House of Commons
Defence Committee

SDSR 2015 and the Army

Eighth Report of Session 2016–17

Report, together with formal minutes relating to the report

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The Defence Committee

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The current staff of the Committee are James Davies (Clerk), Dr Adam Evans (Second Clerk), David Nicholas, Eleanor Scarnell, and Ian Thomson (Committee Specialists), David Gardner (Senior Committee Assistant), Carolyn Bowes, (Committee Assistant).

Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Defence Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 5857; the Committee’s email address is defcom@parliament.uk. Media inquiries should be addressed to Alex Paterson on 020 7219 1589.
Contents

Summary 3

1 Introduction 5
   Background 5
   Our inquiry 5

2 SDSR 2015: Headline ambitions for the Army 8
   Strategic rationale of Army 2020 8
   Army 2020 Structure 8
   SDSR 2015 9
      Joint Force 2025 9
   SDSR 2015 commitments to Army equipment 10

3 A new warfighting division 12
   Introduction 12
   Vision for the new warfighting division 12
      Air superiority and protection of the warfighting division 15
      Enhanced forward presence and deployment of the new warfighting division 16
   Training 18
   Integrated Action 20
   Regeneration and reconstitution 22

4 Defence engagement and national resilience 25
   Introduction 25
   Defence engagement 25
   National resilience 28

5 Army personnel 30
   Background 30
   Trained personnel 31
   Army strength and recruitment 32
      Regular Army 32
      Reserves 34
   Recruitment Partnership 36
   Other recruitment and retention initiatives 37
      Whole Force Concept 37
      Maximising Talent Initiative 37
      New Employment Model 38
### 6 Army equipment

**Introduction**

**Army equipment projects**

- The AJAX programme
- Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank and Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicles
- Mechanised Infantry Vehicle and Multi-Role Vehicle (Protected)

**Delivery of the Army component of the equipment plan**

**Conclusions and recommendations**

**Appendix 1: Armed Forces’ Missions**

**Appendix 2: Army Personnel Statistics**

**Appendix 3: Historical figures for Main Battle Tanks and Warrior Vehicles**

**Formal Minutes**

**Witnesses**

**Published written evidence**

**List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament**
Summary

The 2015 Strategic Defence Review (SDSR 2015) sets out an ambitious plan to restructure the British Army. It is the latest in a series of recent reforms which began with the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and the controversial reductions in Regular Army numbers. At the heart of SDSR 2015 is the creation of a warfighting division, which will be constructed to meet the resurgent threat of conflict with a peer adversary. It will consist of 40,000 troops comprised of two Armoured Infantry brigades and a Strike Brigade, together with associated combat and combat service support elements, which can deploy at speed.

The warfighting division represents a significant advance on the Army 2020 strategy capable of deploying a division for a non-enduring warfighting operation at “best effort” with appropriate warning and additional resource. However, we have identified a number of significant risks and challenges to the delivery and affordability of this new capability.

The delivery of a warfighting division relies on the recruitment and retention of both 82,000 Regulars and 30,000 Reservists. However, despite the fact that the size of the Regular Army has been set at an historic low, the MoD has yet to recruit to even that low total. In addition, its ability to achieve the target of 30,000 trained Reservists by March 2019 has been met with scepticism, most notably from the independent UK Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team. If the MoD fails to address its problems with recruitment and retention, the capability and credibility of the warfighting division will be undermined.

The Army has acknowledged that recruitment and retention is a challenge and the need to widen the pool of recruits to include those from non-traditional areas, in particular, women and individuals from Black and Minority Ethnic backgrounds. It is also committed to changing the culture of the Army through initiatives on employment, talent management and leadership. Successful implementation of these initiatives should attract greater numbers of soldiers and provide them with a structure within which to achieve their full potential. However, in its desire to reach the full complement of Regulars and Reservists, the MoD must ensure that entrance and training standards are clearly sufficient for preparing an Army to be able to participate in state-on-state conflict.

The warfighting division will require access to appropriate training facilities and environments both in the UK and overseas. We welcome the Army’s reassessment of its training requirements to meet the threat of a challenge by a peer adversary. However we remain concerned that the MoD is unable to provide data on the costs and spending trends of training investment. Without that information, activity levels in training will remain threatened by wider budget pressures on the MoD.

The warfighting division will require an extensive procurement programme for equipment if it is to provide the modern ground-maneuvre warfighting capability envisaged by the MoD. The MoD is committed to the procurement of 589 new AJAX armoured vehicles and 50 Apache Attack Helicopters. In addition, the MoD has also begun the process of developing a new family of Mechanised Infantry Vehicles.
Programmes are also underway to extend the life of the Challenger Mark 2 main battle tanks and to upgrade the Warrior fighting vehicles. However, the MoD could not confirm the number of tanks and vehicles to be upgraded under these programmes. We currently have some 240 main battle tanks compared with more than twice this number in 1997. Further reductions would be fraught with risk.

Together these programmes and upgrades represent a significant financial commitment and it is deeply concerning that the NAO has identified that SDSR 2015 contains an additional £24.4 billion of new commitments to the MoD’s Equipment Plan. It also made clear that the programme for the new Mechanised Infantry Vehicle remains uncosted. The MoD must be clear that the financial settlement is sufficient to deliver this vital equipment—on time and within budget—without raiding other parts of defence expenditure. Inadequate funding of these programmes would seriously impair, if not fatally undermine, the Army’s ability to deploy either the division or the new Strike Brigades.

SDSR 2015 also highlights the importance of the Army’s contribution to defence engagement and national resilience. These are important roles in countering instability abroad and providing reassurance at home. However, meeting those commitments has resource implications for the Army. Demand for defence engagement exceeds the available funding; and it is not yet clear how the allocation of personnel to national resilience will impact on the warfighting division.

A fully-manned and fully-equipped warfighting division is central to the credibility of the Army. At present, it is a work in progress but there are clear risks to its affordability and delivery. The MoD must address the challenges of funding and recruitment. It must set out a timetable with full cost implications for its delivery so that proper scrutiny of progress can take place. Failure to establish a realistic and affordable equipment programme for the Army will mean failing in the critical task set in SDSR 2015 for the Army to provide a warfighting division.

As in so many other areas of defence, the work of the Army is constrained by the fact that defence expenditure has fallen to an unacceptably low level in GDP percentage terms, bearing in mind that, until the mid-1990s, the UK never spent less than 3% of GDP on Defence.
1 Introduction

Background

1. The current restructuring of the Army has its origins in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)\(^1\). That Review set out the Government’s vision for a tri-service armed forces entitled *Future Force 2020*, the Army component of which would require significant changes to its size, shape and structure.\(^2\) However, SDSR 2010 was just the start of the process.\(^3\) The main *Future Force 2020* decisions for the Army were announced in July 2012.\(^4\) The decisions were controversial with reductions in Regular Army personnel, the deletion of several Regular units, and a much greater structural reliance on the Reserve to operate. Further announcements on the role and greater use of Reserve Forces, and Regular and Reserve basing decisions were made in 2013.\(^5\)

2. The latest Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR 2015)\(^6\) was published on 23 November 2015 and took forward that work. It included an updated plan for the size, shape and structure of UK Armed Forces—entitled *Joint Force 2025*—to meet the changing defence and security challenges highlighted in the 2015 SDSR which was combined with an updated National Security Strategy (NSS).\(^7\)

Our inquiry

3. In May 2016, we announced an inquiry into the implications for the Army of the outcomes of the 2015 SDSR. The inquiry’s terms of reference focused on:

- progress in the delivery of the *Army 2020* programme;
- what change is yet required in the Army to meet the requirements of the SDSR’s *Joint Force 2025*, and other evolving strategic circumstances;
- the ability of the Army, by 2025, to deliver a land division with three brigades as part of the 50,000-strong force envisaged by SDSR 2015, including the provision of suitable equipment for land forces;

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4. HC Deb, 5 July 2012, cols 1085–1110 and HC Deb, 5 July 2012, cols 65–67WS; see also British Army, *Modernising to face an unpredictable future: Transforming the British Army*, July 2012
• how the Army is employing Regular, Reserve and other personnel as part of the MoD’s Whole Force Concept; its ability to maximise talent in its ranks; and the suitability of its career structures and terms and conditions of service;

• whether the training programme for the Army is sufficient to meet the broad and varied requirements of its likely future commitments; and

• the structure, flexibility and institutional resilience of the Army to provide both conventional defences against state-based threats and the need to counter threats that do not recognise national borders.

4. Our inquiry also sought to evaluate the proposals for the Army and the extent to which they addressed the checklist of eleven potential threats and vulnerabilities that we identified, in our first report of this Parliament, as set out in the box below.8

Box 1: checklist of potential threats and vulnerabilities

Six potential threat areas:

• Cyber-attack and espionage;
• Growing instability in the Middle East and North Africa;
• Increases in extremism, radicalisation and other enablers of terrorist activity;
• Non-state actors and hybrid warfare undermining the international rules-based order;
• Potential for conflict in the South and East China Seas; and
• Potential for Russian aggression in Europe and the High North and possible dilution of the commitment to Article 5.

Five general vulnerabilities:

• Economic dependence on unreliable partners;
• Inability to react to sub-conventional threats;
• Inadequate training opportunities for UK Armed Forces;
• Lack of numbers in UK Armed Forces and gaps in capabilities; and
• Lack of expertise in Whitehall.


5. We held four oral evidence sessions, with the Secretary of State for Defence, the Chief of the General Staff, a senior officer from the Army Reserve, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff for Military Capability, Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials, the Clerk to the UK Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team, and academic experts. We are grateful to

all our witnesses and those who submitted written evidence. We also wish to record our appreciation to the MoD and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) for facilitating our informal discussions with Warrant Officer Class One Glenn Haughton, the Army Sergeant Major, and senior military officers, academics and commentators from overseas at the 2016 Land Warfare Conference.

6. During the course of our inquiry we visited the headquarters of the new 77 Brigade and observed the 3rd (United Kingdom) Division Combined Arms Demonstration on Salisbury Plain. We thank everyone who facilitated these visits for their assistance.
2 SDSR 2015: Headline ambitions for the Army

Strategic rationale of Army 2020

7. The Army’s contributions to Future Force 2020 were announced under the heading Army 2020. The MoD described Army 2020 to our predecessor Committee in the following terms:

The strategic rationale for Army 2020 came from the October 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and the associated National Security Strategy, which laid out what the Army would be required to deliver in terms of types, frequency and concurrency of tasking. The funding envelope was set by the Ministry of Defence as a result of the so-called Three Month Exercise.

The result was to be an Army consisting of 82,000 trained Regular personnel and 30,000 trained Reservists, which together would provide an integrated Army of around 112,000.

Army 2020 Structure

8. Army 2020 was announced in July 2012 with the stated need for a “generational change” in the Army’s “vision, structure, composition and capability” to prepare it to meet the challenges of 2020 and beyond. At the time, the MoD told our predecessor Committee that Army 2020 redefined the core purposes of the Army and determined that it should be capable of providing:

- contingent capability for deterrence and defence;
- defence engagement and overseas capacity building; and
- UK engagement and the military contribution to homeland resilience.

9. These tasks would be delivered through three main elements:

- a Reaction Force at high readiness to undertake short-notice contingency tasks and to provide the Army’s conventional deterrence. The Reaction Force would be trained and equipped to undertake the full spectrum of intervention tasks and to provide the initial basis for future enduring operations;

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9 HC Deb, 5 July 2012, cols 1085–1110 and HC Deb, 5 July 2012, cols 65–67WS; see also British Army, Modernising to face an unpredictable future: Transforming the British Army, July 2012
11 HC Deb, 5 July 2012, cols 1085–1110 and HC Deb, 5 July 2012, cols 65–67WS; see also British Army, Modernising to face an unpredictable future: Transforming the British Army, July 2012, p 2
13 The Reaction Force would be designed to deploy rapidly to respond to events anywhere in the world and designed to deter adversaries from acting against UK interests.
an Adaptable Force of seven infantry brigades and a logistics brigade—comprising Regular and Reserve forces—to provide headquarters and units for enduring operations as well as acting as the primary source of capability for the Army’s standing tasks plus Defence Engagement at home and overseas; and

Force Troops combining Combat Support, Combat Service Support and Command Support to deliver a broad range of capabilities such as engineer, artillery and medical support from a centralised pool of Regulars and Reservists.

SDSR 2015

10. SDSR 2015 provided a further revision of Army 2020. It highlighted four particular challenges which were likely to shape UK security priorities for the next decade with both immediate and longer-term implications:

- the increasing threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability;
- the resurgence of state-based threats and intensifying wider state competition;
- the impact of technology, especially cyber threats and wider technological developments; and
- the erosion of the rules-based international order, making it harder to build consensus and tackle global threats.

Joint Force 2025

11. To deliver the Armed Forces’ missions (which are set out in Appendix 1), SDSR 2015 announced the development of Joint Force 2025 which would build on the work of Future Force 2020. According to the MoD, the ambition for Joint Force 2025 was to provide the UK with the capabilities to fight in the information age and to be better able to undertake the most difficult operations, including warfighting under NATO Article 5 obligations. Joint Force 2025 would also be constructed in a way which would allow the Armed Forces to fulfil more missions in more locations in the UK and abroad, and achieve greater interoperability with allies and partners.

12. The Army’s contribution to Joint Force 2025 would include:

- a new warfighting division, optimised for high-intensity combat operations, and with the ability to deploy three brigades rapidly over long distances;

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14. Overseas defence engagement is the use of defence assets and activities short of combat operations building to achieve influence. In the UK it is the Armed Forces’ contribution to homeland resilience, for example supporting civilian emergency organisations in times of crisis.

15. Force Troop Brigades would provide a broad range of Regular and Reserve capabilities. These would include engineer, artillery and medical support from a centralised pool as well as a coordination and control function for key tasks such as overseas capacity building.


- two innovative brigades, comprising a mix of Regulars and specialist capabilities from the Reserves with the ability to contribute to strategic communications, tackle hybrid warfare and deliver better battlefield intelligence; and
- a number of infantry battalions reconfigured to make an increased contribution to countering terrorism and building stability overseas.\(^{20}\)

The detailed reorganisation to achieve this would be undertaken by the *Army Refine* project.\(^{21}\)

13. On 15 December 2016, Rt Hon Sir Michael Fallon MP, Secretary of State for Defence, announced the outcome of *Army Refine*.\(^{22}\) The Regular Army would remain at a level of 82,000 personnel with a whole force of 112,000 Regular and Reserve troops. Large parts of the Army would remain unaffected but units would be required to change their roles, equipment or location.

14. A modernised warfighting division, centred on 3 (UK) Division, would comprise four brigades (two Armoured Infantry and two Strike) to replace the existing three Armoured Infantry Brigades.\(^{23}\) The MoD considered this to be a significant uplift in capability with one of each type of brigade held at high readiness rather than the current single Armoured Infantry brigade. This would enable the Army to deploy a “credible division of three brigades” at a time of crisis.

