31.Both the UK and Turkish governments used the word “strategic” to describe the relationship between the two countries. Both sides emphasised trade, security, and defence co-operation as being at the heart of the relationship. Sir Alan Duncan told the Committee that “we want a deep strategic relationship, which is of course political, but also based on trade.” Using the same word, “strategic”, the Turkish Embassy wrote that
Turkey and the UK enjoy well–established relations based on NATO alliance, strategic partnership, mutual economic interests and shared security concerns. [ … ] The future presents ample opportunities for further enhancement of the bilateral relations. Defence and security, large infrastructure projects like airports, health, nuclear energy and finance sectors will be at the forefront of the economic co-operation between the two countries.
32.The UK-Turkey relationship does not take place in isolation, but it takes place in the context of an existing network of relations, and possible repositioning in Turkey’s strategic direction. The past few years saw increasing friction between the EU, the United States, and Turkey, which might have led to a diminishing of influence by the West in Turkey. In this regard, the UK has differentiated itself not only from the EU but also from many other Western countries as well. The same period has seen a rapprochement between the Turkish government and Russia. We are concerned that the loss of influence of the UK’s international allies in Turkey might have a detrimental effect on the possible leverage that the UK might have on Turkey as well. The FCO should use its close relations with the Turkish establishment to mediate as required between Turkey and the US and EU states.
33.Despite the damage caused by the coup attempt and government’s response, Turkey represents an economy that the UK will find difficult to ignore. Turkey’s population currently stands at almost 79 million, according to the World Bank, and the Turkish Statistical Institute (TSI) projects that this will rise to exceed 83 million by 2023. Turkey remains a demographically youthful country and the TSI projects that half of the population will be under the age of 34 in 2023. The Turkish Embassy in London told us that Turkey had an average growth rate of 5% during the period of 2002–2016. Although this rate has recently slowed, and has been harmed in part by the conditions created by the coup attempt, both the OECD and World Bank project future growth rates of over 3%.
34.During its visit to Turkey in January 2017, the Committee met with representatives of UK companies that had invested in the country. They told us that the coup attempt and the ensuing purges had heightened the perceived risk of investing in Turkey, and that levels of additional investment were therefore currently suppressed. But they remained committed to their investment in Turkey due to the long-term potential that they saw in the country. They highlighted its young, growing, and well-educated population as a particular asset. More broadly, Mina Toksoz, an economist working for Chatham House, described an economy with both significant challenges and the resilience to overcome them with an emphasis on trade:
Since the global financial crisis the [Turkish] economy has been stuck at middle-income of around $10,000 per capita and productivity is lagging. Global conditions are more difficult. Turkey’s neighbourhood region is in deep political crisis. High levels of corporate foreign currency debt, big current account deficit, weak currency and the expected rise in international interest rates, as well as the growing financial burden of defence and hosting of 3 million refugees have increased country risks leading to recent sovereign ratings downgrades by Moody’s and S&P.
The economy looks set to slow in the short term. But, modest medium term growth is still likely on the back of the large domestic market and modest consumer debt levels, supported by a strong banking sector and competitive exporting sectors.
35.The Turkish Embassy in London told us that there were 2,900 UK companies currently operating in Turkey, and that they were invested in a wide range of sectors. This, the Embassy said, established the UK as “one of the largest investors in Turkey in terms of foreign direct investments”. The UK is also a highly important market for Turkish exports, with the Embassy telling us that “bilateral trade between Turkey and the UK has increased by 68% since 2009 and exceeded 16 billion dollars in 2015. The UK is one of the top destinations (ranks 2nd) for Turkish exports”. The extent of Turkish investment in the UK and the prominence of Turkey as a market for UK exports is relatively lower, but remains significant. The FCO told us that
Turkey is the UK’s 19th largest export market. As of June 2016, we export more to Turkey than to India, Russia, Brazil or Mexico. Up to 200 Turkish businesses, across a range of sectors, have set up operations in the UK.
