Formal Minutes
Tuesday 13 September 2016
Members present:
Dr Julian Lewis, in the Chair
|
Douglas Chapman James Gray Johnny Mercer Jim Shannon |
Ruth Smeeth John Spellar Bob Stewart Phil Wilson |
Draft Report (UK military operations in Syria and Iraq), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 52 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 53 read, as follows:
During the course of this inquiry we wrote to the Secretary of State seeking clarification on the UK bombing campaign in Syria and Iraq. In particular, we wanted details of the numbers of airstrikes and targets, and of how many airstrikes were in direct support of forces fighting on the ground. This information is of great importance if we are to evaluate accurately, the effectiveness of the United Kingdom’s operations in both countries. Obtaining that information has not been straightforward and the Secretary of State’s responses have been incomplete and unsatisfactory. The full correspondence is set out in Appendix 3. In relation to the number of airstrikes carried out in direct support of opposition forces on the ground in both Syria and Iraq, the Secretary of State responded:
Unfortunately we do not categorise the information we hold in this way. This is because it is not needed to assess whether the result has had the desired military effect or to confirm that the target has been prosecuted accurately and in a legal and proportionate manner. An alternative categorisation would require a re-evaluation of each individual Mission Report—and its associated material, including the weapons system’s video—to assess the purpose of the mission and its weapons release. As an indication of the magnitude of this task, there are currently over 3,000 pieces of archived information as background to the 819 strikes the RAF had undertaken as at 27 May. This would be a lengthy exercise of no operational value to my Department and which would divert resources from critical work supporting counter-DAESH operations.252
Motion made and Question put, That the paragraph stand part of the Report.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 2 Douglas Chapman Jim Shannon |
Noes, 5 James Gray Ruth Smeeth John Spellar Bob Stewart Phil Wilson |
Paragraphs 54 to 75 (now paragraphs 53 to 74) read and agreed to.
Paragraph 76 (now paragraph 75) read, as follows:
If the Government is to continue to justify and validate its policy of airstrikes in Syria, it must provide the necessary detail on what is being targeted and how those airstrikes directly support moderate forces on the ground which actually have a prospect of taking control. We therefore recommend that the MoD put this information into the public domain so that realistic judgements on the effectiveness of the UK’s air operations in Syria can be made.
Motion made, to leave out paragraph 76 (now paragraph 75) and insert the following new paragraph:
If the Government is to continue to justify and validate its policy of airstrikes in Syria, it should provide the necessary detail on what is being targeted. We therefore recommend that the MoD put this information, as far as possible, into the public domain so that realistic judgements on the effectiveness of the UK’s air operations in Syria can be made. At the very least, Government ministers ought to be made aware of such figures.—(Phil Wilson.)
The Committee divided.
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Ayes, 6 Douglas Chapman James Gray Ruth Smeeth John Spellar Bob Stewart Phil Wilson |
Noes, 1 Jim Shannon |
Paragraphs 77 to 85 (now paragraphs 76 to 84) agreed to.
Paragraph 86 (now paragraph 85), read as follows:
This reluctance to identify the groups for fear of helping Assad has not prevented academics and experts outside of government researching and publishing lists of such groups. For example, Charles Lister, when at the Brookings Institute, produced his own analysis of what he regards as moderate opposition fighters. When we asked him whether he thought that any of the names on his list would be unknown to the Assad regime, he replied that “Assad knows about the groups, but obviously defines them in a very different way”. He argued that Russia also had this information and that “all the groups together know what each of them represents, who their respective external backers are and what their political positions are”.253 His work—set out below—claims that the following groups would contribute around 65,000 of the stated 70,000 moderate opposition:
|
Grouping |
Areas of Operation |
Manpower |
|
Southern Front (58 factions) |
Deraa, Quneitra, Danascus |
25,000 |
|
Northern Free Syrian Army (14 factions) |
Homs, Hama, Idlib, Aleppo |
20,000 |
|
Tajamu Fastaqm Kama Umrat |
Aleppo |
1,000 |
|
Thuwar al-sham |
Aleppo |
1,000 |
|
Jabhat al-Asala wal Tanmiya |
Qalamoun, Homs, Hama, Aleepo |
5,000 |
|
Al-Jabhat al-Shamiya |
Aleppo |
2,500 |
|
Kataib Nour al-Din al-Zinki |
Aleppo |
1,500 |
|
Faylaq al-Rahman |
Damascus |
2,000 |
|
Faylaq al-Sham |
Homs, Hama, Idlib, Aleppo |
4,000 |
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Al-Ittihad al-Islami Ajnad al-Sham |
Damascus |
3,000 |
Mr Lister went on to argue that, in addition, there were “roughly 25–30 additional factions that would fall under this ‘moderate’ label” which combined, represented “a further 10,000 fighters”.254
Amendment proposed, in lines 2 to 3 to delete “For example,” and insert “However, we fully accept that there may be significant differences between the Joint Intelligence Committee’s list of moderate Syrian opposition groups and those published by academics and experts. We also accept that the Government may consider itself to have a duty of care, not only towards both members of the groups it is supporting but also towards any UK Special Forces troops who are assisting those groups.”—(Phil Wilson.)
