2DAESH and the threat posed by DAESH affiliates
6.The nature of DAESH has been the subject of intense concern and debate throughout its existence. On 26 November 2015, the then Prime Minister described DAESH as a snake, the head of which was in Raqqa.4 By contrast, others have referred to DAESH as a hydra, with the ability to survive and grow even if several of its ‘heads’ are cut off. The importance of assessing this correctly is central to its containment and eventual defeat, as the tactics employed will depend upon what form DAESH adopts. Charles Lister, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, explained:
Raqqa, Mosul and Fallujah are three particularly significant areas for ISIS. If it comes under pressure in one, it will reinforce the other two—that is practised ISIS strategy […] Unless we establish conditions on the ground whereby multiple significant targets can be attacked at the same time, ISIS will continue to be able to be, as you suggest, a kind of Hydra force that is always significantly strong in one area of strategic significance, even while taking losses elsewhere.5
Tim Marshall, formerly of Sky News and editor of ‘The What & The Why’, agreed, telling us that “if you squeeze Raqqa, people will go to Mosul. If you squeeze Mosul, people will go to Raqqa. They are part of a whole”.6
7.A central question, therefore, is whether DAESH is reliant upon territory for its survival. Dr Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute and Charles Lister believed that the existence of a ‘caliphate’ was an important recruiting tool for DAESH and that it therefore needed to be dismantled if DAESH were to be beaten.7 Michael Eisenstadt, a fellow at the Washington Institute of Near East Policy, agreed:
If there is no caliphate, there is no lording over non-believers. There is no glory. There is no victory of their version of Islam. There are no sex slaves or spoils of war: all the reasons why people go over there to fight. That is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of victory—of defeating the ideology.8
8.Both Patrick Cockburn, foreign correspondent for the Independent, and Tim Marshall thought that the loss of territory and therefore its ‘caliphate’ was a vital psychological blow which had to be delivered. Tim Marshall told us:
The blow to them is equally political, military and psychological—we shouldn’t underestimate the psychological blow. I think that’s where the currency came in. They introduced a currency because if they were a state, they could have a currency.9
9.Despite this need to retake territory, Michael Eisenstadt believed that it alone would not remove the threat. He cited the overthrow of Nazi Germany as an example of support and ideology surviving the defeat of a state:
People said, “Well, we had some stupid leaders who made stupid mistakes,” but if you look at polling data through the ’50s and ’60s, it took a generation of change, social engineering, the rise of the left in Europe and Willy Brandt’s policies in the ’60s to finally bury the ideology—and the fact that you had an occupation for several decades.10
He suggested that the key was “to create frameworks where they are unable to act on their belief”. He used the example that, after Nasser’s death, there was no Nasserist state although there were still lots of Nasserists. We were told that this demonstrated that:
You cannot defeat them by counter-narratives. You have to defeat them by creating an overwhelming reality problem—that their whole ideology flies in the face of the reality on the ground, which is that they are defeated.11
10.Richard Atwood of the International Crisis Group also questioned the extent to which the loss of territory would result in the defeat of DAESH. Whilst he agreed that it would weaken DAESH, he believed that the organisation would survive and morph into a different entity.12
11.A number of our witnesses supported that position. Both Michael Eisenstadt and Dr Neil Quilliam of Chatham House thought that DAESH would revert to an underground terror network.13 Dr Lina Khatib of the Arab Reform Institute suggested that in order to compensate for losses in Iraq and Syria, DAESH would escalate its operations elsewhere and increase the number of opportunistic terror attacks in which it was engaged, particularly in the West.14 Dr Khatib also believed that the longer DAESH remained in control of territory, the more likely it was to become a franchise rather than a hierarchal organisation, with “pockets like al-Qaeda which are decentralised”.15 General (retd) Jack Keane of the Institute for the Study of War agreed, likening the ‘caliphate’ to the safe haven provided in Afghanistan to al-Qaeda and concluded that the re-taking of territory was vital but was not in itself sufficient to defeat DAESH. In support of that view he told us that DAESH now had nine affiliates of which Libya was the largest and concluded that there was “no comprehensive strategy to deal with any of those affiliates”.16 Peter Ford, the former UK Ambassador to Syria, similarly highlighted his concern that even in the event of defeat in Syria and Iraq, DAESH could simply relocate to another area.17
12.Our meetings in the Middle East highlighted concerns about the nature of the campaign and the fact that it was being fought on a tactical rather than a strategic basis. Whilst it is clear that DAESH must be removed from Iraq and Syria, whether that can be done simply by defeating their strongholds in these countries is not at all certain. Few of our interlocutors in the Middle East could demonstrate the existence of the infrastructure or tools necessary to fill the vacuum of social and economic stability in which DAESH had taken up residence. DAESH have also proven to be highly adept at evolving its structures to meet the changing nature of the conflict. The recognisable and well organised military force which stormed across Iraq in 2014 bears little resemblance to the guerrilla, asymmetric fighters which we now see in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. The reality is that conventional warfare alone is not likely to defeat DAESH and the fluid nature of DAESH and the ease of movement for its forces, weapons and goods between Syria and Iraq means that unless they are encircled simultaneously, one can be reinforced from the other. The battle in both Iraq and Syria will be neither quick nor easy.
