54 The
EU and Central Asia
Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny
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Document details | Joint Staff Working Document on the implementation of the EU Central Asia Strategy
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Legal base |
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Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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Document numbers | (36624), 5241/15, SWD(15) 2
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
54.1 The 2007 EU Central Asia strategy embracing Kazakhstan,
the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
prioritised a number of areas for engagement and cooperation:
· good
governance, rule of law, human rights and democratisation;
· education
and training; economic development, trade and investment;
· transport
and energy; environmental sustainability and water management;
and
· common
security threats and challenges (see our predecessors' earlier
Reports for full details[ 393]).
54.2 The Strategy envisaged a formal review. But
Member States and the Commission agreed in mid-2012 on a "lighter-touch
implementation review" and "a future orientation to
guide the EU in its engagement", which was reinforced by
Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions.
54.3 In 2014, the European Court of Auditors (ECA)
produced a highly-critical report on how the Commission and the
European External Action Service (EEAS) had planned and managed
674 million (£479 million) of development assistance
to the Central Asian republics in the period 2007-12. Assistance
covered too many sectors and involved too many small projects.
The Commission/EEAS could not establish how much the EU had spent
per sector and per country. Disbursement decisions were based
on partner countries' professed commitments to reform rather than
on progress achieved. Implementation was slow overall. The regional
programmes did not achieve a genuine regional dimension. Commission
reports focused on activity rather than results.
54.4 Related to this was a separate ECA Report on
EuropeAid's evaluation and Results-Orientated Monitoring Systems
(which was debated in European Committee B) and the prospect of
the Commission's long-overdue EU
Development and Cooperation Results Framework (see
"Background" below for further details).
The Joint Staff Working Document
54.5 In January 2015, the Commission and the High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR; Federica
Mogherini) issued this further report. It provides an overview
of progress to date on the implementation of the EU Central Asia
Strategy, identifies possible areas for change or additional focus
and sets the scene for a further detailed policy review scheduled
to take place over the coming months under the Latvian EU Presidency
(see our predecessors' 25 February 2015 Report for details[ 394]).
54.6 The previous Committee said that it raised three
issues:
the
quality of the Commission and EEAS evaluation systems (about which
the previous Committee had been pressing the Government for a
year, based on several European Court of Auditors Special Reports);
who represented the EU in roles such
as this (an EU Special Representative (EUSR), appointed by the
Council, or a Special Envoy appointed by the HR); and
how an upcoming review of this Strategy
was to be handled in terms of parliamentary scrutiny.
54.7 Most recently, it asked the Minister for Europe
(Mr David Lidington) to keep it fully informed on that policy
review. The Minister now explains that, rather than a "top
level substantive strategy review
just two years since
the previous review in 2012", Council Conclusions have been
agreed that "form a narrative assessment that provides guidance
on implementation of the underlying strategy, reaffirming its
core validity, while adjusting where needed emphasis on specific
areas". The 2007 EU Central Asia strategy itself thus remains
unchanged and there are no specific new policy proposals within
the Council Conclusions.
54.8 Adopted by the 22 June Foreign Affairs Council,
the Council Conclusions reaffirm Central Asia as a region of strategic
importance, confirm that the main objectives and priority areas
of the 2007 EU Strategy for Central Asia remain pertinent, and
commit the EU to establishing a strong, durable and stable relationship
with the five Central Asian countries and to a relationship "based
on the principles of responsibility and ownership, which is aimed
at fostering the stable, secure and sustainable development of
the region".
54.9 A core focus remains on promoting good governance
and respect for the Rule of Law, as well as promoting educational
links and addressing continuing serious challenges to human rights
in the region.
54.10 As well as encouraging greater trade and investment,
the aim is gradually embedding the region more firmly into international
rules-based systems.
54.11 The Council Conclusions additionally highlight
the importance of assessing approaches in the region and tailoring
these to suit specific national circumstances, given the significant
political, economic and broader differentiation between the states
in the region. This should not, however, (the Minister notes)
come at the expense of continued work on established and useful
regional initiatives where common approaches are required (for
example cross-border security challenges such as migration, border
management, water management and action against drugs trafficking).
