72.On the evening of Friday 15 July 2016, elements within the Turkish armed forces attempted to overthrow the elected, AK Party–led government and remove the elected President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, from power. They failed. The President escaped from his villa in the port of Marmaris before rebel soldiers reached him, and flew to Istanbul. He spoke to the media from his mobile phone to call on Turks to oppose the coup attempt by taking to the streets. Large public demonstrations formed. Turkey has a history of military coups, but this was the first such attempt that had been resisted by the public and by the majority of the security forces. At least 241 people were killed as a result.
73.The popular will, combined with the fact that the majority of the security forces remained loyal, ensured the failure of the coup. But, in addition to those killed, a night of violence had seen many thousands injured and physical damage done to national institutions in Turkey. The attack that has come to symbolise both the brutality of the coup attempt and the threat to democracy that it represented was the bombing of the Turkish parliament by a rebel jet while its chamber sat in emergency session. All four of Turkey’s parliamentary parties united in their condemnation of the coup attempt.
74.The investigations into who exactly was responsible for the coup attempt, and why, are yet to conclude. Witnesses to our inquiry identified four categories of those who, in their view, appeared to be involved:
75.While some of our witnesses have therefore presented theories about diverse groups and interests supporting the coup, the Turkish government exclusively blames the Gülenists. The perception that the Gülenists were responsible for the coup attempt is not confined to the AK Party and the Turkish government. We heard this view in Turkey from a wide range of people, during our meetings. The attribution of blame solely to the Gülenists is especially important because it has justified and sustained an effort by the government to remove, root and branch, perceived Gülenists from positions of public influence in Turkey. The origins of this campaign of detentions and dismissals preceded the coup, and intensified significantly thereafter with the use of powers granted under the State of Emergency in Turkey, with President Erdoğan calling the coup attempt a “gift from God” for apparently this reason. We examine the response of the Turkish government in Chapter 4 of this report, and devote the next section of this Chapter to examining the conflict between the Gülenists and the Turkish government, as well as the FCO’s position.
76.The conflict between the Gülenists and the Turkish government is deep and bitter. We do not ourselves use the terms “Fethullah Terrorist Organisation” (‘FETÖ’) or “Parallel State Structure” (PSS)—which the Turkish government uses to describe the Gülenists—or terms such as “‘Hizmet’” and “Cemaat”, which the Gülenists use to describe themselves. Our Conclusions and Recommendations are informed by an examination of both perspectives, during which we use the term “the Gülenists”.
77.It is not our intention to re–state the arguments of both sides in the detail that they give them, but rather to offer a summary. Both sides have produced extensive material to illustrate their perspectives, and we provide some links to a number of examples that are illustrative but certainly not exhaustive. During our visit to Turkey, and in meetings that included conversations with the President, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister, we heard the perspective of the Turkish government. We have also published two written submissions from the Turkish government to our inquiry, provided by the Turkish Embassy in London. Our inquiry has also heard the perspective of groups and individuals representing the Gülenists. We have published written submissions from the Gülenists, and held an oral evidence session with Gülenist representatives that is a rare example of this organisation being publicly questioned.
78.Based on these sources, we can report that the Turkish government describes the Gülenists as a highly–organised and deceitful terrorist conspiracy that hides behind a charitable face to conceal its true objective: forming a parallel state to infiltrate, undermine, and supplant the current Turkish government. The Turkish government views the Gülenists as having a centralised and intricate command and control structure, deriving from a cult–like obedience to the orders of Fethullah Gülen at the apex of the hierarchy.
79.The Turkish government holds the Gülenists responsible for the 15 July coup attempt, as well as for many other negative developments in Turkey. It puts particular emphasis on the Gülenists’ prioritisation of the establishment of educational institutions as being a pre–requisite for their infiltration of the state. It also says that the movement institutionalised a system of cheating in examinations for entry to state institutions. As well as its education activities, the Government says that the Gülenists established a range of media outlets for propaganda and dis–information purposes, as well as a wide array of secretive business networks for fund–raising.
80.The Gülenists, by contrast, describe themselves as a philanthropic social organisation that is inspired by a moderate and democratic interpretation of Islam but that does not discriminate on the basis of faith, and which embraces secularism while focusing on charity, welfare, dialogue, and education. Instead of the view that Fethullah Gülen is at the apex of a hierarchy, they describe themselves as lacking a centrally organised, top–down, structure that encapsulates the entire movement. Instead, they say, theirs is a movement inspired by Gülen rather than being controlled by him, and relying on informal networks to connect like–minded volunteers around the world.
