



House of Commons  
International Development  
Committee

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# **DFID's programme in Nigeria**

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**Second Report of Session 2016–17**





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*Report, together with formal minutes relating  
to the report*

*Ordered by the House of Commons  
to be printed 19 July 2016*

## The International Development Committee

The International Development Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Department for International Development and its associated public bodies.

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# Contents

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|   |           |
|---|-----------|
| <b>Summary</b>  | <b>3</b>  |
| <b>1 Introduction</b>   | <b>5</b>  |
| <b>2 Governance—processes and outcomes</b>                              | <b>11</b> |
| Deepening Democracy   | 13        |
| Politically smart programming   | 15        |
| Anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria                                      | 18        |
| Supporting judicial reform in Nigeria                                   | 19        |
| From transparency to accountability                                     | 21        |
| <b>3 Inclusive Economic Development</b>                                 | <b>23</b> |
| Power Sector Reform   | 25        |
| Private Sector-led strategies   | 28        |
| <b>4 Delivering Basic Services</b>                                      | <b>33</b> |
| Political and financial commitment to basic services                    | 34        |
| Delivering quality, inclusive education                                 | 37        |
| Learning from health successes  | 43        |
| Services for women and girls affected by violence                       | 45        |
| <b>5 Conflict and fragility</b>   | <b>48</b> |
| DFID's work in the North East   | 49        |
| Tackling the drivers of conflict  | 53        |
| Reconciliation and community cohesion                                   | 54        |
| <b>Conclusions and recommendations</b>                                  | <b>58</b> |
| <b>Appendix: Programme from the Committee's visit to Nigeria</b>        | <b>66</b> |
| <b>Formal Minutes</b>   | <b>68</b> |
| <b>Witnesses</b>  | <b>69</b> |
| <b>Published written evidence</b>                                       | <b>70</b> |
| <b>List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament</b> | <b>72</b> |



## Summary

With 120 million people living below or only just above the poverty line, 10% of the world's mothers who die in childbirth and 16% of the world's out of school children, the scale and depth of development challenges in Nigeria are significant. Despite the re-establishment of democratic civilian rule in 1999 and decades of impressive economic growth, the vast potential of Africa's most populous nation has yet to be realised. The proceeds of economic successes, largely from the oil sector, have not been shared evenly, with the concentration of poverty in the North contributing to marginalisation and a surge in violence that has killed thousands and devastated the lives of many millions more. Women and girls, particularly in the North, face substantial barriers to empowerment in the form of cultural, social, political and economic disadvantages. Oil wealth has sustained an exclusive political system driven by patronage, and has undermined the accountability of elites to citizens. While the election of the reformist President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015 gives cause for optimism, there is an urgent need to deliver necessary reforms to the economy and structures and processes of governance.

In accordance with the scale and importance of these challenges, the Department for International Development (DFID) has significantly increased its allocation to Nigeria in the last 15 years. Funding for 2016–17 is £266 million, up from £20 million in 2001–02, making it DFID's second largest programme in Africa and third largest in the world. Nigeria fared poorly on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—achieving only two of the eight goals set out by the United Nations in 2000. DFID's increasing prioritisation of Nigeria is thus highly important, particularly given the setting of new global targets in the form of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) last year.

DFID made it clear in evidence to our inquiry that its strategy in Nigeria is focused on helping the Nigeria Government to do better with its own resources. Strengthening the capabilities of the Nigerian authorities through smart, flexible and politically sensitive programming is the most effective way to foster more effective and accountable governance and pave the way towards an eventual exit from aid. Supporting the entrenchment of the democratic process, developing a deeper understanding of Nigeria's political economy, using DFID data and expertise to foster accountability and strengthening the Nigerian judiciary are areas of existing operations that DFID should prioritise.

We view DFID's spending in Nigeria as tackling some of the most important development challenges of the 21st Century. Given its economic potential and rapid population growth, successful development in Nigeria is a global priority. We consider DFID assistance to be important to stability and prosperity in West Africa and thus to the UK national interest.

Basic services such as health and education have not been given the priority they deserve by the Nigerian Government.<sup>1</sup> DFID needs to act as a catalyst to counter these deficiencies.

<sup>1</sup> In 2014, Nigeria spent 0.9% of GDP in public expenditure on healthcare compared with 3.2% in Botswana and 4.2% in South Africa. While the complexity of spending across the different tiers of government make it difficult to make similar cross-country comparisons for education, past reports have indicated that public education spending is low relative to other sub-Saharan African countries, particularly at the primary level.

We are particularly alarmed by the poor prospects for Nigeria's achievement of SDG 4 on inclusive and quality education. The inability of the public school system to cater for all children may necessitate some reliance on private sector provision in certain cases. However, DFID should ensure that expanding the public sector remains its priority and that support for the private sector conforms to the principle of "no one left behind". DFID supports two major education projects in Nigeria. ICAI praised the Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria (ESSPIN) and criticised the Girls' Education Project (GEP) in a 2012 report. Evidence to our inquiry supported this assessment. We welcome DFID's commitment to girls' education in the North, and though we heard of some modest improvements against a low baseline, we remain concerned to see the Girls Education Project's (GEP) consistent failure to deliver twelve years after the first phase was first launched.

The lack of access to electricity constrains the economic potential of millions of Nigerians, yet we have concerns about the way in which DFID is attempting to deliver power sector reforms. While there is likely to be a net benefit to the privatisation of the sector, we are not convinced that the impacts of associated price increases for many poor Nigerians have been sufficiently researched and that measures to mitigate these impacts are adequate. We would also like to see evidence of a more cohesive and complementary strategy between DFID and other parts of Her Majesty's Government (HMG) that have a stake in private sector development in Nigeria.

Despite the operational challenges caused by the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East and other areas of instability, DFID has continued to deliver both development interventions and humanitarian aid by remaining flexible and responsive to the changing security situation. DFID should continue its support to the North East with two urgent priorities:

- (1) Ensure that, unlike in previous years, humanitarian needs are fully funded; and
- (2) Ensure that it is strategically well placed to intervene in reintegrating displaced persons and re-building communities as soon as possible.

# 1 Introduction

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1. Nigeria experienced an unprecedented development in its history in 2015. Despite negative forecasting, the victory of Muhammadu Buhari in Nigeria's presidential elections saw the nation's first ever democratic and peaceful transfer of power to an opposition candidate. Since its return to civilian rule in 1999, Nigeria has experienced strong economic growth. Over the last decade, Nigeria has seen its economy grow by 5% or more each year. A rebasing of its GDP saw the figure reach £307.6 billion in 2013, making Nigeria the largest economy in Africa. Nigeria has, since the oil boom of the 1970s, been heavily dependent on its oil and gas sector for growth but is slowly diversifying. Utilities, manufacturing and construction were its fastest growing sectors over 2010–13, leading some commentators to suggest Nigeria is no longer just a petro-economy. Nigeria's economic potential is considerable because of the size of its domestic market, its geographical position and its human and natural resources. With over 170 million people, not only is Nigeria Africa's most populated country, it is also very youthful with almost half its residents aged 14 and below,<sup>2</sup> creating the potential for a demographic dividend.<sup>3</sup>

2. Despite these figures, population growth of nearly 3% per year along with a regionally polarised and non-inclusive pattern of growth has led to slower increases in living standards relative to previous years. 120m Nigerians still live below or only just above the poverty line.<sup>4</sup> More than 60% of those living in poverty are situated in the North while the poverty rate in rural areas is over three times greater than in urban centres.<sup>5</sup> As a result, inequality has increased with the Gini coefficient (a common measure of income inequality) going from 0.40 in 2004 to 0.45 in 2013.<sup>6</sup>

3. Nigeria is one of DFID's top five bilateral programmes and the second largest in Africa behind Ethiopia.<sup>7</sup> DFID works across the country with Federal and State Governments and its programme implementers to assist with development in Nigeria. DFID provides no financial aid to the Government of Nigeria because of fiduciary risk and to avoid substituting Nigerian resources.<sup>8</sup> Aid represents less than 1% of its GDP compared to a sub-Saharan African average of 10%. Rather, DFID describes the purpose of its programme in Nigeria as ensuring "Nigeria is able to deploy its own resources effectively towards the delivery of services."<sup>9</sup> In 2015–2016, 110 DFID Nigeria staff across four offices, situated in Abuja, Enugu, Kano and Lagos, helped to deliver a programme valued at nearly £220m.<sup>10</sup> DFID focuses its efforts in eight out of 36 states and now spends more than 60% of its allocated funds in six northern states.<sup>11</sup>

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2 UN Data, [Nigeria](#) (accessed 20 July 2016)

3 Whereby the labour force temporarily grows more rapidly than the population dependent on it, freeing up resources for investment in economic development and family welfare.

4 DFID ([NIG0011](#)) p 1

5 World Bank, [Nigeria Economic Report](#) (July 2014), p 17

6 World Bank, [The Center Cannot Hold: Patterns of Polarization in Nigeria](#) (June 2014), p 33

7 DFID, [Development Tracker](#), accessed 20 July 2016

8 DFID, [Nigeria Operational Plan 2011–2016](#) (December 2014)

9 DFID ([NIG0011](#)), p 2


10 DFID ([NIG0011](#)), p 2

11 DFID ([NIG0011](#)), p 2

4. The three main pillars of the current Operational Plan for DFID Nigeria for 2011–16 are:

- promoting better governance at local, state and federal levels, and helping to improve management of Nigeria's own resources to benefit its citizens;
- improving the business environment to create jobs and incomes for poor people; and
- helping Nigeria to deliver basic services more effectively and efficiently.<sup>12</sup>

Fig 1: DFID funding in Nigeria by sector



Source: DFID, Development Tracker

As part of the DFID Bilateral Aid Review, DFID is currently undertaking a review of its strategy for Nigeria, which will result in a new five-year Operational Plan for DFID Nigeria.

5. Our inquiry follows on from a previous International Development Committee inquiry into “DFID’s programme in Nigeria” published on 23 October 2009.<sup>13</sup> In 2009–10, DFID’s budget for Nigeria was £120 million.<sup>14</sup> Since then, DFID has scaled up its Nigeria programme to £244 million in 2015–16 in line with the UK Government’s previous commitment to spend 30% of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in fragile and conflict-affected states.<sup>15</sup> It is in this context we decided to hold an inquiry into DFID’s programme in Nigeria. We launched our inquiry on 16 December 2015 and called for written submissions on the following issues:

- How can DFID work most effectively to reduce poverty in the context of such inequality and ensure no one is left behind?
- How effective has DFID’s work on economic development/diversification been so far, and how might DFID support the Nigerian Government to ensure sustainable and inclusive economic growth into the future?

<sup>12</sup> DFID, [Nigeria Operational Plan 2011–2016](#) (December 2014)

<sup>13</sup> International Development Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2008–09, [DFID’s Programme in Nigeria](#), HC 840–I

<sup>14</sup> International Development Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2008–09, [DFID’s Programme in Nigeria](#), HC 840–I

<sup>15</sup> HM Treasury and Department for International Development, [UK aid: tackling global challenges in the national interest](#) (November 2015)

- How effective have DFID's governance programmes been in enhancing transparency and accountability, and what could they be doing better?
- What impact is insecurity in the North of Nigeria having on DFID's ability to reduce poverty in the region, and is DFID adapting its approach to work in conflict-affected areas?
- How effective has DFID's work been in reducing the disadvantages women and girls face in Nigeria? What could it be doing better?
- How effective has DFID's work been on improving education systems in the country, particularly in the most fragile states in the North? Given the recent agreement of the SDGs and the renewed focus on the quality of education, should there be a move towards supporting secondary and tertiary education in Nigeria?

6. We visited Nigeria from 28 February to 3 March 2016. We went first to Lagos, then to Kano and ended our visit in Abuja. We met State and Federal Ministers and officials, DFID staff, NGOs and a wide range of Nigerian people living in both urban and rural settings. Our full visit programme is set out as an Annex to this Report. We would like to express our thanks to everyone we met in Nigeria for the contribution they made to such an interesting and valuable visit, and particularly to the DFID officials who arranged our programme.

Fig 2: International Development Committee's visit to Nigeria



| Sector     | Visit activities   | Location   | Examples of DFID Support to this sector |   |
|------------|--|--|---|---|
| Governance | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Visit to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)</li> <li>- Meeting with the Vice President</li> <li>- Roundtable with civil society on building a more accountable government</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with Senate President</li> <li>- Meeting with Speaker of the House of Representatives</li> <li>- Meeting with the Governor of Kano State</li> </ul> | Abuja & Kano                            | Deepening Democracy in Nigeria (DDiN1) [£35m]; Justice for All (J4A) [£52m]; Voices for Change (V4C) [£41m] |

| Sector                 | Visit activities   | Location   | Examples of DFID Support to this sector |  |
|------------------------|--|--|---|--|
| Basic services         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Visit to low-cost private school</li> <li>- Visit to integrated Quranic school</li> <li>- Visit to nursing and midwifery college</li> </ul>                                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Visits to public primary schools in both Lagos and Kano</li> <li>- Visit to general hospital</li> <li>- Meetings with DFID partners including UNICEF, Malaria Consortium and Sightsavers</li> </ul> | Lagos & Kano                            | Education Sector Support in Nigeria (ESSPIN) [£140m]; Girls' Education Project (GEP3) [£107m]; Women for Health (W4H) [£29m]   |
| Economic Development   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting with DFID project on improving access to finance</li> <li>- Visit to the Lagos Deep Offshore Logistics Base (LADOL)</li> <li>- Visit to the Mile 12 Market</li> </ul> |  | Lagos                                   | Nigeria Infrastructure Advisory Facility (NIAF2) [£106m]; Financial Sector Development Programme (EFInA) [£39m]; Growth and Employment in States Programme (GEMS) [£91m] |
| Conflict and fragility | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Visit to Kuchingoro camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs)</li> <li>- Conflict briefing by UK Mission Officials</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Dinner discussion with young girls supported by DFID programmes</li> <li>- Attending a rally with 'Bring Back Our Girls' campaigners</li> </ul>   | Abuja & Kano                            | Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) [£36m]; Life Saving Humanitarian Support in Northeast Nigeria [£34m]   |

7. This Report has used the evidence received, both in writing and across three oral evidence sessions:

- **Session 1:** Dr Kate Meagher, Associate Professor in Development Studies, London School of Economics, Josephine Osikena, Director, Foreign Policy Centre, Dr Sola Kasim, Research Fellow in Energy Economics, University of Aberdeen, Dr Leena Koni Hoffman, Associate Fellow, Chatham House, Alex Duncan, Director, The Policy Practice, and Joseph Hurst-Croft, Stakeholder Democracy Network.
- **Session 2:** Dr Joanna Härmä, Research Fellow, Centre for International Education, Chris Horn, Former Consultant, ICAI, Georgia Taylor, Director, WISE Development, Ojobo Atuluku, Country Director, ActionAid Nigeria, Dr Titilola Banjoko, Founder, Africa Recruit and Prudence Hamade, Technical Advisor, Malaria Consortium.

