1 EU Afghanistan Cooperation Agreement
on Partnership and Development
| Committee's assessment |
Politically important |
| Committee's decision | (a) and (b): Not cleared from scrutiny; recommended for debate in European Committee B (decision reported on 20 January 2016), together with the Joint Communication: Elements for an EU Strategy in Afghanistan 2014-16, already referred for debate on 25 February 2015 (decision confirmed on 21 July 2015)
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| Document details | (a) Council Decision on the signing of the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development between the EU and Afghanistan; (b) Council Decision on the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development between the EU and Afghanistan
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| Legal base | Article 37 TEU and Articles 207 and 209, in conjunction with Article 218(6)(a) and the second paragraph of Article 218(8) TFEU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Document Numbers | (a) (37417), 15503/15 + ADD 1, JOIN(15) 35;
(b) (37418), 15504/15 + ADD 1, JOIN(15) 36
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Summary and Committee's conclusions
1.1 A 2014 Joint Communication, Elements for an EU Strategy
in Afghanistan 2014-16, outlined the key objectives and initiatives
upon which the EU would seek to focus on in support of the Afghan
Government: promoting peace and security; reinforcing democracy;
encouraging economic and human development; and fostering the
rule of law and respect for human rights. It was designed principally
to ensure a comprehensive and coordinated approach to activities
on the ground between the EU and Member States in support of the
Government.
1.2 Details of the context — particularly the
2012 Tokyo Conference, at which the International Community pledged
to improve aid effectiveness and provide US$16 billion[1]
to Afghanistan in return for the Government of Afghanistan meeting
its commitments under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework
(TMAF)[2] — are summarised
in our previous Report.[3]
1.3 Against this background, on 17 December 2015
the Commission submitted to the Council a proposal to sign and
conclude a Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development
(CAPD) between the EU and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
It was described by the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
as:
"a framework for further engagement and cooperation
between the EU and Afghanistan across a number of wider range
of areas, including political cooperation, human rights, gender
equality, civil rights, peace building, counter-terrorism, development,
trade, rule of law, policing, migration, education, energy and
the environment."
1.4 The Minister said that the CAPD underpinned the
EU's commitment to supporting Afghanistan's future development
during its "decade of transformation" agreed
at the 2011 Bonn conference, and acknowledged the results of the
subsequent Bonn, Chicago, Kabul, Tokyo and London international
conferences on Afghanistan.
1.5 The Agreement includes provisions on political
dialogue and on cooperation in a broad range of areas. It draws
on the EU's standard political clauses on human rights and the
International Criminal Court, and includes commitments related
to the rights of women and children. The Agreement builds on the
principles of mutual accountability and reiterates the willingness
of the parties to address shared concerns, including: 1) the fight
against terrorism, international crime and illegal trafficking;
2) non-proliferation, disarmament and nuclear security; 3) Weapons
of Mass Destructions (WMD); 4) Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW);
and 5) counter-narcotics. The provisions on cooperation cover
the following sectors: infrastructure development, energy, transport,
health, natural resources, tax, education and culture, employment
and social affairs, science and technology, and environment and
climate change. The Agreement also emphasises the importance of
legal cooperation and affirms the parties' commitment to fighting
organised crime, money laundering and corruption.[4]
1.6 The Minister described all this as "a high-level
agreement framing the EU's intention to strengthen its relationship
with Afghanistan", noting that the EU "has a significant
role to play in the future of Afghanistan as a means to help develop
the country in many areas including governance and the rule of
law". Afghanistan itself had, he said, "just finished
the first year of its 'transformation decade', [h]aving taken
responsibility for its own security in 2015". The National
Unity Government headed by President Ghani had "committed
to an ambitious reform agenda and has begun to pursue peace with
the Taleban". In order to "continue down the path of
peace and stability", the Afghan Government "requires
the support of the international community, including the EU".
The UK's bilateral contribution to Afghanistan was "significant",
and the bilateral relationship "strong". The CAPD "does
not commit the UK to greater cooperation", nor "prevent
us pursuing our bilateral cooperation". The UK's objective
in Afghanistan is "to prevent it from returning to being
a haven for international terrorism, and to build the capacity
of the government". The involvement of the UK, and the EU
"is vital" and the CAPD "provides the framework
for a partnership to endure".
