



House of Commons

Committee of Public Accounts

Use of consultants and temporary staff

Thirty-sixth Report of Session 2015–16



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Report, together with formal minutes relating to the report

*Ordered by the House of Commons
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The Committee of Public Accounts

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Committee reports are published on the Committee’s website at www.parliament.uk/pac and in print by Order of the House.

Evidence relating to this report is published on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee’s website.

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Stephen McGinness (Clerk), Dr Mark Ewbank (Second Clerk), George James (Senior Committee Assistant), Sue Alexander and Ruby Radley (Committee Assistants), and Tim Bowden (Media Officer).

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Contents

Summary	3
Introduction	4
Conclusions and recommendations	5
1 Assessing the need for consultants and temporary staff	8
Introduction	8
Developing the skills of the civil service	8
Improving long-term staff planning	9
2 Managing consultancy and temporary staff assignments	11
Monitoring the employment of consultants and temporary staff	11
Ensuring that temporary staff pay the right tax	12
Coordinating the procurement of consultants and temporary staff by departments	13
Ensuring that small businesses can bid for government work	13
Formal Minutes	14
Witnesses	15
Published written evidence	15
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament	16

Summary

Consultants and temporary staff can be a flexible and cost-effective part of the government workforce, for example to provide specialist skills that a department requires for a short period only. However, these resources can cost twice as much as permanent staff and the valuable experience in service delivery they gain during the assignment is lost once the assignment ends and they leave. Their use is therefore justified only when it is not feasible for departments to maintain the necessary skills in-house or to borrow those skills from elsewhere within the civil service. Spending controls introduced by the Cabinet Office in 2010 helped to reduce departments' spending on consultants and temporary staff from its peak in 2009–10 but spending has been increasing again since 2011–12.

Despite some progress since the previous Committee's 2010 report on this subject, we are disappointed that concerns identified then have not been properly addressed. We expect to see much better planning of skills needs across government and a clearer view from the Cabinet Office of the place of temporary resources in the overall workforce.

Introduction

The main 17 government departments and their agencies paid permanent staff salaries totalling £17 billion in 2014–15. Departments also spent between £1.0 billion and £1.3 billion on consultants and temporary staff, who are paid as independent suppliers rather than as employees. They can fulfil anything from highly specialist roles through to providing cover during peaks in demand for less skilled work, and the approach to managing these resources needs to be tailored accordingly. Both consultants and temporary staff are sometimes used to fill gaps in the skills of the civil service.

In 2010, as part of its plan to reduce the deficit, the Government introduced a more coordinated approach to the procurement of common goods and services, including for consultants and temporary staff. A series of cross-government contractual agreements (frameworks) are managed by the Crown Commercial Service, an agency of the Cabinet Office. The Government also introduced new spending controls which required departments to obtain ministerial approval before appointing external resources, and to inform the Cabinet Office before appointing consultants for more than 9 months.

Conclusions and recommendations

1. **We are not convinced that the Cabinet Office has a clear strategy to reduce the skills gap across government, including in project delivery.** Relying on external resources risks incurring costs that are higher than for the equivalent permanent staff and key knowledge being lost when temporary staff move on. The Cabinet Office told us that a good start has been made with setting up specialist functions within the civil service, the recruitment of 150 senior digital staff and the creation of ‘fast streams’ in commercial, technical and project management. However, departments will find it difficult to retain these recruits while the civil service lacks a clear career path for successful project delivery and technical specialists to rise to the highest level. We are also concerned that the Cabinet Office cannot properly be held to account for its future performance as its plans to develop the specialist functions remain vague and underdeveloped.

Recommendation: *The Cabinet Office needs to set out clearly how it will define success in developing key skills across government. By January 2017 it should have in place realistic targets for the skills it expects to be held within specialist functions and the senior civil service by the end of this Parliament.*

2. **Departments have not made progress with their workforce planning which means they do not know their future resource needs and will have to resort more often to using consultants and temporary staff.** This Committee has repeatedly urged government to identify its long-term skills requirements, but departments only made their first attempts at a detailed cross-government skills audit in 2013–14 and none of the 7 departments recently reviewed by the NAO had workforce plans covering the whole departmental group. Our witnesses expressed good intentions to develop better workforce plans over the next few years and they are now making some use of ‘surge teams’ within and between departmental groups to reduce the need for temporary staff to cover peaks in workload.