36.In terms of the emphasis on enhancing trade in the bilateral relationship, the Turkish Embassy wrote:
Economic relations between the two countries will be particularly important in the post–Brexit area. The UK has a larger trade volume with Turkey than with other big countries like Russia and Mexico. Therefore, it will be important to ensure that trade be carried out in the freest way possible with minimum obstacles between the two countries. It is a welcome development that initial contacts between our countries have already started to this end. During the recent visit of the Turkish Minister of Economy to London, it was agreed to initiate exploratory talks between Turkey and the UK with the prospect of a free trade agreement after the realization of Brexit.
37.Turkey has a Customs Union with the EU covering most goods but not unprocessed agricultural products, and the FCO told us that “future bilateral arrangements will depend on negotiations for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU”. Nevertheless, both the UK and Turkish governments have emphasised their intention to expand trade and investment ties. The Turkish Embassy told us that the “post Brexit period presents new opportunities for better economic relations between Turkey and the UK”. While both Turkey and the UK will need to take account of their respective customs and trading relations with the EU, there is likely to be scope to agree preferential trading arrangements in areas that are not covered by the Customs Union agreement such as agricultural produce, services, and public procurement. The FCO said that “the Secretary of State for International Trade has identified Turkey as a key trade partner. Department for International Trade colleagues are talking to their Turkish counterparts about key barriers to further growth and future options for our trade relationship.”
38.A totally free trade agreement with Turkey may not be possible due to the current relationship that Turkey has with the EU and the EU Customs Union. Given Turkey’s Customs Union with the EU, the FCO should clarify what trade arrangements it is currently able to negotiate with Turkey, when and how that might change, and when they will be implemented. The FCO should work with the Department for International Trade in exploring and delivering new trade and investment opportunities with Turkey, now and following Brexit, and in negotiating revised trading arrangements with Turkey once the UK leaves the EU.
39.In addition to trade, the FCO described security co-operation between the UK and Turkey as being central to the relationship. As well as benefitting the two countries bilaterally, the FCO said that such co-operation was in the interest of the broader region:
Foreign and security policy collaboration between the UK and Turkey is vital to the stability of Europe and the Middle East. A solution in Syria is of paramount importance to both countries. Turkey has an important role to play in moving towards a settlement on Cyprus; responding to the major challenges faced by the NATO alliance; and European energy security. Turkey’s role in tackling the migration crisis has been extraordinarily important, with continued engagement with the UK and European partners vital.
Sir Alan Duncan added that “we [the UK] work with them [Turkey] as well on important counter–terrorist issues against Daesh, ISIS”.
40.Turkey is an essential partner facing a volatile period. It needs and deserves our support. We support the construction of a ‘strategic’ relationship between the UK and Turkey. Both the UK and Turkish governments emphasise to us their aim to enhance their trade ties, and their defence and security co-operation. Successful engagement would serve the prosperity and security of both countries, though a successful Turkey will be one that respects democratic norms.
41.The complexity of modern Turkey, and the nature of its internal divisions, means that the process of constructing this relationship must be managed by the FCO with adequate capability and subtlety. We were impressed by the leadership and effectiveness of Her Majesty’s Ambassador to Turkey Richard Moore, and by the knowledge of his staff. The FCO is running a large operation in Turkey, and it is important that the FCO is given the resources to sustain this operation and manage the complex and important relationship with Turkey going forward.
42.As the FCO describes trade and security co-operation as being at the heart of the strategic relationship between the UK and Turkey, it also describes a project known as ‘TF-X’ as being at the heart of this co-operation. TF-X is a project to develop a future-generation combat aircraft for the Turkish military, and an agreement was recently reached between BAE Systems and Turkish Aerospace Industries to work together on this process. The Heads of Agreement were signed by both companies, in the presence of the Prime Ministers of the UK and Turkey, on 24 January 2017. TF–X is intended to be a long–term project between the UK and Turkey, involving contracts for defence–linked industries in both countries and the exchange of technological expertise between them. Sir Alan Duncan told us:
The signing of the first phase of the TF-X- deal was a very significant step that could last for the long term. [ … ] We have essentially taken a very important strategic initiative that we want to maintain and sustain over many years—something for which the TF-X fighter project will embed commercial interests.
