4 European Agenda on Migration
Committee's assessment |
Politically important |
Committee's decision | Not cleared from scrutiny; recommended for debate on the floor of the House (decision reported 21 July); drawn to the attention of the Home Affairs Committee and the International Development Committee
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Document details | (a) Commission Communication: A European Agenda on Migration (b) Commission Communication: EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015-20)
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Legal base | (Both)
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Department | Home Office |
Document Numbers | (a) (36877), 8961/15, COM(15) 240
(b) (36920), 9345/15, COM(15) 285
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
4.1 In May, the Commission published a Communication, A European
Agenda on Migration document (a) proposing
a series of actions to address the immediate humanitarian crisis
in the Mediterranean and a range of longer-term measures to lay
the foundations for a "fair, robust and realistic" EU
migration policy. It was accompanied by a further Communication,
an EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling document
(b) setting out practical measures to strengthen the EU's
response to the criminal gangs involved in smuggling vulnerable
migrants to the EU. The measures envisaged include enhanced cooperation
between judicial and law enforcement authorities, better gathering
and sharing of information, greater awareness of the risks associated
with smuggling, and stronger cooperation with third countries
of origin and transit.[ 25]
The Action Plan fleshes out a number of actions included in the
European Agenda on Migration and in a further Commission
Communication proposing A European Agenda on Security.[ 26]
4.2 The Minister for Immigration (James Brokenshire)
broadly endorsed the Commission's proposals to improve management
of the EU's external borders, intensify cooperation with countries
of origin and transit to address the root causes of migration,
take further action against the criminal networks involved in
the smuggling of migrants, and enhance EU efforts to tackle illegal
migration. He considered, nevertheless, that the Commission Communications
failed to "present the correct set of policies to address
the problems that Europe is currently facing in the Mediterranean
and from other migratory pressures".[ 27]
In particular, he made clear that the Government opposed proposals
to relocate individuals in clear need of international protection
from frontline Member States and to establish "EU quotas"
for the resettlement of refugees from third countries.
4.3 We considered that the information contained
in the Minister's Explanatory Memorandum was thin on substance,
given the scale of the challenge facing the EU. We suggested that
Members across the House would wish to question the Government
on its policy approach to the crisis in the Mediterranean, the
contribution made by the UK to existing EU efforts, and the way
in which the commitment to "the principle of solidarity and
fair sharing of responsibility" enshrined in the EU Treaties
should be interpreted and applied.[ 28]
We therefore recommended both Communications for debate on the
floor of the House and asked the Government, ahead of the debate,
to respond to a number of questions set out in our Second Report,
agreed on 21 July. We reproduce in this chapter the questions
we asked and the Minister's response.
4.4 We welcome the Minister's comprehensive response,
albeit after a delay of nearly three months. Navigating the flow
of documents emanating from the Commission presents challenges
for us, as well as the Government, with the information we receive
often having been superseded by subsequent events. The pace of
developments only reinforces the case for a debate on the floor
of the House our initial debate recommendation was made
on 21 July to enable Members across the House to question
the Government on its approach to the crisis in the Mediterranean.
4.5 We make the following observations on the
Minister's letter which may help to inform the debate. First,
the Minister acknowledges criticism of the Dublin Regulation but
does not accept that it is, of itself, unfair, underlining the
need for a procedure to identify a single Member State responsible
for examining an asylum claim and where, justified, providing
refuge. Whilst there is an evident benefit in establishing clear
lines of responsibility, there is a risk, too, that where there
are mass influxes frontline Member States may have little incentive
to fulfil their Dublin obligations. Seen in this light, the EU
policy of relocating from frontline Member States a proportion
of individuals in need of international protection may be a vital
tool in preserving the Dublin system.
4.6 Second, the Minister highlights the importance
of "break[ing] the economic model that encourages criminals
so callously to put people in harm's way at sea". He will
recall that one element of the European Agenda on Migration
is to establish "legal pathways" to enter the EU, thereby
reducing reliance on criminal networks and the risk of exploitation.