The Committee divided.
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Ayes, 6 James Gray Jim Shannon Ruth Smeeth John Spellar Bob Stewart Phil Wilson |
Noes, 1 Douglas Chapman |
Paragraph 86 (now paragraph 85), as amended, read, divided and agreed to (now paragraph 85 and 86).
Paragraphs 87 to 89 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 90 read, as follows:
Peter Ford, the former UK Ambassador to Syria went further. He described the existence of moderate opposition groups in Syria as “largely a figment of the imagination”.255 Dr Frederick Kagan also argued that “virtually all the opposition is Islamist, one way or another, at this point”. He said that in terms of assessing the opposition forces, the distinction lay between Salafi jihadi groups (for example Jabhat al-Nusra, DAESH, and Ahrar al-Sham) and political Islamist groups256 tied to the Muslim Brotherhood; the latter being “the likeliest source of acceptable allies that we could work with”.257
Amendment proposed, in line 2, after “imagination.” insert “It is recognised that the figure quoted by the then Prime Minister came from the Joint Intelligence Committee who would be likely to have greater and more timely information than Mr Ford”.—(James Gray.)
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 5 James Gray Ruth Smeeth John Spellar Bob Stewart Phil Wilson |
Noes, 2 Douglas Chapman Jim Shannon |
Paragraphs 91 to 104 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 105, read as follows:
The Government’s case for extending UK military operations to Syria was based on a strategy of supporting the 70,000 moderate opposition forces identified by the then Prime Minister, David Cameron. We have sought to test this figure in terms of both numbers and orientation. Even if the Government’s assessment is accurate, its refusal to provide a list of the groups which we are supporting weakens the credibility of its position. Outside organisations have published such lists and most, if not all, the individual groups have already been identified. That information is in the public domain and therefore the groups will already be known to the Assad regime. It is therefore not credible for the Government to shelter behind security concerns as a reason not to publish the list of those groups itself, so that their ideological and political complexion can rigorously be assessed. Only then can it be known if a democratic, pluralist outcome in Syria, under such groups, is to any extent realistic.
Amendment proposed, in line 4, delete “Even if the Government’s assessment is accurate, its refusal to provide a list of the groups which we are supporting weakens the credibility of its position.” and insert “If the Government’s assessment is accurate, its refusal to provide a list of the groups which we are supporting may weaken the credibility of its position.”—(Bob Stewart.)
The Committee divided.
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Ayes, 6 James Gray Jim Shannon Ruth Smeeth John Spellar Bob Stewart Phil Wilson |
Noes, 1 Douglas Chapman |
Another amendment proposed, in line 4, delete “Even if the Government’s assessment is accurate, its refusal to provide a list of the groups which we are supporting weakens the credibility of its position.”—(Phil Wilson.)
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 5 James Gray Ruth Smeeth John Spellar Bob Stewart Phil Wilson |
Noes, 2 Douglas Chapman Jim Shannon |
Another amendment proposed, in line 5, delete from “Outside” to the end of the paragraph and insert “We understand why the Government have been unable to provide a list of the groups, since that would risk providing useful intelligence to the Assad regime. However, we have relied upon outside organisations who have published such lists and most, if not all, the individual groups have as a result, already been identified. That information is in the public domain which means that the groups will already be known to the Assad regime.”—(James Gray.)
