Appendix: Government response
INTRODUCTION
Over the last five years we have seen almost two
million more people in work and the current employment rate of
73.6% is the highest since records began. Furthermore, the number
of workless households has fallen by 671,000 since 2010, and is
now the lowest on record since 1996. This represents a transformation
in many people's lives; giving families more security; boosting
self-esteem; and providing hope for those who have been unemployed
for years.
There is a large body of evidence[1]
showing that work is good for physical and mental wellbeing and
that, where they are able, people should be encouraged and supported
to remain in, or to re-enter work as soon as possible. The evidence
also shows that children in working households have better outcomes
in academic attainment, training and future employment. Work provides
a route out of poverty for families and improves children's wellbeing
and life chances as fewer will grow up in workless households.
This is why the Department invests significant resource
to help people move quickly into employment.
For claimants who are able to work, it is widely
accepted that a conditionality system is the most effective way
of offering support, and international evidence is clear that
benefit regimes tied to conditionality get people into work.
The purpose of the conditionality system is to encourage
claimants to meet the reasonable requirements designed to help
them to seek employment or take steps to move closer to work.
Individuals are supported in their journey towards employment
and claimants are made aware about the consequences of not engaging
with the offer of support and what is expected from them in return
for financial support.
All claimants will agree a tailored Claimant Commitment
or Action Plan which sets out what is expected of them, and also
the consequences of failing to meet these requirements. The vast
majority of claimants comply with these.
As taxpayers would expect, for the small minority
of claimants who refuse to meet their agreed requirements or refuse
to take up employment without good reason, a benefit reduction
is applied. Any decision to temporarily reduce or halt a benefit
payment is always thoroughly considered. A robust decision making
process is in place to ensure that decisions are correct. Independent
Decision Makers consider each case, including any evidence of
good reason put forward by a claimant and claimants can ask for
the decision to be reconsidered and appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.
We also take particular care with those with a mental
health condition, learning disability or a condition affecting
communication or cognition, who often require more support to
understand the conditionality rules and the requirements placed
upon them. In addition, hardship payments may be available as
a safeguard to people who are subject to a benefit sanction.
Employment and Support Allowance supports those who
are the most vulnerable and unable to work. Recipients are not
required to apply for work and those who are assessed as not being
able to undertake work-related activity have no conditionality
applied. Where a claimant is assessed as being able to do some
work-related activity, which will help them to move closer to
employment, this is carefully applied based on the recipient's
circumstances.
Since the publication of the Oakley review we have
implemented a number of improvements to our processes. We also
keep our systems under review to ensure that they operate as effectively
and fairly as possible and, where we identify issues, we act to
put things right. In 2001, the process for issuing sanction notifications
was changed, replacing automated letters with arrangements whereby
staff had to manually trigger a notification. Recent analysis
assessed historical compliance with these arrangements as above
93%. The Department has introduced new checks to move compliance
towards 100%, and will revert to the pre-2001 arrangement of issuing
letters automatically. The Department will write to claimants
we have identified who may not have had a decision letter to explain
the position.
We welcome the committee's report and we will respond
to the recommendations in themed groups in the next chapter.
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
CALL FOR AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW, EVALUATING THE WELFARE
REFORM ACT 2012 CHANGES AND REVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
FOR SANCTIONING
1. We recommend that
DWP commission a broad independent review of benefit conditionality
and sanctions, to investigate whether sanctions are being applied
appropriately, fairly and proportionately, in accordance with
the relevant Regulations and guidance, across the Jobcentre Plus
network. This review should be established and report as soon
as is practicable in the next Parliament. (Paragraph
9)
9. We recommend that DWP evaluate, by testing
different approaches, the relative impacts on movements off out-of-work
benefits and into work of: benefit conditions themselves; the
level of accompanying employment support; and the application,
or deterrent threat, of financial sanctions.
10. We further recommend that DWP evaluate the
efficacy and impacts of four-week minimum sanction periods, as
introduced following the Welfare Reform Act 2012, compared to
minimum sanction periods of one week. (Paragraph 60)
26. We recommend that the clarity and coherence
of the legislative framework for benefit sanctions policy be included
in the terms of reference of the full independent review which
we have recommended. (Paragraph 112)
Not accepted
We have made a number of improvements to the Jobseeker's
Allowance (JSA) and Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) sanction
systems, and are implementing further changes following recommendations
made by Matthew Oakley within his review. It is important that
we now focus on embedding those changes and improvements including
within Universal Credit.
It is widely agreed that sanctions play a vital role
in supporting conditionality. They encourage claimants to comply
with the requirements that are designed to help them move into
or prepare for work - DWP research shows that 72 per cent of JSA
claimants and 61 per cent of ESA claimants said awareness of sanctions
made them more likely to follow rules. In addition, international
evidence is clear that benefit regimes tied to conditionality
get people into work.
As with all our policies, we are keeping the operation
of the sanctions system under constant review to ensure that it
continues to function effectively and fairly and that, where we
identify an issue, we act to put it right. This has recently been
illustrated through a compliance issue we have identified, which
has resulted in a quality assurance exercise on sanctions communications,
and a decision to automate the notification system to move compliance
in sending notifications towards 100%.
