Appendix: Government response
The Government notes the House of Commons Defence
Committee's inquiry into 'Decision-making in Defence Policy' and
the findings set out in the Committee's report published on 26
March.
We welcome the Committee's recognition of the significant
improvements made to the organisation of Defence, through the
Levene reforms, and the cross-Whitehall decision-making structure,
through the introduction of the National Security Council. As
the Committee says, these have brought clearer accountability
to decision-making and reinforced civilian control. And in some
areas, such as the Departmental equipment programme, we are already
seeing obvious benefits, such as the planning of new equipment
being properly aligned with those responsible for its future employment
and closer scrutiny of requirements setting.
The Government also recognises that decision-making
in Defence is increasingly challenging and that we need to continue
to invest in our people and to improve our processes so that we
make the best decisions that we can.
We share the Committee's assessment that we are operating
in an increasingly complex strategic environment, in which we
face a growing variety of threats, including ISIL and renewed
tension with Russia, as well as new unconventional and ambiguous
warfare methods stretching from cyber to information operations.
This is the strategic environment which forms the background for
the ongoing National Security Strategy and the Strategic Security
and Defence Review.
We also welcome the Committee's recognition of some
of the additional challenges that we face: the increasing complexity
(and expense) of the technology required to support the Armed
Forces, particularly given resource constraints; the challenges
associated with operating within coalitions made up of countries
with different traditions and strategies from our own; the difficulties
created by the current legal environment surrounding overseas
operations; the requirement to maintain public support for the
use of the Armed Forces; and the development of new capabilities
such as remotely-piloted air systems. These are all themes which
are being addressed in the Strategic Defence and Security Review.
We also agree that we are only as good as the people
within the organisation and one of the particular focuses in the
Review is ensuring that our people are appropriately prepared
to meet the challenges we face.
Our specific responses to the committee's conclusions
are set out below.
Case Studies
119. We are concerned that the Government does
not fully recognise the extent of the flaws in past decision-making
practice, and therefore needs to make more fundamental changes
than have already been effected. We would therefore welcome the
Government's views on the analysis in this report, including our
assessment of the Helmand and carrier design cases, and our views
of more general problems in the past decision-making process.
Decision making and Helmand
The decision to launch military operations in Afghanistan
has been the subject of extensive public debate over the last
decade. But it is perhaps the decision to go into northern Helmand
which has arguably attracted most scrutiny and been the subject
of extensive public discussions, and that which the Committee's
report had focused on.
The Government of the day's response to the Committee's
report of 2012 on 'Operations in Afghanistan' set out the Government's
understanding of the decision-making process; and acknowledged
that with hindsight, mistakes were made in the lead up to and
during the military deployment to Helmand. This Government shares
that view.
The Government believes that the strategy we have
pursued since 2010 has been realistic, well-designed and aligned
with our national interests. We also believe we have learned from
previous mistakes. As the report notes, the National Security
Council (NSC) has now been established; it benefits from the Chief
of Defence Staff (CDS) attending, so that military advice can
be provided directly at the highest levels, including when decisions
are taken on substantive new tasks outside current areas of operation.
This is discussed in further detail in this response.
We have continuously learned tactical lessons throughout
our operations in Afghanistan, such as the better detection and
defusing of Improvised Explosive Devices. In due course, we will
also want to look at broader lessons that can be learned from
the campaign. But our focus in recent months has been the effective
establishment of Operation Resolute Support. No decisions have
been taken yet on any review. In making such a decision, the Government
will wish to learn how best any improvements could be made both
quickly and practically.
DFID rejects the Committee's assertion [para 24]
that discussing their work in Afghanistan with delivery partners,
including the Afghan Government and people, somehow dilutes the
importance of the UK's NSC strategy. This is a false choice; indeed,
it is vital that any cross-Government strategy should be informed
by the wishes of the Afghan people and by the work of the wider
donor community. The UK's strategy is not weakened or 'relegated
to low priority' by taking account of the views and intentions
of others—on the contrary, its importance and relevance
are greatly enhanced.
Decision making and the carriers
The Department welcomes the carrier case study and
its analysis of some of the issues surrounding this highly complex
programme. The themes in the carrier case study were covered in
the Gray Report in 2009: equipment aspiration outstripping affordability;
shifting requirements; entryism and optimism bias; absence of
clear ownership; and shortcomings in the delivery organisation.