Recommendation: *By December 2016, all departments should produce a strategic workforce plan that covers their entire group for the next five years, identifying expected ‘skills gaps’ and other resource needs and how they will be filled (including by consultants and temporary staff). The Cabinet Office should provide us with an update, naming those departments still lagging behind, in March 2017.*

3. **The numbers of temporary staff employed by departments has been growing since 2011–12 and specialist temporary staff often cost twice as much as permanent staff.** Departments’ overall spending on temporary staff has increased by up to 90% since 2011–12: to between £679 million and £775 million in 2014–15. Poor data is available in some departments and centrally on the total cost, numbers and length of time temporary staff remain in post. In part this is due to the lack of a consistent distinction between consultants, temporary staff and other types of contractors used by departments. Of the three departments we questioned, only the Home Office reviewed the length of time temporary staff were in post, and it found that most of them had skills that the department already had or could readily recruit as permanent staff. Specialist staff typically cost twice as much as the comparable civil servant, with some earning more than the most senior civil servants. The number of temporary staff paid more than £1,000 per day has recently been reduced to 32. But

the fact that some temporary staff are paid so highly underlines the need to ensure that these arrangements do not become permanent by developing the relevant skills where possible within the civil service.

Recommendation: *By autumn 2016, all departments should have established regular reviews of the need for temporary staff across their whole group, the time in post and the progress made in filling more of these posts with permanent staff. The Cabinet Office should cover this issue in its update to us in March 2017.*

4. **We are not convinced that departments are doing all they can to ensure that temporary staff pay the right tax.** Almost all specialists are contracted through personal service companies and so can pay less tax than permanent staff with similar overall remuneration but who are on the payroll. In addition, as the employing department does not deduct tax on a PAYE basis, there is an increased risk that the wrong tax is paid. Defra and the Home Office review the tax calculation of some temporary staff, and Defra will now also review regularly their tax status. In its most recent evaluation of the arrangements, HM Treasury found problems in a minority of departments. As this Committee has previously stated, off-payroll arrangements are not appropriate for those in management positions or those working for a significant period with the same employer, and we are concerned that the numbers of these arrangements may rise as departments rely more on temporary staff. We note the announcement in the March budget, after we had taken evidence in February that the Government intends to place a duty on public sector organisations from April 2017 to ensure that their staff do not obtain a tax advantage by contracting through a personal service company for providing services on the same basis as employees.

Recommendation: *HM Treasury should re-evaluate its guidelines to departments in the light of Budget 2016. It should also require that departments immediately review whether their off-payroll staff should be on PAYE and, after April 2017, that departments review the calculation of tax for a sample of any temporary staff who continue to be contracted as a company.*

5. **Departments use central procurement agreements for only half of consultancy and temporary staff assignments, reducing government's ability to get the best deals.** As far as possible departments are expected to source consultants and temporary staff through the agreements negotiated by the Crown Commercial Service (CCS) on behalf of government. However, the NAO estimates that central agreements are not used for around half of consultancy and temporary staff assignments. The Cabinet Office feels unable to insist that departments make more use of the agreements and it considers that some highly specialised requirements are not suitable for a general agreement. However, it now intends to set up new agreements that are more commercially attractive to departments. Nevertheless, we would expect the proportion of spending going through the CCS agreements to be much higher than it currently is.

Recommendation: *From April 2016, all departments should use Crown Commercial Service agreements as their default option for appointing consultants and temporary staff, except in rare instances where, for example, particularly specialist skills are required and for which the business case provides a clear justification for use of other procurement routes.*

6. **The current procurement agreements for consultancy benefit large firms, and across all contracts there is minimal use of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).** Since 2010 the largest six suppliers have received three-quarters of assignments let through CCS consultancy agreements. In contrast, SMEs receive only 9% of consultancy work through CCS agreements, and 5% of all consultancy work, compared to the overall government target of 33% by 2020 set last year. The Cabinet Office accepted that the present agreements for both consultancy and temporary staff were inflexible and plans to redesign them during 2016. It is considering using an internet model (the Crown marketplace), with a view to enabling small suppliers to win 35% of consultancy engagements and 70% of temporary staff work let through CCS agreements.

