88.The Equality Act 2010 for the first time gave trans people explicit protection in their own right (in Great Britain) against discrimination. The UK thereby became one of a small group of countries to have passed such legislation. Protection for trans people was achieved by means of Section 7 of the Act, which refers to the “protected characteristic” of “gender reassignment”. A person has this characteristic if he or she:
is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person’s sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex.
Such a person is referred to in the statute as a “transsexual person”.
89.Under the Act, discrimination against people covered by Section 7 can take the following forms:
The Act also provides those people covered by Section 7 with protection from harassment, and victimisation.
90.The inclusion of gender reassignment in the Act as a protected characteristic was widely welcomed and seen as having made an appreciable difference to the lives of trans people. James Morton, the Manager of the Scottish Transgender Alliance, told us:
pulling the trans protected characteristic out from underneath the sex discrimination protected characteristic was really, really helpful in the Equality Act. Although we would like the definition slightly tweaked, it has been really effective in terms of encouraging employers and also service providers to take into account the needs of trans people.
91.Evidence, and legal opinion, that we received indicate that the protections are not universally seen as legally complete and many trans people still face discrimination in employment and in other aspects of their lives.
92.A major criticism was that, as regards trans equality, the Act is couched in terms that are seen as outdated and confusing, with its references to “gender reassignment” and “transsexual” persons.
93.And there is a consequent, apparently widespread, misapprehension that the Act only provides protection to those trans people whose transition involves medical “gender-reassignment” treatment. (Likewise, “transsexual”, being primarily a medical categorisation, can be seen as referring specifically to someone who intends to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone such a medical intervention.)
94.It also seems to be widely believed by employers and service providers (as well as some trans people) that the Act only protects trans people who have been granted a GRC.
95.Our evidence also called into question the extent to which the Act protects people with broader kinds of trans identities, who may not be seeking, or may not have sought, gender reassignment, medical or otherwise. We obtained a legal opinion on this point from expert barrister Claire McCann, who told us that people falling within such a broader definition of trans identity could have “no certainty” of being protected from discrimination.
96.Ms McCann explained that when the Equality Bill was going through Parliament the then Solicitor General had clearly indicated that it was only the provision in respect of discrimination by perception which would protect those members of “the wider transgender community” who did not come under the protected characteristic of gender reassignment. That is, they would only be protected if they were discriminated against because they were perceived to be proposing to undergo, to be undergoing or to have undergone gender reassignment. The difficulty with this provision is that there are likely to be cases where an individual from the wider trans community, is discriminated against because of who they are and not because they are perceived to be transsexual. Mr Morton gave us an example: “if they have come out as non-binary, they are being perceived as non-binary, not as transsexual”.
97.In its response to the online petition on gender self-declaration (see Chapter Three) the MoJ said:
The Equality Act 2010 protects people from discrimination if it arises from their being perceived as either male or female. We recognise that a very small number of people consider themselves to be of neither gender. We are not aware that that results in any specific detriment […]
98.This statement, which reflects policy that has been current since the Coalition government was in office, was very distressing to many non-binary people, who felt that it did not reflect the reality of their day-to-day experience. Mr Morton told us:
We are aware that the Ministry of Justice said there is no specific detriment faced by non-binary people. In our survey of 895 non binary people in the UK, within the last five years, 11% said they had been refused services and one third had experienced harassment in services. In employment within the last five years, one fifth had experienced workplace harassment and 95% were worried about disclosing themselves as non-binary in the workplace and being discriminated against if they came out.
99.Ms Dinenage responded to these criticisms as follows:
This was probably a very regrettable example of MoJ officials trying to answer a petition factually and swiftly without really being necessarily as aware of things like understanding and tone as they should be. What they said was that they felt that there was no specific detriment experienced by people who identify as non-binary. What they meant to say was that there is no specific detriment experienced by people who identify as non-binary that is not already covered by existing legislation […]
100.The Minister indicated non-binary people were protected under the discrimination-by-perception provisions of the Equality Act and “They may also be protected by other forms of laws, such as employment legislation and hate crime and human rights laws”.