The Department has systematically addressed these issues. From
SDSR10 to 2012, we reduced the Equipment Programme to the point
where our aspirations matched the budget available, with layers
of risk contingency and headroom built in to ensure we are protected
against cost growth and time slippage. The result has been an
Equipment Programme which has remained stable and properly affordable—an
achievement recognised by the National Audit Office in their Equipment
Plan and Major Project Review reports, and by the Public Accounts
Committee in its oral evidence session on Equipment Plan and Major
Projects Report 2014 and Reforming Defence Acquisition in March
2015.
As part of Defence Reform, we have transformed the
Department's operating model, delegating the responsibility and
budget for equipment acquisition to the Front Line Commands. This
ensures that accountability and responsibility for planning new
equipment is properly aligned with those responsible for its future
employment. It also reduces the likelihood of entryism and optimism
bias, as those responsible for sponsoring new programmes will
have to bear the financial responsibility for their decisions.
Requirements setting is now subject to much closer
scrutiny than in the past. In support of the Department's Investment
Approvals Committee, a Joint Requirements Oversight Committee
has been established. This group, chaired by the Vice Chief of
Defence Staff (VCDS), reviews major project requirements at an
early stage, to ensure that the performance, cost, time and risk
balance is properly scrutinised and understood at the most senior
levels in Defence.
The Department has changed the process for leading
and delivering major programmes. The Department uses the processes
and principles established by the Major Project Authority in the
Cabinet Office. A named Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) is appointed,
with a mandate issued by the PUS, to deliver a programme to specified
performance criteria, with an approved cost and to a specified
time. There is a governance structure established through the
mandate which ensures delivery and programme performance is reported
within the Department to the Defence Board and Ministers, and
to the Government Major Project Portfolio. SROs are required to
attend the Cabinet Office Major Project Leadership Academy, which
inculcates a professional approach to programme management and
decision making.
The Department acknowledges the shortcomings in several
aspects of past decision-making in the Carrier programme. Such
major programmes are inherently risky, but since 2012, the programme
has been stable—requirements have not changed and delivery
remains within cost and time parameters—and we have the
right governance and processes in place to ensure that we are
now firmly on track to deliver the capability as planned to the
front-line.
Expertise
120. We believe that there is still a crucial
lack of authoritative, expert information which can serve as the
basis for strong defence decision-making, in particular on the
detailed political situation in conflict areas. We do not believe
that the existing information-gathering institutions—including
within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence
and intelligence agencies—are currently capable of providing
information of sufficient quality and quantity. We urge the Government
to explain how it plans to remedy this situation.
121. We ask the Government to outline how it will
equip military and civilian advisers with better education and
training in thinking strategically.
122. We believe that Ministers may not have the
necessary capacity or personal support to be able to reach a well-informed
judgement on the issues they are asked to decide, nor to challenge
constructively the official advice they are receiving. We recommend
that they should be more often provided with the opportunity to
reach their own conclusions, including through visits to conflict
regions during which they should have wider and unfiltered access
to local opinion. We recommend that the Ministry of Defence investigate
how to improve induction training for new Ministers in their portfolios,
and examine what additional advice and support they need.
124. We note the drastic reduction in recent years
of domain competence in the Civil Service, reflected in the civilian
representatives on the Defence Board and on other high level decision-making
bodies. We also note the deplorable loss of defence scientific
expertise from the Defence Board. We recommend that the Civil
Service should once again be required to possess specialist defence
and technical expertise to improve the quality of decision-making.
This will also have the benefit of balancing military input with
expert civilian input and of reducing the temptation to pursue
Single Service agendas.
It is the role of officials to advise Ministers on
options and make recommendations to enable Ministers to make effective
decisions. MOD has highly skilled and knowledgeable officials.
Whilst is not always necessary or possible for officials to be
deep experts themselves, they need to understand the issues, have
access to subject matter expertise, and be able to communicate
the facts and options available for decision clearly to Ministers.
When they start in the Department, new Minsters receive comprehensive
written and oral briefings on key issues and subjects they are
likely to need to make decisions on in the near future. A series
of visits are also organised according to the Minister's portfolio
to ensure they are familiar with its subject matter, including
to operational theatres.
