6 Common Foreign and Security Policy,
including Common Security and Defence Policy
| Committee's assessment |
Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Not cleared from scrutiny; recommended for debate on the floor of the house; drawn to the attention of the Defence Committee and Foreign Affairs Committee
|
| Document details | Main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP (part II, point E, paragraph 25 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 2 December 2013) — 2014 — Draft Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
|
| Legal base | — |
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Document Numbers | (37005), 11083/15, ¯
|
Summary and Committee's conclusions
6.1 Under Article 36 TEU (previously Article 21 TEU), the European
Parliament is to be consulted regularly by the High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President
of the Commission (HR/VP; Federica Mogherini) on the main aspects
and basic choices of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); to be kept
informed of how these policies evolve; and to have its views "duly
taken into account".
6.2 Thus the Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA) of 2 December
2013, part II, point E, paragraph 25, provides that, each year,
the High Representative shall consult the European Parliament
on a forward-looking document, which will set out the main aspects
and basic choices of the CFSP, including the financial implications
for the general budget of the European Union, an evaluation of
the measures launched in the year n-1 and an assessment of the
coordination and complementarity of CFSP with the Union's other
external financial instruments.
The 2014 Report
6.3 The report (as is customary) describes the main CFSP decisions
and activities undertaken in 2014 by EU Member States, and by
the European External Action Service (EEAS) on their behalf:
— Overview
of Activities by Regions;
— Addressing
Threats and Global Challenges;
— Contribution
to a More Effective Multilateral Order;
— Support
to Democracy, Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law and
the Rule of Law;
— Comprehensive
Approach, Conflict Prevention, Mediation and Crisis Response;
and
— Common
Security and Defence Policy.
6.4 Part Two is focussed on looking ahead to 2015.[ 37]
The Minister of State
at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Grant Shapps) notes
that: the CSDP section focuses predominantly on follow-up work
to the December 2013 European Council, "delivering various
policy initiatives including UK priorities such as the Comprehensive
Approach[ 38] and EU-NATO
cooperation"; progress has been made on enhancing the effectiveness
of CSDP in contributing to international crisis resolution and
management ("a much stronger focus on lessons learned");
and the report highlights the importance of partnerships in CSDP,
particularly that of the EU's relationship with NATO, and "encouragingly
states the continued improvement of cooperation between the two
organisations in the face of a shared assessment of the changing
nature of the threats faced in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods".
The June 2015 "Defence" European Council
(JEC15)
6.5 We also include in this chapter of our Report
a detailed update from the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
and the Minister for the Armed Forces (Mr Julian Brazier) on JEC15
and the preparatory May 2015 Foreign Affairs Council (which was
based around a number of reports from the EU High Representative
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR; Federica Mogherini)
and the Commission/EEAS), and on the main outcomes. The key points
they highlight are:
— as
expected, the HR was tasked with producing a new Foreign and Security
Strategy, which they say they ensured will be taken forward in
close co-operation with Member States;
— Member
States committed to allocating "a sufficient level of expenditure
for defence" whilst making "the most effective use of
resources" — "a key objective for the UK, which
the Prime Minister highlighted during discussions in the Council";
— the
Council reinforced the need to "intensify partnerships",
including cooperation with NATO — "a key UK objective";
— as
part of EU-NATO co-operation, hybrid and strategic communications
were prioritised, as part of an overall response to Russia and
threats in the wider EU neighbourhood;
— Conclusions
also supported the strengthening of Europe's defence industry,
including Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), and highlighted
the need for appropriate EU funding for the Preparatory Action
on defence research due to start in 2017 as well as fostering
greater European defence co-operation to deliver key capabilities,
including through EU funds;
— leaders
highlighted the new EU capacity building initiative to "empower
and enable partners to prevent and manage crises".
6.6 The Ministers state that all of these points
reinforce key UK objectives — "the need for greater
efficiency, and support to Member States' capabilities; to improve
Member States' ability to act, including with partners, especially
NATO; and to increase the CSDP's contribution to 'full spectrum'
response to crisis and conflict management."
6.7 They also draw attention to the presence of NATO
Secretary General Stoltenberg at the European Council —
"for which we had pushed", and which "helped demonstrate
both the centrality of NATO to the security of Europe and the
need to increase NATO-EU cooperation; and to the fact that "High
Representative Mogherini highlighted that a stronger EU and NATO
provided mutual benefits" (see "Background" below
for full detail).
