26 Enabling partners to prevent and manage
crises
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Not cleared; further information awaited
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| Document details | Joint Communication on capacity building in support of security and development
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| Legal base | —
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Document numbers | (36825), 8504/15, JOIN(15) 17
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
26.1 The starting point of this Commission/EEAS[ 244]
Joint Communication is that violent conflict and poor governance
— fuelled by new threats such as terrorism and organised
crime — are continuing, crucial developmental challenges.
Coordinated external action that makes use of the EU's diplomatic,
security, development and humanitarian tools is thus essential
to restore confidence and ensure that partner countries' institutions
are equipped to meet the challenges.
26.2 The link between security and development is
a key underlying principle of the EU's "Comprehensive Approach"
to external conflicts and crises, and complementary to the internal
security policies, maritime security and others.[ 245]
However, the EU's "Comprehensive Approach" needs to
be strengthened to cover gaps in the current EU response.
26.3 The objectives of EU capacity building in security
and development (previously known as "Train and Equip")
are two-fold:
— to
build the capacity of third countries to prevent crises starting;
and
— to develop their capability to manage
crises once they have occurred.
26.4 The Joint Communication reviews existing EU
policies currently contributing to security and development work
and the challenges, including in pilot test cases conducted in
Africa; identifies shortcomings and remedies — improving
information-sharing and other forms of cooperation between the
relevant Commission and EEAS services, and with international
partners; new mechanisms such as an EU-wide strategic framework
for Security Sector Reform — and proposes a review of the
effectiveness of current financial instruments and consideration
of a new, dedicated financial instrument (see "Background"
below for full details).
26.5 This Joint Communication has been developed
in response to a "tasking" from the December 2013 European
Council to find ways to support partner countries in improving
their ability to manage crises.
26.6 The initiative will create a formal mechanism
for the EU to assess third country security and development needs,
to provide necessary training, and donate appropriate (i.e., non-lethal)
equipment to meet capability gaps.
26.7 The Joint Communication is not subject to formal
adoption by the European Council. However, the 18 May Foreign
Affairs Council agreed Conclusions that "invite the EEAS
and the Commission services to carry out further work in view
of the Foreign Affairs Council in October/November", and
the 25-26 June "Defence" European Council is thus expected
to task the EEAS, Commission and Member States to develop the
initiative further.
26.8 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
says that he:
— regards
this initiative as a tangible means for implementing the EU's
"Comprehensive Approach" principles of early planning;
efficiency through working with partners; and aspiring to ensure
long-term sustainability following EU crisis intervention, and
as meeting the capacity building objectives identified in HMG's
Building Stability Overseas Strategy;[ 246]
— has made clear that the Government would
not accept any new permanent structures or head count;
— successfully opposed any notion concerning
the donation of lethal equipment under this new initiative; this
must remain a bilateral responsibility;
— on financing, accepts exploration of
adapting the African Peace Facility (APF)[ 247]
in the short term but on the condition that this is without detriment
to existing EU supported peace-keeping operations, but also supports
the "Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace"
(IcSP[ 248]) being considered
as part of the broader exploration of financing options and, over
the longer term, further work to explore the creation of a new
dedicated instrument, whilst making clear that contributions from
Member States should be on a voluntary basis;
— has made it clear that the UK will not
accept the expansion of Common Funding[ 249]
to fund EU capacity building, and that the EEAS and Commission
need to assign appropriate existing resources to implement this
initiative;
— supports a flexible geographical focus
for EU capacity building but prefers it to focus on existing CSDP
activity e.g. in Somalia, and UK priority areas going forward;
— wants this initiative, when fully implemented,
to ensure that the skills and expertise transferred to third countries
are not used in a way that adversely affects UK or EU human rights
priorities;
— would like to adopt a tool for assessing
the human rights risks of the EU overseas security and justice
assistance work and identifying measures to mitigate such risks;
— in terms of long term sustainability,
will ensure the concept delivers genuine capacity development
across different third state sectors, which goes beyond training
and equipping foreign security forces;
— will also ensure that any proposed actions
following the June European Council relating to implementation,
maximise efficiencies and take full account of existing resources.
26.9 This initiative seems to be well-conceived
thus far. The Minister has outlined some proper resource constraints
(no new institutions, no net additional head count, non-use of
Common Funding, no support for lethal weapons, maximising efficiencies
and taking full account of existing resources), which we endorse.
26.10 There is, though, clearly much more work
to be done. We look forward to hearing more from the Minister
in the light of the June "Defence" European Council
on the details of this further "tasking".
26.11 We would be also grateful if he would now
outline what he envisages in the prospective EU-wide strategic
framework for Security Sector Reform (especially given the interest
that previous Committees have taken in the programmes/missions/operations
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo and
Afghanistan that are apparently to be used for "lessons learned"
purposes) and clarify whether or not this is to be in a form that
will be subject to normal parliamentary scrutiny.
