House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committee

The UK’s role in the economic war against ISIL

First Report of Session 2016–17
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Report, together with formal minutes relating to the report

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The Foreign Affairs Committee

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Summary

ISIL is facing a constant, and increasingly desperate, struggle to raise money. It is therefore a mischaracterisation to describe it as the world’s “richest” terrorist group. As part of this struggle, the group has come to rely on oil production, taxation, cash storage facilities, and access to national or international financial systems, among other infrastructure and institutions more usually associated with a state. These attributes are key points of vulnerability for ISIL, and targeting them has been at the centre of the UK’s contribution to the economic war against this terrorist organisation.

Oil sales have been one of the primary sources of revenue for ISIL. The UK has contributed to a campaign of Coalition airstrikes that have targeted elements of ISIL’s oil infrastructure that are difficult to replace. The UK is also taking other steps, such as seeking to limit ISIL’s access to the spare parts or chemical additives that the group’s oil operations require. Targeting the wellheads directly carries risks, including that the ultimate capacity for post-war reconstruction in the areas now controlled by ISIL will be undermined. But the Coalition should consider targeting the wellheads more intensively if ISIL’s oil production continues to provide the group with revenue and fuel.

Taxation, the cash economy, and other methods of extorting money from the populations under its control have been another primary source of revenue for ISIL. Airstrikes to destroy ISIL’s bulk cash storage facilities appear to have had a significant impact on ISIL’s financial capacity. But the only way to completely stop ISIL from exploiting the populations and economies under its occupation is to end this occupation itself, by recapturing the territory held by the group. Local ground forces in the region should lead this fight, with UK support taking into account the unreconciled territorial disputes that exist between some of the sides now fighting against ISIL.

The defeat of ISIL depends on ensuring that the group cannot access local or international financial systems as a means of making or moving money, whether through the bank branches under the group’s occupation or through more informal methods of transferring money such as the ‘Hawala’ system. We have specifically examined ISIL’s attempts to infiltrate the legitimate financial structures of Iraq, and the UK should work to ensure that any deficiencies in Iraq’s ability to counter ISIL’s finances are addressed. The Iraqi authorities should have access to UK training and expertise in order to help them build their own capacity in this respect.

ISIL has received funding from donations in the past. The UK should work with local partners in the region to ensure that they have the capacity and resolve to rigorously enforce local laws to prevent the funding of ISIL, so that the group cannot benefit from donations in the future.

As its oil and tax revenues are countered, ISIL is likely to evolve new sources of funding. The UK should play a leading role in the international efforts to counter ISIL’s finances, and be prepared to adapt its response to the evolving threat. The group’s affiliate in Libya may provide an example of how ISIL may raise money in the absence of these sources, and a holistic understanding of ISIL is vital to the effective global defeat of
the group. As well as enhancing internal cooperation, Government departments should ensure that procedures are in place to promptly hire and pay external experts when their expertise is required.
Introduction

1. As part of its on-going inquiry into the UK’s role in the fight against ISIL, the Foreign Affairs Committee established a sub-Committee in January 2016 to examine the financing of ISIL. As this sub-Committee, we worked to

a) Identify the sources of revenue for ISIL.

b) Assess the effectiveness of the UK’s efforts, as part of the international Coalition against ISIL, to prevent ISIL from raising revenue.

2. We are pleased to acknowledge the written submissions to our inquiry, which can be found on the sub-Committee webpage\(^1\) as well as that of the Committee inquiry into the UK’s role in the fight against ISIL.\(^2\) Our inquiry also held three oral evidence sessions, attended by:

a) Luay al-Khateeb, Executive Director, Iraq Energy Institute; David Butter, Associate Fellow, Chatham House; Tom Keatinge, Director, Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI); and Gülçi Cem IŞik, Deputy Chief of Mission, Turkish Embassy in London

b) Tobias Ellwood MP, Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO); and Dan Chugg, Head of the Counter-ISIL Coalition Communications Cell and Head of the Iraq Department, FCO

c) Air Vice-Marshal Edward Stringer, Cross-Whitehall Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) for Counter-ISIL Finance, and Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Operations); and Patrick Rarden, Counter-ISIL Finance subject matter expert, currently a consultant to the Ministry of Defence.

3. Our characterisation of ISIL, which is also referred to in this report as Daesh, was informed by the evidence from our witnesses. That characterisation carries two implications for how we have described ISIL in this report, and how the UK can most effectively counter the group’s efforts to raise revenue.

(1) It is a mischaracterisation to describe ISIL as the world’s “richest” terrorist organisation.\(^3\) ISIL may have been able to generate more revenue than any other terrorist organisation, but it also incurs costs that are unprecedented for such groups. ISIL’s ambition to sustain the apparatus of a state, over a large area and at a time of war, is expensive. The evidence to our inquiry has shown that ISIL is facing a constant, and increasingly desperate, struggle to raise money.

(2) Although an important aspect of countering ISIL’s narrative is refuting that it is a state, this terrorist organisation does possess state-like attributes that should be targeted to counter both its finances and its capabilities more generally. ISIL’s struggle to raise revenue has involved reliance on oil production, taxation, cash storage facilities, and

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\(^1\) Foreign Affairs sub-Committee, ISIL financing inquiry - publications
\(^2\) Foreign Affairs Committee, The fight against ISIL: the UK’s role inquiry - publications
\(^3\) The phrase has been used as a headline by numerous media organisations, as accessed by an internet search on 17 June 2016
access to national or international financial systems, among other infrastructure and institutions more usually associated with a state. These attributes are key points of vulnerability for this terrorist organisation.

Air Vice-Marshal Edward Stringer described ISIL in this way:

> It’s a pseudo-state, so we need to think in terms of how you take a state structure apart...it is economic warfare, like taking apart the Nazi state in ’43 and ’44, rather than conventional counter-finance.

4. This report distinguishes between the military and non-military means used by the UK to counter ISIL’s finances, as part of this economic war.
1 An overview of ISIL's finances

5. Government officials told us that the sources from which ISIL primarily draws its revenue fall into three main categories, which Air Vice-Marshal Stringer described as:

   i) internal oil sales
   ii) internal taxation and extortion
   iii) other sources, such as: the sale of antiquities; Kidnap for Ransom (KfR); and foreign donations.  