6.8 The (16 pages) May 2015 Foreign Affairs Council
Conclusions begin by noting that the global and European security
environment has changed dramatically in recent years, call for
"a stronger Europe, with a stronger and more effective Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)" and state that, by addressing
conflicts, sources of instability and other security challenges
in the EU's immediate and wider neighbourhood, "the EU and
its Member States are assuming increased responsibilities to act
as a security provider, at the international level and in particular
in the neighbourhood, thereby also enhancing their own security
and their global strategic role by responding to these challenges
together", with the EU and its Member States, CSDP and other
policies and instruments, having "a strong role to play through
the unique EU Comprehensive Approach to preventing and managing
conflicts and addressing their causes". [ 39]
6.9 The Council Conclusions also highlight the
continued close and mutually reinforcing co-operation with NATO
in areas of shared interest, both strategically and operationally,
in crisis management as well as on military capability development
where requirements overlap, and welcome the High Representative's
efforts to strengthen strategic and practical co-operation between
the EU and NATO, with the overall objective of building a true
organisation-to-organisation relationship.
6.10 Ministers stress that these and the (much
shorter) European Council Conclusions on CSDP[ 40]
are "firmly within UK red lines". But it is also notable
that — as with the December 2013 "Defence" European
Council (the first such since 2007) — it was again necessary
for them to lobby for the attendance of the NATO secretary-general;
something that sits oddly with a genuine conviction by other Member
States and the HR about "building a true organisation-to-organisation
relationship". It is thus perhaps not surprising that Ministers
also note that the HR's main contribution to the May FAC —
her report on CSDP — did not bring out clearly enough that
Member States have primacy over defence issues; did not give enough
weight to EU-NATO cooperation; put forward proposals on the role
of the EDA (European Defence Agency) that went beyond what Member
States had previously agreed; and provided insufficient evaluation
of the value added by CSDP missions and operations.
6.11 The HR has now been tasked with preparing
a new European Security Strategy, for "JEC16" next June.
Her "ground-breaking" initial strategy paper[ 41]
says that, while it has developed from scratch since 2000 and
its modus operandi in partnership with international and
regional organisations works well, CSDP still faces difficulties
in force generation and access to early and common financing,
enablers, intelligence and logistics, with EU Battle Groups having
never been deployed and the Lisbon Treaty's Article 44 never implemented,[ 42]
and concludes that: "While the EU is not a military alliance,
it cannot ignore the 'D' in its CSDP". This is very much
in line with the previous European Council President's remarks
at the February 2014 Munich Security:
"Starting this year, Europeans will be launching
new joint defence programmes, for cutting-edge drones, satellite
communication, cyber defence and air-to-air refuelling. It is
the start of a process. All these tools: at the service of Europe's
interests and security."[ 43]
6.12 Notwithstanding what the Council Conclusions
may say, and the Ministers' assertions about "red lines",
it seems plain that the European institutions, and at least some
Member States, continue to favour a deepening of the EU's own
defence capabilities.
6.13 Ministers see "framing the strategy
proper" as offering an opportunity, "in line with our
own SDSR,[ 44]
to improve the co-ordination of EU policies, instruments and tools
and better align them to UK priorities", and note that the
Council Conclusions "rightly emphasised the requirement for
close consultation/co-operation with Member States". They
also say that, though the new EU strategy on foreign and security
policy is to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016,
the strategy text "is to be owned and drafted by the HR/VP
with the option of Council endorsement at the end of the process",
thus avoiding "full negotiation at 28 over such a text",
which is "our favoured way of working." All of this
raises a number of important questions.
6.14 First, while some Members will find the process
outlined by the Ministers reassuring and uncontroversial, others
will not; views on CFSP and CSDP are diverse; development of a
new EU strategy on foreign and security policy, and of the related
policies listed by the Ministers, is thus politically important.
6.15 Secondly, if (quite rightly) there is to
be close consultation/co-operation with Member States, the question
arises as to how the House to be involved in the scrutiny of these
developments. The previous Committee's experience, prior to and
after the 2013 December "Defence" European Council,
is not encouraging; its final Report on the EU Comprehensive Approach
catalogues the previous Government's prevaricating over the timing
and location of debates on key documents leading up to DEC 13
— one of which (the Defence Implementation Road Map) still
remains to be debated. It also catalogues the previous Government's
lack of commitment to the depositing of documents that frame the
policy debate, thereby continuing to frustrate the Committee's
long-standing endeavours to improve "upstream" scrutiny
of CSDP, so that it is not presented with policy and legislative
faits accomplis.[ 45]
6.16 Regrettably, this continues to be the case.
For no good reason, this Annual Report has been adopted prior
to being submitted for scrutiny; since it is essentially a record
of past activity, we see no way in which this override was unavoidable,
and regard the Minister's explanation as pro forma (see
paragraph 6.29 below).
6.17 In addition, the Minister for Europe declined
to deposit formally for scrutiny the HR's Strategic Review (or
the other two documents dealt with in the joint letter) on the
grounds that it did not have a formal cover, was for information
only to the Council, and only provided a framework for decisions
to be taken.