Our assessment
1.7 As well as authorising the signature and conclusion
of the CAPD, these Council Decisions include, in annexes, the
detailed texts concerning the areas covered by the Agreement.
But the Minister said nothing about these. Nor did he say anything
about how the Agreement was to be carried out. Or about what expenditure
was likely to be involved, other than that the CAPD had no financial
implications as such, in that it did "not commit any funds
directly".
1.8 We therefore asked the Minister to provide more
information on the workings of the agreement. How much money was
the EU committed to provide under which headings in order to enable
the new Government to implement its "ambitious reform agenda"?
In what ways would the EU be involved in the administration and
control of these funds? How did these funds relate to those provided
by other funders? In what ways would the Government of Afghanistan
be held to account? Paragraph 11 of the TMAF says:
"The Afghan Government and the International
Community are to monitor performance for five major areas of development
and governance according to the modalities described below. A
timeline for these indicators is to be developed by the Afghan
Government for the next JCMB meeting. The desired goals and initial
indicators for each area are stated below."
1.9 Were there similar provisions with regard to
the work streams in the CAPD and the expenditure involved? In
what sense was the sort of "conditionality" involved
in similar EU work in the western Balkans and the "near neighbourhood"
built into the CAPD?
1.10 We noted that this wide ranging agreement was
entered into by the EU without the Member States participating
separately. The Commission's Explanatory Memorandum implied that
it might cover matters for which competence was shared.[5]
We therefore asked the Minister whether the EU would be exercising
shared competence by these Decisions. If so, to what extent; and
what was the justification for departing from the normal Government
policy, that Member States should exercise shared competence?
1.11 Although the Council Decisions and annexes were
in final form, the Minister said that the "Council Decisions
are not yet finalised and continue to be negotiated in Brussels".
We were given to understand that the EEAS/Commission had jumped
the gun, in the sense that the texts were published in final form
before all Member States had agreed to them at official level.
This suggested that, though there might yet be some changes, these
were unlikely to be substantive; in which case, the likelihood
was that the Council Decisions would then move swiftly to adoption
by the Council.
1.12 We also noted that it was nearly a year since
the previous Committee had recommended that the precursor to these
Council Decisions — the Joint Communication referred to
above — be debated in European Committee. At our first meeting,
we endorsed their recommendation for the same reason: it would
be appropriate to debate the role that, one way or another, the
EU would be undertaking (with EU taxpayers' money) in post-2014
Afghanistan, and the host of uncertainties surrounding the essentials
for its successful implementation. Those uncertainties remained,
particularly regarding the security situation. The financial uncertainties
were outlined above. Nonetheless, that debate had yet to be arranged.
1.13 We therefore recommended that the Council Decisions
containing this consequential CAPD be debated, in European Committee,
as soon as possible, together with the Joint Communication: Elements
for an EU Strategy in Afghanistan 2014-16, already referred for
debate on 25 February 2015 (decision confirmed on 21 July 2015).
It was important that the EU policy in Afghanistan embodied in
these documents was subject to further examination, in debate,
thereby enabling the Government to clarify and discuss the many
uncertainties about the context in which, and how, this Agreement
would operate, and interested Members to explore all the implications,
including for the UK's own commitments.
1.14 In order to facilitate the best possible debate,
we asked the Minister to respond to the queries raised above as
speedily as possible, so that they could be reported to the House
before the debate took place.
1.15 In the meantime, we retained the Council Decisions
under scrutiny.[6]
1.16 The Minister begins his response by referring
to separate correspondence in connection with the number of debate
recommendations outstanding from the previous Parliament, and
says:
"The Government had understood, on the basis
of your letter to the Leader of the House of Commons on 14 October
2015, that the Committee's recommendation for a debate on the
'Joint Communication: Elements for an EU Strategy in Afghanistan
2014-16' would be rescinded. I note the Committee's recommendation
of a debate on the CAPD, and the Government will seek to schedule
a debate in a timely manner, taking in to account other Parliamentary
business."