We will continue to publish sanctions statistics
on a quarterly basis.
Work Programme Providers' and ability to accept
"good reason"
2. We accept that allowing contracted Work Programme
providers formally to accept "good reason" for a claimant
not fulfilling a benefit condition will require both legislative
change and contractual negotiations. However, we believe that
DWP should take more urgent steps to ensure that a more common-sense
approach is set out in guidance. We recommend that DWP's guidance
to contracted providers makes clear that discretion can be applied
where providers' staff are confident that a claimant's failure
to meet a mandatory condition was due to extenuating circumstances
beyond the claimant's control.
3. We further recommend that negotiations with
Work Programme prime providers, ahead of the re-letting of prime
contracts in 2017, prioritise the development of a more flexible
approach to "mandation". (Paragraph 29)
Accepted in Principle
Providers of mandatory back-to-work schemes already
have the discretion to set and amend mandatory requirements. This
gives considerable flexibility. For example, if a claimant participating
in the Work Programme contacts them before they are due to undertake
a mandatory activity, such as attending an interview, the provider
can decide whether to re-arrange this to a more suitable date.
In such circumstances, because the mandatory requirement (the
interview) has changed before the breach of the requirement occurred
there is no need for the provider to consider good reason or make
a sanction referral. We have expanded current guidance to ensure
that this discretion and flexibility is as clear as possible to
the provider and are taking steps to ensure that all providers
and sub-contractors are aware of this guidance and utilising it,
and are happy to share this guidance with the Committee if helpful.
However, where a sanctionable failure has already
occurred the provider has no discretion and must refer all failures
to a DWP Decision Maker. We are pleased that the committee accepts
that this is necessary under current legislative and contractual
obligations. This is different to the system for our Work Coaches
who have the ability not to refer cases where a claimant clearly
has good reason. These are known as "treat as straightforward"
cases.
As set out in our commitment in the Government response
to Matthew Oakley's report, we also accept that in principle there
may be some circumstances where it would be appropriate for these
straightforward decisions to be made (i.e. circumstances where
it is quite clear that a sanction should not be applied). We will
therefore consider this as part of our ongoing policy development.
Pre-sanction written warnings and non-financial
sanctions
4. We note that the Department considers that
piloting of pre-sanction written warnings and non-financial sanctions
for first-time Work Programme failures where the claimant has
a previously good record of compliance with benefit conditionality
would require legislative change. We believe that there would
be considerable value in piloting these approaches urgently; we
therefore urge DWP either to reconsider its position, and conduct
small scale pilots prior to making legislative changes, or to
bring forward the necessary secondary legislation, and conduct
the pilots, as soon as is practicable in the next Parliament.
5. We also recommend that DWP pilot pre-sanction
written warnings and non-financial sanctions in relation to claimants'
first-time failures within the Jobcentre Plus conditionality system.
(Paragraph 33)
30. DWP should also test alternative, non-financial
models of conditionality for vulnerable groups. In particular,
it should review the situation of claimants with co-morbidities,
to ensure that there are no perverse unintended consequences in
applying non-financial models to particular vulnerable groups
of claimants. (Paragraph 135)
Accepted in Principle
It is already the case that claimants receive clear
warning about the consequences of failing to meet their requirements
without good reason. When a claim is made, the Work Coach verbally
explains requirements and agrees them with the claimant so that
they are clear about the commitment they have made. In addition,
the Work Coach issues written information about expectations and
consequences within the Claimant Commitment, agreed by the claimant
and their Work Coach - so there should be no doubt about what
the claimant needs to do and what non-compliance can mean to their
benefit payment.
However, we do see potential benefit in an approach
which encourages positive compliance: the sanctions system is
not designed to be punitive. As set out in the Written Ministerial
Statement accompanying this response, we will trial arrangements
whereby claimants are given a warning of our intention to sanction,
and a 14-day period to provide evidence of good reason before
the decision to sanction is made. During this time, claimants
will have another opportunity to provide further evidence to explain
their non-compliance. We will then review this information before
deciding whether a sanction remains appropriate. We expect that
this will strike the right balance between enforcing the claimant
commitment, and fairness.
Impact of sanctions on Housing Benefit
6. We recommend that DWP clarify, in its response
to this Report: the extent to which Housing Benefit payments have
been incorrectly impacted by Jobseekers Allowance sanctions, as
identified by the Oakley Review; the steps it has taken-beyond
advising claimants themselves to inform their local authority
when they are sanctioned-to address the issue; and whether robust
systems are now in place to ensure that the issue no longer arises.
(Paragraph 38)
Accepted
A DWP sanction should in no way impact the payment
of Housing Benefit.
Analysis of over 300 cases has indicated no instances
of impact, or the systems operating incorrectly. We continue to
monitor to ensure that this remains the case.
In thinking through this issue we reflected that
it is possible that a sanction may be wrongly classified as a
disentitlement of benefit, in which case there would potentially
be an impact on Housing benefit. Although we cannot find evidence
that this has been the case, as a safeguard we recently produced
and published additional guidance for Local Authorities, to ensure
they take correct action following a sanction notification, and
that they classify the sanction in the right way.
