Immigration Bill Committee

Written evidence submitted by Amnesty International UK (IB 20)

Immigration Bill 2015-16 (Bill 74)

Amnesty International UK is a national section of a global movement of over three million supporters, members and activists. We represent more than 518,000 members, supporters, activists, and active groups across the UK. Collectively, our vision is of a world in which every person enjoys all of the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments. Our mission is to undertake research and action focused on preventing and ending grave abuses of these rights. We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion.


1. Amnesty International UK (AIUK) thanks the Committee for the opportunity provided to our Refugee and Migrant Rights Programme Director, Steve Symonds, to give oral evidence on 22 October 2015. In this submission, we elaborate on some of the answers we then gave and address further aspects of the Immigration Bill 2015-2016 (Bill 74), for which there was insufficient time. That we do not directly address any particular provision is no indication of our support for it.

2. We have reviewed the evidence given by other parties to the Committee over the four oral evidence sessions held. Rather than repeating others’ evidence, we indicate agreement with the evidence of specified others. That we do not express a view on any particular aspect of any of the evidence neither indicates agreement nor disagreement with it.

3. Below, under four discrete headings, we address:

· Part 4 (Appeals)

· Part 5 & Schedule 6 (Support for certain categories of migrant)

· Detention; clause 29 & Schedule 5 (Immigration bail)

· General expansion of immigration powers

Part 4 (Appeals):

4. By clause 31, the Bill would extend a measure introduced by the Immigration Act 2014 to all appellants facing removal. [1] That measure currently permits the Home Office to issue a certificate before or after a person initiates an appeal against his or her deportation. The issue of the certificate precludes the person from beginning or continuing the appeal from within the UK. [2]

5. The main category of case liable to be affected by this extension of the existing measure will be those who make an application to remain in the UK under the immigration rules relating to family members and long residence. The relevant rules are to be found in Part 6, Part 7, Appendix FM and Appendix FM-SE of the immigration rules, albeit members of the Committee who wish to better acquaint themselves with the "alphabet soup of non-sequential provisions" to which Colin Yeo of Garden Court Chambers [3] referred in his oral evidence should also consider Part 1 and Part 9 which generally apply to applications made under any part of the rules. [4]

6. Under clause 31, it is intended that children may be removed from the UK – removed from their school, from their friends and community, from family including one or other parent – before it is ultimately determined in the appeal Parliament has retained for them whether to do so would be in breach of their right to respect for private and family life. Other children with entitlement to be here, including British children, may be effectively required to leave because of the removal of their parent. Similarly, adults may be removed from the UK – removed from their partner, from their children, from their work, home and community – before that same question has been ultimately determined in the appeal retained for them.

7. The basis on which this is to take place is that even were their appeal successful there would be no human rights violation in the meantime. The recent judgment, [5] to which the Minister and Manjit Gill QC of No5 Chambers referred in oral evidence, [6] indicates that whether there will be "a real risk of serious irreversible harm" [7] is not the appropriate test. We have three broad concerns with this clause. Firstly, the difficulties someone may face in seeking to pursue an appeal from overseas may prevent their doing so at all. Mr Yeo offered an example in his evidence. [8]

8. Secondly, the difficulties in pursuing such an appeal may so undermine the ability of the appellant to pursue the appeal effectively that an appeal which would otherwise have succeeded will fail. We agree with the reasons given by Adrian Berry of the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (both those he expressly listed and listed by Mr Gill with which he agreed). [9] We are not comforted by the recent judgment. That judgment described the Home Office guidance being applied in these cases as containing "an incomplete and misleading statement of the statutory test" and "liable to mislead decision-makers". The court held that in general the tribunal hearing an appeal could make arrangements to do sufficient justice to the appellant – though not wholly mitigating the disadvantage to the appellant of not being able to conduct the appeal from within the UK. We doubt this conclusion of principle will safely translate into practice and, as other witnesses, question the availability of resources to achieve justice in many cases. [10]

