SDSR 2015 and the Army Contents

3A new warfighting division


19.The creation of the new warfighting division is the most important element of SDSR 2015’s vision for the Army. In this section we consider how the new division will meet the threats and general vulnerabilities identified in our SDSR checklist Report published in November 2015.30 In particular, whether it will be able to counter:

Vision for the new warfighting division

20.Under Army 2020, the MoD regarded the Army as “already prepared to deliver a division capable of operating within the context of a non-enduring warfighting intervention”.31 However, the MoD conceded that this was a “best effort” capability which would require adequate warning and additional resource for it to be both generated and sustained.32 Joint Force 2025 is tasked with rebalancing and modernising the Army to provide a division which is available at “higher readiness”.33

21.The warfighting division will consist of three brigades, drawing on two Armoured Infantry Brigades and one of the two new Strike Brigades,34 together with associated combat and combat service support elements. The two Strike Brigades will be able to deploy rapidly over long distances using the new AJAX armoured vehicles and new Mechanised Infantry Vehicles. The SDSR states that this will double the number of brigades ready for operations.35 Together with 16 Air Assault Brigade’s very high readiness forces, the SDSR asserted that the UK would have an improved ability to respond to “all likely threats”.36

22.In oral evidence, General Sir Nicholas Carter, Chief of the General Staff (CGS), considered the capacity to field a warfighting division as central to the credibility of the Army,37 and described the change as “one of the great outcomes from the SDSR”.38 He likened it to the Royal Navy’s Aircraft Carrier programme which provided a capability where “the full orchestra comes together”.39

23.The new warfighting division will also be configured to counter the potential for adversaries to conduct “anti-area access denial”40 and particularly where an adversary could impede the ability of either the RAF or the Royal Navy to dominate either the littoral or air space.41 A key aspect of this will be the ability of the warfighting division to project combat power “at reach” over distances of up to 2,000km; and to disperse and concentrate rapidly in order to dominate ground and population mass in a different manner from at present.42

24.The warfighting division has the potential to address the re-emergence of a potential state-on-state conflict; but witnesses to our inquiry highlighted challenges to its implementation. The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research (CHACR), the Army’s own think-tank, argued that the warfighting division would be created in the context of:

Furthermore, the CHACR said that “the prospect of ‘losing the division in an afternoon’ will weigh heavily on the chain of command, with strategic-to-tactical command compression almost inevitable as politicians appreciate the stakes involved in committing the division to battle”.44 The Centre added that the Army must be able to “regulate how much risk” the UK’s sole warfighting division is exposed to during conflict “unless we are prepared to lose it”.45

25.Dr Warren Chin, from the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London, highlighted the argument raised in some quarters that the creation of the warfighting division was to achieve the “covert goal” of “protecting the Army from the prospect of further cuts”.46 He was not convinced that a division was the best organisational way to deploy the various elements of land capabilities. Given the financial constraints, he argued that the MoD should have thought more boldly and given more consideration to the brigade as “the most important currency unit”.47 Dr Chin cited the Chilcot Inquiry which, he asserted, had challenged the assumptions that the commitment of a division would increase the UK’s influence in the military or political domain. In relation to Iraq, he highlighted the suggestion contained in the inquiry that a smaller and more discrete force package would have produced the same level of power and influence while exposing the UK to less risk during the occupation phase in Iraq.48 Furthermore, Dr Chin, cautioned that the success of the new division would depend greatly on the acquisition and timely delivery of the new AJAX armoured vehicle and other vehicles in the AJAX fleet (which we consider later in this Report).49

26.Lieutenant General (retired) Sir Paul Newton, former Commander Force Development and Training for the Army, was, however, more optimistic and contrasted the vision of a warfighting division with the “unambitious” outcome of the 2010 SDSR:

I think 2010 was dangerously unambitious for the Army, because what it said was, “Well, we’d like you to deploy a division, but only at best effort.” So it set an aspiration that the UK might do this, but without resourcing it. What 2015 said was, “No, we want you to be able to deploy a war-fighting division.50

He concluded that as long as the Army’s budget “does not get raided” it was a “credible” proposal.51

