The use of UK-manufactured arms in Yemen Contents

2The crisis in Yemen

A humanitarian emergency

9.Years of poverty, poor governance and insecurity had left Yemen the poorest country in the Middle East prior to the current crisis. However, the last 24 months of conflict and import restrictions have exacted a heavy toll on the civilian population and development in Yemen. On 1 July 2015, the UN declared Yemen a level 3 crisis, a category reserved for the most severe and large-scale humanitarian crises. It is estimated that some one fifth of people in need around the world as a result of conflict are in Yemen.4 The International Development Committee described the situation in Yemen as “one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, with 82% of the population in need of assistance.”5

10.It is difficult to compile authoritatively accurate casualty figures for the conflict in Yemen considering the complexities of the situation and the challenges faced by humanitarian monitors across the country. Estimates range considerably, with Tim Holmes from Oxfam telling the Committee that the figure could be as high as 6,100 killed and 35,000 injured,6 which contrasts with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights which has documented a total of 3,704 civilians killed and 6,566 injured.7 The UN has confirmed that grave violations against children have increased dramatically as a result of the escalating conflict.8 Nearly half of all school-aged children are out of school.9 2.8 million people are internally displaced.10 Attacks on health facilities and staff, coupled with a lack of fuel and medicines, have left the health system on the brink of collapse.11 Over half the population are living in ‘emergency’ or ‘crisis’ levels of food insecurity, with some governorates seeing as much as 70 per cent of their population struggling to feed themselves, which the UN has said shows the “the huge magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.”12 The crisis has also left the economy “on the verge of total collapse.”13 A joint report by the World Bank, United Nations, Islamic Development Bank and European Union, published in August 2016, has found that the cost of damage to infrastructure and economic losses has reached $14 billion. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, Jamie McGoldrick, said that “the scale and intensity of the humanitarian situation here is bleak—and by many measures it’s continuing to get worse.”14 The level of need is simply staggering.

11.A cessation of hostilities was declared on 10 April 2016, accompanying ongoing peace talks in Kuwait, which has provided some relief for civilians and has improved humanitarian access across the country, although civilian casualties continued to mount during that period: the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights documented 815 civilian casualties, including 272 deaths and 543 injured, between 11 April and 11 August 2016. Peace talks broke down in early August 2016, at which point hostilities resumed in earnest. Attacks with deadly consequences for civilians have been recorded by both sides to the conflict. The impact of the conflict on basic services, infrastructure and the economy is still being felt and the humanitarian crisis shows little sign of abating; in fact, it continues to get worse.15 DFID has committed £85 million to the humanitarian response.

The Saudi-led coalition’s intervention

12.The escalation in hostilities and in humanitarian need in Yemen can be traced back to the Houthis’ armed seizure of the capital and their march further south. The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen has also stated that “The Houthis, acting in consort with their affiliated political organization, Ansar Allah, have gradually assumed control of State institutions and brought about the current crisis.16 The Saudi-led intervention began in March 2015 in response to the request of Yemeni President Hadi to halt the advance of the Houthi armed group which had forced the legitimate government into exile in Saudi Arabia. As explained by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in its evidence to us:

The legal basis for the intervention in Yemen by the Saudi Arabian-led Coalition is host nation consent. President Hadi wrote to the UN Security Council (UNSC) on 24 March 2015 requesting a Chapter VII Resolution “inviting all countries that wish to help Yemen to provide immediate support for the legitimate authority by all means and measures to protect Yemen and deter the Houthi aggression”. In that letter, he also informed the Security Council that he had requested assistance from the Arab League and the Gulf Co-operation Council to provide “all means necessary, including military intervention, to protect Yemen and its people from continuing Houthi aggression”. In its Resolution 2216, the UNSC noted President Hadi’s requests for assistance and also reaffirmed its support for “the legitimacy of the President of Yemen, Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi”. President Hadi has therefore requested and consented to Saudi assistance in Yemen in broad terms. As such, that consent provides a legal basis for the Saudi military intervention.17