1.17 The Minister goes on to say that, rather than
committing any funds directly, the CAPD is a signal of political
commitment that outlines the areas in which both the EU and the
Government of Afghanistan agree they can work together; detail
on implementation will be decided once the CAPD is in place, in
consultation with Member States throughout, and is all likely
to take place in the context of determining the next EU Strategy
for Afghanistan. Once the CAPD is agreed, and once the details
on implementation are decided, funding will come from the usual
range of development assistance financial instruments, the most
significant being the current Multiannual Indicative Programme
(MIP), part of the EU Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI),
which covers the period 2014 to 2020 and has a total budget allocation
of €1.4 billion (£1.07 billion). The Minister also explains
that the EU is a member of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring
Board referred to in the quotation from the TMAF in the Committee's
previous report, which means that any cooperation activity which
ultimately flows from the CAPD will be coordinated with other
donors "through the usual processes", and "will
align with the conditionality measures agreed between the wider
donor community and the Government of Afghanistan" (see "Background"
for details).
1.18 On the exercise of competence, the Minister
says that "the status of the CAPD with regard to Member State
participation has not yet been agreed", and that he shares
Committee's concerns. He states that "Government policy on
unexercised shared competence has not changed", and that,
to this end, "the UK is making the case in Brussels for Member
State participation in the CAPD".
1.19 So far as the Committee is concerned, the
proposal to rescind the debate recommendation concerning the current
EU-Afghanistan Strategy was part and parcel of a wider package
of proposals, to which the Government has yet to respond. Moreover,
from the further information now provided, it would seem that,
both politically and legally, the CAPD is far from the finished
article, particularly with respect to how much and in what ways
the Member States will participate in its operation.
1.20 The Committee therefore maintains its earlier
recommendation, and thus its subsequent recommendation that both
the EU-Afghanistan Strategy and the CAPD should be debated
together.
1.21 In the meantime, the documents remain under
scrutiny.
Full details of
the documents: (a) Joint Proposal
for a Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the European
Union, of the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development
between the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan:
(37417), 15503/15 + ADD 1, JOIN(15) 35; (b) Joint Proposal for
a Council Decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European
Union, of the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development
between the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan:
(37418), 15504/15 + ADD 1, JOIN(15) 36.
Background
1.22 The 20 October 2014 Foreign Affairs Council
welcomed the formation of a Government of National Unity in Afghanistan,
reiterated the EU's long-term commitment to Afghanistan and reaffirmed
the comprehensive strategy agreed in June. It looked forward to
working in close cooperation with the new government and international
partners to safeguard the advances Afghanistan had made over the
last 13 years and to support and incentivise urgently needed reforms.
The EU recognised the important future role to be played by UNAMA
in Afghanistan.[7] It pledged
up to €1.4 billion (£1.07 billion) in assistance up
to 2020, complementing the development assistance to be provided
bilaterally by Member States. The EU restated its willingness
to finalise the CAPD, as the basis for a wide-ranging long-term
partnership between the EU and Afghanistan.
1.23 The Council also called for a clear and unequivocal
commitment to respect human rights, in particular the rights of
women and girls, and says that it is now imperative that the Government
of Afghanistan enact the reforms necessary to restore economic
confidence, promote job creation, increase revenue generation,
reform the judicial system, tackle the twin threats from corruption
and narcotics and improve the accountability of the state to ordinary
Afghans.[8]
1.24 In February 2015, the Minister said that a new
Afghan government augured well for the EU to achieve its objectives
over the next three years: the reform agenda set out by President
Ghani at the November 2014 London Conference was "a credible
framework for delivering economic security by tackling corruption;
maintaining progress on national security; delivering political
reform; and consolidating progress on human rights", and
was closely aligned with the EU's 2014-16 strategy — this
being "designed principally to ensure that the EU and Member
States can adopt a comprehensive and coordinated approach to activities
on the ground in support of the Afghan Government". A CAPD
would then provide a legal underpinning for a long-term partnership
between the EU and Afghanistan. The Minister acknowledged that
the work of the EU would be constrained by the tough security
environment: but ratification of the US Bilateral Security Agreement
(BSA) with Afghanistan, NATO's equivalent Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) and "the successful standing up" of the NATO
Resolute Support Mission was "a welcome backdrop for EU work"
and had ended "a long period of uncertainty".