6.18 This is an unconvincing argument: even if
provided "for information only" (it was in fact tabled
as "a background paper, prepared by the EEAS with a view
to supporting discussions amongst Ministers at the joint meeting
of the Foreign Affairs Council/Defence Ministers on 18 May"),
it was clearly meant for serious discussion. It is essentially
a Commission/Joint Communication by another name (Commission/Joint
Communications being very much frameworks for decisions to be
taken). As our scrutiny operates on the basis of a deposited document,
providing this Strategic Review by letter impedes proper prior
scrutiny, as the House has chosen to do it. We therefore make
it clear that we expect the Minister to deposit the HR's Review
next Spring, before it is considered by the Council, with an Explanatory
Memorandum and his views on it.
6.19 Third, the country will soon determine its
future relationship with the EU via a referendum. As our colleagues
on the Foreign Affairs Committee (to whose attention we draw these
developments) have already noted, leaving the EU could have significant
implications for the UK's alliances and strategic partnerships,
standing in other international organisations, "soft power"
and national security. We also draw this Chapter to the attention
of the Defence Committee.
6.20 In all these circumstances, we consider that
this CSDP Report, and the related issues set out in the Ministers'
letter and in our Conclusion, should be debated now; and recommend
that this debate should be held as soon as possible on the floor
of the House.
Full
details of the documents:
Main aspects and
basic choices of the CFSP (part II, point E, paragraph 25 of the
Interinstitutional Agreement of 2 December 2013) — 2014
— Draft Annual report from the High Representative of the
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: (37005),
11083/15, —.
Background
6.21 In its introduction, the report describes 2014
as a decisive year for the European Union's Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP):
"Armed conflict, destruction and the loss of
human lives in the European Union's neighbourhood called for swift
and determined action and demonstrated the need for a truly united
European Common Foreign and Security Policy".
6.22 The EU "used the entire range of its tools
— CFSP and non-CFSP — to respond to these challenges",
to tackle them in an integrated way and to alleviate their impact
on the countries concerned as well as on Europe. The broader global
changes driving the numerous and simultaneous crises "highlight
the need to forge a long-term strategy for the EU's external action."
6.23 In order to reflect this "comprehensive
approach", the report includes appropriate references to
non-CFSP policies and instruments, such as development cooperation,
trade and humanitarian aid.
6.24 Throughout the year, the EU coupled diplomacy
with new and existing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
missions on the ground, humanitarian intervention in areas hit
by crisis, and development aid for those in need; and worked closely
with international, regional and local partners.
6.25 The Report lists three ways in which the EU's
Common Foreign and Security Policy contributes to global peace
and security:
1. the EU is directly involved in — and
in some cases leads — international peace negotiations on
behalf of the international community, for example between Belgrade
and Pristina on the future of Kosovo and in the Iran nuclear talks;
2. the EU can assemble a wide range of political
and economic foreign policy tools, in a world where security challenges
are becoming ever more complex; addressing all dimensions of a
crisis, from its roots to its immediate manifestation, such as
EU action to address the crisis in Ukraine and countering piracy
at the Horn of Africa; and
3. the EU works closely with — and materially
supports — international and regional partners to deal with
regional challenges where only collective efforts can deliver
results, such as climate change (the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change), sustainable development (the UN
framework towards post-2015 Development goals) and disaster risk
management and relief (the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction 2015-2030).
The Government's view
6.26 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 4 August 2015,
the Minister (Mr Grant Shapps) says that:
"The landscape of foreign policy in 2014
was constantly changing, the UK acted positively in coordination
with EU Member States and Institutions to achieve some notable
successes in line with UK objectives. These included the continued
progress made in nuclear talks with Iran."
6.27 Noting that the report is nearly 300 pages,
the Minister summarises areas that he sees as "of interest
and primacy to Members".[ 46]
6.28 With regard to CSDP, the Minister says:
"The CSDP section of the report focuses
predominantly on follow-up work to the December 2013 European
Council, delivering various policy initiatives including UK priorities
such as the Comprehensive Approach and EU-NATO cooperation. The
report further highlights the progress that has been made to enhance
the effectiveness of CSDP in contributing to international crisis
resolution and management. This includes a much stronger focus
on lessons learned, with the Lessons Manage Group meeting for
the first time to agree and annual lessons report.
"The report highlights the importance of
partnerships in CSDP, particularly that of the EU's relationship
with NATO. It encouragingly states the continued improvement of
cooperation between the two organisations in the face of a shared
assessment of the changing nature of the threats faced in the
Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods. The UK-hosted Wales NATO
Summit contributed to continuing strengthening of EU-NATO relations.
"A new military operation was launched to
counter illegal migration in the Mediterranean, EUNAVFOR Med.