Helping claimants to comply
7. We agree that benefit conditionality is appropriate
and necessary but reiterate our view that it is important that
conditionality is balanced by effective employment advice and
support for claimants. We recommend that DWP ensure that the relevant
guidance to JCP Work Coaches includes that sanctioned claimants
should be offered additional, tailored support, to help them meet
their benefit conditions and improve their employment prospects,
including attending a specific meeting after a sanction has been
applied to discuss how to improve compliance and ensure that the
Claimant Commitment fairly reflects the individual's needs and
abilities. (Paragraph 51)
Accepted
We are pleased that the Committee agrees with our
approach.
Building upon established guidance, we are also strengthening
the support provided to JSA claimants though a new Work Coach
delivery model. Key to this will be claimants seeing the same
Work Coach each time they attend the Jobcentre. This continuity
of contact provides the basis for even greater tailoring of employment
support and discussions about conditionality following the imposition
of a sanction.
Throughout a claim all claimants will receive personalised
support and advice to help them move closer and into work. As
part of this support the claimant enters into a Claimant Commitment
which is tailored to the claimant's needs and circumstances, clearly
sets out their agreed requirements and is regularly reviewed.
During these regular interventions the Work Coach can utilise
the wide menu of support on offer for the claimant such as skills
training or help with CV writing.
Following a sanction a Work Coach will continue to
support the claimant at their next face-to-face meeting which
should fall within two weeks.
At this meeting staff will offer advice and agree
further ways in which to improve prospects of moving into or towards
work. The claimant also has an opportunity to discuss their requirements
and future compliance at this meeting and as the Claimant Commitment
is a live document it can be amended to reflect any changes agreed
between the Work Coach and the claimant.
In-work conditionality
8. We recommend that the Government does not proceed
with in-work sanctions beyond the existing pilots until robust
evidence is available from the pilots to demonstrate that in-work
conditionality can be effectively applied. (Paragraph 56)
Accepted in part
We agree that individuals on Universal Credit and
in work will not be subject to the full range of work-related
requirements and sanctions beyond existing pilots until we have
fully considered the learning from those pilots. Outside of the
pilots, Universal Credit claimants will continue to be subject
to the current light-touch offering until we have enough evidence
from the pilots to make a decision on the way forward.
Claimants subject to the light-touch offering are
required to participate in two mandatory Work Search Interviews:
at day one; and at eight weeks. In these interviews, the Work
Coach will offer tailored support and advice to help the claimant
to increase their earnings, for example this may include encouraging
the claimant to speak with their employer to increase their hours,
find another job, or attend training courses to increase their
hourly pay rate. There are no further mandatory requirements other
than to participate in these two conversations. Claimants are
not required to attend further Work Search Reviews, and all other
work-related activity is agreed as part of a voluntary action
plan.
Monitoring the destinations of sanctioned claimants
11. We recommend that DWP develop systems, using
RTI data, to track shorter and longer term employment outcomes
and earnings progress for sanctioned benefit claimants within
Universal Credit, as part of its ongoing evaluation of the efficacy
and impacts of benefit sanctions policy. (Paragraph 66)
Not accepted
We are using the RTI data to track employment outcomes
and evaluate what difference Universal Credit makes to the labour
market outcomes of new claimants. A preliminary impact evaluation
using RTI data was published in February 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/universal-credit-estimating-the-early-labour-market-impacts
There are currently no plans to use RTI data to track
shorter and longer term employment outcomes and earnings progress
for sanctioned claimants within Universal Credit.
The Department releases statistics and management
information on Universal Credit in line with the publication strategy
set out in September 2013 which follows guidelines set by the
UK Statistics Authority. (https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/universal-credit-statistics).
This is designed to ensure that statistics are placed
into the public domain in a clear and controlled way.
Setting JSA job-searching conditions
12. We recommend that DWP's evaluation of the
Claimant Commitment includes an assessment of: whether claimants
are fully involved in the process of developing a suitable job-searching
strategy and in setting realistic and achievable targets; and
whether reasonable conditions are being set for all groups of
JSA claimants, including those with physical and mental health
conditions, learning disabilities and caring responsibilities.
We also believe that more than another year before the findings
of this evaluation are published is too long a wait for an assessment
of new benefit conditions affecting so many claimants.
13. We therefore further recommend that DWP expedite
its evaluation and publish initial findings as early as possible
in the next Parliament, and certainly before the end of 2015.
12. Accepted in principle 13. Not accepted
We are including the Claimant Commitment in our evaluation
of Universal Credit. To date, the evaluation has looked at the
attitudes of claimants towards the Claimant Commitment. Findings
from the Pathfinder Survey were published in October 2014: (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/380537/rr886-universal-credit-pathfinder-evaluation.pdf)
and interim findings from the Expanded Gateway Singles
Survey were published in February 2015:
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/403415/universal-credit-survey-report-final-ad-hoc-20.pdf)
These show that the vast majority of claimants thought
that some or all of the actions they accepted as part of their
Claimant Commitment would increase their chances of finding work,
took account of their personal circumstances, and were achievable.
Almost all respondents said that they knew what would happen (reduced
or stopped payments) if they did not fulfil their Claimant Commitment
conditions.
