UK military operations in Syria and Iraq Contents

Appendix 3: Correspondence between the Committee and the Secretary of State

9 June 2016: MoD to Chairman

hcdc inquiry into uk military operations in iraq and syria: follow-up answers to questions raised at the evidence session on 26 may 2016

The costs of the military operations against DAESH

The net additional cost of military operations has been met from the HM Treasury Special Reserve and the Deployed Military Activity Pool. Ultimately, the cost will be determined by the length of the campaign and the nature and extent of the UK airstrike contribution. As an indicator, the net additional cost of military operations against DAESH in Iraq and Syria between August 2014 and 31 March 2016 is estimated to be around £250 million. The MOD Annual Report and Accounts for 2015–16 are still to be finalised, and thus this estimate remains subject to change until the Accounts are laid before Parliament prior to Summer recess.

The nature of the close air support provided by RAF aircraft to local forces on the ground in both Iraq and Syria

Following the Committee hearing, the Clerk to the Committee has refined the request for information and seeks a month by month breakdown of:

the number of airstrikes in Iraq;
the number of airstrikes in Syria;
the number of air strikes in Iraq that count as close air support and a breakdown of which armed forces they were in support of,
the number of air strikes in Syria that count as close air support and a breakdown of which armed forces they were in support of.

Updated information about our weapons releases in Iraq and Syria is provided at Annex 1 and 2. This is UK-verified data, set against each weapons release and provides a better overall picture than providing the number of airstrikes. The Committee will note that the information in the table is divided along the lines of the targets that the Department has provided previously.

Turning to the question of “Close Air Support”, while this is sometimes used as a narrative term in online statements, the data we hold does not classify missions in this way because it is not information we need in order to evaluate effectiveness. We need to know whether targets have been prosecuted accurately, in a manner consistent with the Rules of Engagement and the principles of the Law of Armed Conflict, and whether the action has had the desired military effect against the target.

In Iraq, Coalition air activity including UK activity is delivered in direct support of the Government of Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government in the fight against DAESH. In Syria, as I set out to the Committee, the situation on the ground is much more complex. Unlike Iraq, there is no unified Government that represents all of the people, and there is a variety of moderate and more extreme groups; the situation is further complicated by Russia’s military deployment. As we mentioned in our evidence, this has meant taking some finely balanced decisions. To date UK strikes in Syria have focused on pre-planned strikes against key DAESH infrastructure including fortified areas, command and control buildings, weapon manufacturing and storage facilities, targeting DAESH’s oil infrastructure, and downgrading their ability to finance their fighting capability. The Coalition as a whole has also targeted DAESH in northwest Syria, where they are engaged in combat with non-extremist Syrian opposition forces.

Annex 1 (to the Secretary of State’s letter)

Weapons Releases vs Targets—Syria

		Weapon Release Events
		Infrastructure		Fielded Enemy Forces		Vehicles		Weapons, Ammunition and Materiel
Year	Month	Building/Structure	POL	EF in Building	EF in Open	Moving	Static	Weapon Emplacement	Weapons Cache	IED	Other
2015	DEC	0	21	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2016	JAN	6	1	15	5	0	21	0	8	0	0
	FEB	1	0	2	4	0	4	0	2	0	0
	MAR	7	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	APR	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
	MAY	6	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

Annex 2 (to the Secretary of State’s letter)

Weapons Releases vs Targets—Iraq

Year	Month	Weapon Release Events
		Infrastructure		Fielded Enemy Forces		Vehicles		Weapons, Ammunition and Materiel
		Building/Structure	POL	EF in Building	EF in Open	Moving	Static	Weapon Emplacement	Weapons Cache	IED	Other
2014	AUG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	SEP	0	0	1	2	1	2	0	0	0	0
	OCT	14	0	4	3	2	4	0	0	0	0
	NOV	3	0	5	25	4	17	0	0	0	0
	DEC	9	0	0	15	1	29	0	0	0	1
2015	JAN	4	0	6	23	6	25	0	0	0	0
	FEB	5	0	0	11	1	10	0	0	4	0
	MAR	3	0	6	20	4	16	3	1	0	0
	APR	17	0	5	17	1	10	1	0	1	0
	MAY	9	0	12	7	6	10	4	4	1	0
	JUN	13	0	15	3	2	10	0	0	0	0
	JUL	9	0	9	4	3	7	5	0	4	0
	AUG	11	0	4	14	5	17	2	3	1	0
	SEP	2	0	17	15	7	8	4	2	5	0
	OCT	0	0	10	14	1	3	3	0	1	0
	NOV	0	0	27	30	1	11	10	6	5	0
	DEC	5	0	69	31	0	19	3	0	2	1
2016	JAN	8	0	86	34	1	19	6	5	5	0
	FEB	4	0	44	24	0	10	9	5	2	1
	MAR	24	0	65	27	1	8	10	4	0	7
	APR	7	0	60	17	0	10	18	19	7	0
	MAY	13	0	41	16	4	12	19	28	5	1

