23 EU Special Representative for the
Middle East peace process and wider EUSR issues
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Not cleared from scrutiny; further information requested
|
| Document details | Council Decision on the appointment of the European Union Special Representative for the Middle East peace process
|
| Legal base | Articles 31(2) and 33 TEU; QMV
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Document number | (36769), —
|
Summary and Committee's conclusions
23.1 EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) were established under
Article 18 of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. They are appointed by
the Council through the legal act of a Council Decision (formerly
a Joint Action) where the Council agrees that an additional EU
presence on the ground is needed to deliver the political objectives
of the Union. Their purpose is to represent the EU in troubled
regions and countries and to play an active part in promoting
the interests and the policies of the EU.
23.2 The substance of the mandate depends on the
political context of the deployment. Some provide, inter alia,
a political backing to a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
operation; others focus on carrying out or contributing to developing
an EU policy. Some EUSRs are resident in their country or region
of activity; others work on a travelling basis from Brussels.
At the time at which this Council Decision was deposited for scrutiny,
there were seven EUSRs; for Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo, the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, the Horn
of Africa, Human Rights and the Sahel.[ 222]
23.3 All EUSRs carry out their duties under the authority
and operational direction of the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR: Federica Mogherini).
Each is financed out of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) budget. In addition, Member States also contribute regularly
through, for example, seconding some of the EUSR's staff members.
23.4 After the coming-into-force of the Treaty of
Lisbon and the establishment of the European External Action Service
(EEAS), the HR now has the sole right of initiative for the establishment
of EUSRs and also proposes the person to occupy the post. Most
were previously senior national diplomats or active politicians.
The Council continues formally to determine their mandate and
to appoint EUSRs, who report back through the Political and Security
Committee (PSC[ 223]),
including meeting the PSC on a regular basis.
23.5 The previous EUSR for the Middle East, Dr Andreas
Reinicke, was appointed in February 2012: a German diplomat with
more than 25 years' experience, who had devoted most of his career
to the Middle East, and who had deep and extensive knowledge about
the MEPP. A June 2013 Council Decision extended his mandate until
30 June 2014, with a provision to review developments on the ground
between then and 31 December 2013. At that point, the Council
then decided to terminate it. The background is set out in our
predecessors' Reports of January and February 2014.[ 224]
23.6 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office describe
Mr Reinicke as having "stepped down from the role",
with his role and responsibilities being "transferred to
the EEAS in the interim, with Helga Schmidt (EEAS Deputy Secretary
General) acting as envoy to the HR". This carefully-worded
formulation glosses over the much wider issue then in play: whether,
post-Lisbon, the EUSR as a "concept" was to be continued
or (as the then HR, Baroness Ashton, had proposed in the context
of a revision of the EUSR guidelines) transferred, along with
their associated resources, into the EEAS — the consequence
being that Member States would no longer be able to approve the
mandate of what are effectively the Council's special envoys to
a variety of trouble spots affecting EU and national interests;
or the job holder; or their budget (which included salaries of
c.€175,000 per annum plus allowances).
23.7 As our predecessors' previous Reports relate,
not only this mandate but also that of the EUSR to Central Asia
and the EUSR to the Southern Mediterranean were set aside and,
in the meantime, effectively replaced by the HR's own Special
Envoys. There was also a five-month gap, following the unexplained
resignation in January 2014 of the EUSR to the South Caucasus
and the crisis in Georgia, Philippe Lefort (a senior and experienced
French diplomat, most of whose career had been dedicated to the
Caucasus and Russia, including as Ambassador to Georgia in 2004-07),
until Herbert Salber (Germany's Deputy Permanent Representative
to NATO, with extensive knowledge of the former-Soviet region
and the conflicts in the South Caucasus ) was appointed by the
Council in June 2014.
23.8 In the event, final decisions on the way forward
were put off until Baroness Ashton's replacement was in post and
virtually all the mandates came up for renewal in February 2015.