The Minister's letter of 10 February 2016
1.25 The Minister begins by referring to a separate
correspondence in connection with the number of debate recommendations
outstanding from the previous Parliament, and says:
"The Government had understood, on the basis
of your letter to the Leader of the House of Commons on 14 October
2015, that the Committee's recommendation for a debate on the
'Joint Communication: Elements for an EU Strategy in Afghanistan
2014-16' would be rescinded. I note the Committee's recommendation
of a debate on the CAPD, and the Government will seek to schedule
a debate in a timely manner, taking in to account other Parliamentary
business."
1.26 On the workings of the CAPD, the Minister again
notes that "the Agreement does not commit any funds directly",
and continues thus:
"The CAPD is a signal of political commitment
and outlines the areas for cooperation that both the EU and the
Government of Afghanistan agree they can work together on. It
does not include detail on implementation: that will be decided
once the CAPD is in place, in consultation with Member States
throughout. This is all likely to take place in the context of
determining the EU's next strategy for Afghanistan, to follow-on
from the current strategy which runs to the end of 2016."
1.27 As to where funding will come from, the Minister
says:
"EU funding in Afghanistan comes from a variety
of sources, the most significant being the current Multiannual
Indicative Programme (MIP), part of the EU Development Cooperation
Instrument (DCI), which covers the period 2014 to 2020 and has
a total budget allocation of €1.4 billion. It also receives
funding from regional and thematic programmes, including the Instrument
for Stability and Peace, for projects covering human rights, rule
of law, assistance for displaced persons, food security and health.
Once the CAPD is agreed, and once the details on implementation
are decided, these are examples of the sources of funding from
which the EU will draw. The Committee may also wish to note that
the EU is a member of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
referred to in the quotation from the Tokyo Mutual Accountability
Framework. Any cooperation activity which ultimately flows from
the CAPD will be coordinated with other donors through the usual
processes, and will align with the conditionality measures agreed
between the wider donor community and the Government of Afghanistan."
1.28 Finally, on the exercise of competence, the
Minister says:
"the status of the CAPD with regard to Member
State participation has not yet been agreed, and I share the concerns
of the Committee. The Government policy on unexercised shared
competence has not changed. To this end, the UK is making the
case in Brussels for Member State participation in the CAPD."
Previous Committee Reports
Twentieth Report HC 342-xix (2015-16), chapter 2
(20 January 2016); also see (35996), 9467/14, JOIN(14) 17: Thirty-fourth
Report HC 219-xxxiii (2014-15), chapter 1 (25 February 2015),
Eighteenth Report HC 219-xvii (2014-15), chapter 5 (5 November
2014) and Third Report HC 219-iii (2014-15), chapter 5 (18 June
2014); also see (37191), —: Eighth Report HC 342-viii (2015-16),
chapter 10 (4 November 2015) and (36033) —: Second Report
HC 219-ii (2014-15), chapter 11 (11 June 2014).
1 €1 Euro = £0.7641. Back
2
The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) agreed in May
2012, establishes the mutual commitments of the Government of
Afghanistan and the international community to help Afghanistan
achieve its development and governance goals. Back
3
See Twentieth Report HC 342-xix (2015-16), chapter 2 (20 January
2016). Back
4
See the Commission's Explanatory Memorandum. Back
5
Shared competence can be exercised by either the EU or the Member
States. Back
6
Twentieth Report HC 342-xix (2015-16), chapter 2 (20 January 2016). Back
7
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is
a political mission established by the Security Council in 2002
at the request of the Government to assist it and the people of
Afghanistan in laying the foundations for sustainable peace and
development in the country. UNAMA thus "provides political
good offices in Afghanistan; works with and supports the government;
supports the process of peace and reconciliation; monitors and
promotes human rights and the protection of civilians in armed
conflict; promotes good governance; and encourages regional cooperation".
Its mandate is reviewed annually with the latest mandate renewal
being on 16 March 2015 when the Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 2210 (2015). Back
8
See 20 October 2014 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions , pp.2-24. Back
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