- **Session 3:** Professor Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Associate Professor of African Politics, University of Oxford, Dr Caroline Varin, Lecturer in Security and International Organisations, Regent's University London, Professor Abiodun Alao, Professor of African Studies, King's College London, Nick Hurd MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for International Development and Ben Mellor, Head of Office and Country Representative, DFID Nigeria.

We are grateful to all those that submitted oral and written evidence which has proved invaluable in helping to generate a list of recommendations we believe are vital for DFID to ensure its programme in Nigeria increases in effectiveness and efficiency.

## 2 Governance—processes and outcomes

“UK aid to Nigeria is not about resource transfer. None of our aid goes through government systems because of fiduciary risk and to avoid substituting for the Government’s own resources but rather it is about influencing how Nigeria uses its own resources: to reduce poverty—leaving no one behind, to create better livelihoods and to deliver improved services for its citizens.”—DFID Nigeria

8. Improving the structures and processes that determine the way in which Nigeria is governed is central to development progress.<sup>16</sup> A strong and consistent theme that emerged in written and oral evidence from DFID Nigeria as well as during our country visit, was that the Department prioritises influence over resource transfer—it aims to assist the Nigerian government in delivering services to secure poverty reduction, as opposed to delivering these services itself. Since 1980, oil exports have brought in more than \$1 trillion in cumulative revenue, yet despite pockets of wealth there has been a consistent failure by successive Nigerian governments to translate sizeable natural resource revenues into tangible socio-economic benefits for the majority of Nigerians.<sup>17</sup>

9. Despite operations in Nigeria being DFID’s third largest bilateral programme in 2016–17, it is one of its smallest relative to the size of the population, the size of the economy and the scale of poverty. Thus the influencing approach, if executed effectively, has the potential to deliver maximum impact for taxpayers’ money. In this sense, efforts to improve governance can be considered the key component of DFID Nigeria’s strategy that ties all of its programming together.

10. Nigeria was under military rule for most of the period between 1967 and 1999, and democracy was only re-established in 1999 with the election of President Olusegun Obasanjo. The current three-tier system of federal government—federal, state and local government area (LGA)—has “contributed to the survival of Nigeria as a cohesive nation”.<sup>18</sup> However, it has been argued that “a federal structure, whose prime objective was to maintain security by curbing regional and ethnic influence, does not foster development.”<sup>19</sup> The 1999 Constitution, Nigeria’s fourth since independence, transferred greater responsibility to states to provide infrastructure and social services including health and education. A report by the Africa Research Institute argues that state governments have consistently failed to deliver the services to improve the lives of many Nigerians, they are not accountable to their citizens and corruption is endemic,<sup>20</sup> as it is through all tiers of the Nigerian Government.<sup>21</sup> As Nick Hurd MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for DFID, told us, effectively deploying resources to the benefit of the poorest Nigerian citizens has been a “political failing” in the past.<sup>22</sup> Put simply—in its current form, governance in Nigeria is not sufficiently effective to fight poverty in a meaningful and sustainable way.

16 DFID, *Nigeria Operational Plan 2011–2016* (December 2014), p 5

17 International Energy Agency, *Africa Energy Outlook 2014* (Feb 2014), p 138

18 DFID, *Country Partnership Strategy 2005–09*, para 31

19 Africa Research Institute, *State(s) of crisis: Sub-national government in Nigeria* (March 2016), p 1


20 Africa Research Institute, *State(s) of crisis: Sub-national government in Nigeria* (March 2016), p 1

21 ActionAid, *Corruption and Poverty in Nigeria* (June 2015), p 30

22 [Q107](#)

11. The legacy of military rule has meant that institutions are weak and there is a lack of capacity at all levels of government. Despite their constitutional responsibility to deliver basic services, the recent Nigerian States Budget Transparency Survey 2015 found budgeting processes employed by state governments to be “deplorable” (although improving).<sup>23</sup> Falling oil revenues mean that even more pressure is likely to be exerted on states to allocate resources efficiently in the near future. At present, Nigeria’s oil producing states in the South accrue 13% of federally collected revenues—this is based on what is known as the “derivation principle”, for states that generate revenue from their territorial resources. After this, the federal government keeps 52.68% of all revenues from oil exports, duties and corporation taxes. Nigeria’s 36 states then share 26.72% and its 774 local governments areas are allocated 20.60%.<sup>24</sup> Figure 1 shows the varying capacities of states to generate their own revenue to cover monthly spending commitments. Those in red were unable to generate sufficient revenue to cover recurrent expenditure such as civil servant salaries, let alone service debts or invest in the public services that are crucial to reducing poverty.

**Fig 3: Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) as a share of monthly recurrent expenditure commitments**



Source: BudIT, The State of States

12. Despite the bleak picture associated with governance in Nigeria, the current situation must be placed in historical context. As Dr Leena Koni Hoffmann, Associate Research Fellow, Chatham House, told us:

“The broader picture or the broader context in which we should look at the improvements in governance should be the journey [...] There was a very repressive military regime in place, there was very, very little press freedom and institutions of governance were severely weakened by corruption and patronage to networks tied to military power.”<sup>25</sup>

23 Civil Resource Development and Documentation Centre, *Nigerian States Budget Transparency Survey 2015* (January 2016), p 10

24 Victor Lukpata, “*Revenue Allocation Formulae in Nigeria: A Continuous Search*” *International Journal of Public Administration and Management Research*, Vol 2(1), (October 2013), pp 32–38

25 [Q23](#)

While the challenge is substantial, there is reason for optimism. The election of Muhammadu Buhari as President has been widely regarded as “a significant step forward for the country”,<sup>26</sup> and Buhari’s agenda of tackling corruption, ending the insurgency in the North East and generating inclusive economic growth has been hailed by DFID and others as prioritising the right areas.<sup>27</sup> While frustrations have started to emerge with the new administration just over a year into its rule,<sup>28</sup> Minister Hurd asserted that: “progress has been slow, but progress has been real”.<sup>29</sup>

## Deepening Democracy

13. Nigeria is a large country whose modern history has been characterised by efforts to achieve a balance between ethnic, regional and religious groups that have a history of divisions and conflict.<sup>30</sup> Managing resources in a way that satisfies these diverse interests poses a serious challenge to the state, and demands a strong and inclusive democracy. However, the opportunities for corruption and rent-seeking<sup>31</sup> created by oil and the lack of effective democratic checks and balances represent state failures that must be addressed in supporting Nigeria’s development.

14. DFID is in the process of delivering a £35 million second phase of its Deepening Democracy in Nigeria programme (DDiN), designed to “strengthen the democratic character of Nigerian political processes and outcomes”.<sup>32</sup> DDiN 2 aims to deliver on this through three determinants of change: promoting more meaningful elections; enabling citizens to hold the executive to account; and encouraging a better informed, broader and more engaged electorate.<sup>33</sup> In written evidence, Plan International UK were highly complimentary of DFID’s efforts in democratic strengthening:

“DFID is arguably the most systematic and influential supporter of election programmes in Nigeria. Its support for elections has in the last 8 years contributed tremendously to transformation in Nigeria’s electoral processes, culminating in a successful transition after a relatively peaceful general election despite global apprehension.”<sup>34</sup>

15. The build-up to the 2015 Presidential Election was characterised by this ‘global apprehension’. Various factors including tensions between the two main political parties, the use of religious and regional rhetoric that increased a sense of suspicion and fragmentation, the Islamist Boko Haram insurgency in the North East and intercommunal violence in several middle-belt and northern states suggested that Nigeria was “heading toward a very volatile and vicious electoral contest.”<sup>35</sup> However, the national elections were considered fair and relatively free of violence and have been hailed as the most credible

26 DFID (NIG0011) p 1

27 DFID (NIG0011) p 1

28 “*Nigeria’s new start is in danger of derailing*”, Financial Times, 13 April 2016

29 Q113

30 DFID, *Deepening Democracy in Nigeria Phase 2 Business Case and Summary* (December 2014), para 17

31 Use of resources to obtain economic gain from others without reciprocating any benefits to society through wealth creation.

32 DFID, ‘*Deepening Democracy in Nigeria 2*,’ accessed 20 June 2016

33 DFID, *Deepening Democracy in Nigeria Phase 2 Business Case and Summary* (December 2014), p5–9

34 Plan International UK (NIG0002) para 10

35 International Crisis Group, “*Nigeria’s Dangerous 2015 Elections: Limiting the Violence*” (November 2014) p i

presidential elections in Nigeria's history, with US Secretary of State John Kerry referring to the election as "a decisive moment for democracy across Africa".<sup>36</sup> In oral evidence, Dr Leena Koni Hoffmann told us:

"As much as previous elections have not lived up to expectations of credibility, equality, etc., the last election in 2015 was a direct result of this journey of strengthening electoral management bodies and making them more efficient and supporting them in terms of funding and technical capacity."<sup>37</sup>

Joseph Hurst-Croft of Stakeholder Democracy Network also stressed the value of DFID's work in this area, and asserted that efforts should be maintained even outside the electoral cycle.<sup>38</sup>

16. In oral evidence, Ben Mellor, Head of Office and Country Representative, DFID Nigeria, emphasised the collaboration between DFID Nigeria and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in its democratic strengthening work.<sup>39</sup> This was reiterated by Minister Hurd who told us that: "what DFID does needs to be seen in a broader context of HMG effort".<sup>40</sup> Lack of HMG-wide policy coherence for development was a key issue raised by our predecessor Committee.<sup>41</sup> By bringing together heads of FCO and DFID on the board, DDiN provides a good model for cross-Government collaboration and learning in development programming.

17. Beyond support to free and fair elections, DDiN's work in engaging the electorate is an important feature of Nigeria's changing political landscape that can be used to promote accountability and the improved delivery of basic services. As Palladium wrote in evidence:

"Levels of citizen interest and engagement with political processes are at a high and a range of issues that were previously off the agenda, such as internally generated revenue and public sector human resource management, have gained increased political traction with both citizens and elites across regional and ethnic divides. Reforms on these issues could have powerful effects on service delivery, poverty outcomes and conflict reduction."<sup>42</sup>

18. **We commend DFID for its support to strengthening democratic processes and outcomes in Nigeria, and recognise the direct impact that this work has had in contributing to a credible, fair and peaceful presidential election in 2015.**

19. ***We urge DFID to maintain its support throughout the election cycle by strengthening systems and institutional management and civic education. DFID should ensure that a successor programme to its Deepening Democracy in Nigeria 2 (DDiN) programme—due to end in 2018—is established well in advance of the 2019 Presidential Election. Learning from DDiN, boards of DFID projects should include staff of other Government departments where possible, in accordance with the stated desire for DFID's work to***

36 "Africa: Decisive Moment for Democracy", US Embassy blog, 6 October 2015

37 [Q23](#)

38 [Q42](#)

39 [Q112](#)

40 [Q107](#)

41 International Development Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2014–15, [The Future of UK Development Co-operation: Phase 2: Beyond Aid](#), HC 663, p 16–24

42 Palladium ([NIG0012](#)) para 4.3.1

*be “embedded in the broader HMG effort”.<sup>43</sup> DFID should also use its comparative advantage in parliamentary strengthening to enhance scrutiny, foster transparency and support legislative oversight. When we met members of the Nigerian Senate and House of Representatives in Abuja, it was requested that DFID support capacity building among Nigerian Parliamentarians. This could be facilitated through support for the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD). The UK Government should review the lessons it has learned through extensive parliamentary strengthening efforts in Burma and consider how these can be applied to its work with the Nigerian Parliament.*

## Politically smart programming

“The prevailing political economy results in a systematic failure of the state to provide the public goods on which poverty reduction depends—quality public services, public infrastructure, a conducive environment for investment and growth, and personal security.”—Alex Duncan, The Policy Practice

20. Much of the evidence to this inquiry stressed that politics and development in Nigeria are inextricably linked. As Alex Duncan, Director, The Policy Practice, told us:

“[...] the fundamental problems of governance that impact on poverty are very, very profound in this society. [...] Politics has to work differently in Nigeria ultimately if these problems are going to be addressed.”<sup>44</sup>

Despite the scale of this challenge, Dr Leena Koni Hoffmann asserted the need for the UK Government to engage with Nigeria’s politics without “being afraid or concerned about the connotations of challenging ideas and policies”.<sup>45</sup>

21. DFID is a leader in acknowledging that inclusive development is intrinsically linked to politics and inclusive institutions. A thorough understanding of the political constraints to, or opportunities for, change is key to delivering more effective aid.<sup>46</sup> Thinking and acting politically requires a thorough understanding of the political context in which policy is formed, as well as the ability to respond to this information with intelligence and creativity.<sup>47</sup> The benefits of spending on political economy analysis were discussed in evidence to this inquiry.<sup>48</sup> DFID’s approach in Nigeria reflects the idea that an important component of its efforts relate to tackling the political challenges. As Ben Mellor stated in oral evidence:

“[...] if we are not aware of the politics when we get into these things, it will undermine what we are trying to do. It is about a better understanding, but also using what we are doing to inform a better political understanding in turn, so creating a virtuous circle.”<sup>49</sup>

43 [Q107](#)

44 [Q24](#)

45 [Q38](#)

46 Alina Rocha Menocal, [Getting real about politics: From thinking politically to working differently](#), (London, 2014)

47 Overseas Development Institute, [Politically smart, locally led development](#) (September 2014), p 3

48 [Q22](#)

49 [Q112](#)

22. As Adam Smith International pointed out in its written evidence: “It is also important for DFID to remain clear sighted about the limitations to reform driven from the outside—without government champions reform will fail.”<sup>50</sup> Being politically smart thus requires DFID to work with reformers in the Nigerian Government. Minister Hurd expressed DFID’s will to “be smart in terms of how we work outside but alongside [Nigerian] Government systems”.<sup>51</sup> This involves working with reformers in the various levels of the Nigerian Government but particularly at the state level. As Ben Mellor said:

“There we work with reforming governors, reforming individuals who we believe can make a difference, and make sure we are supporting them in their efforts, because that is where the sustainability comes from, and that is where the route out of aid comes from for Nigeria.”<sup>52</sup>

23. Evidence to this inquiry highlighted that in order for reforms to be sustainable and last beyond the life of DFID interventions, they need to be aligned with political priorities of Nigerian actors. DAI wrote: “there could be more appetite for improved financial management because of the fiscal crisis precipitated by the collapse of the oil price.”<sup>53</sup> DFID should recognise and leverage such opportunities and ensure that reforms are truly embedded in Nigerian governance in two crucial ways:

- (1) By broadening their scope beyond relatively small-scale projects that have been ‘islands of success’ and applying these successes elsewhere; and
- (2) By deepening them to connect with service delivery issues on the ground to enable the poor to feel the benefits.<sup>54</sup>

24. While there are advantages to working with reformers in Government, there are also limitations, as Ojobo Ataluku, Country Director, ActionAid Nigeria, told us: “It is a systemic and institutional change that we are looking for, not just a one-on-one individual change.”<sup>55</sup> In 2003, a DFID document investigating ‘drivers of change’ in Nigeria came to the conclusion that “a strategy built upon support to individuals and organisations alone will have limited impact, unless it begins to address the underlying institutional problems and structural constraints.”<sup>56</sup> Working through political channels with reformers within the government systems should therefore be complemented by working closely with those outside of these systems, such as civil society organisations (CSOs). As Joseph Hurst-Croft stated: “Unless you begin to support civil society and other groups [...] you are going to continue to have this elite group that extracts from the core and therefore undermines the resources Nigeria does have.”<sup>57</sup>

25. One way in which DFID has demonstrated the success of its politically smart approach is through programming targeted towards specific sectors. In particular, its work through the Facility for Oil Sector Transparency (FOSTER) programme (see Box 1). However, the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), identified as “critical” in evidence to our inquiry by Dr Hoffmann, has still not been approved by the Nigerian Parliament despite

50 Adam Smith International ([NIG0009](#)) para 4.1

51 [Q107](#)

52 [Q107](#)

53 DAI ([NIG0007](#)) para 7.6

54 DAI ([NIG0007](#)) para 3–4

55 [Q68](#)

56 DFID, [Drivers of change in Nigeria: A preliminary overview](#) (July 2003), p ii

57 [Q24](#)

the contributions of FOSTER and despite being initiated almost a decade ago. With the FOSTER programme having ended in April 2016, it is of great importance that this Bill continues to receive the necessary technical and political support for it to be approved by Parliament and deliver much needed reforms to the sector.

**Box 1: Politically smart development programming in Nigeria—FOSTER**

The Facility for Oil Sector Transparency (FOSTER) is a £14 million DFID-funded programme designed to promote greater transparency and accountability within Nigeria's oil and gas sector. It works in partnership with the Nigerian government, civil society and the private sector to reduce opportunities for corruption or revenue mismanagement by improving the understanding of oil and gas sector issues in Nigeria; strengthening the capacity of civil society to challenge government and industry; and working with reformers within government.

Delivering greater transparency and accountability in the sector requires working with entrenched vested interests among elites, as well as challenging those vested interests or pushing for them to be re-framed in less damaging ways. This involves a high level of risk, both for DFID and for the wider work of the UK government in Nigeria. FOSTER aims to understand the underlying political economy and incentive structures that can prevent the benefits of Nigeria's natural resource wealth being shared more broadly. It tries to capitalise on and nurture appetite for reform, both within government and outside, by working opportunistically and strategically with government and civil society institutions and actors.

FOSTER has played an important role in supporting the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), first initiated in 2007, which seeks to achieve a much needed restructuring of the oil and gas sector. While the PIB is still awaiting approval by Parliament, it has made considerable progress. Other achievements by FOSTER include over £300 million of Nigeria's public revenues identified and recouped through support for forensic audits of the petroleum sector and developing an evidence base for policymaking and advocacy on gas flaring.

Source: ODI, [Politically smart support to economic development: DFID experiences](#) (March 2016)

26. The DFID-funded State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI), an exemplar of politically smart, locally led development,<sup>58</sup> has been said to be “delivering good results and illustrating a potential that could well be applied more widely”.<sup>59</sup> A report by the Overseas Development Institute was positive about the contribution of SAVI, but it raised the issue of the division of labour between technical support to health, education and employment sectors, and the distinct programmes, run by different contractors, delivering complementary governance inputs. The report stated: “Collaboration among the programmes sometimes allows this to work well [...] However, much of the time it does not, because the programmes have both different managers and different ways of working.”<sup>60</sup>

58 House of Commons Library, [Nigeria 2015: analysis of election issues and future prospects](#) (January 2015) p 36

59 “[Towards politically smart, locally led development in Africa](#)”, David Booth, African Arguments, 23 October 2014

60 Overseas Development Institute, [The SAVI programme in Nigeria: Towards politically smart, locally led development](#) (October 2014), p vi

27. DFID's approach to politically smart development programming is at the forefront of addressing the significant political barriers to development in Nigeria. We regard DFID-funded research into the political economy of Nigeria as an investment in more effective programming.

28. *We encourage DFID to invest in research into the political economy of Nigeria, particularly on how to better align political and development priorities. It is important that governance inputs are not isolated, and form an integrated part of interventions in education, health, etc. We urge DFID to produce a review within the next year of how programming in its governance suite can better collaborate with its wider interventions and, ultimately, to try to integrate these fully to reduce the need for distinct governance programmes.*

### Anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria

29. Nigeria has the largest economy in Africa, the eighth largest known oil reserves in the world and is designated as a middle-income country by the World Bank. Yet, despite the resources and wealth it possesses, poverty is pervasive, with the numbers of poor actually increasing over the last 25 years. Only China and India have more people living in poverty and both have over six times the population of Nigeria.<sup>61</sup> According to DFID's written evidence:

“The failure to deliver social services, the endemic problem of power supply, the failure to defeat Boko Haram and the collapse of infrastructure are all linked to public sector corruption on a grand scale. An independent report by the Natural Resource Governance Initiative in August 2015 estimated as much as US \$32 billion was lost to corruption during the 6 year administration of former President Jonathan.”<sup>62</sup>

30. This is a view shared by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), one of the anti-corruption bodies in Nigeria, who wrote in their 2012 Annual Report that: “The failure to deliver social services, the endemic problem of power supply and the collapse of infrastructure are all linked with corruption”.<sup>63</sup> A study by PricewaterhouseCooper suggests that the cost of corruption in Nigeria equated to roughly \$1,000 per person in 2014, and could be nearly double that by 2030 (up to 37% of GDP).<sup>64</sup> This is a toll felt by Nigerians on the ground, with Nigeria ranking 136th of 168 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2015.<sup>65</sup> The fight against corruption is therefore a crucial component of encouraging the Nigerian Government to make better use of its own resources to reduce poverty. As Minister Hurd told us: “this agenda is so important because it touches so much in terms of our desire to get resources applied where they are meant to be applied in terms of delivering basic services.”<sup>66</sup>

61 World Bank, 'World Development Indicators: Nigeria,' accessed 17 June 2016

62 DFID (NIG0011) p 5

63 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Annual Report 2012, cited in ActionAid, [Corruption and Poverty in Nigeria](#) (June 2015), p 6

64 PricewaterhouseCoopers, [Impact of Corruption on Nigeria's Economy](#) (February 2016), p 3

65 Transparency International, 'Corruption Perceptions Index 2015,' accessed 26 June 2016

66 [Q121](#)

31. A commitment to fighting corruption was a central feature of President Buhari's election campaign and is thus a key pillar of his mandate, so there is much room for optimism moving forwards. As Ben Mellor stated: "We cannot underestimate the importance of a President coming to power whose primary mandate is to tackle corruption in a country where corruption is endemic."<sup>67</sup> However, it is also important to note that in the 2009 Report by our predecessor Committee, the then President Yar'Adua had also identified the fight against corruption as one of his priorities.<sup>68</sup> Despite this, Nigeria has made little progress in the fight against corruption since 2009, actually slipping down the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index from 130<sup>th</sup> in 2009 to 136<sup>th</sup> in 2015.<sup>69</sup> Nigeria also fell from 35<sup>th</sup> out of 53 countries in 2009 to 39<sup>th</sup> out of 54 in 2014 in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance.<sup>70</sup> This suggests that political will is a necessary but not sufficient condition for turning the tide against corruption in Nigeria.

32. Corruption is a particular problem in certain sectors. In the oil and gas sector, President Buhari has suggested that oil proceeds have been directly diverted into personal accounts in the past,<sup>71</sup> highlighting the need for reforms to the sector. Dr Leena Hoffmann mentioned the importance of the passage of the Petroleum Industries Bill for these essential reforms, highlighting the role that DFID has played in providing technical assistance to this Bill.<sup>72</sup> However, in other sectors DFID and other donors are failing. Transparency International highlighted the insufficient attention paid to corruption in the defence and security sector. In written evidence, Transparency International wrote:

"Corruption in the defence and security sector poses one of the main threats to Nigerian security. Alongside the threat of Boko Haram the army has dealt with soldiers deserting in unprecedented numbers as a result of their disillusion with the state and there were even reports that whole units are selling weapons, intelligence, and even their services to Boko Haram."<sup>73</sup>

### *Supporting judicial reform in Nigeria*

33. DFID's approach to tackling corruption in Nigeria has three stated areas of focus: sanctions, systems and society:

- **Sanctions:** supporting enforcement agencies' capacity and ability to detect, investigate, prosecute and convict those that break the rules, and recovering fraudulent assets to ensure effective sanctions.
- **Systems:** working to develop more accountable and responsive systems for institutions to deliver better services and sustainable growth.
- **Society:** recognising that reducing corruption will require a change of attitudes and expectations across Nigerian society.<sup>74</sup>

67 [Q128](#)

68 International Development Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2008–09, *DFID's Programme in Nigeria*, HC 840–I, para 92

69 Transparency International, '[Corruption Perceptions Index 2015](#),' accessed 26 June 2016

70 Mo Ibrahim Foundation, '[Ibrahim Index of African Governance \(IIAG\)](#),' accessed 28 June 2016

71 "[Oil proceeds went into personal accounts, Nigerian president says](#)", Reuters, 30 December 2015

72 [Q32](#)

73 Transparency International ([NIG0026](#))

74 DFID ([NIG0011](#)) p 5–6

This approach is executed through a range of programmes including the (£52m) Justice for All (J4A) programme, the (£29m) Federal Public Administration Reform (FEPAR) programme, the (£66m) State Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and Capability (SPARC) programme, the (£33m) State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI) and the (£14m) Facility for Oil Sector Transparency (FOSTER), as well as funding to the International Crime Unit of the National Crime Agency. While these programmes have recorded good results, they have “not yet delivered the needed transformation” due to the scale of the problem.<sup>75</sup>

34. In order to deliver an effective deterrent as part of the ‘sanctions’ pillar, it is vital that Nigerian judicial institutions are strengthened. Dr Leena Hoffmann told us that: “the Nigerian state itself—the President, the federal state and local government—should invest in strengthening these institutions and how they work, so you have a prevention process or strategy, as opposed to recovering and prosecuting corrupt officials.”<sup>76</sup> Support to this process has been identified by DFID as a priority areas in an improved, HMG-wide approach to investigative activities.<sup>77</sup> The FCO and the National Crime Agency (NCA) have provided technical support to the Nigerian judiciary to develop a system that optimises resources and delivers better case management, while DFID support has focused on legislative reform.

35. Evidence from Crown Agents identified a number of priority areas for judicial reform, with a need for a thorough research base and clearly defined goals and objectives in achieving them. These priorities include:

- improvement of the archaic court system;
- a re-definition of judicial offices and the appointment process and professionalism of judicial office holders;
- a grassroots revamping of adjudicative procedures (particularly in connection with criminal law processes);
- a complete review of executory processes;
- strengthening of protocols for preservation and maintenance of records; and
- securing authentic and sustainable independence from an intrusive overbearing executive branch.<sup>78</sup>

The evidence from Crown Agents also pointed out that Nigeria has a valuable resource in the form of Nigerian advocates (with or without dual English qualification) of which there are many in both the UK and Nigeria.