9. The data provided by the Minister in response to a written question from Gavin Newlands MP gives cause to think the existing measure in relation to deportation appeals is already causing injustice. The Minister indicated that of those removed under a deportation order where the existing certificate (commenced from 28 July 2014) had been applied, around one quarter (426) had brought an appeal and of these only 3% (13) had been successful. [11] This compares to 2,096 deport appeals decided in the 2014/15 year, of which 33% were successful. [12] The Home Office may say the exceptionally low success rate is demonstrative that the certificates are used in cases without merit – just as the Home Office has long argued the exceptionally low success rate in detained fast track asylum appeals confirmed it was only poor cases selected for that process rather than the process was so structurally unfair as to prejudice appellants’ chances on appeal. [13] Litigation has finally confirmed the structural unfairness in the latter process, which this year has been found to be unlawful. [14] Whereas the Minister, in his statement to Parliament confirming the suspension of the process, did not concede the inherent flaw in it, he did acknowledge it was not possible to evaluate the risk of unfairness in the system as it was operating. [15]

10. Thirdly, in practice this measure would be likely to disproportionately and unlawfully interfere with private and family life in many cases. It cannot be calculated how long any interference will last. Disruption to a child’s contact with a parent, or removal from school and community, in particular, may have devastating effects even if the period is short. Yet there is no reason to think the period would be short. The period would, however, be indefinite; and the uncertainty surrounding that would compound the potential anguish and other harms to appellants and family members, including children. Research commissioned the Children’s Commissioner reached just such conclusions in respect of family separation of resulting from the application of the immigration rules on family migration. [16] These considerations are not on the face of it addressed in the judgment to which the Minister and Mr Gill referred. We note that judgment concerned two appellants – one had no children, the other had no subsisting family life with his children. [17]

11. Our experience of the length of time to hearing of appeals in which we provide expert country evidence accords with the oral evidence of Mr Yeo [18] – nine to ten months is common, and this can be greatly extended by adjournments including those requested by the Home Office. Moreover, the Home Office often seeks permission to appeal if an appeal is allowed. Determination of that request prolongs the period to resolution, and where permission is granted the appeal’s conclusion may be delayed very much longer. Mr Yeo also rightly referred to other significant consequences, which may be suffered by an appellant, including loss of job or home. [19]

12. Accordingly, we recommend that clause 31 should not stand part of the Bill.

13. In our oral evidence, we briefly referred to the failure of the government – when removing the right of appeal against a decision to cancel, curtail or revoke a person’s leave by the Immigration Act 2014 [20] – to replace that remedy with a right to apply for administrative review. [21] The explanatory notes when that Act was before Parliament had expressly indicated such a right would be provided. [22] Given the consequences of a wrongful withdrawal of someone’s leave (liability to summary eviction under provisions of this Bill, [23] to detention, removal etc.), this failure by government should be urgently made good, and we would recommend the Minister is pressed in Committee to do so.

14. As regards the value of appeals generally, Craig Whitaker MP inquired as to the proportion of refused applicants who appeal as he was concerned to determine whether the appeals success rates quoted by witnesses represented a significant or relatively small proportion of applicants. [24] Like Mr Yeo, we are unable to provide the statistic that Mr Whittaker sought, but one difficulty with the question is that not all applicants have a right of appeal. The right has been withdrawn from various and large groups of applicants by successive Acts, most recently by the Immigration Act 2014. [25] Hence, as a proportion of all applicants, the number of successful appellants would inevitably be relatively small. What we do know is that in the year 2014/15, more than 66,000 people had their appeal determined by the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber). [26] As to the number of dependents on those appeals, or children and partners who were directly affected by the outcomes, this too we do not know.

