Implications of the referendum on EU membership for the UK's role in the world Contents

Appendix 2 Written submissions from Vote Leave and Britain Stronger in Europe

Vote Leave

Does EU collective action help or hinder the UK in achieving its key foreign policy objectives and/or adds value to UK foreign policy?

EU collective action only adds value insofar as the UK agrees with the action that is being taken. In order to judge how effectively EU collective action benefits the UK, one must therefore first ascertain the UK’s ability to block any EU action that it disagrees with.

The UK’s representation in the institutions of the EU has declined drastically over its 43 years of membership. We now have very little influence in the EU’s decision making process. Every time the UK has voted against a measure in the Council of Ministers it has been outvoted. This is happening with increased frequency: of the UK’s 72 defeats, over half (40) have occurred in the last five years (Vote Leave, October 20151). This reflects the UK’s increased marginalisation within the EU as it is forced to accept rules that the Eurozone caucus (which has an inbuilt majority) wants. It now doesn’t matter which way the UK votes— it is the Eurozone states that decide which laws are introduced in the UK.

The UK’s representatives are often outvoted in the European Parliament as well. The majority of UK MEPs voted against 576 EU proposals between 2009 and 2014, but 485 still passed (Business for Britain, September 20142). In addition, the UK has been defeated in over 77% of cases in which it has been a party in the European Court (Vote Leave, March 20163). Since the current Government entered office in May 2010, the UK has been defeated on 16 occasions: a failure rate of 80%.

It is for those who want Britain to remain in an unreformed EU to provide similarly convincing quantitative evidence of Britain’s influence and not just rely on anecdotal accounts.

The ‘common foreign and security policy’ is an area where unanimity is, in theory, required in the Council of Ministers. In practice the EU’s definition of what constitutes ‘foreign policy’ is nebulous and ever-shifting. It is for the Court of Justice to determine what constitutes foreign policy (see article 40 of the Treaty on European Union). Many aspects of foreign affairs, such as trade and development policy and the conclusion of international agreements relating to the subject matter of an EU competence, fall outside the EU’s very narrow definition of ‘foreign policy’. This means that they are subject to qualified majority voting and the jurisdiction of the European Court. It would, therefore, be a mistake to claim that the UK has influence over EU foreign policy.

Crucially, Britain’s supposed opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights has proved to be a mirage. Our own Supreme Court and the ECJ have made clear we have no opt-out. The ECJ can therefore use the Charter to take control of issues concerning foreign and defence policy. For example, the ECJ has recently used the Charter to exert its control over how our intelligence services monitor suspected terrorists and to stop us deporting security threats (BBC News, July 20144).

EU institutions have also repeatedly attacked Britain’s intelligence sharing agreements with other countries (‘Five Eyes’) which have been at the heart of security policy since 1945. The combination of the Charter and ECJ means that the EU could systematically undermine these vital agreements which could be extremely damaging for foreign, defence, and security policy.

Does the EU’s priorities for its common foreign policy align or conflict with the UK’s foreign policy goals, and how influential are the FCO and UK Government are in directing EU common action?

See above.

How might the UK’s standing in multilateral organisations (e.g. the UN, NATO, OSCE and WTO) change if it were to leave the EU?

In 1971, the European Court ruled that the Treaties conferred on the EU the capacity to conclude international agreements by implication in fields where the EU has legislative competence. This was a very significant extension of the EU’s power over the UK’s foreign policy. In 1975, the European Court declared that the EU had exclusive competence over an OECD agreement on export credits, ruling that member states could not ‘ensure that their own interests were separately satisfied in external relations, at the risk of compromising the effective defence of the common interests of the Community’ (Opinion 1/75 [1975] ECR 13555).

In 1993, it ruled that even where an international agreement excluded the EU from participating, the EU’s ‘external competence may, if necessary, be exercised through the medium of the Member States acting jointly in the Community’s interest’ and that there was a ‘requirement of unity in the international representation of the Community’ (Opinion 2/91 [1993] ECR I-10616).