81.The Gülenists reject the charges of infiltration, saying that any presence of their supporters in state institutions is coincidental—and derived primarily from the success of Gülenist–run schools—rather than organised. They describe their viewpoint as having been persecuted, requiring them to protect themselves. They say that they are strictly peaceful, that they have been baselessly blamed by the Turkish government for the 15 July coup attempt among other negative developments, and that the Turkish government is persecuting them in a bid to remove any possible counter to the rule of President Erdoğan and the AK Party.
82.Although the Turkish Embassy makes no reference to it in its submission, and the fact is also absent from other accounts supported by the Turkish government, numerous witnesses told us that the Gülenists and the AK Party were once allied. These witnesses included Lindsay Appleby, a Director for Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Gülenists acknowledge their support for the AK Party against the “secular establishment” in their evidence to our inquiry, and we understand that President Erdoğan has acknowledged the past association between his party and the Gülenists as a “mistake”. Bill Park, a Senior Lecturer at the Defence Studies Department, King’s College, University of London, told us in his written submission that
‘Gülenists’—typically better educated than mainstream AK Party [supporters]—had penetrated the law, media, academia, and state institutions such as the police and bureaucracy. Many had been fast–tracked by the AK Party government, and some AK Party figures were themselves sympathisers.
Asked in oral evidence what portion of blame for the coup attempt he placed on the Gülenists, Mr Park replied that
Immediate responsibility—probably 60%. [ … ] Responsibility in a deeper sense for there being that many Gülenists in the officer corps, if there were that many, lies with the AK Party.
83.It is unclear when and how exactly the relationship between the AK Party and the Gülenists soured. The Gülenists themselves cited significant policy and ideological differences in their evidence. What is discernible from the Turkish media is that
84.The AK Party and the Gülenists were once allied. They are both movements with Islamist influences, and they made common cause in challenging the Kemalist establishment and military leadership. This past alliance is a fact that AK Party officials now prefer not to mention, and this reinforces our concern that purges of perceived Gülenist sympathisers will be undertaken with the added bitterness of a fratricidal conflict.
85.The Gülenists were first officially described in Turkey as a terrorist organisation in April 2015, and the Turkish Interior Ministry listed Fethullah Gülen as one of Turkey’s most wanted terrorists on 28 October 2015. Turkey’s National Security Council described the Gülenists as the “Fethullah Terrorist Organisation” (‘FETÖ’), in May 2016, six weeks before the coup attempt.
86.The Gülenists nevertheless dispute whether their definition as terrorists has validity under Turkish law. They argue that, under Turkey’s constitution, only the United Nations or Turkey’s High Court can make terrorist designations, and that neither institution has designated the Gülenists as terrorists. A Memorandum by the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights has also questioned the legal validity of the definition of the Gülenists as terrorists in Turkey, on procedural grounds. The Memorandum also said that “the Commissioner must also take note of the fact that this organisation’s readiness to use violence, a sine qua non component of the definition of terrorism, had not become apparent to Turkish society at large until the coup attempt”, thus calling into question the basis for the designation of the Gülenists as terrorists prior to the coup attempt. The Turkish government nevertheless maintains that the designation of the Gülenists as terrorists is both valid and essential.
87.The evidence presented so far to argue in favour of the culpability of the Gülenists for the coup attempt has been overwhelmingly anecdotal or circumstantial, and often based on confessions. The validity of these confessions has been called into question in some cases, amid accusations that they were detained under duress. One prominent example, which is frequently cited by anti–Gülenist literature, is the purported confession of Lieutenant Colonel Levent Turkkan—an aide at the time to General Hulusi Aker, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff who was held hostage by the coup plotters—that he was a member of ‘FETÖ’ and that ‘FETÖ’ orchestrated the coup. But, in Turkkan’s case, images have emerged to suggest that he may have been injured in detention. Allegations of torture being used by the Turkish security forces are discussed in Chapter 5 of this report. Gareth Jenkins, an analyst based in Turkey who works as a Non–Resident Senior Fellow at the Institute for Security & Development Policy, concluded in an article published on 26 January 2017 that
Remarkably, despite months of vigorous interrogation, no convincing evidence has yet been made public about how the coup was planned or coordinated. There can be no doubt that, if such evidence had emerged, the Turkish authorities would have ensured it was in the public domain.