As we continue with the safe and secure rollout of
Universal Credit we are extending the evaluation accordingly.
By the end of the year the Department will publish results from
the Universal Credit Extended Gateway Survey of claimants and
the findings from qualitative interviews with claimants. We do
not plan to evaluate the Claimant Commitment under JSA.
14. We believe that there is a specific need to
review whether the conditionality applied to those claiming JSA
while a decision on ESA eligibility is being reconsidered or appealed
should be altered to reflect this, and the individual's specific
circumstances. (Paragraph 74)
Accepted
Evidence shows that work is good for physical and
mental wellbeing. This is why we believe that where an individual
is fit and able for work that they are encouraged and supported
in finding employment.
It is really important that the transition from ESA
to JSA benefits is carefully managed. To support this we have
made a number of improvements to our processes so that recipients
of benefit have access to the full package of support offered
by Jobcentre Plus. This support is tailored to the claimant based
on their circumstances and requirements and designed to help them
move towards work.
In response to the Committee's recommendation, comprehensive
guidance has been issued to staff to help improve awareness of
how JSA conditionality can be varied to take account of the claimant's
physical or mental health conditions and caring responsibilities.
Claimants can agree with their Work Coach any restrictions in
their pattern of availability and/or in the type/nature/hours
of work they are capable of doing, as long as the restrictions
are reasonable in light of their condition.
Therefore, all JSA claimants should have conditionality
requirements that are tailored to their specific circumstances
and there is sufficient flexibility in current processes to ensure
individual circumstances are taken into account, including for
those who are appealing an ESA decision. We will continue to monitor
the quality of Claimant Commitments to ensure they are appropriate,
realistic and achievable as claimant circumstances change.
Under Universal Credit we are driving a model of
even more early and positive engagement and tailoring to individual
circumstances.
15. We recommend that DWP, drawing on specialist
advice from health experts, develop guidance on vulnerability
which is specifically intended to assist JCP staff in identifying
vulnerable JSA claimants, including those with mental health problems
and learning disabilities, who may face difficulties in understanding
and/or complying with benefit conditionality. This guidance should
include examples or case studies to illustrate how conditionality
can be tailored in a range of circumstances.
16. We further recommend that the Department amalgamate
this guidance into the broader Claimant Commitment guidance, so
that it becomes part of the routine process of developing appropriate
and tailored JSA conditionality. (Paragraph 80)
Accepted
Well-established vulnerability guidance is in place
to assist Work Coaches in dealing with vulnerable claimants. It
is linked to the wider Vulnerability Hub which has been created
to support staff in dealing with all forms of vulnerability. The
Vulnerability Hub contains links to a wide body of information
such as the Mental Health Toolkit and the Hidden Impairment Toolkit
which have been developed in conjunction with health experts,
recognised organisations and DWP Work Psychologists.
The Vulnerability Guidance provides staff with information
on where they can access further expert advice. In the case of
mental health conditions this may include the Department's Work
Psychologists who will provide specific advice and guidance to
ensure the welfare of the claimant is fully considered. Jobcentre
Plus District Managers also have the flexibility to consider the
appointment of Mental Health and Wellbeing Partnership Managers
to improve and facilitate links between local mental health provision
and partners with employment services.
The Vulnerability Guidance also signposts staff to
a range of learning and development to support them in working
with vulnerable claimants. The content of the guidance is reviewed
frequently and the Department works with both internal and external
stakeholders to ensure it consistently meets the needs of staff
in effectively recognising and supporting the vulnerable.
We accept the Committee's recommendation and will
supplement existing Work Coach guidance to illustrate how conditionality
can be tailored to take account of individual claimant's circumstances
where they have complex needs or need additional support to use
the Department's services effectively. We are considering the
most appropriate guidance in which to include such examples to
ensure their accessibility to staff developing tailored conditionality.
Claimant Commitment guidance is auto-linked to appropriate
guidance to ensure staff fully consider the needs of claimants
when developing requirements. We will review existing links to
ensure they also include guidance on vulnerable claimants.
Use of Jobseeker's Directions
17. We recommend that DWP's evaluation of the
Claimant Commitment include an assessment of the appropriate use
of Jobseeker Directions and their interaction with the Claimant
Commitment process. (Paragraph 84)
Accepted
We agree that it is important that Jobseeker's Directions
are used appropriately alongside the Claimant Commitment. We are
currently rolling out a programme of refresher training to ensure
that all of our staff have a clear and consistent understanding
of the Claimant Commitment and use of Jobseeker's Directions.
All JSA claimants are required, by legislation, to
agree a Claimant Commitment which includes details of the actions
they will take on an on-going basis to fulfil the Actively Seeking
Work requirement. However, if a claimant does not complete the
exact actions detailed in their Claimant Commitment, Work Coaches
have the discretion and ability to evaluate whether they have
fulfilled their obligation to actively seek work in other ways.
Some JSA claimants can also be issued a Jobseeker's
Direction, in accordance with the legislation, to compel them
to undertake specific, one-off, activities which will either help
them find work or improve their job prospects - for example to
attend a CV course or set up a profile on Universal Jobmatch.
