA sanctioning
21. The
very large majority of ESA sanctions relate to claimants' failures
to attend or participate in the Work Programme. This reason accounts
for almost all of the notable increase in ESA sanctioning which
has occurred since 2013. While the performance of the Work Programme
has improved significantly after a poor start, and is now meeting
minimum contractual performance expectations for new ESA claimants,
there remains widespread concern, including from contracted providers,
that the Work Programme does not yet provide sufficiently specialised
and effective support for ESA claimants who are some distance
from the labour market. We therefore believe there is a risk that
ESA conditionality is still not properly balanced by effective
employment support. We recommend that DWP review ESA sanctioning
in relation to the Work Programme, accelerating development of
more effective support for this group, and prioritising the updating
of regulations early in the next Parliament, to empower Work Programme
providers to be able to accept "good cause". We call
upon DWP also to review the programme of Core Visits as soon as
possible, to clarify what changes to conditionality and the application
of sanctions occur as a consequence of such Core Visits.
(Paragraph 134)
22. There is a
lack of evidence for the efficacy of financial sanctions in moving
claimants with long-term health conditions and disabilities closer
to employment or into work. There is some evidence that voluntary
approaches are more appropriate and effective. We welcome DWP's
commitment to testing alternative approaches, particularly for
ESA claimants with mental health conditions. We recommend that
the Department include voluntary approaches in its pilots, including
the Individual Placement with Support model. DWP should test and
evaluate these new approaches, and publish its findings, prior
to the re-letting of Work Programme contracts in 2017. DWP should
also test alternative, non-financial models of conditionality
for vulnerable groups. In particular, it should review the situation
of claimants with co-morbidities, to ensure that there are no
perverse unintended consequences in applying non-financial models
to particular vulnerable groups of claimants.
(Paragraph 135)
Further improving communication with claimants
23. We
note with concern claimants' uncertainty over whether a sanction
has been applied which, as the Oakley Review highlighted, has
arisen in large part because of poor communication from DWP. Such
confusion can often feed through to self-reported statistics about
the role benefit sanctions may play in the requirement for emergency
food aid, potentially leading to false conclusions being drawn.
We recommend that DWP carry out further work with the Behavioural
Insights Unit to ensure that claimants understand their position
within the benefits system, their underlying entitlements and,
when changes to their benefit payments occur, what the reasons
are for this. (Paragraph
141)
Hardship payments
24. The
improvements DWP has made to its systems and communications should
ensure that all claimants are aware of the potential availability
of hardship payments, and have sped up the hardship payment application
and decision-making process. Despite this some people who would
qualify are still not applying for a variety of reasons. Furthermore,
there is widespread concern that DWP's system of discretionary
hardship payments does not prevent severe financial hardship in
all cases, often because JSA hardship payments are not typically
available until the 15th day of a sanction period. We believe
that changes to the system are required to ensure that the risks
of severe financial hardship are more comprehensively mitigated.
There should also be signposting for, and access to, welfare advice
support. (Paragraph 149)
25. We recommend
that DWP make hardship payments available from day one of a sanction
period in all cases, including JSA. We further recommend that,
where the claimant has dependent children or is a member of a
vulnerable group, the hardship payment decision-making process
be instigated by DWP Decision Makers, and coordinated with the
decision on the sanction referral itself, regardless of whether
the claimant has proactively applied for a hardship payment. The
fact that in January 2015 the most recent data on hardship payments
were from 2010-11, and those data were only made available in
response to a Parliamentary Question, is highly regrettable, particularly
given that this has been a period of significant change in the
sanctions regime. It should not take four years to gather and
validate such data. We therefore also recommend that DWP publish,
on at least an annual basis, official data on the number of applications
for hardship payments made by sanctioned claimants; the number
of hardship payments made; and the number which were made on day
one of a sanction period. (Paragraph 150)
Investigating deaths of benefit claimants
26. It
is right that the Department investigates all deaths of claimants
resulting from suicide, and other deaths of vulnerable claimants
with complex needs, through a system of "peer reviews".
We fully appreciate that in such cases there are likely to be
multiple and complex factors involved. We understand that DWP
has undertaken 49 peer reviews since February 2012, and that in
33 cases these resulted in recommendations for consideration at
either national or local level. We ask that the Department set
out the number of peer review cases where the claimant was subject
to a benefit sanction at the time of death and the results of
any such reviews in terms of policy changes. In addition, DWP
should seek to establish a body modelled on the Independent Police
Complaints Commission, to conduct reviews, at the request of relatives,
or automatically where no living relative remains, in all instances
where an individual on an out-of-work working-age benefit dies
whilst in receipt of that benefit. Such a model, operated within
the purview of the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman,
should ensure that the role of all publicly-funded agencies involved
in the provision of services or benefits to the individual is
scrutinised, so that a learning document can be produced setting
out how policy, and the service delivery pathway, can be improved
at every stage. (Paragraph
154)
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