43.The group Campaign Against Arms Trade wrote in its written submission that “the value of known UK export licences for military equipment to Turkey over the last three years for which data is available, July 2013 to June 2016, was £466million”. The group also noted that the UK aimed to expand defence sales to Turkey, and expressed concern about the message that this may send in terms of human rights, saying that
Turkey’s official invitation to arms fairs and its inclusion in the “priority market” list, sends the message to President [Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan that the UK government is unconcerned about his record on human rights and democracy when there is a potential for military sales.
44.The UK operates strict arms export restrictions, including in particular the European Union Consolidated Criteria. We asked Sir Alan Duncan whether he was confident that these would apply to the TF-X project, and he replied:
Yes. This is a NATO ally, don’t forget. We are dealing here with a NATO ally, a member of NATO.
45.The FCO also told us that the TF-X contract would be covered by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), but that the details of the commercial contract had not been signed at the time that the Committee took this evidence.
46.The Government will need to consider that the Turkish government announced in 2013 its intention to buy a Chinese missile system which the Turkish Defence Minister said will not be integrated with NATO infrastructure. The Turkish government then rejected the Chinese system following pressure from the West. At the time of the publication of this Report, the Turkish government was in talks to buy a Russian anti-missile system which might be an issue for concern regarding the TF-X deal at a time when the Turkish government is less responsive to Western pressure.
47.We welcome the agreements reached over the ‘TF–X’ combat aircraft development programme, as a key component and symbol of the strategic co-operation between the UK and Turkey. This programme should last for decades; it needs to reflect the long–term interests of both countries and survive the inevitable short–term ups and downs in their bilateral relations. The strategic partnership implied by this deal should be reinforced by the Government making clear what restrictions there are on the use or transfer by Turkey or the UK of sensitive technology and intellectual property contained within the programme, both during the aircraft’s construction and after its completion.
48.The Government should also clarify what safeguards are in place to ensure that the aircraft will be used in compliance with international humanitarian law. The UK is subject to safeguards in this respect, and we expect the FCO to explain how these safeguards will apply to TF–X.
49.Attacks against targets in Turkey that have been claimed by or attributed to the Islamic State group (ISIL, also known as ‘ISIS’ or ‘Daesh’) include that against a rally of predominantly Kurdish activists in the town of Suruç in July 2015, against another predominantly Kurdish rally in Ankara in October 2015, against Istanbul’s Atatürk airport in June 2016, and against the Reina nightclub in Istanbul during New Year’s Eve celebrations to mark the beginning of 2017. Between 2015 and 2016, ISIL terrorists based in Syria launched fatal rocket and artillery fire across the border into Turkey. By the date that the Turkish Embassy in London submitted its written evidence to our inquiry, in October 2016, it said that 245 people had been killed in attacks by ISIL, and hundreds had been injured. Turkey has confronted the terrorist threat from ISIL in a variety of ways.
50.ISIL is a shared enemy of the UK and Turkey, and Turkey has suffered greatly from terrorism by these extremists. Turkey is a vital military partner in the fight against ISIL, reinforced by the context of its NATO membership. The UK, as a strategic partner of Turkey, and within the framework of both NATO and the Global Coalition against ISIL, must continue to engage Turkey fully in the fight against ISIL as a shared priority and ensure that Turkey is not distracted from focusing on this military objective, in light of concerns set out in Chapter 5.
51.The FCO told us that Turkey has been a vital partner, for both the UK and the EU, in efforts to prevent what the FCO terms “irregular migration”. In 2015 and early 2016, Turkey replaced the North African route as the primary departure point for migrants and refugees trying to reach the EU by sea. Of the 972,500 people who the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported to have crossed the Mediterranean to reach the EU in 2015, over 800,000 crossed the Aegean Sea between Turkey and Greece whereas approximately 150,000 crossed from North Africa. Syrians affected by the country’s civil war accounted for half their number.
