65 The EU's Special Representative (EUSR)
to Bosnia and Herzegovina
| Committee's assessment
| Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Cleared from scrutiny
|
| Document details | Council Decision extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina
|
| Legal base | Articles 31(2) and 33 TEU; QMV
|
| Department
Document numbers
| Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(36894), —
|
Summary and Committee's conclusions
65.1 EUSRs are appointed where the Council agrees with the High
Representative that an additional EU presence on the ground is
needed to deliver the political objectives of the Union. The EU
has appointed an EUSR in BiH since 2002.
65.2 The draft Council Decision extends the mandate
of the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (BiH), Mr Lars-Gunnar Wigemark until 30 October
2015. The current mandate expires on 30 June 2015.
65.3 The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
explains that this is "a short term, technical extension
to roll over the mandate for four months, to bring it in line
with the mandates of other EUSRs". He notes that the role
of EUSR is currently combined with that of the EU's Head of Delegation
in BiH.
65.4 The mandate of the EUSR in BiH will be:
"continued progress in the Stabilisation and
Association process,[ 469]
with the aim of a stable, viable, peaceful, multi-ethnic and united
BiH, co-operating peacefully with its neighbours and irreversibly
on track towards EU membership. To this end, the EUSR offers advice
and facilitation in the local political progress, co-ordinates
the activities of EU actors in BiH and provides EU actors and
EU Heads of Mission with regular reporting on the local political
situation. The EUSR also undertakes significant outreach work,
aimed at communicating to the BiH population the benefits of EU
integration and why certain reforms are necessary to realise them.
The EUSR will therefore play a key role in the delivery of the
EU initiative on BiH."
65.5 Nineteen years after the Dayton Accords, and
notwithstanding sustained support from the International Community,
a country of four million inhabitants remained divided by mistrust
between the various ethnic groups, the upshot of which has been
political stagnation, a lack of badly needed reform and the consequential
stagnation of the Bosnian EU accession process. Against this background,
in November 2014 the Foreign Secretary and his German counterpart
put forward a new, high-profile initiative towards BiH's EU accession,
which was swiftly followed up by the EU High Representative/Vice-President,
Federica Mogherini, and the Enlargement Commissioner in a visit
to Sarajevo. As the Minister suggests, the EUSR is seen as crucial
in supporting HR Mogherini's mandate under the new EU initiative,
which was endorsed by the December 2014 Foreign Affairs Council.
65.6 The hiatus between the resignation of Mr Wigemark's
highly-regarded predecessor last October and his own appointment
in March was thus particularly ill-timed. The Minister assured
our predecessors that this was nonetheless not related to the
tension between the previous EU High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy (Baroness Ashton) and the European
External Action Service (EEAS), and the Council, over the appointment
and control of such emissaries; he was also upbeat about Mr Wigemark's
potential, notwithstanding his lack of regional and local experience
(see "Background" below and the previous Committee's
January 2015 Reports for full information).
65.7 The continuation of Mr Wigemark's mandate
has resulted in an override of scrutiny, in view of the fact that
the Committee had not yet been formed at the time at which this
Council Decision needed to be adopted. In the circumstances and
on this occasion, we do not take issue with the Minister's decision.
65.8 We now clear the Council Decision. In so
doing, we endorse all that our predecessors have said about the
need for the next round of EUSR mandate renewals to be submitted
in a timely fashion, i.e., so that any questions that may arise
may be dealt with before the adoption of the relevant Council
Decision.
65.9 In this instance, we would like the Minister's
next Explanatory Memorandum to contain a full assessment of the
political situation in BiH and the extent to which the HR has
been able to pursue and fulfil her mandate under the new EU initiative;
and a similarly full assessment of the EUSR's performance since
his appointment in March.
Full
details of the documents: Council Decision
extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative
in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (36894), —.
Background
65.10 EU Special Representatives (EUSR) tackle specific
issues (including Human Rights), countries or regions of conflict.
They provide the EU with an active political presence, acting
as a "voice" and "face" for the EU and its
policies.[ 470] They
answer directly to the EU High Representative/Vice-President,
who is responsible for proposing their appointment. But they are
appointed by the EU Council, who determine each mandate, budget
and job holder.
65.11 Council Decision 2011/426/CFSP appointed Peter
S¾rensen as the EU's Special Representative (EUSR) to Bosnia
and Herzegovina (BiH) with a mandate until 30 June 2015. As recently
as June 2014, the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) had
described him as having strengthened the EU's visibility and political
impact in BiH, taken the lead in supporting BiH in EU-related
matters and being a respected and trusted interlocutor who carried
real weight with key Bosnian politicians from all three constituent
parties (Bosniak, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat); the EUSR mandate,
he said, remained critical to galvanising BiH's leaders into making
the reforms needed to allow them to submit a credible application
for candidate status.