27.General (retired) Sir Richard Shirreff, former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, agreed that SDSR 2015 represented a positive reversal of the “severe cuts made by the coalition government”.52 He believed that the warfighting division gave the UK an opportunity to re-establish credibility in the eyes of its allies who were “disappointed at the diminished stance of Western Europe’s premier military power”.53 However, he cautioned that the effect of the 20% cuts in regular manpower inflicted by the 2010 SDSR, and an increased dependence on under-recruited, under-trained Reserves presented the risk of a force “hollowed out” to the extent that “the deployment of a brigade, let alone a division, at credible readiness would be a major challenge”.54 This was also raised by the Human Security Centre who questioned the ability of the Army to deploy at the divisional level, in particular against a capable state-based opponent.55

28.We welcome the Ministry of Defence’s commitment, set out in SDSR 2015, to re-create a warfighting division as part of the restructuring of the Army. We agree with General Carter’s observation that its delivery is central to the credibility of the Army. It is also a key part of the UK’s ability to contribute effectively to NATO’s collective deterrence and defence. However, the development of the division is a major increase in ambition when considered in the context of the “best effort” approach of SDSR 2010 for a deployment of smaller forces under Army 2020. Although the programme for the new division is in its infancy, the MoD needs to be alive to the challenges and risks in providing this capability—not least the importance of maintaining the Army’s budget. We therefore recommend that the MoD should provide us with detailed annual reports on progress towards the establishment of the warfighting division. These should include detailed timelines, regular updates on progress against each planned stage of delivery of the division, and financial statements to demonstrate that the Army’s budget is sufficient to enable the proposed timetable to be met.

Air superiority and protection of the warfighting division

29.In the previous section, we touched on concerns about air superiority and the UK’s ground-based air defence capabilities. When he gave evidence to us, the Chief of the General Staff accepted that the Army had “bent itself out of shape” during operations in Afghanistan with tactics, equipment and doctrine focused on a specific counter-insurgency challenge.56 The challenge now for the Army was to counter the current range of threats and for it to improve its readiness to fight in a combined arms battlefield.57 He described this as “‘Back to the Future’ type stuff” in which most Western armies were used to owning the airspace—which was not the reality against sophisticated state threats. He stressed to us the importance of investing “significantly” in the Army’s ability to operate in a “much more demanding environment” because that was where the Army was “most vulnerable” at present.58

30.Dr Chin cited Russia’s air power in its western military district and its sophisticated “anti-access area denial” capability, as examples of state capabilities which presented significant challenges to those of the UK.59 He was cautious of General Carter’s assertion that the warfighting division’s new Strike Brigades, utilising the new AJAX vehicles and new technology, could offer an alternative way of conducting long-range strikes against aggressive Russian forces, a role traditionally allocated to airpower.60 Despite the potential for the new Strike Brigades, using the AJAX vehicles’ new technology, to project combat power “at reach” over distances of up to 2,000km, and to disperse and concentrate rapidly in order to dominate ground and people in a different way, he was uncertain how UK and NATO forces would survive in a battlespace in which control of the air was “at best contested”.61 To illustrate this point, Sir Paul Newton recalled being told, during his Army career, that trying to manoeuvre without ground-based air defence was an “expensive form of suicide”.62 Sir Paul agreed that this capability gap needed to be closed as a priority, if the UK was to have a credible warfighting division.63

31.The Human Security Centre argued that the solution—in part—was to shift the balance for fire support back to ground forces, particularly the new Strike Brigades. The Centre noted the introduction of the Common Anti-Air Modular Missile (CAMM) as a useful asset in this context but cautioned that it had a fairly short range and would equip only one regiment.64 A better solution would be the introduction of an enlarged Guided Multiple Rocket System capability, alongside an additional regiment equipped with an extended-range variant of the CAMM.65

32.The Secretary of State for Defence acknowledged that there were capability gaps which need to be addressed, in particular with respect to air defence.66 However, he argued they were being tackled, in part, through the commitment in SDSR 2015 to enhance the Army’s Apache helicopters which would deliver a significant improvement in air attack capability.67 Lieutenant General Mark Poffley, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Capability), also pointed out that air defence was a tri-service responsibility,68 and that the RAF took the lead for ground-based air defence. That said, he highlighted the fact that the MoD was planning to replace the Rapier missile system—currently deployed in the Falklands—with the Future Local Area Air Defence System (FLAADS) which could also be deployed by a Division.69 The proposed ‘layered defence’ for the Army would include these elements, alongside a point defence provided by a High Velocity Missile (HVM) system.70 The HVM system will be considered as part of the next MoD planning round and General Poffley agreed to provide us with regular updates. He added that “judgments about the structure and size of that [HVM] contribution” would also be made as part of the Army Refine work. However no details were included in the Secretary of State’s announcement on the outcomes of Army Refine.