Tobias Ellwood MP, Under-Secretary of State at the FCO, explained what proportion of ISIL’s income was formed by each of these three sources:

   We believe that about 40% of their revenues, roughly, comes from oil, 40% comes from extortion, taxation and the local cash economy, and 20% from remaining flow—from antiquities and other sources, donations and so forth.  

This ratio of 40:40:20 was provided to Mr Ellwood by Air Vice-Marshal Stringer, who cautioned that these were approximate figures that could change in the future.

6. In their evidence, Government officials did not provide an assessment of whether ISIL’s revenues exceed its costs, or vice versa. Air Vice-Marshal Stringer said of ISIL’s “ledger” that:

   We do not know whether it is in surplus or deficit. We have put a lot of effort into that... We still cannot get an agreement around the Coalition on exactly where it sits.  

They also did not provide a precise figure for the total amount of money that they estimated ISIL to be able to generate from its various financial activities. Speaking in general terms, and describing “the sale of crude oil and domestic taxation/extortion” as ISIL’s “most important streams of revenue”, Mr Ellwood said that “both are likely to be in the tens of millions of dollars a month.”

7. ISIL draws money from numerous sources, and different assessments of the group’s finances come to different conclusions about which sources matter the most to the group, and what their financial value might be. For example, IHS assessed in December 2015 that ISIL’s monthly revenue stood at around $80 million. Of this $80 million, IHS estimated that around 50% had come from taxes, and around 43% had come from oil revenue. In a separate assessment, Thomson Reuters produced an infographic in September 2014 that projected ISIL’s annual revenue to be $2.906 billion. In terms of what proportion of this

6 Air Vice-Marshal Edward Stringer (SIF0004)
7 Q76
8 Q155
9 Q167
10 FCO (SIF0005) para 2
11 An analysis and consultancy firm
13 A news and information agency
money came from different sources, the assessment included oil (38%) and tax/extortion
(12%) but also described other sources such as natural gas (17%), phosphate products (10%),
and cement (10%), that neither the FCO nor the Ministry of Defence (MoD) specified in
their evidence. Both of these accounts drew primarily on open-source information and
provided an assessment for the time at which they were produced.

8. Despite the difficulty of obtaining them, some documents detailing aspects of ISIL’s
finances do appear to have been taken from the group. One such document, obtained by
the broadcaster NPR,15 purportedly detailed one month’s budget (January 2015) for the
Syrian province of Deir ez-Zour under ISIL’s occupation. The document showed a total
expenditure, in that province for that month, of $5,587,000 by ISIL. The document also
showed a surplus, with ISIL making in revenue $3 million more than it spent. Money from
oil and gas made up 27% of ISIL’s revenue, according to the document, and 25% came
from taxes. The largest proportion of the revenue (44%) came from confiscations, with
the document going into extensive detail of the items that ISIL took from the population
under its control in one month. NPR reported that “it included 17 houses, 80 cars, 36
trucks, $480,000 in material sums, 180 dunams of land, 1,200 cases of cigarettes and 1,320
sheep and 50 cows.”16

9. In view of the difficulty of obtaining detailed information from within the territory
held by ISIL, we understand why HMG officials prefer to describe the group’s overall
finances in terms of estimates rather than precise numbers. But as well as having a sense
of the sources of ISIL’s revenue, it is important to assess whether these sources generate
sufficient money to fund the group. Knowing whether ISIL’s revenues can match its
costs is an essential measure of the Coalition’s success in the economic war against
the group. We recommend that a continuing assessment is made of ISIL’s finances and that
this assessment is part of the Government’s ongoing Counter-Daesh Quarterly Update
to Parliament.

15 “Episode 667: Auditing ISIS”, Planet Money, NPR, 4 December 2015
16 Transcript, “Episode 667: Auditing ISIS”, Planet Money, NPR, 4 December 2015
2 Military measures against ISIL’s finances

The deaths of ISIL financial operatives

10. Military action by the Coalition has killed a number of ISIL’s financial planners. Witnesses to the inquiry have highlighted that individuals can be key architects of ISIL’s most intricate funding mechanisms. For example, David Butter, an Associate Fellow at Chatham House, told us that a method that ISIL used to raise revenue by infiltrating foreign-exchange auctions held in Iraq appeared to have been devised by one man, “a former Ba’ath party official”. This individual, believed to have been “Abu Salah”, was thought to have been killed by a US airstrike in November 2015. Other examples include a raid by US Special Forces in May 2015 that killed “Abu Sayyaf”, who was identified as a key official in ISIL’s oil production. The raid also captured documents from ISIL, which are now in the public domain, about how the group’s oil business functioned. In March 2016, a raid by US Special Forces killed “Haji Imam”, who was believed to have acted as ISIL’s “finance minister.”

11. In their evidence to the Committee, Government officials did not provide a definitive assessment of whether the deaths of high-ranking ISIL operatives were undermining the ability of the group to maintain its most complex revenue-generating activities. Air Vice-Marshal Stringer said that “most of the evidence we have at the moment is second order”, but that “my judgment is that, as we remove—where we can—the central control of Daesh, of course it will be replaced”. The UK’s efforts to undermine ISIL’s finances should be informed by an assessment of whether ISIL does, or does not, depend on a small number of high-ranking operatives to run its most lucrative financing operations. If ISIL does largely depend on such operatives, then two key measures of success in the economic war against the group would be:

   i) Assessing the financial disruption caused to ISIL by the deaths of these operatives; and

   ii) Assessing to what extent ISIL is able to replace these operatives after their deaths.