All requirements set in a Jobseeker's Direction must
be reasonable, taking into account the claimants individual circumstances.
A claimant will not receive a sanction if they have good reason
for failing to comply with a Jobseeker's Direction. We will continue
to monitor and review the use of Jobseeker's Directions as part
of our Operational Performance Plans.
Jobseeker's Directions are not part of the Universal
Credit process as all mandatory requirements - work search, work
availability, work preparation and attendance at work-focused
interviews - are included in the Universal Credit Claimant Commitment.
Single parent conditionality
18. We recommend that DWP increase training for
JCP Work Coaches on the regulatory flexibilities which should
be applied to the benefit conditions of single parent JSA claimants.
(Paragraph 87)
Accept
Jobcentre Plus Work Coaches all receive comprehensive
training to equip them with the skills and knowledge to deal with
the full range of Jobcentre Plus claimants, including those with
parental responsibilities. This allows Work Coaches to offer a
personalised approach to claimants based on their individual needs,
rather than a service based on particular claimant groups or individual
benefits.
This training is supplemented by operational guidance,
which makes clear the flexibilities available to single parents
on JSA. To supplement this guidance, we have recently published
additional information on our internal Intranet site.
Under Universal Credit, we are transforming the way
that we work with individuals, providing even more tailored and
positive support.
19. We also recommend that DWP produce a straightforward,
plain English guide to the flexibilities, which should be given
to all single parent JSA claimants. (Paragraph 87)
Accepted
A plain English factsheet around the flexibilities
available for lone parent JSA claimants is already published on
gov.uk:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/368554/jobseekers-allowance-for-lone-parents-oct14.pdf
20. We further recommend that DWP review the regulatory
flexibilities afforded to single parent Universal Credit claimants,
with a view to ensuring that they are offered the same level of
protection from inappropriate conditionality and sanctioning as
JSA claimants. (Paragraph 88)
Accepted
The same protections exist for individuals in Universal
Credit as they do for JSA claimants, including single parents.
The intention is that a more flexible conditionality regime will
mean the expectations placed on claimants properly reflect their
personal circumstances. Therefore under primary legislation, Work
Coaches have flexibility to vary the requirements placed on claimants,
including allowing limitations to work search and availability
requirements to take into account the needs of claimants in a
whole range of different circumstances.
Within this framework, Work Coaches should always
ensure requirements are reasonable and appropriate, taking into
account individual needs and circumstances. Claimants will be
made aware of and agree to their responsibilities and the consequences
of failing to meet their requirements without good reason. These
will be clearly set out in their Claimant Commitment.
Legislation clearly sets out the circumstances in
which it is not reasonable to expect a person to meet even limited
work search and availability requirements and provides powers
to lift the requirements placed on claimants - this provides for
greater flexibility than in JSA. It is, therefore, not necessary
to apply blanket rules in regulations to specify what requirements
must or must not be placed on particular claimant groups.
We will continue to ensure that the Claimant Commitment
is underpinning work search activity in the most effective way
as part of the wider Universal Credit evaluation.
Testing a more targeted approach to conditionality
and sanctioning
21. We recommend that DWP draw on its 2011 research
into the attitudes of unemployed people towards job-seeking and
work, and consider whether its insights could inform a more targeted
approach to benefit conditionality and sanctioning.
22. We recommend that DWP establish a small-scale
pilot to test the efficacy of a targeted approach based on segmentation
of claimants by their attitudes and motivations. (Paragraph 93)
Accepted in Principle
We agree with the committee that a targeted approach
to conditionality is valuable.
Our conditionality approach has been designed to
be responsive and to encourage claimants to share relevant information
with us so that barriers to work and motivation issues can be
identified. This enables us to respond to an individual's capability
and personal circumstances by tailoring the activities we expect
them to undertake, ensuring they are relevant and will support
their individual needs.
These tailored activities are set out within the
Claimant Commitment, which is now available in all jobcentres
across Great Britain. The Claimant Commitment is designed to encourage
personal responsibility and independence by setting out an agreement
between the individual and the State about what claimants are
required to do to find work, based on a claimant's personal circumstances.
Analysis of the latest survey of Universal Credit
Claimants and their JSA counterparts[2]
show that the substantial majority of Universal Credit claimants
felt that either all or some of the actions agreed in their Claimant
Commitment would increase their chances of finding work, took
account of personal circumstances, were achievable and would be
checked by the jobcentre. Over time, attitudes towards the Claimant
Commitment have been sustained.
By setting clearly defined conditionality groups
we are able to target support effectively to those who need it
most.
We believe there is a further role for segmentation
in targeting our services and support and are currently developing
a segmentation approach through Universal Credit. Drawing on evidence
from current Departmental trials and through future testing, including
analysis of attitudes of unemployed people towards job search,
the Department aims to develop an evidence-based segmentation
model with the long term aim of identifying claimant needs and
allocating appropriate interventions and support in the most effective
way to help people to improve their prospects of finding employment.
Targeting our services must be our primary aim - providing the
right level of support as claimant circumstances change.
We have drawn on 2011 and subsequent research as
a part of developing our segmentation data collection tool which
was tested in a "Weekly vs. Fortnightly Randomised Control
Trial" and other trials which will help to inform our segmentation
model.