Based on the Minister's own figures, more than 175,000 of those
crossing the Mediterranean from January to September this year
would appear to have a claim for protection based on their nationality
(Syrians and Eritreans). So far, Member States have collectively
agreed to resettle 22,504 individuals from outside the EU who
are in clear need of international protection in 2015,[ 29]
to be supplemented by the resettlement in the UK of a further
20,000 refugees from camps bordering Syria over the next five
years. Based on these figures, it seems clear that resettlement
alone cannot meet current needs for international protection.
Nor is the longer-term objective of ensuring stability and development
in migrants' home countries likely to stem migratory flows in
the near future. The debate may therefore wish to consider whether
it is possible to establish safe and legal routes to the EU for
those with clear protection needs, without creating new "pull
factors".
4.7 We urge the Government to bring these documents,
and the others we have recommended to be debated at the same time,
to the floor of the House at the earliest opportunity. We draw
this chapter to the attention of the Home Affairs Committee and
the International Development Committee.
Full
details of the documents:
(a) Commission Communication:
A European Agenda on Migration: (36877), 8961/15, COM(15)
240; (b) Commission Communication: EU Action Plan against migrant
smuggling (2015-20): (36920), 9345/15, COM(15) 285.
Background
4.8 Since publishing these Communications in May,
there has been a proliferation of measures at EU level seeking
to address different aspects of the crisis in the Mediterranean.
These are summarised in our earlier Reports listed at the end
of this chapter. The numbers crossing the Mediterranean during
2015 illustrate the magnitude of the challenge facing the EU.
The latest estimates indicate that there have been more than 650,000
arrivals by sea and over 3,000 documented deaths.[ 30]
EU leaders agreed in June that the EU should focus its response
on three key areas:
· relocation
and resettlement of individuals in clear need of international
protection;
· return,
readmission and reintegration of irregular migrants who do not
(or no longer) have a right to remain in the territory of an EU
Member State; and
· cooperation
with countries of origin and transit.[ 31]
The Minister's letter of 12 October 2015
4.9 The Minister apologises for the delay in responding
to our Second Report, published on 21 July, and in submitting
some Explanatory Memoranda (EMs) on EU documents relating to the
migration crisis. He continues:
"The rapid pace
of development of the migration
crisis has significantly changed the nature of the dossiers produced
by the European Commission and forced Member States to review
their positions across a range of migration issues. This has inevitably
meant that the dossiers have quickly become out of date before
an accurate response to the ESC [European Scrutiny Committee]
could be provided. Although late, the content of the EMs and letters
provided to the ESC has been as up-to-date as possible at the
time of sending."
4.10 In our Second Report, we noted the Government's
view that the Commission "has failed to present the correct
set of policies to address the immediate crisis" but added
that "the Minister's Explanatory Memorandum is disappointingly
thin on substance, given the undoubted scale of the problem, and
the detail contained in both Commission Communications".
The Minister's response misconstrues our criticism, suggesting
that it was directed at the Communications themselves, rather
than his Explanatory Memorandum. In this light, he purports to
agree that the Commission failed to "detail a response that
would deal with the scale of the problem" and had little
to say "on the immediate situation or how to deal with push
factor issues". He continues:
"Yet the crisis demands a wider response
and in the Government's view we need to treat the causes of this
problem, not just deal with its consequences. That means helping
the countries where these people come from to reduce the push
factors by stepping up efforts to address conflict and instability
as key drivers of migration, including in Syria. It also means
working with countries of origin and transit to provide sufficient
regional protection for those who need it, to facilitate the returns
of those who do not, and to tackle the people smugglers and traffickers
who exploit migrants. Therefore the Home Secretary met
with the French and German Interior Ministers in Paris on 29 August
and jointly called on the Luxembourg Presidency of the European
Union to convene the extraordinary meeting of the Justice and
Home Affairs (JHA) Council. That meeting took place on 14 September
in Brussels. A further extraordinary meeting of the JHA Council
was held on 22 September. The Home Secretary attended both
meetings on behalf of the United Kingdom and letters reporting
the outcome of the Councils, including key decisions and interventions,
have been sent to both Houses.