The disruption of oil production and sale by ISIL

12. The production and sale of oil by ISIL, in the territory that the group holds in Iraq and Syria, is an aspect of the group’s revenue generation that has received extensive media

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17 See Chapter 3 of this report, Section 1, ‘ISIL’s infiltration of foreign exchange auctions in Iraq’
18 Q16
19 “The Islamic State’s Sovereign Wealth Fund”, Talisman Gate Again, 11 December 2015
23 Q157
24 Q158
attention. It is also one that has been targeted by the Coalition’s military campaign against ISIL. Describing the UK’s contribution to this campaign, Air Vice-Marshal Stringer told us that:

The UK is playing an important role in the Coalition’s military campaign with around 1000 UK personnel supporting Operation SHADER in the wider region. RAF Typhoon, Tornado and Reaper have flown over 2000 combat missions, including against the Omar oilfield, one of the most important to Daesh’s financial operations.25

13. In terms of the impact of the Coalition’s military campaign on ISIL’s oil activities, Air Vice-Marshal Stringer said:

The UK has participated in Coalition operations that have damaged or destroyed 1216 oil infrastructure targets and tankers, inflicting significant damage on Daesh’s oil industry. This amounts to a 25% reduction in oil production,26 estimated to have reduced Daesh’s overall revenue by as much as 10%. The UK and US, along with oil industry partners will present in the CFIG [Counter-ISIL Finance Group] Oil subgroup a list of parts and chemicals that Daesh need to repair production facilities, in order to disrupt oil revenue further.27

14. There is disagreement over how much revenue ISIL generates from oil production. The written submission from the FCO estimated, in approximate terms, that ISIL’s oil revenue was “likely to be in the tens of millions of dollars a month”.28 Luay al-Khateeb, the Executive Director of the Iraq Energy Institute, gave a separate assessment: “My calculations, based on sources inside Syria, suggest ISIS made no more than $200 million in a year from oil (at best case scenario)”.29

15. The variations in the estimates of how much ISIL can earn from oil revenue are due to varying estimates of how much oil the group can produce, and of how much money the group can sell this oil for. Air Vice-Marshal Stringer estimated ISIL’s oil production capacity to be “about 30,000 barrels a day, but it is very patchy. It goes up and down”.30 Luay Al-Khateeb agreed that the figure fluctuated, but assessed that “in the best-case scenario ISIS-controlled territory managed to produce no more than 20,000 barrels, and this is on good days and, again, not necessarily seven days a week”.31

16. In terms of the selling price, Mr Al-Khateeb assessed that “when Brent was around $100, ISIS-controlled territories could hardly manage to sell for more than $20 a barrel, or $25 in the best case scenario. During 2015, we are talking about $10 to $12 a barrel”.32 Mr

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25 Air Vice-Marshal Edward Stringer (SIF0004)
26 Air Vice-Marshal Edward Stringer (SIF0004). A footnote at this point in the evidence read “Approximately 10,000 barrels per day.”
27 Air Vice-Marshal Edward Stringer (SIF0004)
28 FCO (SIF0005) para 2
29 Luay al-Khateeb (SIF0001) Executive Summary
30 Q164
31 Q7
32 Q14
Al-Khateeb considered this low price to be due to the low quality of the oil extracted by ISIL.\textsuperscript{33} But Air Vice-Marshal Stringer reported that ISIL was able to get a larger amount of money for the oil it sold, because it was selling that oil into a closed market:

Because it is a closed internal market you have got to think more in terms of the supply and demand of drugs—narcotics. If you halve the supply, you can double the price. So, even when the open market price per barrel was $30 a few months ago...Daesh was still selling it at up to $50 and maybe a little bit more.\textsuperscript{34}

17. Experts agree that ISIL’s oil market is largely internal, meaning that the commodity is predominantly sold in the territory under the group’s occupation through a convoluted supply chain. The FCO referred to open source reporting that suggests that up to 95% of ISIL’s oil trade is internal.\textsuperscript{35} Air Vice-Marshal Stringer told us that:

There is micro-smuggling, but it is down to hosepipes and things like that. There is no evidence, other than gas supplies to the Assad regime, that there is any large-scale systemic smuggling outside and therefore transfers of money in based on oil.\textsuperscript{36}

18. ISIL does not appear to refine the oil before selling it. Instead of converting it into a form that is usable as fuel, ISIL is therefore selling crude oil.\textsuperscript{37} ISIL sells this oil as it exits the ground at the wellhead, to a large number of small-scale middlemen traders who store it in whatever containers and vehicles they possess. These traders move the crude oil elsewhere, sell it again, or refine it. ISIL gains most of its oil revenue from various fees imposed at the wellhead where the crude is sold, or through taxes levied later down the supply chain.\textsuperscript{38}

19. As well as the constraints inherent in its fractured supply chain, ISIL’s oil production faces other pressures. ISIL’s fields in Iraq and Syria are ageing, and the oil that they produce contains impurities.\textsuperscript{39} This puts technical obstacles in the way of producing oil in high quantities and qualities. ISIL has also lost control of some of the territory in which its oil wells were situated, to armed opponents.\textsuperscript{40} This is in addition to the impact of the Coalition’s air campaign. Explaining the priorities of this campaign, Air Vice-Marshal Stringer told us that it sought to target particular elements of ISIL’s oil production capacity:

We try to hit those small but high-value elements in any of the plant that will then be difficult to replace and shut the whole plant down, rather than flattening the thing and having to rebuild the industry from scratch afterwards.\textsuperscript{41}

Air Vice-Marshal Stringer also highlighted UK efforts to disrupt ISIL’s ability to access the spare parts needed to repair its oil facilities,\textsuperscript{42} and its ability to access the chemical additives required to turn crude oil into usable fuel.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{33} Luay al-Khateeb (SIF0001) para 4
\textsuperscript{34} Q156
\textsuperscript{35} FCO (SIF0005) para 2
\textsuperscript{36} Q166
\textsuperscript{37} Q165
\textsuperscript{38} Q14
\textsuperscript{39} See Air Vice-Marshal Stringer, Q161
\textsuperscript{40} See Air Vice-Marshal Stringer, Q161
\textsuperscript{41} Q201
\textsuperscript{42} Q165
\textsuperscript{43} Q166
20. Despite these measures, the FCO assesses that ISIL continues to earn tens of millions of dollars a month\textsuperscript{44} from its sale of oil from the wellheads. Patrick Rarden told the inquiry that “[ISIL] have shown a reasonably large amount of resilience in still being able to produce [oil] and their middle men to refine”.\textsuperscript{45}

21. Military strikes against ISIL must always be balanced against the risk of undermining the ultimate capacity for post-war reconstruction in the areas now controlled by ISIL, and the danger of worsening the conditions of the populations who now live under the group’s occupation. The targeting of ISIL’s oil industry must also consider the environmental impact, as well as the risk to civilians who are not necessarily adherents of ISIL but who nevertheless work in the oil supply chain controlled by the group.