23. We recommend that DWP make a clear distinction
- in its processes, its communications with claimants, and in
the official data - between claimants who are not meeting the
underlying conditions of entitlement, in particular those who
are genuinely "not actively seeking employment" and
may therefore be abusing the system, and those who have not fully
complied with the precise terms of a Claimant Commitment. At the
moment, both receive the same penalty. (Paragraph 101)
Accepted in Principle
We expect—and are clear—with JSA claimants
that they must do all they reasonably can each week to look for
work. The need to comply with mandatory work-related requirements
is set out clearly in legislation.
The system has been designed to be as fair as possible
and allows Decision Makers to decide whether a sanction should
be imposed in accordance with the evidence provided. There are
some distinctions in place. Where someone may be abusing the system
and it is determined that they are genuinely 'not actively seeking
employment' they would receive a sanction. However, where someone
has made every effort to 'actively seek employment' they may not
be referred for not meeting this particular requirement regardless
of whether they have fully complied with the precise terms of
their Claimant Commitment.
Claimants must, each week, do all that can reasonably
be expected of them to give themselves the best prospects of employment.
What is deemed reasonable for each individual is discussed, agreed
and set out in their Claimant Commitment, taking into account
their particular needs and circumstances to ensure the requirements
are helpful, realistic and achievable.
When reviewing what the claimant has done Work Coaches
should not only review what the claimant said they would do on
their Claimant Commitment, but, importantly, also consider what
the claimant actually did and whether that was reasonable taking
into account the prevailing circumstances during the period in
question. Where a claimant may not have completed everything in
their Claimant Commitment in a particular period, it does not
automatically follow that they were not actively seeking work
if what they actually did was reasonable during the period being
considered (for example they may not have completed all their
agreed activities for the period as they were preparing for and
attending an interview).
Where it appears the claimant has not done all that
could reasonably be expected to give themselves the best prospects
of employment, the Work Coach is required to refer the case to
a Decision Maker for further consideration. The independent Decision
Maker will consider all available information, including that
provided by the claimant. Where they decide the claimant has done
all that was reasonable a sanction will not be imposed.
We recognise the importance of setting realistic
and achievable requirements to support claimants towards work.
We are delivering further refresher upskilling for our Work Coaches
on the Claimant Commitment, and on making assessments on the "actively
seeking" requirement.
24. We recommend that the Government confirm the
steps it has taken to ensure that suspensions of JSA payments
where the JCP Work Coach believes that the claimant has not been
"actively seeking employment" do not occur before good
reason can be considered, and a decision made, by a Decision Maker
detached from the employment support process. DWP should set out
the steps it has taken to address this issue, to provide assurance
that the newly instituted procedure of making decisions in these
circumstances within two days of referral is sufficiently robust
to ensure that the decision has in fact been made, and the claimant
notified, before the JSA payment is suspended.
(Paragraph 108)
Accepted in Principle
DWP have robust processes in place to ensure that
good reason is considered, both for disentitlement and for sanction
decisions. In order to be entitled to benefit JSA claimants are
required to satisfy conditions of entitlement, two of which are
that they must be available for work and they must be actively
seeking work. This is set out in primary legislation—the
Jobseekers Act 1995—which requires JSA benefit to be immediately
suspended as soon as a doubt is raised about whether a claimant
has met these requirements. The Work Coach must then refer the
case to a decision maker who will consider good reason.
The Department has made significant improvements
to ensure doubts around actively seeking work are resolved quickly.
We make Decision Maker referrals immediately and have committed
to processing decisions within 48 hours, including consideration
of good reason. Our internal checks have shown that the vast majority
of decisions are made within this timescale. The small number
of cases which go over are usually those which require further
information.
We have systems in place to ensure that when the
Decision Maker makes a decision in the claimant's favour, their
benefit payments are transferred to them as quickly as possible
using the faster electronic payment system to ensure the payment
reaches the claimant's account on the same day. This ensures
that the vast majority of claimants continue to feel no impact
and receive payment on their normal payment day.
At the point of referral, claimants should be told
how and when they will receive a decision and how to challenge
the decision. They are also informed about hardship payments in
various stages in the process, in the event that they are disentitled
and a sanction is imposed.
Additionally, and in recognition of the immediate
impact of their benefit being suspended, vulnerable claimants
(which include for example anyone responsible for a child, claimants
with chronic medical conditions and those under 21 who have left
local authority care in the last 3 years) have access to hardship
payments at the point a doubt is referred to the Decision Maker.
We are currently quality assuring our notifications
processes to ensure that we clearly explain each stage in the
customer journey to the claimant in the right way and at the right
time. We are also reintroducing automated sanctions notifications,
as set out in the Written Ministerial Statement accompanying this
response.
Following the results of our trial on early warning
for sanctions, we will further consider how the approach might
be tailored for where a doubt is raised for entitlement to JSA.
25. We also believe that notification should be
by either written or telephone communication, depending on the
claimant's preferences as previously expressed to JCP staff when
signing the Claimant Commitment, or subsequent to this. (Paragraph
108)
Accepted
Where a claimant gives additional contact information
we record it. Our Work Coaches and Decision Makers will then have
the option to supplement any communications with additional contact
via this channel (typically an e-mail address).