65.12 The objective of the EUSR is to assist in the
creation of a stable, viable, peaceful and multi-ethnic BiH, co-operating
peacefully with its neighbours and irreversibly on track towards
EU membership. To this end, the EUSR offers advice and facilitation
in the local political progress, co-ordinates the activities of
EU actors in BiH and provides EU actors and EU Heads of Mission
with regular reporting on the local political situation. The EUSR
also undertakes significant outreach work, aimed at communicating
to the BiH population the benefits of EU integration and why certain
reforms are necessary to realise them.
65.13 The current political framework emerged from
the 1995 Dayton Agreement, which ended a bitter three-and-a half-year
war. The longstanding goal has always been for BiH to work its
way towards European accession. The BiH authorities need to deliver
five objectives (well established, approved by the PIC SB[ 471]
and all previously recognized by BiH authorities as obligations)
revolving around creating a sustainable, multi-ethnic, democratic,
law-based State, and fulfil two conditions — signing of
a BiH Stabilisation and Association Agreement, and a positive
assessment of the situation in BiH by the PIC SB based on full
compliance with the Dayton Agreement.
65.14 But things have not gone according to plan.
Delivery or fulfilment of these "Five Objectives and Two
Conditions" has, however, proved elusive. Nineteen years
later, a country of four million inhabitants remains divided by
mistrust between the various ethnic groups, the upshot of which
has been political stagnation, a lack of badly needed reform and
the consequential stagnation of the Bosnian EU accession process.
65.15 On 6 November 2014, the British and German
foreign ministers met their eight western Balkan counterparts
and then proposed a new joint initiative, the key points of which
the two Foreign Ministers set out in a joint article in the German
daily newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau and in an "open
letter" in Bosnia and Herzegovina and neighbouring countries.
Their proposals focused on improvements in economic and social
policy and good governance, so as to create jobs, strengthen the
rule of law and reduce corruption and criminality. The two foreign
ministers called on the political leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina
to commit in writing to "making the country's institutions
fit" at all levels as a precondition for working effectively
with the European Union; urged them to draw up a broad reform
agenda with the European Union to help the country make progress
on the road towards EU membership; and extended an offer to the
people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the politicians they have
elected: if they implement the necessary reforms, they would "work
to achieve progress on the country's path towards Europe".
65.16 They also promised actively to seek broad-based
political support for their initiative from neighbouring Croatia
and Serbia, EU partners and the USA. However, the most important
factor, they argued, was leadership on the part of Bosnian politicians,
who must have the interests of their whole country at heart, regardless
of ethnic affiliations.[ 472]
65.17 This initiative was followed up in a 5 December
2014 visit to Sarajevo by the EU High Representative/Vice-President,
Federica Mogherini, and the Enlargement Commissioner, Johannes
Hahn; in an end-of-visit statement, the HR said:
"From our side this would mean not lowering
the bar and changing the EU conditionality — that is not
something that is on the agenda — but it might mean that
we can look at how the sequence can be changed or can be better
addressed to make sure that there are some concrete deliverables
in terms of reforms, starting from the economic and social reforms
and getting also to the functionality of the state."[ 473]
65.18 The initiative was subsequently endorsed by
the 15 December 2014 Foreign Affairs Council, who invited HR Mogherini
and Commissioner Hahn:
"to continue engaging with the BiH leadership
to secure at the earliest its irrevocable commitment to undertake
reforms in the framework of the EU accession process… [in
order to]… establish functionality and efficiency at all
levels of government and allow Bosnia and Herzegovina to prepare
itself for future EU membership." [ 474]
65.19 However, despite this being a critical juncture
and Mr S¾rensen's high level of performance, a vacancy arose
on 31 October 2014 due to (as the Minister for Europe put it)
his "early departure … to another position".
65.20 It was not until 2015, however, that the Council
proposed to appoint his successor, from 1 March: Mr Lars-Gunnar
Wigemark — described by the Minister as "a senior Swedish
diplomat with close to 30 years of experience, most recently as
EU Head of Delegation to Pakistan".
65.21 Thus the EU lost a key interlocutor at a crucial
moment and was now having to rely on a short-term appointment.
The fact that the previous HR had decided to leave the appointment
until her successor had taken office seemed to the previous Committee
to reflect a much wider uncertainty over the future of EUSRs as
a whole. As noted in other earlier Reports,[ 475]
Baroness Ashton had wished to incorporate all the EUSRs into the
European External Action Service (EEAS), thereby turning them
from special representatives agreed by the Council into ones who
would be appointed by, and report only to, the High Representative
— a proposal that the previous Committee had indicated that
it would find disturbing because it would undermine Member State
control of an important element in Common Foreign and Security
Policy.