Recommendation: *The Cabinet Office's Crown Commercial Service should set out how it will design wider SME participation into its new framework agreements, and specify a clear timescale with interim targets for the proportion of all government spending in these areas.*

1 Assessing the need for consultants and temporary staff

1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Cabinet Office, Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, and the Home Office.¹

Introduction

2. In 2010, as part of its plan to reduce the deficit, the Government changed the way departments appointed consultancy firms and temporary staff—individuals not formally employed by the department, which pays for their services on presentation of an invoice. Departments now operate common procedures for internal approval of proposed assignments, and Cabinet Office agreement is needed for consultancy assignments lasting more than 9 months. The Cabinet Office also expects departments to use cross-government agreements, administered by the Crown Commercial Service, for procuring consultants and temporary staff.²

3. These controls helped government make significant reductions in spending on consultants and temporary staff, and spending in 2011–12 was around £700 million compared to its peak of £2.7 billion in 2009–10. Nevertheless, more recently there has been upward pressure on spending: the NAO estimates that central government spending on consultants and temporary staff in 2014–15 was between £1.0 billion and £1.3 billion, nearly double that of 2011–12.³

Developing the skills of the civil service

4. Six years ago, the previous Committee reported that the Cabinet Office was not doing enough to grow government’s core skills, particularly in IT and in programme and project management. This was despite earlier recommendations in previous Committee reports in 2002 and 2007⁴ and the Cabinet Office’s own study on the use of consultants in 1994.⁵ However, despite further assurances from government, significant skills shortages remain. There is a lack of information about the skills available and those needed across departmental groups.⁶ None of the three departments who gave evidence to us had skills registers covering their departmental groups, and only the Home Office had done an analysis of its temporary staff to better understand the skills they need.⁷

5. One of the main risks for government of relying on consultants or other temporary staff is that key knowledge is lost when the assignment ends and the individuals move on. The Cabinet Office itself employs some 250 temporary staff and spends £1 on external

1 C&AG’s Report, [Use of consultants and temporary staff](#), Session 2015–16, HC 603, January 2016.

2 [Qq 25–27](#); C&AG’s Report, paras 1.3 and 3.2.

3 [Q 53](#); C&AG’s Report paras 6, 1.7–1.8.

4 Committee of Public Accounts, [Central government’s use of consultants and interims](#), Twelfth Report of Session 2010–11, HC 610, December 2010, [Better value for money from professional services](#), HC 309, Twenty-first Report of Session 2001–02, conclusion 28 and [Central government’s use of consultants](#), Thirty-first Report of Session 2006–07, HC 309, recommendation 7.

5 Cabinet Office, [The Government’s use of External Consultants: An Efficiency Unit Scrutiny](#), 1994.

6 [Qq 8–9, 11, 20](#).

7 [Q 52](#); C&AG’s Report para 1.15 and Figure 8.

expertise for every £4 it spends on permanent staff, the highest proportion among the main government departments. It told us that it was now recruiting 10 to 12 commercial specialists to replace temporary staff, but that it remained dependent in the short-term on temporary workers until the lengthy recruitment process for permanent staff can deliver sufficient staff.⁸ The Cabinet Office denied that the frequent use of consultants and temporary staff, the use of outsourcing and the 23% reduction in permanent staff since 2010, had damaged the capability of the civil service. However, it accepted that the civil service was critically short of some specific skills, including commercial, technical and project leadership.⁹

6. The Cabinet Office told us that it has now begun to rebuild civil service skills. From 2014 it has introduced a common system of annual skills audits covering departments and their arm's-length bodies.¹⁰ In addition, government has recruited 150 senior digital staff and created 'fast streams' in commercial, technical & project delivery and management to recruit and prepare junior staff for the senior civil service. The Cabinet Office believed that, despite the likely higher salaries on offer by the private sector, half of the skilled civil servants who left for the private sector might eventually return because of the interesting and demanding roles on offer in the public sector.¹¹