Today, the EU Treaties give the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, the power to ‘adopt a decision... establishing the positions to be adopted on the Union’s behalf in a body set up by an agreement, when that body is called upon to adopt acts having legal effects’ (TFEU, art. 218(9)7). The scope of this provision was initially unclear. In an October 2014 decision, the European Court ruled, contrary to the UK’s submissions, that this means the EU may require the UK to adopt a common EU position in an international organisation of which the EU is not a member, provided that the subject matter of the decision relates to an EU legislative competence. As a result, member states were required to adopt a common EU position in the International Organisation of Vine and Wine (Germany v Parliament & Council, Case C-399/128).

If we Vote Leave we end this damaging situation. The UK will become a more influential voice for free trade and friendly cooperation by regaining our seat and/or independent voice on the international organisations where the UK has been forced to defer to a common EU line.

When the EU accedes to an international agreement, the UK is silenced if its subject matter relates to an exclusive EU competence. For example, in the the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, the UK has a seat, but only in respect of its overseas territories outside the EU (ICCAT, 20169). The EU represents the UK in all other respects.

The EU is planning to take the UK’s seat in more international organisations. This can only be stopped by voting to leave the EU. The Chamber of Shipping has condemned the Commission’s attempts to supersede the UK’s voice in the International Maritime Organization. It has stated that ‘Commission involvement in IMO work items can often be unwelcome given the obligation on Member States to internally coordinate positions along EU lines’ (Chamber of Shipping, November 201510). The Commission has said: ‘the gradual development of a more co-ordinated EU external aviation policy is the logical consequence of the EU internal market’ in respect of the International Civil Aviation Organization (European Commission, 16 December 201511).

Of greater interest is the EU’s attempts to silence the UK in the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Five Presidents’ Report called for common EU representation ‘in the international financial institutions’, stating that the EU’s ‘fragmented voice means the EU is punching below its political and economic weight’. It singled out the IMF as one such example (European Commission, June 201512). In October 2015, the Commission proposed a Council Decision to establish unified representation of the euro area in the IMF. The draft Decision, on which the UK will not have a vote, states that:

Since the EU has legislative competence over financial services, it is highly likely that the European Court will permit the EU to force the UK to adopt a common EU position in the IMF in the near future. The European Parliament recently endorsed a report calling for the abolition of the UK’s permanent seat on the UN Security Council (European Parliament, 201514). The UK’s international influence will continue to decline in the event of a vote to remain.

What impact, if any, would leaving the EU have on the UK’s foreign relations including, but not limited to, the transatlantic relationship, the Commonwealth, and relations with the BRIC countries?

As there would be no prospect of the UK losing its seat in the UN Security Council, or its independent voice in the IMF, it will remain an important force for friendly cooperation on the global scene, and an important ally of both the United States and other countries around the world. The UK, no longer facing the threat of losing its place at the ‘top table’, would continue to be a voice for friendly cooperation, peaceful coexistence and free trade.

It should be noted that being a member of the EU has undermined the UK’s relationship with other countries in security matters. The US Attorney General, Loretta Lynch, has warned that it is ‘highly concerning’ that the EU is undermining the sharing of information vital in the fight against serious crime and terrorism (Reuters, December 201515). The former CIA Director, General Michael Hayden, has said that the EU ‘gets in the way’ (BBC News, March 201616).

These problems are likely to only get worse if Britain votes to remain, as the EU has made clear that it wants significantly more power in this area. On 20 November 2015, the European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, stated that he supported the ‘creation of a European Ιntelligence Agency’ (November 201517). The leader of the liberal ALDE group in the European Parliament, Guy Verhofstadt, has also voiced his support for this proposal (EurActiv, November 201518) and the Belgian Prime Minister, Charles Michel, has argued that ‘we must quickly put in place a European intelligence agency, a European CIA’ (Yahoo News, November 201519).

Outside the EU there would be no risk of these crucial relationships being undermined. Furthermore, the former head of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove has said that a vote to leave the EU would not ‘damage our defence and intelligence relationship with the United States, which outweighs anything European by many factors of 10... The replacement of Trident, the access to overhead satellite monitoring capabilities, the defence exchanges that are hidden from public view, the UK-US co-operation over signals intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency/Secret Intelligence Service/Federal Bureau of Investigation/MI5 liaison and much more would continue as before’ (Prospect, April 201620).

Sir Richard also wrote that Brexit could improve security in two fields at least— removing human rights protections for terrorists and improving control over immigration.