The timing of the launch of the operation means that assessment
of its effectiveness is not possible within this annual report."
The Minister's letter of 4 August 2014
6.29 The Minister for Europe says that the final
version of the report was agreed too late to be considered by
the Committee before the 20 July Foreign Affairs Council; regrets
that the report was endorsed by the Council before the Committee
has had an opportunity to scrutinise the document; notes the Committee's
previously expressed concern about the lack of time available
to conduct proper scrutiny of EU documents; says that he has instructed
his officials to continue to raise these concerns with colleagues
in the EU; and maintains that, the seriousness with which he takes
his responsibility to keep the Committee informed on these issues,
the need for the override of scrutiny on this occasion was "regrettably
unavoidable".
The Ministers' letter of 23 July 2015
6.30 In their letter, the Minister for Europe and
the Minister for the Armed Forces report as follows:
"June European
Council on Defence
"Our objectives for the June European Council
were: to take stock of the December 2013 Council commitments;
an emphasis on improving the effectiveness of CSDP, looking at
practical and relevant policy initiatives; no institutional expansion
or Commission encroachment; full complementarity with NATO; and
a more open and competitive European defence industry. We also
pushed to ensure short and strategic Conclusions.
"The final negotiations reflected these objectives.
As you will have seen, the Conclusions on CSDP (attached[ 47])
were concise and focused on reinforcing previous commitments,
including the 18 May Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions (see
below[ 48]). Some key
points:
— "As
expected, the High Representative was tasked with producing a
new Foreign and Security Strategy. We ensured that this will be
taken forward in close co-operation with Member States;
— "Member
States committed to allocating "a sufficient level of expenditure
for defence" whilst making "the most effective use of
resources". This was a key objective for the UK, which the
Prime Minister highlighted during discussions in the Council;
— "The
Council reinforced the need to 'intensify partnerships', including
cooperation with NATO — a key UK objective;
— "As
part of EU-NATO co-operation, hybrid and strategic communications
were prioritised, as part of an overall response to Russia and
threats in the wider EU neighbourhood;
— "Conclusions
also supported the strengthening of Europe's defence industry,
including Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), and highlighted
the need for appropriate EU funding for the Preparatory Action
on defence research due to start in 2017 as well as fostering
greater European defence co-operation to deliver key capabilities,
including through EU funds;
— "Leaders
highlighted the new EU capacity building initiative to "empower
and enable partners to prevent and manage crises".
"All of these points reinforce key UK objectives
— the need for greater efficiency, and support to Member
States' capabilities; to improve Member States' ability to act,
including with partners, especially NATO; and to increase the
CSDP's contribution to 'full spectrum' response to crisis and
conflict management.
"Finally, we would like to note that the presence
of NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg at the Council — for
which we had pushed — helped demonstrate both the centrality
of NATO to the security of Europe and the need to increase NATO-EU
cooperation. High Representative Mogherini highlighted that a
stronger EU and NATO provided mutual benefits.
"May Foreign Affairs Council
"As part of preparations for the June European
Council, Foreign and Defence Ministers attended the 18 May Foreign
Affairs Council. Defence Ministers met in the morning to
discuss CSDP operations in the Neighbourhood. Foreign Ministers
joined a "jumbo" session on: preparation of the June
European Council on CSDP; the European Security Strategic Review;
and CSDP missions in the neighbourhood.
"The Foreign and Defence Secretaries stressed
the need for the June Council to be a stocktake of the December
2013 taskings. They stressed that co-operation with NATO had to
be at the heart of the EU's CSDP policy; the EU had a role to
play in tackling Russian hybrid tactics - and strategic communications
were key; and they welcomed the report on defence capability,
in particular the focus on competition and SMEs, but noted that
challenges of overcapacity in the European defence industry needed
to be resolved by the market, not by governments.
"FAC Conclusions were agreed and are attached
for your interest. These Conclusions were firmly within UK red
lines (for example, no new structures) and supported UK priorities,
and they helped lay the foundations for a successful June European
Council as outlined above.
"FAC Conclusions covered the same broad areas
as the June European Council, but went into further detail in
some areas.[ 49] Key points
were:
— "Strategic
Review: The FAC welcomed High Representative Mogherini's report
on the EU in a changing global environment (a December 2013 EC
tasking).[ 50] The follow
up to the report would be a new foreign and security strategy,
which we see as a good opportunity, in line with our own SDSR,
to improve the co-ordination of EU policies, instruments and tools,
better aligning them to UK priorities.
— "Hybrid:
FAC Conclusions tasked the High Representative to take forward
a "Joint Framework with actionable proposals to help counter
hybrid threats"[ 51]
by December 2015. The UK successfully managed to secure a text
which highlighted the need for coordination with partners, particularly
NATO, and for a more joined up approach on strategic communications.
