



House of Commons

Committee of Public Accounts

Delivering major projects in government

Thirty-first Report of Session 2015–16



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*Report, together with formal minutes relating
to the report*

*Ordered by the House of Commons
to be printed 9 March 2016*

The Committee of Public Accounts

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Publication

Committee reports are published on the Committee’s website at www.parliament.uk/pac and in print by Order of the House.

Evidence relating to this report is published on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee’s website.

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Stephen McGinness (Clerk), Dr Mark Ewbank (Second Clerk), George James (Senior Committee Assistant), Sue Alexander and Ruby Radley (Committee Assistants) and Tim Bowden (Media Officer).

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Summary

We have supported the Major Projects Authority's efforts to improve project delivery in government and recognise the steps it has taken to strengthen project assurance, improve transparency, and introduce project leadership training. But it is disappointing that after nearly 5 years we cannot see more tangible signs of what impact these initiatives have had. Moreover, there are still big challenges ahead. The Major Projects Authority rated 34% of the government's major projects as either 'red' or 'amber-red' at June 2015, meaning that successful delivery is unachievable or in doubt unless action is taken. For the projects due to deliver in the next 5 years, 35% are rated as red or amber-red. In this demanding environment, it is important that there is a body within government which challenges departments about their plans and implementation of projects. We are concerned that the merger of the Major Projects Authority and Infrastructure UK risks the new body (the Infrastructure and Projects Authority) becoming too much of a champion for government projects, at the expense of its vital role in challenging government performance.

Introduction

Government projects play a crucial role in delivering strategic objectives such as defence capability, new infrastructure and improving the efficiency of public services. Central government's biggest and riskiest projects are grouped into the Government Major Projects Portfolio (the Portfolio). In June 2015 the Portfolio comprised 149 projects with an estimated whole-life value of £511 billion. The Major Projects Authority was established in March 2011 with responsibility to provide independent assurance on the projects within the Portfolio. It was also responsible for providing support to those projects and for reporting on their performance. On 1 January 2016, the Major Projects Authority merged with Infrastructure UK to form the Infrastructure and Projects Authority.

Conclusions and recommendations

1. **The merged Infrastructure and Projects Authority's interest in promoting government projects risks compromising its ability to challenge government's performance.** The Infrastructure and Projects Authority (the Authority) is the result of the merger of two very different bodies; the Major Projects Authority, which provided valuable independent assurance over government projects, and Infrastructure UK (IUK), a body which promoted the development of infrastructure. The Authority is still looking at the plans of the two merged bodies and identifying ways the merger will improve performance. It argues that the merger of the two bodies will bring new expertise, for example on costing for large infrastructure projects, allow the Treasury and Cabinet Office to act together in decisions on financial approvals for projects, and will increase the level of support and intervention that it can provide to projects. But the Authority has not worked out how to evidence whether the merger is in fact leading to better outcomes.

Recommendation: *The Authority should maintain its focus on project assurance and support and, in January 2017, it should report to us on the benefits the merger with IUK has produced, with clear examples in relation to project approvals.*

2. **The Authority does not collect the data to allow a transparent, open and honest dialogue about project performance.** The Authority's most recent data on projects in the Portfolio was not good enough for the NAO to conclude on whether project delivery to time, cost and quality had improved. Nor does the Authority's annual publication of a limited set of project data six months in arrears give an up to date picture of performance. The Authority says that matters are improving but accepts that it still needs to collect data about project costs on a consistent basis, and improve the quantification of project benefits, before it can establish a clear baseline from which to measure performance. It is also working to improve its analysis of data to arrive at appropriate metrics to measure project performance and benefits.

Recommendation: *In its January 2017 report to us the Authority should set out how it has improved data collection and analysis, and set out clear milestones towards reporting publicly on how delivery to time, cost and quality has improved across the Portfolio.*

3. **Over-ambition, both in terms of project budgets and timescales and across the whole Major Projects Portfolio, is among the main reasons projects are at risk.** The Authority identified a failure to plan and set up projects from the outset as a major cause of projects ending up rated 'red' or 'amber-red'. It accepts that project timescales are sometimes too ambitious and that departments sometimes attempt too much within the political cycle. It is working on developing processes which would involve earlier interventions in a project's lifecycle, and thinking more about how to develop innovative or novel projects in manageable stages. It agrees that for projects which aim to change public behaviour there is a need for a revised approach to project initiation with a greater emphasis on public engagement from the earliest stages, as for many projects user buy-in is critical to success. Recognising the risk of trying to do too much, it is also working with departments to promote better prioritisation of projects and it sees Single Departmental Plans as an opportunity to help departments better match their resources and ambitions.