22. \textbf{If the FCO assesses that, despite the Coalition’s efforts to eliminate key aspects of ISIL’s oil-producing capacity, ISIL’s oil production continues to provide the group with revenue and fuel, then the Coalition should be prepared to target the wellheads themselves more intensively.}

The disruption of ISIL’s cash economy, and its taxation

23. As well as the 40% of its revenue that the FCO assessed ISIL to gain from oil sales, it told us that the group gained a further 40% of its money from “extortion, taxation and the local cash economy”.\textsuperscript{46} This multi-faceted category of revenue generation partly involved the use of cash that ISIL had looted from the banks and populations under its occupation in Iraq and Syria. Air Vice-Marshal Stringer informed us that “the best assumptions that we, the Coalition, have are that ISIL has managed to loot up to $1 billion. That is a commonly accepted figure.”\textsuperscript{47}

24. ISIL keeps some of its cash in bulk-storage facilities that the Coalition has been able to target, in what Air Vice-Marshal Stringer called “cash strikes”.\textsuperscript{48} He described “probably no more than 10 strikes, mostly around the northern Iraq area” and reported that “US Treasury estimates of what they believe they have removed from circulation would now be into the hundreds of millions”.\textsuperscript{49} Air Vice-Marshal Stringer said that, although their precise impact was difficult to assess, evidence suggested that the cash strikes had placed financial strain on ISIL:

\begin{quote}
The second order effects that we saw, principally after the cash strikes—once again, cause and effect are hard to be definite about, but this was certainly after some of the cash strikes—included ISIL reporting that they could only afford to pay 50% of salaries to some of their fighters.\textsuperscript{50}
\end{quote}

25. Cash strikes are examples of precision operations that have a significant impact on ISIL’s financial capacity. But broader measures are also required, as ISIL has sought to integrate itself into—and profit from—various aspects of the economy under its control. In addition to forms of wealth tax, Air Vice-Marshal Stringer told us that:

\textsuperscript{44} FCO (SIF0005) para 2
\textsuperscript{45} Q166
\textsuperscript{46} Q76
\textsuperscript{47} Q167
\textsuperscript{48} Q167
\textsuperscript{49} Q167
\textsuperscript{50} Q167
There are taxes on agriculture and, essentially, on all productive elements of the economy51...Broadly, I would say, look at any aspect of the economy and whether it’s easy to regulate and calculate it...If you had an industry that was quite easy to observe, they were very good at taxing it and, as I say, that has become more arbitrary and more draconian recently.52

Air Vice-Marshal Stringer suggested that, in the face of growing financial pressure, ISIL may be relying on taxation to a greater extent,53 and the nature of ISIL’s taxation appears to be becoming more arbitrary and criminal:

Now it looks a heck of a lot more like gangsterism and protection rackets, because they are desperate for more money, which would tend to indicate that it is a problem for them.54

26. The only way to completely stop ISIL from exploiting the populations and economies under its occupation is to end this occupation itself, by re-capturing the territory held by the group. Particular emphasis should be placed on recapturing the cities now occupied by ISIL, because holding them allows the group to control concentrations of people and commerce. The re-capture from ISIL of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria will be especially important for eroding the group’s finances, as well as its capabilities more generally. Using examples in Iraq, Air Vice-Marshal Stringer told us that:

The UK has trained more than 3300 Peshmerga and over 7200 Iraqi Security Force soldiers. These personnel, supported by Coalition airpower, have been involved in regaining territory in Ramadi and Sinjar, thus reducing Daesh’s taxation opportunities.55

27. Local ground forces in the region should lead the fight to erode ISIL’s territorial control. When choosing which ground forces to support in the fight against ISIL, the UK must take into account that there are unreconciled territorial disputes between some of the different sides that are currently fighting the terrorist group. Providing military support should be undertaken in the context of a broader effort to reconcile the anxieties of different national communities in both Iraq and Syria.
3 Isolating ISIL from financial systems

ISIL’s infiltration of foreign exchange auctions in Iraq

28. ISIL’s initial territorial expansion in parts of northern and central Iraq seems to have afforded the group a regrettable capacity to leech the financial lifeblood of the state. The Embassy of Iraq in London informed us, for example, that the total cash looted by ISIL from all of the Iraqi banks that it captured was $223 million.\(^\text{56}\) ISIL also appears to have been able to access other sources of cash. For example, the Iraqi Government halted the payment of salaries for state employees into areas held by ISIL in August 2015, out of concern that the group was taxing or stealing this money.\(^\text{57}\)

29. During the inquiry, the Committee was informed of a method through which ISIL was attempting to multiply this stolen cash by feeding it into the regular official auctions of US Dollars that are held in Iraq. Patrick Rarden told us that ISIL “were abusing the system and were able to enter it”.\(^\text{58}\) The group was able to move its money in such a way as to exploit small differences in the official exchange rates between the US Dollar and Iraqi Dinars, and thereby multiply the value of the cash that it held.\(^\text{59}\) The FCO provided an explanation of this method:

> The system Daesh allegedly used involved transferring captured money out through regional banks and Money Services Businesses (MSBs)—disguising its source—and then inserting the money back into the Iraqi banking system in Baghdad. The money was then entered into foreign currency auctions, where Daesh were able to make a profit on the differential between wholesale and retail exchange rates. Any profit from these activities was then transferred back into Daesh controlled areas through the Hawala system, which comprises of regulated and unregulated MSBs [Money Services Businesses].\(^\text{60}\)

30. David Butter, from Chatham House, told us that he had seen “credible estimates” that ISIL was able to make “$20 million to $25 million a month” out of this method.\(^\text{61}\) But, responding specifically to that figure, Dan Chugg said “we have not seen anything to substantiate that”.\(^\text{62}\) The FCO told the inquiry that:

> We assess the amount of money moved, and profit gained, in this way does not represent a significant proportion of Daesh’s income.\(^\text{63}\)

31. Regardless of the disagreement over the extent to which the group was able to profit, ISIL’s infiltration of the foreign currency auctions shows that the group was able to gain access to local financial systems within Iraq. The defeat of ISIL depends on ensuring that the group cannot access local or international financial systems as a means of making or moving money, in Iraq but also in any other territory that the group controls.