The Chief Scientific Advisor (CSA) heads science
and technology in Defence, and makes sure the main decisions made
by ministers, senior officials and the armed services are informed
by high quality, expert scientific advice and analysis. While
CSA does not sit on the Defence Board, he reports to PUS (who
is a permanent member of the Board) and is a member of the Investment
Approvals Committee, which is a subcommittee of the Defence Board
and responsible for considering major investment proposals.
However, we recognise that there are always improvements
that can be made to enhance decision-makers' skills, experience,
knowledge, awareness of historical precedents and strategic imagination.
We agree an appropriate degree of subject specialism, as well
as management skill is required in the civil service, and we are
taking steps to improve these skills. For example, we have reenergised
the Defence Academy so that it delivers and develops education
and training that meets the demands of the Future Operating Environment—which,
as the report recognises, is likely to place a greater premium
on human capability. The Defence Academy now forms part of the
broader Joint Force Development (JFD) organisation, within Joint
Forces Command. This 3 Star-led organisation has brought together
the doctrine and concepts, the training and education delivery,
and Joint exercise delivery to create more effective organisational
relationships and better information repositories to inform and
improve decision making.
The Academy is increasingly becoming an "intelligent
provider" responsive to the evolving needs of Defence and
Security by strengthening its portfolio in certain key areas such
as Cyber Security and languages. The Defence School of Languages
(DSL) is now the Defence Centre for Languages and Culture (DCLC)
based at Shrivenham, while the Defence Centre of Training Support
(DCTS) and the Defence Operational Languages Support Unit (DOLSU)
have been embedded in the Academy headquarters structure to offer
a comprehensive training package.
The Defence Academy also offers places to civilians
on the Advanced Command and Staff Course, the Higher Command and
Staff Course and the Royal College of Defence Studies International
Course. These courses aim to prepare selected military and civilian
officers for senior positions by developing their analytical,
decision-making, communication and strategic thinking skills through
the study of military, defence, political and international affairs.
The issue of expertise is not limited to decision-making in defence
policy, but is also relevant in the rest of government. The Defence
Academy therefore also offers this training to other government
departments.
As part of the wider government creation of the Policy
Profession, in 2012 the MOD established an introductory Policy,
Strategy and Parliamentary course for those entering the profession
and likely to be involved with decision-making. This is now being
expanded to include a continual learning programme of short courses
on specific areas of policy making. Other actions are also being
taken that will improve decision making across government. This
includes the recent establishment of a trial course for an Executive
Masters in Public Policy. The course will provide a thorough understanding
of the practical and political environments in which we work and
equip participants not only to be adept at leading and commissioning
world-class analysis and creative thinking but engender these
skills in their departments.
We need to become more effective in exploiting the
huge array of open source data now available, use more advanced
analytical tools and systems than it has now, and to better use
its current assets. Joint Forces Command is pursuing a number
of initiatives to improve the quality and quantity of information
and analysis provided to decision makers (both in Defence and
in the wider national security system). Joint Forces Command,
through its Joint Warfare Analysis Branch, also sponsors the lessons
process to improve agility and adaptability for future operations.
They report on and analyse the capability of the Joint Force in
order to inform the direction of training requirements and joint
force development.
Government structures and decision making processes
118. The changes that have been introduced, including
the introduction of the National Security Council (NSC) and the
Levene reforms, have clarified and improved the structures of
decision-making. But they have not yet addressed fundamental problems
in the process of decision-making.
123. We believe that the Levene reforms have been
helpful in giving the Chiefs of Staff greater authority for the
management of their services, and in reducing the potential for
Single Service institutional rivalries to distort spending plans
and operational policy. But these benefits have also come at the
expense of severely limiting the ability of the Chiefs to provide
expert strategical advice. We feel that the post-Levene Chiefs
of Staff Committee is too detached from the central policy-making
process in the MoD and also, crucially, from the NSC. We recommend
that the roles of the Chief of Staff should be redefined to give
greater weight to their function as strategy advisors. We recommend
that the Chiefs of Staff Committee should become the official
military sub-committee of the NSC, in order to tender to it joint
military advice on strategy. We believe that such a sub-committee
will be effective only if its military members do not use its
deliberations to pursue Single Service institutional agendas.
