6.The idea that donors should give 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) in official development assistance (ODA) comes from the report of the Pearson Commission on International Development in 1969, which was set up by the World Bank to look at the effectiveness of the World Bank’s development assistance. It proposed that ODA “be raised to 0.70% of donor GNP [gross national product] by 1975, and in no case later than 1980”. The idea behind this target was that, if all donors were to provide this amount, the need for development assistance would soon cease as recipients would be able to become self-sufficient. The Commission was also clear, though, that what it was calling for was not just more aid, but also better aid.
7.In 1970, the United Nations General Assembly signed up to the target, although progress towards it since has been slow. Among members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), while Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark all reached the target by 1980 and continue to do so, only Luxembourg (in 2000) and the UK have since joined that group. Both major political parties in the UK pledged to hit the 0.7% target in their 2010 manifestos. The target was reached by the UK in 2013, and subsequently enshrined into law through a private member’s bill—the International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Bill 2015.
8.The 2015 UK aid strategy sought to demonstrate how ODA spending is in the UK’s national interest. Through our inquiries in this Parliament, we have seen first-hand that this is true. We have seen how UK aid spending has allowed refugees fleeing the war in Syria to settle closer to home, so that they did not have to make the dangerous journey to Europe and the UK. We have seen how UK leadership in Sierra Leone kept the Ebola outbreak contained, preventing it from spreading to neighbouring countries and becoming a global crisis, while saving countless lives. We have seen how UK support to address the drivers of conflict in northern Nigeria, including addressing issues relating to employment and empowerment, is countering radicalisation and allowing the region to stabilise in the context of Boko Haram terrorism.
9.After the vote to leave the European Union, UK aid and DFID’s expertise can also play an important role in giving the UK a global leadership role, and allowing the UK to build strong and mutually beneficial partnerships with other countries. Former Secretary of State for International Development Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell MP told us that “Britain has huge moral authority because we have stuck to our promise of providing 0.7% of our gross national income on development. [ … ] That gives us very substantial ability to exert moral and practical pressure on the way in which the system develops.” Former Prime Minister Rt Hon Gordon Brown told us that:
You have to have a consistent policy on aid, which lasts across Governments, which is long term and not short term, and therefore I think the target is an important way of recognising how central overseas aid is to the success of anti-poverty policies around the world, but to the success of our objectives in international relations. [ … ] Aid has to be understood in the context of an interdependent world, where if we do not help each other and help ourselves deal with some of the problems we all face together, then we ourselves in Britain will face greater pressures as a result.
Through our work as a Committee we have seen that UK aid spending can be, and often is, a strong investment contributing to create a more prosperous world, which pays far-reaching dividends including to UK taxpayers at home.
10.As well as seeing the benefits, including domestically, of ODA, we are well aware of the criticisms. The 0.7% target has come under heavy fire in recent months. This stems in part from the perceived unfairness of protecting the aid budget, while other domestic budgets are being cut. A petition created by The Mail on Sunday on the parliamentary petitions website gathered 235,979 signatures leading to a debate in Westminster Hall. The petition argued that “Despite spending cuts at home the Government is committed to hand over 0.7% of national income in overseas aid, regardless of need.” The subsequent Westminster Hall debate was broadly supportive of the 0.7% target, with the majority of participating MPs speaking in favour of it.
11.There has also been criticism that the 0.7% target has unintended consequences. ODA flows are reported for the calendar year, while departmental budgets are allocated by the financial year. In addition, reliable estimates of GNI can only be reached after the end of the year. This can make planning more difficult, and it has been alleged, such as by the journalist Ian Birrell, that there is pressure for the UK to “simply shovel cash out the door” at the end of each calendar year to meet the target. In turn, it is alleged that this leads to prioritising the amount spent rather than effectiveness and the result achieved, leading to wasteful spending.
12.We agree with our predecessor committee in supporting the 0.7% commitment. We acknowledge and understand concern that aid spending is protected whilst domestic spending is not. We have already set out that we think that aid spending is in the national interest. It is right that every penny of the 0.7% is spent as effectively as possible, to tackle the harshest examples of poverty, humanitarian need, and causes of instability, and we regard it as our primary function as a Committee to scrutinise spending to ensure it achieves maximum benefit for its beneficiaries and the UK taxpayer. In doing so we are glad to have the support of the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) and the National Audit Office (NAO), which together guarantee that foreign aid is the most scrutinised part of UK Government spending. There have been some examples of ineffective spending and we have sought to identify these and make suggestions for improvements. The examples we have seen of less effective spending do not represent a considerable portion of, nor are they an inevitable consequence of, the 0.7% target. As we discuss further in para 34, maximising the value for money of aid spending often requires innovation, which means that there is a higher level of risk. In our view this is reasonable if risk is carefully managed and each experience is learned from, as it allows greater results to be achieved in the end.