52.In March 2016, Turkey and the EU signed a deal whereby Turkey worked to restrict the flow of people crossing by boat into Europe. The impact was significant in terms of curtailing the passage of migrants and refugees departing from Turkey. In the first nine months of 2016, the UNHCR reported that 165,000 migrants and refugees had arrived in Greece from Turkey, a figure 57% lower than that for the same period in 2015. The FCO told us that “the Turkish coastguard has interdicted migrant vessels across the Aegean Sea to curb irregular migration flows” and that this had resulted in the numbers of those crossing being “dramatically down”.
53.Turkey has also contributed to international humanitarian relief efforts for the wars in Syria and Iraq in particular, by hosting large numbers of refugees. According to the UNHCR, Turkey hosts more refugees than any other country in the world, including approximately three million registered Syrian refugees. Approximately 90% of these refugees are hosted in local communities rather than camps. The Turkish government told us that it was also hosting at least 200,000 Iraqi refugees.
54.The number of refugees that Turkey is hosting comes with the associated strains on the country at all levels, ranging from the national budget to local resources. It is a burden that is familiar to other refugee–hosting nations, not least Lebanon and Jordan—smaller, less wealthy countries with a larger number of refugees per capita than Turkey—in the context of Syria’s civil war. We gained an insight into Turkey’s response for ourselves when we visited facilities for refugees in the Turkish city of Adana.
55.Among the terms of the March 2016 agreement between the EU and Turkey, the EU offered Turkey:
But the agreement has only been partly fulfilled so far. Offering his assessment, Professor William Hale, from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, wrote:
Implementation of these agreements—especially the last—proved difficult, however, since President Erdoğan refused to amend certain articles of Turkey’s anti–terrorist legislation, demanded as one of the criteria. By early October 2016, the agreement on refugees was partially working, as the flow of would–be migrants across the Aegean had vastly reduced; some migrants were being returned to Turkey, but the EU countries were not accepting refugees from Turkey in return. The EU Commission was paying its share of the €3 billion, but some member states were failing to do so. The post–coup wave of arrests was delaying implementation of the visa waver agreement, but it was hoped that once the furore had died down in 2017 progress might be made.
56.In monetary terms, Turkey said that the hosting of refugees has cost it at least $12 billion, and that this figure is rising. However, of the €6 billion that it says it was promised by the EU for 2016–2018, Turkey says that—as of March 2017—€1.45 billion had been contracted and €748 million had actually been disbursed. In terms of the UK’s contribution, the FCO told us that
The UK has spent £32 million on humanitarian projects in Turkey. We have committed more than €300 million to the €3 billion Facility for Refugees in Turkey which will support refugees with education, food, healthcare and job opportunities. [ … ]The UK is in the process of launching a new set of migration projects worth over £2m to be delivered in partnership with the Turkish government in 2016–17.
57.Turkey hosts a larger number of refugees than any other state, and the third largest number per capita. This contribution should not be underestimated and a debt of gratitude is owed to Turkey from the entire international community. It plays a vital role in limiting or preventing the flow of migrants and refugees into the EU, within the framework of an agreement that it has reached with the bloc. The EU wants Turkey to continue to host and hold refugees, but the amount of money delivered to Turkey by way of assistance in this objective has so far been too small, and it has been provided too slowly. To support Turkey though the refugee challenge, and the costs to Turkey that it entails, the UK should press the EU swiftly to give Turkey the funds for this purpose that have been promised but not yet delivered. While the terms of the agreement between Turkey and the EU are not being fully met by either side, it is the non-delivery of promised EU resources to relieve the actual suffering of refugees which is reinforcing an anti-EU narrative from the Turkish government.