16 June 2016: Chairman to MoD

Thank you for the follow-up evidence which you provided on 9 June. Unfortunately, the evidence did not contain the information which you had agreed to provide us with when you gave evidence to the Committee on 26 May (Q395–7). Instead of numbers of airstrikes, we were given the number of weapon releases. We note that the Ministry of Defence has used different definitions of ‘airstrike’ during the military campaign in Iraq and Syria, but that it currently uses the Coalition method to determine airstrike numbers.247 In order to ensure that we have a good overall picture of the British military effort and its role in the coalition, we need to have comparable data to that published by the Coalition.

We have produced the attached pro-forma table to set out the information that we require. We presume that there is no “double-counting” in the table you previously provided, listing the categories of targets subjected to weapons releases. Please confirm that this is the case. If not, please resupply the previous data in a table with categories which do not overlap.

Similarly, when you supply the data for our pro-forma table on the numbers of airstrikes against each category of targets, please confirm that there is no overlap between these categories too.

We are also happy for you to clarify in writing where the UK is further supporting the Coalition in other ways (such as target acquisition).

It is not acceptable that you have failed to provide us with the numbers of airstrikes that were in support of opposition fighters on the ground. We do not believe that the Ministry of Defence holds data which includes the category of targets but not whether those targets were in support of ground forces. What we request is a list of which airstrikes were mounted in support of armed opposition fighters engaging the enemy in the target area.

As the information requested is straightforward to supply, we ask that you provide us with it by 5pm on Monday 20 June. If you are unable to provide us with this information in writing we may need to invite you to give further oral evidence on this inquiry.

Number of UK airstrikes248 between December 2015 and May 2016

A: Number of airstrikes

B: Number of airstrikes in support of fighters on the ground

Target

December

January

February

March

April

May

Total

Iraq

Syria

Iraq

Syria

Iraq

Syria

Iraq

Syria

Iraq

Syria

Iraq

Syria

Infrastructure

Building/Structure

Petrol, Oil, Lubricant infrastructure

Fielded Enemy Forces

EF in Building

EF in Open

Vehicles

Moving

Static

Weapons, Ammunition and Material

Weapon Emplacement

Weapons Cache

IED

Other (Please Specify)

Total

20 June 2016: MoD to Chairman

Thank you for your letter of 16 June 2016 asking for a breakdown of information on the UK’s contribution to the Coalition air campaign by air strikes rather than by weapon releases, and for information on which air strikes were in support of opposition fighters on the ground in Iraq and in Syria.

Your letter states that the Ministry of Defence currently uses the Coalition method to determine air strike numbers. Following my statement to the House last year (16 July 2015: Column 32WS), it would be more accurate to say that the Ministry of Defence is using Coalition-produced numbers for UK air strikes to ensure consistency with Coalition data. Unfortunately, this Coalition data is not categorised or available from the Coalition in the form you seek. This explains why we are also publishing UK data on weapon releases which can be broken down into greater detail and which provides a fuller picture of the RAF’s contribution to the Coalition air campaign.

You also requested a breakdown of airstrikes that were mounted in support of armed opposition fighters engaging the enemy in the target area. Unfortunately we do not categorise the information we hold in this way. This is because it is not needed to assess whether the result has had the desired military effect or to confirm that the target has been prosecuted accurately and in a legal and proportionate manner. An alternative categorisation would require a re-evaluation of each individual Mission Report—and its associated material, including the weapons system’s video—to assess the purpose of the mission and its weapons release. As an indication of the magnitude of this task, there are currently over 3,000 pieces of archived information as background to the 819 strikes the RAF had undertaken as at 27 May. This would be a lengthy exercise of no operational value to my Department and which would divert resources from critical work supporting counter-DAESH operations.