Part 5 & Schedule 6 (Support for certain categories of migrant)

15. The Committee has received a great deal of evidence in relation to support. We do not repeat that. We agree with the oral evidence of Mike Kaye of Still Human Still Here, save that as explained above our current experience indicates he underestimated the length of time between refusal and appeal hearing. [27]

16. In the first oral evidence session during the afternoon on which we gave evidence, the Committee took evidence from the London boroughs of Hillingdon and Croydon; and from Henry St Clair Miller of the No Recourse to Public Funds Network. In his evidence, Mr Miller explained that were a local authority to be faced with a family refused asylum, whose asylum and human rights appeal had been finally concluded and rejected, "…it should be possible for the local authority to [similarly conclude]… that no assistance is required other than a return to the country of origin through assisted voluntary return." [28] Insofar as it goes, that answer may be correct. But what Mr Miller did not at that time go on to contemplate is the situation where the family refuses to accept an assisted return. In such circumstances, the local authority’s duty to the children will no more be displaced by the non-cooperation of the adults than they would in other circumstances in which a parent or parents were acting in a way which put a child’s safety or welfare at risk. Thus, the complex questions as to how best to ensure the child’s safety or welfare, including considerations as to the welfare implications of taking a child into local authority care as discussed more widely in that session, will arise.

17. We are generally opposed to removal of support, and especially concerned at the consequences to families and children. We also recommend that appeal rights be retained in support cases.

18. Reference was made in that oral evidence session to section 55 in relation to the safety and welfare of children – that is section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. During the session in which we gave evidence, Rebecca Hilsenrath of the Equalities and Human Rights Commission generally raised concerns as to the lack of equality impact assessments in relation to measures in the Bill. [29] As regards the intention to remove support for families with children, who have been refused asylum, if and when their appeal is dismissed, there was a short consultation. That consultation made but one reference to a child save in the capacity as a dependent on one or more adults. [30] The one reference was in the assertion that what was proposed would retain important safeguards for children. It was not made express what safeguards were meant. The failure to give specific consideration to children in their own right as distinct from mere appendages of parents or other adult carers remains – after six years of the section 55 duty having been commenced [31] – a feature of Home Office practice, decision-making and policy-making, which is incompatible with both that duty and the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

19. We have no confidence that this important duty to ensure the safety and welfare of children has received any adequate consideration in the formulation of other measures in this Bill; and similarly have no confidence that if commenced the powers provided by this Bill will generally be exercised with proper regard to that duty.

Detention; clause 29 & Schedule 5 (Immigration bail):

20. Clause 29 and Schedule 5 would achieve two distinct results. They would rename the current status of ‘temporary admission’ as ‘immigration bail’. Separately, they would transfer significant powers from an independent tribunal to the Home Office in relation to cases which (as now) are properly regarded as bail cases – i.e. cases where bail is granted by the tribunal to a person previously subjected to detention by decision of the Home Office.

21. This transfer of power to the Home Office constitutes a serious assault on the principle that a detained person should have access to independent judicial scrutiny of his or her detention. As Mr Berry pointed out, such a transfer can be expected to lead to increased unlawful detention and increased compensation payments. [32] We are opposed to provisions in Schedule 5 which would empower the Home Office to effectively overrule or ignore the decision of an independent tribunal.

22. We also agree with the criticism of renaming temporary admission made by Mr Berry in oral evidence. [33] When, for example, a person subject to immigration control presents to an immigration officer at a port of entry, the officer is required to determine whether the person is entitled to be admitted to the UK. If the officer is uncertain as to that question, the officer is empowered to admit the person under temporary admission with conditions (including reporting) attached while that question is investigated. Asylum-seekers claiming at a port of entry are frequently admitted on this basis because it is not possible to properly assess their claim without further enquiry than can be conducted at that time at the port. Asylum-seekers claiming at the Home Office offices in Croydon are also frequently granted this status on the same basis. However, other people are also admitted on this basis when there is some question in the mind of an immigration officer that it is thought needs further consideration.