15. In order to develop and transition to this new posture, the division would be delivered and developed through the establishment of the Strike Experimentation Group with the objective of establishing the first new Strike Brigade by 2020.\(^{24}\) According to *Jane's Defence Weekly*, the *Army Refine* project will involve over 4,500 soldiers transferring to new units and 40 major units being reconfigured to establish the warfighting division and form its two new Strike Brigades.\(^{25}\) It will also require changes to the roles or brigade assignment, personnel numbers, basing, and equipment for 97 battalion-sized units. The target is for all the changes to be complete by 2025, when the second Strike Brigade is expected to be fully operational.

**SDSR 2015 commitments to Army equipment**

16. In the Financial Statement of 8 July 2015, the Government committed to continue to meet the NATO minimum of 2% of GDP to be spent on defence.\(^{26}\) In order to fulfil this undertaking, the MoD’s budget would see an annual real-terms increase of 0.5% until 2020–21 which would enable the Government to maintain its pledge to provide a 1% annual increase in the Defence Equipment Plan over the next decade.\(^{27}\) SDSR 2015 reaffirms these pledges.\(^{28}\) Whilst this was generally welcomed, it must be seen in the

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\(^{21}\) Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)
\(^{22}\) HCWS367
\(^{23}\) HCWS367
\(^{24}\) HCWS367
\(^{25}\) Jane’s Defence Weekly, *Details emerge of major British Army re-organisation*, 16 March 2017
\(^{26}\) HC Deb, 8 July 2015, col 337
\(^{27}\) HM Treasury, *Summer Budget 2015*, HC 264, July 2015, para 1.81, and also HM Treasury press release: *Summer Budget 2015 Key Announcements*, 8 July 2015
context of a significant number of procurement projects for the Army, highlighted in SDSR 2015, which the MoD considers to be vital to provide modern ground manoeuvre warfighting capability which underpins the Army element of Joint Force 2025.29

17. Together, these plans represent a fundamental change to the structure and direction of the Army. Our Report first considers the core tasks assigned to the Army: the warfighting division, Defence Engagement and National Resilience. We then consider the MoD’s policies for recruitment and retention in the new structure. In the final section we consider the major procurement programmes for the Army.

18. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review sets out ambitious plans for the British Army, including a reset of its roles, a major reorganisation of its structures and an extensive new equipment programme. The headline ambition of recreating a warfighting division is of considerable significance in the light of the resurgence of state-based threats. However, this programme of change is accompanied by significant financial risks and challenges for its fulfilment.
3 A new warfighting division

Introduction

19. The creation of the new warfighting division is the most important element of SDSR 2015’s vision for the Army. In this section we consider how the new division will meet the threats and general vulnerabilities identified in our SDSR checklist Report published in November 2015.\(^{30}\) In particular, whether it will be able to counter:

- Non-state actors and hybrid warfare undermining the international rules-based order;
- Potential for Russian aggression in Europe and the High North and possible dilution of the commitment to Article 5; and
- A lack of numbers in UK Armed Forces and gaps in capabilities.

Vision for the new warfighting division

20. Under Army 2020, the MoD regarded the Army as “already prepared to deliver a division capable of operating within the context of a non-enduring warfighting intervention”.\(^ {31}\) However, the MoD conceded that this was a “best effort” capability which would require adequate warning and additional resource for it to be both generated and sustained.\(^ {32}\) Joint Force 2025 is tasked with rebalancing and modernising the Army to provide a division which is available at “higher readiness”.\(^ {33}\)

21. The warfighting division will consist of three brigades, drawing on two Armoured Infantry Brigades and one of the two new Strike Brigades,\(^ {34}\) together with associated combat and combat service support elements. The two Strike Brigades will be able to deploy rapidly over long distances using the new AJAX armoured vehicles and new Mechanised Infantry Vehicles. The SDSR states that this will double the number of brigades ready for operations.\(^ {35}\) Together with 16 Air Assault Brigade’s very high readiness forces, the SDSR asserted that the UK would have an improved ability to respond to “all likely threats”.\(^ {36}\)

22. In oral evidence, General Sir Nicholas Carter, Chief of the General Staff (CGS), considered the capacity to field a warfighting division as central to the credibility of the Army,\(^ {37}\) and described the change as “one of the great outcomes from the SDSR”.\(^ {38}\) He likened it to the Royal Navy’s Aircraft Carrier programme which provided a capability where “the full orchestra comes together”.\(^ {39}\)
23. The new warfighting division will also be configured to counter the potential for adversaries to conduct “anti-area access denial”\(^\text{40}\) and particularly where an adversary could impede the ability of either the RAF or the Royal Navy to dominate either the littoral or air space.\(^\text{41}\) A key aspect of this will be the ability of the warfighting division to project combat power “at reach” over distances of up to 2,000km; and to disperse and concentrate rapidly in order to dominate ground and population mass in a different manner from at present.\(^\text{42}\)

24. The warfighting division has the potential to address the re-emergence of a potential state-on-state conflict; but witnesses to our inquiry highlighted challenges to its implementation. The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research (CHACR), the Army’s own think-tank, argued that the warfighting division would be created in the context of:

- reductions in the Regular forces and the requirement for the use of Reserves to provide additional manpower;
- gaps in air-defence capability;
- the changing character of warfare, including cyber, electronic warfare, and information operations; and
- gaps in interoperability within UK Armed Forces and with allies.\(^\text{43}\)

Furthermore, the CHACR said that “the prospect of ‘losing the division in an afternoon’ will weigh heavily on the chain of command, with strategic-to-tactical command compression almost inevitable as politicians appreciate the stakes involved in committing the division to battle”.\(^\text{44}\) The Centre added that the Army must be able to “regulate how much risk” the UK’s sole warfighting division is exposed to during conflict “unless we are prepared to lose it”.\(^\text{45}\)

25. Dr Warren Chin, from the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London, highlighted the argument raised in some quarters that the creation of the warfighting division was to achieve the “covert goal” of “protecting the Army from the prospect of further cuts”.\(^\text{46}\) He was not convinced that a division was the best organisational way to deploy the various elements of land capabilities. Given the financial constraints, he argued that the MoD should have thought more boldly and given more consideration to the brigade as “the most important currency unit”.\(^\text{47}\) Dr Chin cited the Chilcot Inquiry which, he asserted, had challenged the assumptions that the commitment of a division would

\(^{40}\) “The objective of an anti-access or area-denial strategy is to prevent the attacker from bringing its forces into the contested region or to prevent the attacker from freely operating within the region and maximizing its combat power.” (Sam. J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare. Countering A2/AD Strategies, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2013, p.2)

\(^{41}\) Q3

\(^{42}\) Q3 and Q62

\(^{43}\) Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Ares & Athena: Warfighting at Scale: Regenerating and Reconstituting Mass, November 2016. It should be noted that the views expressed are those of individual contributors and not the official views of the Army, the MoD, or any components thereof.

\(^{44}\) Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Ares & Athena: Warfighting at Scale: Regenerating and Reconstituting Mass, November 2016, p 12

\(^{45}\) Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Ares & Athena: Warfighting at Scale: Regenerating and Reconstituting Mass, November 2016, p 12

\(^{46}\) Dr Warren Chin (ARM0011), para 28

\(^{47}\) Dr Warren Chin (ARM0011), paras 28–29
increase the UK’s influence in the military or political domain. In relation to Iraq, he highlighted the suggestion contained in the inquiry that a smaller and more discrete force package would have produced the same level of power and influence while exposing the UK to less risk during the occupation phase in Iraq. Furthermore, Dr Chin, cautioned that the success of the new division would depend greatly on the acquisition and timely delivery of the new AJAX armoured vehicle and other vehicles in the AJAX fleet (which we consider later in this Report).

26. Lieutenant General (retired) Sir Paul Newton, former Commander Force Development and Training for the Army, was, however, more optimistic and contrasted the vision of a warfighting division with the “unambitious” outcome of the 2010 SDSR:

I think 2010 was dangerously unambitious for the Army, because what it said was, “Well, we’d like you to deploy a division, but only at best effort.” So it set an aspiration that the UK might do this, but without resourcing it. What 2015 said was, “No, we want you to be able to deploy a war-fighting division.”

He concluded that as long as the Army’s budget “does not get raided” it was a “credible” proposal.

27. General (retired) Sir Richard Shirreff, former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, agreed that SDSR 2015 represented a positive reversal of the “severe cuts made by the coalition government”. He believed that the warfighting division gave the UK an opportunity to re-establish credibility in the eyes of its allies who were “disappointed at the diminished stance of Western Europe’s premier military power”. However, he cautioned that the effect of the 20% cuts in regular manpower inflicted by the 2010 SDSR, and an increased dependence on under-recruited, under-trained Reserves presented the risk of a force “hollowed out” to the extent that “the deployment of a brigade, let alone a division, at credible readiness would be a major challenge”. This was also raised by the Human Security Centre who questioned the ability of the Army to deploy at the divisional level, in particular against a capable state-based opponent.

28. We welcome the Ministry of Defence’s commitment, set out in SDSR 2015, to re-create a warfighting division as part of the restructuring of the Army. We agree with General Carter’s observation that its delivery is central to the credibility of the Army. It is also a key part of the UK’s ability to contribute effectively to NATO’s collective deterrence and defence. However, the development of the division is a major increase in ambition when considered in the context of the “best effort” approach of SDSR 2010 for a deployment of smaller forces under Army 2020. Although the programme for the new division is in its infancy, the MoD needs to be alive to the challenges and

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48 Dr Warren Chin (ARM0011), para 29
49 Dr Warren Chin (ARM0011), para 26
50 Q216
51 Q216
52 Atlantic Council, Alliance at Risk: Strengthening European Defence in an age of turbulence and competition, February 2016, p 9
53 Atlantic Council, Alliance at Risk: Strengthening European Defence in an age of turbulence and competition, February 2016, p 9
54 Atlantic Council, Alliance at Risk: Strengthening European Defence in an age of turbulence and competition, February 2016, p 9
55 Human Security Centre (ARM0006), paras 5.1–5.5
risks in providing this capability—not least the importance of maintaining the Army’s budget. We therefore recommend that the MoD should provide us with detailed annual reports on progress towards the establishment of the warfighting division. These should include detailed timelines, regular updates on progress against each planned stage of delivery of the division, and financial statements to demonstrate that the Army’s budget is sufficient to enable the proposed timetable to be met.

**Air superiority and protection of the warfighting division**

29. In the previous section, we touched on concerns about air superiority and the UK’s ground-based air defence capabilities. When he gave evidence to us, the Chief of the General Staff accepted that the Army had “bent itself out of shape” during operations in Afghanistan with tactics, equipment and doctrine focused on a specific counter-insurgency challenge. The challenge now for the Army was to counter the current range of threats and for it to improve its readiness to fight in a combined arms battlefield. He described this as “Back to the Future” type stuff in which most Western armies were used to owning the airspace—which was not the reality against sophisticated state threats. He stressed to us the importance of investing “significantly” in the Army’s ability to operate in a “much more demanding environment” because that was where the Army was “most vulnerable” at present.

30. Dr Chin cited Russia’s air power in its western military district and its sophisticated “anti-access area denial” capability, as examples of state capabilities which presented significant challenges to those of the UK. He was cautious of General Carter’s assertion that the warfighting division’s new Strike Brigades, utilising the new AJAX vehicles and new technology, could offer an alternative way of conducting long-range strikes against aggressive Russian forces, a role traditionally allocated to airpower. Despite the potential for the new Strike Brigades, using the AJAX vehicles’ new technology, to project combat power “at reach” over distances of up to 2,000km, and to disperse and concentrate rapidly in order to dominate ground and people in a different way, he was uncertain how UK and NATO forces would survive in a battlespace in which control of the air was “at best contested”. To illustrate this point, Sir Paul Newton recalled being told, during his Army career, that trying to manoeuvre without ground-based air defence was an “expensive form of suicide”. Sir Paul agreed that this capability gap needed to be closed as a priority, if the UK was to have a credible warfighting division.

31. The Human Security Centre argued that the solution—in part—was to shift the balance for fire support back to ground forces, particularly the new Strike Brigades. The Centre noted the introduction of the Common Anti-Air Modular Missile (CAMM) as a useful asset in this context but cautioned that it had a fairly short range and would equip only one regiment. A better solution would be the introduction of an enlarged Guided
Multiple Rocket System capability, alongside an additional regiment equipped with an extended-range variant of the CAMM.65

32. The Secretary of State for Defence acknowledged that there were capability gaps which need to be addressed, in particular with respect to air defence.66 However, he argued they were being tackled, in part, through the commitment in SDSR 2015 to enhance the Army’s Apache helicopters which would deliver a significant improvement in air attack capability.67 Lieutenant General Mark Poffley, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Capability), also pointed out that air defence was a tri-service responsibility,68 and that the RAF took the lead for ground-based air defence. That said, he highlighted the fact that the MoD was planning to replace the Rapier missile system—currently deployed in the Falklands—with the Future Local Area Air Defence System (FLAADS) which could also be deployed by a Division.69 The proposed ‘layered defence’ for the Army would include these elements, alongside a point defence provided by a High Velocity Missile (HVM) system.70 The HVM system will be considered as part of the next MoD planning round and General Poffley agreed to provide us with regular updates. He added that “judgments about the structure and size of that [HVM] contribution” would also be made as part of the Army Refine work. However no details were included in the Secretary of State’s announcement on the outcomes of Army Refine.

33. The new warfighting division will have to operate without the assurance of ‘owning’ the airspace, when it faces a modern state adversary. This presents MoD and Armed Forces’ planners with significant challenges. Whilst we note that air defence is a tri-Service responsibility, led by the RAF, we are greatly concerned about the level of detail and timescale of the plans to provide ground-based air defence for the new warfighting division. Addressing this vulnerability must be given the highest priority. The MoD has promised to provide us with regular updates on this matter. In its response to our Report, the department should set out the timetable for the decisions on replacement of both Rapier and the High Velocity Missile systems and by when these replacements will be delivered.

**Enhanced forward presence and deployment of the new warfighting division**

34. In SDSR 2010, the Government took the decision that there was no longer “any operational requirement” for UK forces to be based in Germany and that the combination of financial costs, disruption to the lives of personnel and their families, and opportunity costs in terms of wider Army coherence, required a withdrawal from that country.71 As a result, the UK’s Army would be almost completely UK-based for the first time in many years.72

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65 Human Security Centre (ARM0006), para 13.4
66 Q238
67 Q239
68 Q239
69 Qq239–243
70 Q240
35. SDSR 2015 emphasised the re-emergence of state-based threats, in particular from a Russia which has become “more aggressive, authoritarian and nationalist, increasingly defining itself in opposition to the West”. That security consideration led DefenceSynergia to question the wisdom of the withdrawal and suggested that it should be reversed, not least to facilitate the potential need for UK armoured units to be committed to NATO ARRC formations. In a similar vein UKNDA believed the withdrawal was premature in the light of the US decision to re-base heavy armour in Germany to counter the threat from Russia.