I can, however, confirm that there is no “double-counting” in any of the data that has been provided. It may help your analysis to have some further information on the categories set out in my previous memorandum:

Under “Infrastructure”, the “POL” category (petrol, oil and lubricants) is generally exclusively interdiction, because our strikes against oilfields have a long-term, strategic value in reducing DAESH’s income from oil. But strikes against DAESH’s major command and control HQs under the “Building/Structure” category—around Raqqa and Mosul, for example - have value in shaping future ground operations in the longer term.

The majority of “Fielded Enemy Forces” targets are likely to be on or near the front line where local ground forces are engaged or about to be engaged against DAESH.

“Vehicles” might include an armed pick-up truck, on its way into an operation, or already engaged but could also include a crane or rig on its way to repair a damaged oil well that we have previously targeted, which would be considered to be a component of strategic interdiction.

Strikes against “Weapons, Ammunition and Materiel” are likely to be in the context of front line operations but the distance from the frontline and the timing of future operations would also be relevant.

“IEDs” are also likely to be attacked because of the immediate threat they pose to advancing forces.

I hope that this sets out the background more clearly and assists the Committee in its inquiry.

4 July 2016: Chairman to MoD

I write in response to your letter dated 20 June 2016. The information you supplied did not address the Committee’s questions in sufficient detail. Therefore, I am writing to request the following information which is set in numbered points below. I should make clear that this information is key to our inquiry into UK military operations in Iraq and Syria.

1. You have helpfully previously provided us with data on the numbers of each make of weapon released in Iraq and Syria until the end of April 2016. We would therefore request that you provide us with the number of each of the different types (broken down by make) of weapons released in a) Iraq and b) Syria for May and June 2016.

2. You have previously published monthly totals of airstrikes in Iraq (under the previous definition and the Coalition definition) up to the end of June 2015 (see table 1) We are requesting that you update this data from for each month from July 2015 until the end of June 2016. If you are not willing to do so, please could you give your reasons?

3. You have also published monthly totals of airstrikes in Syria from December 2015 to 30 May 2016 (see table 2). We are requesting that you update this data to include 31 May and June 2016. For the sake of consistency, it would be helpful if this information could be presented in the same form as the information in table 1. Again, if you are not willing to do so, please could you give your reasons?

4. In your response dated 20 June 2016, you stated that it would be too time-consuming for the MoD to provide details of all UK airstrikes in direct support of opposition forces fighting on the ground. Table 2 states that the UK had conducted 48 airstrikes in Syria. We do not believe that it would be an onerous burden to provide this information on those 48 airstrikes and request that you provide that information. Thus, on the basis of the breakdown of weapons releases you have already supplied, it seems improbable that airstrikes would have been mounted in direct support of moderate forces on the ground in more than a limited proportion of these 48 airstrikes - primarily those which you describe as being carried out against enemy forces in buildings and in the open. Again, if you are unwilling to provide that information, we will expect an explanation. This information would help address the concern that little if any bombing is being carried out in close support of armed groups fighting DAESH in Syria beyond that in support of Kurdish-led forces such as the Syrian Democratic Forces.

5. The Committee also would like a list of the main armed opposition moderate groups—apart from the Kurds—who we are supporting in the bombing campaign in Syria. If you are not willing to do so, please could you give your reasons?

I would be grateful if you could provide us with the information by Monday 11 July.

Table 1: UK airstrikes in Iraq249

	Monthly Strikes–UK Method	Cumulative Total–UK Method	Monthly Strikes–Coalition Method	Cumulative Total–Coalition Method
September - 2014	2	2	2	2
October - 2014	15	17	8	10
November - 2014	40	57	26	36
December - 2014	33	90	26	62
January - 2015	46	136	28	90
February - 2015	24	160	19	109
March - 2015	42	202	29	138
April - 2015	34	236	26	164
May - 2015	37	273	34	198
June - 2015	30	308	28	226

Table 2: Number of UK airstrikes in Syria

Month	Number of Strikes
December - 2015	11
January - 2016	20
February - 2016	6
March - 2016	3
April - 2016	5
May (as of 30 May) - 2016	3

These strike numbers are constantly reviewed and updated by the Coalition to ensure records are as complete and accurate as possible. As such, there may be minor changes in future statements regarding such statistics.