23. There is no illegality on the face of the circumstances just described. Nonetheless, many commentators (and others) too readily wrongly elide these circumstances with criminality and associated risks. When we gave oral evidence, Simon Hoare MP expressed concerns regarding social cohesion with the thought that greater certainty as to the legitimacy of people’s presence in the UK would ease related anxieties. [34] It appears to us that very similar concerns have underpinned much of the immigration legislation and expansion of immigration powers, which we criticised in our oral evidence. [35] We offer some further brief thoughts on this matter in the following section. However, we would emphasise here that the renaming of temporary admission as immigration bail risks, for the reasons given by Mr Berry, contributing to the very anxieties which Mr Hoare was concerned to have eased. We also agree with Mr Berry’s assessment that the renaming will not assist in addressing a culture in which what is supposed to be regarded as an exceptional measure (use of the power to detain) has become normalised in Home Office practice – as we and others have observed including the cross-party parliamentary group which reported on its use in March 2015. [36]

24. Independent inspectorates have also made findings consistent with these concerns. [37] HM Chief Inspector of Prisons concluded his introduction to his most recent report on an Immigration Removal Centre (Yarl’s Wood) by stating: "…decisive action is needed to ensure that women are only detained as a last resort. Procedures to ensure the most vulnerable women are never detained should be strengthened and managers held to account for ensuring they are applied consistently. Depriving anyone of their liberty should be an exceptional and serious step." [38] Observations like this are only made because culture and practice have become far out of step with what purports to be the long-standing policy – that there is a presumption against detention, that it should only be used where there is no alternative and if used must be for the shortest possible time. [39]

25. In oral evidence, Jerome Phelps of Detention Action highlighted cases in which the High Court has found immigration detention of someone to have been so catastrophic for that person’s mental health and the response so wilfully or recklessly lacking as to violate the UK’s absolute obligation not to subject anyone to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. [40] Although, as Craig Whittaker MP pointed out, these cases constitute a very small proportion of those subjected to detention, they should be of far greater concern for at least four reasons.

26. Firstly, it is extremely serious for the court to make such a finding in any case, and for the High Court to have done so five times since 2011 [41] is lamentable. Secondly, with curtailment of legal aid and increased barriers to judicial review over recent years, there can be no assurance that other cases have not come to light simply because victims have not secured access to any or competent legal advice. [42] Thirdly, we cannot know if other cases have not come to light because the Home Office has settled a claim out of court to avoid the risk of such a finding. Finally, we do know there have been numerous successful unlawful detention claims [43] – both findings by courts and cases settled out of court – and even where the treatment to which the individual was subjected by reason of their detention did not cross the Article 3 threshold, the unlawful detention of someone constitutes an human rights abuse and the detention of someone – whether lawful or otherwise – can cause serious harm, particularly to mental health. [44]

27. These concerns are exacerbated by several factors. We highlight four. Firstly, immigration detention in the UK is indefinite. The only time limits in UK law or policy operate in respect of detention of children. [45] Secondly, as revealed by a recent report of Medical Justice, there is widespread, harmful and inappropriate use of segregation in the immigration detention estate. [46] The report highlights a disturbing disparity in the number of people recorded as having been subjected to segregation – the Home Office recording around 1,200 detainees to have been segregated in 2014, whereas HM Chief Inspector of Prisons’ inquiries suggest the figure to be around 4,800. The report also highlights the use of segregation as a means to ‘manage’ mental illness and self-harm. The harmful use of segregation as a response to mental illness and self-harm has, for example, been identified by the High Court in the Article 3 cases to which Mr Phelps referred. [47] Thirdly, there is the related evidence of woefully inadequate healthcare provided in immigration detention, including in relation to mental health. For example, the most recent annual reports of Independent Monitoring Boards for Yarl’s Wood and Harmondsworth each reported concerns about the provision of healthcare, highlighting mental health, the use of segregation and the detention of people clearly unfit for detention.

28. Finally, we draw attention to the Home Office immigration detention statistics to which Mr Phelps made reference. [48] He gave the data for 2014. The most recent data gives figures for the 12 months to end June 2015. It shows increasing use of detention and falling effectiveness of that use. The introduction to the Home Office publication states: "The number of people entering detention in the year ending June 2015 increased by 10% to 32,053 from 29,122 in the previous year. Over the period there was a similar increase of 9% in those leaving detention (from 29,055 to 31,628). There was a continuing decline in the proportion of detainees being removed on leaving detention from the most recent peak in the year ending March 2011 of 64% to 49% in the year ending June 2015." [49]

29. We recommend the introduction of a statutory time limit on the immigration detention of all persons subjected to this power, which could be done by amendment to this Bill. That time limit must be sufficiently short to act as a real constraint on the use of detention and not to provide a target or justification for extending the detention of those who might otherwise be detained for a shorter period.