54.12 All in all, the Minister "continues to
believe that the EU Central Asia Strategy provides a useful framework
for EU engagement in the region". Looking ahead, as the existing
Strategy based on the Council Conclusions is implemented, and
the EEAS and Commission put forward proposals on this basis, the
Minister "will continue throughout to seek to encourage focus
on what concrete outcomes can be achieved by proposed projects
and programmes and how this can best be evaluated".
54.13 Elsewhere in this Report we consider two
key related developments:
the
latest Commission/EEAS proposals on an EU International
Cooperation and Development Results Framework, whose
contents are the latest stage in a long-overdue process, which
has already involved two European Committee debates;[ 395]
and
a draft Council Decision on the EU
Special Representative (EUSR) for Central Asia,[ 396]
for whom these Council Conclusions envisage a central role in
taking the Strategy forward.
54.14 Given the findings of the ECA Special Report
(c.f. paragraph 53.03 above) and the fact that programming for
2014-20 will be 1.1 billion (£781 million) (56%
more that in 2007-13),
effective implementation will be ever more crucial. The Council
Conclusions make the right noises:
in implementing the Strategy, the EU "will take into account
the lessons learnt and the changes in the region as well as the
altering geopolitical situation around it", and "[i]n
view of the growing differentiation in the region and in order
to address the important areas highlighted in these Conclusions",
"encourages" the EEAS and the Commission to "come
forward with proposals for effective implementation of the Strategy
in accordance with the needs for a renewed partnership with the
region".
54.15 However, time alone or, perhaps,
a further European Court of Auditors' Special Report in due course
will tell whether the results live up to these prescriptions
and exhortations.
54.16 In the meantime, we now clear this Joint
Staff Working Document.
Full
details of the documents:
Joint Staff Working Document: Progress Report on the implementation
of the EU Central Asia Strategy: (36624), 5241/15, SWD(15)
2.
Background
54.17 At the time of the mid-2012 "lighter-touch
implementation review", the Minister for Europe (Mr David
Lidington) produced his own assessment (see our predecessors'
previous Reports for details). In brief, he regarded the EU Central
Asia Strategy as a useful framework in terms of building the regional
stability, greater rule of law and economic growth he wished to
see. While there was still clear room for improvement, the Strategy,
together with the active engagement of the EU Special Representative
for Central Asia over the last five years, had helped the EU raise
its profile and impact in a region of growing strategic importance,
from what was a low base in 2007. His main concern was that EU
assistance was spread too thinly. He was encouraging the EEAS
to open (and fully staff) Delegation Offices in all Central Asian
states as a key element of improving EU visibility, and had underline
the importance of personal high-level engagement with senior leaders
in the five countries. It would be important, particularly in
light of transition in Afghanistan, for the EU to focus on regional
security issues in the mid-term, as well as remaining focussed
on promoting rule of law/human rights, economic regional co-operation.
54.18 In 2014, a European Court of Auditors' Special
Report examined how the Commission and the European External Action
Service (EEAS) had planned and managed 674 million (£479
million) of development assistance to the Central Asian republics
in the period 2007-12. It concluded that, under challenging circumstances,
planning and allocation had been generally satisfactory. But assistance
covered too many sectors and involved too many small projects.
The Commission/EEAS could not establish how much the EU had spent
per sector and per country. Disbursement decisions were based
on partner countries' professed commitments to reform rather than
on progress achieved. Implementation was slow overall. The regional
programmes did not achieve a genuine regional dimension. Commission
reports focused on activity rather than results. At that time,
the then Minister (Lynne Featherstone) said that these were general
issues, which would be addressed via the EU's new "Agenda
for Change",[ 397]