101.Terry Reed, of GIRES, told us that the GEO believed a legal test case was necessary in order to verify the application of the Act in this respect. Peter Dunne, who is conducting doctoral research on gender-identity law, spoke to us about the lack of relevant case law in this respect. He explained that people might be reluctant to initiate test cases for fear that they would lose: “Ambiguity is sometimes better than having a bad precedent”. Mr Morton added that it was very difficult to persuade people to pursue test cases:
It is incredibly emotionally demanding. You would be scrutinised by the press; your identity may well end up mocked. You do not have a guarantee that there would be reporting restrictions […]
In addition, undertaking a test case would entail a huge sacrifice of time: “we cannot make someone give up years of their life to that process”.
102.Many witnesses proposed that, rather than relying on a test case, the Government should instead amend the Equality Act to replace the “gender reassignment” characteristic with a broader definition. The EHRC told us that:
a broader definition of who is protected from transgender discrimination would provide more clarity and certainty for those with responsibilities and rights under the Act.
103.Several witnesses proposed that the protected characteristic in Section 7 of the Equality Act should be changed to “gender identity”—as defined in the Yogyakarta Principles:
each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body (which may involve, if freely chosen, modification of bodily appearance or function by medical, surgical or other means) and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms.
We were told that this would also be in accordance with Council of Europe Resolution 2048.
104.We took detailed advice from Ms McCann on how best to amend the Act. She told us:
Clearly, in my view, the addition of “gender identity”—if defined as referring to each person’s internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth—will widen the protected characteristic within s.7 of [the Equality Act] to include elements of the “transgender” community more widely.
105.When we asked the Minister for Women and Equalities about the application, and possible revision of, Section 7, she indicated her willingness to reconsider the wording of the Act, if a case for change were made:
The Act is only five years old and […] the world moves on very swiftly […] The issues of non-binary certainly, as I understand it, were discussed when the Act was debated in both Houses of Parliament and Parliament decided to go with the wording that was put forward by the then Government. I also understand that some of that relates to the Equal Treatment Directive and its implementation. What is in the Act does reflect that, but, again, life clearly does move on apace.
106.Another issue raised with us was the current inability of the EHRC to pursue a complaint by a person aged under 18 without their parents’ consent (see Chapter Six).
107.The inclusion of “gender reassignment” as a protected characteristic in the Equality Act 2010 was a huge step forward and has clearly improved the position of trans people. However, it is clear to us that the use of the terms “gender reassignment” and “transsexual” in the Act is outdated and misleading; and may not cover wider members of the trans community.
108.The protected characteristic in respect of trans people under the Equality Act should be amended to that of “gender identity”. This would improve the law by bringing the language in the Act up to date, making it compliant with Council of Europe Resolution 2048; and make it significantly clearer that protection is afforded to anyone who might experience discrimination because of their gender identity.
109.The protections afforded by the Equality Act 2010 are intended to be available to all, including children and adolescents. The Equality and Human Rights Commission must be able to investigate complaints of discrimination raised by children and adolescents without the requirement to have their parents’ consent.
110.The Equality Act 2010 allows for the provision of separate-sex and single-sex services where this is “a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim” (a form of words intended to require the application of an objective standard of justification). The Act also effectively permits service providers not to allow a trans person to access separate-sex or single-sex services—on a case-by-case basis, where exclusion is “a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim”.
111.We heard a range of views on this difficult and sensitive issue. Some voices were raised in support of the law as it stands. Women Analysing Policy on Women told us:
There are situations such as women-only domestic and sexual violence services where vulnerable women surviving in crisis find it very difficult to feel safe. Some of these women may feel unable to access services provided by or offered jointly to all women including transwomen; this produces a clash with the rights of transwomen to be treated exactly the same as other women. In such cases when the safety, wellbeing and recovery of women are reliant upon their ability to access services the law has created exemptions to allow for women only services that do not include some transwomen, in some circumstances.
112.Similarly, we heard from the Prison Reform Trust that:
Some organisations working with female prisoners, such as those providing support for women who have experienced domestic violence or sexual assault may decide not to provide services to transwomen as long as the decision is legitimate and proportionate. We support the current position.
113.Providers of services for domestic-abuse survivors were concerned to emphasise their commitment to including trans women as far as possible. One told us:
Women’s Aid is committed to ensuring that transgender people are treated with respect and do not experience discrimination and/or harassment on the basis of their gender identity.
