House of Commons
Committee of Public Accounts

Department for International Development: responding to crises

Thirty-fifth Report of Session 2015–16
House of Commons
Committee of Public Accounts

Department for International Development: responding to crises

Thirty-fifth Report of Session 2015–16

Report, together with formal minutes relating to the report

Ordered by the House of Commons
to be printed 13 April 2016
The Committee of Public Accounts

The Committee of Public Accounts is appointed by the House of Commons to examine “the accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted by Parliament to meet the public expenditure, and of such other accounts laid before Parliament as the committee may think fit” (Standing Order No. 148).

Current membership

Meg Hillier (Labour (Co-op), Hackney South and Shoreditch) (Chair)
Mr Richard Bacon (Conservative, South Norfolk)
Harriett Baldwin (Conservative, West Worcestershire)
Deidre Brock (Scottish National Party, Edinburgh North and Leith)
Chris Evans (Labour (Co-op), Islwyn)
Rt Hon Caroline Flint (Labour, Don Valley)
Kevin Foster (Conservative, Torbay)
Mr Stewart Jackson (Conservative, Peterborough)
Nigel Mills (Conservative, Amber Valley)
David Mowat (Conservative, Warrington South)
Stephen Phillips (Conservative, Sleaford and North Hykeham)
Bridget Phillipson (Labour, Houghton and Sunderland South)
John Pugh (Liberal Democrat, Southport)
Karin Smyth (Labour, Bristol South)
Mrs Anne-Marie Trevelyan (Conservative, Berwick-upon-Tweed)

Powers

Powers of the Committee of Public Accounts are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No. 148. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publication

Committee reports are published on the Committee’s website at www.parliament.uk/pac and in print by Order of the House.

Evidence relating to this report is published on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Stephen McGinness (Clerk), Dr Mark Ewbank (Second Clerk), George James (Senior Committee Assistant), Sue Alexander and Ruby Radley (Committee Assistants), and Tim Bowden (Media Officer).

Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Committee of Public Accounts, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 4099; the Committee’s email address is pubaccom@parliament.uk.
Contents

Summary 3

Introduction 4

Conclusions and recommendations 5

1 The Department for International Development’s performance 8

Assessing performance 9

2 Resourcing the Department’s response to crises 11

The people needed for crisis response 11

The Department’s response to the Ebola outbreak 12

Establishing a crisis response 12

3 Working with partners 14

The United Nations and other multilateral organisations 14

Delivery chains 15

Formal Minutes 16

Witnesses 17

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament 18
Summary

Responding to humanitarian crises is one of the main responsibilities of the Department for International Development (the Department). Its spending in this area has trebled in the 4 years to 2014–15, and now exceeds £1 billion. Many aspects of its approach to responding to crises are working well, leading to positive results. The Department is a major player in the international humanitarian system and is well regarded by its partners. It is seen as innovative, agile and influential. The Department’s staff and those of its partners show considerable commitment and bravery when working in volatile and dangerous environments. Nonetheless, the Department can improve value for money, particularly in its response to those complex, longrunning crises, such as Syria and Yemen, in which it is increasingly involved. It needs to strengthen its systems for resourcing and assessing the performance of its interventions, as well as improving its oversight of partners. It must also make full use of its influence if it is to secure much needed change to the international humanitarian system led by the United Nations (UN). The World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016 provides a timely opportunity for the Department to bring its influence to bear.
Introduction

Over recent years, the number and severity of crises that have humanitarian consequences have been increasing. Crises threaten the health, safety, security, wellbeing and livelihoods of people and impede the progress of developing countries. Some crises occur suddenly, such as natural disasters; others develop over time and become protracted. The Department leads the UK Government’s response to humanitarian crises, often working with other government departments. In 2014–15, the Department spent almost £1.3 billion on humanitarian assistance, representing 14% of its overall budget (compared to 6% in 2010–11). The Department provides most of its crisis response by funding UN agencies and other multilateral organisations, non-governmental organisations and contractors. These first-tier partners often deliver assistance through engagement with their own partners.
Conclusions and recommendations