NATO is also due to deliver a hybrid strategy in a similar timeframe
— we will work to ensure the two are coordinated and are
complementary.
— "The
EU Wide Strategic Framework for Security Sector Reform, to
be delivered by mid-2016, is part of an effort to embed the EU's
Comprehensive Approach to crisis-management and conflict prevention
— a concept we have long championed. It is likely to build
on a similar concept document from 2005, and aims to ensure that
co-ordination between EU institutions is more systematic.
— ""Capacity
building in support of security and development — Enabling
partners to prevent and manage crises" (formerly 'Train
and Equip'):[ 52] FAC
Conclusions invited the EEAS and Commission to create an Implementation
Plan to guide this work further; and to present findings in view
of the Foreign Affairs Council in October/November, on the financial
options, including a potential adaptation of the African Peace
Facility. We assess that this initiative could increase the effectiveness
and operational impact of EU crisis intervention. It also provides
a tangible means for implementing the EU's Comprehensive Approach
given its principles of early planning, working with partners,
and aspiring to ensure long-term sustainability following EU crisis
intervention. We will continue to engage constructively
in discussions as this concept is further operationalised, whilst
guarding against any infringement on established UK red lines.
— "Military
Rapid Response Concept: The FAC welcomed the agreement of
the new Military Rapid Response Concept,[ 53]
which supplements the EU Battle Groups (EUBGs[ 54])
with additional voluntary land, air or maritime modules from Member
States. The UK remains supportive of the EUBGs as a rapid response
tool and driver for capability development, and we supported the
development of the new concept which increases the flexibility
of this capability. The Council also highlighted the need to consider
the EUBGs as an option of choice for initial entry in CSDP operations.
Initial entry is an existing task for the EUBGs and the UK supports
efforts to increase the deployability and usability for this capability,
whilst ensuring they remain flexible enough to conduct their full
range of possible tasks. Thanks to lobbying by Ministers and officials,
we successfully resisted efforts to expand areas eligible for
Common Funding under the Athena mechanism. We have insisted it
is political will, not common funding, that is required to enhance
the prospects of deploying EU Battlegroups.
"May EDA Steering Board
"On 18 May — ahead of the FAC(D) —
Defence Ministers attended the Steering Board of the European
Defence Agency (EDA). The key outcomes were:
— "a
tasking of the EDA, in coordination with the EEAS, to conduct
an analysis of the implications of hybrid warfare for European
defence capability development - a key UK ask;
— "a
revised action plan to support defence SMEs: these guidelines
should help foster greater innovation, competitiveness and industrial
performance across the wider defence market.
— "agreement
to continue work to further incentivise defence cooperation, including
the Preparatory Action on CSDP-related research and clear objectives
and actions for a Security of Supply regime.
— "These
outcomes are in line with UK objectivities and red lines. Further
detail of the meeting can be found in the Annex."[ 55]
"High Representative's report on CSDP
"Ahead of the 2015 June European Council (JEC15)
Federica Mogherini released a report on CSDP (attached[ 56])
in her capacity as High Representative, Vice-President of the
Commission, and Head of the European Defence Agency. The report
covers two aspects: an overview of the implementation of the December
2013 European Council Conclusions; and some proposals on a way
forward. It was issued ahead of the May FAC and European Council
as Mogherini's primary method of seeking to shape the JEC15 Conclusions
on defence and security.
"The report is broadly in line with UK policy
and provides welcome updated analysis of the European security
environment, with firm language on Russia. However, there were
some areas where we disagreed:
— "The
report did not bring out clearly enough that Member States have primacy
over defence issues;
— "EU-NATO
cooperation was not given enough weight;
— "The
proposals on the role of the EDA went beyond what Member States
have previously agreed; and
— "There
was insufficient evaluation of the value added by CSDP missions
and operations.
"The report's Conclusions are non-binding: it
was not negotiated at 28 or formally endorsed by Member States.
Ultimately, the May FAC or JEC15 Conclusions did not incorporate
the majority of its proposals; and it is these Conclusions that
will set the direction of CSDP policy in the short term. As the
JEC15 Conclusions illustrate, other Member States do not fully
endorse all the elements of the HR/VP report's conclusions either.
"Commission Report on the Implementation
of the European Commission's Communication on defence
"At the same time as the HRVP report, the Commission
released an update report (attached)[ 57]
on its activities to implement its July 2013 Communication "Towards
a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector".[ 58]
The report follows the June 2014 Implementation Roadmap[ 59]
and provides an update on Commission activity since then, along
with its planned actions in the defence sector, focusing in particular
on the internal market, research and industrial policy.