Where a claimant has a particular communication need,
for example, because of a disability, we record that information
and provide contact via those channels, where we have permission.
We are currently quality assuring our notifications
processes and, as part of that, will ensure that the issue of
how to notify an individual according to their preference is made
clear.
ESA sanctioning
27. We recommend that DWP review ESA sanctioning
in relation to the Work Programme, accelerating development of
more effective support for this group, and prioritising the updating
of regulations early in the next Parliament, to empower Work Programme
providers to be able to accept "good cause". (Paragraph
134)
Accepted in Principle
Work Programme performance has improved significantly
since the programme began and in contract year four all providers
exceeded their contractual targets. The Department has taken significant
steps to continually drive the performance for ESA groups within
the Work Programme and actions taken include:
· Identifying
and sharing best practice across the market;
· Conducting
additional compliance monitoring checks to ensure ESA claimants
are receiving the correct level of support;
· Giving
equal weighting to ESA performance when assessing which providers
enter our Enhance Performance Management regime (meaning that
higher volume JSA performance does not mask weak ESA performance).
Of the most recent joiners to the Work Programme
nearly 1 in 10 ESA new claimants found lasting work within 12
months. This is well above the expected level of around 1 in 14
and compares to around 1 in 25 of the first joiners.
S16(3) of the Welfare Reform Act 2007 specifically
prevents the contracting out of decisions on whether the claimant
has failed to comply, shown good cause or should suffer reduction
of ESA (i.e. sanction). Any changes to this approach would require
primary legislation.
It is important that we maintain a fair and independent
approach to decision making and the current process ensures that
this is possible. However, we accept that there are some occasions
where the provider could benefit from being able to accept good
reason in straightforward cases. As committed to within the Government
Response to Matthew Oakley's review, we have already taken steps
to improve the good reason (good cause in ESA) evidence gathering
process. Guidance and supporting products for providers have been
strengthened to make clear their obligations to the mandation
process, where there is flexibility to set requirements and to
record any reasons for non-participation.
There are a number of existing safeguards in place
to provide claimants on ESA with effective support whilst on the
Work Programme. Contractually providers are bound to comply with
all applicable legislation relating to safeguarding and protecting
vulnerable groups. To strengthen existing processes, new provider
guidance has been developed, to clarify their responsibilities
within the sanctions process and to ensure that they check that
the claimant fully understands requirements.
We will consider what more we can do to enhance this
process.
28. We call upon DWP also to review the programme
of Core Visits as soon as possible, to clarify what changes to
conditionality and the application of sanctions occur as a consequence
of such Core Visits. (Paragraph 134)
Accepted in principle
We continue to monitor our internal processes, including
the core visit programme, to ensure it operates as an effective
safeguard, although we have no plans to conduct a specific review
of the process.
A core visit is a home visit which is made by a DWP
visiting officer to a claimant. The purpose of the visit is to
ensure that the claimant understood the requirement that they
have failed to meet. Where it is established that they did not
understand the requirement a referral to a Decision Maker is not
made and the Work Coach will tailor further support activity as
appropriate for an individual claimant's circumstances.
Work Programme providers will, where they identify
a claimant as vulnerable, make every attempt themselves to engage
'face to face' with the claimant to ensure that they understood
the requirements and the consequences of not carrying out the
mandated activity.
29. We recommend that the Department include voluntary
approaches in its pilots, including the Individual Placement with
Support model. DWP should test and evaluate these new approaches,
and publish its findings, prior to the re-letting of Work Programme
contracts in 2017. (Paragraph 135)
Accepted
We welcome the Committee's acknowledgement that the
Department is testing alternative approaches for claimants with
long term health conditions and disabilities. In November 2014,
we announced a package of ESA measures, including a trial of the
Claimant Commitment for ESA claimants at various stages of the
claimant journey and the Voluntary Early Intervention (VEI) Pilot
to improve further the support we offer disabled people and those
with health conditions. We recognise the need to evaluate pilots,
and the findings will help inform our future policy design.
We accept the Committee's recommendation to release
evaluation findings of voluntary pilots, and it is our intention
to publish the Individual Placement Pilots and the Voluntary Early
Intervention Pilots findings in summer 2016.
Further improving communication with claimants
31. We recommend that DWP carry out further work
with the Behavioural Insights Unit to ensure that claimants understand
their position within the benefits system, their underlying entitlements
and, when changes to their benefit payments occur, what the reasons
are for this. (Paragraph 141)
Accepted
We recognise how important it is that all our communications
on sanctions are clear so that claimants understand the sanction
process and can take the necessary action. We take this very seriously
and we are prioritising improvements to communications on sanctions
through our quality assurance processes.
The Department will also work with behavioural insights
specialists to improve the content of the letters we are reviewing.
We have gathered insight from claimants on different versions
and layout of letters to make sure the most effective options
are used.