9 July 2016: MoD to Chairman

Thank you for your letter of 4 July.

In answer to your first question, the table at Annex A updates the information about weapons releases in Iraq and Syria for the months of May and June 2016. Your second and third questions request monthly data on RAF strikes in Iraq from July 2015 to end June 2016 based on the Coalition method of calculating strikes and on the former UK methodology. As explained in my letter of 20 June and in the Written Ministerial Statement from which your Table 1 is drawn, we decided last year that it would be preferable for consistency to use Coalition produced information. Updated information on this basis is in the tables at Annex B. We do not hold any data calculated by the UK methodology since June 2015 and consider that there would be no operational value in retrospectively producing it.

You also requested that we should categorise the strikes conducted in Syria to break out those mounted in direct support of opposition forces fighting on the ground. As I explained previously, we do not hold information in this form and there is no operational benefit to the opportunity cost of diverting Departmental resources to this work; however, as you have indicated, the information we have provided in relation to weapon releases, when taken with the additional information on the various categories of target provided in my last letter to you, should allow conclusions to be drawn on the broad order contribution of RAF aircraft against different types of target in Syria.

In relation to UK air support to forces engaged in the counter-DAESH fight in Syria, I would stress that neither the UK nor the Coalition is undertaking a generalised bombing campaign in Syria in support of moderate armed opposition groups. Rather the Coalition, including the RAF, is giving targeted air support to specific counter-DAESH offensives, in particular in northwest Syria where the Syrian Democratic Forces are engaged around Manbij and where other opposition forces have been seeking to push eastwards from the area of Azaaz and Mar’ a. The Coalition Air Operations Centre allocates targets across Iraq and Syria on a case by case basis according to operational need and the availability and suitability of different Coalition aircraft and weapon systems. In each case, the option chosen balances a range of factors. The availability of RAF aircraft and weapon systems to contribute to the counter-DAESH fight, both strategic and tactical and across both theatres, provides important additional flexibility to the Coalition enabling it to prosecute the overall counter-DAESH campaign more effectively.

Finally, you ask for a list of the “main armed opposition moderate groups - apart from the Kurds- who we are supporting in Syria”. As you are aware, the Prime Minister set out last year our estimate that there were around 70,000 Syrian opposition fighters on the ground who do not belong to extremist groups. Many of these were linked to the Free Syrian Army. It should be noted that information on individual groups was drawn in large part from intelligence. It would not be to the benefit of these non-extremist opposition fighters if we were to make their details public to DAESH and the Syrian regime. My Right Honourable Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces provided two written answers on 22 April 2016 (33816 and 33889) which noted our assessment that non-extremist opposition numbers had held up despite recent pressure and that numbers in groups fighting DAESH were likely to have increased.

Annex A—Weapon Releases in Iraq and Syria

Weapon Type Released	May 2016			June 2016
Weapon Type Released	Iraq	Syria	Total	Iraq	Syria	Total
Hellfire	13	1	14	49	4	53
DMS Brimstone	11	0	11	10	0	10
Enhanced Paveway 3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paveway IV	118	2	120	110	6	116
Enhanced Paveway 2	0	5	5	15	0	15
GBU-12	1	0	1	11	0	11
Storm Shadow	0	0	0	4	0	4
Total	143	8	151	319	10	329

Annex B—Number of Airstrikes

Iraq

Month	Number of UK strikes
July 2015	26
August 2015	29
September 2015	34
October 2015	17
November 2015	58
December 2015	75
January 2016	79
February 2016	54
March 2016	64
April 2016	67
May 2016	65
June 2016	72

Syria

Date	Number of UK strikes
December 2015	11
January 2016	20
February 2016	6
March 2016	3
April 2016	5
May 2016	3
June 2016	5

8 August 2016: Chairman to MoD

Thank you for the follow up evidence which you have previously provided to our inquiry into UK military operations in Iraq and Syria. It has been helpful in allowing us to evaluate the UK’s military effort to counter DAESH. Before we publish our report, we wish to ensure that we have the most up to date figures available.