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 5 James Gray Ruth Smeeth John Spellar Bob Stewart Phil Wilson |
Noes, 2 Douglas Chapman Jim Shannon |
Paragraph 106 read, as follows:
There are inherent dangers in supporting non-state actors in a civil war. These dangers are increased by the complexity and the multi-faceted nature of the Syrian civil war. Whilst the need to counter the threat from DAESH is great, supporting groups on the basis of their assurances that they will abide by a future democratic process that may limit their aspirations, borders on the naïve.
Amendment proposed, in line 5, at the end to add “and is a gamble”.—(Douglas Chapman.)
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 1 Douglas Chapman |
Noes, 6 James Gray Jim Shannon Ruth Smeeth John Spellar Bob Stewart Phil Wilson |
Another amendment proposed, in line 5, delete “, borders on the naïve” and insert “is a gamble”—(Bob Stewart.)
Amendment agreed to.
On the proposal of the Chair, and with the leave of the Committee, a single Question was put on paragraphs 106 and 107.
Paragraphs 106 and 107 read as follows:
106. There are inherent dangers in supporting non-state actors in a civil war. These dangers are increased by the complexity and the multi-faceted nature of the Syrian civil war. Whilst the need to counter the threat from DAESH is great, supporting groups on the basis of their assurances that they will abide by a future democratic process that may limit their aspirations is a gamble.
107. The UK Government must set out how it is engaging in Syria with the claimed 70,000 moderate fighters on the ground in an effective and cohesive manner. We further recommend that the Government should finally publish the names of what it regards to be the ‘moderate’ groups fighting on the ground in Syria, and identify those of them in support of which, apart from the Kurds, our airstrikes have been carried out.
Motion made, and Question put, That paragraphs 106 and 107 stand part of the Report.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 2 Douglas Chapman Jim Shannon |
Noes, 5 James Gray Ruth Smeeth John Spellar Bob Stewart Phil Wilson |
Paragraphs 108 to 126 (now paragraphs 106 to 124) read and agreed to.
Paragraph 127 (now paragraph 125) read, as follows:
The complexity of the civil war and the numerous and fractured opposition groups (a number of whom are avowed Salafi jihadist groups) means that—apart from Kurdish forces—it is certainly difficult to identify credible partners on the ground. There is little agreement, even amongst experts, on the extent to which armed opposition groups in Syria can properly be described as ‘moderate’ rather than Islamist. By contrast, our partner in Iraq is the Iraqi Government and we are supporting the Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga. The 26 September 2014 debate on airstrikes in Iraq started at 10.35 with the vote called at 4.59pm, a duration of almost six and a half hours. The 2 December 2015 debate on Syria started at 11.40am with the first vote called at 10pm, a duration of almost ten and a half hours. The allocation of time for debate and the differing results of the parliamentary votes in favour of airstrikes in Iraq (524 ayes to 43 noes) and Syria (397 ayes to 223 noes) indicate the much greater contentiousness about engaging militarily in Syria than doing so in Iraq, the previous year.
Amendment proposed, in line 7, delete from “The 26 September 2014” to the end of the paragraph.—(James Gray.)
The Committee divided.
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Ayes, 5 James Gray Ruth Smeeth John Spellar Bob Stewart Phil Wilson |
Noes, 2 Douglas Chapman Jim Shannon |
Paragraphs 128 to 169, (now paragraphs 126 to 167) read and agreed to.
Several papers were appended to the Report.
Resolved, That the Report be the Second Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.
[Adjourned till Tuesday 11 October 2016 at 10.45am
252 Letter, SoS Defence to Chairman, 20 June 2016 [See Appendix 3]
253 Q247
254 ‘Yes, there are 70,000 moderate opposition fighters in Syria. Here’s what we know about them’ The Spectator, 25 November 2015
255 Q128
256 The Institute for the Study of War defines political Islamist groups as “groups that desire a Sharia-based constitution but do not demand that Sharia courts form the basis of governance in a post-Assad Syrian state.”
257 Q220
© Parliamentary copyright 2015
16 September 2016