To what extent could the UK continue to participate in EU collective action on an ad-hoc basis if it left the EU, and what are the benefits and drawbacks of such an approach?

The UK could continue to participate with EU foreign policy on an ad-hoc basis if it considered it was in its national interests to do so. The EU works in conjunction with a number of countries—article 8 of the Treaty on European Union states that ‘the Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.’

We will use our freedom from EU law and our strengthened international voice to promote more effective and faster international cooperation often at a global level. European cooperation will continue in fields where it already exists such as air travel, sanitary controls, disease, and counterterrorism.

We must go much further, particularly to deal with rapidly accelerating technological revolutions such as genetic engineering and machine intelligence. The EU is clearly unable to cope and there is widespread recognition of the need for new global economic and security institutions to deal with humanity’s biggest problems. We need institutions that are much faster to adapt to accelerating changes.

What are the international legal implications of a UK exit from the EU, including the scope and cost of renegotiating the international treaties to which the UK is a signatory as an EU member state (including the likelihood of securing favourable terms in such negotiations)?

It will be in the interests of third countries to maintain existing agreements as the Executive Director of the Britain Stronger in Europe (BSE) campaign, Mr Will Straw, has admitted (Evidence to the Treasury Committee, 2 March 201621). If the UK makes clear it wants existing agreements to be maintained on current terms, there is little reason to think any third country with which the EU currently has a free trade agreement would disagree. The UK is, after all, the fifth largest economy in the world (World Bank, 201422)— there is no reason why third countries would want to cut off access to this.

Foreign leaders have increasingly made clear that third country trade agreements could continue in force. The Prime Minister of New Zealand, John Key, has said: ‘we would want to preserve both our existing position with Great Britain and continue to grow that relationship. We would need to find a way through that. The reality is there are a number of mechanisms where that would be possible’ (Daily Telegraph, 29 October 201523). The Prime Minister of Iceland, Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson, has said that: ‘The UK is one of our most important trading partners and whatever you decide to do we would like to have a free trade deal with you, whether through the EEA or independently’ (Daily Telegraph, 9 March 201624).

Even the European Commission has admitted that it would be in the EU’s interests for third country trade agreements to continue to apply to the UK in the event of a leave vote. Ahead of Greenland’s withdrawal from the then European Economic Community, the Commission stated that if third country trade agreements ceased to apply to Greenland on its withdrawal, it was an open ‘question whether the Community would have to negotiate with its partners compensation for the rights and benefits which those countries would lose as a result of the “shrinking” of the Community’ (European Commission, 2 February 198325). This strongly implies that the EU might have to compensate countries like South Korea or Mexico if the UK left the EU and third country trade agreements ceased to apply to the UK.

Third country trade agreements currently applicable to the UK would not come to an end as soon as we Vote Leave. The European Union Referendum Act 2015 creates a consultative referendum. A vote to leave will, in and of itself, have no legal consequences for the continued applicability of third country trade agreements. The best way to give effect to the result of the referendum will be a matter for the British Parliament and Government to decide (whether by way of article 50 of the Treaty on European Union or by other means). There is no fixed timescale.

The UK will, however, be able to begin negotiations to maintain existing third country agreements and make new trade agreements immediately after we Vote Leave. The Government has claimed that: ‘While these [EU withdrawal] negotiations continued, we would be constrained in our ability to negotiate and conclude new trade agreements with countries outside the EU’ (HM Government, February 201626). This is highly misleading. While the UK’s new trade agreements could not enter into force until after it left the EU, there would be nothing to stop it immediately after a vote to leave beginning negotiations to enter into trade agreements to come into force after the UK left.

It should be noted that there are 1,720 civil servants in Whitehall who specialise in trade policy who could be deployed during this period to ensure a smooth transition (Business for Britain, 201527). The UK will have the capacity to begin negotiations immediately.

What are the foreign policy implications of any changes to trade treaties resulting from a UK withdrawal from the EU?

See above.

What would the impact be on other EU states and EU institutions of UK withdrawal from the EU?

The EU is suffering a combination of crises: an economic crisis, an immigration crisis, a democratic crisis, and an institutional crisis. The euro and its dysfunctional institutions are making the economic crisis worse. The Eurozone is trapped between continuing with a system that everyone can see is economically unsustainable in the medium-term and taking another leap forward with even greater centralisation which is democratically unsustainable. The Five Presidents Report makes clear that the Commission wants to pursue the latter in accordance with the long-term Monnet-Delors vision of the EU as a highly centralised quasi-state.