We have produced the attached tables to set out the information that we require, based on the information that you have previously provided to us. We would like to have the information for June and July by 30 August. Due to our report publication timetable, we require the information for August by 5 September. I apologise for the short time frame but it is unavoidable.

Syria

Year

Month

Number of Airstrike

Weapon Release Events

Infrastructure

Fielded Enemy Forces

Vehicles

Weapons, Ammunition and Materiel

Building/Structure

POL250

EF251 in Building

EF in Open

Moving

Static

Weapon Emplacement

Weapons Cache

IED

Other

2016

JUNE

JULY

AUGUST

Total

Iraq

Year

Month

Number of airstrikes

Weapon Release Events

Infrastructure

Fielded Enemy Forces

Vehicles

Weapons, Ammunition and Materiel

Building/Structure

POL

EF in Building

EF in Open

Moving

Static

Weapon Emplacement

Weapons Cache

IED

Other

2016

JUNE

JULY

AUGUST

Total

Weapon Type	Number of weapons fired at targets in Iraq from September 2014	Number of weapons fired at targets in Syria from 2 December 2015
Hellfire
Dual Mode Seeker Brimstone
Paveway IV
Enhanced Paveway 3
Enhanced Paveway 2
GBU-12
Storm Shadow
Total

25 August 2016: MoD to Chairman

Thank you for your letter dated 8th August 2016.

You asked for the latest data for our airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, to complement data we have provided to you previously.

The first part of the data you have requested–the data on weapons released by platform and weapon type–is to be found at Annex A. We will provide an update to include data for August 2016, as you have requested.

At Annex B, we are providing the updated figures for June and July 2016, relating to weapons released against target type. Again, we will update you on the data for August.

As always, the data is believed to be complete and correct at the time of issue. Our operational activity databases are frequently reviewed and any errors and omissions are corrected. It is therefore possible that future statements might not match this statement exactly. Naturally, our aim is to ensure that our records are as complete and correct as possible.

We hope to be able to comply with your request for the August data by 5th September.

Annex A

Weapons Releases by Platform and Weapons Type

Aircraft	Weapon	Weapons released before 2/12/15		Weapons released after 2/12/15 to end July 16		Total
Aircraft	Weapon	Iraq	Syria	Iraq	Syria	Total
REAPER MQ9	AGM-114P	109	0	0	0	109
	AGM-114R2	165	0	129	31	325
	GBU12	14	0	19	3	36
Tornado GR4	PWIV Mk1	0	0	164	7	171
	PWIV Mk2	328	0	165	45	538
	EPW2	0	0	15	5	20
	EPW3	0	0	2	0	2
	DMSB	105	0	78	19	202
	StormShadow	0	0	4	0	4
Typhoon FGR4	PWIV Mk2	0	0	534	22	556
Total		721	0	1110	132	1963

Annex B

Weapons Released by Target Type

Iraq		Weapon Release Events
Year	Month	Infrastructure		Fielded Enemy Forces		Vehicles		Weapons, Ammunition and Materiel
Year	Month	Building/Structure	POL	EF in Building	EF in Open	Moving	Static	Weapon Emplacement	Weapons Cache	IED	Other
2016	JUNE	22	0	81	45	7	23	18	2	0	3
2016	JULY	3	0	18	18	5	10	15	1	3	4

Syria		Weapon Release Events
Year	Month	Infrastructure		Fielded Enemy Forces		Vehicles		Weapons, Ammunition and Materiel
Year	Month	Building/Structure	POL	EF in Building	EF in Open	Moving	Static	Weapon Emplacement	Weapons Cache	IED	Other
2016	JUNE	0	0	4	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
2016	JULY	0	0	2	7	0	0	0	0	0	0

5 September 2016: MoD to Chairman

In your letter dated 8th August 2016, you asked for the latest data for our airstrikes and weapons releases in Iraq and Syria, to complement data we have provided to you previously. Having provided the information for June and July in my letter of 23rd August, I write to now to provide an update.

The first part of the data you have requested–weapons released by platform and weapon type–is to be found at Annex A, updated to include August 2016.

At Annex B1, the updated figures relating to weapons released against target type are provided for Iraq - and for Syria at Annex B2. For completeness, the figures for the entire operation since 2014 have been included.