58.An important aspect of the relationship between the UK and Turkey has been the UK’s consistent support for Turkey’s accession process for membership of the European Union. A wide array of Turkish officials expressed to us their appreciation for this support when the Committee visited Turkey, and the FCO confirmed to us that this support remains the UK’s position. But this aspect of the relationship was given less emphasis by both governments, in their evidence to this inquiry, than trade, defence, and security ties. Several witnesses expressed concern to us that the way in which Turkey was discussed during the UK’s EU referendum campaign, and the UK’s ultimate decision to leave the EU, would damage relations with Turkey. Professor Hale assessed that “the British government is attempting to develop its relations with Turkey, but in opting to leave the EU it has lost its main negotiating card”.
59.But the relevance of this argument strikes us as currently being diminished. In its evidence submission, the Turkish Embassy referred to Turkish membership of the EU only briefly, and as a “strategic objective”. The processes appears to be moribund, with the Embassy referring to “political and artificial blockages for the opening of new chapters”. Sir Alan Duncan described Turkish membership of the EU as being “a long way off”. The accession process currently seems to be a low priority for Turkey itself, as the country faces a State of Emergency, a contentious internal debate over its future model of government, and significant security challenges both within its borders and close beyond them. Our analysis in this Chapter suggests that both the UK and Turkish governments currently regard the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union as being both an opportunity and incentive to strengthen their bilateral relationship, through the enhancement of trade, defence, and security ties.
60.However, possible opportunities associated with the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union extend beyond bilateral UK-Turkish relations. The German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel noted that the establishment of a “special relationship” between the UK and the EU “will be an important learning process for the EU and perhaps some of it can serve as a blueprint for other countries [such as Turkey] in the long term.”
61.The relationship between EU countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria worsened in the months prior to the publication of this Report. This might be the result of Turkey losing its EU membership incentive, as well as the EU’s handling of the attempted coup and the failure fully to implement the refugee deal. Recently the row with the Netherlands and Germany over AK Party ministers being barred from holding meetings in the Netherlands has caused relations to sour. These tensions developed despite the fact that Germany is Turkey’s leading trade partner.
62.Sir Alan Duncan, the FCO Minister with responsibility for Turkey, told us that, in the relationship with Turkey, the UK would “ask the questions and understand first, before criticising later”. In Chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this report, we examine significant concerns about the erosion of the status of human rights and democracy in Turkey. It is notable that, while the written submission made by the Turkish Embassy to this inquiry opened with a reference to the “shared values” between the UK and Turkey, the FCO’s submission made no such reciprocal reference. Instead, the short section of the FCO’s submission on ‘Rights and values’ in Turkey noted that “the EU Commission’s Annual Progress Report on Turkey, released on 10 November 2015, rightly highlighted the need for reforms to further strengthen human rights and democracy in Turkey.”
63.We have noted, above, that Turkey’s relationship with the EU has recently soured, and the accession process towards membership of the EU appears to have become both moribund and a low priority for Turkey. But several witnesses to our inquiry noted that this accession process had provided positive impetus to the improvement of human rights in Turkey, and the FCO said in its Human Rights report of 2015 that, for Turkey, “the EU accession process—and prospect of accession—provides a powerful vehicle to drive human rights reform and compliance”. Now that the influence of this accession process on Turkey appears to have declined, it is important for the UK to place pressure on Turkey to ensure that these standards are met nevertheless.
64.The UK has distinguished itself as a friend in the eyes of the Turkish government, and both sides are seeking to cement a strategic relationship. But, as the UK does so, it must not be seen as disregarding—or even excusing—allegations of serious human rights violations and the erosion of democracy in Turkey. It is vital that the UK’s criticism both privately and publicly is not withheld when grounds for criticism exist.
65.In order to possess effective influence within Turkey, on human rights as well as other issues, the UK must foster a basis of interdependence within the relationship in such a way that engenders leverage. Several witnesses told us that they believed the UK to lack such leverage, for reasons that include its decision to leave the European Union. Professor Rosemary Hollis from City, University of London, told us that “the Brits have got insufficient assets—with Brexit, now less than they had—to be much use to the Turks,” and Professor Hale from SOAS told us that the UK “will be right to push the need for strengthening democracy, but in criticising Ankara on these grounds Britain has to tread cautiously, given that it has no usable sanctions to apply if the Turkish government fails to respond positively.” But Sir Alan Duncan told us that trade, and its development, would give the UK the influence required to have an impact, saying:
It is probably only when we do have good trade that we can speak strongly about human rights.