13.We heard that the situation in Yemen would have been much worse than the current humanitarian emergency without the Saudi-led military intervention. As Foreign Office Minister Tobias Ellwood MP told us:

However, had the Saudi-led coalition not been formed, the scale of violations of humanitarian law that would have taken place in Yemen would have been 10 times worse. The Houthis would have managed to get all the way down to the port of Aden and we would have had a completely failed state, far worse than the humanitarian catastrophe that is currently taking place, and despite the civil war that is actually there.18

14.Sir Simon Mayall, a former Middle East adviser to the MoD, further outlined the consequences of non-intervention:

If the Saudis had not intervened in Yemen, a combination of Iranian-backed Houthis, AQAP [al-Qa’eda in the Arabian Peninsula] and ISIS would have led to another awful bleeding sore, as we have seen in Syria. As William Hague said yesterday, yes, there is a price for intervention, but there is a price to be paid for non-intervention. The fact that we are going to thwart, I hope, Iranian ambition in Yemen and we have pushed AQAP out of Mukalla is only as a result of Saudi Arabian intervention […] It is a matter of national importance to the Saudi Arabians to intervene in Yemen. We should be grateful, otherwise we would end up with another Iranian satrapy on the Bab el Mandeb.19

15.The International Committee of the Red Cross has noted that the obligation to have respect for and ensure compliance with IHL is “binding upon States involved in multinational operations, as well as on the International Organisations under whose auspices multinational operations are undertaken”.20

16.There is a legal basis for the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen and a legitimate need to quell the armed uprising of the Houthi rebels. The UK has an interest in preventing the further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Yemen that would accompany Houthi expansion in the country. There is also a security interest in denying extremist militant groups such as al-Qa’eda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) further space to operate in Yemen. We agree with Sir Simon Mayall that we should be grateful for the Saudi-led intervention. However, the fact that the UN Security Council has conferred legitimacy on the military intervention does not automatically endorse the conduct of the coalition, as we explore below.

The conduct of the conflict

17.The UN has described a “particularly worrisome escalation of conflict”21 which has been seen in Yemen. The intensity of the bombing campaign has attracted particular attention.

18.A report produced by Action on Armed Violence recorded in the first seven months of 2015 more civilian deaths and injuries reported from explosive weapons in Yemen than in any other country in the world.22 Aerial bombing by the Saudi-led coalition was responsible for 60 per cent of civilian deaths and injuries from explosive weapons in Yemen.23

19.International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is based on the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. The principle of distinction obliges parties to a conflict to target only military objectives and not the civilian population or individual civilians or civilian objects (e.g. homes, schools and hospitals). The principle of proportionality limits and protects potential harm to civilians by demanding that the least amount of harm be caused to civilians and, when harm to civilians must occur, it must be proportional to the military objective. Moreover, each party to the conflict must take all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population and civilian objects under its control against the effects of attacks.24 Therefore, evidence of civilian casualties cannot be equated with evidence of violations of IHL. There have been allegations of violations of IHL committed by both sides to the conflict. However, as the UK does not supply arms to the Houthis or other armed opposition groups, this report will focus on the Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Yemen.

20.On 2 June 2016, the United Nations published its annual report on Children and Armed Conflict, in which it highlighted the worrying situation in Yemen as well as the Saudi-led coalition’s role:

The United Nations verified a sixfold increase in the number of children killed and maimed compared with 2014, totalling 1,953 child casualties (785 children killed and 1,168 injured). More than 70 per cent were boys. Of the casualties, 60 per cent (510 deaths and 667 injuries) were attributed to the Saudi Arabia-led coalition and 20 per cent (142 deaths and 247 injuries) to the Houthis […] The United Nations verified 101 incidents of attacks on schools and hospitals, which is double the number verified in 2014. Of the attacks, 90 per cent caused the partial or complete destruction of schools or health facilities, while the remaining 10 per cent involved attacks on protected personnel, including students. Of the attacks on schools and hospitals, 48 per cent were attributed to the coalition, 29 per cent to the Houthis and 20 per cent to unidentified perpetrators.25

The same report also found a “fivefold increase in cases of recruitment and use of children by armed groups…Of the 762 verified cases of recruitment of children (all boys), the majority were attributed to the Houthis (72 per cent).”