"A number of these activities complement our
own objectives for a more open, innovative and competitive defence
market including: working with Member States to implement the
Defence Procurement and Security Directive; promoting greater
use of the Intra Community Transfers Directive and accordingly
reducing the administrative burden of export licensing within
the EU; encouraging access to EU Funding for dual use projects;
and supporting cross border access for defence SMEs. There are
other areas which need to be managed carefully, such as:
— "The
CSDP-related Preparatory Action, which potentially offers
significant capability benefits for our armed forces. But we must
ensure a strong Member State role and that it is attractive to
the defence industry which is also likely to contribute;
— "The
roadmap for a comprehensive EU-wide Security of Supply regime.
We support efforts to improve confidence in cross-border trade,
particularly better use of the Intra-Community Transfers Directive,
but would not support new regulation (including on the control
of investment in strategic assets) or any action that would constrain
UK ability to veto exports; and
— "Proposals
to clarify the use of certain Defence Directive exclusions
(including the exemption of Government to Government sales and
procurement through international organisations from the scope
of the Directive). The Commission has indicated that its
guidance will bring some useful clarity to the application of
the exclusions rather than seek to constrain our ability to procure
capability. We will of course remain engaged pending publication
of the guidance, which is expected before the end of 2015.
"We will remain fully engaged in the debate
to shape development of the actions to deliver benefit for the
UK and to resist action that could cross our red lines. To date
the Commission has welcomed this engagement and indications are
that it will continue to seek our views and expertise as this
work is taken forward.
"Strategic Review: "The European Union
in a changing global environment: A more connected, contested
and complex world"
"We last wrote on the Strategic Review ahead
of the June FAC. This latest document (attached[ 60])
is HR/VP Mogherini's evaluation of the strategic environment the
EU now faces (her answer to a DEC13 tasking 'to assess the impact
of changes in the global environment and to report.on the challenges
and opportunities arising for the Union'). The document identifies
the challenges for the EU along lines broadly familiar to UK policy-makers:
— "The
fraying post-Cold War European order: Russia and economic integration/
association agreements;
— "Western
Balkans and Turkey: reform and enlargement;
— "Upheaval
in North Africa and the Middle East: addressing ISIL; CT and the
link between EU work on internal and external security; humanitarian
crises in refugee-hosting countries and their impact on economic,
migration, asylum and security policies;
— "A
redefined relationship with Africa with the right mix of migration
and mobility policies; security cooperation with the UN and AU;
and by bridging fair trade and economic integration objectives;
— "Stronger
transatlantic partnerships via closer EU-NATO links and Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP);
— "A
policy on Asia, balancing support for a rules-based system with
trade.
"The next stages — those of framing the
strategy proper — offer an opportunity, in line with our
own SDSR, to improve the co-ordination of EU policies, instruments
and tools and better align them to UK priorities. The June FAC
Conclusions noted that the High Representative would continue
the process of strategic reflection with a view to preparing an
EU strategy on foreign and security policy — the strategy
proper, the wider-in-scope successor (i.e. covering both foreign
and security policy) to the old ESS, dubbed the 'European External
Strategy' (EES).
"The Conclusions rightly emphasised the requirement
for close consultation/co-operation with Member States. They also
call for the strategy to be submitted to the European Council
by June 2016. We understand the strategy text is to be owned and
drafted by the HR/VP (similar process as the 2003 ESS) with the
option of Council endorsement at the end of the process. We understand
the HR/VP seeks to avoid full negotiation at 28 over such a text.
This is our favoured way of working: Member States would retain
sovereignty and decision making powers in these areas as before,
but without the travails of the negotiation accompanying the 2008
report on ESS.
"EU Maritime Security Strategy
"In our previous letter to you, I promised an
update on the EU Maritime Security Strategy. A brief review of
the EU Maritime Security Strategy took place at the April meeting
of the European Commission's Group of Member States' Experts on
the Integration of Maritime Surveillance. Member States and the
Commission reported that work in some areas such as EU/NATO cooperation
and a review of research and development work had started. DG
MARE has commissioned progress reports from Member States to be
submitted by 18 September to inform a report being issued in November.
The FCO continues to lead cross-government co-ordination on the
EU MSS and I will provide a further update following the issue
of November's report."
Previous Committee Reports
None, but see (35696), 17859/13, JOIN(13) 30: Twenty-ninth
Report HC 219-xxviii (2014-15), chapter 12 (14 January 2015) and
(36178), —: Sixth Report HC 219-vii (2014-15), chapter 12
(9 July 2014).
Annex to the Minister's letter~
"Overview of the EDA Steering Board
"Defence Ministers welcomed the progress achieved
in the implementation of the December 2013 European Council Conclusions.
The four capability programmes on Air-to-Air Refuelling, Cyber
Defence, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems and Governmental Satellite
Communications endorsed by the European Council in 2013 are continuing
to make progress, although all are long term projects.