"Additionally, on 9 September, the Commission
published a new and extensive Migration Package of Communications
and legislative proposals to address the immediate crisis as well
as the longer term push factors. The package is not confined to
the Central Mediterranean. We deposited seven Explanatory Memoranda
on 30 September, and I understand that my HM Treasury colleagues
are preparing further EMs on the associated EU budgetary changes.
"Within that context, the two Communications
published in May 2015 have, to some degree, been superseded by
events. The Migration package published on 9 September included
relocation from Italy and Greece as well as both mandatory and
voluntary resettlement proposals. I believe that the set of EMs
deposited on 30 September explain the widened EU response and
provide the substance you have been seeking."
4.11 The following paragraphs set out the questions
(in bold) raised in our Second Report, followed by the Minister's
response.
4.12 Do the Frontex-coordinated Operations Triton
and Poseidon have a search and rescue capacity equal to that of
the now defunct Mare Nostrum operation in the Mediterranean?
"A review of the multitude of EU operations
in the Mediterranean forms a key component of the Migration package
published on 9 September. I refer you to the detail contained
in the EMs. The practical reality is that the assets now available
for search and rescue will be greater than under Mare Nostrum.
As well as the Frontex operations, and passing shipping, military
vessels involved in the EU mission to target the human smugglers
are also available to respond to those in distress."
4.13 What contribution is the UK making to Operations
Trident and Poseidon and on what terms? In particular, what obligations
does the UK have towards migrants rescued by UK vessels and what
action is the UK able to take against smugglers or traffickers
apprehended at the same time?
"The UK has significantly increased its
operational support to Frontex operations in the Mediterranean.
UK assets, including Royal Navy and Border Force vessels, have
rescued over 7,500 people so far. Where a UK vessel takes on board
rescued migrants and captured smugglers, they are handed over
to the landing State for processing in that State. UK vessels
carry on board an Italian law enforcement officer (known as a
'ship rider') to exercise powers of arrest where required.
"We are constantly reviewing the resources
needed across many operations and missions. In 2015, the UK has
committed to provide or has provided a range of resources to different
operations.
"To Operation Triton, this includes a national
officer to the Frontex International Coordination Centre, ten
and a half months' deployment of debriefing experts, and three
months' deployment of nationality screening experts to help identify
the true nationalities of illegal migrants in order to build capability
to return those migrants with no right of stay. The UK also provided
two Border Force cutters for approximately four months over the
summer to support search and rescue capabilities. The cutters
have now been withdrawn to be replaced by ships from other countries
which are more suited to winter weather conditions. To Operation
Poseidon Sea, this has included four months' deployment of debriefing
experts. The UK has also offered to provide an additional 57 months'
deployment of debriefing/nationality screening experts to support
these Frontex operations.
"All Member States have expressed support
for EUNAVFOR MED, a military Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP) operation to disrupt the business model of human smuggling
and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean,
and the transition to Phase 2 has been agreed. Phase 1 focused
on gathering intelligence on smuggling networks. Phase 2 will
include the boarding, search, seizure and diversion on the high
seas of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or
trafficking. Phase 2 will be assisted by the deployment of HMS
Richmond. HMS Enterprise has previously been our main contribution
to the CSDP mission, accompanied by a Merlin helicopter, and has
rescued over 450 migrants."
4.14 The Government believes that "any sustainable
approach to search and rescue must involve the 'decoupling' from
entry into the EU, except where there is a genuine case for asylum".
UNHCR data indicate that Syrians and Eritreans are the main nationalities
arriving by sea in Italy. What is the Government's estimate of
the proportion of migrants crossing the Mediterranean who are
in clear need of protection?
