Conclusions and recommendations
DAESH and the threat posed by DAESH affiliates
1.Global terrorism trends indicate that, as in the case of al-Qaeda previously, pre-existing Islamist organisations will attach themselves to whichever militant network appears to be in the ascendant at any given time. (Paragraph 30)
2.The UK and Coalition’s strategy to counter DAESH is predominately focused on Iraq and Syria; and relies on the removal of territory from DAESH in order to eliminate it. That is a necessary, but not sufficient, strategy. If DAESH transforms itself into an international movement or a network of affiliates—like al-Qaeda before it—which can survive the loss of territory, the UK Government approach will need to adapt. For example, if DAESH is defeated in the Middle East but then grows strong in Africa, the current strategy will require major revision. (Paragraph 31)
3.We recommend that the Government should set out how the strategy will be flexible enough to cope with the various possible outcomes, and should explain what the differing options are. If the military action is successful but the overall strategy does not adapt, then DAESH will continue to pose a threat to stability and safety across the region and, indeed, much more widely. (Paragraph 32)
4.At present the UK has as its primary focus the defeat of DAESH in Iraq. However, the rapid increase in DAESH-affiliated groups elsewhere should be a cause for grave concern, particularly where there are strong links between the DAESH leadership in Iraq and Syria and those groups. The danger posed by the majority of these DAESH-affiliated groups may be minimal at present, but the evidence presented to us suggests that, if unchecked, they could form yet another front in the battle against international Islamist terrorism. The International Community needs to work together to provide a holistic approach to counter violent Islamic extremism through improving education, governance and infrastructure in areas at risk as well as countering the funding and export of extreme Islamic views. This should be parallel and complimentary to any military action. (Paragraph 33)
5.We recommend that, as part of an explanation of how it is countering the global threat from DAESH, the Government should provide more details of the military and capacity-building operations which are being undertaken to counter the DAESH affiliates. (Paragraph 34)
The UK military effort
6.It is disappointing that the MoD has been unable to provide us with the full statistical analysis of UK airstrikes in Syria which we requested. Their inability to do so for understandable reasons, nonetheless may tend to undermine the Government’s assertion that the bombing campaign in Syria is in support of credible moderate ground forces (apart from the Kurds) which was one of the key elements of its argument for extending the UK’s campaign against DAESH to that country. (Paragraph 74)
7.If the Government is to continue to justify and validate its policy of airstrikes in Syria, it should provide the necessary detail on what is being targeted. We therefore recommend that the MoD put this information, as far as possible, into the public domain so that realistic judgements on the effectiveness of the UK’s air operations in Syria can be made. At the very least, Government ministers ought to be made aware of such figures. (Paragraph 75)
8.In Iraq it is clear that air operations have been effective in reclaiming territory, despite the adaptation of DAESH tactics to counter that threat. This is because of their role in supporting identifiable local ground forces which are able to take and hold territory. The air operation in Syria is much smaller mainly because of a lack of partners on the ground, other than Kurdish forces, which can benefit from that support. (Paragraph 76)
9.Also in Iraq, the UK training effort appears to be both effective and substantial. Over a third of troops trained by the Coalition have received this training from UK military personnel. The expansion of training offered by UK troops means that the UK now has a presence at all of the Iraqi training bases. In the gifting of equipment, the length of time that it has taken for the UK Government to re-supply Peshmerga forces with ammunition for machine-guns it previously supplied, is of great concern. We recommend that, in future, the Government should ensure that its support to allies and partners is more consistent and timely. (Paragraph 77)
10.We recommend that the Government should provide an assessment of how long it took the UK to get to the position where it was operating at strength within the Coalition and how long it can maintain that position. (Paragraph 78)
11.We also recommend that the Government should provide clarification on the training of Syrian opposition fighters including the number of individuals it has trained, the number of UK military personnel currently engaged with such training, and most importantly the identity of the groups to which the trainees belonged. (Paragraph 79)
12.It is clear that the UK is part of an International Coalition and that the strategy of that Coalition is subject to revision by those involved. However, the reasons for such revisions and the resultant changes in the UK effort ought to be explained. Whilst the discussion, for instance, about modifying the train-and-equip programme in Syria may have taken place in the United States, the UK Government has failed to set out why changes have been made and what impact they have had on UK personnel or those they have been training. The publication of information concerning the UK’s military effort, whilst greater than in some previous operations, ought to demonstrate how UK military actions are supporting the wider strategy. (Paragraph 80)
Armed actors in Syria
13.The Government’s case for extending UK military operations to Syria was based on a strategy of supporting the 70,000 moderate opposition forces identified by the then Prime Minister, David Cameron. We have sought to test this figure in terms of both numbers and orientation. We understand why the Government have been unable to provide a list of the groups, since that would risk providing useful intelligence to the Assad regime. However, we have relied upon outside organisations who have published such lists and most, if not all, the individual groups have as a result, already been identified. That information is in the public domain which means that the groups will already be known to the Assad regime. (Paragraph 105)
14.As with the DAESH affiliates, the threat posed by Jabhat al-Nusra must be monitored by the Government. The danger posed by an organisation which has been one of al-Qaeda’s most successful affiliates may well be limited to Syria at present but the potential for it to carry out terrorist attacks globally may increasingly become a reality. Its recent rebranding and formal separation from al-Qaeda, may increase its influence over other elements of Islamist armed opposition in Syria, narrowing the political options for the future still further. (Paragraph 113)