21.In a report prepared for the UN Security Council by the Panel of Experts on Yemen in January 2016, 119 coalition air sorties relating to potential violations of IHL were identified:

The Panel documented that the coalition had conducted air strikes targeting civilians and civilian objects, in violation of international humanitarian law, including camps for internally displaced persons and refugees; civilian gatherings, including weddings; civilian vehicles, including buses; civilian residential areas; medical facilities; schools; mosques; markets, factories and food storage warehouses; and other essential civilian infrastructure, such as the airport in Sana’a, the port in Hudaydah and domestic transit routes.26

22.The Panel further noted the coalition’s designation of the entire city of Sa’dah and region of Maran as military targets, confirming that “entire cities or governorates cannot be considered military targets, even with attempts to provide advance warning.”27 The UK Government’s response to the UN Panel of Experts report has been to underline that the experts did not enter Yemen but relied on satellite imagery,28 a criticism Mr Ellwood repeated in his evidence to our inquiry.29 However, much evidence of IHL violations has been documented by organisations on the ground in Yemen. David Mepham, UK Director of Human Rights Watch, told us about the evidence they had documented:

We have been to the 36 sites; we have looked at the evidence and talked to eyewitnesses; we have talked to bystanders and looked at photographic evidence, where it has been available; and we have looked at the satellite imagery. Lawyers have pored all over it, and we are very confident that in the 36 cases we have documented—there may be a considerable number of further cases—violations of IHL have taken place.30

23.Amnesty International told us about the similar process they had gone through in documenting a further 30 examples of IHL abuses, in which “the laws of war have been violated, in particular the key principles of proportionality and distinction and the steps taken to minimise civilian casualties.” We heard about one example between May and July 2015 in the Sa’dah region, where a series of strikes resulted in the deaths of 100 civilians, 55 children and 22 women. Therefore, the majority of deaths in those particular strikes were women and children.31

24.Together, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International documented a case in September 2015 in which the remnants of a British-supplied cruise missile had been identified from a strike on a ceramics factory. Evidence of all of the above airstrikes have been shared with the British and Saudi authorities, as David Mepham told us:

I was at a meeting with [the Foreign Secretary] several months ago when I gave him copies of our report and said, “These are the GPS coordinates; these are the strikes; these are the markets and schools that were hit.” Therefore, he has that evidence. The Foreign Office has had that evidence for months. It is extraordinary that the line comes back that they do not have evidence, when that evidence has been shared with them for a considerable period of time.32

25.It has been noted by a number of sources that the UK Government frequently cites Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International evidence in other conflicts, such as Syria, but in Yemen the Government appears to be relying on assurances from the Saudi authorities.33 In her written evidence to us, Dr Anna Stavrianakis of the University of Sussex states:

The UK government is thus currently both refusing to respond to published, documented evidence provided by independent experts; and relying on secret claims provided by the Saudi military. This creates an information black hole that makes it impossible for CAEC or other independent observers to properly assess UK government policy and hold it to account.34

26.As we heard from Professor Philippe Sands QC, in his opinion the Government should be cautious about relying on assurances from the Saudis:

The essence of our position is this. In the face of the overwhelming evidence of what is happening on the ground as a consequence of coalition attacks, as well as attacks from the other side—from the Houthi forces—it appears clear that the coalition forces are engaged in violations of international humanitarian law. In those circumstances, an assurance such as that at paragraph 6.2835, given by the Saudis, does not appear to be worth the paper it is printed on. If I were a Minister, I would be extremely anxious and worried about relying on such an assurance in the face of a report by a Security Council group of experts that makes it clear that the assurance is not accurate.36

27.We have heard evidence of potential breaches of international humanitarian law by both sides of the conflict. The warring parties have potentially not adequately distinguished between civilian and military targets, which has caused enormous suffering; civilians account for half of those killed, and nearly three million people have fled their homes.37 The UK Government has not responded to allegations of breaches of international humanitarian law by the Saudi-led coalition. We recommend that the Government press all parties to the conflict to comply with international humanitarian law to minimise harm to civilians and protect civilian infrastructure and continue to monitor the situation.