**36. A central component of DFID’s anti-corruption strategy in Nigeria is supporting enforcement agencies’ capacity and ability to detect, investigate, prosecute and convict those who engage in corrupt behaviour. While DFID, the FCO and the NCA are delivering a cross-Government approach to strengthening judicial systems in Nigeria, we have heard that this approach is overlooking a valuable resource in the form of UK-trained advocates, including in the UK-based diaspora and practising in Nigeria.**

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75 DFID ([NIG0011](#)) p 5

76 [Q27](#)

77 DFID ([NIG0011](#)) p 6

78 Crown Agents - Annex A ([NIG0039](#)) p 1

37. *We urge DFID to make use of the large number of UK-trained lawyers who may be motivated to help drive reform in the judicial system, including the UK-based Nigerian diaspora. The Vice President, with whom DFID works closely and who studied law in the UK, can serve as a key figure in rallying a powerful network of reformers, both in Nigeria and abroad.*

### **From transparency to accountability**

38. Much of DFID's work in the area of corruption relates to promoting transparency and accountability in governance processes, particularly at the state level. Successes in delivering more transparent and effective budgeting processes have been noted. As Ben Mellor told us with regard to SPARC:

“We found that in the 10 states that we were working in over £1 billion of additional money was properly budgeted and therefore properly executed, and that led to better health and education outcomes. We hoped that showing that would have a replication effect across other states.”<sup>79</sup>

39. Yet as Alex Duncan told us: “The states vary enormously in the quality of governance and accountability from really some quite impressive reformers—Lagos is a lot discussed—to ones that are run by people who are highly corrupt and unaccountable.”<sup>80</sup> DFID expressed a will to deliver “more transformational programmes which pave the way to an eventual exit from aid.”<sup>81</sup> One way this could be done is by taking a more active role in ensuring that lessons learned from SPARC and SAVI are rolled out into other states.

40. The Nigeria Governor's Forum (NGF) was set up as a body to facilitate coordination between the 36 elected state governors. In recent years, SPARC played a key role in the NGF's establishment of the States Peer Review Mechanism (SPRM), designed to foster good governance through comparing periodic reviews of development policies, plans and programmes between states. However, the SPRM processes have either been slow to take hold or their documentation is not being published, with only two state reviews (from January 2013) published on the website. In order for government to be held accountable, it is essential that the citizens have access to information on the performance of their government. Yet as Paul Adams of the Africa Research Institute highlighted in written evidence: “the public find it difficult to know how their state government is performing.”<sup>82</sup> Given that the extent of corruption at the level of the state governments is extremely high, this lack of information is a barrier to accountability.

41. The SAVI programme has had success in helping state houses of assembly, civil society, the media and citizens to demand better performance from government. SAVI documented 89 cases in the year preceding its most recent review where partners have played a role in influencing the design and delivery of public policy and programmes.<sup>83</sup> However, Joseph Hurst-Croft, Stakeholder Democracy Network, highlighted weaknesses in the link between transparency and accountability, specifically in terms of the time-lag in information being published:

79 [Q120](#)

80 [Q30](#)

81 DFID ([NIG0011](#)) p 3

82 Africa Research Institute ([NIG0038](#))

83 DFID, [State Accountability and Voice Initiative Annual Review](#) (February 2015), p 1

“[...] we have seen some good audits supported recently, particularly in the oil sector and other sectors, but they are very backward-looking and perhaps three or four years late, so that the people that have been involved in stealing that money are well gone. How we support those audit processes and add that accountability in a much more real-term political cycle is something that DFID's resources could lead to a lot more accountability; if that threat is there and people know that the capacity there is coming, we could have a lot more accountability.”<sup>84</sup>

42. In oral evidence, Minister Hurd made reference to ‘BudgIT’—a civic organisation that aims to simplify state and federal budgets and make them more accessible and transparent to ordinary citizens.<sup>85</sup> DFID could contribute to such transparency platforms through its own data. As Paul Adams of the Africa Research Institute pointed out in written evidence: “well-sourced data on state governments available to the public is very limited and would enhance the democratic process which, at state and local government area level, is evidently flawed [...] the work done by SPARC could encourage these developments”.<sup>86</sup>

43. **The quality of governance at the state level varies significantly and it is vital that processes are in place to ensure that the lessons learned—both from DFID programming and more broadly—are spread across Nigeria. The emergence of platforms like BudgIT, which make public budgets available and accessible to citizens, are a key step towards greater transparency and accountability.**

44. *We encourage DFID to ensure that the States Peer Review Mechanism (SPRM) is implemented with the specific objective of delivering greater accountability from two perspectives:*

- *Bottom-up: Ensure citizens are kept well-informed of the relative performance of their state government, generating calls for greater accountability; and*
- *Top-down: bring pressure to bear on the poorer performing states from the Federal government.*

*DFID should play an active role in facilitating this peer-review process and ensuring that reviews take place regularly and are available and accessible to the public. They should be published immediately after completion to enable citizens to process and react to the information. DFID-funded projects such as SPARC have amassed significant amounts of data that should be summarised and made available to the media and civil society. This can provide an added push towards greater accountability at limited cost to DFID as the data is already being collected.*

84 [Q30](#)

85 BudgIT, ‘[About Us](#),’ accessed 30 June 2016

86 Africa Research Institute ([NIG0038](#))

### 3 Inclusive Economic Development

“This economy needs to find another gear.”—Nick Hurd MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, DFID

45. Since it returned to civilian rule in 1999, Nigeria has experienced a sustained period of impressive economic growth, averaging an annual growth rate of 7.4% compared with 2.0% for the UK over the same period.<sup>87</sup> With a recent rebasing of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Nigeria has become Africa's largest economy with per capita income reaching over \$3,200 in 2014.<sup>88</sup> While Nigeria has typically been dependent on its oil and gas sector to stimulate the economy, growth in recent years has been largely driven by the non-oil sectors, with utilities, manufacturing, agriculture, trade and telecoms having contributed the most to overall growth.<sup>89</sup> This diversification away from oil and towards other sectors is a key component of President Buhari's third pillar of his election platform: fixing the economy.<sup>90</sup>

46. Yet economic growth in Nigeria in recent years has not been inclusive: it has been geographically concentrated in the South; it has not created enough jobs; and it has not broken down existing patterns in social exclusion. The consequences of the narrowly distributed benefits of this growth are starkly outlined by the conflict in the North East. Professor Raufu Mustapha, Associate Professor of African Politics, University of Oxford, outlined some of the underlying causes of conflict with respect to the inequality within and between regions:

“The north-east of Nigeria, relative to other parts of Nigeria, is the poorest and most disadvantaged area, and within that society itself the communities there have one of the highest levels of inequality within them. It is the intensity of the poverty and the inequality, both regional and within the society itself that needs to be addressed.”<sup>91</sup>


87 World Bank, [‘World Development Indicators: Nigeria,’](#) accessed 22 June 2016

88 World Bank, [‘World Development Indicators: Nigeria,’](#) accessed 22 June 2016

89 Nigerian National Bureau Of Statistics, [GDP Report, Q4 2014](#) (February 2015)

90 [“Diversification of Nigeria's economy urgent, says Buhari”](#), The Guardian Nigeria, 16 April 2016

91 [Q88](#)

Fig 4: Poverty rates in Nigeria by state<sup>92</sup>

Source: Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI)

47. Nigeria's progress on human development indicators reflects inequities in the distribution of economic growth. In efforts to reduce maternal mortality in line with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Nigeria saw a significant increase in the proportion of births attended by a skilled health attendant nationally: from 36.3% in 2004 to 58.6% in 2014. Yet the two regions with the worst performance, well below the national average, are the North East and North West—also the regions that have least felt the benefits of the economic boom.<sup>93</sup>


48. Much of the exclusionary pattern of growth is related to the way that windfalls from oil have been consumed rather than invested. Investment has been woefully low relative to other emerging economies, and investment in public infrastructure in particular is well below the level needed to secure sustainable and inclusive growth.<sup>94</sup>

92 Poverty here is determined by the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) produced by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI). It captures various elements of poverty including education, health and standard of living, with a person identified as in poverty if they are deprived in at least a third of the relevant indicators.

93 Nigerian National Bureau Of Statistics, *The Millennium Development Goals Performance Tracking Survey 2015 Report* (March 2015), p 23

94 World Bank, *Nigeria - Country partnership strategy for the period FY2014-FY2017* (April 2014)

**Fig 5: Nigeria is rich enough to be a middle income country, yet more than 1 in 10 children there die before the age of 5**



Source: World Bank, "[Who Should Get Foreign Aid?](#)", GatesNotes, 5 April 2016

\* GNI converted to dollars using the World Bank's Atlas Method,

## Power Sector Reform

49. One area in which the impacts of low investment have been strongly felt is in the power sector. Despite having the continent's largest economy, Nigeria also has the highest number of Africans (96 million) living without access to electricity.<sup>95</sup> Increasing access is a key component of the poverty reduction strategy in Nigeria. It can improve the productivity and output of enterprises, create jobs and free people from the burden of self-generation (which is usually more expensive). Greater access can create a positive feedback loop by increasing incomes and allowing the poorest to invest in education and other productive resources that are central to sustainable development.<sup>96</sup>

50. In the most recent version of its Operational Plan 2011–2016, DFID Nigeria recognises that poor infrastructure is one of the main "constraints to growth", acting as a barrier to economic and social development.<sup>97</sup> The aim of its Nigeria Infrastructure Advisory Facility (NIAF), now in its second phase with a budget of £106m, is to support the improvements to infrastructure that are so vital for development, with a particular focus on necessary power sector reforms. As Adam Smith International—DFID's chosen implementer for the NIAF programmes—pointed out in written evidence, over \$70 billion dollars of investment in the power grid is required, and the only realistic source for this amount of capital is the private sector.<sup>98</sup> As a result, the NIAF programmes have advised on the sale or concession of generating plants and distribution systems owned by the Government, with the aim of creating a commercially viable and privately owned power

95 International Energy Agency, [World Energy Outlook 2015](#) (November 2015)

96 Practical Action Consulting, [Utilising Electricity Access for Poverty Reduction](#) (January 2015), p 12–13

97 DFID Nigeria, [Operational Plan 2011–2016](#) (December 2014), p 9

98 Adam Smith International Annex A ([NIG0029](#)) para 1.3

network.<sup>99</sup> Adam Smith International also wrote that NIAF 2 has achieved: “a number of landmark results including saving over £1 billion per annum for Nigerian electricity consumers and bringing in huge private investment to the power sector”.<sup>100</sup>

51. Concerns were raised in evidence about the impact that the NIAF programmes have had on the poor. Global Justice Now wrote that NIAF 2: “appears to treat privatisation as an end in itself rather than increasing energy access for the poor and reducing poverty.”<sup>101</sup> As outlined in our recent Report ‘UK aid: allocation of resources: interim report’, poverty reduction is a statutory requirement for the spending of development assistance by DFID and it is essential that all DFID programming consider first and foremost its impacts on the poorest—both in the short term and the long term.<sup>102</sup> Yet the evidence from Global Justice Now revealed that the vast majority of Nigerian electricity users have seen electricity price increases since the launch of NIAF.<sup>103</sup> Adam Smith International drew attention to the fact that: “The poorest consumers continue to be protected via the Lifeline R1 tariff bracket offering cross-subsidised electricity for low income users.”<sup>104</sup> However, this only covers a very small proportion of the population which has raised concerns. As Dr Kate Meagher stated:

“The privatization strategy supported by DfID may have been well intended, but it was poorly designed and thought through [...] offering concessional tariffs that cover 0.5% of the Nigerian population cannot be said to address concerns about poverty in a society in which over 60% of the population is below the poverty line.”<sup>105</sup>

52. The need for power sector privatisation strategies to be carefully thought through is reflected in a 2005 World Bank report on power sector reform in Africa. The Bank wrote:

“[...] cost-reflective tariffs often mean substantial increases for poor households, which results in reduced consumption and welfare [...] Special pricing systems for low-income households can mitigate some of the negative impacts of price reforms and, as the case studies show, are in almost all cases necessary.”<sup>106</sup>

While 350 low-income households and 150 micro-enterprises were surveyed to help the electricity regulator understand the experience and requirements of low-income electricity consumers, this seems to us to be insufficient. The survey was conducted in Ibadan which has a poverty rate well below the national average and is in the South, despite the fact that the stated geographical focus of NIAF 2 is the more impoverished North of Nigeria. Understanding the experiences and needs of low-income electricity consumers demands detailed research, and evidence to this inquiry suggests that the NIAF programmes have failed to deliver in this respect.<sup>107</sup>

99 DFID, *Nigeria Infrastructure Advisory Facility 2: Business Case and Intervention Summary* (January 2014), p 2

100 Adam Smith International (NIG0009) para 3.2

101 Global Justice Now (NIG0003) p 1

102 International Development Committee, Third Report of Session 2015–16, *UK aid: allocation of resources: interim report*, HC 533, para 8

103 Global Justice Now (NIG0003) para 3.2

104 Adam Smith International Annex A (NIG0029) para 3.1

105 Dr Kate Meagher (NIG0032) para 4

106 World Bank, *Power Sector Reform in Africa: Assessing Impact on Poor People* (August 2005), para 10.6

107 Dr Kate Meagher (NIG0032); Global Justice Now (NIG0003)

53. Regarding the Northern focus of the programme, a recent NIAF Annual Review (December 2015) reveals that half of the indicators in the “Northern Growth” output were discontinued, which DFID stated was an attempt to ensure that targets are “aligned with the opportunities presented by a new administration”.<sup>108</sup> Yet the recent logical framework (January 2016) fails to set out new targets for increasing access to electricity for the poorest Nigerians in the North.<sup>109</sup>

54. Further concerns have been raised about the way in which private companies raised funds to purchase power sector assets. In written evidence, Dr Kate Meagher wrote: “The process of privatization was deeply financialized, requiring purchasers to take out such huge loans that they are now unable to invest in improving the power infrastructure, and focus largely on raising tariffs to meet the cost of their debt obligations.”<sup>110</sup> It was also mentioned in oral evidence by Dr Meagher that loans were raised “from all over the world”.<sup>111</sup> This adds an additional layer of concern given the recent devaluation of the Naira, Nigeria’s currency. A less valuable Naira, which fell almost 30 percent to a record 281.75 per US dollar,<sup>112</sup> is likely to add to the debt burden of those companies required to service their debts in foreign currencies. This may have implications for the viability of the power sector based on current tariff structures.