30. We further recommend urgent attention to the findings and recommendation of the cross-party parliamentary group, which reported in March 2015. As they found detention is being used disproportionately, and the many problems associated with its use could and should be largely addressed by simply detaining far fewer people.

31. Parliament should be strengthening judicial oversight of detention not weakening it; and we support calls for the introduction of automatic and regular judicial oversight of any individual’s detention.

32. We do not support the substitution of the name ‘immigration bail’ for ‘temporary admission’, and the Bill should be amended to retain the distinction between bail and temporary admission.

General expansion of immigration powers:

33. We agree with the oral evidence of Rachel Robinson of Liberty [50] and Mr Yeo [51] on this subject. In addition to the oral evidence we gave on this subject, we wish to emphasise four matters – partly to expand on our evidence, and partly to offer some further response to the concerns of Mr Hoare about social cohesion and anxiety to which we refer above.

34. Firstly, we are concerned that expansion of powers and targets has contributed and will continue to contribute to inefficiency, ineffectiveness and abuse by the Home Office. There is a misguided tendency at the Home Office to equate increased enforcement activity with increased effectiveness. This is not cost-effective, does not reduce any anxiety others may have yet increases the likelihood of abuse of powers. For example, the Home Secretary at Second Reading announced: "More than 8,000 proposed marriages have been referred to the Home Office, with 120 of them being identified as shams." The effectiveness of these referrals was on this data at only 1.5%. (This contrasts starkly with the effectiveness of 40% or more which on a similar basis may be attributed to appeal rights, which the government continues to wish to remove or curtail.) As detailed above, while the use of detention has increased the proportion of those whose detention ends in removal has significantly reduced.

35. The report of the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, to which Mr Yeo referred, into the emergency travel document process (this is a process to secure documents on which someone may be removed from the UK) revealed that: "The Home Office was applying for too many ETDs that had little prospect of being used, rather than focusing on cases where re-documentation was likely to result in removal. This is a long-standing issue… the Home Office had not used several thousand ETDs that had already been agreed by embassies. In some instances, these agreements dated back more than ten years." [52] Increased activity does not equate to effectiveness. Indeed, increased activity may both indicate and produce its opposite. It is, however, likely to draw attention and – if ineffective or unnecessary – increase anxiety. It also risks inconsistency, arbitrariness and abuse – none of which contribute to the confidence anyone can have in the UK immigration system. The Home Office would be far better reducing its powers, and more responsibly targeting its efforts.

36. Secondly, we remind the Committee the degree of scrutiny to which the Home Office is subject has been significantly reduced in recent years by reduction in legal aid and increased barriers to judicial review. Independent inspectorates cannot mitigate these losses. Inspectorates do valuable work, but have neither the resources nor the remit to keep constant watch on the full range of Home Office activity, still less provide safeguards or remedies in individual cases. Committee members might usefully review the website of the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration and consider the range of Home Office activity that inspectorate has reviewed since 2009. The range of activity is such that there will always be much activity that cannot be under review at any one time, and an ongoing dilemma about whether to follow-up inspection work on any discrete area of activity at the expense of inspecting something else.

