22 An EU regional strategy for Syria
and Iraq as well as the Da'esh threat
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Not cleared from scrutiny; further information requested
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| Document details | Joint Communication: Elements for an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da'esh threat
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| Legal base | —
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Document numbers | (36664), 6031/15, JOIN(15) 2
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
22.1 This is not the first time that the EU has endeavoured to
articulate a comprehensive approach to the Syria crisis (see paragraphs
0.18 below for details).
22.2 But events moved so quickly between the end
of 2013 and last summer that, come October 2014, the Foreign Affairs
Council had tasked the European External Action Service (EEAS)
and the Commission with producing this successor.[ 210]
It flows from the response of the August 2014 European Council
to the deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation
in Iraq and in Syria as a result of the occupation of parts of
their territory by the self-styled Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL), and the indiscriminate killings and human rights
violations perpetrated by this and other terrorist organisations,
by describing the creation of an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and
Syria, and the Islamist-extremist export of terrorism on which
it is based, as a direct threat to the European security, and
saying that the European Union was determined to contribute to
countering the threat posed by ISIL and other terrorist groups
in Iraq and Syria.[ 211]
22.3 The Joint Communication, Elements for an
EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da'esh
threat,[ 212] was
accordingly published on 5 February 2015. It focuses on three
key areas:
OBJECTIVES COMMON TO SYRIA, IRAQ AND OTHER AFFECTED
AREAS:
· regional
engagement;
· countering
ISIL as a terrorist organisation and its narrative;
· stemming
the flow of foreign terrorist fights, funds and arms to ISIL;
· preventing
regional spill-over and enhancing border security;
· humanitarian
aid; and
· building
resilience and capacity.
COUNTRY SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES FOR SYRIA:
· Work
towards political transition;
· Strengthening
the moderate opposition and civil society;
· Promoting
human rights and ensuring accountability; and
· Preparing
for long term recovery and stabilisation.
COUNTRY SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES FOR IRAQ:
· Supporting
Iraqi government efforts to be more inclusive;
· Strengthening
regional and local administration;
· Supporting
basic services and economic development; and
· Supporting
peace building and national reconciliation.
22.4 The Minister for Europe's (Mr David Lidington)
approach to this proposal is summarised in the "Background"
section below. [ 213]
The previous Committee's assessment
22.5 Most analysts took the view that denying it
territory was the key to defeating the ISIL phenomenon; and the
EU had no role therein.
22.6 In other ways, however, there was no doubt that
the EU had a major role to play in securing long-term stability.
The challenge, as the Minister rightly highlighted, was to ensure
that "the right framework is in place to ensure that initiatives
are targeted and add value to the efforts of the Global Coalition
to Counter ISIL" and that existing EU activity to address
the problems in Iraq, Syria and the region was "brought together
as part of a single strategy with a clear purpose".
22.7 On the other hand, as the European Committee
resolved after having debated this Joint Communication's precursor,
that "in responding to the Syrian crisis, the EU should focus
its efforts on those areas in which it has expertise, complementing
broader national and international efforts".[ 214]
22.8 As its title suggests, this Joint Communication
was the first stage. Even so, it was already sitting alongside
an existing related EU Strategy, about which the Minister had
said very little. Moreover, it awaited reinforcement and further
fleshing-out in Council Conclusions; and, then, an implementation
plan. The Minister had set out what he wanted to see; in the first
instance, the House needed to see whether he achieved this.
22.9 The previous Committee therefore asked the Minister
to write immediately after the 16 March Foreign Affairs Council,
so that it could report the outcome to the House before it dissolved
(the Committee's last meeting being on 24 March). In that letter,
it asked the Minister to articulate clearly how the Council Conclusions
met his objectives. In sum, the previous Committee wished to know
what an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the
Da'esh threat then looked like.
22.10 The previous Committee also asked:
· the
Minister to explain more clearly how he saw this new EU strategy
dove-tailing with the external dimensions of the EU's counter-terrorism
current and prospective work; and
· what
the plans then were for the publication of the implementation
plan for any new EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well
as the Da'esh threat.
22.11 In the meantime, the previous Committee retained
the Joint Communication under scrutiny.[ 215]
22.12 The then (and current) Minister for Europe
(Mr David Lidington) confirmed on 24 March that the 16 March Foreign
Affairs Council (FAC) adopted the Joint Communication, as drafted,
and that it and the Council Conclusions — which set out
the context for the Strategy and reiterate earlier related Councils
Conclusions from October 2014, December 2014 and February 2015
— now constitute the EU Regional Strategy for Syria, Iraq
and ISIL/Da'esh. He notes in particular that the Conclusions make
clear that the Regional Strategy will be coordinated with and
complementary to the efforts of Member States, and international
organisations and partners. He also highlights a number of specific
points that reflect and complement UK policy (see paragraphs 22.20-22.21
below for details).