**55. The economic and social potential of millions of Nigerians is severely constrained by lack of access to electricity. Therefore we welcome DFID’s efforts to increase energy access in the country and recognise the importance of private sector investment in doing so. While there are likely to be benefits to all households of increased energy access in the long term, we share the concerns held by several witnesses to this inquiry that poverty reduction has not been given sufficient consideration and that the research base for the NIAF programme was inadequate. Tariff increases are hurting poor Nigerians in the short term, even if there is a net overall benefit to privatisation of the power sector in the long term. Despite the NIAF programme’s supposed focus on the North, the dropping of targets for the region suggest that DFID is not delivering in this respect.**

***56. We suggest that DFID encourage the Nigerian Government to take measures to mitigate negative impacts of electricity price increases on the poorest households and consider both the short and long term impacts of its power sector programmes in terms of poverty reduction. While we recognise that the ‘Lifeline’ tariff aims to do this, its coverage is far too narrow. DFID should support the expansion of the ‘Lifeline’ tariff and should monitor the impact of price increases on poor households not covered by this tariff. In preparing for any future infrastructure programmes in Nigeria or elsewhere, DFID should carry out more in-depth impact assessments to thoroughly consider the impacts of privatisation on the poor.***

108 DFID, [Nigeria Infrastructure Advisory Facility Phase 2: Annual Review](#) (December 2015), p 5

109 DFID, [Nigeria Infrastructure Advisory Facility Phase 2: Logical Framework](#) (January 2016), p 5

110 Dr Kate Meagher (NIG0032) para 4

111 [Q10](#)

112 “Devalued Naira Too Hot for Traders Seeing Further Currency Slide”, Bloomberg, 29 June 2016

## Private Sector-led strategies

57. In our recent Report on the UK Implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), we welcomed DFID's engagement with the private sector and stressed the important role that it has to play in complementing poverty reduction efforts.<sup>113</sup> This is particularly true in a country such as Nigeria. While Nigeria is DFID's third largest bilateral programme in 2016–17, receiving over £264m in Official Development Assistance (ODA), Justin Moore pointed out in written evidence that other types of financial flows between the UK and Nigeria are far more substantial. Remittances were worth almost ten times as much as ODA in 2014 and foreign direct investment (FDI) about nine times as much in 2012.<sup>114</sup> Dr Kate Meagher told us in oral evidence about the importance of leveraging foreign investment for: “connecting up value chains, integrating informal and small-scale industries into the local private sector, and connecting up local units that can create not only low-value jobs but high-value jobs.”<sup>115</sup> Josephine Osikena, Director, the Foreign Policy Centre, went on to say that: “DFID could be more co-ordinated in working with British Nigerian diaspora organisations” to fill these gaps.<sup>116</sup>

**58. *There is no mention of the Nigerian diaspora in DFID's latest Nigeria Operational Plan 2011–2016. We urge DFID Nigeria to conduct a review into its engagement with British Nigerian diaspora groups, particularly professional associations and those focussed on development, with the objective of ensuring that the substantial financial flows in the form of remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI) complement Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the benefit of the poorest Nigerians.***

59. CDC Group, the UK Government's development finance institution, may also be key to unlocking the potential of the private sector for inclusive economic growth. CDC invests in countries where the private sector is weak, with a focus on generating jobs: examples in Nigeria include a recent investment in a 450MW gas power plant near Benin City.<sup>117</sup> CDC takes a sectoral based approach to private sector development, seeking out investment opportunities in sectors where there is strong potential for job growth. DFID take a mixed approach, focusing both on specific sectors (such as in its Generating Employment in States (GEMS) programmes) as well as economy-wide systemic issues (such as increasing access to finance through its Financial Sector Development Programme). We heard in oral evidence that this mixed approach towards both sectoral and systemic issues is the right one,<sup>118</sup> though it is unclear how effectively DFID and CDC Group are collaborating on the sectoral focus of DFID's economic development programme.

113 International Development Committee, First Report of Session 2016–17, [UK Implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals](#), HC 103, para 62

114 Justin Moore ([NIG0021](#))

115 [Q4](#)

116 [Q4](#)

117 CDC Group ([NIG0016](#)) para 9

118 [Q2](#)

**Box 2: GEMS 4—Improving the performance and inclusiveness of wholesale and retail markets to support women and the poor**

One of the keys to unlocking inclusive growth in Nigeria lies in increasing the value of the goods and services that the poor rely on to earn a living. In Lagos we visited Mile 12, one of the largest wholesale fresh produce markets in Nigeria. Forty trucks of tomatoes are transported daily from Northern Nigeria to Mile 12. However, the quality of much of the produce is affected by delayed harvest, poor handling, inappropriate packing and poor storage during transportation. This causes wastage of around 41% per basket as well as poor product quality, short shelf life and low prices.

GEMS 4 is working with trader associations, transporters and market workers to introduce better handling practices in an effort to reduce waste and increase the retail value of tomatoes and boost incomes. As of March 2015, 2,150 people had seen positive rises in income, of which 1,473 were poor, and 439 were women, with the expectation that this will rise rapidly over the 12 months following the most recent annual review.<sup>119</sup>

On our visit we learned that the damage caused to tomatoes in transit relates, in part, to the traditional baskets used to transport them. Though as DFID acknowledged, the manufacture of these baskets is also a source of income for the poor. Due to the interconnectivity of markets, delivering pro-poor market outcomes requires careful planning and an in-depth understanding of the context.

60. An additional element of the UK Government's private sector development approach is the use of the Cross Government Prosperity Fund. As DFID stated in written evidence:

“Nigeria is one of 5 pilot countries set to receive funding from the new UK Prosperity Fund. DFID is working closely with the FCO and UKTI to develop interventions that will reduce barriers to trade and tackle corruption within the business environment.”

A Report from our predecessor Committee, ‘The Future of UK Development Cooperation: Phase 2: Beyond Aid’, emphasised the importance of policy coherence for development (PCD)—the integration of different aspects of international development within policy-making. The Report singled out weaknesses in PCD in private sector development in particular.<sup>120</sup> Our recent Report on UK implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals also mentioned concerns about “the lack of a strategic and comprehensive approach to implementation” across Government.<sup>121</sup> It is unclear to what extent poverty reduction will be prioritised in the use of the Prosperity Fund.

**61. The private sector must play an essential role in successful economic development in Nigeria, and investments in commercially viable, job-creating industries will be key to unlocking growth potential. Various parts of the UK Government and associated bodies will play a role in this, including DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) and CDC Group. We, and our predecessor committee, have expressed concerns about a lack of a coherent, joined up strategy on**

119 DFID, Growth and Employment in States Programme (GEMS): Annual Review (November 2015), p 46

120 International Development Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2014–15, *The Future of UK Development Cooperation: Phase 2: Beyond Aid*, HC 663, para 33

121 International Development Committee, First Report of Session 2016–17, *UK Implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals*, HC 103, para 83

how these various pieces will fit together. In particular, it is not clear to what extent poverty reduction and inclusive growth will be prioritised by the Prosperity Fund, and whether DFID will therefore take the lead in its delivery.

62. *We recommend that in addition to its new Operational Plan, DFID publishes a strategic plan of how the UK Government's various approaches will be mobilised to make progress towards inclusive growth and poverty reduction. This should include how it coordinates with CDC Group with respect to its sectoral approach to economic development in Nigeria.*

63. Employment is the key to inclusive growth.<sup>122</sup> Yet in evidence to our inquiry, concerns were raised about the ability of private sector-led, market-based strategies to deliver. In terms of regional divides, there is evidence to suggest that private sector-led strategies can actually exacerbate inequalities. Imbalances in education and skills between the North and South of Nigeria also result in imbalances in access to jobs created by the formal private sector. As Dr Kate Meagher wrote in written evidence:

“In the context of historically low levels of Western education, the encouragement of private sector-led strategies of employment generation have exacerbated regional inequalities between northern and southern Nigeria. [...] Private sector processes of economic inclusion are selective, and that means that northern youth are being left ever farther behind.”<sup>123</sup>

It is therefore essential that job opportunities are well-matched to skills, particularly in the North.

64. DFID Nigeria is well aware of the challenges associated with employment. Ben Mellor, Head of Office and Country Representative, DFID Nigeria highlighted DFID's Increasing Economic Opportunities for Marginalised Youth in Northern Nigeria programme:

“It is targeted specifically at youth in the north—the Almajiri, who are the marginalised youth of northern Nigeria. It is targeted [...] at identifying opportunities within the private sector and, therefore, making sure that the skills that it provides are matching where we believe the private sector could go”.<sup>124</sup>

In order to deliver on skills-matching, DFID needs to ensure that it maintains a thorough understanding of the realities regarding skills and employment as it exists for its marginalised target groups. As Professor Abiodun Alao, Professor of African Studies, King's College London told us:

“We must know what took place on the ground, what the gaps are that need to be filled, and until a proper analysis of these are done we will be starting off on the wrong footing.”<sup>125</sup>

122 McKinsey Global Institute, *Africa at work: job creation and inclusive growth* (August 2012)

123 Dr Kate Meagher (NIG0032) para 1

124 [Q129](#)

125 [Q95](#)

65. Understanding skills requirements must extend beyond the 'formal' to the 'informal' economy.<sup>126</sup> Formal wage employment accounts for only 13% of the workforce in Nigeria and over half of this is in the public sector.<sup>127</sup> In this context, targeting the informal economy is therefore essential. As CDC Group wrote in evidence:

“Informal employment can often mean poor employment conditions, and is associated with increasing poverty. Women and other vulnerable groups who are excluded from opportunities often have little choice but to take informal low-quality jobs.”<sup>128</sup>

Despite being such an important component of inclusive growth in Nigeria, we heard in evidence that DFID has little understanding of the dynamics of the informal economy. Dr Kate Meagher identified this as: “one of the big weaknesses in a lot of DFID’s programming.”<sup>129</sup>

66. In its Business Case for the Increasing Economic Opportunities for Marginalised Youth in Northern Nigeria programme, DFID sets out the key assumptions driving its theory of change that it hopes will see the project deliver a lasting impact on employment.<sup>130</sup> However, of the 16 theoretical links that connect the beneficiaries to the outcomes ('increased incomes' and 'increased social cohesion and stability'), the evidence for 11 of them is determined to be 'Weak' or 'Weak/Medium'.

**67. Employment is central to Nigeria’s future development, and the successful creation of quality jobs has significant implications for both inclusive growth and social cohesion and stability. A growing private sector is essential to delivering the two million jobs needed for young people entering the labour market each year. Yet the evidence suggests that the selective nature of private sector processes can actually limit the inclusivity of growth if interventions are not carefully planned based on a strong body of evidence. Large-scale programmes should not be based on a body of evidence that is deemed to be ‘weak’. Furthermore, an understanding of the dynamics of the informal sector, where the majority of Nigerians work, is key to delivering effective programming.**

**68. We urge DFID to invest in research to develop a better understanding of the processes underlying quality job creation in Nigeria. Future programmes designed to generate jobs should be built on a stronger evidence base, with a particular focus on capturing the dynamics of the informal sector to ensure decent, secure livelihoods for the millions of vulnerable people who rely on informal employment.**

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126 According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), some of the characteristic features of informal employment are lack of protection in the event of non-payment of wages, compulsory overtime or extra shifts, lay-offs without notice or compensation, unsafe working conditions and the absence of social benefits such as pensions, sick pay and health insurance. Women, migrants and other vulnerable groups of workers who are excluded from other opportunities have little choice but to take informal low-quality jobs.

127 World Bank, [Where has all the Growth Gone? A Poverty Update for Nigeria](#) (August 2013), para 88 and 90

128 CDC Group ([NIG0016](#)) para 3

129 [Q1](#)

130 DFID, [Increasing Economic Opportunities for Marginalised Youth in Northern Nigeria: Business Case and Summary](#) (October 2015), p 22

### *Addressing non-market barriers for women*

69. The underlying barriers faced by women are key to their economic empowerment. Evidence to our inquiry suggested the need for a gender-sensitive approach to understanding how markets work for the poor and addressing these barriers. As Georgia Taylor, Director, WISE Development, told us:

“There has been a big struggle in trying to include women in these [DFID] programmes, partly because the underlying analysis and research at household level is not happening well enough [...] We define women’s economic empowerment as not just about earning money but about being in control of that money and being able to make decisions around assets and income”.<sup>131</sup>

DFID’s economic development programmes have delivered some commendable results for women, raising the incomes of at least 247,000 and giving 9.8 million additional women access to finance.<sup>132</sup> Much of this success relates to the use of a ‘Making Markets Work For the Poor’ (M4P) approach, designed to tackle the fundamental weakness in market systems to the benefit of those who are often excluded from these systems.

70. Written evidence from Plan International UK indicated that, in supporting the vulnerable, DFID may also need to consider targeting non-market barriers.<sup>133</sup> Georgia Taylor, developed this point when she told us that:

“[...] women face barriers of unpaid care work and sexual and reproductive health—not having access to family planning or safe abortion is a massive issue for women trying to run businesses or go out to work. Some of those links are not being made for women within these markets programmes because they are just about the market”.<sup>134</sup>

Through its Voices for Change (V4C) programme, DFID has been investigating these non-market barriers.<sup>135</sup> However, evidence to this inquiry suggested that they are still an issue of high priority.