This trajectory is very dangerous. Britain voting ‘leave’ will not only be better for Britain but will also be good for Europe. Britain’s unique system of ‘equal under the law’ and open democratic government will be preserved—an example that Europe desperately needs to be preserved given its history. Further, a ‘leave’ vote will require all Europe to consider how we build the overall system we need over the next decade—a system in which all countries, in or out of the euro and EU, can trade and cooperate in a friendly way. Europe and the world need more international cooperation, not less. The problem with the EU is not that it promotes international cooperation but that it is so bad at it.

A great advantage of a ‘leave’ vote is it gives Britain wider options. It is the best move regardless of how the EU responds. If the EU institutions and other member states refuse to face reality and accept the need for changes in the European architecture, we will obviously have done the right thing. If voting to leave forces them to face reality and accept sensible changes, we will not only have helped Britain but we will also have helped Europe avoid continued decline.

What would be the implications of leaving the EU be for the Union (that is, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) and their foreign policy consequences?

The referendum on 23 June is on the question of the United Kingdom’s membership of the unreformed European Union and nothing else. It is not a vote on the future of the UK. Vote Leave has no corporate position on whether Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland remain a part of the UK.

If we Vote Leave, the Acts of Union of 1707 and 1800 will continue in force. Leaving the EU will mean a substantial increase in the powers of the devolved Parliaments and Assemblies. For example, EU competences over agriculture and fisheries would, in the most part, be vested in the devolved legislatures automatically after the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972. This will meet, in part, the demand throughout the UK for further devolution of powers.

It is also questionable that any part of the UK would vote to leave the UK in order to join the EU. In principle, such a candidate country would be obliged to join the euro and the Schengen Area, and would forfeit what it is left of the UK’s rebate-grant. This would require substantial cuts in public expenditure and the acceptance of the Eurozone’s austerity programme. We consider it highly unlikely that any part of the UK would decide to leave the UK in order to join the unreformed EU.

Britain Stronger in Europe

Britain Stronger in Europe (BSiE) is the leading cross-party organisation campaigning for a ‘Remain’ result in the UK’s June 2016 EU membership referendum. BSiE was formally launched in October 2015 and is registered with the Electoral Commission as a permitted participant for the referendum. BSiE has dedicated campaign organisations in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and Gibraltar, over 50 university-based student organisations, and 227 MPs, peers, MEPs, members of the devolved assemblies and local council leaders acting as its ‘political champions’. BSiE’s Chairman is Lord Rose of Monewden and its Executive Director is Will Straw.

BSiE has applied to the Electoral Commission for designation as the lead campaigner on the ‘Remain’ side of the referendum campaign, under the European Union Referendum Act 2015. When this submission was prepared (early April 2016), the Electoral Commission’s designation decision was awaited. BSiE’s application for the designation is supported by Conservatives In and the Conservative Group for Europe, the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrat Party, the Green Party in Northern Ireland, Plaid Cymru, the Alliance Party and the Social Democratic and Labour Party, as well as The European Movement, London First, Friends of the Earth, Scientists for EU, the National Association of Women’s Organisations, Universities UK, Community the Union, Environmentalists for EU, Henna Foundation, City Sikhs and the National Union of Students.

This submission comprises a general argument about the risks of being outside the EU and the benefits of being in, followed by evidence on some specific areas of UK foreign policy.

Summary

EU membership and UK foreign policy

The risks of being out

Membership of the EU has been a cornerstone of the UK’s international relations for over 40 yearstwo-thirds of the period since WW2. Over that time, working through the EU has become embedded in UK foreign policy and foreign policy-making. Leaving would be a dramatic shift in UK foreign policy.