65.22 The Committee therefore asked the Minister
to provide a swift update on where this proposal now stood, in
the aftermath of HR Mogherini's appointment; and to provide the
background to Mr S¾rensen's premature departure — why
he had left, whether it had anything to do with this political
tussle over the future of EUSRs and what his new appointment was.
In the meantime, the Council Decision appointing Mr Wigemark was
cleared from scrutiny.[ 476]
65.23 The Minister:
— agreed
entirely that it was unfortunate that the EU had lost a key interlocutor
at this juncture, but nonetheless maintained that Mr Wigemark
would bring significant experience to the role, and be well supported
by an experienced team in Sarajevo, including a Deputy Head Delegation
with substantial regional expertise, in Kosovo as well as in BiH;
— understood that Mr S¾rensen's departure
was entirely for personal reasons and not as a result of any other
issues; his new role was as Head of the EU Delegation to the United
Nations and other International Organisations in Geneva;
— said that, during discussions of both
the 2014 and 2015 EU budgets, the UK and likeminded Member States
had ensured that EEAS proposals for transferring the EUSRs and
their associated resources, currently under the (Member State-controlled)
CFSP budget, into the EEAS, had been rejected;
— that, now Federica Mogherini had taken
office, he would "continue to underline the primacy of the
Member States in this important tool";
— had written to Federica Mogherini towards
the end of last year to stress the importance of allowing sufficient
time for national scrutiny processes in advance of the forthcoming
round of mandate renewals;
— understood that the new mandates would
issue shortly;
— recalled that Baroness Ashton did not
replace the EUSRs for Central Asia and the Middle East Peace Process
when they resigned last year, stating that she did not wish to
pre-empt the decision of her successor;
— understood that Federica Mogherini was
considering filling both slots in the near future; and
— described all this as "a promising
start", which he would "continue to monitor".
The previous Committee's assessment
65.24 The previous Committee said that it would continue
to do likewise. It accordingly looked to the Minister to lean
hard on the EEAS in order to ensure that the raft of mandate renewals
that were falling due for renewal were submitted for scrutiny
in good time for any questions that might arise to be dealt with
before those mandates expired.
65.25 In the meantime, the previous Committee noted
with approval that the previous High Representative's proposal
had been rejected, and that the role and mandate of all EUSRs
would therefore continue to lie in with the Council, along with
approval of any change of incumbent — all of which remained
subject to prior parliamentary scrutiny.[ 477]
Previous Committee Reports
None, but see (36572) —: Thirty-first Report
HC 219-xxx (2014-15), chapter 6 (28 January 2015) and Twenty-eighth
Report HC 219-xxvii (2014-15), chapter 14 (7 January 2015) and
(35701), —: First Report HC 219-i (2014-15), chapter 27
(4 June 2014); also see (36036), —: Second Report HC 219-ii
(2014-15), chapter 12 (11 June 2014); (35032), —: Seventh
Report HC 83-vii (2013-14), chapter 12 (26 June 2013); also see
(33960), —: Fourth Report HC 86-iv (2012-13), chapter 23
(14 June 2012) and (34725), —: Thirty-fourth Report HC 86-xxxiv
(2012-13), chapter 12 (6 March 2013): also (32951), —: Thirty-sixth
Report HC 428-xxxii (2010-12), chapter 17 (6 July 2011); (32579),
—: Twenty-second Report HC 428-xx (2010-12), chapter 8 (16
March 2011); and (31844),— (31856-66),— and (31884),
—: First Report HC 428-i (2010-12), chapter 66 (8 September
2010).
469 The Stabilisation and Association process agreed
between the EU and the countries of the Western Balkans explicitly
linked the offer of the prospect of accession - and assistance
to achieve it - to willingness and ability to meet the political
and economic requirements set for all aspirants. Regional cooperation
constitutes an essential element and is recognised as a qualifying
indicator of the Western Balkan countries' readiness to integrate. Back
470 See EU Special Representatives for full information. Back
471 The Peace Implementation Council (PIC). Back
472 Steinmeier and Hammond, which is reproduced at the first Annex
to our predecessors' Twenty-eighth Report HC 219-xxvii (2014-15),
chapter 14 (7 January 2015). Back
473 Statement of 5 December 2014. Back
474 Council conclusions on-Bosnia and Herzegovina. Back
475 Principal among these being our predecessors' Report at: (35701),
-: First Report HC 219-i (2014-15), chapter 27 (4 June 2014). Back
476 See Twenty-eighth Report HC 219-xxvii (2014-15), chapter 14 (7
January 2015). Back
477 See (36572), -: Thirty-first Report HC 219-xxx (2014-15), chapter
6 (28 January 2015). Back
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