23.9 In the interim, the previous Committee endorsed
the Minister for Europe's position: Member States must retain
at least their present degree of control over the establishment
of each position, the mandate and the job-holder,[ 225]
and the need for greater transparency in the EUSR process.[ 226]
23.10 The previous Committee's Reports in February
2015 deal with the outcome. In essence, the new HR (Federica Mogherini):
— decided
to extend the extant mandates, which the then Minister for Europe
described as "a positive step" that the UK had welcomed;
— proposed the reestablishment of the EUSRs
for Central Asia and the Middle East Peace Process;
— had written to Member States on 27 January
2015 stating that the reason for the eight month extension for
those EUSRs with a geographical remit was to allow her to "further
acquaint herself with their work and interaction with the EEAS
before making substantial proposals on the way ahead in autumn
2015"; and
— had also announced that she intended
to conduct a wider evaluation on EUSRs, looking at the "political
objectives, visibility of the EU, interaction with the EEAS, the
resource implications and the ability of the EEAS to take on some
of the tasks".
23.11 The Minister for Europe:
— supported
the initiative to hold such a "horizontal discussion";
— reported that, prior to Ms Mogherini's
appointment, Member States had "once again fought off"
proposals by the EEAS for a transfer of the EUSR budget from the
CFSP Budget to the EEAS budget; and
— said that he would continue "to
emphasise the importance of Member State oversight of this important
tool of the CFSP".[ 227]
23.12 This Council Decision proposes that Fernando
Gentilini be appointed as EUSR for the Middle East peace process
for a period of 12 months, until 30 April 2016.
23.13 Mr Gentilini is described as a senior Italian
diplomat who is well connected in Brussels, with strong negotiation
skills and an excellent understanding of CFSP issues and EU external
relations; and as having worked on conflict issues including,
most recently, the Western Balkans, where, as EUSR/Kosovo, he
was well regarded by the parties to the dialogue. Though he has
no background in Middle East issues, the view is put forward that
this "may not necessarily hamper his efforts as it will mean
he has a clean slate with both parties". Re-establishing
the EUSR/MEPP position is welcomed as "a visible demonstration
of EU and Member States' commitment to making progress on the
peace process and enhancing the EU's engagement".
23.14 The proposed budget for financial year 2015/16
is currently calculated to be €1.98 million, based on costs
associated with accommodation and an office in Jerusalem (see
"Background" below for further details).
23.15 In writing to the Committee on 7 April 2015,
the Minister said that it was "important that the EUSR is
in place quickly so that he will be able to deliver his mandate
as soon as the Israeli Government is formed following elections
on 17 March" (and apologised for the consequential scrutiny
override). He noted that the new EUSR's mandate, while based on
his predecessor's, also includes a specific reference that the
EUSR should report regularly to the Political and Security Committee
(PSC[ 228]) in addition
to the minimum requirements for reporting and objective setting,
and should coordinate closely with the Heads of EUPOL COPPS,[ 229]
EUBAM RAFAH[ 230] and
the EU missions in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.
23.16 The preamble to the draft Council Decision
notes that "resolution of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict
is a strategic priority for Europe and the European Union must
remain actively engaged until it is solved on the basis of the
two -State solution".
23.17 At the time, however, there was effectively
no Middle East Peace Process; indeed, during the Israeli election
campaign, the eventual winner, Mr Benyamin Netanyahu, had cast
doubt on the notion of a two-state solution. Little has changed
since then.
23.18 Nonetheless, in his Explanatory Memorandum
of 5 June, the Minister notes that the Middle East Peace Process
remains high on the international agenda and says that there is
"a growing appetite amongst EU partners for the EU to do
more to help support efforts to return the parties to negotiations".