26.12 In the meantime, we shall retain the Joint
Communication under scrutiny.
Full
details of the documents:
(36825), 8505/15, JOIN(15) 17: Joint Communication: Capacity
building in support of security and development — Enabling
partners to prevent and manage crises.
Background
26.13 In what it styles "The security-development
nexus in EU policies", the Joint Communication describes
the EU's external action objectives, as stated in the Treaties,
as inter alia, "to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and
strengthen international security […]" and also "to
foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development
of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty".[ 250]
26.14 Though the primary objective is "the reduction
and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty",[ 251]
the EU's development policy also addresses sustainable development,
inequalities, social injustice and human rights violations.
26.15 The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP), including the Common Foreign and Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP), provides the EU with operational implementation
capacities. The EU may use CSDP assets on missions outside its
territory for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening
international security in accordance with the principles of the
United Nations Charter. The need for mutually reinforcing interventions
in the areas of security and development is clear. The EU has
consistently underlined that "security is a precondition
for development" and that "without development and poverty
eradication there will be no sustainable peace". Creating
and fostering the political, social and economic conditions for
stability is essential for a country's security and a prerequisite
for its development. This security-development nexus "is
central to maximising the effectiveness of the EU's external action".
26.16 Events in Africa, in Europe's neighbourhood
and beyond point to a dramatic and deteriorating global security
situation, with more than 1.5 billion people living in fragile
and conflict affected regions worldwide. Countries in fragile
situations have not reached the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
making violent conflict and poor governance continuing crucial
developmental challenges. Fragility and violence have also been
fuelled by new threats such as terrorism and organised crime.
26.17 Coordinated external action that makes use
of the EU's diplomatic, security, development and humanitarian
tools is thus essential to restore confidence and ensure that
partner countries' institutions are equipped to meet the challenges.
The link between security and development is a key underlying
principle of the EU's "Comprehensive Approach" to external
conflicts and crises,[ 252]
and complementary to the internal security policies, maritime
security and others. However, the EU's "Comprehensive Approach"
needs to be strengthened to cover gaps in the current EU response.
A number of significant political frameworks are relevant to both
security and development, some of which are under review: the
European Neighbourhood Policy, the post-MDG development framework,
the Strategic Review on Foreign Policy, the EU Maritime Security
Strategy and the European Agenda on Security.
26.18 On the basis of the December 2013 European
Council conclusions[ 253]
and the April 2014 EU-African Union (AU) Summit
Declaration,[ 254] this
Joint Communication identifies shortcomings and proposes remedial
measures. While it addresses the issue of equipment to support
partner countries' security capacity building, it does not address
the provision of lethal weapons: "The EU will not provide
such equipment".
The Joint Communication
26.19 Reviewing the current situation, the Commission/EEAS
notes that several of the 34 CSDP missions and operations conducted
so far have already been engaged in civilian and military capacity-building,
e.g., the EU military advisory mission in the Central African
Republic (EUMAM RCA), which is assisting the national military
to move towards the goal of becoming modernised, effective and
accountable armed forces; and the EU's civilian CSDP mission in
Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), which supports the restructuring of the
Malian domestic security forces (i.e. the police, the gendarmerie,
and the garde nationale).
26.20 As well as sharing the common costs among Member
States,[ 255] such peace
and security actions are currently financed by:
— the
IcSP and its precursor, the Instrument for Stability;
— the European Development Fund
(EDF), which has channelled €1.2 billion
since 2003 to the APF, covering, inter alia, operational
costs for African peacekeeping operations (excluding salaries),
training and exercises, command, control and communication systems,
or fact-finding missions and, since 2007, around €800 million
to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
26.21 Two pilot cases are examined:
— the
EU Training Mission in Mali
(EUTM Mali), which was established
to help to train Malian soldiers, enabling them to form an effective
and democratically accountable national armed force that can help
stabilise the country;
— EUTM Somalia, which was launched in April
2010 to support and develop the Somali security sector by strengthening
the Somalia Armed Forces through the provision of targeted military
training
26.22 Initial findings indicate training and equipment
needs as well as a requirement for improved coordination, both
at operational and strategic level.
26.23 The Commission/EEAS then examine ways of improving
the delivery of capacity-building in support of security and development.
The constraints on existing financial instruments are outlined,
and the conclusion reached that, while financing security capacity
building, including that of the military, is possible under the
APF, it is subject to a number of other limitations that may prevent
its effective in addressing all situations with which the EU is
confronted. Nonetheless, more could be achieved within the existing
framework through the application of a more coherent and a more
coordinated approach.