Cluster munitions

28.Human Rights Watch reported on 14 February 2015 that the Saudi-led coalition was using cluster munitions supplied by the United States in Yemen despite evidence of civilian casualties. It was noted in the UN Panel of Experts report that the military spokesman of Saudi Arabia, Brigadier General Ahmed Asiri, had indicated that Saudi Arabia had used cluster munitions on or against armoured vehicles in Yemen.38 We were told that the UK has not supplied cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia “for many decades”39. The UK has not supplied, maintained or supported these weapons since signing the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2008. Even though neither Saudi Arabia nor the United States are signatories to the convention, the coalition’s alleged use of these weapons might contravene IHL and is significant for the UK Government which, as a signatory, is obliged to do all they can to prevent the use of cluster munitions in armed conflict. As Oliver Sprague from Amnesty International explained:

It is important in two ways. First, as a general view on the conduct of the hostilities, the UK is clearly saying that cluster munitions are a prohibited weapon and they can never have a legitimate use in conflict because of their disproportionate effect on civilians. Therefore, if an armed force is deploying those weapons, it should ring very clear alarm bells about the conduct of that armed force in relation to that conflict.

The second point is the legal position of the UK on the provision of cluster munitions. If you look at the cluster munitions treaty, it is very clear in its obligations. It is not just about whether the UK is being used to deploy them or selling them; it is about whether the UK is facilitating their use. That is not just whether it is on aircraft; it is UK personnel. My earlier point was that that is a question for the Government. The Government need to be very clear about what steps they have taken in this conflict to ensure that they are fulfilling their obligations under the cluster munitions treaty. Secondly, by using these weapons, Saudi Arabia and its allies are demonstrating a casual disregard for the rules of war, which should be a very important and significant factor in the UK’s decision whether or not to supply weaponry to them, given the examples of how they are being used.40

29.From a legal perspective, Professor Philippe Sands QC agreed that the reports on the coalition’s use of cluster munitions needed to be considered further by the UK Government:

It is certainly a factor that could be taken into account. I do not think that it is likely to be a dispositive factor as such. However, if a country uses weaponry of a particular kind, in particular circumstances, when it ought not to be doing so, one would form the impression that it is more likely to be doing other things that it ought not to be doing. That would push HMG to look with greater care at whether it is appropriate in all the circumstances to be contributing, where that is happening.

It is an interesting question. I would put it this way. You cannot say that it is irrelevant and you cannot say that it is dispositive, but it is certainly a factor I would want to know more about.41

30.On 23 May 2016, Amnesty International reported that they had identified and documented a UK-supplied BL-755 cluster munition used by the coalition on farmland in a village in northern Yemen.42 In response to the Amnesty International report, the Foreign Secretary told the House of Commons that the Government had had assurances from Saudi Arabia that cluster munitions had not been used in the conflict in Yemen, but that the MoD would be urgently investigating the allegations.43 As the then Minister for Defence Procurement, Philip Dunne MP, responded to an Urgent Question in the House:

Based on all the information available to us, including sensitive coalition operational reporting, we assess that no UK-supplied cluster weapons have been used, and that no UK-supplied aircraft have been involved in the use of UK cluster weapons, in the current conflict in Yemen […] The Saudis have previously denied using UK cluster munitions during the conflict in Yemen, but we are seeking fresh assurances in the light of this serious new allegation.44

31.Mr Ellwood, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, raised cluster munitions (CM) in a letter to us on 18 May 2016, in which he confirmed that “the UK did provide CM to Saudi Arabia in the 1990s, but we understand that none of these CM have been used in Yemen and no UK-supplied aircraft have been used to deploy CM in Yemen.”45 The evidence published by Amnesty International, five days after this letter was sent, raises serious questions about the Government’s understanding both in terms of the use of cluster munitions by the coalition in Yemen and the use of UK-supplied aircraft in deploying them.