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\(^\text{56}\) Embassy of the Republic of Iraq \((\text{SIF0008})\) para 2
\(^\text{57}\) Air Vice-Marshal Edward Stringer \((\text{SIF0004});\) Embassy of the Republic of Iraq \((\text{SIF0008})\) para 2
\(^\text{58}\) Q167
\(^\text{59}\) Q167
\(^\text{60}\) FCO \((\text{SIF0005})\) para 1
\(^\text{61}\) Q15
\(^\text{62}\) Q93
\(^\text{63}\) FCO \((\text{SIF0005})\) para 1
ISIL’s occupation of bank branches

32. One of the ways in which ISIL has sought to access official financial systems is through its control of bank branches in the territories that it occupies. In terms of the counter-measures taken in Iraq, Patrick Rarden informed us that the Iraqi authorities “have cut 90 Daesh-controlled branches of banks off from their system”.64 We were told that UK financial entities have played a positive role in helping to identify bank branches in ISIL-held territory.65 The UK should work in conjunction with international partners to ensure the effective exclusion of all ISIL-occupied banks from national and international financial systems.

33. Speaking about Libya, Air Vice-Marshal Stringer said that the Libyan Central Bank had been quick to sever links with bank branches that ISIL has been able to capture in the Libyan city of Sirte.66 But, regarding Syria, a 2015 report on ISIL financing by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)67 concluded that:

More than 20 Syrian financial institutions with operations in ISIL-held territory continue to operate in Syria. Syrian bank branches in territory where ISIL operates are connected to their headquarters in Damascus; and some of them may maintain links to the international financial system.68

The FCO should assess whether ISIL is capable of accessing local or international financial systems via Syria, and work to close any remaining points of access for ISIL elsewhere if they exist.

ISIL’s use of Money Services Businesses, and the Hawala system

34. ISIL has been able to move money through other methods, which do not require the group to physically occupy bank branches. Money Services Business (MSBs) are another type of institution involved in the transfer of money that ISIL has been able to exploit. For example, Mr Rarden told us that 146 MSBs69 have already been listed in Iraq for involvement with ISIL and have been prevented from taking part in Iraq’s foreign exchange auctions.70 But Mr Rarden also said that there were 1,800 MSBs in Iraq in total,71 leaving a large number to be monitored.

35. Another threat is ISIL’s use of Alternative Value Transfer Systems (AVTS), which are often referred to (in the context of the Middle East) as the ‘Hawala’ system. This is an unofficial method of transferring money without necessarily moving cash, based on a relationship of trust between different money traders in different locations.72

36. Some features of AVTS/Hawala networks, such as their avoidance of electronic transfer methods, make them difficult to track and disrupt. But these systems are used
throughout (and beyond) the Middle East. Understanding ISIL’s use of the Hawala system should be a priority in the effort to counter the group’s finances. Air Vice-Marshal Stringer told us that his team had taken specific steps, such as the use of external experts, to enhance their knowledge of AVTS.

**Isolating ISIL from Iraqi financial systems**

37. A written submission from the Embassy of Iraq in London has outlined the measures that the Iraqi authorities have taken to prevent ISIL from making or moving money by infiltrating that country’s financial systems. The submission does not provide an account of whether these measures have been effectively implemented, or of what impact they have had on ISIL’s finances. But the submission does appeal for the provision of technical support and financial expertise from the international community, to allow Iraq to build its own enforcement capacity:

> Iraq is eager to be an active and effective element in the international society, and to adopt its position and orientation to combat terrorism through deeper coordination and cooperation with the international society. Therefore, Iraq needs training and developing of its financial expertise in human resources.

The submission concludes by describing five areas in which the Iraqi Government specifically requests assistance. They include the provision and sharing of information, the enhancement of technical capabilities, and the development of the Iraqi personnel working to counter ISIL’s finances.

38. We have been told that it is overwhelmingly the US Treasury that has led efforts to cut ISIL off from Iraq’s financial system. This is understandable, given that one of the key issues was ISIL’s purported exploitation of the US Dollar auctions. But foreign assistance should not come at the expense of weakening local capacity. ISIL has thrived in states whose capacity to uphold law and order has been debilitated by war, and where challenges such as those of corruption provide another longstanding obstacle to the effective enforcement of the measures put in place against ISIL. States such as Iraq, in which ISIL operates, must achieve and maintain an effective ability of their own to counter ISIL’s finances. The FCO should work to ensure that any deficiencies in Iraq’s ability to counter ISIL’s finances are addressed, and that the Iraqi authorities can access UK training and expertise in order to help build their own capacity in this respect.

**Donations to ISIL**

39. The Ministry of Defence told us that:

> It is accepted amongst FATF [Financial Action Task Force] members that the overall value of external donations to Daesh is minimal in relation to the revenue it generates from other sources, such as oil and taxation. But there is
historical evidence of instances of financial donations to Daesh from within Gulf States.\textsuperscript{78} Furthermore, it is understood that family donations are being made to Daesh, through the unregulated Alternative Value Transfer Systems.\textsuperscript{79}

40. The Government emphasised to us that it had no evidence of any state in the Middle East providing money to ISIL as a matter of policy. A written submission from the Ministry of Defence outlined the important role that countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar are playing in the international Coalition against ISIL,\textsuperscript{80} and the Embassy of Qatar in London wrote separately\textsuperscript{81} to the inquiry about that state’s efforts to militarily and financially isolate this terrorist group. The Gulf States are vital allies in the war against ISIL, but the UK should be able to ask hard questions of close friends as part of our collective efforts to counter this common threat.