66.The Committee notes that good trade relations between Germany and Turkey did not prevent the relationship going sour. The difference between Germany’s apparent failure to use trade as leverage and Russia’s and Iran’s ability to succeed in doing that can possibly be explained by two things: Successful compartmentalisation of energy and commercial relations from conflicting geopolitical interests; and the ability of Russia and Iran to potentially use other regional actors, such as the Kurds, as leverage against Turkey. However, the UK can also rely on security co-operation with Turkey, especially the TF-X project and intelligence sharing as well as its potential mediatory role between Turkey and the UK’s Western allies.
67.Numerous witnesses to our inquiry told us that the drive to secure enhanced trade ties was a central aspects of Turkish foreign policy, and that trade played a significant role in shaping Turkey’s relations with different countries. The Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD) told us that this policy developed under the early years of the rule of Turkey’s incumbent AK Party after it was first elected to government in 2002, and was established while Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was still Prime Minister as opposed to his current position of President:
During Erdoğan’s time in office as prime minister, a more active foreign policy was designed which paved the way to more trade and investment in Turkey’s surrounding regions and in particular the Middle East. This new foreign policy was not only designed to bring peace and prosperity to the region, but also allow Turkey to improve its economic relations in the region.
Providing a specific national example, the Middle East analyst Lydia Sizer dedicated her written submission to explaining the instrumental role that trade ties played in shaping Turkey’s policies towards Libya both before, during, and after the 2011 Libyan revolution.
68.There is evidence that Turkey’s prioritisation of its trading ties adds an incentive for it to listen to, and compromise with, nations with which it otherwise has disagreements. Perhaps the highest–profile example is Russia. As well as having a historically tense relationship, Russia and Turkey also have significant contemporary disagreements, not least with regard to the war in Syria where they support opposite sides. Yet the two countries have recently enjoyed an improvement of their ties, and have enhanced their diplomatic co-operation. When the Committee visited Turkey in January 2017, and asked President Erdoğan about the basis of Turkey’s current good relations with Russia despite other policy disagreements, President Erdoğan’s reply cited the high volume of trade between Turkey and Russia as a vital strategic concern. The Turkish Embassy also cited trade as being the basis for co-operation between Turkey and Russia, despite other disagreements:
Despite diverging views on some issues, Turkey and Russia constructed their relations by focusing on areas of co-operation. Turkey believes dialogue is the key to resolving differences and values its partnership with Russia. With this understanding, the two countries became important partners during the last two decades and developed a comprehensive co-operation, based on mutual understanding especially in the fields of trade and energy.
69.In order to have an effective impact on human rights, the FCO must also cultivate the UK’s influence and interdependence with Turkey to ensure that its voice is heard in Ankara. As the enhancement of its international trade ties has been a foreign policy priority for Turkey, strong trade ties between the UK and Turkey are likely to provide the UK with added leverage on a range of other policy areas, including human rights. However, we believe Sir Alan Duncan’s statement that “it is probably only when we do have good trade that we can speak strongly about human rights” must be qualified to the extent that the UK should always raise serious human rights concerns whenever they occur; the UK’s promotion of fundamental values cannot be predicated on “good trade”, or any other precondition. The enhancement of its international trade ties has been a foreign policy priority for Turkey. There are examples, such as Turkey’s relationship with Russia, to indicate that strong trade ties do indeed provide Turkey with incentive to compromise with countries that it disagrees with in other policy areas.
70.We support the expanding of trade and defence ties between the UK and Turkey, not only because of their security and prosperity implications but also because of the strong voice that these ties should give the UK in Ankara. It is a voice that we expect the UK to use, not least so that its human rights concerns are heard.