36. General Carter told us that although the withdrawal would still go ahead, the UK would retain certain assets in Germany in order to provide “jumping-off points” for other exercises and other activity which might be necessary. Although he acknowledged the concerns raised by the UK’s posture (including through NATO) in relation to the threat in eastern Europe, General Carter argued that the capacity to operate with eastern European partners meant that a base in western Germany would not necessarily be more helpful than a UK base. He believed that operating and exercising “further east” was a better priority.

37. The Secretary of State highlighted the deployment of UK Forces (and those of NATO allies) to the eastern border of NATO as a better form of an enhanced forward presence. As examples, he cited the 800 UK personnel deployed to Estonia—which was being mirrored by other countries deploying to Latvia, Lithuania and Poland—and the deployment of RAF Typhoon aircraft to Romania in May 2017 as part of policing NATO’s southern border. Those forward deployments, he argued, would act as an early “tripwire” as well as offering reassurance as a NATO deterrent to any potential aggression.

38. However, a more fundamental concern was the ability of the UK rapidly to deploy a division to a front-line NATO state, given Russia’s investment in area denial technology. The Secretary of State told us:

   A key part of the preparation of both enhanced forward presence and the preparation of the very high readiness taskforce is to deal with these issues of border crossing—of movement across NATO borders internally. Huge progress has been made in the last two years in ensuring that forces can deploy more rapidly across NATO’s internal borders; that the various permissions that are needed, have now been sorted out. I am satisfied that that has improved enormously.

39. Lieutenant General Poffley told us that the ability to move by land was being examined very carefully so that the necessary cross-border permissions were in place.
and that “associated bureaucracies” were diminished. This would also ensure that the relevant logistics were in place to be able to facilitate deployment. However, he argued that for some parts of Europe it would be quicker to deploy by sea and therefore the investment the UK was making to “re-establish our ability to protect our home waters and our near-abroad waters” was important in countering “anti-area access denial”.

40. We welcome the Government’s commitment to deploy UK Armed Forces to NATO’s eastern and southern borders as part of NATO’s enhanced forward presence. We also welcome the MoD’s work to resolve the challenges of deploying across NATO’s internal borders. This is a matter that must be kept under constant review, particularly given the re-emergence of potential threats from peer adversaries. In particular, the prospect of retaining some Army basing on the continent should not be ruled out if Russian assertiveness to the east and north continues to intensify.

Training

41. The changes to the Army’s structure have required a new cycle of training—Formation Readiness Mechanism (FORM). The intention is that formations and units will rotate through different levels of training with a graduated approach to readiness in order to optimise force preparation. This will enable different units to share standing commitments and other tasks, and maintain institutional resilience through regular and varied training. The MoD explained that the new FORM cycle would deliver:

Greater productivity by doubling the number of brigades held at readiness, offering Defence choice in the force packages available for deployment, whilst maintaining the Army’s commitment to fixed tasks. It also supports wider Defence Engagement and capacity building by providing enduring training, assistance and mentoring to our partners.

42. The Army would continue to use the training estate in the UK, for small-scale training needs, while the UK’s overseas training estate—primarily in Canada, Kenya and Belize—would provide larger-scale training opportunities. Overseas training also offers the opportunity to train in different climatic and environmental conditions. Following SDSR 2015, the Army is now also considering an increase in training in Oman where it intended to make “a significant contribution to the UK’s Gulf Strategy”.

43. SDSR 2015 acknowledged that the UK would operate on its own only on rare occasions and, therefore, training would be targeted to deliver an Army which is “interoperable by design”. In 2016–17, the Army took part in 17 NATO Assurance Measure exercises across eleven European countries, including the deployment of the UK battlegroup to Poland, and 16 Air Assault Brigade alongside a French Brigade and the 82nd (US) Airborne Division to Poland and Germany. The Army also held a number of exercises

with the United States in order to identify and close interoperability gaps between the two forces. The MoD explained that such events would enable the Army better to exploit the capabilities of allies as well as their scale.91

44. Sir Paul Newton told us that Army training needed to prepare the Army for the most probable types of operations it would need to undertake.92 In that respect, he believed that the Army’s training estate was in need of modernisation93 and that the priorities should be:

operating with allies, operating with air forces, urban and forests, and probably somewhere hot, because of the problems in the world.94

Sir Paul highlighted Army training in north-west Europe and the decision to have a training hub in Oman as good examples of the MoD addressing these training needs, and noted that they better matched the potential risks set out in SDSR 2015.95

45. Despite the MoD’s commitment to training and the establishment of a new FORM, concerns continue to be expressed that training levels might be reduced as part of the MoD’s savings programme. For example, there have been reports recently of a potential reduction in the level of training at the British Army Training Unit Suffield (BATUS) in Canada.96 In our Report, Shifting the Goalposts? Defence expenditure and the 2% pledge, we noted that the MoD was unable to provide a breakdown of the costs associated with individual and collective training.97 In its response the MoD stated that the large number and differing types of training activities made it difficult to provide these figures.98 However the Department did recognise that an increased understanding of training costs would be beneficial, and therefore the Army and RAF were working on developing a better understanding of the costs of training.

46. We welcome the Army’s intention to continue training overseas and the Army’s reassessment of its training requirements in the light of the increased threat of peer adversary conflict as described in the SDSR. We expect the MoD to update us on the outcome of the Army’s assessment of its training requirements.

47. We remain concerned about the MoD’s lack of data on the costs and spending trends of training investment. As we identified in our previous report on defence expenditure, there is currently no mechanism by which such expenditure and projected future costs can be scrutinised. This is of greater concern given reports of possible reductions in training due to MoD cost pressures. Such reductions could potentially risk the Army’s capabilities, particularly those of the new warfighting division. In its response to our Report, we ask the MoD to provide the projected levels of spending on collective training for the constituent parts of the division for each year until 2025. The response should also include the number of overseas and UK training events cancelled since SDSR 2010.

91 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002) and Ministry of Defence (ARM0018)
92 Q193
93 Q193
94 Q197
95 Q198
96 “British Army cuts threaten crucial battlefield training”, The Times, 12 April 2017
97 Defence Committee, Second Report of Session 2015–16, Shifting the Goalposts? Defence expenditure and the 2% pledge, HC 494, para 27
Integrated Action

48. SDSR 2015 also highlighted the need to address modern information warfare, and the Army identified “the impact of the contemporary information environment” as the most significant new dimension to warfare and operations. The experiences of recent and current operations, from Iraq and Afghanistan to Syria and Ukraine demonstrated that warfare has entered the ‘Information Age’, with operations taking place in front of a worldwide audience. In response to these challenges the Army is evolving its core doctrine to deliver ‘Integrated Action’ which will require the Army to be “adept at orchestrating a wide range of non-kinetic actions and activities and incorporating them into new tactics”. During our inquiry, the MoD told us that the Army’s “Integrated Action” had now been incorporated into the updated Army Doctrine Publication, Land Operations, which was published on 31 March 2017.

49. To reflect these changes the Army has given greater focus to developing the capabilities of 77 Brigade and 1 (Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance) Brigade. In particular, the two Brigades have been tasked to:

Improve situational intelligence, counter adversaries’ hybrid warfare techniques, and better integrate non-lethal effects into operations, which when task organised with combat elements from the Division, will enable different and novel approaches to counter both conventional and unconventional threats.

50. General Carter told us that this would require commanders at all levels to analyse the results they are seeking to achieve and to then consider the broadest audience relevant to reaching the required outcome. That audience would extend beyond the population in the UK and the area of deployment to include allies, opponents and other broader adversaries and actors on the ground. This, in essence, is the role assigned to 77 Brigade.

51. In June 2016, we visited 77 Brigade to see at first-hand the development of the Brigade’s capabilities. The Brigade is intended to provide the single integration hub to support all levels of command in the specialist planning and delivery of Information Activities and Outreach. The MoD’s planning assumption is that 77 Brigade will reach full operating capability in December 2019.

52. The Chief of the General Staff saw the establishment of 77 Brigade as a key part of the evolution of the Army’s core doctrine but acknowledged that the Army still had some challenges to face:

I think we still have some distance to go. We will look very hard at how we combine intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance with information

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100 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)
101 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)
102 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)
103 Ministry of Defence (ARM0015)
104 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)
105 Q91
106 Q91
107 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002); see also British Army website, 77 Brigade
108 PQ40346 (Armed Forces: Information Warfare)
warfare, cyber and information services more broadly. I suspect we will look hard at the structures of our Royal Signals. I think we will want to differentiate between infrastructure and networks, and the smart bit of data management and information services and all that goes with applications, to take us to a different level. I would not be surprised if we initiate an experiment to pull those capabilities together around 77 Brigade over the course of the next year or two.\textsuperscript{109}

53. In addition, the Chief of the General Staff pointed out that although language training was now a prescribed competence for command of a company or squadron, the Army did not have the linguists it needed to meet the challenges of the modern world.\textsuperscript{110} The Chief of the General staff conceded that the Army was playing ‘catch up’ in this area.

54. There is wide support for the concept of Integrated Action and the establishment of 77 Brigade. TechUK saw them as a part of the means of meeting the challenges of war in the information age,\textsuperscript{111} whilst Sir Paul Newton saw the two as a natural consequence of the Army’s experience in Iraq and Afghanistan:

They come out of the notion of understanding the environment you are in, understanding the mosaic of conflict, understanding the people you are encountering—your adversaries, innocent bystanders or whatever—and then being able to influence those people and being able to talk to them, ideally in their own language.\textsuperscript{112}

55. Sir Paul was also confident that the concept of 77 Brigade would be supported by the wider Army:

I think you would find that there are probably more applicants for the jobs in 77 Brigade than in many of the more conventional parts of the Army. So does it have buy-in? Yes it does. It now needs to be enshrined in the doctrine, because the doctrine is your body of knowledge and that is what is taught at the staff college, so it goes into the DNA.\textsuperscript{113}

56. The Secretary of State pointed out that not only does integrated action apply to all land forces, including the Royal Marines and the RAF Regiment, it is also aligned with NATO’s comprehensive approach.\textsuperscript{114} The Army doctrine publication on land operations had also been reviewed by the RAF and Royal Navy warfare centres, and similar future publications would be specifically aimed at informing Service personnel in the other Services, and also civil servants who work alongside the land forces.\textsuperscript{115}

57. We welcome the Army’s development of an Integrated Action doctrine, which should provide the capability to deliver an innovative response to both conventional and non-conventional threats. However we note with concern the Chief of the General Staff’s warning that the Army does not have a sufficient number of linguists even though this is a prescribed competence for a company or squadron commander. We
expect the MoD to set out how it plans to address this matter and the timescale for doing so. We also welcome the establishment of 77 Brigade and the integrated nature of its tasks. The challenge for the MoD will be to ensure that it is fully integrated with the other Services, UK Government Departments and UK allies. We ask that the MoD keep us informed of progress in the development of 77 Brigade and other similar units within the Armed Forces as they progress towards becoming fully operational.

Regeneration and reconstitution

58. The number of regular soldiers in the UK regular Army is at its lowest level in history, which can be seen by the force levels set out in Appendix 2. This has led to concerns about the Army’s ability to regenerate and reconstitute itself, particularly in the event of an unexpected emergency or a major conflict with another state. In oral evidence, the Chief of the General Staff told us that this was a matter which the Army took seriously, in particular in the context of the re-emergence of the potential for state versus state conflict.

59. The Chief of the General Staff cited two mechanisms for the rapid growth of the Army: the Army Reserve (volunteers) and the Regular Reserve (ex-regular personnel who retain a liability to be prepared to be mobilised or recalled). Major General Crackett, Director, Reserves, saw the change in the defence planning assumptions as enabling the Army to re-examine and refine the roles of the Reserve Army:

An important part of that role, as well as the force's driving requirement to sustain a division as it goes out of the door, will be around regeneration and reconstitution—in other words, thinking about how the division could be sustained after conflict or over a long period, or even if the force expanded at a later stage. This is very early days. We are just working through the early stages of how we assimilate these new equipment types and what the concepts of the operation will be, so we have barely started this work yet, but that would be the first means of regeneration and reconstitution.

60. The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research (CHACR) identified advantages in the utilisation of the volunteer Army Reserve for regeneration and reconstitution. It saw them as “reasonably assured, available (albeit at longer readiness times), medically and physically fit, trained as soldiers, and with a basic trade skill”. In addition, it argued that the Reserves were a flexible resource which could be retrained to suit the need of the moment.

\[116\] Q8
\[117\] Army Strategy Branch definition: Regeneration is the timely activation, in full or part, of existing force structures and infrastructure, including the restoration of manning, equipment and stocks to designated levels (see Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Ares & Athena: Warfighting at Scale: Regenerating and Reconstituting Mass, November 2016, p 23).
\[118\] Army Strategy Branch definition: Reconstitution is the expansion of force structures and infrastructure beyond existing levels, including the restoration of manning, equipment and stocks to designated levels (see Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Ares & Athena: Warfighting at Scale: Regenerating and Reconstituting Mass, November 2016, p 23).
\[119\] Q7
\[120\] Q8
\[121\] Q9
\[122\] Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Ares & Athena: Warfighting at Scale: Regenerating and Reconstituting Mass, November 2016, pp 24–26
\[123\] Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Ares & Athena: Warfighting at Scale: Regenerating and Reconstituting Mass, November 2016, pp 24–26
61. Although the Regular Reserve should also be able to provide capacity for rapid growth of the Army, an historic concern has been the Army’s inability to keep track of former personnel with a liability to be recalled. Major General Crackett acknowledged the need for a “sharper mechanism for training assurance and recall”.124 The Chief of the General Staff told us that this was of particular importance in some of the more “esoteric capabilities” such as attack helicopter pilots.125 However, Air Vice-Marshal (retired) Paul Luker, from the UK Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team, pointed out to us that in times of national emergency, Regular Reserves had a “habit of coming forward and volunteering again”.126

62. Lieutenant General Poffley informed us that work on the Regular Reserve had to date (November 2016) classified more than 27,000 of those who had left in the previous five years and that the database was growing continually.127 He added:

We are particularly looking at those who have niche skills that are pressure points inside the structure, ensuring that we now track them as they retire in a far more deliberate fashion than we did previously.128

63. The Army is now undertaking further work on the use of the Regular Reserve with a focus on how it can be “best utilised and better targeted”.129 It had also conducted a skills survey which suggested that whilst skill fade was an issue “re-learning to regain currency can be rapid, especially if the skills were learned to a high standard of performance initially”.130 CHACR suggested that both skills fade and tracking could be addressed either by incentivising some form of annual training weekend or to persuade more Regular Reservists to become Volunteer Reserves.131

64. CHACR also suggested that consideration should be given to the greater use of sponsored reserves (civilians, employed by defence contractors, who are required to have a Reserve commitment as part of their employment).132 These Reservists are designed specifically to deliver particular capabilities to reconstitute or regenerate the force. The Army currently has three separate contractual arrangements for the provision of sponsored Reserves, two of which are in the recruitment phase.133

65. The MoD is now providing us with six monthly updates on regeneration and reconstitution.134 In its October 2016 update, the MoD stated that the Army had been directed to explore the optimal regeneration and reconstitution framework to deliver a second division.135 At the same time, the Army also has two complementary workstrands which impact on Reserves:

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124 Q9
125 Q8
126 Q130
127 Q279
128 Q279
129 Ministry of Defence (ARM0012)
130 Ministry of Defence (ARM0012)
132 Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Ares & Athena: Warfighting at Scale: Regenerating and Reconstituting Mass, November 2016, p 25
133 Ministry of Defence (ARM0015)
134 Q10
135 Ministry of Defence (ARM0015)
• The development of more effective recall and training plans for the Regular Reserve, together with work to make the Regular Reserve more usable; and

• The Army Reserve Development Programme: this is currently on track to grow the Army Reserve to a trained strength of 30,000 by 1 April 2019, leading to 32,000 by 2025.\textsuperscript{136}

66. We are concerned about the lack of detail on how the MoD could regenerate a warfighting division or reconstitute a greater force in the face of significant strategic challenges. In its response to our Report, we ask the MoD to confirm when the work to improve the mechanism for tracking, recalling and retraining the Regular Reserve will be completed. We also ask that the MoD set out the timetable for the completion of the work exploring the optimal regeneration and reconstitution framework necessary to deliver a capable second division. We are also concerned that there is no systematic strategy linking these two pieces of work. We therefore recommend that the MoD includes in its promised six-monthly updates on regeneration and reconstitution details on how the Army is fulfilling both ambitions.
4 Defence engagement and national resilience

Introduction

67. In this section we consider the other two core tasks of the Army: overseas defence engagement,\textsuperscript{137} and civil engagement and homeland/national resilience.\textsuperscript{138}

68. SDSR 2015 set out the Government’s ambition to make broader use of the Army better to support missions other than warfighting.\textsuperscript{139} Changes envisaged under SDSR 2015 included:

- increasing support to UK resilience and overseas training tasks through the use of the existing brigades to support engagement and resilience activity. Within these brigades reconfigured infantry battalions will be formed to provide an increased contribution to countering terrorism and building stability overseas. They will conduct Defence Engagement and capacity building, providing training assistance, advice and mentoring to UK partners; and

- developing a group of culturally-aware regional specialists to focus on geographical areas in which the UK has the greatest interest, in order to build long-term relationships and understanding.\textsuperscript{140}

Defence engagement

69. Under the Army 2020 plan, delivery of Defence Engagement was the responsibility of 1st (UK) Division, with the Adaptable Force Brigades and some Force Troops Command Brigades assigned responsibility for specific world regions. This approach enabled brigades to develop an understanding of the geography, culture and language of their specified region.\textsuperscript{141} The MoD explained that in 2016 the Army participated in over 300 overseas tasks,\textsuperscript{142} including 173 overseas training exercises, 98 short-term training teams and 38 individual training activities. This represented a 15% increase on activity in 2015.\textsuperscript{143}

70. SDSR 2015, for the first time, made defence engagement a funded core task for the MoD, meaning that the Armed Forces would have to prioritise this alongside other core tasks.\textsuperscript{144} On 17 February 2017, the FCO and the MoD published an updated defence engagement strategy, UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy.\textsuperscript{145} The strategy

\textsuperscript{137} Overseas defence engagement is the use of defence assets and activities short of combat operations building to achieve influence.

\textsuperscript{138} Ministry of Defence (ARMID12); the core takes of the Army under Army 2020 are: contingent capability for deterrence and defence; overseas engagement and capacity building; and civil engagement and homeland resilience; (see also British Army, Modernising to face an unpredictable future: Transforming the British Army, July 2012, p 2).

\textsuperscript{139} Ministry of Defence, SDSR 2015 Fact Sheets, January 2016, p 12

\textsuperscript{140} Ministry of Defence, SDSR 2015 Fact Sheets, January 2016, p 4

\textsuperscript{141} British Army, Transforming the British Army: an update, July 2013, p 21

\textsuperscript{142} Ministry of Defence (ARMID12)

\textsuperscript{143} Ministry of Defence (ARMID12)

\textsuperscript{144} HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, Cm 9161, November 2015, para 5.14

\textsuperscript{145} Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy, February 2017
envisaged the UK building strategic relationships with key countries and acting as a leader of international organisations such as the UN and NATO. In a statement on the announcement of the strategy, the Defence and Foreign Secretaries said:

Defence engagement projects influence, promotes our prosperity and helps to protect our people. It enables the UK to respond to threats and crises when they emerge, and strengthens our position as the world’s leading soft power. In short, it is vital to UK interests.\(^{146}\)

71. In support of its commitment to defence engagement, the Government also announced:

- the establishment of three new regional British Defence Staffs for defence engagement in the Gulf, Asia Pacific and West Africa;
- new Defence Sections in Albania and Finland, and new Attaché posts in Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia (for the South Caucasus), Qatar, Japan, Pakistan and Afghanistan;
- a new Defence Section for the Sahel, covering Senegal, The Gambia, Mali and Niger;
- increased military exercises with NATO partners and allies, including in Ukraine, Poland and Estonia;
- leading development of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) with Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Norway; and
- exercising and training with partners in the Five Power Defence Arrangements such as Exercise Eastern Venture.\(^{147}\)

72. Central MoD funding for defence engagement is currently around £80 million and is planned to rise over the next four years.\(^{148}\) In addition, defence programmes supporting broader Government strategies are funded from the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF),\(^{149}\) at a level of around £56 million. According to the MoD and FCO, the resources committed to defence engagement are now “greater than ever before”, and are underpinned by a “whole of Government” approach.\(^{150}\) However the strategy acknowledged that in the sphere of defence engagement, demand would invariably exceed supply.

73. In evidence, the Chief of the General Staff said that while defence engagement was an important task for the Army,\(^{151}\) it presented the Army with a number of challenges:

\(^{146}\) Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, *UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy*, February 2017, p 1


\(^{151}\) Q3
Our conventional infantry battalions, who have been at the forefront of doing this, have had to send many of their leaders away to do what is fundamentally a task, when you come to train indigenous forces, that is very much heavy on leaders and less on soldiers. Actually, what we have discovered is that we want bespoke structures that are longer on leaders, longer on cultural expertise and longer on the ability to be able to train and perhaps to take greater risk in terms of that task.\footnote{Q3}

74. As part of meeting these challenges SDSR 2015 announced the creation of specialised infantry battalions. These will be relatively small, consisting of 300 personnel,\footnote{Qq76–77} and will come with cultural and linguistic skills and expertise to enable them to provide a variety of outputs. General Carter explained that these specialisms would allow a smaller force to have a greater impact:

I want them, for example, to be able to go into the heart of Nigeria and be able to train a Nigerian division to go into the fight against Boko Haram. I want them to be able to train the Kurds to go and fight against Daesh in Iraq. I want them to be able to train the Ukrainian armed forces to be able to provide an effective deterrent to Russia. I want them to do tasks that are at the higher end of risk, and to be able to really do something that is quite specialised. I won’t be able to create that many. I don’t want them any larger than they actually are.\footnote{Q77}

The first two new Specialised Infantry battalions would be established in 2017, with two further Specialised Infantry battalions anticipated.\footnote{HCWS367}

75. Sir Paul Newton believed that this approach would link well with the Army’s warfighting capability. He argued that, if an Army Division was deployed into a theatre of operations, the special infantry battalion based there would have already established a network of partnerships, which would inform the understanding and awareness of that environment. In addition, the work of 77 Brigade, which we mention earlier in this report, would feed into that understanding.\footnote{Q180}

76. Other witnesses, while supportive of defence engagement, highlighted several concerns. Jie Sheng Li, an independent researcher on international development and human security, supported the policy of the regional alignment of brigades, but highlighted the fact that there remained significant gaps in the Army’s geographical footprint.\footnote{Jie Sheng Li (ARM0001)} He argued that defence engagement and diplomacy should have a wider focus than countries where threats currently existed, so that units were trained to meet unexpected future threats and different environments.\footnote{Jie Sheng Li (ARM0001)}

77. Professor Timothy Edmunds, Professor of International Security at the University of Bristol, also cautioned that experience of previous defence engagement operations demonstrated that lessons had to be “continuously relearned” and that a key challenge
would be sustaining activities once the immediate project had finished.\textsuperscript{159} He believed that for UK defence engagement to be successful a “sharper focus” on engaging local ownership was necessary.\textsuperscript{160}

78. We welcome the establishment of the new specialised infantry battalions to deliver the MoD’s programme for defence engagement and the decision to fund it as a core Defence task. Given the positive influence these activities can have on conflict prevention and stability, it is essential that these tasks are funded sufficiently. However, this should not be at the expense of the Army’s, or the other Services’, warfighting capabilities. \textit{In its response to our Report, the MoD should commit to set out, on an annual basis, expenditure on defence engagement tasks (including associated training costs), together with expenditure on collective and individual training for warfighting operations to enable comparison.}

**National resilience**

79. SDSR 2015 also highlighted the support provided by the Armed Forces to UK civil authorities:

\begin{quote}
The Armed Forces support civil authorities when needed in times of emergency. This ranges from providing specialist teams after aircraft crashes, to ensuring continuity of essential services during industrial action. We have helped local responders understand the support that the Armed Forces can provide and how to access it quickly. We have integrated military experts and planners more closely into local planning and emergency response, and conducted more preparatory exercises at local and regional levels.\textsuperscript{161}
\end{quote}

80. In 2016, the Army had participated in excess of 105 national resilience tasks, including 56 tasks in support of civilian agencies (Police/Border Force) and had provided the Defence real estate to civil agencies for training or operations on 40 occasions.\textsuperscript{162} In addition it held around 5,000 soldiers at readiness to respond to a terrorist attack in the UK.\textsuperscript{163} According to the MoD, this level of support reflected a doubling of the requests placed upon the Army and other Services in comparison with 2013.\textsuperscript{164}

81. In support of the Army’s homeland security tasks, SDSR 2015 committed to place military planners in key Government departments to provide the military with a wider and more formal role in supporting national resilience contingency planning.\textsuperscript{165} Furthermore, the National Risk Register and associated contingency plans would be regularly reviewed to identify areas where the Armed Forces could contribute more. The Secretary of State highlighted this work as a key contribution to improving national resilience:

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{159} Q179
\textsuperscript{160} Q179
\textsuperscript{162} Ministry of Defence (ARM0012)
\textsuperscript{163} Ministry of Defence (ARM0012)
\textsuperscript{164} Ministry of Defence (ARM0012)
\end{flushleft}
You will see that we are optimising our support to the civil authorities in this country to strengthen our resilience, and we maintain through Operation Temperer a trained and ready force of around 10,000 personnel that can respond very rapidly to a national emergency such as a terrorist attack.\textsuperscript{166}

The Chief of the General Staff subsequently confirmed that the 10,000 military personnel available on standby were in addition to the personnel that would form the planned warfighting division.\textsuperscript{167}

82. The Chief of the General Staff also told us that the requirement for regional commanders to align themselves with the emergency services and with the civil administrative systems had ensured that relations between commanders and civil powers had been developed and tested, before they needed to be used.\textsuperscript{168} This had been reflected in the Army’s readiness plans, so that soldiers and units had the ability to respond, at short notice, to a terrorist threat or other incident.\textsuperscript{169}

83. \textbf{We support the MoD’s decision to designate national resilience as a core defence task. However, we seek assurances from the MoD that this task will in no way undermine the primary function of the Army—to succeed in warfare given the manifest constraints on Defence expenditure. We recommend that the MoD provides us with an annual breakdown of expenditure on national resilience tasks (including associated training costs) together with expenditure on collective and individual training for warfighting operations to enable comparison.}
5 Army personnel

Background

84. The Coalition Government, in its 2010 SDSR, envisaged a Regular Army of 95,000. However, the Army 2020 plan, published in 2012, reduced this figure to 82,000 Regulars supported by around 30,000 Reserves, with a training margin of 8,000. The Army was expected to reach the Regular strength target by 2015 and the Army Reserve target by 2018.

85. Responding to the reduction, our predecessor Committee recommended that the MoD develop a concept of a “critical mass” for the Armed Forces in order to establish a clear, measurable statement of the minimum threshold of operational effectiveness to enable effective verification and monitoring by Parliament. This concept was important given the acknowledgement of the then Secretary of State for Defence that the Army 2020 plan had been designed to fit a financial envelope. He told our predecessor Committee:

We have available to us a fixed envelope of resources, and making the decision to proceed with the draw-down of Regular force numbers to the target of about 82,000 and to build the reserve over a period of five years allows us to take the dividend from the reduced size of the Regular force and invest in the recruitment, training and equipment provision of the Reserve forces.

86. Following SDSR 2015, General Sir Nicholas Carter, Chief of the General Staff, went some way toward this when he declared that the credibility of the Army would be based on its capacity to field a warfighting division. He explained that SDSR 2015 had identified a figure of 50,000 to deliver an expeditionary force and that:

The 80,000-odd [Regulars] that we have at the moment, give or take 3,000 or 4,000 here or there, and the Reserve we have, provide us with the essential capacity to be able to deliver a division like that.

He argued that the MoD had “carefully calculated” the capacity of the Army to deliver a warfighting division although he conceded that the margins were “quite tough.”

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171 The 8,000 would be additional personnel in training to sustain the overall number of 30,000 trained Reservists; HC Deb, 19 January 2012, col 939W.
172 The MoD expects to reach its target for 30,000 trained Reservists by 2018 (see British Army, Modernising to face an unpredictable future: Transforming the British Army, July 2012, p 9). The reduction in Regular Army personnel to 82,000 was expected to be completed by mid-2015 with the restructuring of the Regular component by 2016 (see Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2013–14, Future Army 2020, HC 576, Q 67, Q 125 and Q 271).
176 Q39
177 Q39
178 Q39
87. General Carter also emphasised that any consideration of critical mass should focus on the “target end strength of 120,000 personnel” rather than distinguish between Regular and Reserve personnel. He told us:

If you take the whole number that I have described and you bring readiness criteria into it—how quickly you would expect us to field this thing—the plain fact is that that provides you with the ability to do a one-off divisional intervention, probably in a multinational context, and then it probably provides you with the opportunity to reorganise and to keep something behind thereafter while also watching your back in the UK, but there is not much margin for error thereafter.

88. Although the warfighting division would be able to undertake a one-off intervention, General Carter conceded that the capacity did not exist to replace the full division following its deployment although it might be possible to find a replacement divisional headquarters at readiness and to deploy a brigade on an enduring basis.

89. We note the MoD’s view that the critical mass required by the Army to deliver a warfighting division will comprise the overall combined strength of trained Regulars and Reservists. This makes it critically important that the full strength of trained Regulars and Reservists is achieved. If it is not, the credibility of the warfighting division will be undermined. We also note the Chief of the General Staff’s acknowledgement that, at present, the capacity does not exist to replace the full division following its deployment on a one-off intervention. We recommend that the MoD and the Army undertake work to establish the critical mass required for the Army to be able to deploy the warfighting division on a one-off deployment and to be able to replace it with a capable second division.