13.We consider that DFID should be capable of spending the 0.7% in an effective way. We have not seen evidence that poor or wasteful spending is any more of a problem for DFID than any other government department or other international donors; instead we would assess it to be effective in its spending. What we have seen over the last year leads us to the conclusion that poor spending which does exist often reflects reductions in DFID’s own capacity. DFID’s staff numbers have not kept pace with its increase in spending. This has led to pressure to spend money through a small number of large programmes, rather than a larger number of small ones. It has also reduced DFID’s ability to closely oversee some programmes. Later in this Report, we deal with the issue of capacity and suggest it should be increased. We think that this change would go a long way to addressing many of the specific and practical issues which critics often associate with the 0.7% target.
14.In addition, DFID is often accused of ‘dumping money’, including by some strong supporters of UK aid and the 0.7% target, through large multilateral organisations and multi-donor trust funds administered by the World Bank and European Development Fund, where it is alleged the money often sits unused with high charges for administration. In the Multilateral Development Review, both of these multilateral organisations were assessed to be very effective in achieving development results. It has been suggested to us that, rather than paying high charges for the administration of and having its money sit in trust funds run by multilaterals, DFID should set up its own fund. We think that DFID should explore the idea of creating a mechanism for carrying funds forward which could then support its work when the need arose.
15.In paragraph 45 we question how DFID makes decisions about which type of delivery mechanism to use to deliver aid and development. In some cases working multilaterally may be the best way to achieve results by reaching further to beneficiaries through existing structures or pooled resources. However, we are concerned that DFID’s lack of capacity is limiting its choices and effectiveness which makes it more difficult for it to balance its spending to the target across the year.
16.We have seen the great need for development assistance globally and the life changing opportunities it provides. We have visited schools in Jordan and Lebanon which would be unable to provide an education without UK support. We have met people in Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo whose jobs and livelihoods, and therefore their route out of poverty, have only been available due to the work that DFID is doing. Over the past year we have inquired into humanitarian crises in Syria, Yemen and South Sudan; crises where basic needs such as food and shelter are only being provided because the UK is able to fund them. As Rt Hon Gordon Brown told us, “There is no way under present circumstances that the demand for help, whether it is humanitarian or development aid, is going to fall. It would be unrealistic to expect that in the short term we have to do anything other than increase our support for humanitarian aid.”
17.The Secretary of State told us that she has “been very clear on the 0.7% that we will honour the commitments that we have made on development.” She went on to say that “a wellfinanced aid budget is obviously there to deliver tangible results to the world’s poorest in challenging parts of the world.” The Prime Minister, in her first speech to the UN, also stated that “We will continue to honour our commitment to spend 0.7% of our Gross National Income on development, building on the achievements we have already made to reduce poverty, deal with instability and increase prosperity the world over.” The Chancellor told the House of Commons that “we have a manifesto commitment to spend 0.7% of GDP on overseas aid. That commitment has been legislated for and is therefore locked, unless this House were to decide otherwise.” The Secretary of State also recently gave a robust defence of aid at the March 2017 Bond Annual Conference. She told the conference that “It matters for our place in the world and I completely believe we should stand tall and be proud in the world, I think it speaks to our leadership. It speaks to the values that we have, as a country but as individuals as well. Yes, our moral values, but also because it’s in our national interest.”
18.Aid and development spending must truly follow need, and we have no doubt that there is sufficient need in the world for the commitment to the 0.7% target to be necessary. If all countries were meeting this commitment the chances of ultimately eliminating development need would be much greater; the fact that the UK hits the target gives the Government leverage to convince other countries to do the same. The inaction of others does not dissipate the UK’s responsibility to meet the target. This is both morally right and in our national interest. The response to many of the criticisms of aid spending is for DFID to continue to strive to spend better, not for it to spend less. It is our challenge to the Secretary of State to lead the Department in a way which displays the value for money and impact of good UK aid spending.