26.24 EU support to security sector capacity building
needs to be underpinned by EU external action principles. These
include:
— ownership
by the partner country and alignment to the partner's long-term
development strategies;
— respect for human rights and adherence
to international humanitarian law; and
— coherence with other EU actions as part
of a broader EU comprehensive approach to external conflict and
crises..
26.25 In addition, the Commission/EEAS say that it
is "important to use context analysis to prevent offer-driven
capacity building support, develop a risk management methodology
and ensure broad support from the international community and
coordination with other actors on the ground". A number of
practical measures are suggested:
— enhance
information-sharing of ongoing and planned capacity building support
activities in the broader crisis prevention management areas (including
support to justice and security sectors) conducted through the
bilateral cooperation of Member States, the EU development and
technical cooperation instruments and CSDP activities;
— extend information-sharing to the EU's
multilateral partners (including the UN, NATO and OSCE) and other
third countries and strategic partners;
— draw on the introduction of the Political
Framework for Crisis Approach process[ 256]
to intensify the ties between services handling development cooperation
and security policy matters; make better use of development cooperation
expertise, and vice-versa, including between the work of the instrument-specific
management committees and the work of the CSDP Council working
parties;
— organise more regular and systematic
interaction between EU delegations and the CSDP mission and/or
operations at partner country level.
26.26 To support and implement these commitments,
the Commission and EEAS propose that they should further develop
the following initiatives:
— an
EU-wide strategic framework for Security Sector Reform, shared
by CSDP and development cooperation policy and drawing on lessons
learnt in programmes/missions/operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan in terms of the
transition from CSDP to other instruments;
— a shared evaluation, monitoring and results
framework, irrespective of the policy framework under which they
are conducted;
— a dedicated risk management methodology.
26.27 Summing up, the Commission and the High Representative
say that they:
"are committed to implementing the measures
on coordination and coherence of existing instruments outlined
in this Joint Communication. Under the comprehensive approach
to external conflicts and crises, this will be fully effective
only if matched by corresponding efforts with and among Member
States on their own instruments at strategic and operational levels.
A "unity of effort" is required so as to ensure the
EU's collective ability to engage at the right time and with the
appropriate mechanisms and resources for a specific context in
a partner country or with a regional organisation".
26.28 Against this background, the Commission and
HR propose that the practical feasibility of the three following
actions should be considered:
— adapting
the African Peace Facility to address its limitations;
— establishing a facility linking peace,
security and development in the framework of one or more existing
instruments;
— a dedicated financial instrument;
— extending the Athena mechanism to include
capacity building in partner countries.
The Government's view
26.29 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 5 June 2015,
the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) comments as follows:
"We assess that this initiative could potentially
increase the effectiveness of EU crisis intervention. It also
provides a tangible means for implementing the EU's 'Comprehensive
Approach' principles of early planning; efficiency through working
with partners; and aspiring to ensure long-term sustainability
following EU crisis intervention. More broadly the initiative
also meets the capacity building objectives identified in HMG's
Building Stability Overseas Strategy.
"Whilst we have broadly supported the initiative,
we have robustly safeguarded our usual caveats on Common Security
and Defence Policy (CSDP). We have made clear that we would not
accept any new permanent structures or head count within the institutions
to make this initiative work. We have also made clear that we
do not support the donation of lethal equipment under this new
initiative and we successfully argued that such donations must
remain a bilateral responsibility.
"The FAC conclusions invite the EEAS and Commission
to explore: financing options including an adaptation of the current
African Peace Facility (APF); the establishment of a facility
linking peace, security and development under an existing instrument;
and the creation of a dedicated instrument. We
accept exploration of an adaptation to the APF as a means to fund
'Train and Equip' in the short term but on the condition that
this is without detriment to existing EU supported peace keeping
operations. The 'Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace'
(IcSP) has also been suggested as an option but it is not explicitly
stated in FAC Conclusions or the Joint Communication 'Way Forward'.
We support the IcSP being considered as part of the broader exploration
of financing options work.
"As the concept is further operationalised,
we will lobby the EEAS to ensure that practical feasibility of
this initiative includes a clear understanding and implementation
of the Official Development Assistance rules and includes an impact
assessment which considers the potential political, reputational
and budgetary consequences. Long-term the EEAS and Commission
want to use the mid-term review of the multiannual financial framework
2014-2020 to create a financial instrument for EU capacity building.
We have supported work to explore further the creation of such
a new dedicated instrument whilst making clear that contributions
from Member States should be on a voluntary basis.
"We have made clear that the UK will not accept
the expansion of Common Funding to fund EU capacity building.