1. **The Department, its staff and many of its partners are doing a good job of intervening across an increasing number and range of crises.** The Department is currently responding to 21 crises around the world, with a variety of causes such as conflict, natural disaster, disease and weather events, including droughts. Some of these interventions involve the Department’s staff and its partners operating in dangerous environments, where their health and indeed their lives may be at risk. The Department’s interventions in crises have achieved tangible results, including: controlling the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone; improving the resilience of many thousands of chronically poor people in the Horn of Africa who face food insecurity; and building the capability of the Philippine Government to deal with the impact of typhoons. We recognise that the environments in which the Department operates are inherently challenging and that achieving the optimal use of resources is not easy. In that context, our recommendations focus on those areas where the Department can build on its current approach so that it is well placed to secure value for money from all its crisis interventions.

2. **The Department does not have a full and clear understanding of what constitutes success across its crisis interventions.** The Department assesses the performance of individual interventions. It looks at performance across its sudden-onset interventions, but does not have such a structured approach for its protracted interventions, limiting its ability to learn lessons. The Department has found it difficult to establish performance measures which allow it to aggregate, and report publicly, its performance across all of the crisis interventions it makes, which now account for a sixth of its total budget. As a consequence, it is difficult for the Department to demonstrate whether its performance is improving.

**Recommendation:** The Department should extend its approach to reviewing performance across its portfolio of sudden onset crises to include longer running and more complex crises. It should use the resulting information to aid its decision-making and to provide assurance to Parliament on its performance.

3. **The Department plans to increase its capability to respond to crises but has yet to identify the most cost-effective mix of civil servants and contractor staff.** The Department employs humanitarian advisers and other experts such as conflict advisers. It also has a contract which enables it to bring in external support as and when required, which it is currently re-letting. It told us that it was looking to increase its capacity and capability in both areas but had yet to determine the best mix between internal and external experts. Contractors provide a flexible resource which can be deployed quickly to supplement the Department’s staff and can provide expertise that the Department may only need to draw on occasionally. Contractors can, however, be expensive, especially when engaged for long periods.

**Recommendation:** Before re-letting its contract in 2017 for humanitarian support, the Department should assess the most cost-effective way of securing the specialist capability it needs to respond to crises and ensure that it is only contracting for those skills which are not already available in-house.
4. The Department does not have a good understanding of the impact on its wider business when it moves staff and resources from planned activities to support a major response to a crisis. The effectiveness of the Department’s response to the Ebola outbreak relied on it transferring 164 staff from other teams to work on its response, and relied on the good will of its staff to be able to do so. We heard from the Department that it organised staff moves in such a way as to ensure that it could still deliver the Government’s top-level development commitments, while delaying and stopping some activities that were a lower priority. But the Department has not assessed the impact of delaying or stopping activities, as it was concerned that to do so would have required a big exercise that would not have been value for money. We argued that there are proportionate ways of identifying the impact, it need not be a huge exercise, and that such information would help the Department decide how best to manage the reallocation and transfer of staff when it faces new crises.

Recommendation: The Department should assess the impact its response to the Ebola outbreak had on the progress and results of programmes run by teams that released staff and funding to enable the response.

5. For some complex crises, the Department’s support systems have hindered its establishment of a fully operational local presence. The Department’s success in quickly and effectively deploying teams overseas for a short time to respond to natural disasters, has not always been mirrored in other crises. In Lebanon, for example, it took the Department nine months to fill one of the key posts in its team in Beirut and there were delays in getting important equipment on site. When responding to the Ebola outbreak, the Department’s human resource team did not work sufficiently closely with the team managing the response, leading to some loss of morale among staff transferred onto the Ebola team.

Recommendation: Within the next 6 months, the Department must develop its systems so that it can quickly deploy staff, and provide them with the support and equipment they need to work effectively in complex crises.

6. The value for money for the UK taxpayer of the Department’s funding of UN agencies is undermined by the overlapping remits of the agencies and inflexibility in their systems. UN organisations received around half of the Department’s £1,288 million spending on humanitarian activities in 2014–15. Despite being a major and wellregarded donor, the Department has found it difficult to influence the UN to adapt its structure and the practices of individual UN bodies to improve their effectiveness. The Department has now identified 3 priorities for UN agencies—encouraging them to: work together more effectively; improve the quality of their data; and extend the period over which they commit to fund the partners they engage to deliver services. The Department sees the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016 as an opportunity for it to influence the wider humanitarian system, of which UN agencies are a major part.