The new EUSR will therefore have "a useful role" to
play in diplomatic efforts aimed at preserving the viability of
a two state solution, supporting the conditions for a return to
talks, mitigating the risk of renewed conflict in Gaza and improving
the situation on the ground, and engaging Arab partners in the
region. Access to key interlocutors on both sides will enable
the new EUSR MEPP to present a strong unified EU voice on issues
of concern, including UK priorities. In addition to supporting
any US efforts to return to negotiations, the Minister is "encouraging
him to focus on areas where the EU can make a visible difference
— maintaining pressure on both parties to reduce tensions
and improve conditions on the ground, particularly in Gaza".
23.19 As well as the considerable uncertainty
surrounding the "useful role" that Mr Gentili will be
able to play in practice, there is a similar uncertainty about
the precise location and size of his office, and the actual cost.
We should therefore be grateful if, to enable the Committee to
consider it at our meeting on 9 September, the Minister would
clarify what has transpired between when he was appointed in April
and now. We would like in particular to know the total number
of staff engaged in Brussels and in Jerusalem in the EUSR's office,
and what the salary and allowances are of the EUSR slot within
the total personnel costs.
23.20 We would also like the Minister to bring
the Committee up to date on what has transpired on the political
front since early April, and to outline how Mr Gentilini has been
able to fulfil his role.
23.21 When he writes to us, we would like him
to explain why special reporting requirements vis à
vis the Political and Security Committee are thought to be
necessary in this instance, but not for other EUSRs. We would
also like to know why, if it is (rightly) felt to be necessary
now, previous EUSRs/MEPP (and the interim HR "envoy")
were not required to coordinate closely with the Heads of EUPOL
COPPS, EUBAM RAFAH and the EU missions in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.
23.22 This leads on to the wider issues outlined
above, when our predecessors noted in their February 2015 reports
on other EUSR mandates that they were over-optimistic in thinking
that the previous HR's proposal had been dealt with definitively.
They noted that the importance of this issue was clear: the more
the EUSR role is absorbed into the EEAS, the less will the Member
States control the mandates of what are effectively the Council's
special envoys to a variety of trouble spots affecting EU and
UK interests, or the job holder and his or her or performance.
Instead, such "special envoys" would more and more represent
the HR/EEAS, and not the Member States through the Council. Citing
words used at the time by the Minister for Europe, they noted
that "oversight", or supervision (OED), is significantly
different from "control", or "power of directing"
(ibid), and said that the Committee would therefore continue
to follow this matter closely. In the first instance, they asked
the then Minister (or his successor), in early September, to provide
the Committee with an update on the timing of the HR's "wider
evaluation"; what he or she then knew of the HR's thinking;
and what views he or she would be taking into the "horizontal
discussion" to which the then Minister had referred. We look
forward to hearing from the Minister on this matter too. For now,
we note that the replacement of the EUSR for Central Asia by a
similar HR/EEAS "envoy" led to a significant fall-off
in effectiveness, which the new EUSR now has to restore.[ 231]
23.23 In the meantime, we shall retain the document
under scrutiny.
Full details of
the document: Council Decision appointing
the European Union Special Representative for the Middle East
peace process: (36769),—.
Background
23.24 The specific and wider background is summarised
above, and detailed in those of our predecessors' previous relevant
Reports cited in, and at the end of, this chapter of our Report.
The draft Council Decision
23.25 Noting that "the
resolution of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict is a strategic
priority for Europe" and the European Union "must remain
actively engaged until it is solved on the basis of the two-State
solution", the Council Decision proposes that an EUSR for
the Middle East peace process should be appointed for a period
of 12 months; and that Fernando Gentilini be appointed as the
EUSR for the Middle East peace process until 30 April 2016.
23.26 In a post-dissolution Explanatory Memorandum
of 7 April 2015, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office noted that:
EU HR Mogherini wrote to EU Member States on 27 January 2015,
proposing to appoint a new EUSR/MEPP; a number of proposed candidates
were put forward by EU Member States; the UK did not have a preferred
candidate; at the 16 March 2015 Foreign Affairs Council meeting,
Ms Mogherini announced Fernando Gentilini ("Italian, Director
for Western Europe, Western Balkans and Turkey, EEAS") as
the new EUSR/ MEPP; and no EU Member State objected to his candidacy.