41. Witnesses from the FCO addressed allegations that some governments in the region may have failed to prevent donations reaching ISIL from their citizens. Dan Chugg said that:

There were allegations that Gulf countries were turning a blind eye, at the very least, to what was happening\textsuperscript{82}...allegations that Saudi, Qatar and Turkey were involved in funding Daesh in some ways\textsuperscript{83}...I am not aware of hard evidence that those countries were funding Daesh, but there was a lot of speculation that those countries were not playing a terribly helpful role.\textsuperscript{84}

42. Tobias Ellwood described a time, soon after ISIL first caught international attention with its rapid military expansion, when the group may have been perceived as a defender of Sunni Muslims in the wars in Iraq and Syria.\textsuperscript{85} Dan Chugg put this period “around two years ago”,\textsuperscript{86} while Tobias Ellwood referred to “before 2014”.\textsuperscript{87} During this period, ISIL may have been able to attract donations from sympathetic Sunnis, with the wealthiest states in the region—the Sunni monarchies of the Gulf—being the subject of particular concern. Mr Chugg said that “it was certainly a problem in the early days of the Daesh organisation that there was funding coming in from Gulf countries and other places.”\textsuperscript{88}

43. States in the region are establishing the legal and institutional infrastructure required to counter ISIL’s ability to raise finances. These steps have been described to us by the Ministry of Defence,\textsuperscript{89} and we welcome the action taken. Progress has also been made in establishing a global framework for internationally-coordinated action. UN Security Council Resolution 2253, which was passed on 17 December 2015, is an important international standard for countering terrorism financing. It establishes provisions that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{78} Ministry of Defence (SIF0006). A footnote at this point in the evidence read* E.g., On 24 September 2014, a Daesh official was listed and sanctioned by the US Department of the Treasury after receiving a 2 million USD donation emanating from the Gulf (http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-ISIL.pdf).*
\item \textsuperscript{79} Ministry of Defence (SIF0006)
\item \textsuperscript{80} Ministry of Defence (SIF0006)
\item \textsuperscript{81} Embassy of the State of Qatar (SIF0003)
\item \textsuperscript{82} Q103
\item \textsuperscript{83} Q104
\item \textsuperscript{84} Q106
\item \textsuperscript{85} Q113
\item \textsuperscript{86} Q106
\item \textsuperscript{87} Q113
\item \textsuperscript{88} Q101
\item \textsuperscript{89} Ministry of Defence (SIF0006)
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
member states are expected to enact so as to counter funding, and other material support, for ISIL. Resolution 2253 includes such measures as preventing donations to ISIL, freezing its assets, and inhibiting trade related to the group.90

44. But these efforts—of both individual states and of the international community—will not be effective if the measures against ISIL are enforced more effectively in some states than others. Some of the local measures to counter ISIL’s fundraising have been slow to be implemented by regional states. For example, the MoD told us that it was only in March 2015 that the Interior Ministry of Saudi Arabia passed laws making it illegal for Saudi residents to provide support to ISIL.91 In contrast, the UK designated ISIL as a distinct terrorist organisation in June 2014.92 There is also the issue that some of those donating to ISIL may have been close to the ruling families of the region. Tobias Ellwood told us that:

It is very opaque, it has to be said. When somebody who is close to the top of a royal family is a very rich individual donor and chooses to do so, that is very likely to happen.93

45. Dan Chugg said that:

It is difficult with some of these countries to know exactly what is Government funding and what is not when you are dealing with royal families, wealthy princes and those kind of things94…Our strategy was not to try to ascertain whose problem and whose fault it was, but to stop the funding going to Daesh. That was what was important. And that is what our efforts have been focused on.95

46. ISIL has received funding in the form of donations in the past. The FCO should work with local partners in the region to ensure that they have the capacity and resolve to rigorously enforce local laws to prevent the funding of ISIL, so that the group cannot benefit from donations in the future.

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90 UN Security Council, Resolution 2253, 17 December 2015
91 Ministry of Defence (SIF0006)
93 Q113
94 Q106
95 Q109
4  The evolution of ISIL’s finances, and the UK’s response

The future evolution of ISIL’s finances

47. The assessment of the Government, as described in this report, is that ISIL’s two pre-eminent sources of revenue are currently derived from oil production, and taxation. But these sources are being intensively countered through the military means detailed in this report, and their viability for ISIL will ultimately be eroded as the group loses its territorial control. Mr Rarden assessed that:

Clearly, when they suffer territorial loss and move away from a pseudo-state, they will move to more traditional terrorist fundraising activities.\(^{96}\)

Air Vice Marshal-Stringer told us that:

Our assessment has to be that, as you force people on to the back foot and make their operations simpler, to some extent they become more resilient\(^ {97}\)… we will see Daesh move ever more into the black economy and other ways of shifting cash around, and we have to be prepared for that.\(^ {98}\)

48. Growing involvement in the “black economy” would see ISIL profiting from criminal activities such as kidnap-for-ransom or involvement in various forms of smuggling. In the past, this has included the sale of Yazidi women to tribal leaders.\(^ {99}\) Involvement in the black economy may be less lucrative, but there is a risk that they will also be more resilient and difficult to target militarily. As its oil and tax revenues are countered, ISIL is likely to evolve new sources of funding.

ISIL in Libya

49. The group’s operations in Libya may provide a case study of how ISIL can operate, even without access to oil revenues or tax resources. ISIL’s affiliate in Libya does not control large populations or economies (it currently occupies only one major settlement, Sirte) and it does not hold facilities that it can use to produce and sell oil on a large scale. Yet ISIL in Libya has still been able to operate. It has staged attacks against the country’s oil facilities as well as its capital Tripoli, and the group attempted to capture a border crossing with Tunisia in March 2016. Its occupation of Sirte has been associated with the same restrictions and atrocities as its control in areas of Iraq and Syria.

50. Air Vice-Marshal Stringer told us that “not a lot is known about ISIL or Daesh in Libya”,\(^ {100}\) and the ISIL affiliate in Libya was not specifically mentioned in any of the written evidence from the UK Government (which focused instead on ISIL in Iraq and Syria). ISIL in Libya is able to function without the financial resources that the Government has identified as providing the majority of the funding to the group in Iraq and Syria.

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\(^{96}\) Q196

\(^{97}\) Q158

\(^{98}\) Q172

\(^{99}\) Members of the parliament of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq told us in May 2016 that 934 Yazidi women had been rescued from ISIL but that 1,935 remained in captivity. Women had typically been sold for $100 to $200 each.

\(^{100}\) Q191
The Government should present an assessment of how ISIL in Libya funds itself, and whether financial links exist between the core ISIL groups in Iraq or Syria and their Libyan affiliate. A holistic understanding of ISIL is vital to the effective global defeat of the group.

Adaptation of the UK response

51. We note the role played by the UK in the military Coalition against ISIL, and this role should continue. But the primary focus of our inquiry has been on the non-military contributions of the UK to the international efforts to isolate ISIL financially. In this respect, Air Vice-Marshal Stringer told the inquiry that “the UK is an active member of the CIFG”, referring to the Counter-ISIL Finance Group, a collection of countries that Stringer described as “working to deny Daesh access to the international financial system”. But the UK is not a co-chair of the CIFG, which is chaired instead by the US, Italy, and Saudi Arabia. The UK should play a leading role in the CIFG, and be prepared to adapt its response to the evolving threat from ISIL’s finances.