Trained personnel

90. The trained strength of the Army was formerly defined as the number of Service personnel who had completed their Phase 2 training; the ‘Special to Arms’ training which is specific to a particular type of unit. In June 2016, the MoD changed the definition of trained strength to include Regulars and Reservists who had passed Phase 1 training: entry training to provide basic military skills. This change provided an increase in the Army’s available force size; however, it was limited to responses to a crisis within the UK.

91. In November 2016, following a public consultation (which received no external responses) the Secretary of State announced that the term “Trained Strength” would now include all personnel trained to undertake the core functions of the Army (Phase 1 trained) and that this would be reflected in the monthly Service personnel statistical publication from 1 October 2016. Full-Time Trained personnel who had also passed Phase 2 training
would now be classified as “Trade Trained”. This would enable continued reporting on “Trade Trained” personnel which would allow consistent comparisons with the previous statistical time series.

92. There is logic in the MoD’s decision to include, in numbers of Trained Strength, Army personnel who have completed Phase 1 Training so that they can be deployed on national resilience tasks. However, we seek assurances from the MoD that the target strengths for Regulars and Reservists set out in the Army 2020 plan—which were based on personnel who had completed Phase 2 training—remain unchanged.

Army strength and recruitment

Regular Army

93. The target figure of 82,000 for the Regular Army was reconfirmed in SDSR 2015, together with a commitment that the Regular Army would not be reduced below that level. However, although over 8,100 new recruits joined in 2015–16, the MoD confirmed that this target had not been reached. Statistics published by Defence Statistics on 9 March 2017 gave the Full-Time Trade Trained Strength of the Regular Army as 78,620.

94. Several reasons were given for the current shortfall in Regular Army personnel. The MoD cited a “highly competitive” recruitment market as a result of falling unemployment and rising earnings; the Army highlighted a “steady decline” in applications from traditional recruiting areas alongside an increasing BAME population which historically has not been attracted to a career in the Armed Services. Other factors cited were the Raised Participation in Education Agenda and rising levels of obesity. Dr Warren Chin agreed that the MoD should cast its net wider, and Sir Paul Newton believed that the MoD would benefit from a greater focus on women and BAME recruits. Sir Paul also highlighted an end to combat operations as another contributory factor, as those operations had been an attraction for some recruits.

95. In summer 2015, the MoD set itself targets to increase the diversity of both Regular and Reserve personnel: to increase female personnel to 15% of total intake by 2020 and to increase BAME personnel to a minimum of 10% of total intake by 2020 with progress towards 20%. The current position for the Army is set out in the tables below:

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184 Ministry of Defence, Consultation outcome: MoD personnel statistics: change to Army trained strength definition, November 2016
186 The MoD advised the Committee that the recruiting year covers the same period as the financial year.
187 Ministry of Defence (ARM0012)
189 Ministry of Defence (ARM0012)
190 Ministry of Defence (ARM0012)
191 Ministry of Defence (ARM0012)
192 Q200
193 Q201
194 Q201
Table 1: Army strength by gender as at 1 April 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regular (Trained Strength)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Female</td>
<td>7,660</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Male</td>
<td>77,380</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reserve (Total Strength)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Female</td>
<td>3,710</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Male</td>
<td>24,970</td>
<td>87.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Defence (figures are taken from Defence Statistics (Tri) Biannual Diversity Report)

Table 2: Army strength by ethnicity as at 1 April 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Percentage (of those known)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Army Strength Regular</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAME:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which UK BAME</td>
<td>3,650</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which non-UK BAME</td>
<td>5,010</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>76,190</td>
<td>89.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Army Strength Reserve</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAME</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>26,880</td>
<td>94.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Defence (figures are taken from Defence Statistics (Tri) Biannual Diversity Report)

96. When he came before us, the Chief of the General Staff acknowledged the need to improve the Army’s recruitment performance, in particular, to target a wider recruiting base. However, the MoD remained confident the Army had the manpower it currently needed to meet all the operational demands placed on it and that it would achieve the target of 82,000 Regulars by April 2020.

97. The Armed Forces monthly personnel statistics, published on 9 February 2017, did offer some encouragement with a significant increase in the number of applications to join the Regular Army. Compared to the previous year, 2016 had seen an overall increase of 23,840 applications to join the Regular Army. However, these figures relate only to the number of applications received and not the number of applicants. Therefore the headline figures could mask the fact that some candidates may submit several applications.

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195 Ministry of Defence (ARM0015)
196 Explanatory note by the Ministry of Defence (ARM0015): The total Regular BAME figure is comprised of both UK Nationals and non-UK Nationals (including Gurkha transfers, the BAME element of the Commonwealth who do not have Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR), Commonwealth who already have ILR, and non-White personnel). While there are non-UK BAME in the Army Reserve, they require a minimum of 5 years’ residency to be eligible to join so are not counted separately here.
197 Ministry of Defence (ARM0015)
198 Q46
199 Ministry of Defence (ARM0012)
and others may decide against a career in the Army after submitting an application.\textsuperscript{201} Therefore, intake figures are not comparable to the application figures for the equivalent period.\textsuperscript{202} Furthermore, it is worth noting that the outflow of personnel from the Regular Army in each year since 2010 has exceeded intake, and that compared to the 12 months to 31 January 2016, intake to the Army had decreased by 6.1%.\textsuperscript{203}

98. The target establishment of the trained Regular Army was for 82,000 trained soldiers by 2015. However, despite the fact that this target was lowered from 95,000 in 2012, the strength of the Army remains below 80,000. Although the MoD asserts that the current level of personnel is sufficient for the Army to meet current operational demands, we do not believe this figure is adequate to counter a sudden unexpected threat. The MoD has to address this shortfall. An Army which falls below the already historic low target of 82,000 makes itself dangerously vulnerable to external aggression.

99. We welcome the MoD’s acknowledgement that its traditional recruiting grounds are no longer sufficient for the Army’s needs and that it must access a wider pool of talent. In its response to our Report, the MoD should set out the progress it is making to achieve its targets for women and Black and Minority Ethnic recruits.

Reserves

100. One of the most controversial aspects of Army 2020 was the proposed growth of the Army Reserve to 30,000 trained personnel,\textsuperscript{204} with a requirement for 8,000 to be in training at any one time. The deadline set for delivery of this new Reserve was the end of the 2018–19 financial year.\textsuperscript{205} Following the MoD’s decision to redefine “Trained Strength” for the Army, the Secretary of State agreed a revised growth profile for the Army Reserve.\textsuperscript{206} The original and revised Army Reserve growth figures for future financial years can be found in the table below:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & 31 March 2017 & 31 March 2018 & 31 March 2019 \\
\hline
Original Target (phase 1 and phase 2 trained) & 22,900 & 26,100 & 30,100 \\
\hline
Revised Target (phase 1 trained) & 26,700 & 28,600 & 30,100 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Planned Army Reserve Growth Profile}
\end{table}

Source: Ministry of Defence

101. In December 2013, the MoD also published target recruitment figures, for each financial year, for the volunteer Reserve element of each Service.\textsuperscript{207} These targets were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{201} Ministry of Defence, \textit{UK Armed Forces Monthly Personnel Statistics: 1 January 2017, February 2017}, p 11
\item \textsuperscript{203} Ministry of Defence, \textit{UK Armed Forces Monthly Personnel Statistics: 1 February 2017, March 2017}, p 7
\item \textsuperscript{204} Reservists who had completed their Phase 1 and Phase 2 training; see Ministry of Defence, \textit{Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued}, Cm 8655 July 2013, p 11, footnote 5.
\item \textsuperscript{205} HC Deb, 19 January 2012, col 939W
\item \textsuperscript{206} HCWS248
\end{itemize}
further broken down between trained entrants (who would immediately count against the trained strength) and new recruits. The former were predominately former Regular Service personnel. The targets for the Army Reserve are shown in the table below:

**Table 4: Recruitment Targets for the Army Reserve**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>FY 14</th>
<th>FY15</th>
<th>FY16</th>
<th>FY17</th>
<th>FY18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trained entrants</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New recruits</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>7,270</td>
<td>9,270</td>
<td>8,940</td>
<td>7,910</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Defence

102. Following the decision to change the definition of “trained strength”, the MoD discontinued publication of data on the progress against these targets, as external reporting of the growth of the Reserves would be based on strength profiles only. As at 1 February 2017, the Army Reserve Total Strength stood at 29,770 and the trained (phase 1) strength was 26,530 (against a target of 26,700 to be achieved by 31 March 2017).

103. The MoD exceeded its target for the recruitment of Reservists in 2015–16. However, while the UK Future Reserves External Scrutiny Team (EST) acknowledged this improvement, it was not confident that the final target of 30,000 trained Army Reservists would be achieved by March 2019. Air Vice-Marshal (retired) Paul Luker, Clerk to the EST, anticipated that it would take one or two more years beyond March 2019 to achieve the target.

104. The Secretary of State emphasised that the target was important and that progress had already been made towards it. He also believed that the EST had been too pessimistic and not taken full account of some of the improvements already taking place, for example, the reduction from 240 days to 120 days in the average time to join the Reserves. In written evidence, the MoD told us that even if the target were missed, it would not have a significant impact on capability. However, it acknowledged that not reaching the target to time would “reduce the capacity of the Reserve to provide regeneration and reconstitution” and would also impact on the reputation of the Army. Commenting on the potential reputational damage, the Secretary of State contended that this was currently hypothetical as it had not yet happened. However, he acknowledged that Ministers would be accountable for the target.

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211 Council of Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations, The United Kingdom Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team Annual Report 2016, paras 1 and 4
212 Q127
213 Qq259–264
214 Qq 259 and 261
215 Ministry of Defence (ARM0012)
216 Ministry of Defence (ARM0012)
217 Qq268–269
105. We are not convinced by the MoD’s assertion that missing its manpower targets for the Army Reserve “would not impact significantly on capability”, particularly given the Chief of the General Staff’s evidence that the critical mass to deliver a warfighting division will comprise the total combined strength of Regulars and Reserves. A failure to recruit the necessary numbers of Reservists is not so much a threat to the Army’s reputation but a threat to the credibility and competence of the MoD’s approach to delivering a revitalised Reserve. The MoD must conduct a review of its recruitment policy to identify the blockages that exist in the system which are hindering the recruitment of sufficient Reservists.

Recruitment Partnership

106. In March 2012, a ten-year recruitment partnership contract was signed with Capita to deliver recruitment services for the Army. Air Vice-Marshal (retired) Paul Luker, clerk to the EST, argued that although there had been an uplift in recruits coming through the system, there remained a number of structural faults within the initial recruiting process, and the time it took for a Reserve candidate to go through the medical process was too long. Whereas previously the EST had given Capita and the Army the benefit of the doubt over the partnership; it now questioned whether the contract was fit for purpose. In particular, the EST argued that Reserve units were spending too much time engaged in administrative matters and were undertaking tasks which were the responsibility of the recruitment partnership. AVM Luker, added:

I am not saying for a moment that they should not nurture [new recruits], but I don’t think they should be taking on so much of the role, which they are necessarily having to do at the moment. The whole of the process needs a firm look. I also think that we need to look very carefully at how we manage medicals and whether in all cases the criteria for joining remain valid, and we definitely need to look at the referrals and deferrals process.

107. Despite being signed in 2012, the Recruitment Partnership has yet to reach full operational capability. According to the MoD, the declaration of full operating capability was dependent on the implementation of a Capita-provided ‘Information & Communication Technology solution’. The ‘go-live’ date was currently under consideration by Defence Ministers and the Treasury. The interim ICT systems currently being used were performing adequately but the implementation of the new ICT solution has been subject to a series of delays. In response to a Parliamentary Question on 31 October 2016, Rt Hon Mike Penning MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, informed the House that a revised ‘go-live’ date had been set for November 2017, although Capita was working to deliver an earlier date of Spring 2017.

108. It is unacceptable that the Recruitment Partnership for the recruitment of both Regulars and Reserves, which was signed in 2012, is still not fully operational and that evidence presented to us pointed to the Recruitment Partnership contract being not
fit for purpose. *In its response to our Report, the MoD must set out the problems which need to be addressed and the timetable for the delivery of the new ICT systems and for fully-operational status to be achieved. We expect urgent action from the MoD and Capita to resolve the outstanding issues.*

**Other recruitment and retention initiatives**

**Whole Force Concept**

109. As well as the recruitment challenges faced by the Army, it also needs to ensure the retention and development of its personnel to ensure efficient delivery of the Army’s element of *Joint Force 2025*. Much of this work will be delivered through the ‘Whole Force Concept’. This concept envisages Defence being supported by the most sustainable, effective, integrated and affordable balance of Regular military personnel, Reservists, MoD civilians and contractors.224

110. The MoD stated, that over the past 5 years, the Army has sought vigorously to exploit current legislation and policy, to enable it to begin to operate as an integrated force.225 Initiatives announced under SDSR 2015 provide further legislation and policy opportunities to enable the Army to adopt modernised ways of working and conditions of service.226 A key challenge, however, will be how the Army engages with the Civil Service, as it reduces in size and evolves under the SDSR, to ensure that the Army’s new structures are a complementary part of the Whole Force Concept.227

**Maximising Talent Initiative**

111. The Maximising Talent Initiative is intended “to deliver a sustainable manned and motivated whole force, with the best talent and right skills at an affordable cost which is representative of UK society by 2025”.228 The initiative has six elements: skills, culture, career structure, contractual framework, manning numbers and human potential. This work will be underpinned by the development of the Army as an inclusive employer through the roll-out of the Army Leadership Code and an Inclusivity, Diversity and Inclusion Action Plan.

112. Future changes to terms and conditions outlined in SDSR 2015 include:

- the Flexible Engagements System, which will enable Regular and Reserve personnel to vary their commitment in terms of time and liability for deployment;
- the Future Accommodation Model, which will broaden choice for soldiers and officers by enabling them to rent accommodation and to assist in home ownership, whilst reducing capital investment in Service accommodation;
- the New Offer for New Joiners, which will enable the recruitment and retention of future soldiers and officers in sufficient numbers and with the correct skills to support the Army proposition in an affordable manner; and

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225 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)
226 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)
227 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)
228 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)
the Enterprise Approach which is working with industry to explore how to make the most of scarce skills across Defence.  

113. The Chief of the General Staff emphasised that if the Army were to maximise talent, it needed to re-examine career structures which had been primarily designed for men, so that they could be adapted for all personnel. Flexible working was being introduced to give Service personnel the opportunity to change the pace of their careers—for example to meet family obligations—and then return at a faster pace at a later date. In addition, the traditional Army career path was being modified to promote a career structure which valued specialisms but did not necessarily require those personnel to be commissioned.

114. There is general support for these innovations, but cautionary notes have been sounded in respect of flexible engagement. Varying levels of commitment will need to be clearly understood and valued by defence stakeholders. The Regular Army rightly has a strong service ethic where continuous availability is seen as part of the identity of being a soldier. Professor Vince Connelly, of Oxford Brookes University, warned that this ethos must be taken into account as the Army changes its employment options:

The behavioural norms associated with commitment are conflated with the notion of affective commitment—failure to demonstrate the former is evidence of failure of the latter. This is why a large proportion of Regular personnel when asked their opinions “questioned whether individuals in the Reserves ‘took it seriously’” and this was also demonstrated in recent research for the Army where Regulars and Reserves each had quite different views of professionalism and thus what commitment meant to them and how they judged it.