88.Another prominent example of anecdotal evidence, that is frequently cited by anti–Gülenist literature to argue that Fethullah Gülen himself was directly involved in orchestrating the coup, is the testimony by General Aker that one of the soldiers who took him hostage—Brigadier General Hakan Evrim—tried to make him speak to Fethullah Gülen on the telephone during the coup attempt. The General said that he refused to do so. Several of our witnesses told us that, if the Gülenists were indeed involved in the coup, then it was highly likely that Fethullah Gülen himself had direct knowledge of the attempt. But Bill Park nevertheless cast doubt on the account of General Aker being offered a telephone conversation with Fethullah Gülen:
One of the problems with this idea that Aker was told they could put him in touch with Fethullah Gülen is the assumption that this organisation, which can take over the state in a secretive way and more or less take over the economy in a massive way, is so dumb as to say to the chief of the general staff, who is going to oppose them, “Look, we’re Gülenists and you can phone this guy.” It is contested whether he was given that opportunity [to speak with Fethullah Gülen on the telephone]. The aide de camp who apparently gave him that opportunity [to speak with Fethullah Gülen on the telephone] was beaten up badly when he initially said, “Yes, that’s what I did.” So I am not sure we can say that there was going to be a phone call.
89.The size, scope, and decentralised nature of the Gülenist movement also casts doubt on the validity of the blanket designation of it, and by implication anyone ever associated with it, as terrorists. At the very least, it raises questions about whether the evidence used to make such a designation is highly circumstantial in the case of individuals. Among their global activities, and the institutions that the Gülenists have established world–wide, the Gülenists have described:
The Gülenists told us that “the total value of the land and properties seized [in Turkey] from ‘Hizmet’–affiliated schools, universities, hospitals and charities is estimated to have reached 15 billion dollars”.
90.The Gülenists insisted that the movement did not maintain a centrally–organised, top–down hierarchy that bound members strictly into the movement. Instead, they repeated that the movement was bound by “networks” that they described as being “informal”, rather than “loose”, and being predicated on inspiration, volunteering, and philanthropy:
As a social movement, ‘Hizmet’ does not have a corporation–style centrally organised, top down, hierarchical structure that encapsulates the entire movement. Rather, it relies on informal networks, moral authority and organic leadership to mobilise the grassroots to support ‘Hizmet’s’ formal activities.
91.Given the extent of this organisation, and its purportedly informal organisation, the Gülenists have argued that individuals are being linked to the movement by the Turkish government, and therefore being punished as terrorists, on the basis of evidence that includes connections as circumstantial as what school they or their children go to, which bank they use (with Bank Asya being associated with the Gülenists), whether they use the messaging app ‘ByLock’ which the government associates with the Gülenists, which media publications they read or write for, and the charities that they donate to or are affiliated with. The evidence provided by purported informants is alleged by the Gülenists to often form the basis of cases against individuals.
92.Witnesses to our inquiry challenged the Gülenists’ claim to lack a hierarchical structure. Ziya Meral told the Committee that the Gülen movement has “layers”, differentiating between those who were simply inspired by Gülen’s teachings and those on the “more politically active and professional side of the movement—people who are paid by the movement and under the movement’s command.”
93.These witnesses told the Committee that, on the basis of their understanding of the nature of the Gülen movement, they found it inconceivable Gülen would not have known about individual Gulenists’ involvement in the coup and that he would have had to sanction any activity. Ziya Meral noted that “if any Gülenist officer was part of it [the coup], they would never have acted on their own; their participation would have gone all the way up. It is impossible for a Gülenist general to act without consulting Gülen and getting his tacit or direct approval.” Professor William Hale also noted that “I can’t believe that Fethullah Gülen didn’t know anything about it, and I can’t believe that, if he did know something about it, he couldn’t have stopped it. I find that impossible to believe.”
94.The Turkish government immediately blamed the Gülenists for the coup attempt, and did so on the night of 15 July itself. But having the Turkish courts convict individuals of participation in the coup on the basis of evidence, let alone convict them for doing so with Gülenist motivations, has proved to be a slower and more complex process. Gareth Jenkins concluded of the immediate blaming of the Gülenists that “it was was an assumption, not a deduction”.