32.Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented evidence of the Saudi-led coalition’s use of cluster munitions in Yemen. Cluster munitions are banned under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, to which the UK is a signatory, although Saudi Arabia is not. That notwithstanding, Saudi Arabia’s reported use of cluster munitions in Yemen could contravene international humanitarian law and calls into question the coalition’s wider respect for the rules of war. Evidence of a UK-supplied cluster munition dropped by the coalition in Yemen means this is a matter which the UK Government must address.

33.We do not believe that the UK Government can meet its obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions by relying on assurances from the Saudis. We recommend that the Ministry of Defence carry out its own investigation into the evidence of a UK-supplied cluster bomb found in Yemen. We also recommend that the Government, as a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, set out the steps it has taken not only to make sure UK-supplied aircraft and UK personnel are not in any way implicated in the use or deployment of these weapons, which is prohibited under the Convention, but also the steps it has taken to stop Saudi Arabia from using cluster munitions.

Investigations into reports of violations of International Humanitarian Law

34.It was noted by the International Development Committee that a proposal for an international independent mechanism for investigating violations of IHL in Yemen was tabled by the Netherlands at the UN Human Rights Council meeting in September 2015, but was not adopted in favour of a Saudi text which did not include any reference to an independent inquiry.46 The UK supported the Saudi proposals that they investigate violations of IHL attributed to them in the first instance. As Mr Ellwood told us:

What Britain did, along with other nations, was to make sure that the text provided was eventually agreed unanimously, and that meant the onus was on the Saudis initially to do the investigation. I make it very clear that this is nothing new. When other countries, including ourselves, are in operations overseas and mistakes—collateral damage—take place, the country that is responsible conducts its own independent inquiry and presents the results.47

35.Members of the Saudi-led coalition including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Yemen, formed the Joint Incidents Assessment Team (JIAT) to investigate allegations of breaches of international humanitarian law in Yemen. Witnesses to the inquiry have questioned the efficacy and transparency of the JIAT, and have raised concerns about the time it has taken for the JIAT to publish its work.48

36.The Saudi authorities announced on 31 January 2016 the results of an investigation into the October 2015 airstrike on a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) facility in Sa’ada. Mr Ellwood wrote to us about the steps taken by the Saudis following this investigation49, as follows:

Inviting MSF to Riyadh to discuss the incident and agree on new measures, including a hot line to MSF and greater protection for hospitals;
Setting up a new investigation team outside Coalition Command to review all existing procedures and suggest improvements;
Improving Saudi procedures on rules of engagement and targeting;
Ensuring that people on the ground who are providing intelligence to Coalition forces are aware of all protected sites on the no strike list and have better means of communicating information to pilots; and
Providing additional IHL training for Saudi officers and pilots, including courses supported by the US and UK.

37.On 4 August, the JIAT released the results of eight further investigations of incidents where there were allegations of violations of IHL. These investigations found that the Coalition had abided by the military rules of engagement in six out of the eight instances, and that mistakes were made in the other two, for which it will pay reparations to the victims’ families. Mr Ellwood admitted:

I share the Committee’s frustration that that information has been slow to come forward. This is a nation that is not used to sharing information in this manner and to having to expose internationally the details of what it does. This is the first time it has had to do sustained warfare. It must look up and answer to the international standards that we expect. We will make it very clear if we feel that it does not meet those standards, but we require time, and Saudi Arabia will require time, to provide the analysis that needs to be done in all these cases.50

38.The Yemeni National Commission of Inquiry was due to report on their investigations to the UN Human Rights Council in March 2015; instead, they agreed to provide an update later in the year. Mr Ellwood told the House on 4 July 2016 that they would now report back to the next session of the Human Rights Council in September51—12 months since the commission of inquiry was set up and six months after the original target. Mr Ellwood also told us about an Independent Committee with foreign advisors to investigate Saudi Arabian military activity in Yemen which was announced on 29 February 2016 and which the Minister expected would shortly begin work when he wrote to us on 18 May 2016.52 Reports of IHL abuses cannot be verified without reports from the Saudis, without which those responsible cannot be held accountable nor reparations made. As a report on the Yemen crisis for VICE News in the US explained:

Mike Newton, a former US soldier and military lawyer and one of the leading American authorities on international humanitarian law, quibbles with the way groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch interpret humanitarian law. For human rights organizations, establishing what appears to be a widespread pattern of indiscriminate attacks that cause large numbers of civilian casualties is enough to prove the law has been broken. But under the complex legal framework involved in such cases, Newton says, rights organizations would have to have highly precise details from the ground and from inside the coalition operations center, which they almost certainly do not.53

39.This process was clarified to us by Mr Ellwood, who said:

With any information that is provided to us via NGOs on the ground or, indeed, a UN expert panel, we must make sure that the Saudi independent investigations committee has the opportunity to investigate and make a report. Yes, it has been slow—far too slow—and they must improve. They have not had experience of this. They will report back and we will then make a judgment.54

40.However, by repeatedly insisting that all UK extant arms licences to Saudi Arabia are compliant with the UK’s legal obligations, the UK Government is making a judgement: that there is no risk that arms sold to Saudi Arabia will be used to violate IHL in Yemen. The then Minister for Defence Procurement, Philip Dunne MP, told us how the UK Government was able to make that judgement:

When an incident is brought to our attention, whether by the Saudis or by NGOs, we seek access to the operational reports which, as I have explained, the Saudis are willing to provide to us. We look at our own sources of information to see whether there is any information to which we have access from our own sources that might provide more or corroborating information in relation to the incident. Then we analyse that to see whether or not the incident appears to have involved a strike from the air and whether or not that strike might have been caused by weapons that we have supplied. We form an analysis in that regard, in relation to potential incidents, and encourage the Saudi armed forces to do their own investigation, to see whether they think that incident is or is not compliant with IHL.55

41.In its evidence to this inquiry, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office explained the basis for their judgement that arms export licences to Saudi Arabia are compliant with the UK’s export licensing criteria:

In particular we note that: (1) the Saudi-led Coalition is not targeting civilians; (2) Saudi Arabian processes and procedures have been put in place to ensure respect for the principles of IHL; (3) Saudi Arabia is investigating incidents of concern, including those involving civilian casualties; (4) Saudi Arabia has throughout engaged in constructive dialogue with the UK about both its processes and incidents of concern; (5) Saudi Arabia has been and remains genuinely committed to IHL compliance. The Government is currently satisfied that extant licences for Saudi Arabia are compliant with the UK’s export licensing criteria.56

Human Rights Watch wrote to the Foreign Secretary to contest each of the above five points.57 When asked about the first point, Professor Philippe Sands QC told us that it depended on the meaning of “They are not targeting civilians”. He argued that while it was unlikely that the Saudi authorities were identifying groups of civilians and targeting them, they were bombing entire towns or entire areas and that that is on its face a violation of international humanitarian law.”58

42.David Mepham of Human Rights Watch described the claim that Saudi Arabia has been and remains genuinely committed to IHL compliance as “remarkable”59 given the scale of civilian casualties from airstrikes in Yemen. He told us that, even under increased international scrutiny, Saudi conduct in Yemen had not changed:

The pattern of indiscriminate attacks we have described has continued. There was discussion the other day with the Saudis suggesting they may be trying to scale back their military offensive, but the bombs continue to fall. A press release put out by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights talked about a strike that took place last week that killed 106 civilians in a crowded village market in north-western Yemen […] So I do not think there has been a change in the pattern of their conduct in this conflict.60

43.It is challenging for the public to effectively scrutinise the Government’s claims as it has provided very little evidence in response to reports of IHL violations and is relying on information and reports from the Saudis to which independent observers are not privy. As we heard from Dr Anna Stavrianakis, “The Government’s response thus far has been to say, “We have a policy. It’s okay,” or, “We’ve been reassured by the Saudis. It’s okay,” but there is a whole series of credible allegations the Government have simply not responded to.”61 She questioned why the Government had not responded to these criticisms and why it had not provided any evidence to refute them.

