2 EU Special Representative for the Sahel
| Committee's assessment |
Politically important |
| Committee's decision | Not cleared from scrutiny; further information requested
|
| Document details | Council Decision appointing the EUSR Special Representative for the Sahel
|
| Legal base | Articles 28, 31(2) and 33 TEU; unanimity
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Document Number | (37201), —
|
Summary and Committee's conclusions
2.1 The Sahel region is defined in this context as Mali, Mauritania
and Niger. The mandate was initiated in 2013, at the time of the
French-led intervention in Mali. The current EUSR Sahel is Michel
Reveyrand-de Menthon, a French diplomat.
2.2 His mandate is based on the EU's policy objectives,
i.e., to contribute actively to regional and international efforts
to achieve lasting peace, security and development in the region.
The EUSR's job involves enhancing the quality, intensity and impact
of the EU's multi-faceted engagement in the Sahel region, including
the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel,[11]
participating in coordinating all relevant instruments for EU
actions and liaising with international partners. Initial priority
was given to Mali and to the regional dimensions of the conflict
there.
2.3 M. Reveyrand-de Menthon has been regarded throughout
his mandate as having done a good job. The Minister for Europe
(Mr David Lidington) says that he has provided "a senior
diplomatic presence that can represent the EU on all Sahel matters"
and been instrumental in developing relations across the region.
Priorities for the new mandate remain similar to those in the
current mandate, "although the UK has secured stronger language
on the need for the EUSR Sahel to engage on migration" (see
"Background" for further details).
2.4 The Minister explains that M. Reveyrand-de Menthon
is leaving the position at the end of this current mandate; it
is hoped that a successor will be in place by the end of 2015;
and in the meantime, the Council Decision is required to ensure
the legal basis for the position remains open with an agreed budget
to maintain an office and staff (see Annex below for budget details).
2.5 The extension of the EUSR Sahel and the proposed
budget raise no questions. We would therefore normally have cleared
this Council Decision from further scrutiny. But two other legal
issues arise.
2.6 First, we note that the Minister suggests
that Article 28 TEU should be included amongst the legal bases
in addition to Articles 31 (2) and 33 TEU as used in other
such instances. If so, this would result in a requirement for
unanimity rather than qualified majority voting in the Council.
We ask him to confirm that this is the proposed legal base and,
if so, to explain the discrepancy.
2.7 Secondly, we are concerned that the proposal
is not, as elsewhere, simply to extend the mandate and provide
for a budget, but that, instead, the Minister appears to be content
with the notion of the person being appointed as EUSR not having
been chosen by the time the Council adopts the Decision —
in which case, as the text stands, the Council would adopt a decision
approving the appointment of "XXXX" without that person
being named. This would be unacceptable legally and from the point
of view of scrutiny. The job and the job holder are inseparable.
We should not be expected to approve the one and to take the other
on trust.
2.8 We shall therefore continue to retain the
Council Decision under scrutiny until we know who Reveyrand-de
Menthon's successor is to be, and why the Minister regards him
or her as an appropriate choice.
Full
details of the documents:
Council Decision appointing
the EUSR Special Representative for the Sahel: (37201), —.
Background
2.9 Council Decision 2013/133/CFSP of 18 March 2013
appointed Michel Reveyrand-de Menthon as the new European Union
Special Representative (EUSR) for the Sahel.[12]
2.10 A year on, the Minister for Europe (Mr David
Lidington) reported that Mr Reveyrand had performed satisfactorily,
and there was broad consensus that his mandate be extended for
a further 12 months. It had been "tweaked" to reflect
the subsequent (broadly positive) political developments in the
Sahel (the signing of the Ouagadougou Accords in June, the deployment
of the UN Mission (MINUSMA) to Mali in July, and the successful
presidential and legislative elections in Mali), and now included
language on the need for the EUSR to push for further progress
on the Malian peace process, and to "keep a weather eye on
Niger and Burkina Faso, which will hold important elections in
2015-16".
2.11 Following what the Minister called a "light-touch
"refresh" of the EU's Sahel Strategy (which in future
would also cover Chad and Burkina Faso), a further (fifth) Policy
Advisor would be funded by savings made elsewhere in the budget.
The Minister also noted that the 12-month extension until February
2015 would bring it into line with the majority of other EUSR
mandates, which were to be renewed "for only 8 months from
June 2014 to February 2015".
2.12 In February 2015, the Minister said that Mr
Reveyrand had continued to perform effectively, noting that:
— the
proposed mandate was unchanged from 2014-15, which would provide
sufficient latitude for Mr Reveyrand to adapt his role to evolving
events in the Sahel region;
— the UK had proposed that Mr Reveyrand
should monitor the Mali negotiations even more closely in future,
and report back regularly to Member States in order that they
could formulate their positions accordingly; and
— Mr Reveyrand's new mandate period of
eight months, rather than a year, was in tune with that of other
EUSRs, and had been proposed by the new High Representative/Vice
President (Federica Mogherini) "to allow her to become acquainted
with the individuals and evaluate their roles and performance".
2.13 The previous Committee noted that this tying-in
of most other EUSR mandate renewals to end-February 2015, and
now their extension to 31 October 2015, reflected a wider tussle
between the previous High Representative (Baroness Ashton) and
the European External Action Service (EEAS), and Member States,
about the future of the EUSR "concept", resolution of
which was postponed until the arrival of the new HR last November.[13]
2.14 This matter remains unresolved, and is being
pursued separately by the Committee.[14]
The draft Council Decision
2.15 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 22 October
2015, the Minister describes the EUSR Sahel as providing "a
senior diplomatic presence that can represent the EU on all Sahel
matters", which he says "was strongly demonstrated during
the crisis in Mali where the EUSR Sahel represented the EU and
was actively involved in bringing a successful conclusion to the
negotiations".