**71. We commend DFID for its commitment to ‘Making Markets Work for the Poor’, and in particular the impressive achievements its approach has delivered for many women. DFID’s economic development programmes in Nigeria have rightly taken a substantial gender focus. We heard that it is not just market barriers but equally non-market barriers that can limit the economic empowerment of women.**

**72. DFID should build upon its current programmes aimed at generating jobs and increasing incomes by addressing the non-market barriers—such as unpaid childcare and family planning—that many women in Nigeria face. In researching these issues and building them into programme design, DFID could strengthen its gender inclusive approach to economic development.**

131 [Q69](#)

132 DFID ([NIG0011](#)) p 3

133 Plan International UK ([NIG0002](#)) para 9

134 [Q69](#)

135 Voices for Change Nigeria, ‘[Research Papers,](#)’ accessed 29 June 2016

## 4 Delivering Basic Services

“The ultimate purpose of DFID’s programme in Nigeria is to ensure Nigeria is able to deploy its own resources effectively towards the delivery of services; and for the poorest (including women and girls) to have a say in and benefit from Nigeria’s development.”—DFID Nigeria

73. In a country such as Nigeria, the consequences of limited access to and low quality of basic social services are dire. A healthy, well-educated population is the cornerstone of economic and social development, yet Nigeria scores very badly on key development indicators, ranking 152nd of 185 countries in the 2015 Human Development Index.<sup>136</sup> While Nigeria accounts for around 2.5% of the world’s population, it contributes to about 10% of global maternal, infant and child deaths.<sup>137</sup> A Nigerian mother is 90 times more likely to die in childbirth than a mother in the UK, and one in ten children do not live to reach the age of five.<sup>138</sup> Many of these deaths are largely the result of preventable diseases such as malaria, measles, respiratory infections and diarrhoea.

74. Along with these prominent health issues, DFID has suggested that Nigeria “urgently needs to take steps to rejuvenate [its] basic education.”<sup>139</sup> The country has the highest number of children out of school in the world—of the 57 million worldwide who are not receiving a formal education, more than 10 million live in Nigeria.<sup>140</sup> As figure 2 reveals, between 1999 and 2010, the number of children of primary age not in school decreased globally, yet increased in Nigeria, with girls making up the majority of those not in education. Only 59% of 6–12 year olds regularly attend primary school and there are wide geographical disparities, with regional differences contributing to lifelong inequalities in opportunities—typically between the North and the South. It is not only access to education that poses a development challenge, but equally the quality of education provision. More than two-thirds of children in the North remain illiterate by the end of primary school, leading DFID to suggest that the current system: is “failing to equip Nigeria’s children with the knowledge and skills they need to thrive in today’s rapidly changing society and economy.”<sup>141</sup>

136 UNDP, *Human Development Report 2015* (December 2015), p 210

137 USAID, ‘Global Health - Nigeria,’ accessed 1 July 2016


138 World Bank, ‘World Development Indicators: Nigeria,’ accessed 1 July 2016

139 DFID (NIG0011) p 9

140 “Nigeria’s girls and the struggle for an education in the line of fire”, The Guardian, 15 May 2014

141 DFID (NIG0011) p 9

Fig 6: Out of school primary age children, millions



Source: World Bank Databank (accessed 1 July 2016)

## Political and financial commitment to basic services

75. Education, health and other basic social services including access to justice are key in translating Nigeria's wealth into tangible social benefits for the poorest. As Health Partners International wrote: "DFID should continue to see health programmes as a key entry point in its cross-sectoral approach to poverty reduction".<sup>142</sup> Yet despite the country's increased wealth, adequate quality and reach of these services has not materialised in recent decades. The 36 state governments and 774 local government areas (LGA) are assigned primary responsibility for the delivery of basic public services for Nigerians. However, in written evidence, Palladium stated: "the spending priorities of states often fail to sufficiently focus on basic services"<sup>143</sup> and a recent report from the Africa Research Institute suggests that LGAs "have all but ceased to function".<sup>144</sup>

76. The effective delivery of services by state governments and LGAs depends on improved governance processes and structures (see Chapter 1) but also on adequate funding. As Chris Horn, former Consultant, ICAI, stated in written evidence: "This financial environment is fundamental to education and other public service improvements."<sup>145</sup> In 2014, Nigeria's public health expenditure stood at 0.9% of GDP compared with 7.6% in the UK,<sup>146</sup> and prospects of a substantial increase under the new government of Muhammadu Buhari are uncertain. Edwin Ikhuoria of ONE Campaign has written:

142 Health Partners International (NIG0018) para 9

143 Palladium (NIG0012) para 4.1.1

144 Africa Research Institute, *State(s) of crisis: Sub-national government in Nigeria* (March 2016), p 1

145 Chris Horn (NIG0037) p 2

146 World Bank, 'World Development Indicators: Nigeria,' accessed 2 July 2016

“While there is a slight increase in the overall provision for funding health programmes in the federal budget proposal (not accounting for inflation), the funding gap is still very wide and grossly inadequate to achieve the health objectives of the SDGs especially at the primary health care level.”<sup>147</sup>

77. Nick Hurd MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for International Development, also expressed uncertainty regarding the Federal Government’s commitment to education. He told us: “it is not entirely clear to me yet what priority the Government attaches to education at the federal level”.<sup>148</sup> DFID noted in oral evidence that Sustainable Development Goal 4—ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all—is “unlikely to be achieved”.<sup>149</sup> Given that the Goals were only agreed last year, it is of great concern to us that there is already talk of Nigeria’s failure on such a key Goal.

78. In written evidence, Chris Horn set out a number of the main challenges to making major progress towards SDG 4, highlighting that the core issue underpinning them all is “security and consistency of funding over the whole period to 2030”.<sup>150</sup> There appears to be considerable variation in state funding for school improvements, ranging from 70% of the annual budget being released and utilised in Jigawa to less than 3% in Enugu.<sup>151</sup> This variation in commitment to education between states is reflected in the resources available for schools. In Kwara state, the ratio of pupils to text books is 1:1 but in Kano it is 1:5.<sup>152</sup> This has a knock-on effect on educational outcomes. There is also an acute shortage of teachers, and Chris Horn also told us that: “I am not sure the scale of the problem is fully recognised either by DFID or the state governments and the federal Government.”<sup>153</sup> In light of fiscal pressures associated with the fall in the oil price, substantial and consistent financial commitment is all the more important. While it is of course up to the Nigerian Government how it should spend its own resources, Dr Oliver Owen wrote in written evidence: “DFID should provide research, modelling and scenario planning which may better enable key decision-makers to come to the best-informed decision possible while respecting their role as a sovereign government.”<sup>154</sup>

79. State governors are largely responsible for releasing funding for basic services, therefore connecting DFID’s programmes with key decision-makers and ensuring strong working relationships is highly important to the success of development interventions. However, concerns were raised in evidence about how effectively this is operating in practice. Dr Oliver Owen wrote:

“Many DFID programmes complain of the lack of strategic engagement with Nigerian governmental partners by DFID staff on their behalf, and so programmes are left to either ‘manage upwards’ and coordinate DFID itself, or to try and manage their own political relationships, or risk their work being

147 “Nigeria: Will the 2016 Health Budget Fund the 2014 National Health Act?”, Edwin Ikhuria, 2 February 2016

148 [Q148](#)

149 [Q148](#)

150 Chris Horn ([NIG0037](#)) p 2

151 ESSPIN, *29th Quarterly Report, October - December 2015* (February 2016), p 13

152 DFID, *Teachers’ Development Programme: Business Case* (June 2012), p 3

153 [Q44](#)

154 Dr Oliver Owen ([NIG0033](#)) p 2

held up by slow DFID efforts to engage politically on their behalf. Certain DFID staff have in the past seemed slow to forge direct working relationships with key FGN counterparts”.<sup>155</sup>

It is also unclear how effectively DFID's education programmes are able to engage fully with State Education Commissioners and Governors, or whether the memoranda of understanding that govern these relationships are sufficiently robust. As Chris Horn told us: “I was quite surprised that some of the memoranda of understanding were very general [...] I tend to think that some of the conversations that go on are simply too general and do not really get to the heart of the matter.”<sup>156</sup>

**80. One of the fundamental barriers to poverty reduction in Nigeria lies in the commitment at all levels of Government to delivering basic services. While the allocation of resources is of course the prerogative of the Nigerian Government, DFID has a key role to play in informing Nigerian policymakers on the importance of basic services in supporting a healthy, well-educated and productive population. We are particularly concerned about the prospects for Nigeria's achievement of SDG 4 on inclusive and quality education. An important part of making progress towards SDG 4 is understanding, and helping the Nigerian Government to understand, the scale of the task at hand.**

*81. DFID should support key Nigerian decision-makers to help them come to the best-informed decisions possible, with a specific emphasis on the value of basic public services. It should help the Nigerian Federal Government in developing a system to compare the performance of different states on delivering basic services. DFID should ensure that it has the resources to connect its programmes to key decision-makers at the state and federal levels, with a particular emphasis on health and education, and that memoranda of understanding reflect specific and firm commitments on the release of funds.*

*82. DFID should also assist the Nigerian Government in performing an exercise to scope its trajectory towards SDG 4. It should develop a working model on education logistics (covering pupil numbers and distribution, teachers, classrooms, learning materials, etc) which will deepen understanding of what needs to change to get closer to achieving that Goal.*

**83. We are concerned that inadequate hospital management systems act as a key structural barrier to improved health outcomes in Nigeria—a problem that DFID in-country staff appeared to be aware of on our visit. In Kano state, Committee members visited Dambatta General Hospital which served as a teaching base for midwifery students participating in the £29m DFID-funded Women for Health (W4H) programme. Students were being trained in hospital surroundings that were unacceptably unhygienic, notably the birthing units. DFID staff informed us that there are clinical directors but no operational directors in such hospitals. Further pressure is added to the system by ‘ghost’ workers and poor management of those workers who do attend.**

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155 Dr Oliver Owen ([NIG0033](#)) p 2

156 [Q60](#)

84. *We recommend that DFID address the following issues when funding such projects in the future:*

- a) *Ensuring immediate and urgent improvement of hospital hygiene standards; and*
- b) *Ensuring that structural problems in hospital management systems are resolved before funding agreements for any specific programmes are finalised.*

*DFID should work with the Nigerian Government to ensure that memoranda of understanding include commitments to improve hospital management, operational systems and hygiene.*

## Delivering quality, inclusive education

85. There are several components to DFID's education programming in Nigeria, with the most substantial being the Girls' Education Project (GEP, currently in a third £110m phase) and Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria (ESSPIN, £139m). These programmes aim to increase enrolment rates, particularly amongst girls, and get millions of out of school Nigerian children into education. Another important part of DFID's approach is improving the learning outcomes of those in school. As DFID stated in written evidence:

“Even when children are in school a large proportion are not learning. Nearly half of all children who have completed primary school cannot read a complete sentence and more than two-thirds of children in the north remain illiterate by the end of primary school.”<sup>157</sup>

86. There are a number of barriers to quality education in Nigeria—one core issue relates to the policy on the language of instruction. In Nigeria, the language of instruction from Grade 4 is English, but as the British Council told us: “various factors rooted in culture and geography negatively affect the quality of teaching in English and student learning outcomes, which impacts the student's whole education career.”<sup>158</sup> Securing qualified teachers is also a challenge, particularly in rural areas. Dr Joanna Härmä told us that this is due to the remoteness of communities, and that: “91% to 95% of all children who are out of school, either having dropped out or never having been, are from rural areas.”<sup>159</sup> Due to poor work force planning, a mismatch exists between the supply of, and demand for, teachers. Urban schools are often more fully staffed than those in rural areas; there are more women in urban schools than in rural schools<sup>160</sup> and higher numbers of qualified teachers in urban schools than in rural schools.<sup>161</sup>

87. DFID is trying to address the lack of trained teachers through its Teacher Development Programme, which aims to provide pre-service and in-service training to 66,000 teachers. However, unlike in other interventions there is no clear emphasis on recruiting to satisfy rural needs. One example where rural demand is a consideration is the Women for Health (W4H) programme that we visited in Kano state.

<sup>157</sup> DFID (NIG0011) p 9

<sup>158</sup> British Council (NIG0014) para 5.7.3

<sup>159</sup> Q44

<sup>160</sup> Paul Bennell and Kwame Akyeampong, *Teacher Motivation And Incentives In Sub-Saharan Africa And Asia* (2007) p 48

<sup>161</sup> T.O. Adeyemi, “*The Effective Distribution of Teachers into Secondary Schools in Ekiti State, Nigeria: A Critical Analysis*”, *Current Research Journal of Social Sciences*, vol 1(3) (2009), pp 74–83

88. **Due to the attraction of living and working in urban areas for teachers, we are concerned about worsening imbalances in the supply of qualified teachers between urban and rural areas. Unlike the Women for Health (W4H) programme which recruits health worker trainees from rural areas in an attempt to fill gaps in services in those areas, there appears to be no clear rural focus in the Teacher Development Programme to address this imbalance.**

89. DFID aims to ensure quality education is delivered not only through public schools, but equally through private schools. Minister Hurd told us that in Lagos State, 70% of children attend private schools.<sup>162</sup> This highlights the need for DFID to work with private sector education providers and state governments, which it does through the Developing Effective Private Education in Nigeria (DEEPEN) programme. While 90% of DFID's education sector support focuses on the public sector, Ben Mellor, Head of Office and Country Representative, DFID Nigeria explained that DEEPEN aims to: "improve the ability of the Lagos state—of the state system—to regulate and improve the quality of the private schools."<sup>163</sup>

90. Dr Joanna Härmä told us that private provision of education is a necessity in Nigeria. In reference to Lagos state, Dr Härmä said:

"I have seen primary 4 classrooms of 200 children in a Government school [...] As far as I am concerned it is past the tipping point, and there is no way that the Lagos state government would ever come back to a situation of being a majority provider."<sup>164</sup>

Like in public schools, the quality of education in the private sector is a major concern. DEEPEN is a good example of where DFID has recognised a need and responded to an opportunity—in the form of a change to a Lagos State Commissioner for Education who recognised the importance of the private sector—to meet this need. Dr Härmä said that DFID "is definitely right in the DEEPEN programme [...] in supporting the Government to see the private sector as carrying a huge part of the burden of educating their children."<sup>165</sup>