33.The new warfighting division will have to operate without the assurance of ‘owning’ the airspace, when it faces a modern state adversary. This presents MoD and Armed Forces’ planners with significant challenges. Whilst we note that air defence is a tri-Service responsibility, led by the RAF, we are greatly concerned about the level of detail and timescale of the plans to provide ground-based air defence for the new warfighting division. Addressing this vulnerability must be given the highest priority. The MoD has promised to provide us with regular updates on this matter. In its response to our Report, the department should set out the timetable for the decisions on replacement of both Rapier and the High Velocity Missile systems and by when these replacements will be delivered.

Enhanced forward presence and deployment of the new warfighting division

34.In SDSR 2010, the Government took the decision that there was no longer “any operational requirement” for UK forces to be based in Germany and that the combination of financial costs, disruption to the lives of personnel and their families, and opportunity costs in terms of wider Army coherence, required a withdrawal from that country.71 As a result, the UK’s Army would be almost completely UK-based for the first time in many years.72

35.SDSR 2015 emphasised the re-emergence of state-based threats, in particular from a Russia which has become “more aggressive, authoritarian and nationalist, increasingly defining itself in opposition to the West”.73 That security consideration led DefenceSynergia to question the wisdom of the withdrawal and suggested that it should be reversed, not least to facilitate the potential need for UK armoured units to be committed to NATO ARRC formations.74 In a similar vein UKNDA believed the withdrawal was premature in the light of the US decision to re-base heavy armour in Germany to counter the threat from Russia.75

36.General Carter told us that although the withdrawal would still go ahead, the UK would retain certain assets in Germany in order to provide “jumping-off points” for other exercises and other activity which might be necessary.76 Although he acknowledged the concerns raised by the UK’s posture (including through NATO) in relation to the threat in eastern Europe,77 General Carter argued that the capacity to operate with eastern European partners meant that a base in western Germany would not necessarily be more helpful than a UK base. He believed that operating and exercising “further east” was a better priority.78

37.The Secretary of State highlighted the deployment of UK Forces (and those of NATO allies) to the eastern border of NATO as a better form of an enhanced forward presence.79 As examples, he cited the 800 UK personnel deployed to Estonia—which was being mirrored by other countries deploying to Latvia, Lithuania and Poland—and the deployment of RAF Typhoon aircraft to Romania in May 2017 as part of policing NATO’s southern border. Those forward deployments, he argued, would act as an early “tripwire” as well as offering reassurance as a NATO deterrent to any potential aggression.80

38.However, a more fundamental concern was the ability of the UK rapidly to deploy a division to a front-line NATO state, given Russia’s investment in area denial technology. The Secretary of State told us:

A key part of the preparation of both enhanced forward presence and the preparation of the very high readiness taskforce is to deal with these issues of border crossing—of movement across NATO borders internally. Huge progress has been made in the last two years in ensuring that forces can deploy more rapidly across NATO’s internal borders; that the various permissions that are needed, have now been sorted out. I am satisfied that that has improved enormously.81

39.Lieutenant General Poffley told us that the ability to move by land was being examined very carefully so that the necessary cross-border permissions were in place and that “associated bureaucracies” were diminished.82 This would also ensure that the relevant logistics were in place to be able to facilitate deployment. However, he argued that for some parts of Europe it would be quicker to deploy by sea and therefore the investment the UK was making to “re-establish our ability to protect our home waters and our near-abroad waters” was important in countering “anti-area access denial”.83

40.We welcome the Government’s commitment to deploy UK Armed Forces to NATO’s eastern and southern borders as part of NATO’s enhanced forward presence. We also welcome the MoD’s work to resolve the challenges of deploying across NATO’s internal borders. This is a matter that must be kept under constant review, particularly given the re-emergence of potential threats from peer adversaries. In particular, the prospect of retaining some Army basing on the continent should not be ruled out if Russian assertiveness to the east and north continues to intensify.