**New Employment Model**

115. The New Employment Model (NEM) is a business change programme which emerged from the 2010 SDSR. The NEM covers four broad areas of policy: Pay and Allowances; Accommodation; Training and Education; and Career Structures and Career Management. Some changes have already been introduced, for example, loan schemes to assist Service personnel with financial help to buy or rent accommodation and a new pay model. An Officers’ Talent Management scheme was also established in Autumn 2016, focusing on improving operational capability by ensuring that the Services have the tools to identify, develop and assign officers in a more structured and objective way. Although the NEM programme is expected to close in 2018, certain strands will continue to transition up to 2020 and beyond.

116. There is some concern that the NEM work and the Flexible Engagement initiative are seen as “cost cutting” measures. This has been cited as one of the key concerns amongst Service personnel. Professor Connelly told us:

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229 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)
230 Q48
231 Q48
232 Professor Vince Connelly (ARM0009)
233 Professor Vince Connelly (ARM0009)
234 Ministry of Defence (ARM0012)
235 Ministry of Defence (ARM0012)
236 Professor Vince Connelly (ARM0009)
The difficulty of course is that these proposals do indeed have an affordability agenda but they also have much more behind them in terms of encouraging and retaining the diverse workforce the Army requires for the future. The potential benefits of a diverse workforce with varied forms of commitment have yet to be accepted by many in the Regular Army and in wider society.\textsuperscript{237}

\textbf{Army culture}

117. A particular ambition of the Chief of the General Staff is to challenge and change certain parts of Army culture and to demonstrate that the Army is a caring employer.\textsuperscript{238} His aim is to instil an understanding in the Army that its culture is changing and that, as it does so, it will become a more inclusive organisation. This change, he asserted must be led from the senior levels of the Army.\textsuperscript{239}

118. In September 2016, the CGS gathered together all commanding officers and their regimental sergeant-majors to launch a new Army Leadership Code, which set out the expectation that leaders had to live up to the values and standards which the Army espoused and that its leaders should be accountable for this.\textsuperscript{240} The CGS also wanted the Army to be transparent about the challenges it faces and how it addresses them. As examples, he highlighted what he described as an overly sexualised culture and problems involving alcohol, bullying and harassment.\textsuperscript{241}

119. We support the Chief of the General Staff’s commitment to changing the culture of the Army through initiatives on employment, talent management and leadership. Successful implementation of these initiatives could provide a structure within which all soldiers can achieve their full potential. However, we recognise that this must not be to the detriment of the Army’s ability to undertake its core role of warfighting. We note the concerns expressed about cultural resistance within the Army to this agenda, particularly in respect of Flexible Engagement. \textit{In response to our Report, we should like to receive further details on how the Army’s various initiatives will dovetail, and how the MoD will ensure that resistance to a changing culture is overcome.}

\textbf{Women in ground close combat roles}

120. In July 2016, the Government announced that women would be allowed to serve in “ground close combat” roles.\textsuperscript{242} Roles in the Royal Armoured Corps were opened up to women in November 2016, while those in Infantry units will become available in 2018.\textsuperscript{243} To achieve a successful roll-out, measures are being implemented for these two phases:

- by November 2016, the Army will have delivered a revised Physical Training policy, initiating a series of steps to adjust training regimes (but not standards) in order to drive down the incidence of musculoskeletal injuries across the Corps; and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{237} Professor Vince Connelly (ARM0009)
\item \textsuperscript{238} Q46
\item \textsuperscript{239} Q52
\item \textsuperscript{240} Q52
\item \textsuperscript{241} Qq52–58
\item \textsuperscript{242} Prime Minister and Ministry of Defence press release, 8 July 2016, \textit{Ban on women in ground close combat roles lifted}
\item \textsuperscript{243} Ministry of Defence (ARM0012)
• in order to meet the 2018 target for the Infantry, the Army is developing, through extensive scientific research, an up-to-date set of Physical Employment Standards, in order to ensure it generates the right physical capabilities in its soldiers for the military tasks it requires them to perform.\textsuperscript{244}

121. Sir Paul Newton was uncertain whether there would be a vast number of women volunteering for these roles, but he did not consider it to be a profound change which would undermine the Army’s warfighting ethos.\textsuperscript{245} He thought it important to make equipment as light as possible for all soldiers, and stressed that maintaining the fitness and training standards was the important factor.

122. \textit{We support the decision to allow women to undertake ground close combat roles, provided that standards of fighting effectiveness can be maintained.} As part of the roll out of this initiative, the Army is revising its training policies and undertaking a review of the physical demands placed on all Army personnel. We believe that these changes can be delivered without diminishing the fighting capability of the Army and other Services. \textit{However, we wish to receive regular updates on the introduction of women in ground close combat roles. These updates should include the outcomes of the scientific research being undertaken into the physical demands placed on all Army personnel.}
6 Army equipment

Introduction

123. In addition to setting out the mission for the Army, SDSR 2015 contained details on an extensive equipment programme for it. In this section we will consider the Army’s major projects and the risks attached to their delivery.

Army equipment projects

124. The key elements of the Army’s equipment plan are as follows:

- AJAX, the armoured cavalry vehicle project, which will support both the armoured infantry and new Strike Brigades;
- the Challenger 2 main battle tank life extension project to sustain the current main battle tank capability; and
- the Warrior infantry fighting vehicle capability sustainment project (to deliver enhanced lethality and protection).

The MoD considered these capabilities to be critical to delivering a modern ground manoeuvre warfighting capability.

125. By 2025, the Army should also start to take delivery of the new Mechanized Infantry Vehicle (MIV) and Multi-Role Vehicle (Protected) (MRV-P) projects. In the same timeframe, the delivery of the next generation of Attack Helicopters (at a cost of $2.3 billion) should be well underway alongside the continued build-up of the new Wildcat armed utility helicopter, the modernisation of the Puma force, an upgrade of the Chinook heavy lift helicopter, and the replacement of the Sea King by the Merlin Mk 4 in the Commando Helicopter Force.

126. According to the MoD, this ambitious programme will add “significant capability to the warfighting division”. The MoD told us that:

Underpinning all of these new capabilities will be the new land environment tactical communication and information systems project. By 2025, this will have delivered the next generation of combat net radio and wide area network for both voice and data communications across the warfighting division.
The AJAX programme

127. The AJAX fleet of armoured reconnaissance vehicles is being developed for the British Army’s armoured cavalry regiments in both the armoured infantry and the new planned Strike Brigades.\textsuperscript{253} Between 2017 and 2024, 589 AJAX will be manufactured at a cost of £4.5 billion and will replace the Army’s Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (tracked) armoured vehicles.\textsuperscript{254} The reconnaissance vehicle will contain a family of variants in support and logistic roles. The breakdown of the AJAX variants will be as follows:

- 245 AJAX Reconnaissance vehicles: surveillance and fire control;
- 93 Ares Reconnaissance Support: carries Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Weapon or troops for dismounted patrols;
- 51 Argus Combat Engineer Reconnaissance;
- 112 Athena Command: mobile battlefield headquarters;
- 38 Atlas Recovery: to recover damaged and immobilised vehicles; and
- 50 Apollo Support Repair: repairs and tows damaged vehicles.\textsuperscript{255}

128. According to the MoD, the new multi-role AJAX armoured fighting vehicle will transform the Army’s medium armour and advanced intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability.\textsuperscript{256} Furthermore, it will be able to conduct sustained, expeditionary, full spectrum operations with a reduced logistic footprint, in a wide range of combat situations and operating environments. The Chief of the General Staff regarded the procurement of the AJAX vehicles as an important component of the strategy to counter the re-emergence of the state-on-state threat and the ability of potential adversaries to conduct “anti-access area denial”.\textsuperscript{257}

129. Those AJAX vehicles assigned to the Strike Brigades will provide the capability to project combat power across distances of up to 2,000km; to disperse and concentrate very rapidly; and to dominate ground and population mass.\textsuperscript{258} The Chief of the General Staff described AJAX as genuinely networked and genuinely mobile, with good firepower and good protection. He also explained that the Army was taking a “methodical and deliberate” approach to the AJAX capability and the plan was to “test it to destruction and to experiment with it” at an early stage so that, by 2021, the Army would have a known initial operating capability.\textsuperscript{259}

130. Each regiment equipped with AJAX will have between 50 and 60 vehicles,\textsuperscript{260} and the two Strike Brigades are each predicted to have two AJAX regiments and two mechanised infantry battalions. Once the Army reaches full operating capability, the Chief of the General Staff expected that one of those brigades would be at 30 days’ notice to move.\textsuperscript{261}

\textsuperscript{253} Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)
\textsuperscript{254} The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2017*, February 2017, p 85
\textsuperscript{255} The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2017*, February 2017, p 85
\textsuperscript{256} Ministry of Defence (ARM0018)
\textsuperscript{257} Q3
\textsuperscript{258} Q3
\textsuperscript{259} Q63
\textsuperscript{260} Q64
\textsuperscript{261} Q70
131. AJAX will come with very sophisticated electronic systems to allow it to conduct networked-enabled warfare to create a battle picture for the divisional HQ.262 This will provide the Army with a significant uplift in capability. However, it should be noted that a similar previous project, the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES), had also encountered difficulties during procurement due to its complexity, affordability and delivery timetable.

132. Dr Warren Chin questioned whether General Dynamics—the producer of AJAX—had learned the lessons of the FRES programme.263 He was particularly concerned about factors which lay outside the control of the Army, such as “affordability, technological feasibility and the means to ensure that it came off the production line successfully”.264 He was concerned that AJAX was being portrayed as a ‘silver bullet’ for the Army to succeed under an airspace which it did not control and in theatres to which the sea lanes of communication might be in jeopardy.265 Sir Paul Newton agreed:

I don’t see Ajax as the silver bullet. If you look back two years and think how far upgrading the capability has gone in that time, the Warrior programme is being upgraded for the armoured infantry, the Challenger programme is being upgraded; attack helicopters are being upgraded, Chinooks are being upgraded. Those are not rhetorical; they are actual programmes that are happening. Ajax is essential to be able to give close recce, because our capability there is a gap.

Warren [Chin] makes an important point about not over-specifying. My understanding is that the Army, as it looks at the Mechanised Infantry Vehicle—the sister project to AJAX—is thinking very hard about making sure it states the absolute requirements, rather than an unachievable shopping list of everything.266

### Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank and Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicles

133. The Army has 227 Challenger 2 main battle tanks, a reduction of 98 from 2010. These are used by the Armoured Infantry Brigades as the Army’s all-weather, mobile, protected, direct-fire anti-tank capability. Challenger 2 is best suited for high-tempo mobile operations against an army of similar sophistication and is equipped with weapons that can engage a wide range of targets—in particular enemy Armoured Fighting Vehicles.267 The tanks are currently divided between the deployable field force, training establishments, storage and long-term maintenance.268 In the context of the restructuring of the Army post-SDSR 2015, the intention is to have four, rather than three, mounted close combat regiments comprising of two Challenger 2 and two AJAX regiments.

134. Challenger 2 is subject to a £700 million Life Extension programme269. This will address key aspects of obsolescence in order for the Army to keep it in service until 2035. In December 2016, the MoD announced that the two preferred bidders for the project’s

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262 Q3 and Q168; Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)
263 Q168
264 Q168
265 Q169
266 Q170
267 Ministry of Defence (ARM0018)
268 Ministry of Defence (ARM0018)
269 Ministry of Defence (ARM0018)
competitive phase would now develop upgrades. However, the MoD were unable to provide us with any information on the number of tanks that would be upgraded, as this would depend on both the solutions presented by the bidders and lessons identified by the Strike Experimentation Group.270

135. The Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicle provides protection and support to infantry soldiers on foot.271 In combination, the Warrior and its infantry personnel form a tightly integrated unit. These vehicles are currently part of a programme, Armoured Infantry 2026, which is tasked with the delivery of an upgraded vehicle platform, and extending the out-of-service date from 2025 to 2040. The Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme element of this is expected to cost some £1.3 billion.272

136. The Army’s Warrior fleet (including all variants) stands at 769. As with the Challenger 2 life extension programme, the MoD was unable to provide an estimate of upgraded Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicles which the Armoured Infantry 2026 programme would deliver as, again, this was subject to assessment and consultation.

137. Equally, the MoD refused to provide, us with information on the numbers of Challenger 2 tanks and Warrior vehicles held at specific levels of readiness—as to do so, they contended, would “compromise operational security, or would be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the Armed Forces.”273

**Mechanised Infantry Vehicle and Multi-Role Vehicle (Protected)**

138. The Mechanised Infantry Vehicle (MIV) is a new programme which was announced in SDSR 2015.274 It is currently in ‘concept’ pre-design phase, but the MoD’s intention is to procure an off-the-shelf design which would be equipped with a minimum number of UK sourced sub-systems such as remote weapons station, communications, battle management system and seating.275 The MIV will equip the mechanised infantry within the new Strike Brigades. According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, it is expected that the MoD will buy between 300 and 350 MIVs with a potential initial operating capability in 2023. However, as the project is in ‘concept’ pre-design phase, the MoD is unable to provide costings for the programme.276

139. In addition, the MoD’s Equipment Plan, set out the requirements for a Multi-Role Vehicle (Protected) (MRV-P) to provide the Army with a family of adaptable, protected general purpose vehicles for command and logistics.277 Two classes of vehicle are required. MRV-P Group 1 will provide logistics, command and control, and liaison, while MRV-P Group 2 will provide specialist platforms, including Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) and protected ambulances.