13.We also discussed the retaking of Mosul and Raqqa by local forces, which was considered by some to be key to the downfall of DAESH. However, the experience of the retaking of Ramadi demonstrates that this may only be achieved at enormous cost. Eighty per cent of Ramadi was destroyed in that operation and casualties, both civilian and military, were extensive. In addition large numbers of IEDs remain in the city which makes it uninhabitable in the near future, or without vast effort and cost.
14.Whilst the battles for Mosul and Raqqa are clearly at the forefront of the strategy to defeat DAESH, this does not address the financial or ideological strength of DAESH. In Saudi Arabia, we were warned that of the four levels of the organisation—Ideology, Finance, Planners and Executors—only the last two levels (command and control and soldiers) were being countered effectively. Without all four levels of the organisation being addressed, the defeat of DAESH in the territory that it holds risks leading to the further spread of extremist ideology and finances. Should we fail to eliminate DAESH effectively, we may be condemned to years of playing what one US interlocutor described as ‘jihadi whack-a-mole’.
15.Our counter-DAESH strategy should be as effective in Nigeria, Afghanistan, or Libya as it is in Iraq, or Syria. There needs to be a grand strategic discussion about the threat posed by DAESH and how we can defeat it. It is therefore vital that a grand strategy is developed which addresses the threat posed by DAESH, in all its forms. This is a matter to which we may return in a future inquiry.
DAESH Affiliates
16.In March 2016, the Institute for the Study of War produced a map showing the geographical spread of DAESH-affiliated groups.
Source: Institute for the Study of War
17.Following the announcement of the DAESH ‘caliphate’ in June 2014, a number of existing terrorist groups announced their support for, and affiliation to, DAESH. The Centre on Religion & Geopolitics published its Global Extremism Monitor in March 2016 which found that a “trend in the first quarter of 2016 has been ISIS’ dominance over al-Qaeda. In March, ISIS-affiliated groups killed twice as many people as al-Qaeda and its affiliates”.18
18.The International Crisis Group has also examined the proliferation of DAESH affiliates, noting that:
IS aims to expand beyond its regional base by establishing provinces (wilayaat) through aggressive recruitment and luring in other groups. It appears less discerning in allowing groups to join than al-Qaeda is about accepting new affiliates. It has had some success elsewhere but nothing like in Iraq—perhaps unsurprising given its strong Iraqi identity and roots in conditions there.19
19.A January 2016 Brookings paper, produced by Charles Lister, listed the DAESH ‘wilayat’ (as of August 2015) demonstrating the geographical reach of the organisation.20 These are set out in the table below:
|
Country |
Wilaya (province) |
|
Iraq |
Baghdad |
|
Iraq |
Shamal (North) Baghdad |
|
Iraq (south of Baghdad) |
Al-Janub (South) |
|
Iraq |
Al-Anbar |
|
Iraq |
Al-Fallujah |
|
Iraq |
Salahuddin |
|
Iraq |
Diyala |
|
Iraq (northern) |
Dijla (Tigris) |
|
Iraq |
Ninevah |
|
Iraq |
Kirkuk |
|
Syria |
Damascus |
|
Syria |
Homs |
|
Syria (Hassakeh) |
Al-Baraka |
|
Syria (deir el-Zour) |
Al-Khayr |
|
Syria |
Hama |
|
Syria |
Aleppo |
|
Syria |
Al-Raqqa |
|
Iraq & Syria (northern) |
Al-Jazeera |
|
Iraq & Syria |
Al-Furat (Euphrates) |
|
Yemen |
Sanaa |
|
Yemen |
Shabwa |
|
Yemen |
Hadramawt |
|
Yemen |
Al-Bayda |
|
Yemen |
Lahj |
|
Yemen (Ibb) |
Liwa al-Akhdar |
|
Libya (Cyrenaica/eastern Libya) |
Barqa |
|
Libya |
Tripoli (or Tripolitania) |
|
Libya |
Fezzan |
|
Algeria |
Algeria |
|
Egypt |
Sinai |
|
Saudi Arabia |
Najd |
|
Afghanistan-Pakistan |
Khorasan |
|
Nigeria |
Gharb (West) Africa |
|
Russia |
Al-Qawqaz (Caucasus) |
20.Dr Kagan told us that DAESH could not be defeated whilst wilayat remained under the control of DAESH.21 Mr Eisenstadt highlighted his belief that although the DAESH flagship operation continued to be Syria and Iraq, it was now setting up camp in Libya with further operations elsewhere. The overseas operations were important to DAESH as they created the perception of momentum, and “image and image management [was] key to their success”.22
Libya
21.Dr Khatib warned that there were “definite links between DAESH in Syria and DAESH in Libya”,23 which went as far back as 2011. At first, Libyan militants had travelled to Syria to train Syrian rebels. However, she suggested that those militants had now returned in order to train Libyan extremists. Dr Khatib also warned that unless DAESH were defeated in Syria and Iraq in the near future, its current hierarchical structure would evolve into a franchise organisation with “pockets like al-Qaeda, which are decentralised”.24