Recommendation: The Department should, by the end of August 2016, report back to us on the impact it has had at the World Humanitarian Summit in bringing about improvements against its 3 priority areas for improvement.
7. For many of its crisis interventions, the Department does not have a full understanding of how much of the taxpayer’s pound is spent by which bodies and on what. The Department’s partners incur a range of costs in delivering assistance. For example, on staff, food and supplies, and on the transport and security necessary to get these items to beneficiaries. For many of its interventions, the Department does not have a good understanding of the size of the different cost components, making it difficult to establish benchmarks and make better informed decisions on the selection and management of partners. Furthermore, in complex projects the Department does not always know the range of organisations its first-tier partners are funding, making it difficult for the Department to manage risks. The Department accepts that it ought to be able track who is receiving and spending UK taxpayer’s money.

Recommendation: As a matter of routine, the Department should identify all the bodies involved in providing assistance, the funding each receives and the main costs incurred. It should use this information to help manage risk and identify cost-effective partners and practices.
1 The Department for International Development’s performance

1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department for International Development (the Department). We also took evidence from three non-governmental organisations that assist people affected by crises: Save the Children; the British Red Cross; and Médecins Sans Frontières. We also drew on the previous Committee’s 2015 report on the UK’s response to the crisis arising from the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa.

2. The number of humanitarian crises and their impact is increasing, and the number of people in humanitarian need has more than doubled since 2004 to over 100 million people. In 2014 almost 60 million people were forcibly displaced through conflict, persecution, generalised violence, or human rights violations. Other people are affected by major outbreaks of disease, such as Ebola, and by natural disasters and weather events, including droughts. Some crises occur suddenly, such as the 2015 earthquake in Nepal. Others develop over time and become protracted, such as the Syria crisis. Crises impede the progress of developing countries, threatening people’s health, safety, security, wellbeing, and livelihoods.

3. The Secretary of State for International Development has set leading the UK Government’s response on emergencies as one of the Department’s three priorities. The Department often involves other government departments when it responds to a crisis and the UK’s contribution is in turn often part of an international response coordinated by the UN. The Department funds UN bodies, other multilateral organisations, non-governmental organisations and contractors to provide its crisis response.

4. The Department’s spending on humanitarian assistance has risen rapidly from £433 million in 2010–11 to £1,288 million in 2014–15. As a result, the proportion of the Department’s budget it has spent on humanitarian assistance has risen over the same period from 6% to 14%.

5. The Department has responded to 32 crises since 2011. By December 2015, it had exited from 11 of these crises and was continuing to provide assistance in the other 21. The 21 included protracted crises caused by droughts and sudden-onset crises caused by natural disasters, and the Department has considerable experience of responding to both these types. The 21 also includes some crises caused by conflict, such as in Syria and Yemen. The Department told us that operating in war zones was much harder in recent years, with terrorists and combatants in wars attacking those seeking to provide help and

---

3 C&AG’s Report, paras 1.1, 1.2
4 C&AG’s Report, paras 1.3, 1.5, 3.2, Figure 11
5 C&AG’s Report, para 1.13, Figure 6
6 C&AG’s Report, para 1.8
relief to victims.⁷ We commend and thank the staff of the Department and its partners for their bravery in working in such environments, and also those people that put their health at risk in tackling the Ebola outbreak.

6. We asked the 3 non-governmental organisations about the Department’s strengths and weaknesses. Save the Children said the Department was agile, innovative and thoughtful in areas such as responding to sudden onset emergencies and longer-term work in disaster response and resilience.⁸ Médecins Sans Frontières and the British Red Cross said that the Department was a major and influential player in the international humanitarian system and how that system responds to crisis. Médecins Sans Frontières explained that in the Syria crisis the Department had pushed the UN to work cross-border to provide assistance to people in Syria.⁹ These views chime with the National Audit Office’s findings. It reported that multilateral organisations and non-governmental organisations had told them that the Department was effective in contributing to the development of humanitarian policy and the humanitarian system.¹⁰