91. While we recognise and accept that the state government in Lagos does not have the capacity to deliver education to all children, we are deeply concerned about the affordability of private education for millions of families. In written evidence, Bridge International Academies, a for-profit education provider funded by DEEPEN, stated that: "At an average cost of \$78–\$110 per child per year, 90% of families in our communities can afford to send all of their children—both boys and girls—to our academies."<sup>166</sup> DFID is thus funding an organisation that provides a service that the poorest 10% cannot access. Dr Joanna Härmä said that it is "not right that the UK taxpayer is providing money to a for-profit corporation" in the form of Bridge International Academies.<sup>167</sup> The costs provided can also be misleading, as Dr Härmä told us: "They claim that they educate children for about \$6 a month. I presume they mean only their fee, because research has found that they charge around \$15 a month in reality."<sup>168</sup>

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162 [Q142](#)

163 [Q144](#)

164 [Q46](#)

165 [Q47](#)

166 Bridge International Academies ([NIG0031](#)) para 2.4

167 [Q47](#)

168 [Q48](#)

92. Even the minimum fees suggested by Bridge may be prohibitively expensive outside Lagos state. Assuming three children per family (a conservative estimate given a fertility rate of 5.7 in 2014), \$234 in annual school fees is likely to be unaffordable for many in a country where more than half the population lives on less than \$1.90 a day.<sup>169</sup> In Lagos, the country's richest state, access problems due to unaffordability have not emerged on a large scale as only 2% of school-age children are out of school.<sup>170</sup> However, even there Dr Joanna Härmä told us in reference to Bridge International Academies:

“They do not serve the poorest. They told me that they would never set up in Makoko slum because there is no market for them there. They are not interested in serving the poorest; they are interested in serving a large market [...] Giving money to Bridge will never reach the poorest people.”<sup>171</sup>

In its policy paper “Leaving no one behind: Our promise”, DFID promised that: “people who are furthest behind, who have least opportunity and who are the most excluded will be prioritised”.<sup>172</sup> Yet we are concerned that the current approach to private sector provision of education is failing to do that, particularly if this model is replicated in poorer parts of the country outside Lagos. As UNESCO wrote:

“Where access depends on paying fees, many of the poorest are left behind. And private providers are highly unlikely to locate to sparsely populated and remote areas, so reliance on private provision can reduce educational and social equity for poor and remote populations.”<sup>173</sup>

93. The responsibility for the provision of education lies with the state government, and it is important that even with an increasing share of services being provided by the private sector, the state government is effective in ensuring equal access and, crucially, quality learning outcomes. As Chris Horn told us: “While it can be attractive for a state government to have some of the burden shared by the private sector, someone still has to have the responsibility to ensure that children learn [...] [W]hen you end up with disappointing results of children going to school, the challenge to get them back into school—or their neighbour's children or the children's children—is even greater.”<sup>174</sup>

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169 World Bank, ‘World Development Indicators: Nigeria,’ accessed 2 July 2016

170 DFID, *Developing Effective Private Education Nigeria: Business Case and Intervention Summary* (August 2013), p 2

171 Q49

172 DFID, ‘Leaving no one behind: Our promise,’ (November 2015)

173 UNESCO, *EFA Global Monitoring Report 2015* (April 2015), p 65

174 Q54

**Box 3: DFID's education programmes in Nigeria**

Members of the Committee saw first-hand the pressure on the Nigerian public school system on our visit to a primary school in Kano with over 13,000 registered students. Kano is one of six states (three of which are in the North) where the Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria (ESSPIN) is operational. ESSPIN is DFID Nigeria's largest education programme in terms of funding, running from 2008 to 2017 with a budget of around £140m. The four main outputs of ESSPIN focus on the following areas:

- Strengthened Federal Government systems supporting states' implementation of school improvement;
- Increased capability of State and Local Governments for governance and management of basic education;
- Strengthened capability of primary schools to provide improved learning outcomes; and
- Improved inclusion policies and practices in basic education.

ESSPIN aims to reach 11,308 schools in total by 2016 as well as supporting 55,000 students in non-formal (Islamic and Nomadic) education centres.

In 2012, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) conducted a review into DFID's education programmes in Nigeria, with a focus on the two large-scale programmes: ESSPIN (implemented by Cambridge Education) and the Girls' Education Project (implemented by UNICEF).<sup>175</sup> It acknowledged that supporting an education system on the scale of Nigeria is a daunting task, and that a functioning education system requires key building blocks to be in place to create the opportunity to learn. This requires very effective programme management and logistics. ICAI concluded that, due to a combination of strong local presence and better planning and execution, Cambridge Education appears to be better at delivering on this than UNICEF and that the ESSPIN model seems more likely to succeed.

**94. We recognise that in parts of Nigeria, state governments are not equipped to provide schooling for all children, therefore supporting quality private sector provision is a necessary feature of DFID's approach. In Lagos we visited a Bridge International Academies school and were impressed by the quality of education provision. However, we are concerned about the affordability of private schooling for the poorest families, and that reliance on for-profit companies to deliver education is not easily reconciled with DFID's commitment to "leaving no one behind". One risk is that families who can only send some of their children to school may prioritise the education of boys over girls. Regardless of the public/private sector balance of provision, the responsibility of educating children lies with state governments. While DFID is supporting public sector education in Lagos and Kano through its Education Sector Support in Nigeria (ESSPIN) programme, the extent to which DFID is encouraging the expansion of the sector is unclear.**

<sup>175</sup> ICAI, [DFID's Education Programmes in Nigeria](#) (November 2012)

95. *We urge DFID to ensure that its support to private sector provision of education aligns with its commitment to “leaving no one behind”, and that the very furthest behind are prioritised. The furthest behind are not going to be served by for-profit companies, therefore DFID should deliver a focused strategy on how it is going to help the Nigerian authorities significantly expand public sector provision and deliver quality education to those who cannot afford school fees. If the DEEPEN approach is to be expanded to other parts of Nigeria, the model must pay due attention to regional variations in both the prevalence and depth of poverty. We also urge DFID to concentrate attention on educational outcomes across both the public and private sectors. DFID should ensure that the state governments it works with are equipped to effectively regulate both public and private schools, guaranteeing both quality and access for all.*

96. Education prospects are a challenge for all Nigerian children, but girls are particularly disadvantaged. Enrolment rates are lower among girls than boys across the country, with the disparities most obvious when looking at the regional picture: 85% of female children in the North East cannot read at all, compared with 20% in the South West,<sup>176</sup> and 25% of all young people in the North between the ages 17–22 have fewer than two years of education with 97% of these being women.<sup>177</sup> The implications of poorly educated girls are lifelong and can transfer across generations. Educated women are more likely to play productive social and economic roles within their families and communities. They become better mothers and they have fewer, healthier children who they want to have better educational opportunities so the benefits are trans-generational.<sup>178</sup> DFID has worked on improving girls' access to education, primarily through the Girls Education Project (GEP), now in a third £107m phase. GEP3 is expected to get one million extra girls into school by 2020.

97. While GEP3 has registered some successes in terms of enrolment numbers, the programme has consistently underperformed. While the most recent annual review indicated a slight improvement in terms of the programme performance ('Outputs moderately did not meet expectation' as opposed to 'substantially' not meeting them in 2014), the GEP3 is still not delivering effective results, despite the fact that the project's first phase began over a decade ago in 2004. Serious concerns over the performance of GEP3 were raised in an Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) report in 2012.<sup>179</sup> This underperformance continues despite DFID instituting a Performance Improvement Programme and initiating the complementary Education Data Research and Evaluation in Nigeria (EDOREN) programme to “address research and evaluation needs” in GEP3 and other DFID education interventions.<sup>180</sup>

98. When questioned about these concerns, Ben Mellor told us:

“We have spent a lot of time and a lot of effort in terms of turning that programme around. We had the option of stopping the programme, but because of the fact that we were absolutely committed to improving the number of particularly girls in education in the north and this was part of that response, we thought it better to try to invest the time turning the programme around rather than

176 National Population Commission, *Demographic Household Education Data Survey 2010: Education Data for Decision-making* (May 2011), p 46

177 DFID, *Girls' Education Project Phase 3 (GEP3): Business Case* (October 2012), p 10

178 DFID, *Girls' Education Project Phase 3 (GEP3) - Business Case* (October 2012), p 14

179 Independent Commission for Aid Impact, *DFID's Education Programmes in Nigeria* (November 2012)

180 DFID, *'Tender: DFID 5975 - Education Operational Research and Evaluation Nigeria (EDOREN)'* (December 2012)

simply stopping it. [...] We took it up at very senior levels within UNICEF to make sure they put the right people on to the programme in-country and that has definitely improved over the last couple of years.”<sup>181</sup>

99. In its 2012 report, ICAI recommended that DFID: “should work with its partners and each participating State to secure a clear agreement about the policy changes and financial contributions required to improve enrolment and learning and to introduce effective financial management and resource planning into education.”<sup>182</sup> Written evidence regarding GEP’s most recent annual review stated:

“[...] the evaluator is continuing to recommend that this UNICEF managed programme must move from an advocacy approach [...] The 2012 ICAI Report on Education Programmes in Nigeria had identified this change as fundamental. DFID instituted a Performance Improvement Programme and has given additional funding to manage the transition to an effective programme. The weakness still remains.”<sup>183</sup>

Other contributors to this inquiry also raised concerns about GEP3. The British Council suggested that the centralised management of GEP3 “can result in a detachment from the local context which can reduce impact”.<sup>184</sup>

**100. While we commend DFID’s commitment to closing the gap in primary school enrolment rates between girls and boys, with a specific focus on regions where girls are particularly disadvantaged, we are concerned about the continued failure of the Girls Education Project (GEP3) to perform satisfactorily. Despite the various phases since 2004, this UNICEF-managed project, awarded without competition, has consistently failed to meet targets and in a number of DFID reviews has been given ratings to indicate that outputs “substantially did not meet expectation”. While there have been improvements, these are relative to an unacceptably low baseline. We are also disappointed to hear in the project’s latest annual review that the recommendations made by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) in 2012 have still not been successfully implemented. While we recognise the operational difficulties associated with this programme, we are concerned by DFID’s continued funding of a programme that has so consistently failed to meet expectations.**

***101. In its response to this Report, DFID should set out what steps it, and UNICEF, are taking to improve the effectiveness of the GEP project and address the specific concerns raised about enrolment, learning, effective financial management and resource planning. It should identify the criteria that improvements will be judged against and to what extent these fall short of the project’s original targets. DFID should also state over what timeframe it expects the project to be fully meeting expectations. This should include an indication of at what point continued underperformance will mean that DFID no longer deems the project viable, and will withdraw its support.***

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181 [Q149](#)

182 Independent Commission for Aid Impact, [DFID’s Education Programmes in Nigeria](#) (November 2012), para 3.17

183 Chris Horn ([NIG0037](#)) p 2

184 British Council ([NIG0014](#)) para 5.5.5

## Learning from health successes

102. Despite the scale of the public health challenge in Nigeria, DFID has been commended for its contributions in fighting the causes of ill-health: particularly with regard to malaria and neglected tropical diseases (NTDs). In written evidence, Malaria Consortium stated:

“DFID have been the pacesetters in the control of malaria in Nigeria. Taking the lead in designing and roll-out of interventions, learning from these and handing it over for other partners and government to roll-out further. DFID is therefore well positioned to lead the elimination efforts in Nigeria in the next five years and also encourage other donors to continue to support efforts.”<sup>185</sup>

Since 2008, DFID's £89 million Support to National Malaria Programme (SuNMaP) has been fighting malaria and strengthening health systems in Nigeria through its support for the National Malaria Elimination Programme (NMEP). SuNMaP assisted NMEP through capacity building, harmonisation, prevention, treatment, demand creation and operational research, resulting in an estimated 48,000 lives saved over the course of the project.<sup>186</sup> With the successes of SuNMaP, there are a number of lessons that we would hope are learnt by DFID, applying to DFID's health programming as well as more broadly. We visited the pharmacy at Dambatta General Hospital to check the availability of anti-malarial drugs and were impressed by the supply available, even in such a remote area. We were encouraged by the enthusiasm of pharmacy staff about encouraging the use of bed nets to prevent malaria.

### *The value of catalytic investments in health*

103. The SuNMaP programme was established to help in malaria control, though it appears that the benefits stretched well beyond the tackling of a single disease. Regarding the programme, Dr Prudence Hamade told us:

“[...] it had a very novel approach in the sense that it was done entirely through the federal and state government programmes. [...] That was a really important and innovative approach from DFID that was done through the SuNMaP programme.”<sup>187</sup>

This capacity building element of the SuNMaP programme was an important strength as it had reach into wider health systems. As the programme's final report stated: “The programme was established to help in malaria control but ended up strengthening the health sector in intervention states such that the results are helping service provision across the entire health sector.”<sup>188</sup>

185 Malaria consortium ([NIG0010](#)) para 5

186 Malaria consortium ([NIG0010](#)) para 6

187 [Q83](#)

188 Malaria Consortium, [Final Report Support to the National Malaria Programme 2008 – 2016](#) (February 2016), p 31

### Long term certainty for partners

104. SuNMaP concluded in March 2016. In written evidence from Malaria Consortium, there appeared to be uncertainty over future funding. It wrote:

“If bilateral and strategic funding is not continued following the bilateral and multilateral aid reviews, then the capacity of NGOs to innovate and react to evolving development needs, will result in the effectiveness of UK Aid to suffer. Malaria Consortium therefore recommends that DFID fully lays out their intentions for strategic funding in the future and ensure that it allows this type innovative approach to work in the future.”<sup>189</sup>

While it was clearly indicated to us in oral evidence by DFID that SuNMaP would be followed by a second phase, the importance of longer term commitments to strategic funding—to ensure that the length of programmes match what research has found to be most effective—was stressed throughout this inquiry. This is relevant to interventions across DFID’s portfolio, including in economic development,<sup>190</sup> protection of women and girls<sup>191</sup> and governance.<sup>192</sup>

### Connecting research communities with the Government

105. A strong evidence base is an important part of programming and effective policy. A strength of SuNMaP was that it effectively connected research communities with decision-makers in Government. As Dr Hamade said: “The other area that was very important was operational research, and bringing the research community into the Government, so that the research community and the Government now hold annual meetings to exchange information about the way forward and applying research into policy.”<sup>193</sup> Lessons on how best to do this can be of great value across DFID’s portfolio.