44.We were told that an international independent investigation into reports of violations of IHL is the most appropriate means for verifying incident information in a transparent and credible way. David Mepham of Human Rights Watch stressed to us the importance of an international and independent investigation in order to establish the facts. He pointed out that the UK Government had championed such an investigation in Sri Lanka at the same Human Rights Council meeting at which the Dutch proposal for an inquiry in Yemen was blocked.62

45.The reports of violations of international humanitarian law in Yemen since September 2014 have been widespread, with all parties to the conflict being accused of failing to meet their respective obligations under international humanitarian law. We welcome the progress that has been made to date by the Saudi-led coalition to establish the mechanisms to investigate allegations of violations of international humanitarian law. We agree with the Government that it is appropriate for the Saudi-led coalition to investigate these allegations in the first instance. However, further progress is needed to ensure that the Joint Incidents Assessment Team is transparent, credible, and publishes its investigations in a timely manner. We recommend that the UK Government offer its support to the Joint Incidents Assessment Team where appropriate so that it can meet these ends. We also believe that an independent, United Nations-led investigation of alleged violations by all parties to the conflict is necessary to supplement the internal investigations of the Saudi-led coalition. We recommend that the UK Government support calls for the establishment of such an investigation as a matter of urgency.

4 HC Deb 24 May 2016, Yemen: Cluster Munitions [Philip Dunne]

5 International Development Committee, 4th Report of Session 2015–16, Crisis in Yemen HC532, Summary

6 Q 50

7 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Press briefing note on Yemen, 10 June 2016

8 UN General Assembly Security Council, Children and Armed Conflict, 20 April 2016, para 164

9 UNICEF evidence to IDC (YEM 0015)

10 “Some 13 million Yemenis need immediate help amid bleak conditions – senior UN relief official” UN News Centre, 16 June 2016

11 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2016- Yemen, (November 2015)

12 UN News Centre, More than half of Yemen’s population now food insecure- UN, 21 June 2016

13 “Some 13 million Yemenis need immediate help amid bleak conditions – senior UN relief official” UN News Centre, 16 June 2016

14 “Some 13 million Yemenis need immediate help amid bleak conditions – senior UN relief official” UN News Centre, 16 June 2016

15 “Some 13 million Yemenis need immediate help amid bleak conditions – senior UN relief official” UN News Centre, 16 June 2016

16 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_73.pdf)

17 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UKY 0013) para 28

18 Q204

19 Q134

20 International Committee of the Red Cross, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts, October 2015, p 25

21 United National General Assembly Security Council, Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, 20 April 2016, para 6

22 “State of Crisis: Explosive Weapons in Yemen”, Action on Armed Violence and UN OCHA, September 2015, p3

23 “State of Crisis: Explosive Weapons in Yemen”, Action on Armed Violence and UN OCHA, September 2015, p7

24 UN Security Council, Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 26 January 2016, para 123

25 United Nations General Assembly Security Council, Children and armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, 20 April 2016, paras 167–169

26 UN Security Council, Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 26 January 2016, para 137

27 UN Security Council, Letter dated 22 January 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 26 January 2016, para 129

28 HC Deb 28 Jan 2016, Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia, c428 [Tobias Ellwood]; WH Deb 22 Mar 2016, War in Yemen: First Anniversary, c517 WH [Tobias Ellwood]

29 Q191

30 Q3

31 Q8

32 Q4

33 https://news.vice.com/article/dead-civilians-uneasy-alliances-and-the-fog-of-yemens-war, evidence given to the International Development Committee Q9 (Roy Isbister); UK Working Group on Arms (UKY 0012) para 7

34 Dr Anna Stavrianakis (UKY 0003) para 8

35 Professor Philippe Sands QC, Professor Andrew Clapham and Blinne Ni Ghralaigh, Legal Opinion: the lawfulness of the authorisation by the United Kingdom of weapons and related items for export to Saudi Arabia in the context of Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen, 11 December 2015, para 6.28

36 Q82

37 “Some 13 million Yemenis need immediate help amid bleak conditions – senior UN relief official” UN News Centre, 16 June 2016

38 UN Panel of Experts report, para 130

39 Q187 [Philip Dunne]

40 Q37