95.The Committee asked the Turkish Embassy, six months after the coup attempt, whether any individuals had yet been convicted by a court for taking part, let alone being convicted of taking part on the basis of Gülenist motivations. The Embassy did not provide us with a figure, saying instead that “as the judicial process is in progress, the number of those subject to criminal investigations is not definite”. We asked the FCO the same question at the same time and, like the Turkish Embassy, it could not point us to a definitive example of a guilty conviction having yet occurred. The FCO told us that
The Justice Minister said on 1 February  that 1,094 trials have been opened against alleged coup plotters and members of the Gülen movement. Many of those trials have multiple defendants. Only a handful of cases have concluded and there are not currently official figures on those found guilty or acquitted.
96.The Committee notes that, at the time of writing, some of the defendants in prominent trials surrounding the coup have admitted in court to taking part in the coup attempt while denying that they were Gülenists, or that their motives for taking part had anything to do with the Gülenists. Those captured soldiers who have purportedly confessed to being Gülenists have not yet done so in court or in public. In terms of the FCO’s position on whether there was sufficient evidence for the UK to designate the Gülenists as a terrorist organisation, Sir Alan Duncan’s answer was categorical:
No. I don’t think that we can say that we have evidence of the sort of activity that would entitle us to call that a terrorist organisation.
97.Given the brutality of the events of 15 July, the severity of the charges made against the Gülenists, and the scale of the purges of perceived Gülenists that has been justified on this basis, there is a relative lack of hard, publicly–available evidence to prove that the Gülenists as an organisation were responsible for the coup attempt in Turkey. While there is evidence to indicate that some individual Gülenists were involved, it is mostly anecdotal or circumstantial, sometimes premised on information from confessions or informants, and is—so far—inconclusive in relation to the organisation as a whole or its leadership. As we publish this report, nine months after the coup attempt, neither the UK nor Turkish governments can point us to one person who has been found guilty by a court of involvement in the coup attempt, let alone anyone being found guilty with evidence of involvement with Gülenist motives. We also note that, despite Turkey purportedly submitting 80 boxes of ‘evidence’ to the US to achieve the extradition of Fethullah Gülen on the basis that he masterminded the coup attempt, the US judiciary has not yet moved to deport him.
98.But the explanations provided to us by the Gülenists did not resolve our uncertainties about the fundamental nature and motives of their movement. The belief that Gülenists were responsible for the coup attempt, as well as for numerous other manipulations of the state through abuse of public positions that they held in Turkey, is manifest across the political spectrum in Turkey. A lack of transparency pervades some of the core activities of the Gülenists, making it impossible for us to confirm that all of these activities are purely philanthropic.
99.Gülenists are unlikely to have been the only elements involved in the coup attempt. Kemalist elements within the military, those who opposed the AK Party, or those who simply wished to preserve their own positions, are also likely to have been involved. Some, especially in the lower ranks of the military, appeared to have taken part, at least initially, without realising that they were involved in a coup attempt.
100.Since around 2013, individuals associated with the Gülenists have adopted a political agenda opposed to the AK Party government of Turkey, and have possessed the means, motive, and opportunity to support the coup attempt, but their culpability has yet to be definitively proved. The FCO told us that it did not have evidence to justify the designation of the Gülenists as a terrorist organisation by the UK, and we agree with this assessment.
101.Despite Sir Alan Duncan telling us that the UK’s understanding of the threat that Turkey is facing was almost unique, the account that the FCO gave us of the Gülenists and their alleged involvement in the coup attempt seemed confused. The FCO’s written submission to our inquiry made no reference to Gülen or the Gülenists. Sir Alan Duncan explained this by saying that the terms of reference of this inquiry did not specifically invite the FCO to comment on the Gülenists, but it was a surprising omission given the emphasis that the Turkish government places on the Gülenists and our aim of understanding the FCO’s policy towards Turkey.
102.The FCO’s oral evidence addressed the Gülenists, but appeared at times to be contradictory. Sir Alan Duncan initially appeared to repeat the Turkish government’s position. He referred to “clear and systematic infiltration of the entire apparatus of government by a group of people who, as a state within the state, try to overturn the state”, although he did not specifically refer to the Gülenists by name. When asked specifically whether the Gülenist organisation were responsible for the coup he answered:
I think the answer has to be, in large part, in terms of significant involvement, yes.