Recommendation: *The Authority should set out for us its plans for a revised approach for early intervention. These should cover: how it will put in place effective prioritisation across government; planning innovative projects in phases; and planning for public engagement on projects which aim to change behaviour.*

4. **The requirements of good project delivery are not understood well enough by policy developers and decision makers outside the project management profession.** We were impressed by the Major Project Leadership Academy's work to promote the principles of good project and programme management delivery, but this is only targeted at project management professionals. Ministers and Permanent Secretaries are often responsible for developing the policies which lead to projects and taking significant decisions on those projects. Yet very few Members of Parliament enter politics with previous experience in running large organisations or delivering major projects. Likewise, permanent secretaries', or potential permanent secretaries' careers will not necessarily include experience of delivering major projects. Without a good understanding of the project delivery process there is a danger that they could hinder the successful delivery of projects.

Recommendation: *By the start of the next parliamentary session, the Authority should offer seminars and workshops to extend awareness of the project delivery process. The training should be tailored to the needs of Members of Parliament and to fast track civil servants who are likely to be responsible for major projects.*

5. **The Civil Service faces serious skills shortages in delivering major projects, especially in the commercial and digital skills needed to deliver 'transformation' projects.** The Major Projects Portfolio (the Portfolio) includes a large number of transformation projects, such as the Courts Reform or Universal Credit projects. These projects are intended to fundamentally change how a process operates, and are often more difficult to deliver than traditional infrastructure projects. They also require commercial and digital technology skills which are areas where the Civil Service faces particular shortages. The Civil Service is acquiring these skills by hiring externally but this presents challenges such as agreeing appropriate remuneration levels. The Authority also told us it was struggling to retain project directors across the Portfolio.

Recommendation: *The Cabinet Office should set out specifically how the ongoing Civil Service reform process will accommodate the need to hire and retain people with the specialist skills, including commercial and digital technology skills, to deliver projects.*

6. **Improving the delivery of benefits is a priority, but there appears to be a gap in responsibilities for ensuring their realisation.** The Authority now requires that departments report project benefits against a standard framework, but the quality of data it receives on benefits is variable. Some projects leave the Portfolio without having an exit review with the Authority to ensure that they are on track to deliver their benefits. In any case, the Authority does not then follow up and monitor whether benefits are in fact delivered. Once a project has left the Portfolio, it is the individual department's responsibility to realise benefits and to evaluate success; but the assessment of whether projects have realised their benefits is a longstanding weakness in government.

Recommendation: *The Authority needs to push departments to state project benefits clearly and to establish appropriate data systems to measure them. It should certify that benefits are on target to be achieved before a project leaves the Portfolio. And it needs to make it clear to departments that once a project leaves the Portfolio the department is responsible for realising the agreed benefits.*

1 Demonstrating improvements in performance

1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Cabinet Office and the Infrastructure and Projects Authority (the Authority, formerly the Major Projects Authority).¹

2. The Government implements many of its objectives through projects. The Authority collects and publishes data, and commissions assurance, on many of central government's biggest and riskiest projects which are part of the Government Major Projects Portfolio (the Portfolio). The Portfolio had an estimated whole-life value of £511 billion in June 2015. Historically, the Government's track record in delivering projects successfully has been poor.²

3. Successive governments have tried to improve project delivery. These initiatives gathered pace during the last Parliament with the establishment of the Major Projects Authority.³ It had a mandate to improve the delivery of projects by providing assurance on major projects, reporting on the performance of the Portfolio, developing skills and capability and providing support, advice and interventions to improve project performance. On 1 January 2016, Infrastructure UK and the Major Projects Authority merged to form the Infrastructure and Projects Authority.⁴