"Comprehensive asylum statistics are not
compiled on the basis of how successful claimants arrived in the
EU, which makes it very difficult to come up with reliable numbers,
particularly as the size and composition of migrant flows can
shift dramatically over a relatively short time. However, Frontex
is now recording nationality in the region of arrival into the
EU. The latest data from Frontex is:
Route and numbers crossing:
Jan-Sept 2015
| Top three nationalities
|
Central Mediterranean (Libya to Italy):
128,619
| Eritrea 26,573
Nigeria 13,061
Sub-Saharan Africans 10,363
|
Eastern Mediterranean (Turkey to Greece):
359,171
| Syria 150,831
Afghanistan 48,087
Pakistan 8,658
|
"The majority of illegal migrants arriving
in Italy through the Central Mediterranean route come from countries
where the drivers of emigration tend to be economic rather than
a genuine fear of persecution. Asylum applications made by nationals
from such countries are generally rejected. The balance further
east is different and a higher proportion of migrants accessing
the EU by those routes are from countries which result in a higher
asylum grant rate.
"Patterns are shifting all the time and
while many refugees make the journey, so too do very many economic
migrants. It is imperative that we address that in order to be
able to provide the best response for those most in need and deter
illegal migration and the life-threatening smuggling that underpins
it."
4.15 Does the Government agree with the Commission's
analysis that the asylum system in the European Union is too fragmented
and that the operation of the Dublin rules is perceived as being
"fundamentally unfair"?
"It cannot be denied that the Dublin Regulation
has its critics in the same way that some perceive a nation's
ability to control its borders to be 'fundamentally unfair' to
those who seek to migrate without any barriers. The Government
does not agree that the Dublin Regulation is, of itself, unfair.
What we believe to be unfair are situations where different States
have to deal with repeat applications from migrants who have already
had their claims rejected in other States or who have decided
to move between safe European States for reasons not related to
international protection, both things that the Regulation seeks
to address. It is also important that the Regulation seeks to
identify a single State that is responsible for examining an asylum
claim, guaranteeing access to a procedure to assess the claim,
which benefits those genuinely in need of protection.
"In the
face of the migration crisis, the system has faced extreme strain.
The Commission has tried to address the immediate problems within
the system through relocation proposals published on 9 September
as part of the Migration package. However, the Commission realises
that for the longer term, it must review the Dublin Regulation.
They have indicated that proposals will be published in March
2016.
"In the meantime, for the Dublin Regulation
to work as intended, Member States must respect their international
obligations to identify, support and protect those who need protecting
and remove those who do not. The Government therefore supports
close practical co-operation between Member States, coordinated
by the European Asylum Support Office, to deliver best practice
on the ground."
4.16 What support has the UK previously given
to the relocation of asylum seekers from frontline Member States?
"Under the previous Labour Government, the
UK was one of the Member States who participated in the Maltese
pilot project, EUREMA. Under that project ten refugees were relocated
to the UK in 2011. It was apparent, however, from EUREMA's subsequent
evaluation that refugees were not inclined to go to certain Member
States. We firmly believe that intra-EU relocation is difficult
and does not tackle the root causes of illegal migratory flows.
Our support has therefore been directed towards helping other
Member States to strengthen their EU external borders and on addressing
the root causes and push factors that cause pressure on Member
States' asylum systems."
4.17 Given the Government's reluctance to support
either a mandatory or a voluntary relocation mechanism, how realistic
is it to expect other Member States to implement voluntary burden-sharing
on the scale envisaged by the Commission?
"The Government has been clear on numerous
occasions that it does not agree with the principle of relocation.
It risks some Member States avoiding their responsibilities and
distracts from measures, such as provision of practical on the
ground support, that could make a real difference in addressing
the migration crisis. We have been clear that we will not opt
in. However, other Member States have agreed to relocation proposals
and they therefore are responsible for implementing them. We do,
however, fully support the 'hot spot' proposals and are already
providing practical cooperation and resource to ensure that the
external border is secured and that arriving migrants are fingerprinted
and processed. We are also providing support to frontline Member
States to assist them in establishing functioning asylum systems."
4.18 In April, the European Council called on
Member States to "reinforce internal solidarity and responsibility".
What other means (besides binding measures) would the Government
be willing to support to ensure greater fairness across Member
States, or should this be left to each Member State to decide?