114.However, we also heard from those who see the current legislation as allowing discrimination against trans people and wish to see it repealed. One person who submitted evidence thought the Statutory Code of Practice was in this regard “a disgrace”:
Treatment process based on appearance reminds one of apartheid. Trans people are again singled out for special negative treatment. The [Equality Act] has introduced “passing privilege”. Indeed, it is the trans folk (with or without a GRC) who do not “pass” that should be especially protected from the excesses of transphobic service providers.
115.Similarly, the Scottish Transgender Alliance thought the provision:
allows wide scope for service providers to identify service users they “suspect” to be trans people, intrusively question them about their gender identity, physical sex characteristics and gender history, and then discriminate against them. We believe this breaches trans people’s right to privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The provision can result in exclusion of vulnerable trans people from vital services such as homeless accommodation, emergency sexual health services and psychological support services. We recommend this single sex services exception be removed.
116.Mr Morton of the Alliance elaborated as follows:
The exception, as currently drawn, effectively has no limit. You could be decades transitioned, you could be fully integrated and you could still be turned away at your moment of need from a refuge or from a rape crisis service.
117.He added that if other service-users felt uncomfortable sharing a service with a trans woman:
you would not turn [the trans woman] away. You would work to educate, you would work to support and you would work to try to make sure that that service could be accessed by them […] There are services, such as rape crisis services and women’s refuges, that are trans inclusive successfully and have not found it impossible to do. They have done it very successfully, so why can others not? […] [T]here might be some situations and very limited situations where you might have to treat someone differently, but they should not be treated worse.
118.Others stressed the harm being done by the current arrangements. Galop told us:
Knowledge of a person being trans* has been used as a basis for exclusion. This can leave people unable to leave violent situations, putting them at risk of serious harm.
119.We heard from Ashley Reed that:
In gendered refuge centres, it is worth noting that trans people will often be turned away from ones that are protected for either gender, so a trans woman could be rejected from a women’s shelter but would also be rejected from a men’s shelter. Were they to go to a men’s shelter, they would be at serious risk of harassment or physical or verbal abuse, and that would be a major onset of dysphoria.
120.One service provider, RISE, thought the problem lay in a lack of clarity in the current wording of the Equality Act:
there has not been [any] opportunity for case law to be developed […] The lack of clear legislation regarding this issue means that vulnerable trans people may not seek support at all in order to avoid potentially intrusive and inappropriate questions and uncertainty about whether they will be included in sex-specific services […] [The Code of Practice] is problematic because it can be interpreted to mean that we can reasonably expect women to present as “feminine” and men to present as “masculine”. This is restrictive for trans people who wish to develop their own sense of style and presentation […] The lack of clarity within the Act may lead organisations to make assumptions that other service users will react negatively to trans people accessing sex-specific groups, and therefore exclude them.
121.Mr Dunne told us:
[A]ll of the research seems to be saying that if you are able to put in place robust frameworks that explain to people everyone’s presence in the particular shelter and that everyone knows all of the ground rules and has a clear understanding, these facilities work perfectly well and inclusion in no way detracts from the ability of individuals to use the services and their experience.
122.When we asked the Minister for Women and Equalities how far she thought these provisions were being used proportionately, appropriately and fairly, she told us:
I suspect overall they probably are. I am not sure that we have necessarily evidence. There are certainly examples. I have some here: group counselling sessions for female victims of sexual assault; public changing rooms; bathing facilities and toilets, which I know is a huge area; and certain procedures in hospitals where it would be appropriate to have single- and separate-sex services. We should be very clear this is not a green light for discrimination. There is a line between discrimination and legitimately offering single-sex services. We are aware of only one case, which relates to a pub in Halifax, which was heard at Halifax Crown Court last year. That was in relation to the gender reassignment exception. That is the first case that we are aware of.
123.The Explanatory Notes for the Act give an example as follows:
A group counselling session is provided for female victims of sexual assault. The organisers do not allow transsexual people to attend as they judge that the clients who attend the group session are unlikely to do so if a male-to-female transsexual person was also there. This would be lawful.
124.Ms McCann advised us that “this example is drafted too categorically”. While it demonstrates a “legitimate aim”, it gives “insufficient information […] to show that the exclusion of trans people is appropriate and reasonably necessary (i.e. proportionate) to meet that aim”. She further suggested that in the instance cited it may only be lawful to exclude trans people if they do not hold a GRC:
I would doubt that a service-provider of single-sex or separate services could turn away a trans service-user who holds a GRC because this is unlikely to be proportionate.