22.13 Principal among these are:
— ISIL:
EU efforts to tackle ISIL will be coordinated with the "Global
Coalition to Counter ISIL" through its working groups and
will focus on areas where the EU can add most value. Whilst the
Regional Strategy outlines the overall framework for the EU's
comprehensive response to Syria and Iraq, the EU's "Syria
and Iraq CT and Foreign Fighters strategy identifies specific
areas for CT activity in the region, with a focus on countering
the foreign fighters phenomenon; both documents are closely linked;
— Syria: though essentially a development
on the 2013 Joint Communication, "Towards a comprehensive
EU approach", the Regional Strategy accordingly acknowledges
the changing situation on the ground, including the rise of extremist
groups such as ISIL. To tackle these threats there must be an
inclusive political solution that meets the democratic aspiration
of the Syrian people and those moderate opposition groups who
represent them; the repressive and violent methods used by Assad
to resist calls for democratic change has enabled extremist groups
to flourish; there is no place for Assad in Syria's future;
— Iraq: the UK worked to ensure
that the Regional Strategy's objectives for Iraq are clearly aligned
with the Government of Iraq's agreed government programme, which
includes commitments to political reform, reconciliation between
communities and the respect for human rights; it will thus create
opportunities for the EU to assist with security and justice sector
reform, economic reform and development, as well as anti-corruption
efforts and enhanced public financial management;
— Joint Council, EEAS and Commission monitoring
of implementation will include six-monthly progress updates, about
the first of which the Government will update the Committee.
22.14 We look forward to receiving the first such
update as soon as it is produced, with the Minister's views thereon.
22.15 In the meantime, we deeply regret the fact
that — despite our predecessors explaining why they wished
to consider these developments at their last meeting before dissolution
— the Minister and his officials took eight days to provide
a letter on a straightforward matter, so that it did not arrive
until after the meeting had taken place. Moreover, the letter
contains no word of explanation or apology.
22.16 We accordingly trust that the Minister will
wish to ensure that systems are now put in place to ensure that
this does not happen in future, as the basis of what we hope will
be a generally more constructive engagement with the scrutiny
process. In the first instance, we would like a swift explanation
as to why the previous Committee's reasonable request was not
met.
22.17 In the meantime, we shall continue to retain
the Joint Communication under scrutiny.
Full
details of the documents:
Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council
— Elements for an EU regional strategy for Syria and
Iraq as well as the Da'esh threat: (36664), 6031/15, JOIN(15)
2.
Background
22.18 In 2013, the Commission and European External
Action Service (EEAS) Joint Communication "Towards
a comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis"[ 216]
reviewed the conflict and
its consequences both in Syria and its neighbouring countries
in what by then were depressingly familiar terms and proposed
a comprehensive EU response. It described a number of areas in
which the EU did or should focus its efforts, and methods by which
this would continue or could be carried forward. After several
exchanges between it and the Minister, the previous Committee
recommended that it should be debated on the floor of the House.[ 217]
That debate was instead held, at the Government's insistence in
European Committee B, and not until 2 December 2013. At the end
of the debate, the European Committee resolved as follows:
"That the Committee takes note of European
Union Document No. 11482/13, a Joint Commission and High Representative
Communication: Towards a comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian
crisis; and agrees with the Government that in responding to the
Syrian crisis, the EU should focus its efforts on those areas
in which it has expertise, complementing broader national and
international efforts."[ 218]