an updated Development Cooperation Instrument and the Commission's
work on an effective results framework, to measure impact and
not just activities undertaken (see our predecessors' 25 February
2015 Report for details[ 398]).
The previous Committee's assessment
54.19 Our predecessors noted with satisfaction that
a related debate on a European Court of Auditors' Special Report
on EuropeAid's evaluation and Results-Orientated Monitoring Systems
had been held, [ 399]
and agreed with all the points made by the relevant Department
for International Development Minister (Mr Desmond Swayne), who
led it. During the debate, the Minister said that:
unless
an organisation could evaluate what it had done and work out what
had worked, what had not and whether those lessons could be learned
and applied to future projects, it would become increasingly inefficient;[ 400]
the key question was whether the EU had
been doing its homework as a result of those processes: in this
regard, the EU had "been panned by the auditors";[ 401]
DFID's own assessment of the European
Union as an effective deliverer of aid was "more a matter
of luck than of judgment";[ 402]
even where "people and our partners"
accepted that matters needed to be dealt with, the key question
was: "how high up the agenda they are"; for the Government,
such matters as vital, but it had to work through allies, with
respect to Nordic countries and others who think these are important
issues and raise them up the agenda, and there was a barrier to
overcome in that others had different priorities;[ 403]
and
the Court of Auditors had done a sterling
job; the relevant procedures were not adequate and were not being
adequately carried out "a woeful situation, which
we must get right".[ 404]
54.20 Though
pleased also to hear in that debate that there were, after all,
to be Council Conclusions regarding the long-overdue EU
Development and Cooperation Results Framework,
our predecessors emphasised
that it was what those Council Conclusions said that would make
the difference, especially as it was plain that far from all Member
States were as keen as the UK on putting the Commission/EEAS feet
to the fire. Our predecessors
therefore
asked the Minister to provide the Committee with a copy of the
Council Conclusions that were finally adopted and his views on
how effectively they moved this vital process forward.
54.21 Our
predecessors looked
forward to receiving the Council Decision and the Minister for
Europe's EM on the new EUSR for Central Asia proposed by HR Mogherini
a move that they welcomed not only because of the need
for such an intermediary if this important EU Strategy was ever
going to get properly off the ground, but also because the EUSR
process was back where it belonged, under the control of the Member
States.
54.22 Finally, our
predecessors welcomed
the Minister for Europe's assurance that the Committee would be
kept fully in the picture on the upcoming work on the next iteration
of this Strategy. Though he did not say so specifically, our
predecessors presumed
that his assurance included depositing the final version for scrutiny
before it was submitted to the Council for adoption.
54.23 In
the meantime, our predecessors continued
to retain this present implementation review under scrutiny.[ 405]
The Minister's letter of 22 June 2015
54.24 The Minister says that, during the dissolution
of Parliament, discussions took place in Brussels working groups,
and encloses a copy of the draft Council Conclusions in
confidence at this stage as it is marked limité,
but in the expectation that this marking will be removed following
adoption, after which his officials will provide an unclassified
version. Thus, in "accordance with standard scrutiny procedures",
the Minister says that the draft Council Conclusions have "not
been deposited for formal scrutiny as the content and method of
adoption do not fall within depositable categories"; he would,
however, "be glad to provide any further information you
may require on UK or EU engagement in Central Asia".
54.25 In the meantime, the Minister says that, as
far as the substance of discussions and the resulting Council
Conclusions is concerned, "the underlying strategy both in
text and substance will not change at all as a result of the Conclusions",
which he says coincides with his assessment, as set out in his
letter of 27 March, "that top level substantive strategy
review should not be the goal at this stage, just two years since
the previous review in 2012". Rather:
"the Council Conclusions form a narrative assessment
that provides guidance on implementation of the underlying strategy,
reaffirming its core validity, while adjusting where needed emphasis
on specific areas."
54.26 Overall, the Minister continues to believe
that "the EU Central Asia Strategy provides a useful framework
for EU engagement in the region".
54.27 He continues as follows:
"The Conclusions update the position on a number
of recent developments such as the appointment of a new EU Special
Representative for Central Asia, Peter Burian, on which the Committee
has already been briefed, and the conclusion of negotiations and
initialling of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
with Kazakhstan, discussions on which continue in Brussels working
groups. Once these are concluded I will be writing to the Committee
to seek clearance for the Council Decision on signature."
54.28 The Conclusions additionally:
"highlight the importance of assessing approaches
in the region and tailoring these to suit specific national circumstances,
given the significant political, economic and broader differentiation
between the states in the region. This should not however come
at the expense of continued work on established and useful regional
initiatives where common approaches are required (for example
cross-border security challenges such as migration, border management,
water management and action against drugs trafficking)."