103.But Sir Alan’s later answers were more equivocal. When pressed about the extent of Gülenist involvement in the coup attempt, he said:
This is a very complicated phenomenon in Turkish government and society; it will probably take years to analyse this and to get to the bottom of it.
Asked specifically whether he believed that the Gülenists were “a state within a state”, Sir Alan said:
I think, from where I sit, if I were asked to say yes or no, I would say yes. Is it absolutely crystal clear? That is impossible to answer. I think there is a court process here, which will decide: extradition requests, that kind of thing. That is a court process. I am a Foreign Minister, not the world’s greatest expert on Fethullah Gülen. But that is the judgment I have offered the Committee.
104.When asked on the basis of what evidence the FCO was reaching its conclusions on the Gülenists and the coup attempt, Lindsay Appleby, a Director for Europe at the FCO, gave an initial reply indicating that it was uncertain to what extent Gülenists were involved:
Many of the key individuals, by the nature of an attempted coup, were from the military. It is not consistent with membership of the military to be a member of an alternative organisation, so it isn’t clear how many of the military people were Gülenists, nor is it clear the degree to which the organisation—or the multiple organisations that make up Gülenism—were themselves directing or driving any of the activity.
Soon afterwards, however, Mr Appleby said that there was evidence of individual Gülenist being involved, although he once again said that the degree of organisational participation by the Gülenists was unclear. He also identified the Turkish government as a source of information for the FCO:
On the basis of the information that I have and on the basis of what we have looked at in the Foreign Office, it is very clear that there were lots of people identified as Gülenists who were involved in the coup. But we don’t have clear information, or an analytical base, to assert definitively one way or another whether the organisation as a whole directed the coup attempt. That is precisely the sort of evidence that we have been asking for from the Turkish government, when they bring to us individual allegations.
105.The FCO seems willing to accept the Turkish government’s account of the coup attempt and the Gülenists broadly at face value. While some of the individuals involved in the coup may have been Gülenists, given the large number of Gülenist supporters and organisations in Turkey, it does not necessarily follow that the Gülenists were responsible for the coup or that their leadership directed the coup. However, the FCO seems unable to cite much evidence to prove that it is true. Despite its claim to possess an almost unique understanding of the threat that Turkey faces, the FCO strikes us as knowing too little for itself about either the Gülenists or their role in the coup attempt. The Government’s support for the Turkish government in the wake of the coup attempt would have been more convincing had it been able to present an independent analysis to support its position. We recommend again that the Government ensures that sufficient funding is available to the FCO, to repair the hollowed-out state of the FCO’s analytical and research capabilities.
112 Foreign and Commonwealth Office para 6
113 See, for example Q32 [Ziya Meral]; and Professor Tim Jacoby paras 3—4, and 11. The coup plotters also forced a statement to be read on a state television channel, TRT, in the name of the ‘Peace at Home Council’. Both the name of the Council, and the rhetoric of the statement, was interpreted to some as alluding to Kemalist ideology. See for example “How Turkey’s military coup failed”, The Associated Press, 20 July 2016.
114 See, for example, the description of opportunism by Ziya Meral, Q32 [Ziya Meral], or the description of military officers trying to preserve economic and financial privileges by Professor Tim Jacoby, para 15. One extensive theory is that the coup plot was launched prematurely by officers who anticipated a purge and sought to protect themselves against dismissal. See, for example, Q30 [William Hale] and Coup Facts, “” (August 2016), p 16
115 See, for example, Ziya Meral, Q32, and Daily Sabah “ (3 July 2016), p 15 “SOLDIERS TOLD THEY WERE CONDUCTING AN EXERCISE: Soldiers in their testimonies have said that their commanders told them it was just a military exercise. Allegations circulating in the media are that high-ranking soldiers kept soldiers until 9 p.m. for night training and later ordered them to take ammunition for a military exercise. In testimony a soldier said: “When the nation came and climbed over the tanks, we realized that it was not a military exercise.””
116 For President Erdoğan’s reference to a ‘gift from God’, see Youtube, “, accessed 13 March 2017; On the purges of the Gülenists preceding the coup attempt, see the assertion by the Gülenists themselves that 60,000 individuals were dismissed in the year and a half before the coup, for perceived links with the movement, TUR0036 para 14c, 74. See also, for example, Bill Park para 6, who refers to President Erdoğan’s use of the phrase ‘gift from God’.