22.Another of our witnesses, Claudia Gazzini of the International Crisis Group, suggested that DAESH operated outside of Syria and Iraq in an “opportunistic way” by “sending out feelers, sending out people, across the region and seeing where they can set up base”. It was this opportunism which had allowed them to take advantage of a “series of local factors, local crises and animosities” in Libya to gain control of a 200km stretch of the Libyan coast.25 She also noted that a number of local Islamist groups in Libya had joined or affiliated to DAESH, despite the absence of a single strategy which brought them together:
How they exist and who is part of the groups very much depend on the local conflict that is taking place. For example, in Benghazi these DAESH affiliates have an alliance of convenience with moderate Islamists, so there is a flow of fighters in their ranks between moderate Islamists and DAESH, and a certain extent of coordination. In the other city, Derna, there are al-Qaeda affiliate groups that are fighting against DAESH, so that is containing their expansion in Derna.26
The Sinai and Yemen
23.Richard Atwood highlighted the Sinai as the next-largest affiliate after Libya.27 We were told that “a mostly Bedouin group, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis” had declared affiliation to DAESH and had demonstrated ties and exchanging of expertise. In Yemen, there were a number of small groups which had declared affiliation to DAESH which had been “conducting high-profile attacks against the holy sites of the Zaidis—the Houthis” in an attempt to increase sectarian divisions in Yemen. That said, Mr Atwood pointed out such groups were greatly overshadowed by the al-Qaeda affiliate, AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula). Patrick Cockburn of the Independent has also concluded that AQAP are “the real winners in this war” having created a mini-state which stretches for 340 miles […] along the south coast of Yemen”.28
Afghanistan
24.The DAESH influence in Afghanistan was also brought to our attention. Richard Atwood said that its success in that country would depend on “the direction of the overall conflict and on the direction taken by the Taliban”.29 At present, those affiliates had been seen in parts of eastern Afghanistan and were composed of “Taliban splinters, Pakistani Taliban commanders, central Asian militants”, in addition to other local groups. In conclusion, Mr Atwood argued that DAESH appeared to be “putting down roots” in Afghanistan and that there were some ties with DAESH in Iraq and Syria.30
Africa
25.Boko Haram in Nigeria has also declared its affiliation with DAESH but our witnesses believed that it remained a movement that was “very much rooted in the political economy of northern Nigeria”. The only difference which Mr Atwood could identify was that its online promotion was “a little more polished” and that some of the statements of its leader, Abubakar Shekau, had “changed a little”.31 Recent reports have suggested that the DAESH leadership had replaced Shekau with an alternative leader; but he later claimed that an attempted coup had failed and that he remained in control of the group.32
US Assessment
26.The US State Department publishes an annual report analysing global terrorism trends. In its 2015 report, the DAESH affiliates in Libya, Egypt, Afghanistan and Nigeria were all considered to pose a threat within their home countries. The report also noted that:
ISIL-aligned groups have also emerged in other parts of the Middle East, Africa, the Russian North Caucasus, Southeast Asia, and South Asia, although the relationship between most of these groups and ISIL’s leadership remained symbolic in most cases. Many of these groups are made up of pre-existing terrorist networks with their own local goals and lesser capabilities than ISIL.33
27.The Secretary of State for Defence acknowledged the importance of being aware of the danger posed by the DAESH affiliates although he declined to comment on the threat posed by any of them to the UK.34 He did, however, raise concerns about expansion of DAESH into Libya:
On DAESH’s ability to expand abroad, we have already seen DAESH grow quite rapidly in northern Libya. That is obviously of concern, and we are intensifying our efforts now to support the new Government in Libya and to get it—of course it has 100 priorities—to focus on what needs to be done to stop DAESH spreading westwards from Sirte.35
28.Dominic Wilson, Director of Operational Policy at the Ministry of Defence, set out the differences between the DAESH affiliates:
There are very different kinds of groups. Some affiliates have just taken the name. Some have bought into the ideology and are using the brand. Some aspire to have more established links with DAESH in Iraq and Syria. There are a mix of individuals and groups at differing stages of development, but the agencies are obviously keeping an eye on them all. Key to the strategy to deal with that is that, while they are in their relative infancy, you have the opportunity to nip them in the bud through…building the capacity of local security forces and agencies to deal with the problems before they expand.36
29.The spread of DAESH and its affiliates is indicative of a wider problem that we are facing. We are not yet convinced that the strategy to counter this problem is a coherent and integrated strategy which will achieve our national objectives in Syria, Iraq, and the wider Middle East. All the separate pieces are linked together in the international coalition’s strategic rhetoric, but there is not an obvious integration of UK Government policy instruments in the evidence we have taken. Considering the global and far-reaching nature of this problem, this is concerning. As Charles Lister told us:
Certainly since ISIL took Mosul and declared its caliphate, our strategy has appeared to be constantly reactive. There certainly is a recognition—although this is whispered—that this is going to be […] a generational struggle. It absolutely is; it will probably be longer than 50 years, but it might not only be against ISIS. It might be against al-Qaeda and another thing that comes after it.37
30.Global terrorism trends indicate that, as in the case of al-Qaeda previously, pre-existing Islamist organisations will attach themselves to whichever militant network appears to be in the ascendant at any given time.
31.The UK and Coalition’s strategy to counter DAESH is predominately focused on Iraq and Syria; and relies on the removal of territory from DAESH in order to eliminate it. That is a necessary, but not sufficient, strategy. If DAESH transforms itself into an international movement or a network of affiliates—like al-Qaeda before it—which can survive the loss of territory, the UK Government approach will need to adapt. For example, if DAESH is defeated in the Middle East but then grows strong in Africa, the current strategy will require major revision.
32.We recommend that the Government should set out how the strategy will be flexible enough to cope with the various possible outcomes, and should explain what the differing options are. If the military action is successful but the overall strategy does not adapt, then DAESH will continue to pose a threat to stability and safety across the region and, indeed, much more widely.
33.At present the UK has as its primary focus the defeat of DAESH in Iraq. However, the rapid increase in DAESH-affiliated groups elsewhere should be a cause for grave concern, particularly where there are strong links between the DAESH leadership in Iraq and Syria and those groups. The danger posed by the majority of these DAESH-affiliated groups may be minimal at present, but the evidence presented to us suggests that, if unchecked, they could form yet another front in the battle against international Islamist terrorism. The International Community needs to work together to provide a holistic approach to counter violent Islamic extremism through improving education, governance and infrastructure in areas at risk as well as countering the funding and export of extreme Islamic views. This should be parallel and complimentary to any military action.
34.We recommend that, as part of an explanation of how it is countering the global threat from DAESH, the Government should provide more details of the military and capacity-building operations which are being undertaken to counter the DAESH affiliates.
5 Q238
6 Q361
7 Q227; Q240
8 Q229
9 Q364
10 Q241
11 Q228
12 Q324–327
13 Q237; Q310
14 Q238; Q291
15 Q294
16 Q229
17 Q144
18 Centre on Religion and Geopolitics, Global Extremism Monitor, March 2016
19 International Crisis Group, Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, March 2016
20 Charles Lister, Jihadi Rivalry: Islamic State Challenges al-Qaida, Brookings Doha Centre Analysis Paper, January 2016
21 Q227
22 Q238
23 Q293
24 Q294
25 Q328
26 Q328; 331
27 Q335
28 Thanks to the UK and US intervention, al-Qaeda now has a mini-state in Yemen. It’s Iraq and Isis all over again, Independent, 15 April 2016
29 Q335
30 Q335
31 Q335
32 What Next for Boko Haram’s Forsaken Leader, Abubakar Shekau? NewsWeek, 10 August 2016
33 United States Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2015, June 2016
34 Q426
35 Q421
36 Q425
37 Q260
© Parliamentary copyright 2015
16 September 2016