The guiding principle of funding for CSDP operations is that 'costs
lie where they fall'. Member States pay for the majority of costs
they incur. However some costs that cannot be directly attributed
to a Member State are regarded as "common costs" and
shared out amongst Member States. The ATHENA mechanism manages
the administration of common costs and is established through
a Council Decision that is reviewed every three years, the last
concluding in April 2015. We made clear in negotiations that the
UK could support ATHENA's use in managing funds provided from
elsewhere, be it through another instrument, Member State or third
nation, but we could not support use of Common Funding for capacity
building equipment donations.
"We support the creation of a new facility to
improve coordination on EU capacity building across EU institutions,
but without additional headcount or permanent structures. The
EEAS and Commission need to assign appropriate existing resources
to implement this initiative. In terms of scope and methodology
we support a flexible geographical focus for EU capacity building
but we would prefer it to focus on existing CSDP activity e.g.
in Somalia. Pilot studies were conducted in Mali and Somalia and
we should push for continued focus in UK priority areas going
forward. When fully implemented we want to ensure that the skills
and expertise transferred to third countries are not used in a
way that adversely affects UK or EU human rights priorities. We
would like the EU to adopt a tool for assessing the human rights
risks of the EU overseas security and justice assistance work
and identifying measures to mitigate such risks. In terms of long
term sustainability we want to ensure the concept delivers genuine
capacity development across different third state sectors, which
goes beyond training and equipping foreign security forces.
26.30 With regard to the Financial Implications,
the Minister says:
"There will be financial implications for the
EEAS, European Commission and Member States once proposals for
finance mature. We will ensure that any proposed actions following
the June European Council relating to implementation maximise
efficiencies and takes full account of existing resources".
Previous Committee Reports
None, but see Joint Communication: The EU's comprehensive
approach to external conflict and crises: (35696), 17859/13,
JOIN(13) 30; Twenty-ninth Report HC 219-xxviii (2014-15), chapter
12 (14 January 2015) and the earlier Reports referred to therein.
244 European External Action Service. Back
245 For a full discussion of the EU's approach, see Nicoletta Palozzi,
The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management. Back
246 Published in 2011. See Building stability overseas strategy. Back
247 The APF was created to strengthen the financial capacity of the
African institutions to foster peace and security on the continent
in response to a request made by the African Union Summit in Maputo
in July 2003. Back
248 The IcSP provides for:
o urgent short-term actions in response to situations
of crisis or emerging crisis, often complementing EU humanitarian
assistance; and
o longer-term capacity building of organisations
engaged in crisis response and peace-building.
On the ground, the implementation of
IcSP actions is typically devolved to EU Delegations located in
the third countries concerned. Back
249 The guiding principle of funding for CSDP operations is that "costs
lie where they fall". Member States pay for the majority
of costs they incur. However some costs that cannot be directly
attributed to a Member State are regarded as "common costs"
and shared out amongst Member States. The ATHENA mechanism manages
the administration of common costs and is established through
a Council Decision that is reviewed every three years, the last
concluding in April 2015. Back
250 Article 21(2) TEU. Back
251 Article 208 TEU. Back
252 Joint Communication: The EU's comprehensive approach to external
conflict and crises: JOIN(13) 30. Back
253 See Council Conclusions. Back
254 See EU-Africa Summit Declaration. Back
255 Athena is the mechanism that handles the financing of common costs
relating to EU military operations under the EU's common security
and defence policy (CSDP). It operates on behalf of the 27 EU
member states who contribute to the financing of EU military operations
(Denmark has opted out of CSDP on military matters). Athena was
set up by the Council of the European Union on 1 March 2004. Five
active EU military operations currently benefit from Athena financing:
EUFOR ALTHEA (Kosovo); EUNAVFOR ATALANTA (anti-piracy); EUTM SOMALIA;
EUTM MALI; and EUFOR RCA. Athena manages the financing of common
costs for these operations, such as transport, infrastructure
and medical services, as well as the nation borne costs, which
include lodging, fuel, and similar costs linked to national contingents.
Athena is managed by an administrator and under the authority
of a Special Committee made up of representatives from the member
states contributing to the financing of each operation. Back
256 An EU-wide document, articulating what the crisis is, and what
could be the potential EU levers of power to address its root
causes (as opposed to its symptoms), namely the Political Framework
for Crisis Approach (PFCA). This PFCA would enact the Comprehensive
Approach of the EU, as all EU stakeholders are entitled to contribute
to it under the coordinating role of the EEAS. Presented to the
Political and Security Committee for information purposes, this
PFCA would support an orientation debate on the political willingness
to utilize the CSDP lever of power, across the wider range of
EU levers of power. This political willingness would be materialised
by the Crisis Management Concept (CMC), which would depict a CSDP
political-strategic option, in concrete terms an ad-hoc combination
- or recipe, as opposed to a simple juxtaposition - of the CSDP
military and the CSDP civilian instruments. See Turning Political
Words into Military Deeds. Back
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