37. Thirdly, the Home Office has frequently failed to act on its own promises to ensure the provision of training or policy instruction to ensure against inconsistency, arbitrariness and abuse. The previous Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration had on more than one occasion raised concerns about failures to implement his recommendations even after these had been accepted by the Home Office. The Home Office has given plentiful assurances as to the provision of rules governing detention in short-term holding facilities since at least 2005, [53] all of which remain as yet unfulfilled. In the wake of the death of Jimmy Mubenga in 2010 during an attempt to remove him from the UK, we published a briefing on the use of force highlighting the urgent need to radically overhaul and improve training, monitoring, accountability and techniques used in enforced removals. [54] More than two years later, the publication of the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman’s report [55] revealed there had already been serious disquiet about the standard of training on the use of force being delivered to escort staff before Mr Mubenga’s death and more than two years after his death the inadequacy of training remained to be addressed. However, the Coroner’s report published close to the same time indicated that a year on this still remained to be addressed. [56]

38. Finally, although this has been emphasised by many witnesses, it is necessary to repeat that the complexity of legislation, immigration rules and policy in support of these has a profoundly detrimental effect upon the Home Office as everyone else. We agree with the Home Secretary’s analysis in 2013 that "a vicious cycle of complex law and poor enforcement of its own policies" is a key cause and symptom of the travails of the Home Office. [57] We do not, therefore, understand why Parliament is now – for the second time since she gave that analysis – being asked to legislate further and compound those complexities.

39. In the circumstances, we believe it would be unwise of Parliament to accede to a further substantial expansion of powers to the Home Office at this time.

October 2015

[1] Section 94B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 was introduced by section 17 of the Immigration Act 2014, partially commenced on 28 July 2014 by the Immigration Act 2014 (Commencement No. 1, Transitory and Saving Provisions) Order 2014, SI 2014/1820, and fully commenced on 20 October 2014 by the Immigration Act 2014 (Commencement No. 3, Transitional and Saving Provisions) Order 2014, SI 2014/2771.

[2] Under section 92(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 as substituted by section 17 of the Immigration Act 2014.

[3] Hansard HC, Public Bill Committee Immigration Bill, 22 October 2015 : Col 100 (Q213)

[4] The Introduction, 16 Parts and 26 Appendices constituting the immigration rules may be viewed at

[5] R (Kiarie & Byndloss) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 1020

[6] Hansard HC, Public Bill Committee Immigration Bill, 22 October 2015 : Col 96 (Q203)

[7] This is the term used in section 94B(3) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, as introduced by section 17 of the Immigration Act 2014.

[8] Hansard HC, Public Bill Committee Immigration Bill, 22 October 2015 : Col 95 (Q199)

[9] Hansard HC, Public Bill Committee Immigration Bill, 22 October 2015 : Col 94 (Q198)

[10] e.g. Hansard HC, Public Bill Committee Immigration Bill, 22 October 2015 : Cols 93-94 (Q197 & Q198)

[11] Hansard HC, written question 11080 answered by the Minister on 14 October 2015.

[12] S ee Table 2.5a available at recognition-certificate-statistics-quarterly-april-to-june-2015

[13] e.g. This has been frequently repeated by the Home Office over several years at meetings of the National Asylum Stakeholder Forum (NASF), at which Amnesty International UK has been a member throughout the lifetime of the forum.

[14] Detention Action v First-tier Tribunal, Upper Tribunal, Lord Chancellor & Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 1689 (Admin); [2015] EWCA Civ 840

[15] Hansard HC, 2 July 2015 : Col 51-53WS, where the Minister said: "Recently the system has come under significant legal challenge, including on the appeals stage of the process. Risks surrounding the safeguards within the system for particularly vulnerable applicants have also been identified to the extent that we cannot be certain of the level of risk of unfairness to certain vulnerable applicants who may enter DFT. In light of these issues, I have decided to temporarily suspend the operation of the detained fast track policy."

[16] Family Friendly? The impact on children of the Family Migration Rules: A review of the financial requirements, Children’s Commissioner, August 2015. Key findings are identified as including that "Children… are suffering distress and anxiety as a result of separation from a parent. This is compounded by the overall stress, anxiety and practical difficulties faced by the family unit.", "Decision-making routinely fails to adequately consider the best interests of children and decision letters are often legally and factually incorrect.", with several of the "…most common emotional and behavioural problems" listed in the executive summary.