The EU matters in international affairs for several reasons:

A UK exit would change the EU (see below). However, the EU would remain a major factor in any post-withdrawal UK foreign policy.

a) Influencing the EU after withdrawal

Managing relations with, and influencing developments in, continental Europe and Ireland have always been central issues for the foreign policy of the UK and its predecessor states. EU membership has helped to resolve these issues, providing a broad and enduring institutional framework for peacefully pursuing national interests, managing differences and exerting influence. If the UK left the EU, and whatever format were adopted for UK-EU relations, its interests would continue to be affected by developments in continental Europe. It would continue to have a foreign policy interest in influencing developments there. Outside the EU, the UK would continue to engage with continental European countries in other bodies, such as NATO, the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). However, the policy scope, legal reach and density of contacts involved in the EU make it the main framework in which continental European countries now manage their affairs. Outside it, the UK would be likely to find managing relations with, and exerting influence over, continental Europe and Ireland again becoming a greater foreign policy challenge.

The UK’s economic, security and diplomatic interests beyond the EU, and the importance of the EU internationally, mean that the UK would continue to have a stake in the nature of the EU’s external action if it left. These UK interests are dictated by the internationalised nature of the UK economy and population, the size and dispersion of the British expatriate and tourist populations, the UK’s responsibilities towards its Overseas Territories, and the UK’s positions in international bodies including the Commonwealth and the UN Security Council. As a non-EU state, the UK would have an interest in EU action around the world being congruent with its own policies. UK international interests would be damaged, and the UK potentially made less safe, if EU policies around the world were ineffective or counter-productive. Outside the EU, influencing EU external action would become a central UK foreign policy task.

Many of the foreign policy and security risks facing the UK can only be tackled effectively through joint international action. Such risks include Russian aggression, international terrorism, climate change and cross-border organised crime, including people-, arms- and drugs-smuggling. Whether the UK is in the EU or outside, EU states are its most likely and most necessary partners in taking such action, because of geographical proximity, economic integration and shared principles. Outside the EU, the UK would still need to win EU cooperation in tackling foreign policy and security risks effectively.

Even as a member state, the UK can find itself competing with other EU countries for inward investment projects, foreign procurement or trade orders or to provide development or governance assistance overseas. If the UK were outside the EU, there would be greater risk that the EU would shape its policies to favour EU states for such opportunities, to the disadvantage of the UK and risking UK prosperity.

There appears to be no established institutional format that allows a non-member state significant influence over EU external policies on an ongoing basis. Countries included in the EU’s enlargement and eastern neighbourhood policies are invited simply to “associate themselves” with EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) statements. The EU’s association, partnership and cooperation agreements and other arrangements with third countries typically provide for ‘political dialogue’, but the German foreign ministry describes this as “a means of influencing the dialogue partners’ behaviour and actions” rather than vice versa.i A recent think-tank study showed that ‘political dialogue’ meetings of various types between the EU and its ‘strategic partners’, such as the US and Canada, were held at most four times a year. The European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement between the EU and European Free Trade Area (EFTA) states is focused on the Single Market and does not mention foreign policy.ii

Campaigners for the UK to leave the EU have not set out their proposed format for UK-EU political relations, nor how they would propose that the UK influences EU external action from outside. In the political field as with post-withdrawal UK-EU economic relations, ‘Leave’ campaigners cannot say what ‘out’ looks like.

b) Withdrawal impact

In the shorter term, negotiating and implementing a British withdrawal from the EU, and the required replacement arrangements such as new trade agreements, would be disruptive and take up significant political, diplomatic and bureaucratic resources. This would apply primarily to the UK, the EU institutions and EU member states, but also to other states around the world. Disruption and additional work would affect the FCO in particular. The process would render the UK, EU and international community less able to act effectively on the numerous international challenges they currently face. This could risk making the UK less safe and less prosperous. The government has estimated that settling post-withdrawal arrangements could take a decade.iii

Into the longer term, a UK withdrawal would affect the nature of the EU as an international actor. Without the UK, the EU would have diminished military, diplomatic and intelligence capabilities among its member states. The voice among the member states for an outward-looking internationally engaged EU, with a responsible approach to security issues, would be weakened. By leaving, the UK would create an EU that would be more difficult to work with as a foreign policy partner.

The benefits of being in

Being in the EU strengthens the UK’s ability to achieve its foreign policy goals. EU foreign policy objectives largely align with the UK’s own, and the EU brings more weight and tools to bear on their achievement than the UK could alone.