23.27 In a separate letter of the same date, the
then (and current) Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) said
that it was important that the EUSR be in place quickly so that
he would be able to deliver his mandate effectively as soon the
Israeli Government was formed following the 17 March general elections,
meaning that, on this occasion, it was necessary, and regrettably
unavoidable, for the UK to agree to the adoption of this Council
Decision before the Committee had had an opportunity to scrutinise
the documents.
23.28 Noting that the mandate is based primarily
on the previous EUSR's mandate, the Minister says that the main
additions, as agreed by EU Member States:
"are aimed at bringing out the importance of
engaging with Arab partners, that the contribution to crisis management
and prevention includes Gaza. This mandate also includes
a specific reference that the EUSR should report regularly to
PSC in addition to the minimum requirements for reporting and
objective setting and that the EUSR should coordinate closely
with Heads of EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM RAFAH as well as Heads of
EU Del in Tel Aviv and EU Representation in Jerusalem."
23.29 The Minister also commented further on the
budget as follows:
"The total budget is €1,980,000. We cannot
make a direct comparison with the previous EUSR budget as the
newly appointed EUSR will be based, for the majority of his time,
in Jerusalem rather than Brussels. Therefore, the allowances
are different to those for EUSRs based in Brussels; the budget
has taken this into account. There is a large contingency in the
budget compared with others EUSRs as a result of the new nature
of the regional based position, this will allow for minor changes
(both up and down) to the individual budget lines on office accommodation
etc., but within the agreed overall figure. We judge that other
elements of the budget are in line with other EUSRs and within
the 2014 Guidelines and that it is value for money for the mandate
the EUSR will have."
23.30 In his post-general election Explanatory Memorandum
of 5 June 2015, the Minister reiterates the appointment process
outlined above, and also that the HR's proposals for the EUSR/MEPP
mandate are based on the EU's policy objectives regarding the
Middle East peace process, including pursuing a comprehensive
peace and a two-state solution; which will involve:
· "actively
pursuing appropriate international initiatives to create a new
dynamic for negotiations;
· "providing
an active and efficient Union contribution to actions and initiatives
aiming to achieve a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict based on the two-state solution;
· "facilitating
and maintaining close contact with all the parties and other relevant
countries and international organisations, paying particular attention
to factors affecting the regional dimension of the peace process,
to the engagement with Arab partners and to the implementation
of the Arab Peace Initiative;
· "supporting
peace negotiations and contributing to the implementation of international
agreements reached and;
· "contributing
to efforts to bring about a fundamental change leading to a sustainable
solution for the Gaza Strip. The government supports this approach."
23.31 With regard to the Financial Implications,
he:
— recalls
that EUSR's are funded from the EU's CFSP Budget, to which the
UK currently contributes 17.5%;
— notes that a political decision still
needs to be taken on where the EUSR will be based;
— confirms that:
· the
cost of the EUSR's mandate for financial year 2015/16 is currently
calculated to be €1,980,000, based on costs associated with
accommodation and office in Jerusalem;
· a political
decision still needs to be taken on where the EUSR will be based;
· there
is no capacity to host the EUSR office with the EUDEL office;
· the
budget is based on the previous EUSR/MEPP one, and is consistent
with the EUSR guidelines and other EUSR budgets;
· there
is, however, a large contingency within it to allow for the confirmation
of where the office will be finally located to provide the flexibility
within an agreed level; and
· the
total number of staff has remained the same, although a greater
number will be based in Jerusalem rather than Brussels, which
has therefore increased the personnel costs; establishing a new
office also means an increase in running costs;
· the
UK has suggested that savings should be made wherever possible
(including mission costs on travel and running expenditure) in
order to reduce overall costs.