19.The existence of an independent department responsible for UK development spending has a chequered history. The Labour government led by Harold Wilson in 1964 set up a Ministry of Overseas Development. When Edward Heath’s Conservatives took over in 1970, this was merged back into the Foreign Office and eventually became the Overseas Development Administration. In 1997, the Labour government again separated it out from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this time as the Department for International Development. Since then, DFID has been the department with primary responsibility for spending official development assistance (ODA). Over the last Spending Review period (2011–15), DFID was responsible for about 85% of the total UK ODA budget. This amounted to just over £10 billion in 2014, which stands in stark contrast to the total UK ODA budget of around £2 billion in 1997 when DFID was set up (about £2.78 billion in real terms in 2014 values).
20.The Conservative Party manifesto in 2015 included a pledge to “maintain an independent Department for International Development”. Despite this, questions continue to be raised about whether DFID should continue in its current form, or whether it should be returned to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In 2013, before her appointment as Secretary of State for International Development, Rt Hon Priti Patel MP expressed the view that the Government should consider replacing DFID with a “Department for International Trade and Development in order to enable the UK to focus on enhancing trade with the developing world and seek out new investment opportunities in the global race.” Recently, a former DFID minister, Rt Hon Grant Shapps MP, expressed similar views in an article for The Sunday Times, in which he called DFID’s spending “out of control”. He argued that “we need to rejoin the work of DFID to that of the Foreign Office”, because “if we continue to spend cash with so little reference to our own national interests, or indeed sometimes the interests of the populations of the recipient countries, then we will risk forfeiting British taxpayers’ consent.”
21.Our predecessor Committee looked at the possible models and concluded that DFID should remain an independent department, to avoid “marginalising development” and “losing technical development expertise”. Former Secretary of State for International Development, Rt Hon Clare Short, argued that, while the Foreign Office has “superb diplomats”, they “are not good at managing money, but they were obsessed with money. I do not know what has happened since, but the global fund for preventing conflict was a useless instrument, not very well managed. They are very good at some things and they should do what they are good at.” Since being appointed Secretary of State in July 2016, Priti Patel has made clear that she is committed to DFID as an independent department. When we asked her about it, she told us:
Obviously, the department has an incredible reputation internationally. Also, when we look at the way in which our partners around the world lean into DFID as well for skills, for expertise or shared learning, of course that will continue. Certainly, over the last seven weeks I have been getting a stronger feel for that and, secondly, I have been working with and speaking to many of my counterparts, because they recognise the great value and significance of DFID as a department, but also the expertise, shared learning and practices that we have.
22.One of the largest changes in the 2015 UK aid strategy was the large increase in the amount of ODA which is planned to be spent by departments other than DFID. Over the current Spending Review period (2015–20) DFID is only expected to spend about 72% of the total UK ODA budget. This opens up more of the budget to be spent by departments such as the Department for Business, Enterprise and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), as well as through cross-government funds like the Conflict, Security and Stabilisation Fund (CSSF) and the Prosperity Fund. In contrast to DFID, which has ending extreme poverty as its sole goal, other departments have more complicated objectives, raising questions over how their aid spending will be focused. In our interim Report in this inquiry we made clear our view that poverty reduction should be the explicit goal of all UK ODA spending, and should be a legal obligation for the spending of ODA, regardless of which department is spending it. We also raised concerns about the capacity and capability of those departments to deliver aid effectively, in contrast to a specialised department like DFID, and the transparency and accountability of those departments, in contrast to DFID which scores highly on the international Aid Transparency Index. Recent reports on the Prosperity Fund, from the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), and the CSSF, from the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS), have not set our minds at ease, especially on transparency issues.
23.We do not believe that abolishing DFID as an independent department would lead to any improvement in the quality of UK aid spending. The effect of merging DFID into another department would be to dilute its expertise as a specialist development department. The only outcome of such a move would be to diminish the focus placed on poverty reduction and development in UK aid spending, as the majority of ODA would become subject to more complex objectives in another department. This would heavily weaken its purpose and effectiveness, almost certainly outweighing any efficiencies or savings. We therefore strongly welcome the Secretary of State’s commitment to maintaining DFID as an independent department, and expect this to remain so in the long-term future.