22.19 Subsequent developments are outlined above.
They include reference to the 9 February 2015 Foreign Affairs
Council Conclusions on counter-terrorism, which:
— called
for comprehensive action against terrorism in line with the 2005
EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy and in full compliance with international
law, fundamental values and international human rights standards;
— noted that, while Member States have
the primary responsibility for addressing terrorism, the EU as
such can add value in many ways; and that the actions taken in
the area of justice and home affairs need to be complemented by
external engagement and outreach, especially to countries in the
Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel and the Gulf;
— said that close coordination between
internal and external action on the one hand, and between relevant
EU actors and EU Member States on the other hand, will enhance
the impact of our common efforts; and that more emphasis on the
prevention of terrorism, in particular countering radicalisation,
on recruitment, equipment and financing of terrorism, and address
underlying factors such as conflict, poverty, proliferation of
arms and state fragility that provide opportunities for terrorist
groups to flourish;
— against this background, decided to step
up, as a matter of urgency, its external action on countering
terrorism in particular in the Mediterranean, the Middle East,
including Yemen, and North Africa, in particular also Libya, and
the Sahel;
— said that counter-terrorism (CT) will
be mainstreamed fully into EU foreign policy;
— called for accelerated implementation
of the EU Syria and Iraq and Counter-Terrorism/Foreign Fighters
Strategy (adopted on 20 October 2014) with a particular focus
on foreign terrorist fighters and the EU's Maghreb Communication;
— welcomed the Joint Communication on EU
regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da'esh threat
and looks forward to its implementation as soon as possible; and
— also welcomed a number of initiatives
to be implemented in the course of 2015, building on those actions
that are already taking place in the field of Justice and Home
Affairs and in Foreign and Security Policy.[ 219]
22.20 On 16 March, the Council issued Conclusions,
running to 27 paragraphs, that begin thus:
"1. The EU remains committed to achieving lasting
peace, stability and security in Syria, Iraq and the wider region,
as well as to countering the ISIL/Da'esh threat. An inclusive
political transition in Syria and inclusive political governance
in Iraq are crucial to sustainable peace and stability in the
region. The EU will continue to support the role of the UN Special
Envoy Staffan de Mistura and the efforts of the Iraqi Government
to achieve those objectives. In this regard, the EU recalls the
Council Conclusions of 20 October, 15 December 2014 as well as
9 February 2015.
"2. The EU condemns unreservedly the indiscriminate
attacks, atrocities, killings and abuses of human rights which
are perpetrated by ISIL/Da'esh and other terrorist groups, in
particular against Christians and other religious and ethnic groups.
The EU underlines the importance of preserving the multi-ethnic,
multi-religious and multi-confessional character of the Syrian
and Iraqi societies. The EU supports international efforts and
initiatives to address these issues and welcomes in this regard
the Ministerial meeting that will take place at the UN Security
Council on 27 March on the victims of attacks and abuses on ethnic
or religious ground in the Middle East.
"The EU strongly condemns acts of violence and
abuses committed against children, noting with concern the practice
of Da'esh/ISIL of enlisting children into its armed units, forcing
them to participate in executions and subjecting them to various
forms of physical and psychological pressure.
"3. The EU urges all international actors, in
particular the countries in the region, to play a constructive
role in addressing the crises as their engagement is necessary
in order to achieve regional and international stability and to
find durable solutions.
"4. The EU supports efforts by the Global Coalition
to counter ISIL/Da'esh, including military action in accordance
with international law. It recalls that military action in this
context is necessary but not sufficient to defeat ISIL/Da'esh.
It will coordinate closely with international partners in the
framework of the Global Coalition's working groups on stabilisation,
strategic counter-messaging, foreign terrorist fighters, countering
terrorist financing and military action. It will also contribute
to implement UN Security Council resolutions 2161, 2170, 2178,
2199, and other relevant resolutions. This will include the security
measures spelled out in the EU Syria and Iraq counter-terrorism/foreign
fighters strategy endorsed by the Council on 20 October 2014,
which is an integral part of the EU regional strategy.
"The EU calls on all states to comply with UN
Security Council resolutions 2161 and 2199 to ensure that no funds,
other financial assets or economic resources are made available,
directly or indirectly, by their nationals or by persons within
their territory for the benefit of ISIL/Da'esh, Al-Qaida and affiliated
groups.
"5. In the implementation of the strategy, the
EU will focus its efforts on policy areas in which it has an added
value in relation to the activities of the Member States. In pursuing
its policy actions the EU will act in close coordination and will
seek complementarity with the measures implemented by other international
and regional partners, and the Iraqi government."[ 220]
The Minister's letter of 24 March 2015
22.21 The then (and current) Minister highlights
paragraph 5 of the Council Conclusions and then highlights the
follow specific points, which he says reflect and complement UK
policy:
"ISIL
"EU efforts to tackle ISIL will be coordinated
with the 'Global Coalition to Counter ISIL' through its working
groups and will focus on areas where the EU can add most value.
Some key areas where the EU has a significant role to play include:
· "diplomatic
engagement with countries in the region to promote regional support
for security and long term peace;
· "assisting
countries in the region, particularly Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan
with border management and aviation security, including capacity
building projects;
· "continuing
to work to unblock Passenger Name Records (PNR) sharing within
the EU;
· "delivering
counter-extremism and counter-narrative initiatives, including
amplifying messages from those in the region, and capacity-building
projects in Lebanon and Jordan;
· "continued
provision of humanitarian assistance to address immediate needs
and to promote resilience, recovery and post-conflict reintegration
and development.