125.A further provision in the Act allows employers to stipulate that a post is only open to individuals with a particular protected characteristic, where this constitutes a “genuine occupational requirement”.
126.Ms McCann noted that this had in effect “reduce[d] the protection afforded to trans people”, as the Gender Recognition Act 2004 had previously ensured employers could no longer rely on an occupational requirement for an employee not to be transsexual where that employee held a GRC.
127.The Explanatory Notes to the Act give the following illustration:
A counsellor working with victims of rape might have to be a woman and not a transsexual person, even if she has a Gender Recognition Certificate, in order to avoid causing them further distress.
Women’s Aid told us that:
In recognition of Women’s Aid’s status as the provider of services to, and promoting the welfare of women only, Women’s Aid has chosen to exercise its right under the Equality Act 2010 […] to apply the Gender Reassignment exception to employment posts within the organisation. This policy is under review.
128.We heard unequivocal opposition to this provision. The Scottish Transgender Alliance told us that they wished to see it repealed:
as well as violating trans people’s article 8 human right to privacy [under the ECHR] about their gender reassignment history, [it] is generally unworkable because the only way anyone could prove beyond doubt that they had not undergone gender reassignment would be to submit to an unacceptably intrusive medical examination.
129.The Alliance also advocated the introduction of a legal provision allowing for certain posts, “perhaps where providing support specifically to trans people”, to be available only to trans people, “as exists for other protected characteristics”.
130.Mridul Wadhwa told us that the provision was:
discriminatory to transsexual people especially trans women. I genuinely believe that there is no space for it in the gender-based violence sector and that it has no place in violence against women work. I was unaware of its existence until a few weeks ago. I have worked in the violence against women sector since 2005 and have never known for it to be used. I am disappointed to think that someone has the right to refuse work to me and others like me in my sector just because they think that I might not be a woman.
131.We asked Ms McCann how the Equality Act might be amended so that single-sex services were no longer able to exclude, on a proportionate and legitimate basis, a transgender or transsexual person with a GRC, from accessing gender-appropriate services and employment. She suggested that the Equality Act might be amended so that:
the occupational requirements provision and / or the single-sex / separate services provision shall not apply in relation to discrimination against a person whose gender has become the acquired gender under the Gender Recognition Act 2004 […] [With such an amendment,] the [Equality Act] would better align with s.9 of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (which requires that the acquired gender of an individual with a GRC is recognised “for all purposes”).
132.Significant concerns have been raised with us regarding the provisions of the Equality Act concerned with separate-sex and single-sex services and the genuine occupational requirement as these relate to trans people. These are sensitive areas, where there does need to be some limited ability to exercise discretion, if this is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. However, we are not persuaded that this discretion should apply where a trans person has been recognised as of their acquired gender “for all legal purposes” under the Gender Recognition Act. In many instances this is unlikely, in any case, to meet the proportionate test. We recommend that the Equality Act be amended so that the occupational requirements provision and / or the single-sex / separate services provision shall not apply in relation to discrimination against a person whose acquired gender has been recognised under the Gender Recognition Act 2004.
133.The GRA refers to “a gender-affected sport”, which is defined as one where “the physical strength, stamina or physique of average persons of one gender would put them at a disadvantage to average persons of the other gender as competitors in events involving the sport”. In the case of such a sport, a person whose change of gender has been recognised under the Act may be excluded from playing in their acquired gender where this is necessary to ensure “fair competition” or “the safety of competitors”.
134.The Equality Act 2010:
allows separate sporting competitions to continue to be organised for men and women where physical strength, stamina or physique are major factors in determining success or failure, and in which one sex is generally at a disadvantage in comparison with the other.
135.In addition, the 2010 Act gives effect to the provision in the 2004 Act regarding sport as if it applied to a person with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment, as defined in the 2010 Act.