25.In the first phase of this inquiry, and in our interim Report, we covered a number of smaller technical issues. These included the use of traditional general budget support, the target for ‘non-fiscal’ spending, and the use of Payment by Results. These are all areas where, to some degree or other, we expressed the view that DFID was being set or was setting itself arbitrary rules and targets that did not necessarily correspond to the evidence on effective development. We do not intend to cover these issues in detail again, but wish to briefly follow up on the Government’s response to our interim Report.
26.DFID is ending all of its traditional general budget support—giving money directly through beneficiary governments. DFID’s focus on fragile and conflict-affected states means that there are fewer governments with which it is working to whom it is appropriate to give general budget support. General budget support should not be used with governments with high levels of mismanagement or corruption. There is, however, evidence which shows that, when used and managed appropriately, general budget support can be an effective means of development. We therefore recommended that DFID should consider “the case for an option to give general budget support in exceptional circumstances, where systems are in place to effectively monitor transparency and accountability.” DFID disagreed with this recommendation, stating that it “will neither start any new, nor restart any previous, traditional general budget support programmes in conventional aid settings” as DFID increasingly works in countries where it is less appropriate and with different needs.
27.DFID is required by Treasury rules to spend £5 billion of ‘non-fiscal’ capital—spending such as loans, equity investments and contributions to multilateral development banks, which do not impact net public sector debt—over the Spending Review period. While we supported an appropriate level of ‘non-fiscal’ spending, we felt that “the target can force DFID to spend large amounts of money through a small number of channels”, including the IDA and CDC. We therefore recommended that this target should be relaxed, to “grant DFID the flexibility to spend in whatever way DFID deems will be most effective.” DFID disagreed with this recommendation as well, arguing that “The appropriate level for financial transactions within DFID’s budget was agreed through the SR.” Since that Report, Parliament has passed legislation allowing DFID to recapitalise CDC by a further £4.5 billion. DFID has indicated that it wishes to do so over the course of the next few years, which would cover the majority of its ‘non-fiscal’ target.
28.We also criticised DFID’s use of Payment by Results, where some funds are only disbursed if certain results are achieved, in 80% of its new centrally-procured contracts. We concluded that “there is still only weak evidence in support of Payment by Results and that it can have negative consequences.” We recommended that “DFID should reduce its use of Payment by Results until it has a stronger evidence base and the deeper knowledge and understanding to implement it without negative consequences.” While DFID agreed “to expand the evidence base on what works best through learning-by-doing”, it rejected our recommendation and insisted that it “is proceeding with caution and learning from experience to ensure that expansion of [Payment by Results] delivers increased value for money and development impact.” We note that the Independent Commission for Aid Impact is currently looking at DFID’s use of Payment by Results.
29.DFID works best when it works flexibly, especially in the fragile and conflict-affected states on which it now focuses. The strict rules and targets surrounding budget support, ‘non-fiscal’ spending, and Payment by Results can be damaging to effective development and can lead to perverse outcomes. While DFID may assess all of the targets and rules surrounding budget support, ‘non-fiscal’ spending, and Payment by Results to be correct right now, it should keep them under constant review and be willing to relax them when appropriate, in order to have the flexibility required to spend effectively.
30.DFID is currently operating in an environment of intense media scrutiny and criticism. One strong element of this is a campaign being run by the Mail on Sunday which opposes the 0.7% target. At times this media scrutiny has been very helpful in uncovering serious issues in UK aid spending. It was partly as a result of the Mail on Sunday’s coverage of private contractor costs that we launched our inquiry into DFID’s use of contractors, and it was as a result of its coverage that we investigated the Conduct of Adam Smith International, when Adam Smith International acted improperly in the submission of beneficiary testimonials to us. However, at other times we have found much media coverage to be misleading about the nature of aid spending. For example, regular articles on UK aid going to beneficiaries in countries with high levels of corruption tend to omit or barely mention the detail that this money never goes through the governments of those countries, but instead goes to specific programmes which DFID is overseeing. This creates the strong impression to readers that UK aid money is going to corrupt governments and being squandered on private luxuries; something of which we have seen no evidence. We think that it is important for the debate surrounding the 0.7% target to take place in an honest and informed way, and we welcome media coverage which is in this vein.