"The EU will also implement United Nations Security
Council resolutions 2161, 2170, 2178, 2199 and other relevant
resolutions. Whilst the Regional Strategy outlines the overall
framework for the EU's comprehensive response to Syria and Iraq,
the EU's Syria and Iraq CT and Foreign Fighters strategy identifies
specific areas for CT activity in the region, with a focus on
countering the foreign fighters phenomenon. Both documents are
closely linked.
"SYRIA
"The Regional Strategy commits the EU to continue
working towards:
· "A
Syrian-led, broad-based transition on the basis of the Geneva
Communiqué, and working with the moderate opposition and
civil society actors towards this end;
· "Continuing
to apply and increasing pressure on the Assad regime, notably
through further targeted sanctions and other appropriate restrictive
measures (through which the EU already adds significant value);
· "Assisting
in the provision of services and rebuilding of administration
in areas of reduced conflict; and
· "Promoting
human rights / international humanitarian law and ensuring accountability."
22.22 The then (and current) Minister describes this
as a development on the earlier Joint Communication ("Towards
a comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis") produced
in June 2013 by the Commission and the High Representative.[ 221]
The Regional Strategy:
"therefore acknowledges the changing situation
on the ground, including the rise of extremist groups such as
ISIL. To tackle these threats there must be an inclusive political
solution in Syria, which meets the democratic aspiration of the
Syrian people and those moderate opposition groups who represent
them. The repressive and violent methods used by Assad to resist
calls for democratic change have created an environment that has
allowed extremist groups to flourish; there is no place for Assad
in Syria's future.
"IRAQ
"The EU, alongside the Global Coalition to Counter
ISIL, has an important role to play in supporting PM Abadi as
he works to rebuild public trust in the Government of Iraq. The
UK worked to ensure that the Regional Strategy's objectives for
Iraq are clearly aligned with the Government of Iraq's agreed
government programme, which includes commitments to political
reform, reconciliation between communities and the respect for
human rights. More specifically, it is welcome that the Regional
Strategy will create opportunities for the EU to assist the Government
of Iraq with security and justice sector reform, economic reform
and development, as well as anti-corruption efforts and enhanced
public financial management.
"The Council also highlighted some additional,
key overarching points and principles:
· "The
EU's commitment to provide support to countries in the region,
including Lebanon and Jordan.
· "Women's
empowerment and their full and effective participation will be
integrated into all EU efforts;
· "Humanitarian
aid will remain strictly separate from other strands of EU action,
in line with the humanitarian principles;"
22.23 So far as an Implementation Plan is
concerned, the Minister says:
"The EU does not plan to publish an implementation
plan at present. The Conclusions set out that the Council, EEAS
and Commission will work together to plan and swiftly implement
the Strategy and that this implementation will be supported by
the exchange of best practice and information. Joint monitoring
of implementation will also take place, including through six-monthly
progress updates from the Institutions. I will undertake to provide
an update on implementation to the Committees in due course, in
particular when the first progress report is made available."
Previous Committee Reports
Thirty-fifth Report HC 219-xxxiv (2014-15), chapter
7 (4 March 2015); also see (35105), 11482/13: Thirteenth Report
HC 83-xiii (2013-14), chapter 2 (4 September 2013).
210 See the full Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions. Back
211 See the Annex to our previous Report and full European Council
Conclusions. Back
212 The acronym in Arabic of the so-called "Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant" is Da'esh. Back
213 And set out in detail in our predecessor's previous Report: see
Thirty-fifth Report HC 219-xxxiv (2014-15), chapter 7 (4 March
2015). Back
214 See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmgeneral/euro/131202/131202s01.htm
for the record of that debate. Back
215 Thirty-fifth Report HC 219-xxxiv (2014-15), chapter 7 (4 March
2015). Back
216 11482/13, JOIN(13) 22. Back
217 See (35105), 11482/13: Thirteenth Report HC 83-xiii (2013-14),
chapter 2 (4 September 2013). Back
218 See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmgeneral/euro/131202/131202s01.htm
for the record of that debate. Back
219 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150209-council-conclusions-counter-terrorism/
for the full Council Conclusions. Back
220 For the full Council Conclusions, see press release . Back
221 See (35105), 11482/13: Thirteenth Report HC 83-xiii (2013-14),
chapter 2 (4 September 2013) for full details of this earlier
Joint Communication and the previous Committee's consideration
thereof. Back
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