Flexibility in the use of Government Department resources

52. Air Vice-Marshal Stringer described “the problem of paralysis by analysis: if you admire the problem for too long, the opposition has already seized the initiative,” and he told us that:

We need to refine and continue to adapt that target systems analysis. We must maintain our intellectual curiosity and our agility, because Daesh will adapt as we start to hurt it. We must keep ahead of it, and we must review the discarded. Just because they’re not making money out of something at the moment doesn’t mean they won’t revert to that in the future.

53. Air Vice-Marshal Stringer told the inquiry that, under his leadership as Senior Responsible Officer for Counter ISIL Finance, the UK had established a framework for improving cooperation between different Government departments over this issue. He also told us that different intelligence sources were being combined, within the context of the international Coalition against ISIL:

We are pulling together previously very separate intelligence structures, some of which had become very compartmentalised because they are to do with national counter-terrorism in all the countries that are involved...We are now ensuring that we do not find intelligence through one channel, only to discard it because it is not useful for that one purpose.

54. Air Vice-Marshal Stringer said that attitudes within Government departments were changing, and that this was serving to ease cooperation between them:

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101 Air Vice-Marshal Edward Stringer
102 Air Vice-Marshal Edward Stringer
103 Q154
104 Q154
105 Air Vice-Marshal Edward Stringer
106 Q224
The next generation coming through may be less channelled down individual Departments, may be less schooled from an early age to be a mandarin of a certain kind, you will now find people from really interesting parts of intelligence agencies working, for example, at the Department for Transport and thoroughly enjoying it. That cross-fertilisation is changing attitudes.  

55. **As the sources of ISIL’s finance evolve, so too must the UK’s response. Rapidity is imperative, and Air Vice-Marshal Stringer’s team should be supported in its efforts to quickly identify and target new funding streams for ISIL as soon as they emerge. Government departments must continue to work to ensure that the appropriate internal processes are in place to allow an agile UK policy, which is able to respond quickly to changes in ISIL’s fundraising.**

**The involvement of UK public and private sector expertise**

56. Describing the UK’s contribution to the multilateral efforts to counter ISIL’s finances, Tom Keatinge told us that:

> Given the significant experience that exists within (albeit rapidly diminishing due to retirement and ‘brain drain’ to the City) and outside HMG as it relates to terrorist financing and financial investigation, the UK’s position as a leading financial centre, and as a key source of FTFs [Foreign Terrorist Fighters], the UK should seek greater profile and leadership in the efforts to counter ISIL financing. Whilst the UK is a member of the Counter ISIL Finance Group along with as many as 30 other nations and four multilateral organisations that support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 2178 and 2199, little demonstrable HMG leadership has been evident.  

57. In answer to a question about the staffing of his team, Air-Vice Marshal Stringer told the inquiry:

> As SRO, I could say I have hundreds of people and I have no one, and probably Patrick [Rarden]—there is no staff under me as SRO…I do not have, if you like, an executive body. My aim is to go around the bits of government where I think things are not being done properly and say, “I think a little bit more investment is needed here”.  

He added that:

> In some ways, investigative journalists, academics and others are sometimes better placed to explain how it [ISIL financing] really works than our structures...We need to pull people in from outside and that we can’t expect people to work for free, and we can’t spend three months going through a complicated approvals process.  

58. When it comes to ensuring that ISIL cannot make or move money by accessing financial systems, the UK’s contribution to the Coalition appears underpowered

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107 Q152  
108 Royal United Services Institute, (ISI0012), para 10  
109 Q178  
110 Q216  
111 Q219
compared to its potential. Expertise from the UK's public and private sector should be effectively introduced into the international effort. It is unacceptable if external experts are expected to provide information on an unpaid basis.\textsuperscript{112} \textit{With the need for a rapid and flexible approach in mind, we urge the FCO to cater for accelerated vetting of the relevant experts, in coordination with other Government departments. The FCO should establish a budget for the payment of these external experts, and the procedures for paying them promptly.}
5 Conclusion

59. The ultimate objective must be the eradication of ISIL, but before that we are likely to see an evolution of the group and its fundraising. UK leadership will enrich the international response: leading by example, leading through the provision of information to partners about ISIL’s changing revenue streams, and leading in helping these partners to build and maintain their own counter-terrorist financing capabilities. In its public and private sectors, the UK has the institutional expertise that the world needs to strangle ISIL financially. With agility in its use of this knowledge, and an ambition to lead, the UK will also have what it takes to maintain a tight grip on an evolving threat.
Conclusions and recommendations

An overview of ISIL’s finances

1. Knowing whether ISIL’s revenues can match its costs is an essential measure of the Coalition’s success in the economic war against the group. We recommend that a continuing assessment is made of ISIL’s finances and that this assessment is part of the Government’s ongoing Counter-Daesh Quarterly Update to Parliament. (Paragraph 9)

The deaths of ISIL financial operatives

2. The UK’s efforts to undermine ISIL’s finances should be informed by an assessment of whether ISIL does, or does not, depend on a small number of high-ranking operatives to run its most lucrative financing operations. If ISIL does largely depend on such operatives, then two key measures of success in the economic war against the group would be:

   i) Assessing the financial disruption caused to ISIL by the deaths of these operatives; and

   ii) Assessing to what extent ISIL is able to replace these operatives after their deaths. (Paragraph 11)

The disruption of oil production and sale by ISIL

3. If the FCO assesses that, despite the Coalition’s efforts to eliminate key aspects of ISIL’s oil-producing capacity, ISIL’s oil production continues to provide the group with revenue and fuel, then the Coalition should be prepared to target the wellheads themselves more intensively. (Paragraph 22)

The disruption of ISIL’s cash economy, and its taxation

4. The only way to completely stop ISIL from exploiting the populations and economies under its occupation is to end this occupation itself, by re-capturing the territory held by the group. Particular emphasis should be placed on recapturing the cities now occupied by ISIL, because holding them allows the group to control concentrations of people and commerce. (Paragraph 26)