136.Ms McCann advised us that a sporting association wishing to exclude a trans person from participating in their acquired / affirmed gender would need to demonstrate firstly that the sport concerned was a “gender-affected” one. This might not be the case in respect of, for instance, under-16s football—as acknowledged by the Football Association in its policy on Trans People in Football. Secondly, it must be demonstrated that the exclusion is necessary to secure fair competition or the safety of competitors. Ms McCann noted that neither the 2004 Act nor the 2010 Act gave any meaningful guidance as to how this might be assessed. She thought that:
An organiser would need very careful[ly] to review the individual circumstances of (1) the trans competitor who is being considered for exclusion; and (2) the gender-affected competitive event in question; and (3) other competitors in that event; and (4) whether alternatives to exclusion would secure the statutory aims (of fair competition and/or safety of competitors).
137.Whether or not a trans person had been granted a GRC would not be a relevant consideration for this purpose. Ms McCann emphasised that: “This issue raises difficult and complex questions and, as the [Sports Council Equality Group] acknowledges, understanding of the legal and medical issues continues to develop.”
138.We heard there are concerns that the legal provisions concerning trans people in sport are being used inappropriately. Dr Jay Stewart, of Gendered Intelligence, told us:
We have a real problem here and it is a big issue […] People who only want to have a kick around and who just want to do some sport activity at university are being excluded. They are not allowed to play because there is fear, there is lack of awareness and there is lack of knowledge around being this one thing or the other.
139.Anna Lee, of Lancaster University Students’ Union, informed us that:
[British Universities and Colleges Sport], the governing body for sport for universities and colleges, just defers straight to the national governing bodies and all of those have often unattainable requirements and requirements that just should not be necessary for young trans people.
140.When we asked Ed Vaizey MP, a Minister at the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, about trans people being inappropriately excluded from playing sport in their acquired / affirmed gender, he told us:
It is incumbent on the sporting authorities to call this practice out where they see it happening […] As far as I am aware, [the legal exemption] is based on a strength and stamina test, from what I have read up about it, but clearly there are many, many sports where both sexes can compete on level terms. I would expect bodies like Sport England, for which we are responsible, and some of the national governing bodies for sport, if it is brought to their attention, to point out that, certainly in terms of informal training, non-competitive sporting activity, even though it might be taking place in terms of a competitive sport, there is no reason for people of different sexes not to be playing together. Where it comes across as a clear case of arbitrary exclusion, they can call them out.
141.The Minister thought that “a body like Sport England and the Government Equalities Office” might fund something such as:
a practical guide, particularly to university sports societies, to say, “You may think, perversely, that if you exclude different sexes from sport you are complying with the law. Actually, you are over-interpreting what this section was designed to do.”
142.We asked the Minister about the issue of trans people’s access to changing rooms. His response seemed to indicate that he was thinking in terms of providing separate changing facilities for trans people. He subsequently wrote to us:
The Sports Councils’ Equality Group recently published ground breaking guidance for National Governing Bodies of Sport (NGBs) on supporting an increase in the number of transsexuals playing sport. The guidance specifically refers to communal changing facilities and provides options for clubs to consider in provision of facilities for transexual people […] Following the publication of this guidance, Stonewall and Transsexuals in Sport were recently invited to present at a training day Sport England organised for its Equality Standard advisors, in partnership with UK Sport, so when NGBs are working through the Standard process, they are appropriately supported on LGBT issues.
143.Trans people are being excluded from the health and social benefits of non-competitive sport because of a misunderstanding of the fairly limited legislative exclusions. We welcome the Minister’s suggestion that a practical guide be produced to better inform sporting groups, including university societies. We recommend that the Government work with Sport England to produce guidance which help sporting groups realise that there are likely to be few occasions where exclusions are justified to ensure fair competition or the safety of competitors.
82 A landmark case in 1996 before the European Court of Justice (concerning employment discrimination) effectively extended the scope of legal provisions regarding sex discrimination so that discrimination in employment and vocational training on grounds of “gender reassignment” also became illegal. Subsequently, in 1999, secondary legislation extended the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 to cover discrimination on grounds of gender reassignment in employment and vocational training. Secondary legislation in 2008 which extended the law on gender discrimination to cover access to and supply of goods and services also effectively protected people with the characteristic of “gender reassignment”. The legal meaning of “gender reassignment” under these provisions included explicit reference to being under “medical supervision” as part of transition.