7. The Department’s crisis interventions can be in complex, volatile and often dangerous environments, where it may be one of many organisations involved. This can have consequences for the assessment of value for money, because it can be difficult for the Department to identify results, attribute them to its spending and thus assess the cost-effectiveness of different programmes.¹¹

Assessing performance

8. The Department reviews the progress of individual interventions and assesses them once completed. It has also started to bring together cost and performance information for each of its crises.¹² However, it acknowledged that it could do more to ensure that it was learning lessons across all its portfolio of crisis interventions.¹³ It currently looks at performance across its sudden-onset interventions to identify lessons, but does not have such a structured approach for its protracted interventions.¹⁴

9. The Department has reported that its interventions in individual crises have achieved significant results. In Sierra Leone, the UK led the international response to help control, treat and ultimately halt the Ebola outbreak.¹⁵ In the Horn of Africa, the Department has reported that it has achieved, or come close to achieving, its targets for providing a range of humanitarian assistance and other support to improve the livelihoods and resilience of thousands of often chronically poor people in Kenya and Somalia.¹⁶ The Department told us how, since Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, it had helped the Philippine Government to build its own capability to deal with the impact of weather events. The Department said that, as a result, when Cyclone Melor struck in 2015, the Philippine Government was able to cope.¹⁷
The National Audit Office found that the diversity of crises to which the Department responds had made it difficult for it to obtain a good view of its achievements across its range of crisis interventions. We asked the Department how it judges whether its performance in managing crises is improving and whether it is getting the most from its spending. The Department told us that it had a system of aggregating the success of each intervention into a score across its portfolio which it can track month by month. The Department said its portfolio of humanitarian interventions performed quite well, but it did not say how its portfolio score had changed over time. Nor has it reported its portfolio score—or other measures of its overall performance in managing crises—in its 2014–15 annual report or, as far as we are aware, in other public documents.
2 Resourcing the Department’s response to crises

The people needed for crisis response

11. We asked the Department about the people they needed to respond to a crisis. It told us that the skills and experience needed to respond to an earthquake were very different from those needed for a response to a typhoon or to an Ebola-style epidemic. It also said that when responding to prolonged crises it needed a mixture of senior managers, programme managers and humanitarian experts from the Department.21 It said it also needed humanitarian experts, including some who could bring technical skills that are not available in government, such as running air transport systems or undertaking disaster epidemiology. The Department therefore uses contractors for these roles.22 Depending on the nature of a crisis, the Department may also use some of the other specialist staff it employs, such as experts in conflict for its response to the Syria crisis.23

12. The Department has increased the number of humanitarian experts—known as humanitarian advisers—it employs from 14 in 2013 to 35 at November 2015. It told us it would be hiring more humanitarian advisers as crisis response is becoming a bigger part of its business.24 The National Audit Office reported that the Department’s partners held their humanitarian advisers in high regard. This was confirmed by the non-governmental organisations we took evidence from.25

13. The Department has a contract which enables it to obtain humanitarian experts to supplement its internal capacity. In the 12 months to August 2015, the Department paid a total of £16 million for staff provided by its contractor.26 The Department told us that there were two reasons why it engaged contract staff. First, because it is not sensible for the Department to keep on a permanent basis all the capabilities it may need to draw on only occasionally. Second, it needs access to additional capacity. The Department explained that if it did not bring in extra resource for crises, it would have to reallocate its own staff and this would impact on the delivery of the Department’s activities which are not linked to emergency response.27

14. The Department is retendering its contract for humanitarian support and aims to have a new contract in place by February 2017. It told us that it was looking for its future supplier to have a much larger capability at the Department’s disposal.28

---

21 Qq 62–64
22 Qq 51, 58
23 C&AG’s Report, para 2.7
24 Q 38; C&AG’s Report, para 2.8
25 Qq 14, 16; C&AG’s Report, para 2.8
26 C&AG’s Report, para 2.9
27 Qq 51–52
28 Q 60; C&AG’s Report, para 2.12
15. While contractors add to the Department’s capability, they are more expensive than the Department’s own staff, and are particularly expensive when deployed for long periods. They may also lack understanding of how government works.\(^{29}\) We therefore asked the Department about what was the correct mix between in-house staff and contractors. It told us that was the key question it was wrestling with at the moment.\(^ {30}\)