117 For some of the arguments in opposition to the Gülenists, and a perspective that is hostile to them, see Daily Sabah “ (3 July 2016); 15 July, 2016: Anadolu Agency (July 2016); or Coup Facts (August 2016)
For some of the arguments in defence of the Gülenists, and a perspective that is supportive of them, see , ‘, or
118 Turkish Embassy and Turkish Embassy TUR0043
119 Centre for Hizmet Studies ; Alliance for Shared Values & Dialogue Platform ; Alliance for Shared Values and the Dialogue Platform . These Gülen-inspired organisations told the Committee that it was difficult to speak on behalf of the movement as a whole, but that they had made their submission as representative as possible of the perspective of the broader Gülenist movement. Mr Özcan Keleş, the Chair of the Dialogue Society, said: “we do not speak on behalf of Gülen, but we do believe that our evidence—both that provided in writing and, hopefully, oral—reflects the common Hizmet perspective.” (Q42)
120 Qq180, 181[Lindsay Appleby]
121 Alliance for Shared Values and Dialogue Platform para 32
122 , Vatan, 5 August 2016
123 Bill Park para 4
124 Q32 [Bill Park]
125 See, for example, , Daily News, 19 May 2013
126 See, for example, , Daily News, 23 November 2013; and “”, Anadolu Agency, 21 November 2013
127 See, for example , Anadolu Agency, 18 December 2013; and , Anadolu Agency, 15 January 2014; and , Anadolu Agency, 29 December 2013
128 Peoples’ Democratic Party TUR0036 repeatedly refers to the date
129 Peoples’ Democratic Party TUR0036 para 14c, 74
130 See, for example, , Anadolu Agency, 9 April 2015
131 Put a Break on Terrorism at all Hands, , accessed 13 March 2017
132 Peoples’ Democratic Party TUR0036, para 65
133 Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, (October 2016), para 20: “Furthermore, it [‘FETÖ’] has not yet been recognised as a terrorist organisation in a final judgment of the Turkish Court of Cassation which, according to the Turkish authorities, is a crucial legal act in the Turkish legal system when it comes to the designation of an organisation as terrorist.”
135 See , Daily News, 20 July 2016
136 , The Turkey Analyst, 26 January 2017
138 See, for example, Q32[Ziya Meral] and, Q31[William Hale]
139 Q31 [Bill Park]
140 Centre for Hizmet Studies para 8; Alliance for Shared Values and Dialogue Platform para 6
141 Turkish Embassy TUR0043 para 3
142 Alliance for Shared Values and Dialogue Platform para 50
144 Alliance for Shared Values and Dialogue Platform para 14b
145 Alliance for Shared Values and Dialogue Platform para 35
146 Alliance for Shared Values and Dialogue Platform makes reference to “’Hizmet’’s Zaman newspaper”
147 Gülen Institute, ‘’, accessed 13 March 2017
148 Alliance for Shared Values and Dialogue Platform para 14c
149 Alliance for Shared Values and Dialogue Platform para 44
150 Alliance for Shared Values and Dialogue Platform para 25
151 See Q82[Özcan Keleş]
152 Alliance for Shared Values and Dialogue Platform , para 5, says “To clarify, in no part of our written statement do we describe ‘Hizmet’ as a “loose network”.
153 Alliance for Shared Values and Dialogue Platform para 7
154 Alliance for Shared Values and Dialogue Platform , para 28; Centre for Hizmet Studies para 9
155 Alliance for Shared Values and Dialogue Platform , para 28; Centre for Hizmet Studies para 9
159 The Turkey Analyst, 26 January 2017
160 Turkish Embassy TUR0043 Q3. Confusingly, the next sentenced reads “less than half of them (around 40%) are detained on demand”, which implies that the Embassy may have at least an indication of the numbers under criminal investigation.
161 Foreign and Commonwealth Office section 1
162 See, for example, the trial of those soldiers who were captured and tried for allegedly trying to assassinate President Erdoğan in Marmaris on 15 July 2016. Some, such as Sukru Seymen and Gokhan Sahin Sonmezates, said that they took part in the coup attempt but denied any links with the Gülenists; Milliyet, 20 February 2017 and , Aydinlik, 20 February 2017.
165 Foreign and Commonwealth Office
172 Q180 [Lindsay Appleby]
23 March 2017