"You will be aware of the Government's view
that real solidarity with other European countries is best expressed
through practical cooperation to build capability in the asylum
and migration systems of Member States struggling to deal with
migratory flows. That is why we will continue to provide concrete
support through the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). We
are also engaged in the EU discussions on specific EU help to
Italy and Greece, based on the Migration package published on
9 September and covered in the EMs deposited on 30 September."
4.19 What is the Government's "blueprint"
for handling the immediate crisis in the Mediterranean, and other
similar crises in the future?
"Beyond their impact in Europe, large movements
of illegal migrants pose a threat to economic wellbeing and stability
in Africa and the Middle East. We have been clear with European
partners that we need an ambitious, long term response, tackling
causes and criminality, not just reacting to symptoms.
"The EU needs to focus on more sustainable
solutions, and on stemming the flows. We must break the economic
model that encourages criminals so callously to put people in
harm's way at sea. That requires comprehensive action from the
countries of origin right through to the EU itself. The Commission
has taken up this message and included a review of EU external
action and engagement with third countries as part of the Migration
package published on 9 September, and explained in the EMs deposited
on 30 September.
"In particular,
the Government believes that the EU needs action in the following
four areas:
"First, a greater focus on how EU
aid money is spent tackling problems at source and in transit
countries.
"Secondly, an increased focus on
fighting organised crime, with better join-up between Member States.
The UK has some expertise in this field, but that must be part
of a renewed and galvanised response by Europe's law enforcement
agencies.
"Thirdly, while some migrants need
our protection, it is unquestionable that many are illegal economic
migrants. We cannot have a situation where illegal economic migrants
are able to enter the EU without effective border controls and
then stay without consequence. We must break the link between
dangerous crossings of the Mediterranean and remaining in the
EU. The UK stands ready to help start turning the tide and demonstrate
that there can be no value in paying money to criminals and setting
out illegally for Europe.
"Fourthly, a much stronger coherence
between upstream development work and the return of economic migrants. That
way, we will offer a real alternative to those who are not entitled
to be here, helping them to find their feet and prosper once home.
Moreover, if we are to address effectively the situation we currently
face, we must also redouble our long term efforts to ensure the
stability and development of migrants' home countries.
"Crucial to all of our efforts on Mediterranean
migration is a stable Libya. A political settlement there will
do more than anything else to change the environment in which
we have to tackle the migratory flows. Whilst recognising a number
of significant political and operational challenges, the EU nevertheless
needs a clear package of support ready to ensure momentum as soon
as a Government of national accord is in place. It is important
that any package has a migration as well as security focus, including
humanitarian support and border management capacity building.
Of course, a resolution of the current situation in Syria would
also play a major role in addressing the flows from that country
and its neighbourhood."
4.20 We note that the Communication keeps open
the possibility of a wider review of the Dublin rules, in 2016,
if the Commission's efforts to secure a fairer distribution of
asylum seekers do not succeed. We ask the Minister to explain
what consequences such a review might have for UK participation
in the Dublin system if the Commission were to propose changes
to the current procedures for allocating responsibility for the
examination of asylum applications which were less favourable
to the UK.
"As I have already stated, the Commission
has indicated it will review the Dublin Regulation and publish
proposals in March 2016. The UK's participation in that proposal
will be subject to an opt-in decision."
4.21 We are disappointed that the Government
has not consulted more widely on the content of the Communications,
given the important role that local authorities, non-governmental
organisations and other stakeholders play in addressing the practical
consequences of asylum and migration policies. We are equally
disappointed that the Minister's Explanatory Memorandum provides
no analysis of the fundamental rights impact of the Communications,
and simply asserts that they do not raise "any particular
issues under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights".[ 32]
This is an implausible assertion, given the nature and scope of
some of the actions proposed, for example on the return of irregular
migrants and on the identification, capture and destruction of
vessels involved in people smuggling. We ask the Minister to provide
a more informed analysis of the principal rights that are likely
to be engaged by the actions proposed in the Communications.[ 33]
"In light of the Prime Minister's announcement
on 7 September that Britain will resettle 20,000 Syrian refugees
over the next five years, Richard Harrington MP has been appointed
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Syrian Refugees (jointly
at the Home Office, the Department for Communities and Local Government,
and the Department for International Development). He will be
coordinating and delivering work across government to resettle
these refugees in the UK, along with coordinating the provision
of government support to Syrian refugees in the region. Work to
engage local authorities, non-government organisations and other
stakeholders is already under way.