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270 Ministry of Defence (ARM0018)
271 Ministry of Defence (ARM0018)
273 Ministry of Defence (ARM0018)
275 Jane’s Defence Weekly, DVD 2016: Bidders line up for British Army’s MIV 8x8 requirement, 9 September 2016
276 PQ50000
277 Ministry of Defence, Equipment Plan 2016, January 2017, p22
140. In January 2017, it was confirmed that the Army had started negotiations to purchase the Oshkosh Joint Light Tactical Vehicle from the United States to fulfil the MRV-P Group 1 requirement.\textsuperscript{278} The expectation is that 750 such vehicles will be acquired. For MRV-P Group 2, which will require a larger platform, we understand that three potential suppliers remain in the competition. A contract is expected to be agreed within two years, and initially the Army is expected to buy 150 APCs and 80 ambulances, with this later rising to 300 of each if the money is available.\textsuperscript{279}

**Delivery of the Army component of the equipment plan**

141. In his Financial Statement of 8 July 2015, the then Chancellor, Rt Hon George Osborne MP, stated that the Government had committed to continue to meet the NATO minimum of 2\% of GDP to be spent on defence.\textsuperscript{280} In addition, the Government committed to an annual real-terms increase in the defence budget of 0.5\% until 2020–21 plus a 1\% annual increase in the Defence Equipment Plan.\textsuperscript{281} Details of this can be found in our Report, *Shifting the Goalposts? Defence expenditure and the 2\% pledge*.\textsuperscript{282} In addition, the Government established the Joint Security Fund (JSF) which could provide a further £3.5 billion to fund new defence and security capabilities.\textsuperscript{283} The MoD would have access to £2.1 billion of this money, over the current Parliament.\textsuperscript{284} However access to this additional funding would be dependent on the MoD realising "efficiency savings".\textsuperscript{285} The SDSR stated that £11 billion of savings had been identified from within the MoD, the security agencies and counter-terrorism funding.\textsuperscript{286} In order to ensure the affordability of the Equipment Plan 2016–2026, the MoD would be required to achieve "efficiency savings" of £7.3 billion (£5.8 billion from within the Equipment plan itself and £1.5 billion from elsewhere in the Defence budget).\textsuperscript{287} Together the MoD’s "growing budget", the JSF and the savings are expected to fund, in full, the commitments contained in SDSR 2015, including the new Strike Brigades.\textsuperscript{288} In total, the MoD’s 2016 Equipment Plan commits £178 billion over the next decade, of which £19.1 billion is earmarked for land equipment which includes the programmes listed above.\textsuperscript{289}

142. The Army is currently in the process of developing a series of ‘efficiency measures’.\textsuperscript{290} These measures will cover personnel, activity levels and support assumptions.\textsuperscript{291} Despite the increase in Departmental funding and the forecast ‘efficiency savings’, the NAO was highly cautious about the affordability of the Equipment Plan. It highlighted the fact that SDSR 2015 had added £24.4 billion of new commitments, the majority of which would

\textsuperscript{278} Jane’s Defence Weekly, *UK confirms FMS JLTV buy for MRV-P*, 26 January 2017
\textsuperscript{279} Jane’s Defence Weekly, *UK confirms FMS JLTV buy for MRV-P*, 26 January 2017
\textsuperscript{280} HC Deb, 8 July 2015, \textit{col} 337
\textsuperscript{281} HM Treasury, *Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015*, Cm 9162, November 2015, para 1.72
\textsuperscript{283} HM Treasury, *Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015*, Cm 9162, November 2015, para 1.72
\textsuperscript{284} Ministry of Defence (\textit{ARM0015}) (This was based on the assumption that the Parliament would last until 2020)
\textsuperscript{285} Ministry of Defence (\textit{ARM0015})
\textsuperscript{287} National Audit Office, *Ministry of Defence: The Equipment Plan 2016–2026*, HC 914, January 2017, para 2.9
\textsuperscript{288} Ministry of Defence (\textit{ARM0015})
\textsuperscript{289} Ministry of Defence, *Equipment Plan 2016*, January 2017, p 22
\textsuperscript{290} Q284
\textsuperscript{291} Q284
need to be funded from within the existing plan.\footnote{National Audit Office, \textit{Ministry of Defence: The Equipment Plan 2016–2026}, January 2017, HC 914, Summary, para 6} Indeed Army Command had seen a 21\% increase in its equipment budget when compared to the 2015 plan, of which the Mechanised Infantry Vehicle was the largest new component.\footnote{National Audit Office, \textit{Ministry of Defence: The Equipment Plan 2016–2026}, January 2017, HC 914, Figure 5, p 19}

143. The NAO concluded that these new commitments had “considerably increased cost uncertainty in the Plan” and that the number of “immature cost estimates”—including those for the MIV—had increased and would be in need of future revision.\footnote{National Audit Office, \textit{Ministry of Defence: The Equipment Plan 2016–2026}, January 2017, HC 914, Summary, para 14} Several of our witnesses highlighted the MoD’s poor record on controlling costs as a significant risk which could have implications for the delivery of equipment and capability.\footnote{Q215} Sir Paul Newton also raised the concern that while the Levene reforms had delegated budget choices to front-line commanders, previous experience had shown that, if costs increased elsewhere in the Armed Forces, it was the Army’s budget that was raided in terms of its equipment plan and training.\footnote{Q257–258}

144. Lieutenant General Poffley maintained that the Army’s equipment plan was not only affordable, but offered the opportunity to upgrade equipment to meet the new challenges presented by technology:

> There is therefore a very definite ambition there to adjust the force structure, to provide a degree of more choice going forward for political decision-makers. You would quite clearly expect us, I would hope, to exploit the very best technologies that are available at the time while making sure that is sustainable well into the future. There is a balance to be struck across the Army’s equipment programme that attends to that. Absolutely, this is as much about improvement as it is dealing with obsolescence.\footnote{Q251}

145. The Secretary of State considered the programme as “a mixture of investment in entirely new vehicles and equipment and an upgrade to some of the existing programmes”.\footnote{Q251} The Army’s equipment programme was now intended to be part of restructuring \textit{Army 2020} to meet the re-emergence of the potential for state-on-state conflict as the main priority as well as being able to cope with other potential scenarios.\footnote{Qq257–258}

146. \textbf{We welcome the SDSR’s commitment to invest in the new AJAX vehicles and in the life extension of the Challenger Mark 2 as well as the upgrades to the Warrior vehicles and the Apache Attack Helicopters.} Any reduction in the number of Challenger Mark 2 tanks would be fraught with risk. Therefore, we seek reassurance about the numbers of main battle tanks which will be retained. We believe that the challenge will be for the MoD, the Army and industry to ensure that these projects are delivered on time and within budget. The failure of previous programmes to achieve this must not be repeated. To do so will seriously impair, if not fatally undermine, the Army’s ability to deploy the SDSR’s envisaged warfighting division and the new Strike Brigades.
147. It is disturbing that the NAO highlights the fact that SDSR 2015 has added an additional £24.4 billion of new commitments to the MoD’s Equipment Plan. This includes the Army’s, as yet uncosted, programme for the new Mechanised Infantry Vehicle (MIV). The NAO concluded that these new commitments had “considerably increased cost uncertainty in the Plan” and that the number of “immature cost estimates” had increased and would be in need of future revision. In response to our Report the MoD must provide a clear statement that all of these programmes are affordable, in each financial year, alongside an assurance that funding for personnel and training will not be used to address shortfalls. The MoD should also set out how the new Mechanised Infantry Vehicle will be funded and the impact it will have on existing projects.
Conclusions and recommendations

SDSR 2015: Headline ambitions for the Army

1. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review sets out ambitious plans for the British Army, including a reset of its roles, a major reorganisation of its structures and an extensive new equipment programme. The headline ambition of recreating a warfighting division is of considerable significance in the light of the resurgence of state-based threats. However, this programme of change is accompanied by significant financial risks and challenges for its fulfilment. (Paragraph 18)

A new warfighting division

2. We welcome the Ministry of Defence’s commitment, set out in SDSR 2015, to re-create a warfighting division as part of the restructuring of the Army. We agree with General Carter’s observation that its delivery is central to the credibility of the Army. It is also a key part of the UK’s ability to contribute effectively to NATO’s collective deterrence and defence. However, the development of the division is a major increase in ambition when considered in the context of the “best effort” approach of SDSR 2010 for a deployment of smaller forces under Army 2020. Although the programme for the new division is in its infancy, the MoD needs to be alive to the challenges and risks in providing this capability—not least the importance of maintaining the Army’s budget. We therefore recommend that the MoD should provide us with detailed annual reports on progress towards the establishment of the warfighting division. These should include detailed timelines, regular updates on progress against each planned stage of delivery of the division, and financial statements to demonstrate that the Army’s budget is sufficient to enable the proposed timetable to be met. (Paragraph 28)

3. The new warfighting division will have to operate without the assurance of ‘owning’ the airspace, when it faces a modern state adversary. This presents MoD and Armed Forces’ planners with significant challenges. Whilst we note that air defence is a tri-Service responsibility, led by the RAF, we are greatly concerned about the level of detail and timescale of the plans to provide ground-based air defence for the new warfighting division. Addressing this vulnerability must be given the highest priority. The MoD has promised to provide us with regular updates on this matter. In its response to our Report, the department should set out the timetable for the decisions on replacement of both Rapier and the High Velocity Missile systems and by when these replacements will be delivered. (Paragraph 33)

4. We welcome the Government’s commitment to deploy UK Armed Forces to NATO’s eastern and southern borders as part of NATO’s enhanced forward presence. We also welcome the MoD’s work to resolve the challenges of deploying across NATO’s internal borders. This is a matter that must be kept under constant review, particularly given the re-emergence of potential threats from peer adversaries. In particular, the prospect of retaining some Army basing on the continent should not be ruled out if Russian assertiveness to the east and north continues to intensify. (Paragraph 40)
5. We welcome the Army’s intention to continue training overseas and the Army’s reassessment of its training requirements in the light of the increased threat of peer adversary conflict as described in the SDSR. We expect the MoD to update us on the outcome of the Army’s assessment of its training requirements. **We expect the MoD to update us on the outcome of the Army’s assessment of its training requirements (Paragraph 46)**

6. We remain concerned about the MoD’s lack of data on the costs and spending trends of training investment. As we identified in our previous report on defence expenditure, there is currently no mechanism by which such expenditure and projected future costs can be scrutinised. This is of greater concern given reports of possible reductions in training due to MoD cost pressures. Such reductions could potentially risk the Army’s capabilities, particularly those of the new warfighting division. **In its response to our Report, we ask the MoD to provide the projected levels of spending on collective training for the constituent parts of the division for each year until 2025. The response should also include the number of overseas and UK training events cancelled since SDSR 2010. (Paragraph 47)**

7. We welcome the Army’s development of an Integrated Action doctrine, which should provide the capability to deliver an innovative response to both conventional and non-conventional threats. However we note with concern the Chief of the General Staff’s warning that the Army does not have a sufficient number of linguists even though this is a prescribed competence for a company or squadron commander. **We expect the MoD to set out how it plans to address this matter and the timescale for doing so. We also welcome the establishment of 77 Brigade and the integrated nature of its tasks. The challenge for the MoD will be to ensure that it is fully integrated with the other Services, UK Government Departments and UK allies. We expect the MoD to set out how it plans to address this matter and the timescale for doing so. We also welcome the establishment of 77 Brigade and the integrated nature of its tasks. The challenge for the MoD will be to ensure that it is fully integrated with the other Services, UK Government Departments and UK allies.** We ask that the MoD keep us informed of progress in the development of 77 Brigade and other similar units within the Armed Forces as they progress towards becoming fully operational. (Paragraph 57)

8. We are concerned about the lack of detail on how the MoD could regenerate a warfighting division or reconstitute a greater force in the face of significant strategic challenges. **In its response to our Report, we ask the MoD to confirm when the work to improve the mechanism for tracking, recalling and retraining the Regular Reserve will be completed. We also ask that the MoD set out the timetable for the completion of the work exploring the optimal regeneration and reconstitution framework necessary to deliver a capable second division. We are also concerned that there is no systematic strategy linking these two pieces of work. We therefore recommend that the MoD includes in its promised six-monthly updates on regeneration and reconstitution details on how the Army is fulfilling both ambitions. (Paragraph 66)**

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**Defence engagement and national resilience**

9. We welcome the establishment of the new specialised infantry battalions to deliver the MoD’s programme for defence engagement and the decision to fund it as a
core Defence task. Given the positive influence these activities can have on conflict prevention and stability, it is essential that these tasks are funded sufficiently. However, this should not be at the expense of the Army’s, or the other Services’, warfighting capabilities. **In its response to our Report, the MoD should commit to set out, on an annual basis, expenditure on defence engagement tasks (including associated training costs), together with expenditure on collective and individual training for warfighting operations to enable comparison.** (Paragraph 78)

10. We support the MoD’s decision to designate national resilience as a core defence task. However, we seek assurances from the MoD that this task will in no way undermine the primary function of the Army—to succeed in warfare given the manifest constraints on Defence expenditure. **We recommend that the MoD provides us with an annual breakdown of expenditure on national resilience tasks (including associated training costs) together with expenditure on collective and individual training for warfighting operations to enable comparison.** (Paragraph 83)

**Army personnel**

11. We note the MoD’s view that the critical mass required by the Army to deliver a warfighting division will comprise the overall combined strength of trained Regulars and Reservists. This makes it critically important that the full strength of trained Regulars and Reservists is achieved. If it is not, the credibility of the warfighting division will be undermined. We also note the Chief of the General Staff’s acknowledgement that, at present, the capacity does not exist to replace the full division following its deployment on a one-off intervention. **We recommend that the MoD and the Army undertake work to establish the critical mass required for the Army to be able to deploy the warfighting division on a one-off deployment and to be able to replace it with a capable second division.** (Paragraph 89)

12. There is logic in the MoD’s decision to include, in numbers of Trained Strength, Army personnel who have completed Phase 1 Training so that they can be deployed on national resilience tasks. However, we seek assurances from the MoD that the target strengths for Regulars and Reservists set out in the Army 2020 plan—which were based on personnel who had completed Phase 2 training—remain unchanged. (Paragraph 92)

13. The target establishment of the trained Regular Army was for 82,000 trained soldiers by 2015. However, despite the fact that this target was lowered from 95,000 in 2012, the strength of the Army remains below 80,000. Although the MoD asserts that the current level of personnel is sufficient for the Army to meet current operational demands, we do not believe this figure is adequate to counter a sudden unexpected threat. The MoD has to address this shortfall. An Army which falls below the already historic low target of 82,000 makes itself dangerously vulnerable to external aggression. (Paragraph 98)

14. We welcome the MoD’s acknowledgement that its traditional recruiting grounds are no longer sufficient for the Army’s needs and that it must access a wider pool of talent. **In its response to our Report, the MoD should set out the progress it is making to achieve its targets for women and Black and Minority Ethnic recruits.** (Paragraph 99)
15. We are not convinced by the MoD’s assertion that missing its manpower targets for the Army Reserve “would not impact significantly on capability”, particularly given the Chief of the General Staff’s evidence that the critical mass to deliver a warfighting division will comprise the total combined strength of Regulars and Reserves. A failure to recruit the necessary numbers of Reservists is not so much a threat to the Army’s reputation but a threat to the credibility and competence of the MoD’s approach to delivering a revitalised Reserve. The MoD must conduct a review of its recruitment policy to identify the blockages that exist in the system which are hindering the recruitment of sufficient Reservists. (Paragraph 105)

16. It is unacceptable that the Recruitment Partnership for the recruitment of both Regulars and Reserves, which was signed in 2012, is still not fully operational and that evidence presented to us pointed to the Recruitment Partnership contract being not fit for purpose. In its response to our Report, the MoD must set out the problems which need to be addressed and the timetable for the delivery of the new ICT systems and for fully-operational status to be achieved. We expect urgent action from the MoD and Capita to resolve the outstanding issues. (Paragraph 108)

17. We support the Chief of the General Staff’s commitment to changing the culture of the Army through initiatives on employment, talent management and leadership. Successful implementation of these initiatives could provide a structure within which all soldiers can achieve their full potential. However, we recognise that this must not be to the detriment of the Army’s ability to undertake its core role of warfighting. We note the concerns expressed about cultural resistance within the Army to this agenda, particularly in respect of Flexible Engagement. In response to our Report, we should like to receive further details on how the Army’s various initiatives will dovetail, and how the MoD will ensure that resistance to a changing culture is overcome. (Paragraph 119)