83 The use of this term in the Act follows its use in the 1996 ruling by the European Court of Justice.
84 Redress for such discrimination can be sought in a County Court (in England and Wales), Sheriff Court (in Scotland) or Employment Tribunal (Section 113, Equality Act 2010). The Act also creates a “general equality duty” (the Public Sector Equality Duty) for public-sector bodies in respect of all the protected characteristics (Section 149, Equality Act 2010). In addition, the enforcement powers vested in the EHRC can be used by the Commission in respect of discrimination under the Act.
85 Section 19, Equality Act 2010
86 Section 13, Equality Act 2010
87 Section 26, Equality Act 2010
88 Section 27, Equality Act 2010
90 Gender Identity Research and Education Service (); Discrimination Law Association ()
91 Unpublished evidence (TRA 263). The Explanatory Notes for the Act make clear that the “process” referred to in Section 7 need not include medical treatment. The following example is given: “A person who was born physically female decides to spend the rest of her life as a man. He starts and continues to live as a man. He decides not to seek medical advice as he successfully ‘passes’ as a man without the need for any medical intervention. He would have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment for the purposes of the Act” – , August 2010, para 43. The Act thus, while using the term “gender reassignment” (in line with the EU Equal Treatment Directive 2006/54/EC), in recognising the possibility of transition being just a social process gave it a broader legal meaning than had hitherto been the case, effectively removing the necessity of demonstrating that “medical supervision” is underway – Government Equalities Office ().
92 Unpublished evidence (TRA 008); unpublished evidence (TRA 048). On GRCs, see Chapter Three.
93 Such as non-binary people, people who do not live full time in their preferred gender and gender-variant young people with a less well-developed or self-understood gender identity than that of an adult.
94 Claire McCann () para 49
95 Claire McCann () para 10. See Equality Bill Committee, 16 June 2009, .
97 Petitions, UK Government and Parliament, “”, accessed 2 December 2015
98 See, for instance, HC Deb, 30 January 2014, [Commons Chamber].
100 It is noteworthy that the form of words used in the MoJ’s response to Ashley Reed’s petition actually appear to indicate that non-binary people are effectively protected under the discrimination-by-perception provisions as they relate to gender discrimination (“The Equality Act 2010 protects people from discrimination if it arises from their being perceived as either male or female”).
102 Terry Reed (); cf. Gender Identity Research and Education Service ()
105 Equality and Human Rights Commission ()
106 ; UNISON (); UK Trans Info (); Scottish Transgender Alliance ()
107 Scottish Transgender Alliance ()
108 Scottish Transgender Alliance ()
109 Claire McCann () para 51. Ms McCann added that further amendments might also be needed to cover groups such as intersex people and cross-dressers, i.e. people whose gender identity is not variant but who express gender in ways that do not conform to conventional male and female forms of gender expression. However, these groups fall outside of the category of trans people as we defined it for the purposes of our inquiry.
110 The Equal Treatment Directive of 1976 (76/207/EEC) required that there should be “no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex” and that there should also be no discrimination on grounds of “gender reassignment”. In 2006 it was recast as Equal Treatment Directive 2006/54/EC.
112 Mermaids ()
113 Paragraph 26, Schedule 3, Part 7, Equality Act 2010
114 Paragraph 27, Schedule 3, Part 7, Equality Act 2010
115 Paragraph 28, Schedule 3, Part 7, Equality Act 2010
116 Women Analysing Policy on Women ()
117 Prison Reform Trust ()
118 Women’s Aid ()
119 The Code of Practice refers (as do the Explanatory Notes) explicitly to trans people being protected by the Act if they can “pass” as the opposite sex.
120 Anonymised ()
121 Scottish Transgender Alliance ()
124 Galop ()
126 RISE ()
129 , August 2010, para 740
130 Claire McCann () para 74
131 Schedule 9, Equality Act 2010
132 Claire McCann () para 70
133 , August 2010, para 789
134 Women’s Aid ()
135 Scottish Transgender Alliance ()
136 Mridul Wadhwa ()
137 Claire McCann () paras 93, 96
138 Section 19, Gender Recognition Act 2004
139 , August 2010, para 614
140 Claire McCann () para 99
141 Claire McCann () para 106
142 Claire McCann () para 107
143 Claire McCann () para 111
144 Claire McCann () para 113
149 Department for Culture, Media and Sport ()
Prepared 8 January 2016