7. In 2013, the Government published its *Capabilities Plan*, as a key part of its overall Civil Service Reform Plan.¹² The purpose of the *Capabilities Plan* was to transform the civil service into a high-skilled, high-performance organisation that was less bureaucratic and more focused on delivering results.¹³ The Chief Executive of the civil service told us that he saw the development of civil service specialisms as one his key roles. Nevertheless, he has not set a specific target for future spending on consultants and temporary staff. He has agreed that in future workforce planning by departments should consider consultants and temporary staff and have effective mechanisms in place to track their use. We asked our witnesses whether more radical options had been considered, for example moving away from the present structure based on departments to a structure based on functions. The Cabinet Office does not think that the civil service as a whole should operate on a functional basis—although the Infrastructure & Projects Authority, which leads on project delivery, and the Government Internal Audit Agency already operate as functions working across all departments.¹⁴

Improving long-term staff planning

8. Strategic workforce planning is a management process which assesses an organisation's current staff resources and skills, predicts its future needs and plans how to meet these needs cost-effectively. None of the three departments we took evidence from, or the four others reviewed recently by the NAO, had strategic workforce plans covering their entire departmental group.¹⁵

8 [Qq 12–14, C&AG's Report](#), Figure 5.

9 [Qq 1–24, 52–54](#).

10 [Qq 2, 5–8, 11, 18, 22, 45](#); Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs ([CTS0002](#))

11 [Qq 52, 58–62](#).

12 Cabinet Office, *Meeting the Challenge of Change—a capabilities plan for the Civil Service*, April 2013 and HM Government, *The Civil Service Reform Plan*, June 2012.

13 Public Administration Select Committee, *Developing Civil Service Skills: a unified approach*, Fourth Report of Session 2014–15, HC 112, March 2015 page 3.

14 [Qq 9, 52, 54–58, 96–97](#); Cabinet Office, ([CTS0005](#)).

15 [C&AG's Report](#), para 7, 1.14; [Qq 2–9, 22](#).

9. All our witnesses expressed good intentions to develop their current workforce plans into more detailed strategic plans covering all the bodies and skills within their departmental group. However, the Cabinet Office conceded that its planning across the whole of government was currently restricted to commercial specialists, with digital and technical to follow soon. It expects that it will take “a little while” before such planning extends across all functions and bodies within the Cabinet Office itself. In the meantime, departments may have to pay higher prices for consultants or temporary staff which they might have avoided by better planning.¹⁶

10. Some individual arm’s-length bodies had more detailed plans than their parent departments. Some flexible use has been made of permanent staff both within and between departments. For example, some departments are making use of the HMRC ‘surge team’, which is to be expanded to 500 staff, and some of the Home Office’s agencies are sharing staff to handle seasonal peaks in workload. However, more effective workforce planning, and improved training of permanent staff, would allow more sharing or loaning of staff in future.¹⁷

11. The NAO found that while departments considered alternatives to the use of consultants and temporary staff in individual cases, none had assessed in overall terms what they were using them for and why permanent staff could not be deployed or recruited.¹⁸ There is very limited information available on the skills of consultants being employed with most assignments being unhelpfully classified as ‘management consultants’. The Cabinet Office told us that it hoped in future it would be able to test applications for using consultancy and temporary staff against improved workforce plans to assess whether the required tasks could be carried out by departments’ permanent staff.¹⁹ In the absence of strategic workforce planning covering all departments, government is unable to have meaningful discussions with the industry about its future requirements.²⁰

16 [Qq 10–11, 58, 79–80.](#)

17 [Qq 9, 39–41, 48, 89–93.](#)

18 [C&AG’s Report, Para 7; Q 84.](#)

19 [Qq 15, 43.](#)

20 [Qq 66, 103–105; Management Consultancies Association \(CTS0001\).](#)