5. When choosing which ground forces to support in the fight against ISIL, the UK must take into account that there are unreconciled territorial disputes between some of the different sides that are currently fighting the terrorist group. Providing military support should be undertaken in the context of a broader effort to reconcile the anxieties of different national communities in both Iraq and Syria (Paragraph 27)
Isolating ISIL from financial systems

6. The defeat of ISIL depends on ensuring that the group cannot access local or international financial systems as a means of making or moving money, in Iraq but also in any other territory that the group controls. (Paragraph 31)

7. *The UK should work in conjunction with international partners to ensure the effective exclusion of all ISIL-occupied banks from national and international financial systems.* (Paragraph 32)

8. *The FCO should assess whether ISIL is capable of accessing local or international financial systems via Syria, and work to close any remaining points of access for ISIL elsewhere if they exist.* (Paragraph 33)

9. *Understanding ISIL’s use of the Hawala system should be a priority in the effort to counter the group’s finances.* (Paragraph 36)

10. States such as Iraq, in which ISIL operates, must achieve and maintain an effective ability of their own to counter ISIL’s finances. *The FCO should work to ensure that any deficiencies in Iraq’s ability to counter ISIL’s finances are addressed, and that the Iraqi authorities can access UK training and expertise in order to help build their own capacity in this respect.* (Paragraph 38)

Donations to ISIL

11. ISIL has received funding in the form of donations in the past. *The FCO should work with local partners in the region to ensure that they have the capacity and resolve to rigorously enforce local laws to prevent the funding of ISIL, so that the group cannot benefit from donations in the future.* (Paragraph 46)

The future evolution of ISIL’s finances

12. As its oil and tax revenues are countered, ISIL is likely to evolve new sources of funding. (Paragraph 48)

13. ISIL in Libya is able to function without the financial resources that the Government has identified as providing the majority of the funding to the group in Iraq and Syria. The Government should present an assessment of how ISIL in Libya funds itself, and whether financial links exist between the core ISIL groups in Iraq or Syria and their Libyan affiliate. A holistic understanding of ISIL is vital to the effective global defeat of the group. *The Government should present an assessment of how ISIL in Libya funds itself, and whether financial links exist between the core ISIL groups in Iraq or Syria and their Libyan affiliate.* (Paragraph 50)

Adaptation of the UK response

14. As the sources of ISIL’s finance evolve, so too must the UK’s response. Rapidity is imperative, and Air Vice-Marshal Stringer’s team should be supported in its efforts to quickly identify and target new funding streams for ISIL as soon as they emerge.
Government departments must continue to work to ensure that the appropriate internal processes are in place to allow an agile UK policy, which is able to respond quickly to changes in ISIL’s fundraising. (Paragraph 55)

15. With the need for a rapid and flexible approach in mind, we urge the FCO to cater for accelerated vetting of the relevant experts, in coordination with other Government departments. The FCO should establish a budget for the payment of these external experts, and the procedures for paying them promptly. (Paragraph 58)
Sub-committee Formal Minutes

Tuesday 5 July 2016

Members of the ISIL Financing Sub-committee present:

Mr John Baron, in the Chair
Crispin Blunt        Stephen Gethins
Ann Clwyd           Mark Hendrick
Mike Gapes           Andrew Rosindell

Draft Report (The UK's role in the economic war against ISIL), proposed by Mr John Baron, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 59 read and agreed to.

Summary read and agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the First Report of the Sub-committee to the Committee.

Ordered, That Mr John Baron make the Report to the Committee.

Ordered, That written evidence from the Embassy of Iraq in London (SIF0008) and from the Ministry of Defence (SIF0006) be reported to the main Committee.

Ordered, That part of the oral evidence taken in private by the Sub-committee on 26 April, from Air Vice-Marshal Edward Stringer and Mr Patrick Rarden, be reported to the main Committee.

[The Sub-committee resolved into full Committee]
Formal Minutes

Tuesday 5 July 2016

Members of the Committee present:

Crispin Blunt, in the Chair

Mr John Baron        Stephen Gethins
Ann Clwyd            Mark Hendrick
Mike Gapes           Andrew Rosindell

Draft Report from the Sub-committee (The UK’s role in the economic war against ISIL) brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 59 read and agreed to.

Summary read and agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the First Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That written evidence from the Embassy of Iraq in London (SIF0008) and from the Ministry of Defence (SIF0006) be reported to the House for publication on the internet.

Ordered, That part of the oral evidence taken in private by the Sub-committee on 26 April, from Air Vice-Marshal Edward Stringer and Mr Patrick Rarden, be reported to the House for publication on the internet.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Thursday 7 July at 10.30 am]
**Witnesses**

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee’s website.

**Tuesday 2 February 2016**

Luay al-Khateeb, Executive Director, Iraq Energy Institute, David Butter, Associate Fellow, Chatham House, and Tom Keatinge, Director, Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies, RUSI  
Q1–34

Güçlü Cem Işık, Deputy Chief of Mission, Turkish Embassy in London  
Q35–72

**Wednesday 2 March 2016**

Tobias Ellwood MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Dan Chugg, Head of Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell and Head of Iraq Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Q73–148

**Tuesday 26 April 2016 evidence given in public**

Patrick Rarden MBE, Counter-ISIL Finance subject matter expert, currently consultant to Ministry of Defence, and Air Vice-Marshal Edward Stringer CBE, Cross-Whitehall Senior Responsible Officer for Counter-Daesh Finance  
Q149–207

**Tuesday 26 April 2016 evidence given in private**

Patrick Rarden MBE, Counter-ISIL Finance subject matter expert, currently consultant to Ministry of Defence, and Air Vice-Marshal Edward Stringer CBE, Cross-Whitehall Senior Responsible Officer for Counter-Daesh Finance  
Q208–225
Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

SIF numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1. Air Vice-Marshal Edward Stringer (SIF0004)
2. Embassy of the Republic of Iraq (SIF0008)
3. Embassy of the State of Qatar (SIF0003)
4. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (SIF0005)
5. Luay Al Khateeb (SIF0001)
6. Ministry of Defence (SIF0006)
7. Sir Alan Duncan (SIF0002)
## List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website.

The reference number of the Government’s response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

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| Second Special Report | The FCO’s administration and funding of its human rights work overseas: Government Response to the Committee’s Fourth Report of Session 2015–16 | HC 545 |