The merger of the Major Projects Authority and Infrastructure UK

4. We supported the creation of the Major Projects Authority and recognised the progress it made in strengthening project assurance and improving the transparency of information on the costs, risks and performance of government's major projects. We recognise the legacy that the new, merged Infrastructure and Projects Authority has inherited of a number of projects that have been poorly planned and implemented.⁵ The challenges that it faces to improve project delivery within government are illustrated by the rating of delivery of 34% of the 149 projects in the Portfolio, as at June 2015, as 'red' or 'amber-red,' meaning that successful delivery is either unachievable or in doubt unless action is taken. 35% of the 106 projects in the Portfolio which were scheduled to finish between 2015–16 and 2019–20 were similarly rated as red or amber-red.⁶

5. Against this background, it is still critical that the Infrastructure and Projects Authority acts as an independent assurance agency, but this role may be at risk. Infrastructure UK was a body which focused on promoting infrastructure projects, and it is merging with the Major Project Authority whose role was to provide independent assurance and challenge to such projects. We put it to the Authority that it would not usually be considered wise to merge a delivery organisation with the body responsible for

1 [C&AG's Report, *Delivering major projects in government: a briefing for the Committee of Public Accounts, Session 2015–16*, HC 713, 6 January 2016](#)

2 [C&AG's Report, paras 1, 4, 1.1](#)

3 [C&AG's Report, para 5](#)

4 [C&AG's Report, para 1.7](#)

5 [Q 1, Committee of Public Accounts, Tenth Report of 2014–15, *Major Projects Authority*, HC 147, 16 July 2014](#)

6 [C&AG's Report, paras 2.12 to 2.16, Figures 8 & 9](#)

providing independent scrutiny of delivery. The Authority told us that it would continue to organise project reviews using its independent reviewers, and said it did not believe that its role as a body providing independent assurance over projects would be compromised.⁷

6. The Authority told us that, following the merger, it would be able to increase the level of support and intervention that it provided to projects.⁸ It said that the merger would improve its expertise, for example in the area of costs and cost estimating for large infrastructure projects, and that this would improve the quality of the recommendations which it made.⁹ It expected the merger to give the Authority more teeth in its assurance role by working more effectively with the Treasury to set conditions for projects to get financial approval, and said it would think about how to evidence that the merger had produced better outcomes. It wanted to use the merger as an opportunity to strengthen a number of other areas but had not identified them all.¹⁰

Data transparency and reporting

7. We asked the Authority how we should measure its performance. It replied that it was responsible for driving better outcomes and that it would expect to see the performance of projects, measured against time, quality and cost, improve over time. It told us it is working to develop a clear methodology for measuring individual project performance against such criteria.¹¹

8. The National Audit Office analysed the latest project data the Authority received from departments to see if it could identify whether project performance in the Portfolio was improving. On using this data, which related to cost, deliverability and benefits, it found that it could not draw clear conclusions. The main problems were that the data did not allow costs to be compared with a consistent baseline, or outturn costs and delivery dates to be compared with forecasts. There were also inconsistencies in how whole-life costs were reported by departments, for example whether costs were reported in real terms or nominal terms, or whether different index years were used.¹²

9. The Authority told us that it had taken steps to enhance the project data it collected from departments.¹³ It said that it was doing a great deal of work to improve the quality of that data, such as ‘harmonising’ it to make it consistent and coherent. It gave the example of cost data and its work to make sure that cost data were stated on the same basis.¹⁴

10. The Authority also told us about its work to improve the analysis of the data it collected. It explained that the first stage was to develop and agree with departments appropriate baselines to measure project performance, and then to establish performance metrics on schedule, cost and benefits.¹⁵ It viewed this as a process of continuous improvement and believed that by January 2017 it would be in much better shape to understand

7 [Q 4](#)

8 [Qq 5–7](#)

9 [Q 22](#)

10 [Q 22](#)

11 [Qq 80–89](#)

12 [Q 87, C&AG’s Report, para 2.6](#)

13 [Q 69](#)

14 [Qq 69, 70, 98](#)