2 Managing consultancy and temporary staff assignments

Monitoring the employment of consultants and temporary staff

12. The number of temporary staff employed by departments has been growing since 2011–12. Overall spending on temporary staff has increased by up to 90% since 2011 to between £679 million and £775 million in 2014–15, depending on the data source used. This increased spend was in part as a result of a 156% increase in the number of interim managers and a 44% increase in specialist contractors. The use of consultants had similarly increased by up to 84% to between £313 million and £636 million in 2014–15.²¹ Witnesses were unable to tell us why these increases had occurred. They conceded that in part it is a consequence of the 2010 moratorium which led to a dramatic halt to spending, which departments have now partly reversed. Cabinet Office believed that this recent increase underlines the need for a more fundamental transformation of the civil service.²²

13. While it can be cost-effective to use temporary staff and consultants for short periods, they are usually more expensive when the assignments become long-term or effectively permanent. The NAO found that specialist staff cost twice as much as the comparable civil servant, and that the most highly-paid temporary staff earn more than the most senior civil servants. Departments lack data on the total cost, numbers and length of time temporary staff remain in post.²³ The Cabinet Office assured us that it now regularly monitors temporary staff across government paid more than £1,000 per day and that numbers had fallen from 47 in May 2015 to 32 in February 2016. However our witnesses admitted that they lacked good quality data on how long other temporary staff had been continuously employed.²⁴ Of the three departments we questioned, only the Home Office had centrally reviewed the length of time their temporary staff had been in post, and it found that most had skills that the department already had or could recruit as permanent staff.²⁵

14. We questioned our witnesses on whether the current definitions of consultants and temporary staff developed by the Cabinet Office are still useful and the most appropriate. Spending data on contractors and temporary staff is likely to be incomplete and departments admitted that they did not have a budgetary overview of their spending in these areas. For example, the Ministry of Defence's Defence Equipment & Support organisation spent £481 million in 2013–14 on external suppliers, some of which are likely to be consultants or temporary staff.²⁶ The Cabinet Office is reviewing whether sufficient guidance exists.²⁷

15. An alternative definition of consultancy and temporary staff could be more useful in managing this spending, for example clearly distinguishing between specialist project-based work and the covering of shortages of staff for the delivery of ongoing business. The

21 [C&AG's Report](#) Figures 3 and 4, paras 5–6, 1.7–1.8, 1.13.

22 [Qq 19–21](#).

23 [C&AG's Report](#), Figure 17, paras 3.13 to 3.14

24 [Qq 15–17, 99–102](#); [C&AG's Report](#) para 3.15.

25 [Qq 106](#); [C&AG's Report](#) paras 2.9 and Figure 10.

26 [Qq 42–43](#); [C&AG's Report](#) paras 1.4–1.5; [Qq 46, 67, 86–88](#).

27 [Qq 98–101, 102, 103](#).

witnesses agreed that to employ consultants successfully on a project it is important for the department to be a good client by clearly defining the outputs and outcomes required and by holding the consultant responsible for delivery.²⁸

Ensuring that temporary staff pay the right tax

16. The Treasury established new rules in May 2012, which made departments responsible for ensuring that ‘off-payroll’ workers were meeting their tax obligations, and that board members and senior officials with significant financial responsibility had off-payroll arrangements only in exceptional circumstances, and then only for up to six months. In 2013–14, departments sought assurance on the tax affairs of 2,505 temporary staff and received satisfactory assurances from 2,248. In 257 cases, contracts were terminated or came to an end before assurance was received. HM Treasury also found four public bodies (Ministry of Defence, Department for Work and Pensions, UK Export Finance and NHS England) had not followed the rules. It imposed fines totalling £1.5 million on the Ministry of Defence and Department of Health.²⁹

17. As previous Committee reports have stated, off-payroll arrangements are not appropriate for those in management positions or those working for a significant period with the same employer. They concluded that off-payroll arrangements across central government occur too often and called on the Treasury to review lessons learnt and where this guidance could be strengthened so that all departments were consistent in how they applied it.³⁰

18. Since 2012, the number of temporary staff employed by departments has increased and 94% of specialists engaged through the Contingent Labour One agreement were contracted through personal service companies on an off-payroll basis. This means that they can pay less tax than permanent staff with similar levels of pay who have the right tax deducted by the department on a PAYE basis.³¹ Defra and the Home Office told us they follow HM Treasury rules and review the tax calculation of high-or medium risk temporary staff. Following our evidence session, Defra told us that it will strengthen its arrangements to regularly check that the tax status temporary staff remains unchanged.³²