41.The changes to the Army’s structure have required a new cycle of training—Formation Readiness Mechanism (FORM).84 The intention is that formations and units will rotate through different levels of training with a graduated approach to readiness in order to optimise force preparation.85 This will enable different units to share standing commitments and other tasks, and maintain institutional resilience through regular and varied training. The MoD explained that the new FORM cycle would deliver:

Greater productivity by doubling the number of brigades held at readiness, offering Defence choice in the force packages available for deployment, whilst maintaining the Army’s commitment to fixed tasks. It also supports wider Defence Engagement and capacity building by providing enduring training, assistance and mentoring to our partners.86

42.The Army would continue to use the training estate in the UK, for small-scale training needs, while the UK’s overseas training estate—primarily in Canada, Kenya and Belize—would provide larger-scale training opportunities.87 Overseas training also offers the opportunity to train in different climatic and environmental conditions. Following SDSR 2015, the Army is now also considering an increase in training in Oman where it intended to make “a significant contribution to the UK’s Gulf Strategy”.88

43.SDSR 2015 acknowledged that the UK would operate on its own only on rare occasions and, therefore, training would be targeted to deliver an Army which is “interoperable by design”.89 In 2016–17, the Army took part in 17 NATO Assurance Measure exercises across eleven European countries, including the deployment of the UK battlegroup to Poland, and 16 Air Assault Brigade alongside a French Brigade and the 82nd (US) Airborne Division to Poland and Germany.90 The Army also held a number of exercises with the United States in order to identify and close interoperability gaps between the two forces. The MoD explained that such events would enable the Army better to exploit the capabilities of allies as well as their scale.91

44.Sir Paul Newton told us that Army training needed to prepare the Army for the most probable types of operations it would need to undertake.92 In that respect, he believed that the Army’s training estate was in need of modernisation93 and that the priorities should be:

operating with allies, operating with air forces, urban and forests, and probably somewhere hot, because of the problems in the world.94

Sir Paul highlighted Army training in north-west Europe and the decision to have a training hub in Oman as good examples of the MoD addressing these training needs, and noted that they better matched the potential risks set out in SDSR 2015.95

45.Despite the MoD’s commitment to training and the establishment of a new FORM, concerns continue to be expressed that training levels might be reduced as part of the MoD’s savings programme. For example, there have been reports recently of a potential reduction in the level of training at the British Army Training Unit Suffield (BATUS) in Canada.96 In our Report, Shifting the Goalposts? Defence expenditure and the 2% pledge, we noted that the MoD was unable to provide a breakdown of the costs associated with individual and collective training.97 In its response the MoD stated that the large number and differing types of training activities made it difficult to provide these figures.98 However the Department did recognise that an increased understanding of training costs would be beneficial, and therefore the Army and RAF were working on developing a better understanding of the costs of training.

46.We welcome the Army’s intention to continue training overseas and the Army’s reassessment of its training requirements in the light of the increased threat of peer adversary conflict as described in the SDSR. We expect the MoD to update us on the outcome of the Army’s assessment of its training requirements.

47.We remain concerned about the MoD’s lack of data on the costs and spending trends of training investment. As we identified in our previous report on defence expenditure, there is currently no mechanism by which such expenditure and projected future costs can be scrutinised. This is of greater concern given reports of possible reductions in training due to MoD cost pressures. Such reductions could potentially risk the Army’s capabilities, particularly those of the new warfighting division. In its response to our Report, we ask the MoD to provide the projected levels of spending on collective training for the constituent parts of the division for each year until 2025. The response should also include the number of overseas and UK training events cancelled since SDSR 2010.

Integrated Action

48.SDSR 2015 also highlighted the need to address modern information warfare,99 and the Army identified “the impact of the contemporary information environment” as the most significant new dimension to warfare and operations.100 The experiences of recent and current operations, from Iraq and Afghanistan to Syria and Ukraine demonstrated that warfare has entered the ‘Information Age’, with operations taking place in front of a worldwide audience.101 In response to these challenges the Army is evolving its core doctrine to deliver ‘Integrated Action’ which will require the Army to be “adept at orchestrating a wide range of non-kinetic actions and activities and incorporating them into new tactics”.102 During our inquiry, the MoD told us that the Army’s “Integrated Action” had now been incorporated into the updated Army Doctrine Publication, Land Operations, which was published on 31 March 2017.103

49.To reflect these changes the Army has given greater focus to developing the capabilities of 77 Brigade and 1 (Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance) Brigade. In particular, the two Brigades have been tasked to:

Improve situational intelligence, counter adversaries’ hybrid warfare techniques, and better integrate non-lethal effects into operations, which when task organised with combat elements from the Division, will enable different and novel approaches to counter both conventional and unconventional threats.104

50.General Carter told us that this would require commanders at all levels to analyse the results they are seeking to achieve and to then consider the broadest audience relevant to reaching the required outcome.105 That audience would extend beyond the population in the UK and the area of deployment to include allies, opponents and other broader adversaries and actors on the ground. This, in essence, is the role assigned to 77 Brigade.106

51.In June 2016, we visited 77 Brigade to see at first-hand the development of the Brigade’s capabilities. The Brigade is intended to provide the single integration hub to support all levels of command in the specialist planning and delivery of Information Activities and Outreach.107 The MoD’s planning assumption is that 77 Brigade will reach full operating capability in December 2019.108

52.The Chief of the General Staff saw the establishment of 77 Brigade as a key part of the evolution of the Army’s core doctrine but acknowledged that the Army still had some challenges to face:

I think we still have some distance to go. We will look very hard at how we combine intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance with information warfare, cyber and information services more broadly. I suspect we will look hard at the structures of our Royal Signals. I think we will want to differentiate between infrastructure and networks, and the smart bit of data management and information services and all that goes with applications, to take us to a different level. I would not be surprised if we initiate an experiment to pull those capabilities together around 77 Brigade over the course of the next year or two.109

53.In addition, the Chief of the General Staff pointed out that although language training was now a prescribed competence for command of a company or squadron, the Army did not have the linguists it needed to meet the challenges of the modern world.110 The Chief of the General staff conceded that the Army was playing ‘catch up’ in this area.

54.There is wide support for the concept of Integrated Action and the establishment of 77 Brigade. TechUK saw them as a part of the means of meeting the challenges of war in the information age,111 whilst Sir Paul Newton saw the two as a natural consequence of the Army’s experience in Iraq and Afghanistan:

They come out of the notion of understanding the environment you are in, understanding the mosaic of conflict, understanding the people you are encountering—your adversaries, innocent bystanders or whatever—and then being able to influence those people and being able to talk to them, ideally in their own language.112

55.Sir Paul was also confident that the concept of 77 Brigade would be supported by the wider Army:

I think you would find that there are probably more applicants for the jobs in 77 Brigade than in many of the more conventional parts of the Army. So does it have buy-in? Yes it does. It now needs to be enshrined in the doctrine, because the doctrine is your body of knowledge and that is what is taught at the staff college, so it goes into the DNA.113

56.The Secretary of State pointed out that not only does integrated action apply to all land forces, including the Royal Marines and the RAF Regiment, it is also aligned with NATO’s comprehensive approach.114 The Army doctrine publication on land operations had also been reviewed by the RAF and Royal Navy warfare centres, and similar future publications would be specifically aimed at informing Service personnel in the other Services, and also civil servants who work alongside the land forces.115

57.We welcome the Army’s development of an Integrated Action doctrine, which should provide the capability to deliver an innovative response to both conventional and non-conventional threats. However we note with concern the Chief of the General Staff’s warning that the Army does not have a sufficient number of linguists even though this is a prescribed competence for a company or squadron commander. We expect the MoD to set out how it plans to address this matter and the timescale for doing so. We also welcome the establishment of 77 Brigade and the integrated nature of its tasks. The challenge for the MoD will be to ensure that it is fully integrated with the other Services, UK Government Departments and UK allies. We ask that the MoD keep us informed of progress in the development of 77 Brigade and other similar units within the Armed Forces as they progress towards becoming fully operational.

Regeneration and reconstitution

58.The number of regular soldiers in the UK regular Army is at its lowest level in history,116 which can be seen by the force levels set out in Appendix 2. This has led to concerns about the Army’s ability to regenerate117 and reconstitute118 itself, particularly in the event of an unexpected emergency or a major conflict with another state. In oral evidence, the Chief of the General Staff told us that this was a matter which the Army took seriously, in particular in the context of the re-emergence of the potential for state versus state conflict.119

59.The Chief of the General Staff cited two mechanisms for the rapid growth of the Army: the Army Reserve (volunteers) and the Regular Reserve (ex-regular personnel who retain a liability to be prepared to be mobilised or recalled).120 Major General Crackett, Director, Reserves, saw the change in the defence planning assumptions as enabling the Army to re-examine and refine the roles of the Reserve Army:

An important part of that role, as well as the force’s driving requirement to sustain a division as it goes out of the door, will be around regeneration and reconstitution—in other words, thinking about how the division could be sustained after conflict or over a long period, or even if the force expanded at a later stage. This is very early days. We are just working through the early stages of how we assimilate these new equipment types and what the concepts of the operation will be, so we have barely started this work yet, but that would be the first means of regeneration and reconstitution.121

60.The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research (CHACR) identified advantages in the utilisation of the volunteer Army Reserve for regeneration and reconstitution. It saw them as “reasonably assured, available (albeit at longer readiness times), medically and physically fit, trained as soldiers, and with a basic trade skill”.122 In addition, it argued that the Reserves were a flexible resource which could be retrained to suit the need of the moment.123

61.Although the Regular Reserve should also be able to provide capacity for rapid growth of the Army, an historic concern has been the Army’s inability to keep track of former personnel with a liability to be recalled. Major General Crackett acknowledged the need for a “sharper mechanism for training assurance and recall”.124 The Chief of the General Staff told us that this was of particular importance in some of the more “esoteric capabilities” such as attack helicopter pilots.125 However, Air Vice-Marshal (retired) Paul Luker, from the UK Reserve Forces External Scrutiny Team, pointed out to us that in times of national emergency, Regular Reserves had a “habit of coming forward and volunteering again”.126

62.Lieutenant General Poffley informed us that work on the Regular Reserve had to date (November 2016) classified more than 27,000 of those who had left in the previous five years and that the database was growing continually.127 He added:

We are particularly looking at those who have niche skills that are pressure points inside the structure, ensuring that we now track them as they retire in a far more deliberate fashion than we did previously.128

63.The Army is now undertaking further work on the use of the Regular Reserve with a focus on how it can be “best utilised and better targeted”.129 It had also conducted a skills survey which suggested that whilst skill fade was an issue “re-learning to regain currency can be rapid, especially if the skills were learned to a high standard of performance initially”.130 CHACR suggested that both skills fade and tracking could be addressed either by incentivising some form of annual training weekend or to persuade more Regular Reservists to become Volunteer Reserves.131

64.CHACR also suggested that consideration should be given to the greater use of sponsored reserves (civilians, employed by defence contractors, who are required to have a Reserve commitment as part of their employment).132 These Reservists are designed specifically to deliver particular capabilities to reconstitute or regenerate the force. The Army currently has three separate contractual arrangements for the provision of sponsored Reserves, two of which are in the recruitment phase.133

65.The MoD is now providing us with six monthly updates on regeneration and reconstitution.134 In its October 2016 update, the MoD stated that the Army had been directed to explore the optimal regeneration and reconstitution framework to deliver a second division.135 At the same time, the Army also has two complementary workstrands which impact on Reserves:

66.We are concerned about the lack of detail on how the MoD could regenerate a warfighting division or reconstitute a greater force in the face of significant strategic challenges. In its response to our Report, we ask the MoD to confirm when the work to improve the mechanism for tracking, recalling and retraining the Regular Reserve will be completed. We also ask that the MoD set out the timetable for the completion of the work exploring the optimal regeneration and reconstitution framework necessary to deliver a capable second division. We are also concerned that there is no systematic strategy linking these two pieces of work. We therefore recommend that the MoD includes in its promised six-monthly updates on regeneration and reconstitution details on how the Army is fulfilling both ambitions.

30 Defence Committee, First Report of Session 2015–16, Flexible response? An SDSR checklist of potential threats and vulnerabilities, HC 493

31 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)

32 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)

33 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)

34 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002); HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, Cm 9161, November 2015, para 4.48

35 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, Cm 9161, November 2015, para 4.48

36 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, Cm 9161, November 2015, para 4.48

37 Q39

38 Q3

39 Q3

40 “The objective of an anti-access or area-denial strategy is to prevent the attacker from bringing its forces into the contested region or to prevent the attacker from freely operating within the region and maximizing its combat power.” (Sam. J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare. Countering A2/AD Strategies, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2013, p.2)

41 Q3

42 Q3 and Q62

43 Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Ares & Athena: Warfighting at Scale: Regenerating and Reconstituting Mass, November 2016. It should be noted that the views expressed are those of individual contributors and not the official views of the Army, the MoD, or any components thereof.