23.32 The following itemised breakdown of costs is
provided:
| Budget heading
| Proposed budget
|
| 1. Personnel costs |
551,269.29 |
| 2. Missions | 262, 316
|
| 3. Running expenditure |
1,077,480 |
| 4. Capital expenditure |
33,750 |
| 5. Representation | 8,400
|
| Sub-total (1-5) | 1,933,215.29
|
| Contingencies | 46, 784.71
|
| Total
| 1,980,000
|
The Government's view
23.33 The Minister supports the work of the EUSR on the Middle
East Peace Process:
"The Middle East Peace Process remains high on the international
agenda and there is a growing appetite amongst EU partners for
the EU to do more to help support efforts to return the parties
to negotiations. The new EUSR will therefore have a useful role
to play in diplomatic efforts, aligned with UK policy objectives,
aimed at preserving the viability of a two state solution, supporting
the conditions for a return to talks in the future, as well as
on mitigating the risk of renewed conflict in Gaza and improving
the situation on the ground and engaging Arab partners in the
region.
"As the last 12 months have shown, even in the
absence of direct negotiations, there is often a need for
intensive diplomatic activity. With access to key interlocutors
on both sides, the new EUSR MEPP will be able to present a strong
unified EU voice on issues of concern, including UK priorities.
In addition to the EUSR's role in supporting any US efforts to
return to negotiations, we are encouraging him to focus on areas
where the EU can make a visible difference — maintaining
pressure on both parties to reduce tensions and improve conditions
on the ground, particularly in Gaza.
"At the EU Foreign Affairs Council in May Ministers
welcomed Gentilini's appointment and a distinct EU role to explore
how to get the parties to return to negotiations and maintain
the viability of the two state solution. Based in Jerusalem, the
EUSR will regularly meet EU Heads of Mission and Heads of EU institutions
in country (EUBAM Rafah, EUPOL COPPS) ensuring a coordinated approach
and messaging. The EUSR will also report regularly to the PSC.
We will use these meetings to review progress and influence which
specific issues the EUSR should focus on as the situation develops."
Previous Committee Reports
None, but see (35701),—: Forty-seventh Report
HC 83-xlii (2013-14), chapter 22 (30 April 2014); Thirty-seventh
Report HC 83-xxxiv (2013-14), chapter 19 (26 February 2014) and
Thirtieth Report HC 83-xxvii (2013-14), chapter 10 (15 January
2014); also see (35061), —: Seventh Report HC 83-vii (2013-14),
chapter 15 (26 June 2013); also see (32601), — and (32982),
—: Fifty-second Report HC 428-xlvii (2010-12), chapter 23
(18 January 2012), Fortieth Report HC 428-xxxv (2010-12), chapter
4 (7 September 2011), Thirty-seventh Report HC 428-xxxiii (2010-12),
chapter 5 (13 July 2011) and Twenty-eighth Report HC 428-xxvi
(2010-12), chapter 4 (11 May 2011).
Annex: Key elements of the revised
EUSR Guidelines
"B. APPOINTMENT AND MANDATE
"1. Political context
"EUSRs, assisted by the EEAS, and acting in
support of and in close coordination with the Council and the
HR, should contribute to the unity, consistency and effectiveness
of the Union's external action and representation. They should
help ensure that all Union instruments and Member States' actions
are engaged consistently to attain the Union's policy objectives.
In particular, they should contribute to improving the effectiveness
of the EU's response to crisis situations, and to the implementation
of the EU's strategic policies.
"2. Procedure
"Where it considers that the political context
so requires, the Council may invite the HR to present a proposal
for the appointment of an EUSR with a mandate in relation to a
particular policy issue. Following the presentation of a proposal
for an EUSR, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) will assess
the proposal and may then invite the competent Council Working
Parties to examine the mandate, with a view to its adoption by
the Council.