31.We have become particularly frustrated with the coverage of reports from scrutiny bodies, including ourselves, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, and the National Audit Office. We trust the media to accurately convey the contents of our Reports, with the appropriate context. On occasion, this has not been done. This creates a risk that scrutiny bodies will have to spend more time concerned with media handling, and how aspects of their reports might or could be taken out of context, rather than on robust scrutiny of DFID and ensuring that UK aid money is spent well.
32.We will continue to fulfil our responsibility for the robust scrutiny of aid and development expenditure, including cases brought to our attention in evidence and media coverage. We do this because we recognise the need for and value of such spending. UK aid and international development is a subject meriting well-informed public debate supported by accurate and factual journalism. We will continue to work alongside the Independent Commission for Aid Impact and the National Audit Office, to pursue robust and fair scrutiny. The media has a responsibility to be accurate and contextual given its role in influencing public understanding and opinion.
33.We received compelling written evidence from Dr Jonathan Fisher, Senior Lecturer in African Politics and Director of the International Development Department at the University of Birmingham, arguing that, in contrast to most other areas of risk, DFID is poor in managing reputational risk. He noted that “limited guidance is available on understanding, recognising and responding to reputational risk”, and he highlighted research showing that reputational concerns are central to a number of aid allocation decisions (including budget support suspensions, which have ultimately led to the ending of general budget support as noted above). He also stated that “Recent research suggests that DFID officials interpret public support for or opposition to key decisions through media headlines”, and therefore argued that “if DFID officials are to base key decisions on aid flows and modalities upon considerations of UK public opinion then their understandings of the latter should be better informed.”
34.We are concerned with DFID’s management of its reputational risk. We note that programmes occasionally appear to be closed based on negative media headlines, despite performing well in DFID’s own assessments and without a proper review of the programmes being undertaken. Some reputational risk is inherent in what DFID does, especially with an increased focus on fragile states and regions. World Vision told us that, if DFID wanted to be more innovative, “it needs to review and increase its risk profile”, and the Bond Disability and Development Group similarly said that “reaching the most marginalised may require a higher level of innovation and therefore a larger risk appetite.”
35.At the start of this inquiry, we felt that DFID was not doing well enough in communicating when it was doing good work and correcting inaccurate coverage. We have been monitoring DFID’s response to this media environment, and the quality of its communications, throughout this inquiry. The situation has since improved, with DFID being more proactive and launching a page on its website responding to recent media articles, which has led to the correction of at least one inaccurate headline. The Secretary of State told us, when she was challenged on how DFID was communicating its good work, that “I am speaking emphatically about the great work that not only DFID does but also, importantly, that our 0.7% does in the world. I am committed to that, and I have said that at every single opportunity.”
36.While there has been some improvement, we still do not believe that DFID is robust in its communications and managing reputational risk. The creation of its ‘DFID in the news’ page is a positive step in this regard but, without proactively advertising it, we think that it is unlikely to gain much exposure or traction with the general public. We urge DFID to continue improving its communications and to be more proactive in publicising when it is doing good work and achieving life-changing impact around the world, with the Secretary of State and ministers leading proactively in this regard.
37.DFID’s decisions as to the allocation of resources should be based on evidence rather than media coverage. We are concerned that it does not have a clearly set reputational risk appetite, which leads it to avoid or close down innovative and effective programmes which might draw negative headlines. This is a particularly important issue as other government departments spend more of the aid budget, which creates additional reputational risks. We recommend that DFID produces clear guidance on how to manage reputational risk, the level of its reputational risk appetite, and how to respond to reputational risk issues in the aid budget across the Government. Part of this guidance should include how the performance of a programme should be reviewed if it receives negative media attention before any decision is taken as to its closure.
12 Apart from the Netherlands which has occasionally fallen below the target.
13 The United Arab Emirates also consistently hits the 0.7% target, but is currently only a DAC Participant, not a member.