15 [Qq 70, 84, 89–95, MJP0003 Written evidence submitted by the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, 29 January 2016](#)

performance, with further improvements in subsequent years.¹⁶ It cautioned that this process of improvement would take time and that it would be several years before it was able to establish clear trends in performance from the project data.¹⁷

11. The Authority publishes project information annually, including project ratings. The information released into the public domain is determined by the Cabinet's transparency policy, which requires that data are published six months in arrears. There is more transparency internally, with departments providing data on projects to the Authority quarterly.¹⁸ It told us that it aimed to create an environment of openness and transparency, but felt that publishing reports of assurance reviews would interfere with being able to have an open and honest conversation internally about project performance. The Cabinet Office pointed out that transparency would not on its own result in good projects—other factors such as capabilities and clear accountability were also required.¹⁹

12. The Authority has agreed with the Cabinet Office to measure its own performance through objectives relating to the training of project leaders, the deployment of project delivery fast track apprentices and fast streamers, the percentage of projects subject to an early intervention review by the Authority, and the ratings of projects on exit from the Portfolio.²⁰

Delivering benefits

13. The Authority told us that it has developed a more rigorous system of benefits description and measurement. It said that it had now introduced a standard framework against which departments were required to report.²¹ But problems remain. The Cabinet Office pointed out that there were still underlying weaknesses in the way that departments articulated benefits and the Authority also told us that there were weaknesses, which it was working to solve, in the quality of the data on benefits which it receives from departments.²² But the Authority stated that it wanted to create more transparency about project benefits and push harder for improvement.²³

14. An exit review, to ensure that a project is on track to deliver its benefits, should be conducted before the project is removed from the Portfolio. However between September 2012 and June 2015, the Authority removed 96 projects from the Portfolio but only conducted 80 exit reviews.²⁴ The Authority agreed with us that exit reviews should be compulsory, while the Cabinet Office believed that such reviews were already compulsory but that occasionally a project “slips through the net”.²⁵

16 [Q 88](#)

17 [Q 96, 97](#)

18 [C&AG's Report para 2.2](#)

19 [Qq 2-3](#)

20 [MJP003, Written evidence submitted by the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, 29 January 2016](#)

21 [Q 23](#)

22 [Qq 25, 69, 70, 72](#)

23 [Q 26](#)

24 [C&AG's Report para 2.19](#)

25 [Qq 24, 25, 79](#)

15. The Authority looks at project benefits when a project exits the Portfolio, but it is not in a position to monitor whether the benefits of a project are realised once it was completed and activities had become ‘business as usual’.²⁶ Departments are responsible for monitoring whether projects realise their intended benefits once they are completed, although in the past they have often failed to do this.²⁷ The Cabinet Office agreed with us that there was a need to measure whether the projected benefits were delivered, and the Authority agreed that at an exit review, benefits should be clearly documented and accountability for realising them might then pass solely to the department.²⁸

26 [C&AG’s Report para 2.19](#)

27 [C&AG’s Report para 2.18](#)

28 [Qq 75–79](#)

2 Tackling barriers to improvement

16. We asked the Authority what trends or recurring themes it had identified amongst the many projects which end up in trouble. It identified a failure to set up projects correctly in the first place, insufficient resources and unrealistic project timetables.²⁹ The three programmes it was most concerned about were: High Speed 2, because of its scope and scale; Courts Reform, because of its complexity; and Shared Services, because it was not going well, having not been well set up.³⁰ The latter two are transformation projects, which are amongst the most difficult for government to deliver and can present the greatest risk of failure.³¹ Often, as with Universal Credit, they rely on applying digital technologies to big business processes.³² Transformation and service delivery projects (as opposed to infrastructure, construction or defence equipment projects) accounted for 37% of the Portfolio as at June 2015.³³

17. The Authority's Chief Executive contrasted his experience in government with his previous experience in the private sector. He said that in the private sector he had experienced more rigour on project processes right at the beginning of a project.³⁴ Projects in the private sector would be benchmarked against industry standards for cost and timescales, which the government could also do for more traditional projects. He said that such benchmarking was very difficult for the more transformational projects in government, but nevertheless should be tried.³⁵ He also said that government projects had a greater political dimension and that this manifested itself most clearly in project timescales. He said that timescales can be squeezed to fit the political cycle.³⁶