Hardship payments
32. We recommend that DWP make hardship payments
available from day one of a sanction period in all cases, including
JSA. (Paragraph 149)
Accepted in Principle
Jobseekers are only asked to meet reasonable requirements
which are tailored to take into account their circumstances and
capability, including health conditions, disability and caring
responsibilities. Throughout a claim all claimants will receive
personalised support and advice to help them move closer to and
into work.
As part of this support the claimant enters into
a Claimant Commitment which clearly sets out their agreed requirements
and is regularly reviewed. The majority of claimants do comply
with these requirements. However, where a claimant does not meet
requirements without good reason, a benefit reduction can be made.
The decision to temporarily halt a claimant's benefit payment
is always thoroughly considered and is not something we do lightly.
There is a well-established system of hardship payments
in place which can pay back 60% of the claimant's benefit (this
is 80% for JSA Claimants who are seriously ill or pregnant) if
a benefit reduction is applied. These are available from day one
of the sanction for ESA claimants, and for JSA claimants with
children and other vulnerable groups. We are grateful to the Committee
for their comments on this and we are now considering the extension
of the definition of vulnerability for the purposes of access
to hardship payments from day one for a broader group of individuals.
33. We further recommend that, where the claimant
has dependent children or is a member of a vulnerable group, the
hardship payment decision-making process be instigated by DWP
Decision Makers, and coordinated with the decision on the sanction
referral itself, regardless of whether the claimant has proactively
applied for a hardship payment. (Paragraph 149)
Accepted in principle
The Department accepts in principle that a Decision
Maker should instigate the initial appointment for hardship where
a claimant is either vulnerable or has dependent children. However,
we will need to conduct some further work on the feasibility of
this recommendation.
Currently in order to make a claim for hardship an
appointment must be made with a hardship officer who will consider
evidence before making a decision on eligibility.
This process allows staff to arrange appointments
at the convenience of the claimant and to signpost those who need
further assistance to additional support services where applicable.
Any changes to the process would need to ensure that we are able
to continue to provide the best support to those who demonstrate
eligibility.
Following the Oakley review we have improved the
hardship process to ensure that our customers are regularly told
about the availability of hardship payments throughout their claimant
journey, and have made improvements to the payment process to
ensure that payments are made within 3 days.
34. We therefore also recommend that DWP publish,
on at least an annual basis, official data on the number of applications
for hardship payments made by sanctioned claimants; the number
of hardship payments made; and the number which were made on day
one of a sanction period. (Paragraph 150)
Accepted in principle
The Department intends to publish further data on
hardship applications and awards and we will consider the best
way to present data for the future.
Investigating deaths of benefit claimants
It is right that the Department investigates all
deaths of claimants resulting from suicide, and other deaths of
vulnerable claimants with complex needs, through a system of "peer
reviews". We fully appreciate that in such cases there are
likely to be multiple and complex factors involved. We understand
that DWP has undertaken 49 peer reviews since February 2012, and
that in 33 cases these resulted in recommendations for consideration
at either national or local level.
35. We ask that the Department set out the number
of peer review cases where the claimant was subject to a benefit
sanction at the time of death and the results of any such reviews
in terms of policy changes. (Paragraph 154)
Not accepted
The Department is unable to set out the number of
cases where the claimant was subject to a benefit sanction at
the date of death because of the high risk that the disclosure
of that information may lead to identification of one or more
of the individuals concerned, and thus breach the Department's
obligations of confidentiality.
Peer Reviews are one of the internal continuous improvement
tools available to the Department when investigating whether its
procedures and guidance have been followed in a particular case,
and whether they require revision or improvement. They are not
a tool for examining policy or recommending policy changes, and
thus recommendations contained in them would relate to procedural
issues only.
36. In addition, DWP should seek to establish
a body modelled on the Independent Police Complaints Commission,
to conduct reviews, at the request of relatives, or automatically
where no living relative remains, in all instances where an individual
on an out-of-work working-age benefit dies whilst in receipt of
that benefit. Such a model, operated within the purview of the
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, should ensure that
the role of all publicly-funded agencies involved in the provision
of services or benefits to the individual is scrutinised, so that
a learning document can be produced setting out how policy, and
the service delivery pathway, can be improved at every stage.
(Paragraph 154)
Not accepted
There are already a number of routes for review available
to relatives or people close to the deceased. If they disagree
with a decision that the Department has made on the deceased's
claim they may have a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.
Relatives or people close to the deceased who disagree with the
way in which the Department has handled the case can also use
the Department's complaints processes and ultimately complain
to the Independent Case Examiner. They also have access to their
Members of Parliament who can investigate for them and, again
through their MPs they have access to the Parliamentary and Health
Service Ombudsman. Finally, where relatives or people close to
the deceased feel that a particular policy or process is unlawful,
they may challenge this through the courts. Accordingly there
are a number of existing mechanisms by which they can challenge
the way in which the Department administers the social security
regime.
The number of claimants who are in receipt of the
following four out-of-work benefits (JSA, ESA, IS and Universal
Credit) means that this proposal to investigate what might amount
to every death of a working age benefit claimant is simply unworkable
and disproportionate.
1 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/214326/hwwb-is-work-good-for-you.pdf Back
2
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/universal-credit-claimant-survey-nov-to-dec-2014-interim-findings Back
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