**The Department’s response to the Ebola outbreak**

16. The Department told us that it had never had to do anything on the scale of its response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014 before. Some 252 staff were involved in its response, including 75 contractors and 13 staff from the Government’s Stabilisation Unit.\(^ {31}\) The remaining 164—some 5% of the Department’s workforce—volunteered and were transferred from other teams. The Department’s ability to respond at scale therefore relied on the goodwill of its staff.\(^ {32}\) The Department also had to reallocate £150 million of funding from other programmes in 2014–15 to fund its response.\(^ {33}\)

17. We asked the Department about the effect of transferring 164 staff for the Ebola response on other parts of its business. The Department told us that it organised itself to make sure that the Government’s top-level commitments on development for the last Parliament were still delivered. It said that “lots of other things had to give” that were a lower priority to the Department.\(^ {34}\)

18. The Department told us that it had not identified all of things that were delayed or stopped as a result of transferring staff to its Ebola response. It was concerned that doing so would have required a big data gathering exercise to work out what all the staff would otherwise have been doing, and that such an exercise would not have been value for money.\(^ {35}\) We suggested there were proportionate ways of identifying the main impacts. For example, undertaking a desk-based exercise to identify what capacities were lost when staff were transferred and what the future impacts might be. Such information would help the Department decide how best to manage the reallocation and transfer of staff to help it to prioritise between future crises and ongoing development activities. The Department said that it was open to conducting such an exercise.\(^ {36}\)

**Establishing a crisis response**

19. The National Audit Office reported that the Department’s processes for supporting a response to sudden-onset disasters appear appropriate. There were no major problems in the Department’s response to the 2015 earthquake in Nepal, where the Department had an established country office. The Department’s partners praised its speed of its response and of its funding.\(^ {37}\) The Department has also been able to respond well to natural disasters in countries where it does not have an established presence. For example, the Department

---

\(^{29}\) Qq 57–58; C&AG’s Report para 15  
\(^{30}\) Q 59  
\(^{31}\) Q 38; the Stabilisation Unit is a Government agency supporting efforts to tackle insecurity overseas.  
\(^{32}\) Q 65; C&AG’s Report, Key facts, page 4, para 2.13  
\(^{33}\) C&AG’s Report, para 2.19, The Department also allocated £94 million from its contingency fund to the Ebola response.  
\(^{34}\) Q 38, 81–82, 85  
\(^{35}\) Q 82  
\(^{36}\) Qq 83–85, C&AG’s Report, para 22d  
\(^{37}\) Q 10; C&AG’s Report, para 2.21
identified in advance the considerable scale of Typhoon Haiyan, which hit the Philippines at the end of 2013. It therefore sent a team to the Philippines 24 hours before the typhoon hit.\(^\text{38}\)

20. The Department, however, has encountered challenges when it has needed to sustain a presence to a complex crisis. In the Lebanon, for example, the Department quickly established a presence, including a permanent head of its new country office. However, the team’s work was initially hampered by delays in being able to access equipment such as a printer. And it took the Department nine months to recruit a deputy head for the new country office.\(^\text{39}\)

21. The National Audit Office found that the Department’s human resource system was not as flexible as it needed to be support the deployment of staff as part of its response to the Ebola outbreak.\(^\text{40}\) The Department accepted that there were things that its human resource department and its team in Sierra Leone could have done better and quicker. For example, they could have been quicker to establish arrangements for allowances and terms and conditions. It told us that the delays had some affect on staff morale but not operations. It also told us that its human resource department and its team in Sierra Leone did get things right, such as providing resilience support to staff.\(^\text{41}\)
3 Working with partners

The United Nations and other multilateral organisations

22. UN organisations received around half of the Department’s £1,288 million spending on humanitarian activities in 2014–15. The UK is one of the largest donors to some of the UN’s main humanitarian agencies. UN agencies told the National Audit Office that the Department was a well-regarded but demanding donor.