71.The UK should therefore seek to both defend human rights and secure trade. These two concerns have complementary—not contradictory—interests. The protection of human rights in Turkey, and the success of UK trade there, both require the rule of law and an impartial judiciary, an end to the purges that have followed the coup attempt, an end to internal conflict and terrorism, and a UK Government that is listened to in Ankara.
35 Turkish Embassy p 2
36 See, for example; , Financial Times, 28 September 2016; and , Reuters, 18 March 2017
37 See, for example, , Euro News, 30 March 2016; and , BBC News, 29 March 2016.
38 See, for example, , Reuters, 6 August 2016
39 See Turkish Statistical Institute, , accessed 16 March 2017; and The World Bank, , accessed 16 March 2017
40 Turkish Embassy p 4
41 See The World Bank, , accessed 16 March 2017; and OECD, , accessed 16 March 2017
42 Dr Mina Toksoz p 1
43 Turkish Embassy p 3
44 Turkish Embassy p 3
45 Foreign and Commonwealth Office para 37
46 Turkish Embassy p 4
47 Turkish Embassy p 12
48 Foreign and Commonwealth Office para 38
49 Turkish Embassy p 3 and European Commission, , accessed 16 March 2017
50 Foreign and Commonwealth Office para 38
51 Foreign and Commonwealth Office para 2
53 BAE Systems, “”, accessed 16 March 2017
56 Campaign Against Arms Trade para 5
57 Campaign Against Arms Trade para 9
58 HC Debate, 25 March 2014
60 Q169 [Sir Alan Duncan]
61 See, for example, , Defense One, 3 February 2016
62 See, for example, , Reuters, 19 February 2015
63 See, for example, , Voice of America News, 8 October 2013
64 See, for example, , Daily Sabah, 22 February 2017
65 Turkish Embassy p 14
66 , Anadolu Agency, 19 January 2017
67 , Anadolu Agency, 4 March 2017
68 See, for example, , Al Jazeera, 23 December 2016
69 Turkish Embassy p 14
70 Turkish Embassy p 20
71 Turkish Embassy p 20
72 Foreign and Commonwealth Office para 20
73 Q145; Foreign and Commonwealth Office para 2
74 UNHCR, “”, 22 December 2015
75 UNHCR, “”, 20 September 2016
76 Foreign and Commonwealth Office para 28
77 Foreign and Commonwealth Office para 34
78 UNHCR “”, accessed 13 March 2017
79 UNHCR “”, accessed 13 March 2017
80 UNISON , para 4.3
81 Turkish Embassy p 14
82 For a summary, see William Hale para 10; European Commission, “”, 4 April 2016
83 William Hale para 10
84 Turkish Embassy p 19
85 Turkish Embassy TUR0043 Q5
86 Foreign and Commonwealth Office para 32
87 Foreign and Commonwealth Office para 34
88 Q133; Foreign and Commonwealth Office para 29
89 William Hale para 1; Union of European Turkish Democrats para 12—13; Dr Mina Toksoz p4
90 William Hale p 1
91 Turkish Embassy p 12
92 Turkish Embassy p 12
94 See also Foreign and Commonwealth Office paras 5 and 44; Turkish Embassy concluded that the “post Brexit period presents new opportunities for better economic relations between Turkey and the UK”, Turkish Embassy p 3.
95 See, for example, , Reuters, 18 March 2017
96 See, for example, , Deutsche Welle, 6 March 2017
97 See, for example, , Newsweek, 14 March 2017
98 See, for example, , New Statesman, 14 March 2017
100 Turkish Embassy p 1
101 Foreign and Commonwealth Office para 11
102 See, for example, Peace in Kurdistan para 5
103 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human Rights and Democracy , April 2016, p 30
105 William Hale para 4
107 See, for example, , European Leadership Network, 11 March 2015; and , International Crisis Group, 13 December 2016
108 See, for example, , Russia Direct, 9 December 2015
109 Union of European Turkish Democrats para 24
110 Lydia Sizer
111 Turkish Embassy p 21
23 March 2017