15 HM Treasury and Department for International Development, UK aid: tackling global challenges in the national interest, , November 2015
19 Oral evidence taken on 14 March 2016, HC (2015–16) , Q65 [Mr Mitchell]
20 Oral evidence taken on 26 January 2017, HC , Q82
21 UK Government and Parliament Petitions, ‘’, accessed 24 February 2017
22 HC Deb, 13 June 2016,
25 International Development Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2013–14, The Future of UK Development Co-operation: Phase 1: Development Finance, HC 334, pp 11–13
26 Owen Barder, ‘’, accessed 10 March 2017
28 Department for International Development, Raising the standard: the Multilateral Development Review 2016, December 2016, p 16
29 International Development Committee, ‘’, accessed 27 February 2017
30 See International Development Committee, Second Report of Session 2016–17, DFID’s programme in Nigeria, HC 110, and International Development Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2016–17, Fragility and development in the Democratic Republic of Congo, HC 99
31 See International Development Committee, First Report of Session 2015–16, Syrian refugee crisis, HC 463, International Development Committee, ‘’, accessed 27 February 2017, and International Development Committee, ‘’, accessed 27 February 2017
32 One country which we have looked at (South Sudan) is now in a state of famine, while two more (Nigeria and Yemen) are at high risk of famine.
33 Oral evidence taken on 26 January 2017, HC , Q84
34 Oral evidence taken on 14 September 2016, HC , Q19
35 Prime Minister’s Office, ‘’, accessed 27 February 2017
36 HC Deb, 15 March 2017,
37 Department for International Development, ‘’, accessed 21 March 2017
39 Department for International Development, Annual Report and Accounts 2013–14, HC (2014–15) , para 1.12
42 “Some countries do not need our money any more, says Andrew Mitchell”, The Telegraph, 16 June 2013
43 “Our aid saves lives—but I saw how it empowered tyrants too”, The Sunday Times, 29 January 2017
44 International Development Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2014–15, The Future of UK Development Co-operation: Phase 2: Beyond Aid, HC 663, pp 32–36
45 Oral evidence taken on 14 March 2016, HC (2015–16) , Q77 [Clare Short]
46 Oral evidence taken on 14 September 2016, HC , Q2
47 Oral evidence taken on 23 February 2016, HC (2015–16) , Q11
51 International Development Committee, ‘’, accessed 24 February 2017
53 International Development Committee, First Special Report of Session 2016–17, UK aid: allocation of resources: interim report: Government Response to the Committee’s Third Report of Session 2015–16, HC 256
54 ActionAid () para 15
56 International Development Committee, First Special Report of Session 2016–17, UK aid: allocation of resources: interim report: Government Response to the Committee’s Third Report of Session 2015–16, HC 256, pp 5–6
58 International Development Committee, First Special Report of Session 2016–17, UK aid: allocation of resources: interim report: Government Response to the Committee’s Third Report of Session 2015–16, HC 256, p 9
60 Commonwealth Development Corporation Bill Committee, 6 December 2016,
62 International Development Committee, First Special Report of Session 2016–17, UK aid: allocation of resources: interim report: Government Response to the Committee’s Third Report of Session 2015–16, HC 256, p 10
63 International Development Committee, ‘’, accessed 24 February 2017
65 For example, see “Queue here for UK’s £1bn foreign aid cashpoint: Just when you thought it couldn’t get any worse... YOUR cash is doled out in envelopes and on ATM cards loaded with money”, The Daily Mail, 3 January 2017 (cf. Overseas Development Institute, Cash transfers: what does the evidence say? (July 2016)), and “Revealed: How Britain pours £568m of YOUR money into war-torn Somalia despite ‘certain’ risk it will be stolen by ISIS and used to fund terrorism”, The Daily Mail, 4 December 2016 (cf. Independent Commission for Aid Impact, DFID’s approach to managing fiduciary risk in conflict-affected environments (August 2016))
66 For example, see “Foreign aid to most corrupt nations soars 30% in a year: £1.3bn is handed to 20 countries despite warnings it could be stolen or seized by terrorists”, The Daily Mail, 22 December 2016
67 For example, see “Taxpayers should accept foreign aid money will be lost because of corruption, MPs say”, The Telegraph, 19 October 2016 (cf. International Development Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2016–17, Tackling corruption overseas, HC 111)
68 Dr Jonathan Fisher ()
69 For example, see DFID DevTracker, ‘’, accessed 27 February 2017, and DFID DevTracker, ‘’, accessed 27 February 2017
70 World Vision UK () para 17
71 Bond Disability and Development Group () para 4.6.1
72 Department for International Development, ‘’, accessed 27 February 2017
73 “Britain loses millions in foreign aid to fraud without noticing”, The Times, 9 February 2017 (originally “Britain loses £300m in foreign aid to fraud without noticing”, cf. National Audit Office, Department for International Development—Investigation into the Department’s approach to tackling fraud, HC )
27 March 2017