2.16 More broadly:
"the EUSR Sahel has been instrumental in
developing relations across the region. Recently, this has been
shown by the engagement with, and visit to Brussels by, the relatively
new grouping of Sahel countries, the G5 Sahel (Mauritania, Mali,
Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso), which was set up to strengthen cooperation
on development and security in the Sahel."
2.17 The Minister says that priorities for the new
mandate remain similar to those in the current mandate, "although
the UK has secured stronger language on the need for the EUSR
Sahel to engage on migration." These priorities are:
· "Actively
contribute to the implementation, coordination and development
of the EU's Sahel Strategy and Action Plan;
· "Engage
with relevant bilateral, regional and international stakeholders;
· "Represent
the EU in regional and international fora;
· "Closely
cooperate with the UN, AU and the West African regional body,
ECOWAS;
· "Follow
the regional dimensions of the challenges facing the region, including
terrorism, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and migration
flows; [and]
· "Contribute
to the implementation of the EU's human rights policy in the region."
2.18 The Minister then says:
"The current EUSR Sahel, French diplomat Michel
Reveyrand-de Menthon, is leaving the position at the end of this
current mandate. The EU is actively seeking a successor and hopes
to have one in place by the end of 2015. In the meantime, the
Council Decision is required to ensure the legal basis for the
position remains open with an agreed budget to maintain an office
and staff."
The Government's view
2.19 The Minister says:
"Overall, the UK Government supports the
work of the EUSR Sahel. The role has been well deployed to support
the negotiations in Mali and strengthen region-wide engagement
for the EU. The EUSR Sahel can also provide information to Member
States from a region-wide perspective, which can be lost when
looking at individual EU Missions or country-specific issues."
2.20 With regard to the Financial Implications,
the Minister say that the proposed budget for the EUSR Sahel and
office is €1,770,000 (£1,250,000), which he says represents
a small pro rata saving from the current budget:
"Overall, I believe this budget is appropriate
for the work of the EUSR and his team. Given the amount of time
they will need to spend in the region, it is right that the EUSR
Sahel should have a reasonable travel budget" (see the Annex
to this chapter of our Report for details).
Previous Committee Reports
None, but see (36629), —: Thirty-fourth Report
219-xxxiii (2014-15), chapter 21 (25 February 2015).
Annex:
EUSR Budget ~
| Budget heading
| Current budget,
8 months (in €s)
| Proposed budget,
16 months (in €s)
|
| 1. Personnel costs
| 512,590 | 946,725.46
|
| 2. Missions
| 273,280 | 618,200
|
| 3. Running expenditure
| 86,164 | 157,724.20
|
| 4. Capital expenditure
| 1,750 | 1,750
|
| 5. Representation
| 8,000 | 16,000
|
| Contingencies
| 18,216 | 29,600.34
|
| Total
| 900,000
| 1,770,000
|
"Personnel costs (€946,725.46): The budget proposes
retaining eight personnel working in this office and a 7.5% like-for-like
reduction in personnel costs. This has been calculated on current
terms and conditions and so may increase depending on the outcome
of any discussions.
"Missions (€618,200): This refers to all travel
costs by the EUSR Sahel and their staff, including transport and
accommodation. The majority of the costs are for travel to countries
in the Sahel or within Europe. The 13% increase in budget is for
the new EUSR to travel more at the beginning of the mandate.
"Running expenditure (€157,724.20): This sub-head
refers to costs for running an office in Brussels, as well as
a small amount provided to the EU Delegation in Bamako. It also
includes provision for four seminars on subjects relating to the
EUSR Sahel's mandate.
"Capital expenditure (€1,750): This sub-head
covers costs for replacement equipment.
"Representation (€16,000): This proposes a flat
€1,000 per month cost for representation.
"Contingencies (€29,600.34): The additional contingency
reserve represents 1.7% of the proposed budget and is a smaller
proportion than in the current budget."
11 The EU Strategy for Security and Development in
the Sahel has four key themes:
o that security and development in the
Sahel cannot be separated, and that helping these countries achieve
security is integral to enabling their economies to grow and poverty
to be reduced;
o that achieving security and development
in the Sahel is only possible through closer regional cooperation.
This is currently weaker than it needs to be, and the EU has a
potential role to play in supporting it;
o all the states of the region will
benefit from considerable capacity-building, both in areas of
core government activity, including the provision of security
and development cooperation; and
o that the EU therefore has an important
role to play both in encouraging economic development for the
people of the Sahel and helping them achieve a more secure environment
in which it can take place, and in which the interests of EU citizens
are also protected.
See European External Action Service
Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel for full information. Back
12
EUSRs promote the EU's policies and interests in troubled regions
and countries and play an active role in efforts to consolidate
peace, stability and the rule of law. They support the work of
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy (HR), in the regions concerned, and provide the EU with
an active political presence in key countries and regions, acting
as a "voice" and "face" for the EU and its
policies. See EU Special Representatives for full details. Back
13
See (36629), -: Thirty-fourth Report 219-xxxiii (2014-15), chapter 21
(25 February 2015) for full detail. Back
14
See (37202), -: EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus
and the crisis in Georgia: Seventh Report HC 342-vii (2014-15),
chapter 8 (28 October 2015). Back
| 