125. Furthermore we consider that there are major
weaknesses in how the NSC operates. This is particularly important
given its dominant role in decision-making.
126. We are concerned that discussion in NSC meetings
is too tactical and discursive, and not does not sufficiently
draw on authoritative expert opinion.
127. We believe that the creation of the NSC has
failed to eliminate the risk of a personal, private and reactive
style of decision-making involving only the Prime Minister and
his closest advisers.
128. We are concerned that the increased use of
the NSC could have the effect of undercutting the principle of
Cabinet government. We seek clarification from the Government
on the relationship between the NSC and the Cabinet, and further
reassurance on how the Cabinet will be involved with national
strategy and the formulation of the next SDSR.
We welcome the Committee's assessment that the Levene
reforms have been useful and agree the reforms and the NSC have
brought clearer accountability to decision-making and reinforced
civilian control.
However, we do not accept the Committee's criticisms
of the National Security Council. The NSC is a mechanism to improve
collective decision-making. It facilitates the sharing of knowledge
and expertise within Government and, by bringing experts from
inside and outside Government together with Ministers, ensures
that expert advice is given proper weight in decision-making.
The Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Chief of
the Defence Staff and the Heads of the Intelligence Agencies attend
NSC. External experts have been invited for discussion on Afghanistan,
the Middle East and Nigeria, among other issues.
The focus and timing of NSC meetings are adjusted
according to the issues at hand. Ministers receive comprehensive
briefings ahead of meetings that are often based on weeks or months
of consideration of an issue at Departmental level. The NSC does
consider long-term strategic issues, but it is also appropriate
for it to have a more operational focus at critical moments. Every
NSC meeting is followed rapidly by specific minuted conclusions,
and the implementation of actions is monitored by the National
Security Secretariat, Cabinet Office.
The Chiefs of Staff Committee is already the UK's
senior military committee. The Chief of the Defence Staff sits
on the NSC. He is the Prime Minister's senior military adviser
and has a remit to represent the views of all three Services collectively.
The report acknowledges the views of both the current Permanent
Secretary of the MOD, Jon Thompson, and the former CDS, Lord Richards,
that the CDS is capable of providing adequate military representation
at the NSC.
The Levene reforms brought about a new role for the
Chiefs, giving them greater authority in leading their Services,
and allowing them more control of their budgets. Although the
Chiefs were removed from the Defence Board, the Armed Forces Committee
was instituted as a forum for the Chiefs to provide advice to
the CDS on the topics that would be discussed at the Defence Board.
CDS and/or VCDS represent the views of the Chiefs at the Defence
Board. There are a number of other meetings where the Chiefs,
the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations)
and the Director General Security Policy provide advice to CDS
on strategic, operational and single Service issues. These meetings,
which include the Chiefs of Staff Committee, help prepare CDS
for his attendance at NSC meetings, as the individual responsible
and accountable for providing military advice to the Secretary
of State and the Prime Minister.
Far from the NSC undercutting the principle of Cabinet
government, the NSC is a committee of the Cabinet, chaired by
the Prime Minister; it reinforces the principles of collective
decision making that underpin Cabinet government. The NSC provides
a forum for responsible Ministers to consider and take collective
decisions on national security issues. It is overseeing the Strategic
Defence and Security Review.
Conclusions
129. We therefore conclude that unless the Government
makes better use of its decision-making institutions, and draws
on higher quality information and advice, there is a significant
risk that future decisions on defence and security issues will
be as poor as in the past, with consequences which are just as
damaging.
130. We urge the Government to take urgent steps
to remedy these weaknesses, and to put in place a genuinely strategic,
well-informed and properly balanced decision-making machine.
We operate in an environment with extremely complex
threats, under resource constraints, with decisions for major
programmes often having to be made many years in advance. This
means even the best individuals, provided with the highest quality
information, and embedded in the best structures with the best
processes, may not always make consistently good decisions. We
therefore agree that modern crises require more, not less, historical
and cultural understanding, greater emphasis on strategic expertise,
deeper efforts of analysis and lessons learning, more openness
to challenge and more imagination in order to continue to meet
these demands. We welcome acknowledgement of the improvements
made in this area over the past five years. However, we recognise
the need for continuing reassessment which is why the forthcoming
revision of the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence
and Security Review will be used as an opportunity to consider
where we can go further.
21 July 2015
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