[17] See paragraphs 76 & 100 of the judgment op cit

[18] Hansard HC, Public Bill Committee Immigration Bill, 22 October 2015 : Col 100 (Q212)

[19] Hansard HC, Public Bill Committee Immigration Bill, 22 October 2015 : Col 99 (Q212)

[20] This was done by section 15 of the Immigration Act 2014.

[21] See Appendix AR to the immigration rules

[22] Explanatory Notes to Bill 206-EN 2013-2014 provided: " 73. administrative review may be sought when a person’s leave is curtailed or is revoked . " S ee 2014/0110/en/14110en.htm

[23] See the two new eviction powers to be introduced by clause 13.

[24] Hansard HC, Public Bill Committee Immigration Bill, 22 October 2015 : Col 93 (Q196)

[25] Appeal rights had before that Act been removed in large numbers of particularly out of country (entry clearance cases) cases and, by section 15, the Act removed those rights from a large number of in-country cases.

[26] See Table 2.5a in tribunal statistics op cit

[27] Hansard HC, Public Bill Committee Immigration Bill, 20 October 2015 : Col 6 (Q1)

[28] Hansard HC, Public Bill Committee Immigration Bill, 22 October 2015 : Col 122 (Q251)

[29] Hansard HC, Public Bill Committee Immigration Bill, 22 October 2015 : Col 138 (Q294)

[30] See

[31] Section 55 was commenced on 2 November 2009 by the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (Commencement No. 1) Order 2009, SI 2009/2731

[32] Hansard HC, Public Bill Committee Immigration Bill, 22 October 2015 : Col 102 (Q217)

[33] ibid

[34] Hansard HC, Public Bill Committee Immigration Bill, 22 October 2015 : Col 141 (Q302)

[35] Hansard HC, Public Bill Committee Immigration Bill, 22 October 2015 : Col 143 (Q306)

[36] In a detailed report citing many instances, the cross-party parliamentary group stated: "Home Office guidance currently states that detention must be used sparingly and for the shortest possible period. What became clear during the course of the inquiry is that the standard working practices and the enforcement-focused culture of the Home Office are resulting in this guidance being ineffective. This is compounded by the lack of a maximum time limit and a lack of effective means for those detained to challenge their continued detention." See

[37] See e.g. National Audit Office (2013) Managing the prison estate, HC 735, Session 2013-14, 12 December 2013; Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (2011) A thematic inspection of how the UK Border Agency manages foreign national prisoners, October 2012

[38] See

[39] Chapter 55 of the Home Office, enforcement instructions and guidance

[40] Hansard HC, Public Bill Committee Immigration Bill, 22 October 2015 : Col 108 (Q228)

[41] A sixth case has been referred back to the court by the Court of Appeal, but there is no outstanding challenge to the findings in the remaining cases.

[42] Part 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and Part 4 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 are of especial significance.

[43] Mr Phelps referred to this in his oral evidence, see Hansard HC, 22 October 2015 : Col 102 (Q216)

[44] See e.g. Royal College of Psychiatrists (2013) Position Statement on detention of people with mental disorders in Immigration Removal Centres

[45] Section 5 of the Immigration Act 2014 introduced a statutory time limit of 24 hours for the detention of an unaccompanied child; and chapter 55 of the enforcement instructions and guidance permits the detention of an accompanied child for a period of up to 72 hours without Ministerial approval, up to seven days with such approval.

[46] See

[47] See e.g. R (MD) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 2249 (Admin)

[48] Hansard HC, Public Bill Committee Immigration Bill 22 October 2015 : Col 101 (Q215)

[49] See

[50] Hansard HC, Public Bill Committee Immigration Bill, 22 October 2015 : Col 144 (Q306)

[51] Hansard HC, Public Bill Committee Immigration Bill, 22 October 2015 : Col 107 (Q224)

[52] See

[53] Most recently, the Lord Taylor of Holbeach gave an assurance on behalf of the government that such rules would be in place before the summer 2014 parliamentary recess; see Hansard HL, 3 March 2014 : Col 1140

[54] See

[55] See

[56] See

[57] Hansard HC, 6 March 2013 : Col 1500

Prepared 27th October 2015