EU international action has furthered UK foreign policy because of UK leadership and influence in this area of EU policy. Its military, diplomatic and intelligence capabilities and permanent UN Security Council seat put the UK alongside only France among the member states in its capacity to influence EU international policy. Our government’s priorities are closer to EU outcomes than those of most other EU governments. An independent study has shown that 73% of the time the UK preferred the policy of adopted legislation to the status quoiv and that the UK is on the winning majority side almost 9 times out of 10 in the EU Council.v

The UK has been in a leading role in bringing EU policy in behind its own preferred policy. The UK’s EU membership amplifies British security policy, for example in efforts to tackle Somali piracy off the coast of Africa. The same applies to British diplomacy. The UK helped lead a negotiated resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and the imposition of economic sanctions on Russia. Thanks to the EU’s diplomatic pressure and economic pull, there is relative peace and stability in the Western Balkans, despite the refugee crisis, with an independent Kosovo and stable Serbia starting to develop arrangements for peaceful co-existence. The EU is the world’s largest provider of humanitarian and development assistance, and the EU is an international leader in tackling climate change.

Being in the EU gives the UK a unique position as a member of all major international organisations. This strengthens the UK’s international influence.

As a member state, the UK is able to benefit from EU foreign policy cooperation without losing its freedom of action. In successive EU Treaty negotiations, successive UK governments led by both major UK parties have preserved EU foreign and defence policy as an area requiring unanimous decision-making, with a veto for each member state. The Prime Minister’s recent renegotiation has reinforced this, via a legally-binding recognition by the other member states that the UK “is not committed to further integration into the European Union”.vi EU membership does not require or prevent the UK’s use of its armed forces in its national interest. These arrangements make Britain stronger.

NATO

The UK’s EU membership strengthens effective relations between the EU and NATO. ‘Soft’ security challenges such as terrorism, organised crime and cyber-attack have underlying facilitators in non-defence fields, such as infrastructure, governance, economic development and trade regulation (for example, of arms, data, energy or the media). This places a greater premium on effective cooperation with the EU if NATO is to fulfil its security mission. Outside the EU, the UK would remain an important NATO member, by virtue of its close relationship with the US and the capabilities of its armed forces and intelligence agencies. However, the UK would be less able to influence the EU to develop in a way that strengthens NATO, and the increased non-overlap in membership would complicate coordination and information-sharing between the two organisations.

Authoritative voices support the view that the UK’s EU membership strengthens NATO. The NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, has said: “A strong European Union with a strong Britain is good for NATO”.vii Lt Gen Ben Hodges, Commanding General, US Army Europe, has said, in the context of a discussion of a possible UK withdrawal from the EU: “if the EU begins to become unravelled there can’t help but be a knock-on effect for the alliance also”.viii

US relations

The UK is a more useful ally for the US inside the EU than out. This is because of the influence that the UK can exercise over EU international action.

US President Barack Obama has said consistently that the US values a “strong United Kingdom in a strong European Union”.ix This position has been reiterated by Secretary of State John Kerryx and US Ambassador to London Matthew Barzun.xi

Commonwealth

The UK remaining in the EU will make the Commonwealth stronger. This is because of the influence that the UK can exercise over EU international policies if it remains in. We see no evidence that there is now any trade-off between the two organisations.

All authoritative figures from around the Commonwealth who have expressed a view have said that they would prefer the UK to remain in the EU:

Climate change

Successive UK governments have identified climate change as a threat to UK security, and international action to mitigate it as a key foreign policy objective.

The EU has been in the lead in international action against climate change. It was the first major participant to submit its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) for the COP21 UN Paris climate change conference in 2015, and it was an ambitious one. This set the bar high for other participants and helped to secure an ambitious legally binding international agreement, with the UK representative playing a key negotiating role.

21 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/treasury-committee/the-economic-and-financial-costs-and-benefits-of-uks-eu-membership/oral/30171.pdf#page=22

27 http://forbritain.org/cogchapter2.pdf#page=43

i http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Europa/Aussenpolitik/GASP/InstrumenteGASP_node.html

ii http://www.efta.int/media/documents/legal-texts/eea/the-eea-agreement/Main%20Text%20of%20the%20Agreement/EEAagreement.pdf

iii HM Government, “The process for withdrawing from the European Union”, Cm 9216, February 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/504216/The_process_for_withdrawing_from_the_EU_print_ready.pdf

viii http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-35808955




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