19. The Government reported in Budget 2016 that inappropriate use of off-payroll arrangements by the public and private sectors is rising and is costing around £440 million a year in lost tax. From April 2017, all public sector bodies will be responsible for determining whether off-payroll arrangements should apply, and for deducting tax and National Insurance at source. The Government also proposes to develop a simpler set of tests and online tools to provide a clear answer as to whether off-payroll arrangements should apply in a particular case. It forecasts that these measures will raise an additional £555 million in tax by 2020–21.³³

28 Qq 63–64, 66.

29 House of Commons Written Statement by the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, (HCWS347), 5 March 2015.

30 Committee of Public Accounts, *Whole of Government Accounts 2012–13*, Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2014–15, HC 678, January 2015, conclusion 6.

31 C&AG’s Report para 14.

32 Home Office (CTS0005); Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (CTS0002)

33 HM Treasury, *Budget 2016*, HC 901, March 2016 paragraphs 1.148–1.489, 2.40 and Table 2.1.

Coordinating the procurement of consultants and temporary staff by departments

20. The Crown Commercial Service (CCS) negotiates agreements for the purchase of consultancy and temporary staff on behalf of central government. These allow CCS to use the combined purchasing power of departments to negotiate bulk discounts, and should therefore be used for all suitable assignments. The agreements are intended to be used for assignments above £100,000 in value up to a limit of £2 million, where contracts must be let through the OJEU process.³⁴ The NAO estimated that, despite an upward trend since 2011, around half of the spending on consultants and temporary staff is still outside the CCS agreements.³⁵ The Cabinet Office told us that individual departments range from between 20% up to 80% of work let through the relevant frameworks. It felt, however, that it could not insist that departments always use the agreements because some have specialised requirements which are not suitable for a general framework or which are provided by contractors as part of a larger outsourcing contract, for example for IT services.³⁶

Ensuring that small businesses can bid for government work

21. The Government's aspiration was that 25% of all government procurement spend would be through small and medium enterprises (SMEs) by 2015, rising to 33% by 2020.³⁷ The Cabinet Office told us that while about 64% of temporary staff assignments managed through CCS agreements were supplied through SMEs in 2014–15, the equivalent figure for consultancy work through the agreements is only about 9%. Just 5% of all government consultancy spend in 2014–15 was with SMEs.³⁸

22. The Cabinet Office accepted that the present agreements for consultancy and temporary staff were inflexible and it plans to redesign them during 2016. Since 2010, the largest six consultancy suppliers have been awarded three-quarters of the assignments let through CCS agreements, as they are considered to offer a wide range of expertise covering most departmental needs.³⁹ In contrast some suppliers who are listed on the agreements have received little or no work, while others complained that they were unable to secure a place on the agreement and could not therefore compete for work. The Cabinet Office is considering other models including an internet based system (the Crown Marketplace), which could allow a larger number of small firms to compete.⁴⁰ The Cabinet Office could also consider establishing a civil service mutual organisation, to manage temporary staff employed by departments. The Cabinet Office has targets for SMEs to deliver 35% of consultancy engagements and 70% of temporary staff work through the redesigned agreements.⁴¹

34 [Qq 14, 46–48](#); Cabinet Office ([CTS0003](#))

35 [C&AG's Report](#) paras 7, 3.7 to 3.8, [Figure 14](#) and [Figure 15](#).

36 [Qq 25–35 and 49–51](#); Cabinet Office ([CTS0003](#))

37 Announcement by the Minister for the Cabinet Office, [Big opportunities for small firms: government set to spend £1 in every £3 with small businesses](#), 27 August 2015.

38 [Qq 25, 107](#); [C&AG's Report](#) paras 10, 2.12 and 2.14.

39 [Qq 26–35, 44](#).

40 [C&AG's Report](#) para 3.10; [Qq 107–109](#).