23. The non-governmental organisations we took evidence from were critical of the performance of UN organisations and of the Department’s oversight of the funding it gave multilateral organisations. Médecins Sans Frontières told us that some of the defined mandates of UN bodies overlap, leading to turf wars, impeding effectiveness and slowing down the humanitarian system. It said it looked to the Department to streamline and improve UN agencies’ performance. The British Red Cross said that quite a lot of money is channelled through multilateral organisations because it is simple and easier to do, rather than build capacity at a local level which can be “complex, long-term work”. Save the Children suggested that the value for money of non-governmental organisations for the British taxpayer was scrutinised more than the funding given to multilateral organisations.

24. The Department told us that the UN plays a unique role in responding to crises and had learnt significant lessons over time, for example, in responding to natural disasters. However, the Department said that there was more that the UN could do. The Department told us it was keen for the UN agencies to make progress in 3 areas:

a) **To work together better and compete less.** However, the Department explained to us why it considered this was difficult to achieve. The UK is just one of 200 member states. Most agencies fund raise independently, have considerable authority and power, and their internal incentives make it hard for the UK to get them to join up. The Department said it was using some of its funding to incentivise joint performance, rather than the success of individual UN agencies.

b) **To improve the quality of their data.** The Department has commissioned an independent review to look at UN agencies’ costs. The Department expects the UN to help with the review. It said it is in everyone’s best interest to improve data and to use data to deliver better value for money.

---

42 C&AG’s Report, Figure 11 (shows four of the UN’s agencies received £453 million in earmarked bilateral funding); The Department’s Statistics on International Development 2014 to 2015 (GPEX table 7) also show that the Department also gave a total of £164 million in core (non-earmarked) funding to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Central Emergency Response Fund, the World Food Programme and the UN Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.


44 C&AG’s Report, para 3.10

45 Q 21–22, 24

46 Q 41

47 Q 41, 47

48 Q 41, 50
c) **To pass on the benefits of multi-year funding to the partners they engage to deliver services.** The Department is moving from annual to multi-year agreements with many organisations responding to crises including UN agencies. The Department’s partners told the National Audit Office that multi-year agreements helped them to invest in relationships, staff and the type of programming needed to deliver longer-term goals. However, the National Audit Office was also told that the procedures of some UN bodies had not allowed them to enter into multi-year agreements with their partners.49

25. The Department sees the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016 as an important opportunity for it to influence wider humanitarian policy and practice.50 Médecins Sans Frontières said that it was very disappointed that the UN’s emergency relief co-ordinator was not willing to look at UN reform as part of the summit. It argued that reform should be considered.51

**Delivery chains**

26. The Department’s response to a crisis can involve a large number of partners in delivering assistance. The ‘first tier partners’ it directly funds and oversees often engage their own partners and delivery chains often have several layers.52

27. The Department’s partners incur a range of costs in providing assistance, including staff and commodities, and on the transport and security necessary to get these items to beneficiaries. Understanding the breakdown of costs is valuable, as it can help the Department select and manage partners. However, for many of its interventions, the Department does not have a good understanding of the size of the different cost components. Alongside its efforts to improve cost reporting by UN agencies, the Department is now aiming to improve its understanding of the costs incurred by non-governmental organisations.53

28. The National Audit Office examined the Department’s response to five crises that had different causes.54 In two of these cases, the Department was not able to map the relationships between all its partners to understand where and how its money is spent, bringing oversight risks.55

29. The Department told us that it had been paying considerable attention to mapping its delivery chain. It said it expected its teams to be clear about who they are giving their funding to and how it is being passed on. It said it was never happy not to know where funding was going, but that there are some circumstances where it can be difficult to find out, such as when it is funding activities in insecure countries such as Somalia. However, it said it was “increasingly confident” that its teams knew where funding was going.56

---

49 Q 41, C&AG’s Report, paras 3.15–3.16
50 C&AG’s Report, para 3.24
51 Q 24
52 C&AG’s Report, para 3.5, Figure 12
53 Qq 48–49; C&AG’s Report, paras 3.10, 3.13–3.14
54 C&AG’s Report, para 1.9, The 5 crises were the 2014 Ebola outbreak, the 2015 earthquake in Nepal and the on-going protracted crises in Syria, Yemen and the Horn of Africa.
55 C&AG’s Report, paras 18, 3.6
56 Qq 104–105
Formal Minutes

Wednesday 13 April 2016

Members present:

Meg Hillier, in the Chair
Mr Richard Bacon          David Mowat
Caroline Flint            John Pugh
Mr Stewart Jackson       Karin Smyth
Nigel Mills

Draft Report (Department for International Development: responding to crises), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 29 read and agreed to.