54.29 A core focus remains on:
"promoting good governance and respect for the
Rule of Law, as well as promoting educational links and addressing
continuing serious challenges to human rights in the region."
54.30 Work on promoting further integration of markets
and an improved investment climate is also highlighted, "with
the potential to play a significant role in gradually embedding
the region more firmly into international rules-based systems".
54.31 As the existing Strategy, based on the Council
Conclusions, is implemented, and the EEAS and Commission put forward
proposals on this basis:
"we will continue throughout to seek to encourage
focus on what concrete outcomes can be achieved by proposed projects
and programmes and how this can best be evaluated."
54.32 In conclusion:
"the 2007 EU Central Asia strategy itself remains
unchanged and there are no specific new policy proposals within
the Council Conclusions."
54.33 On 22 June, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted
Conclusions that are as in the draft sent to us by the Minister.
They thus reaffirm Central Asia as a region of strategic importance,
confirms that the main objectives and priority areas of the 2007
EU Strategy for Central Asia remain pertinent, and commit the
EU to establishing a strong, durable and stable relationship with
the five Central Asian countries and to a relationship "based
on the principles of responsibility and ownership, which is aimed
at fostering the stable, secure and sustainable development of
the region".
54.34 As well as calling for the strengthening of
trade and energy links between the EU and Central Asian countries
and reinforcing cooperation on security and stability, including
sustainable management of natural resources, the Council "emphasises
the fundamental importance of democratisation, respect for human
rights and the rule of law, and socio-economic development, all
of which are essential elements of the Strategy".
54.35 The Council welcomes the appointment
of Ambassador Peter Burian as the new EU Special Representative
for Central Asia, whose role is:
"to act as an important channel of dialogue
and communication at the highest level with the central Asian
countries, to promote overall Union political coordination in
Central Asia and enhance the Union's effectiveness and visibility
in the region."
54.36 In implementing the Strategy the EU "will
take into account the lessons learnt and the changes in the region
as well as the altering geopolitical situation around it".
With this in mind, the Council says:
"In view of the growing differentiation in the
region and in order to address the important areas highlighted
in these Conclusions, the Council encourages the EEAS and the
Commission to come forward with proposals for effective implementation
of the Strategy in accordance with the needs for a renewed partnership
with the region."[ 406]
Previous
Committee Reports
Thirty-ninth Report HC 219-xxxvii (2014-15), chapter
12 (24 March 2015) and Thirty-fourth Report HC 219-xxxiii (2014-15),
chapter 6 (25 February 2015); also see (28674),: Twenty-fifth
Report HC 41-xxv (2006-07), chapter 12 (13 June 2007).
393 See Thirty-ninth Report HC 219-xxxvii (2014-15),
chapter 12 (24 March 2015) and Thirty-fourth Report HC 219-xxxiii
(2014-15), chapter 6 (25 February 2015); also see (28674),-:
Twenty-fifth Report HC 41-xxv (2006-07), chapter 12 (13 June 2007). Back
394 Ibid. Back
395 See (36775), 7604/15, at chapter 17 of this Report. Back
396 See (36777), - at chapter 24 of this Report. Back
397 In 2011 the EU adopted two reforms that (according to its website)
are "designed to make its development policy both more strategic
and more targeted: the 12-points Agenda for Change and new policy
and rules for budget support"; these changes would "make
sure EU aid targets the countries in greatest need, where external
support can really make a difference in terms of poverty reduction",
and will be concentrated "in two overall priority areas":
human rights, democracy and other aspects of good governance;
and inclusive and sustainable growth: see https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/european-development-policy/agenda-change_en
for further information. Back
398 Thirty-fourth Report HC 219-xxxiii (2014-15), chapter 6 (25 February
2015). Back
399 Gen Co Deb, European Committee B, 9 March 2015, cols. 3-16. Back
400 Col. 4. Back
401 Col. 4. Back
402 Col. 5. Back
403 Col. 6. Back
404 Col. 8. Back
405 Thirty-ninth Report HC 219-xxxvii (2014-15), chapter 12 (24 March
2015). Back
406 See Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on Central Asia for the
full text. Back
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