41 [Qq 112–113](#); Cabinet Office ([CTS0003](#))

Formal Minutes

Wednesday 13 April 2016

Members present:

Meg Hillier, in the Chair

Mr Richard Bacon	David Mowat
Caroline Flint	John Pugh
Mr Stewart Jackson	Karin Smyth
Nigel Mills	

Draft Report (*Use of consultants and temporary staff*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 22 read and agreed to.

Introduction agreed to.

Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Thirty-sixth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Monday 18 April 2016 at 3.30pm]

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Monday 1 February 2016

Question number

John Manzoni, Chief Executive of the Civil Service and Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office, **Clare Moriarty CB**, Permanent Secretary, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and **Mike Parsons**, Chief Operating Officer, Home Office

[Q1-130](#)

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

CTS numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 Cabinet Office ([CTS0003](#))
- 2 Defra ([CTS0002](#))
- 3 Home Office ([CTS0005](#))
- 4 Management Consultancies Association ([CTS0001](#))

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

The reference number of the Government's response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

Session 2015–16

First Report	Financial sustainability of police forces in England and Wales	HC 288 (Cm 9170)
Second Report	Disposal of public land for new homes	HC 289 (Cm 9170)
Third Report	Funding for disadvantaged pupils	HC 327 (Cm 9170)
Fourth Report	Fraud and Error Stocktake	HC 394 (Cm 9190)
Fifth Report	Care leavers' transition to adulthood	HC 411 (Cm 9190)
Sixth Report	HM Revenue & Customs performance 2014–15	HC 393 (Cm 9190)
Seventh Report	Devolving responsibilities to cities in England: Wave 1 City Deals	HC 395 (Cm 9190)
Eighth Report	The Government's funding of Kids Company	HC 504 (Cm 9190)
Ninth Report	Network Rail's: 2014–2019 investment programme	HC 473 (Cm 9220)
Tenth Report	Care Act first-phase reforms and local government new burdens	HC 412 (Cm 9220)
Eleventh Report	Strategic financial management of the Ministry of Defence and Military flying training	HC 391 (Cm 9220)
Twelfth Report	Care Quality Commission	HC 501 (Cm 9220)
Thirteenth Report	Overseeing financial sustainability in the further education sector	HC 414 (Cm 9220)
Fourteenth Report	General Practice Extraction Service	HC 503 (Cm 9220)
Fifteenth Report	Economic regulation in the water sector	HC 505 (Cm 9237)
Sixteenth Report	Sale of Eurostar	HC 564 (Cm 9237)
Seventeenth Report	Management of adult diabetes services in the NHS: progress review	HC 563 (Cm 9237)

Eighteenth Report	Automatic enrolment to workplace pensions	HC 581 (Cm 9237)
Nineteenth Report	Universal Credit: progress update	HC 601 (Cm 9237)
Twentieth Report	Cancer Drugs Fund	HC 583 (Cm 9237)
Twenty-first Report	Reform of the rail franchising programme	HC 600
Twenty-second Report	Excess Votes 2014–15	HC 787
Twenty-third Report	Financial sustainability of fire and rescue services	HC 582
Twenty-fourth Report	Services to people with neurological conditions: progress review	HC 502
Twenty-fifth Report	Corporate tax settlements	HC 788
Twenty-sixth Report	The Common Agricultural Policy Delivery Programme	HC 642
Twenty-seventh Report	e-Borders and successor programmes	HC 643
Twenty-eighth Report	Access to General Practice in England	HC 673
Twenty-ninth Report	Making a whistleblowing policy work: progress update	HC 602
Thirtieth Report	Sustainability and financial performance of acute hospital trusts	HC 709
Thirty-first Report	Delivering major projects in government	HC 710
Thirty-second Report	Follow-up on transforming contract management	HC 711
Thirty-third Report	Contracted out health and disability assessments	HC 727
Thirty-fourth Report	Tackling tax fraud	HC 674
Thirty-fifth Report	Department for International Development: responding to crises	HC 728
First Special Report	Unauthorised disclosure of draft Report in the previous Parliament	HC 539
Second Special Report	Network Rail's 2014–2019 investment programme: Office of Rail and Road Response to the Committee's Ninth Report of Session 2015–16	HC 905