18. We support the decision to allow women to undertake ground close combat roles, provided that standards of fighting effectiveness can be maintained. As part of the roll out of this initiative, the Army is revising its training policies and undertaking a review of the physical demands placed on all Army personnel. We believe that these changes can be delivered without diminishing the fighting capability of the Army and other Services. However, we wish to receive regular updates on the introduction of women in ground close combat roles. These updates should include the outcomes of the scientific research being undertaken into the physical demands placed on all Army personnel. (Paragraph 122)

Army equipment

19. We welcome the SDSR’s commitment to invest in the new AJAX vehicles and in the life extension of the Challenger Mark 2 as well as the upgrades to the Warrior vehicles and the Apache Attack Helicopters. Any reduction in the number of Challenger Mark 2 tanks would be fraught with risk. Therefore, we seek reassurance about the numbers of main battle tanks which will be retained. We believe that the challenge will be for the MoD, the Army and industry to ensure that these projects are delivered on time and within budget. The failure of previous programmes to
achieve this must not be repeated. To do so will seriously impair, if not fatally undermine, the Army’s ability to deploy the SDSR’s envisaged warfighting division and the new Strike Brigades. (Paragraph 146)

20. It is disturbing that the NAO highlights the fact that SDSR 2015 has added an additional £24.4 billion of new commitments to the MoD’s Equipment Plan. This includes the Army’s, as yet uncosted, programme for the new Mechanised Infantry Vehicle (MIV). The NAO concluded that these new commitments had “considerably increased cost uncertainty in the Plan” and that the number of “immature cost estimates” had increased and would be in need of future revision. In response to our Report the MoD must provide a clear statement that all of these programmes are affordable, in each financial year, alongside an assurance that funding for personnel and training will not be used to address shortfalls. The MoD should also set out how the new Mechanised Infantry Vehicle will be funded and the impact it will have on existing projects. (Paragraph 147)
Appendix 1: Armed Forces’ Missions

Armed Forces’ Missions

To support the delivery of this strategy, our defence policy sets the Armed Forces eight missions. Routinely, they will:

Defend and contribute to the security and resilience of the UK and Overseas Territories. This includes deterring attacks; defending our airspace, territorial waters and cyber space; countering terrorism at home and abroad; supporting the UK civil authorities in strengthening resilience; and protecting our people overseas.

Provide the nuclear deterrent.

Contribute to improved understanding of the world through strategic intelligence and the global defence network. This includes close and enduring work with our allies and partners during peace and conflict.

Reinforce international security and the collective capacity of our allies, partners and multilateral institutions. This includes work to help shape the international security environment, and to strengthen the rules-based international order including through conflict prevention, capacity building and counter proliferation.

The Armed Forces will also contribute to the Government’s response to crises by being prepared to:

Support humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and conduct rescue missions.

Conduct strike operations.

Conduct operations to restore peace and stability.

Conduct major combat operations if required, including under NATO Article 5.

## Appendix 2: Army Personnel Statistics

### UK Regular Army and Reserve Land Forces strength as at 1 April (1980–1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Overall Strength of the Regular Army(^1,2)</th>
<th>Trained Strength of the Regular Army(^3)</th>
<th>Reserve Land Forces (thousands)</th>
<th>Total Volunteer Reserve(^6)</th>
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<td>108.8</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>190.1</td>
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</table>

Source: House of Commons Library

Notes:
2. UK Regular Army includes full time service personnel, including Nursing Services, but excluding Full Time Reserve Service (FTRS) personnel, Gurkhas, mobilised Reservists, Military Provost Guard Service (MPGS), Locally Engaged Personnel (LEP), Non Regular Permanent Staff (NRPS).
4. Does not include those liable to be recalled. Figures collected from MoD Reserves and Cadet Strengths.
5. Includes those liable to be recalled. Figures collected from ONS Annual Abstract of Statistics.
6. The Territorial Army. Includes Officer Training Corp and Non-Regular Permanent Staff. Does not include the Ulster Defence Regiment or the Home Service Force. Figures collected from ONS Annual Abstract of Statistics.

Figures are rounded.
### UK Armed Forces (Army) and Reserve Land Forces strength as at 1 April (1998–2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Full Time UK Armed Forces (Army)</th>
<th>Reserve Land Forces (thousands)</th>
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<td>UK Regular Army/ UK Armed Forces (Army)</td>
<td>UK AF (Army; trade trained P1+P2)</td>
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<td>2016</td>
<td>90.8</td>
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</table>

**As at 1st of month**

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<td>79.0</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes:

1. Between 1998 and 2013 figures show strength of UK Regular Army, from 2014 onwards figures show the Army component of the UK Armed Forces. UK Regular Army includes full time service personnel, including Nursing Services, but excluding Full Time Reserve Service (FTRS) personnel, Gurkhas, mobilised Reservists, Military Provost Guard Service (MPGS), Locally Engaged Personnel (LEP), Non Regular Permanent Staff (NRPS). UK Armed Forces (Army) includes full time Regular Army, Gurkhas and Full Time Reserve Service personnel (FTRS).

2. Comprises individuals who have completed Phase 1 and Phase 2 training. Figures from UK Defence Statistics Compendium 2001 onwards. UK Armed Forces (Army) includes full time Regular Army, Gurkhas and Full Time Reserve Service personnel (FTRS).

3. From 1 October 2016 there was a change in definition for trained strength in the Army only. From 1 October 2016 those who had passed Phase 1 training were considered trained. For continuity in the time-series series the MoD still provides the Trade Trained Strength (those who have passed Phase 1 and Phase 2). Only the Trade Trained Strength is counted against the SDSR 2015 target for 2020. UK Armed Forces (Army) includes full time Regular Army, Gurkhas and Full Time Reserve Service personnel (FTRS).

4. Does not include those liable to be recalled. Figures from 1998–2011 are collected from MoD Reserves and Cadet Strengths. Figures between 2012 and 2015 are from MoD Strength of the UK reserve forces. Figure for 2016 is from MoD UK Armed Forces Monthly Service Personnel Statistics.

5. Between 1998 and 2007 Regular Reserve includes those persons liable to be recalled. From 2012 does not include those liable to be recalled. Figures collected from ONS Annual Abstract of Statistics between 1998 and 2008. Figures between 2012 and 2015 are from MoD Strength of the UK reserve forces. Figure for 2016 is from MoD UK Armed Forces Monthly Service Personnel Statistics.

6. The Territorial Army; from 14 May 2015 renamed Army Reserve. Includes University Officer Cadets (until 2009), mobilised and High Readiness Reserves (HRR), volunteer personnel serving on ADC and FTRS, Non-Regular Permanent Staff (NRPS), Expeditionary Forces Institute (EFI). Does not include the Ulster Defence Regiment or the Home Service Force. Figures between 1998 and 2008 are collected from ONS Annual Abstract of Statistics. Figures between 2012 and 2015 are from MoD Strength of the UK reserve forces. Figure for 2016 is from MoD UK Armed Forces Monthly Service Personnel Statistics.

Dotted lines indicate break in time-series. See note 3 and 4.

Figures are rounded.

Sources:

**UK Regular Army**
- MOD, UK Armed Forces Quarterly Personnel Report 2015: April
- MOD, UK Armed Forces Monthly Service Personnel Statistics: February 2017

**Army Reserves**
- ONS, Annual Abstract of Statistics 2005: Table 4.6, p. 19
- ONS, Annual Abstract of Statistics 2010: Table 4.6, p. 21
- MoD, Strength of the UK reserve forces, various years.
Appendix 3: Historical figures for Main Battle Tanks and Warrior Vehicles

Main Battle Tanks

Figures below are compiled from official sources. Challenger 2 numbers remained unchanged at 227 tanks following SDSR 2015. See notes below the table for more details.

British Army Main Battle Tanks (MBT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990¹</th>
<th>1997²</th>
<th>2010³</th>
<th>At the time of the SDSR 2015⁴</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Challenger 1</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger 2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chieftain</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>18⁵</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centurion</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6⁶</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1198</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Defence (ARM0018)

Notes:
1. 1990 figures compiled from Statement on Defence Estimate: Britain’s Defence for the 90s Volume 1 1991, p 35. The figures presented in this document are from those presented as part of the declaration on Conventional Forces in Europe, dated November 1990.
2. 1997 figures compiled from UK Defence Statistics 2010 table 4.11. The figures presented in this document are from the information presented as part of the declaration on Conventional Forces in Europe, dated January 1997.
3. 2010 figures compiled from UK Defence Statistics 2010 table 4.11 and the UK holdings as recorded in the return for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty (ICOD January 2010).
4. 2015 figures for Challenger 2 are from the current Army equipment holdings. Figures for other tanks are as recorded in the return for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (ICOD January 2016).
5. Chieftain and Centurion now listed as obsolete equipment.
6. Figures may include non-MBT variants of equipment (for example Chieftain Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers (AVRE)), vehicles in training establishments and equipment used for gate guarding and museum pieces.

Warrior vehicles

The table below sets out the number of Warrior vehicles in the British Army’s inventory declared as part of the UK’s annual declaration on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe return for the stated timescales. These figures are compiled from official sources. See notes below the table for more details.

British Army Warrior Vehicles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990¹</th>
<th>1997²</th>
<th>2010³</th>
<th>At the time of the 2015 SDSR⁴</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warrior AIFV</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrior variants (Warrior RA, Rec, Rep)</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Defence (ARM0018)
Notes:

1. 1990 figures compiled from *Statement on Defence Estimate: Britain’s Defence for the 90s Volume 1 1991*, p 35. The figures presented in this document are from those presented as part of the declaration on Conventional Forces in Europe, dated November 1990 and only include vehicles located within the UK and Europe.

2. 1997 figures compiled from *UK Defence Statistics 2010* table 4.11. The figures presented in this document are from the information presented as part of the declaration on Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (ICOD January 1997) and only include vehicles located within the UK and Europe.

3. 2010 figures compiled from *UK Defence Statistics 2010* table 4.11 and the UK holdings as recorded in the return for the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (ICOD January 2010) and only include vehicles located within the UK and Europe.

4. 2015 figures compiled from the return for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (ICOD January 2016). These represent the closest official statistics to the publication date of SDSR 2015 and only cover vehicles located within the UK and Europe.
Draft Report (*SDSR 2015 and the Army*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

*Ordered*, that the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 147 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Appendices agreed to.


*Ordered*, that the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, that the embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[The Committee adjourned]
Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

Tuesday 14 June 2016

General Sir Nicholas Carter KCB, CBE, DSO, ADC, Chief of the General Staff; Major-General John Crackett CB, TD, Director, Reserves, and David Stephens, Director, Resources and Command Secretary (Army)  

Tuesday 5 July 2016

Air Vice-Marshal (retired) Paul Luker CB OBE AFC DL RAF, Chief Executive, Council of Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Association, and Clerk, United Kingdom Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team

Tuesday 11 October 2016

Lieutenant General (retired) Sir Paul Newton KBE CBE, Professor of Strategy, University of Exeter, Professor Timothy Edmunds, Professor of International Security, University of Bristol, and Dr Warren Chin, Senior Lecturer, Defence Studies Department, King’s College London

Tuesday 1 November 2016

Rt Hon Sir Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, Lieutenant General Mark Poffley OBE, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Military Capability, and Paul Wyatt, Head of Defence Strategy and Priorities, Ministry of Defence
Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

ARM numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1 ADS Group (ARM0014)
2 Child Soldiers International (ARM0007)
3 Child Soldiers International (ARM0008)
4 DefenceSynergia (ARM0005)
5 DefenceSynergia (ARM0017)
6 Dr Warren Chin (ARM0011)
7 Human Security Centre (ARM0006)
8 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)
9 Ministry of Defence (ARM0012)
10 Ministry of Defence (ARM0015)
11 Ministry of Defence (ARM0016)
12 Ministry of Defence (ARM0018)
13 Mr Jie Sheng Li (ARM0001)
14 Professor Vince Connelly (ARM0009)
15 techUK (ARM0010)
## List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website.

The reference number of the Government’s response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

### Session 2016–17

| First Report                  | Russia: Implications for UK defence and security | HC 107  
|                              |                                                | (HC 668) |
| Second Report                 | UK military operations in Syria and Iraq        | HC 106  
|                              |                                                | (HC 1065) |
| Third Report                  | Restoring the Fleet: Naval Procurement and the National Shipbuilding Strategy | HC 221  
|                              |                                                | (HC 973) |
|                              |                                                | (HC 1000) |
| Fifth Report                  | Open Source Stupidity: The Threat to the BBC Monitoring Service | HC 748  
|                              |                                                | (HC 1066) |
| Sixth Report                  | Who guards the guardians? MoD support for former and serving personnel | HC 109  
<p>|                              |                                                | (HC 1149) |
| Seventh Report                | Investigations into fatalities involving British military personnel | HC 1064 |
| First Special Report          | Shifting the goalposts? Defence expenditure and the 2% pledge: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2015–16 | HC 465 |
| Third Special Report          | An acceptable risk? The use of Lariam for military personnel: Government Response to the Committee’s Fourth Report of Session 2015–16 | HC 648 |
| Fourth Special Report         | Russia: Implications for UK defence and security: Government Response to the Committee’s First Report of Session 2016–17 | HC 668 |
| Fifth Special Report          | Restoring the Fleet: Naval Procurement and the National Shipbuilding Strategy: Government Response to the Committee’s Third Report of Session 2016–17 | HC 973 |
| Sixth Special Report          | Exposing Walter Mitty: The Awards for Valour (Protection) Bill: Government Response to the Committee’s Fourth Report | HC 1000 |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Special Report</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>Seventh Special</td>
<td>UK military operations in Syria and Iraq: Government Response to the</td>
<td>HC 1065</td>
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<tr>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Committee's Second Report</td>
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<td>Eighth Special</td>
<td>Open Source Stupidity: The Threat to the BBC Monitoring Service:</td>
<td>HC 1066</td>
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<td>Report</td>
<td>Responses to the Committee's Fifth Report</td>
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<td>Ninth Special Report</td>
<td>Who guards the guardians? MoD support for former and serving</td>
<td>HC 1149</td>
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<td>personnel: Government Response to the Committee's Sixth Report</td>
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**Session 2015–16**

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<tr>
<th>Report</th>
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<tr>
<td>First Report</td>
<td>Flexible response? An SDSR checklist of potential threats and</td>
<td>HC 493 (HC 794)</td>
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<td>Second Report</td>
<td>Shifting the goalposts? Defence expenditure and the 2% pledge</td>
<td>HC 494 (HC 465)</td>
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<td>Third Report</td>
<td>Beyond endurance? Military exercises and the duty of care</td>
<td>HC 598 (HC 525)</td>
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<td>Fourth Report</td>
<td>An acceptable risk? The use of Lariam for military personnel</td>
<td>HC 567 (HC 648)</td>
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