You had also included a column in the tables at Annex B relating to numbers of airstrikes by month. We are now providing this information for June, July and August in the table at Annex C. We have provided this information separately because numbers of airstrikes cannot be compared directly with weapons releases. It is possible that a weapons release might not result in a strike; conversely, a numbers of weapons releases can result in a single strike.

Annex A

Weapons Releases by Platform and Weapons Type

Aircraft	Weapon	Weapons released before 2/12/15		Weapons released after and Including 2/12/15 to end August 16		Total
Aircraft	Weapon	Iraq	Syria	Iraq	Syria	Total
REAPER MQ9	AGM-114P	109	0	0	0	109
	AGM-114R2	166	0	153	45	364
	GBU12	14	0	20	3	37
Tornado GR4	PWIV Mk1	0	0	173	13	186
	PWIV Mk2	328	0	165	45	538
	EPW2	0	0	15	5	20
	EPW3	0	0	4	0	4
	DMSB	105	0	82	25	212
	StormShadow	0	0	4	0	4
Typhoon FGR4	PWIV Mk2	0	0	563	38	601

Annex B1

IRAQ		Weapon Release Events Against
IRAQ		Infrastructure		Fielded Enemy Forces		Vehicles		Weapons, Ammunition and Materiel
Year	Month	Building/Structure	POL	EF in Building	EF in Open	Moving	Static	Weapon Emplacement	Weapons Cache	IED	Other
2014	AUG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	SEP	0	0	1	2	1	2	0	0	0	0
	OCT	14	0	4	3	2	4	0	0	0	0
	NOV	3	0	5	25	4	17	0	0	0	0
	DEC	9	0	0	15	1	29	0	0	0	1
2015	JAN	4	0	6	23	6	25	0	0	0	0
	FEB	5	0	0	11	1	10	0	0	4	0
	MAR	3	0	6	20	4	16	3	1	0	0
	APR	17	0	5	17	1	10	1	0	1	0
	MAY	9	0	12	7	6	10	4	4	1	0
	JUN	13	0	15	3	2	10	0	0	0	0
	JUL	9	0	9	4	3	7	5	0	4	0
	AUG	11	0	4	14	5	17	2	3	1	0
	SEP	2	0	17	15	7	8	4	2	5	0
	OCT	0	0	10	14	1	3	3	0	1	0
	NOV	0	0	27	30	1	11	10	6	5	0
	DEC	5	0	69	31	0	19	3	0	2	1
2016	JAN	8	0	86	34	1	19	6	5	5	0
	FEB	4	0	44	24	0	10	9	5	2	1
	MAR	24	0	65	27	1	8	10	4	0	7
	APR	8	0	61	17	0	6	18	19	7	4
	MAY	14	0	41	16	4	11	20	28	5	2
	JUN	22	0	81	45	7	23	18	2	0	3
	JUL	3	0	18	18	5	10	15	1	3	4
	AUG	7	0	17	13	1	9	18	0	0	1

Annex B2

SYRIA		Weapon Release Events Against
SYRIA		Infrastructure		Fielded Enemy Forces		Vechicles		Weapons, Ammunition and Materiel
Year	Month	Building/Structure	POL	EF in Building	EF in Open	Moving	Static	Weapon Emplacement	Weapons Cache	IED	Other
2015	DEC	0	21	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2016	JAN	6	1	15	5	0	21	0	8	0	0
	FEB	1	0	2	4	0	4	0	2	0	0
	MAR	7	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	APR	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
	MAY	6	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	JUN	0	0	4	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
	JUL	0	0	2	7	0	0	0	0	0	0
	AUG	0	0	16	4	1	8	1	0	0	0

Annex C

Numbers of UK Airstrikes

	June 2016	July 2016	August 2016	Totals
Iraq	72	39	35	146
Syria	5	5	7	17
Total	77	44	42	163

247 See FOI2015/07034, dated 2 September 2015

248 An airstrike is defined for the purpose of this table as an attack on a single target in a single mission, whether by a single aircraft and munition or multiple aircarft and munitions. This conforms to the definition used by the international coalition.

249 HC Deb, 16 July 2015, col. 31WS

250 Petrol, Oil, Lubricant

251 Enemy Forces

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16 September 2016