"Defence Ministers agreed that potential additional
priority capability areas could be investigated using the European
Defence Agency's Capability Development Plan (CDP), an assessment
of cooperative opportunities derived from the Collaborative Database
(CODABA) and wider EU policies. The UK clearly outlined the importance
of the CDP continuing to act as the driving force behind capability
development between EU Member States in order to avoid duplicating
the activities of NATO.
"The Agency was also tasked to conduct an analysis
of the implications of hybrid warfare for European defence capability
development in light of the changed security environment to the
East and South. The analysis might form part of wider efforts,
co-ordinated by the European External Action Service and Commission,
to analyse the impact of hybrid warfare on the European security
environment and to identify, and recommend improvements to existing
EU tools and instruments that are best suited to counter this
threat.
"Incentives for defence cooperation
"Defence Ministers continued to offer their
support to the EDA continuing to work on non-market distorting
fiscal and financial measures to further incentivise defence cooperation.
Tangible progress has been achieved on VAT exemption for ad hoc
projects in EDA, with the support of the Commission and the Belgian
authorities. Three pilot cases currently benefit from VAT exemption.
Formalisation of this VAT exemption is pending the currently ongoing
review of the EDA Council Decision.
"Preparatory Action on CSDP-related research
"Ministers of Defence supported the progress
achieved towards the development of the Preparatory Action on
CSDP-related research by the European Defence Agency and the European
Commission in close cooperation with the Member States. While
the UK agreed that the Preparatory Action offered significant
potential for supporting Member States' defence research priorities,
we also clearly outlined the importance of developing appropriate
governance structures to ensure Member States' national sovereignty
in defence matters is not compromised by large scale Commission
funding of defence Research & Technology.
"SME Action Plan
"Defence Ministers agreed on revised guidelines
for facilitating access to the defence market for Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises (SMEs), supporting the implementation of the Agency's
SME Action Plan. The role of SMEs in the European Defence Technological
and Industrial Base (EDTIB) has gradually increased over time,
partly as a result of greater outsourcing. The non-binding guidelines
were prepared in close cooperation with the Member States and
the European Commission. They contain recommendations dedicated
to access to supply chain, access to finance, support to innovation,
competitiveness and industrial performance, and security of supply
aspects.
"Security of Supply
"The December 2013 European Council called on
the Commission to develop with Member States and in cooperation
with the High Representative and the EDA a roadmap for a comprehensive
EU-wide Security of Supply regime, which takes account of the
globalised nature of critical supply chains. The EDA has together
with its Member States identified potential basic principles and
objectives of such a regime as well as actions that could be taken
at the intergovernmental level. Proposed actions include establishing
specific measures to ensure access to critical capabilities and
technologies, e.g. through an early-warning or prioritisation
mechanism, developing a mechanism to address concrete short term
shortfalls, promoting cross-border cooperation, and bringing the
supply and demand side closer together, for example through user-clubs.
"Future priorities of EDA
"Ministers of Defence endorsed the future priorities
of the EDA including three core activities to further strengthen
defence cooperation: support the development of capabilities and
military cooperation; stimulate defence R&T to prepare the
capabilities of tomorrow and support the EDTIB; and ensure that
the interests and specificities of defence are taken into account
in wider EU policies. Crucially the UK ensured that future EDA
Capability programmes should be drawn from the EDA's list of key
identified priority shortfalls, ensuring the Agency efficiently
delivers the key capability requirements needed by its Member
States."
37 In addition, there are five annexes: Annex I gives
an overview of CFSP legal acts concerning restrictive measures
in 2014; Annex II sets out the appearances of the High Representative/Vice-President
before the European Parliament in 2014; Annex III lists statements
and declarations that were made in 2014; Annex IV details the
CFSP budget for 2014; and finally Annex V makes an assessment
of the coordination of CFSP with the EU's other external financial
instruments. Back
38 In December 2013, the European Council called for further steps
to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the EU's comprehensive
approach. The subsequent May 2014 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions
see the "comprehensive approach" as predicated upon
the notion that European Union and its Member States: "can
bring to the international stage the unique ability to combine,
in a coherent and consistent manner, policies and tools ranging
from diplomacy, security and defence to finance, trade, development
and human rights, as well as justice and migration [which] contributes
greatly to the Union's ability to play a positive and transformative
role in its external relations and as a global actor". The
Council defines the "comprehensive approach" as: "both
a general working method and a set of concrete measures and processes
to improve how the EU, based on a common strategic vision and
drawing on its wide array of existing tools and instruments, collectively
can develop, embed and deliver more coherent and more effective
policies, working practices, actions and results". The Council
said that: "Its fundamental principles are relevant for the
broad spectrum of EU external action" and that "[t]he
need for such a comprehensive approach is most acute in crisis
and conflict situations and in fragile states, enabling a rapid
and effective EU response, including through conflict prevention".