Early planning and avoiding over-ambition

18. The Authority explained to us that it was introducing processes aimed at making much earlier interventions in projects. It said that it was working on getting closer to policy makers in order to review project conception as policy was developed. It mentioned a series of products which were in place to intervene early and provide advice to projects.³⁷ The Cabinet Office spoke of the need to be flexible and to apply different project management techniques and approaches to the early stages of projects. It said that this was especially true for complicated projects involving digital technology where it was unclear what the end state of project outputs would be.³⁸ The Common Agricultural Policy Delivery Programme, e-Borders and Universal Credit projects had all been over-ambitious in their expectations of new technologies.³⁹

19. The Authority recognised the danger of government trying to do too much and emphasised the resulting importance of project prioritisation. It explained what it was doing to encourage better prioritisation amongst departments, for example introducing

29 [Q 8](#)

30 [Qq 60–65](#)

31 [C&AG's Report para 12](#)

32 [Q 18](#)

33 [C&AG's Report Figure 1](#)

34 [Q 30](#)

35 [Q 22](#)

36 [Q 30](#)

37 [Qq 11–13, 21](#)

38 [Qq 18, 19](#)

39 [Q 18](#)

guidance to departments, pushing departments towards prioritisation by better matching up the resources they have with the projects that they have to do and encouraging portfolio management across government.⁴⁰ It expected the Single Departmental Plans, which would bring together departmental commitments and resources, to provide an opportunity to help departments prioritise as well as encouraging them to adopt more realistic project timescales.⁴¹

20. Some government projects seek to influence or change public behaviour. The Authority agreed with us that for such projects public engagement throughout the project and especially at the early stages is vital for success. It told us that the effectiveness of stakeholder engagement was part of its assurance framework and that it had provided guidance on understanding user needs up-front in digital projects.⁴²

Leadership capability

21. When Members first enter Parliament they may often do so without experience in running large organisations or delivering major projects. When such Members become ministers there is a danger that they will fail to understand project management processes and may attempt to override good practice. They could push for rapid project progress at points where a pause would be more sensible or make short-term political decisions without understanding the impact they will have on projects. The Authority agreed with us on the importance of senior decision makers understanding the difficulties and the key criteria for making successful projects. We note that it said that it had already started a process of workshops on projects for existing ministers and permanent secretaries.⁴³

22. Civil servants on the path to becoming permanent secretaries, and even some existing permanent secretaries may also lack experience in delivering major projects. The Cabinet Office agreed with us that it would be desirable for permanent secretaries to have a better blend of skill sets, which would differ for different departments because each department was different.⁴⁴ It was looking to promote people with deep experience, including delivery experience.⁴⁵

Skills gaps

23. The National Audit Office noted that there are shortages of the skills needed to deliver the government's transformational change projects.⁴⁶ The Cabinet Office explained that the increasing proportion of transformation projects in the Portfolio increases the need for commercial and digital technology skills. It warned that these were two areas where it had a critical skills shortage across the civil service. It said that it would have to recruit hundreds of people in the commercial area, and "probably thousands" in the technical area. It said that it was having to bring those people in from outside of the Civil Service and noted that this caused a series of problems such as issues around remuneration policy.⁴⁷

40 [Q 34](#)

41 [Qq 8, 19, 74](#)

42 [Qq 56–58, MJP0003 Written evidence submitted by the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, 29 January 2016](#)

43 [Qq 14–16](#)

44 [Qq 45–54](#)

45 [Qq 31](#)

46 [C&AG's Report para 3.4](#)

47 [Q 28](#)

24. We note the importance the Authority places on the Major Projects Leadership Academy (MPLA) and in creating awareness and understanding of the principles of good project delivery.⁴⁸ The MPLA programme included some coverage of commercial and digital aspects but there was a particular need to develop more of these skills across government.⁴⁹ The MPLA is for senior project officials and the Cabinet Office agreed that project delivery training should be a part of the training for civil servants at every level.⁵⁰