15.We recommend that the Government should set out how it is monitoring the threat posed by Jabhat al-Nusra/Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and how it intends to counter that threat. (Paragraph 114)
16.The Russians are a key actor in the Syrian theatre and, in the past six months, the Assad regime and its supporters have begun to tackle DAESH in its Syrian locations. Military cooperation with Russia may be the only way in which DAESH can finally be suppressed or defeated in Syria. However, active cooperation could take place only with the agreement of the International Coalition—including, as it does, some regional powers which are wholly opposed to the Assad regime. (Paragraph 123)
17.Two years into the military campaign to counter the threat from DAESH, we are seeing the impact of the UK effort in the International Coalition. Whilst the military effort in Iraq is bearing fruit, that is much less certain in Syria. We believe this is partly due to the aspirations of the UK Government in respect of each country. The goals in Iraq are to remove territory from DAESH, to strengthen the Iraqi Government and to maintain Iraq as a unitary state. The goals in Syria are not only to defeat DAESH, but also to help bring into being a Government which will be neither authoritarian and repressive, on the one hand, nor Islamist and extreme, on the other. These goals cannot be accomplished by military means alone. We discuss the wider strategy and the importance of the political aspect of the fight to counter DAESH in the next section. (Paragraph 126)
UK strategy in the Middle East and the wider strategy against extremism
18.The argument that it must be a local force—not a Western one—which takes and holds territory has been borne out by previous experiences of intervention. Such a strategy (western air power and local ground troops) is reliant on political progress alongside military achievement. Whilst the progress in the military campaign to counter DAESH is beginning to gain momentum, the same cannot be said for the progress of political reform. A lack of political reform in Iraq, let alone Syria, may well undermine the military progress to date, removing the threat of DAESH only for it to be replaced by other groups posing similar or even greater threats. (Paragraph 144)
19.The Government must set out exactly how it intends to help ensure that political reform is achieved and what action it is planning to take to keep it in step with the military campaign. (Paragraph 145)
20.The long-term strategy articulated by the Secretary of State—a stable, secure, democratic Middle East—is laudable, but it remains to be seen how the Government expects to achieve this. It is far from clear that the forces unleashed in the Arab uprisings are capable of transition, at this stage of societal development, into the sort of pluralist and tolerant democratic systems that conform to Western ideals. We recommend that the Government should deliver on its undertaking to develop a realistic strategy for the Gulf and should set out how it intends to work with partners, allies and international organisations to promote stability in the Middle East. (Paragraph 149)
21.There are legitimate concerns that have been raised about the overall strategy to counter DAESH. There is potential for DAESH to be defeated territorially only for them (or another group) to continue to pose a threat to stability in the Middle East and the West in general. The importance of stability in the Middle East is clear. If the International Coalition (and therefore the UK) finds itself reduced to a binary choice between an Assad-style dictatorship or a revolutionary Islamist alternative, there will need to be a hard-headed evaluation of which of the unpalatable prospects poses the lesser threat to our national interests. (Paragraph 150)
Changing the way we intervene
22.It is clear that recent interventions have required much more than mere military campaigns. There have been criticisms of levels of engagement in the political sphere in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria too. It is also clear that there is no single formula for success but that understanding the local political and cultural context, as well as the nature of the situation on the ground, is absolutely essential. We welcome the emergence of a new doctrine that extends thinking about intervention to include other actors such as aid agencies, NGOs and the private sector. The ‘whole-of-Government’ approach, epitomised by the National Security Council, is clearly an improvement on the management of previous interventions. However, despite that innovation, a number of concerns have been raised about interventions that have taken place since the National Security Council was created. This indicates that there are still flaws and weaknesses in the system. Some of these were identified in our predecessor Committee’s Report (HC 682) on ‘Decision-making in Defence Policy’, published in March 2015. (Paragraph 158)
23.The fact that witnesses repeatedly identified reactionary politics as a drag on overall outcomes, points to a pessimistic conclusion—that countries riven by intense tribal and religious divisions may take a very long time indeed to accept the basic principles of democracy and equal rights. If so, no amount of injected international aid will significantly accelerate the adoption of democratic norms and values as the basis of their political systems. (Paragraph 163)
24.Stabilisation and reconstruction are central in the fight to counter DAESH, particularly in Iraq. We were impressed by both the calibre and the (relatively low) cost of the work carried out by the UNDP when we were in Iraq. (Paragraph 165)
25.The disparity between military effort and that on stabilisation is concerning. Whilst stabilisation does not carry the same cost as a military operation, the low priority placed on stabilisation does not reassure us about Iraq’s long-term future. We recommend that the Government ensures that the diplomatic and development effort relates more closely to the size of the military effort, whilst recognising that not all societies have reached a stage of development for fully-fledged democratic institutions to command general assent. (Paragraph 166)
26.We shall, therefore consider holding a further inquiry, especially in the light of the Chilcot Report, which will look at the way the UK intervenes—the decision-making process, the preparation and planning both for the military campaign and its aftermath, and the way that the UK Government ensures that it can maintain a solid commitment to a strategy which is comprehensive and achievable. Only in this way can we be confident that lessons learnt from previous interventions are understood before any future ones are contemplated. (Paragraph 167)
© Parliamentary copyright 2015
16 September 2016