Introduction agreed to.

Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Thirty-fifth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Monday 18 April 2016 at 3.30pm]
Witnesses
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

**Wednesday 10 February 2016**

*Sandrine Tiller*, Programmes Adviser, Médecins Sans Frontières, *Fergus Drake*, Executive Director, Global Programmes, Save the Children, and *Ben Webster*, Head of Emergencies, British Red Cross

*Mark Lowcock*, Permanent Secretary, *Joy Hutcheon*, Director General for Corporate Performance, and *Lindy Cameron*, Acting Director General for Country Programmes, Department for International Development

Q1–33

Q34–111
## List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee’s website.

The reference number of the Government’s response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

### Session 2015–16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>HC</th>
<th>(Cm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Report</td>
<td>Financial sustainability of police forces in England and Wales</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>9170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Report</td>
<td>Disposal of public land for new homes</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>9170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Report</td>
<td>Funding for disadvantaged pupils</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>9170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Report</td>
<td>Fraud and Error Stocktake</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>9190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Report</td>
<td>Care leavers’ transition to adulthood</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>9190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Report</td>
<td>HM Revenue &amp; Customs performance 2014–15</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>9190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Report</td>
<td>Devolving responsibilities to cities in England: Wave 1 City Deals</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>9190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Report</td>
<td>The Government’s funding of Kids Company</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>9190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth Report</td>
<td>Care Act first-phase reforms and local government new burdens</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>9220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleventh Report</td>
<td>Strategic financial management of the Ministry of Defence and Military flying training</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>9220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelfth Report</td>
<td>Care Quality Commission</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>9220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirteenth Report</td>
<td>Overseeing financial sustainability in the further education sector</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>9220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourteenth Report</td>
<td>General Practice Extraction Service</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>9220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifteenth Report</td>
<td>Economic regulation in the water sector</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>9237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixteenth Report</td>
<td>Sale of Eurostar</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>9237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventeenth Report</td>
<td>Management of adult diabetes services in the NHS: progress review</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>9237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report Number</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighteenth Report</td>
<td>Automatic enrolment to workplace pensions</td>
<td>HC 581</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Cm 9237)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nineteenth Report</td>
<td>Universal Credit: progress update</td>
<td>HC 601</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Cm 9237)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twentieth Report</td>
<td>Cancer Drugs Fund</td>
<td>HC 583</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Cm 9237)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-first Report</td>
<td>Reform of the rail franchising programme</td>
<td>HC 600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-second Report</td>
<td>Excess Votes 2014–15</td>
<td>HC 787</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-third Report</td>
<td>Financial sustainability of fire and rescue services</td>
<td>HC 582</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-fourth Report</td>
<td>Services to people with neurological conditions: progress review</td>
<td>HC 502</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-fifth Report</td>
<td>Corporate tax settlements</td>
<td>HC 788</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-sixth Report</td>
<td>The Common Agricultural Policy Delivery Programme</td>
<td>HC 642</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-seventh Report</td>
<td>e-Borders and successor programmes</td>
<td>HC 643</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-eighth Report</td>
<td>Access to General Practice in England</td>
<td>HC 673</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-ninth Report</td>
<td>Making a whistleblowing policy work: progress update</td>
<td>HC 602</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirtieth Report</td>
<td>Sustainability and financial performance of acute hospital trusts</td>
<td>HC 709</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirty-first Report</td>
<td>Delivering major projects in government</td>
<td>HC 710</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirty-second Report</td>
<td>Follow-up on transforming contract management</td>
<td>HC 711</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirty-third Report</td>
<td>Contracted out health and disability assessments</td>
<td>HC 727</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirty-fourth Report</td>
<td>Tackling tax fraud</td>
<td>HC 674</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Special Report</td>
<td>Unauthorised disclosure of draft Report in the previous Parliament</td>
<td>HC 539</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>