"On fundamental rights, with regard to the
work of Frontex, since the European Agenda was published the Commission
has increased the budget for joint operations Triton and Poseidon
with the stated aim of reducing the loss of life at sea. The Government
does not consider there to be any incompatibility between the
Commission's Communications and Article 2 of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights in this respect.[ 34]
"With regard to a relocation scheme for
those who have sought asylum within the EU, as well as more effective
returns processing and agreements to return illegal migrants to
their countries of origin, the Government's view is that these
proposals are also consistent with the Charter.
"Article 18 of the Charter provides for
the right of asylum with due respect to the Geneva Convention.
The proposals contained in the Commission's Communication fully
respect the Geneva Convention. Asylum will not be denied to those
who are judged to have a genuine asylum claim. The resettlement
scheme referred to in the Commission's Communications concerns
the allocation around certain EU Member States of those seeking
protection and will not alter the criteria for granting of protection
or the safeguarding procedures for the determination of claims.
"Linked to this asylum agenda is an increased
focus on returns for illegal migrants. Many asylum claims involve
allegations of risk on return, based on the Article 2 right to
life and Article 4 freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment. As noted, the Communications do not envisage a process
which would in any way infringe upon the Geneva Convention or
reduce safeguards for genuine asylum seekers. In respect of cases
of an unfounded asylum claim, removals would only occur once that
claim had been determined and refused, in accordance with the
Convention, ensuring that no breaches of Article 2 or 4 would
occur if the individual is repatriated. This would assist in targeting
resources to those in genuine need of protection, helping to ensure
their fundamental rights are safeguarded."
4.22 Finally, we questioned the Minister on the timescale
for agreeing Council Conclusions on the Communications. He informs
us that "Council Conclusions generally endorsing the European
Agenda on Migration did not materialise as they were superseded
by events".
Previous Committee Reports
Second Report HC 342-ii (2015-16), chapter 1 (21
July 2015). Information on other migration-related policy documents
and legislative proposals is available in the following Reports:
Second Report HC 342-ii (2015-16), chapter 2, chapter 3 and chapter
6 (21 July 2015); Third Report HC 342-iii (2015-16), chapter 8
(9 September 2015); Fifth Report HC 342-v (2015-16), chapter 1,
chapter 2, chapter 3 and chapter 32 (14 October 2015); Sixth Report
HC 342-vi (2015-16), chapter 8, chapter 9 and chapter 17 (21 October
2015).
25 The Action Plan specifically addresses the smuggling
of migrants. There is a separate EU strategy dealing with the
eradication of human trafficking. Whilst the distinction between
the two is often not clear-cut, an element of coercion and exploitation
is necessary for human trafficking offences, whereas people smuggling
is more likely to be based on some degree of voluntary cooperation. Back
26 (36829), 8293/15. See our First Report HC 342-i (2015-16), chapter 6,
(21 July 2015). Back
27 See para 26 of the Minister's Explanatory Memorandum. Back
28 See Article 80 TFEU. Back
29 See the Conclusions on resettlement agreed by the representatives
of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council
on 20 July 2015. Back
30 See the latest update provided as part of the International Organisation
for Migration's Missing Migrants project and the most recent UNHCR figures. Back
31 See the Conclusions agreed by the European Council on 26 June
2015. Back
32 See para 20 of the Minister's Explanatory Memorandum. Back
33 Cabinet Office guidance on the scrutiny of EU documents makes
clear that, where a Commission Communication may lead to legislation,
the Government should draw attention to fundamental rights issues
if they arise, although a detailed analysis is not required at
this stage - see para 3.2.5(vi). Back
34 Article 2 of the EU Charter concerns the right to life. Back
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