44 Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Ares & Athena: Warfighting at Scale: Regenerating and Reconstituting Mass, November 2016, p 12

45 Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Ares & Athena: Warfighting at Scale: Regenerating and Reconstituting Mass, November 2016, p 12

46 Dr Warren Chin (ARM0011), para 28

47 Dr Warren Chin (ARM0011), paras 28–29

48 Dr Warren Chin (ARM0011), para 29

49 Dr Warren Chin (ARM0011), para 26

50 Q216

51 Q216

52 Atlantic Council, Alliance at Risk: Strengthening European Defence in an age of turbulence and competition, February 2016, p 9

53 Atlantic Council, Alliance at Risk: Strengthening European Defence in an age of turbulence and competition, February 2016, p 9

54 Atlantic Council, Alliance at Risk: Strengthening European Defence in an age of turbulence and competition, February 2016, p 9

55 Human Security Centre (ARM0006), paras 5.1–5.5

56 Q5

57 Q5

58 Q5

59 Dr Warren Chin (ARM0011), para 31

60 Dr Warren Chin (ARM0011), para 31

61 Dr Warren Chin (ARM0011), para 31

62 Q148

63 Q215

64 Human Security Centre (ARM0006), para 13.5

65 Human Security Centre (ARM0006), para 13.4

66 Q238

67 Q239

68 Q239

69 Qq239–243

70 Q240

71 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010, p 28 and paras 2.D.12–2.D.13

72 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010, p 28 and paras 2.D.12–2.D.13; see also British Army, Transforming the British Army: an update, July 2013, p 2

73 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, Cm 9161, November 2015, paras 3.19–3.22

74 DefenceSynergia (ARM0005)

75 United Kingdom National Defence Association, UKNDA Commentary No. 13: Strategic Defence & Security Review 2015: One year on, January 2017

76 Q22

77 Q23

78 Q23

79 Q233

80 Q233

81 Q245

82 Q245

83 Q245

84 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)

85 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)

86 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)

87 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)

88 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)

89 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002) and HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, Cm 9161, November 2015, para 4.39

90 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)

91 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002) and Ministry of Defence (ARM0018)

92 Q193

93 Q193

94 Q197

95 Q198

97 Defence Committee, Second Report of Session 2015–16, Shifting the Goalposts? Defence expenditure and the 2% pledge, HC 494, para 27

99 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, Cm 9161, November 2015, paras 3.3, 3.25–3.31 and 4.38; see also Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)

100 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)

101 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)

102 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)

103 Ministry of Defence (ARM0015)

104 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002)

105 Q91

106 Q91

107 Ministry of Defence (ARM0002); see also British Army website, 77 Brigade

108 PQ40346 (Armed Forces: Information Warfare)

109 Q91

110 Q91

111 techUK (ARM0010), paras 2.1–2.8

112 Q171

113 Q171

114 Q236

115 Q236

116 Q8

117 Army Strategy Branch definition: Regeneration is the timely activation, in full or part, of existing force structures and infrastructure, including the restoration of manning, equipment and stocks to designated levels (see Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Ares & Athena: Warfighting at Scale: Regenerating and Reconstituting Mass, November 2016, p 23).

118 Army Strategy Branch definition: Reconstitution is the expansion of force structures and infrastructure beyond existing levels, including the restoration of manning, equipment and stocks to designated levels (see Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Ares & Athena: Warfighting at Scale: Regenerating and Reconstituting Mass, November 2016, p 23).

119 Q7

120 Q8

121 Q9

122 Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Ares & Athena: Warfighting at Scale: Regenerating and Reconstituting Mass, November 2016, pp 24–26

123 Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Ares & Athena: Warfighting at Scale: Regenerating and Reconstituting Mass, November 2016, pp 24–26

124 Q9

125 Q8

126 Q130

127 Q279

128 Q279

129 Ministry of Defence (ARM0012)

130 Ministry of Defence (ARM0012)

131 Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Ares & Athena: Warfighting at Scale: Regenerating and Reconstituting Mass, November 2016, pp 25–26

132 Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, Ares & Athena: Warfighting at Scale: Regenerating and Reconstituting Mass, November 2016, p 25

133 Ministry of Defence (ARM0015)

134 Q10

135 Ministry of Defence (ARM0015)

136 Ministry of Defence (ARM0015)

28 April 2017