25. We asked about the civil service's ability to retain project directors and senior responsible owners. The Cabinet Office was concerned about the civil service's ability to recruit and retain good project directors, and had mechanisms available to enhance their pay.⁵¹ The Authority told us its latest return showed a decrease in turnover of senior responsible owners from 14% to 7% a quarter, equating to an average time in post of three and a half to four years.⁵² Many senior responsible owners still have other professional roles—the Authority told us their project responsibilities could range from 5 to 100% of their time, and 17 were responsible for more than one project.⁵³

48 [Qq 14, 59](#)

49 [Q 28](#)

50 [Q 55](#)

51 [Q 39](#)

52 [Qq 35, 39](#)

53 [MJP0003 Written evidence submitted by the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, 29 January 2016](#)

Formal Minutes

Wednesday 9 March 2016

Members present:

Meg Hillier, in the Chair

Deidre Brock	Stephen Phillips
Chris Evans	John Pugh
Nigel Mills	Karin Smyth
David Mowat	

Draft Report (*Delivering major projects in government*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 25 read and agreed to.

Introduction agreed to.

Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Thirty-first Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Thursday 17 March 2016 at 9.30am

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Wednesday 21 January 2016

Question number

John Manzoni, Chief Executive of the Civil Service and Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office, and **Tony Meggs**, Chief Executive, Infrastructure and Projects Authority, former Chief Executive Officer, Major Projects Authority

[Q1-99](#)

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

MJP numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 Infrastructure and Projects Authority (formally MPA) ([MJP0003](#))
- 2 PCS Union ([MJP0001](#))
- 3 Project Management Institute ([MJP0004](#))

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

The reference number of the Government's response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

Session 2015–16

First Report	Financial sustainability of police forces in England and Wales	HC 288 (Cm 9170)
Second Report	Disposal of public land for new homes	HC 289 (Cm 9170)
Third Report	Funding for disadvantaged pupils	HC 327 (Cm 9170)
Fourth Report	Fraud and Error Stocktake	HC 394 (Cm 9190)
Fifth Report	Care leavers' transition to adulthood	HC 411 (Cm 9190)
Sixth Report	HM Revenue & Customs performance 2014–15	HC 393 (Cm 9190)
Seventh Report	Devolving responsibilities to cities in England: Wave 1 City Deals	HC 395 (Cm 9190)
Eighth Report	The Government's funding of Kids Company	HC 504 (Cm 9190)
Ninth Report	Network Rail's: 2014–2019 investment programme	HC 473 (Cm 9220)
Tenth Report	Care Act first-phase reforms and local government new burdens	HC 412 (Cm 9220)
Eleventh Report	Strategic financial management of the Ministry of Defence and Military flying training	HC 391 (Cm 9220)
Twelfth Report	Care Quality Commission	HC 501 (Cm 9220)
Thirteenth Report	Overseeing financial sustainability in the further education sector	HC 414 (Cm 9220)
Fourteenth Report	General Practice Extraction Service	HC 503 (Cm 9220)
Fifteenth Report	Economic regulation in the water sector	HC 505
Sixteenth Report	Sale of Eurostar	HC 564
Seventeenth Report	Management of adult diabetes services in the NHS: progress review	HC 563

Eighteenth Report	Automatic enrolment to workplace pensions	HC 581
Nineteenth Report	Universal Credit: progress update	HC 601
Twentieth Report	Cancer Drugs Fund	HC 583
Twenty-first Report	Reform of the rail franchising programme	HC 600
Twenty-second Report	Excess Votes 2014–15	HC 787
Twenty-third Report	Financial sustainability of fire and rescue services	HC 582
Twenty-fourth Report	Services to people with neurological conditions: progress review	HC 502
Twenty-fifth Report	Corporate tax settlements	HC 788
Twenty-sixth Report	The Common Agricultural Policy Delivery Programme	HC 642
Twenty-seventh Report	e-Borders and successor programmes	HC 643
Twenty-eighth Report	Access to General Practice in England	HC 673
Twenty-ninth Report	Making a whistleblowing policy work: progress update	HC 602
Thirtieth Report	Sustainability and financial performance of acute hospital trusts	HC 709
First Special Report	Unauthorised disclosure of draft Report in the previous Parliament	HC 539