"The Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Party
(RELEX) will assess the legal, institutional and financial aspects
of the mandate, in particular with a view to ensuring consistency
of EUSR mandates, and will finalise the draft legal act for adoption
by the Council.
"Following an agreement in principle on appointing
an EUSR, the HR will invite the Member States via the PSC to propose
candidates. Member States are encouraged to propose more female
candidates. The HR, assisted by the European External Action Service
(EEAS), will organise the selection process, during which the
Member States will be kept informed, and will submit a recommendation
to the PSC regarding the nomination of the EUSR. If the PSC gives
its political endorsement to that recommendation, the Council
will formally adopt the decision appointing and mandating the
EUSR. New and existing mandates and budgets should be proposed
in sufficient time to allow Member States both to find suitable
candidates and to carry out their national scrutiny procedures.
"EUSR mandates generally have a thematic focus,
relating to a cross-cutting issue, and/or a geographic focus,
in particular mandates covering specific regions.
"In exceptional cases a Head of an EU Delegation
has also been appointed as an EUSR.
"C. STRUCTURE OF THE COUNCIL DECISION
AND DURATION OF MANDATE
"The Council Decision appointing an EUSR will
cover the following elements:
— "scope,
policy objectives of the EUSR's mandate and the EUSR's tasks,
including where appropriate standard language to cover horizontal
issues;
— "appointment of the EUSR;
— "respective roles of the HR and
the PSC;
— "duration of the mandate;
— "criteria and modalities for reporting
to the relevant EU institutions and bodies;
— "co-ordination and liaison in Brussels
and in the field;
— "appropriate indicators for assessing
the achievement of objectives;
— "evaluation and review of the implementation
of the mandate;
— "financial aspects (in particular
financial reference amount and accountability);
— "constitution and composition of
the EUSR's team;
— "privileges and immunities for the
EUSR and his/her staff;
— "security related aspects.
"As a general rule, an EUSR should be appointed
for a period of 12 months while his/her total tenure of office
should not exceed 4 years. Consideration should be given to harmonising,
where possible, the dates of expiry of EUSRs' mandates, whilst
taking into account the timing of specific events related to the
mandate.
"D. OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES
"1. Role of the HR and PSC
"The PSC will act as the primary point of contact
within the Council and provide political direction and strategic
guidance to the EUSR within the framework of the mandate. The
HR should give the necessary operational direction to the EUSR.
In accordance with Article 33 TEU, the EUSR carries out his/her
mandate under the authority of the HR."[ 232]
222 For further information, see http://eeas.europa.eu/background/eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm. Back
223 See (36656), -: Thirty-fourth Report HC 219-xxxiii (2014-15),
chapter 8 (25 February 2015). Back
224 See (35701),-: Thirty-seventh Report HC 83-xxxiv (2013-14), chapter
19 (26 February 2014) and Thirtieth Report HC 83-xxvii (2013-14),
chapter 10 (15 January 2014). Back
225 For ease of reference, we set out what this consists of in the
Annex to this chapter of our Report, as described in the 2014
revised EUSR guidelines. Back
226 See (35701),-: Forty-seventh Report HC 83-xlii (2013-14), chapter
22 (30 April 2014). Back
227 See (36616),-: Thirty-fourth Report HC 219-xxxiii (2014-15), chapter
17 (25 February 2015) and other EUSR-related chapters of that
Report. Back
228 See (36656), -: Thirty-fourth Report HC 219-xxxiii (2014-15),
chapter 8 (25 February 2015). Back
229 See (36115), -: Thirty-ninth Report HC 219-xxxvii (2014-15) chapter
20 (24 March 2015). Back
230 See (36115), -: Thirty-ninth Report HC 219-xxxvii (2014-15) chapter
20 (24 March 2015). Back
231 See (36777), -: Council Decision appointing the European Union
Special Representative for Central Asia at chapter 24 of this
Report. Back
232 See Guidelines. Back
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