For the full text of the on the Comprehensive Approach, see pp.17-21
of the Council Conclusions. Back
39 See Council Conclusions on CSDP. Back
40 See Section II of the European Council Conclusions. Back
41 See the HR's Strategic Review: The European Union in a changing global environment: A more connected, contested and complex world. Back
42 See The Lisbon Treaty, Article 44 TEU. Back
43 See Munich Security Conference. Back
44 The Government's strategic defence and security review, which
will dictate the UK armed forces' capabilities and posture for
the next five years, and which is due to report towards the end
of 2015. Back
45 For chapter and verse, see (35696), 17859/13, JOIN(13) 30: Twenty-ninth
Report HC 219-xxviii (2014-15), chapter 12 (14 January 2015)
and the earlier Reports referred to therein. Back
46 See Explanatory Memorandum of 4 August 2015. Back
47 See Section II of the European Council Conclusions. Back
48 See Council Conclusions on CSDP. Back
49 See Council Conclusions on CSDP. Back
50 See The European Union in a changing global environment: A more connected, contested and complex world. Back
51 A type of warfare widely understood to blend conventional/unconventional,
regular/irregular, and information and cyber warfare. For
a discussion of "hybrid threats", see Hybrid war - does it even exist?
in the Nato Review. Back
52 See (36825), 8504/15, JOIN(15) 17: First Report HC 342-i (2015-16),
chapter 26 (21 July 2015) for the Committee's consideration of
the relevant Joint Communication on capacity building in support
of security and development. Back
53 The relevant document says that, to achieve an overall EU Rapid
Response (RR), both the political reaction and the EU Military
Response need to be fast and effective. While this concept addresses
the Military Response, it also identifies preparation and planning
issues that can contribute to reducing the reaction time and provides
the conceptual framework for the preparation and conduct of CSDP
joint and single service military operations/missions requiring
a Rapid Response in the land, maritime and air domains, and including
special operations, as a part of the EU multidimensional response.
The document describes the EU's approach to Military Rapid Response
and how it could be delivered. This EU Military RR action may
either involve EU Battlegroups (Joint Land Centric RR), Single
Service RR elements (Land, Maritime or Air), Joint RR (combining
EU BG and Single Services RR elements, or combining Single Service
RR elements) or any other RR elements offered by volunteered Member
States. It will define Military Rapid Response, its nature, characteristics,
principles and procedures and establish the framework within which
subordinate Military Rapid Response concepts sit, in accordance
with three principal EU military concepts: EU Concept for Military
Planning at the Political and Strategic level, EU Concept for
Military Command and Control), and EU Concept for Force Generation.
See Military Rapid Response Concept. Back
54 A Battlegroup is the minimum militarily effective a credible and
coherent, rapidly deployable force package capable of stand-alone
operations or for the initial phase of larger operations. It is
based on a combined-arms, battalion-sized force, reinforced with
combat-support and combat service-support elements. In their generic
composition, but depending on the mission, Battlegroups are about
1 500 personnel strong. See EU Battlegroups for full information. Back
55 See the Annex to this chapter of our Report. Back
56 See EU High Representative's Report. Back
57 See Progress Report on implementation of the EU Defence Communication. Back
58 See Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector.
Back
59 The European Council, in its Conclusions of December 2013 which
also endorsed the 25th November 2013 Council Conclusions, welcomed
the Communication and decided to review progress in all relevant
areas in June 2015. The Commission took the European Council Conclusions
as the basis to pursue the following objectives:
"an Internal Market for Defence
where European companies can operate freely and without discrimination
in all Member States; an EU-wide security of supply regime where
armed forces can be sure to be sufficiently supplied in all circumstances
no matter in which Member State their suppliers are established;
a Preparatory Action on CSDP-related research to explore the potential
of a European research programme which, in the future, may cover
both security and defence. This is in addition to exploiting
all possible synergies between existing civil and defence research;
and an industrial policy which fosters competitiveness of European
defence industries and helps to deliver at affordable prices all
the capabilities Europe needs to guarantee its security."
To pursue these objectives, the Commission
established a "roadmap" for the activities set out in
the Communication. It includes a broad variety of actions from
different but often interrelated policies:
"improving security of supply between
Member States, for example, will facilitate cross-border market
access for defence companies; better standardisation will foster
interoperability and market openness; common certification will
reduce costs and enhance industry's competiveness, etc. Taken
together, all these actions will contribute to making the European
defence and security sector more efficient and thereby strengthen
the Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)."
See European Defence Implementation Roadmap for Communication COM (2013) 542. Back
60 See The European Union in a changing global environment: A more connected, contested and complex world. Back
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