106. **DFID’s SuNMaP (Support to National Malaria Programme) has been widely regarded as a success, both in tackling malaria itself and in strengthening health systems more broadly. We believe that a number of lessons have been learned from this programme that may apply across DFID’s health programming and wider interventions in Nigeria and elsewhere.**

*107. We urge DFID to apply lessons from SuNMaP on how catalytic investments, such as in building the capacity of the Nigerian Government’s National Malaria Elimination Programme (NMEP), can have wider benefits for the provision of basic services. DFID should also ensure that the length of programmes matches what research has shown to be most effective: we have heard evidence that this is not always the case at present. Implementing partners and stakeholders should also be kept up-to-date on strategic funding priorities so that they can plan their activities accordingly. We would also like to see DFID invest in building networks between research communities and relevant state and federal authorities in order to deliver effective partnerships and policies that have a strong evidence base.*

189 Malaria consortium ([NIG0010](#)) p 3

190 Palladium ([NIG0012](#)) para 3.3.2

191 [Q67](#)

192 Dr Oliver Owen ([NIG0033](#)) p 1

193 [Q83](#)

108. DFID has also made a substantial contribution towards the fight against neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) in Nigeria through the Integrated Programme Approach to Control a range of Neglected Tropical Diseases implemented by a Sightsavers-led consortium. NTDs including blinding trachoma, elephantiasis, river blindness and hookworm, can lead to irreversible blindness, chronic illness, physical deformities and death, and over 100 million people in Nigeria (two out of every three Nigerians) suffer, or are at risk from, one or more of these diseases.<sup>194</sup> When left untreated, NTDs keep children out of school, parents out of work and cause stunting and impaired brain development, locking societies into endless cycles of poverty.<sup>195</sup>

109. The Leprosy Mission England and Wales pointed out in written evidence that DFID's efforts have been particularly effective in: "disability prevention through enhanced case notification and treatment of NTDs in Zamfara and Kaduna States, thereby mitigating the poverty that could result from disabilities and other consequences of these diseases."<sup>196</sup> At its last annual review, the Sightsavers-led programme had reached over 23.7 million people. With a budget of £12.2 million, the cost per person treated at the end of the programme should be less than or equal to US\$0.12 in some states.<sup>197</sup> On our visit we heard that, in certain areas, the seven NTDs that form the focus of the programme had been eliminated amongst target populations.

***110. With costs per beneficiary expected to be as low as US\$0.12 per person treated by the end of the programme, DFID's Tackling Neglected Tropical Diseases through an Integrated Approach has shown how cost effective life-saving health interventions can be. We urge DFID to actively use such examples as evidence to the public of how cost-effective UK aid can be in changing the lives of millions of Nigerians. We recommend that DFID scale up this programme as part of the effort to eliminate NTDs in Nigeria. Such a programme should also be replicated in other countries that DFID operates where NTDs are a problem.***

## Services for women and girls affected by violence

111. The disadvantages faced by women and girls in Nigeria are staggering, with the country standing 152nd out of 180 countries in the Gender Inequality Index.<sup>198</sup> Due to cultural practices of seclusion and restrictions on mobility, the economic opportunities, visibility and voice of women is limited. These same barriers affect their access to basic services and the widespread violence that they face reinforces this disadvantage and exclusion.<sup>199</sup> Data suggests that 30% of 25–29 year old Nigerian females have been subject to physical violence,<sup>200</sup> yet the true proportion is likely to be much higher. Victims are unwilling to report certain types of violence, such as rape, because of shame and social stigma, so that very few cases are brought to court.<sup>201</sup>

112. DFID's Voices4Change (V4C) programme works with women and girls as well as those around them, particularly boys and young men, to shift attitudes and behaviours.

194 Sightsavers ([NIG0023](#)) para 9

195 World Health Organisation, [Investing to overcome the global impact of neglected tropical diseases](#) (March 2015)

196 Leprosy Mission England and Wales ([NIG0001](#)) para 3.1

197 DFID, [Tackling Neglected Tropical Diseases through an Integrated Approach: Annual Review](#) (January 2016), p 5

198 UNDP, [Human Development Report 2015](#) (December 2015), p226

199 British Council, [Gender in Nigeria Report 2012](#) (May 2012) p iii

200 National Population Commission, [Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 2008](#) (November 2009), p 263

201 British Council, [Gender in Nigeria Report 2012](#) (May 2012), p 47

This has seen some success, particularly in supporting the movement to get the Violence Against Persons Bill approved.<sup>202</sup> The V4C programme is about changing social norms, so it is difficult to assess progress at such an early stage. As Ojobo Ataluku, Country Director, ActionAid Nigeria, pointed out: “Most DFID programmes are three years or five years at the most, maybe with an extension of several years, and you do not change social norms within that kind of window.”<sup>203</sup>

113. Evidence to our inquiry suggested that one area where the approach of DFID and other donors is lacking is in the services provided to women and girls affected by violence. Georgia Taylor, Director, WISE Development told us: “It is not just about creating awareness or saying that men and boys should stop perpetrating violence; it is about the services that are available and about where women can go for support and relief.”<sup>204</sup> Ojobo Ataluku expanded on this point:

“In terms of the services for women and girls who are facing violence, that is a very weak area not just for DFID but for almost every actor, including the Government and other donors and development actors within the country. This is an area that needs to be strengthened, because you cannot just say that people should go to the police, even though DFID has an access to justice programme, because the police are just not the solution to an issue of violence against women. Once you go to the police, it becomes a criminal issue and you find that many women and girls who are victims of violence do not want a criminal solution; they want the violence to stop.”<sup>205</sup>

114. DFID has played a role in supporting Sexual Assault Referral Centres (SARCS), where women and children who have been victims of sexual violence can benefit from counselling, emergency medical treatment, assistance through reporting to the police, forensic evidence, legal advice and support before the courts. In written evidence, Diana Good referred positively to the SARCS:

“The end result appeared to provide a joined up and sustainable programme which was making a real difference and which could be scaled up. It had set out to tackle a the problem not from the top down through the eyes of the institutions of justice but had set out to understand the problem from the citizens’ point of view bottom up based on an understanding of the obstacles for women and children.”<sup>206</sup>

Although the SARCS show signs of early promise, only two exist at present (with plans for five more underway).<sup>207</sup> In a recent review of ‘DFID’s Efforts to Eliminate Violence Against Women and Girls’, the Independent Commission on Aid Impact (ICAI) recommended that: “DFID will need to deliver results on a much larger scale across the full range of VAWG [violence against women and girls] types if it is to achieve transformative impact.”<sup>208</sup>

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202 [Q64](#)

203 [Q67](#)

204 [Q64](#)

205 [Q64](#)

206 Ms Diana Good ([NIG0030](#)) para 30

207 Ms Diana Good ([NIG0030](#)) para 17

208 Independent Commission for Aid Impact, [DFID’s efforts to eliminate violence against women and girls](#) (May 2016), p ii

115. DFID has shown strong commitment to reducing the disadvantages faced by women and girls in Nigeria across all of its programming, while also running targeted interventions aimed at transformative change. However, one of the concerns raised in evidence to this inquiry is the lack of support services to women and girls who have been victims of violence. While the Sexual Assault Referral Centres (SARCS) are a promising start, they are too few and need to be scaled up.

116. *DFID should take immediate action to influence the Nigerian Government to scale up its support services to victims of sexual violence through SARCS, and extend this support to all women and girls subjected to violence. We urge DFID to act upon the recommendations in the recent Independent Commission on Aid Impact (ICAI) report on violence against women and girls, and build upon the 'strong start' it has made in tackling this issue by prioritising support services for affected women and girls in Nigeria.*

## 5 Conflict and fragility

117. Boko Haram was founded around 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, a radical preacher based in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state. Boko Haram did not begin as a violent movement, nor at the point of its transition to a terrorist network in 2009–10 was it a movement of such size and organisation as to be considered a threat to the Nigerian state.<sup>209</sup> Yet in 2014, Nigeria saw the largest increase in terrorist deaths ever recorded by any country in a year, increasing by over 300 per cent to 7,512 fatalities and making Boko Haram the deadliest terrorist group in the world.<sup>210</sup> Since 2009, around 2.5 million people have fled their homes in the worst-affected areas of Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe in the North East. The conflict has displaced 2.2 million internally and left around seven million in need of emergency, life-saving assistance.<sup>211</sup> In December 2015, President Buhari declared that Nigeria had “technically won the war” against Boko Haram, yet this was seen by some as a premature announcement.<sup>212</sup>

118. Conflict and instability is not confined to the North East of Nigeria. Tensions between the nomadic pastoralist Fulani people and their settled counterparts over the use of land for grazing livestock have been long-standing.<sup>213</sup> Such clashes were associated with the deaths of over 1,000 people in 2014—a substantial increase from 63 in 2013.<sup>214</sup>

119. In the Niger Delta, there has been a recent surge of attacks on oil infrastructure and installations. These have largely attributed to the ‘Niger Delta Avengers’, a new group demanding greater ownership of resources for people living in oil-producing areas, as well as environmental repair and compensation for damages inflicted by oil producers.<sup>215</sup> After an amnesty deal was reached between the government and armed groups in 2009, the Niger Delta enjoyed a period of relative harmony. Former combatants were paid monthly stipends for keeping the peace and their former commanders were awarded federal government contracts for securing pipelines. However, incidents of oil theft and sabotage have also increased following President Buhari’s decision to cut the budget for an amnesty programme previously set up with militant groups and his decision to cancel the security contracts given to ex-militants as part of his effort to tackle corruption.<sup>216</sup>

209 Chatham House, *Nigeria's Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis* (September 2014), p 4

210 Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2015* (November 2015), p 2

211 UN OCHA Nigeria, ‘About the Crisis,’ accessed 4 July 2016


212 “Nigeria; Boko Haram is Not ‘Defeated’ but Buhari’s Strategy Is Working”, All Africa, 5 January 2016

213 “Nigeria’s Government Must Ensure a Balanced Response to the Pastoralist–Settler Crisis” Chatham House, 6 May 2016

214 Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2015* (November 2015), p 22

215 “Niger Delta Avengers: Who they are, and what they want”, CNBC, 20 May 2016

216 “Nigeria oil infrastructure threatened by cuts to amnesty fund”, Financial Times, 9 May 2016

**Fig 7: Number or estimate of fatalities due to armed conflict, 2006–2015**

Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, created by Prof. Clionadh Raleigh, University of Sussex

## DFID's work in the North East

120. Conflict in the North East has taken a considerable toll on the development situation—one of Nigeria's poorest regions even before the crisis. As Plan International UK wrote:

“Even prior to the degeneration of the security situation in the region, it [the North East] harbored some of the country's worst development indicators—poverty and employment is above national average, worst cases of maternal and under-five mortality, and highest level of illiteracy. The years of violence have further compounded the situation. The country is facing the largest humanitarian situation in the region with over two million IDPs and 500,000 refugees.”<sup>217</sup>

Despite the additional operational difficulties created by the conflict, DFID has continued to support the North East, including through:

- A £41.5 million humanitarian programme in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa;
- Over £2 million committed to conflict prevention and stabilisation programming; and
- An £8.6 million development portfolio which includes programming in health, education, governance, social development and economic growth.<sup>218</sup>

<sup>217</sup> Plan International UK ([NIG0002](#)) para 15

<sup>218</sup> DFID ([NIG0011](#)) p 6–7

121. One key area highlighted in evidence for strengthening was support to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). Dr Caroline Varin told us:

“[...] the one thing that seems to me to be able to bring a real advantage would be looking into NEMA, the National Emergency Management Agency, which is, in my experience, particularly bad and can do a lot of good. [...] that is an area where DFID can have a real impact with humanitarian aid”<sup>219</sup>

122. While DFID's commitment to humanitarian support in the North East is welcome, it does appear that DFID's response to the crisis has been small relative to the overwhelming financial support offered to other crises, for example the Syria crisis. In 2015, the UK committed US\$635 million in humanitarian funding in Syria,<sup>220</sup> and only US\$6 million in Nigeria.<sup>221</sup> While the scale of the two crises differ, there is still a large imbalance in the funding per person affected. The relatively low levels of support contributed to a seriously underfunded UN Nigeria appeal last year, with the 2015 appeal only 58% funded and support to education being the most underfunded sector at 25%.<sup>222</sup>

123. According to UNICEF, 952,029 school-age children have been forced to flee the violence in the North East and more than 600,000 have lost access to learning due to the conflict.<sup>223</sup> It is not only displaced children whose education is affected but also those from the communities hosting them. Reports indicate that camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) have taken over educational facility grounds, contributing to Borno state children being out of school for over a year.<sup>224</sup> Analysis of the impact of conflict on education and on the impact of education on conflict has been carried out by the Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria (ESSPIN)—DFID's largest education programme in the country.

124. Safety of schools is also a key issue. The abduction of 276 girls from a school in Chibok in Borno state by Boko Haram militants brought significant international attention to the conflict and the dangers faced by women and girls in Nigeria. On our visit to Abuja we met with parents, community leaders and other campaigners for the Bring Back Our Girls campaign. Witnessing their passion and commitment in securing the safe return home for the 218 girls still missing left a lasting impression on us. As a Committee and as individual MPs we continue to push for UK Government support for a safe return of the Chibok girls.

125. Schools have been consistently targeted by Boko Haram attacks, with some parents withdrawing their children due to fears for their safety, exacerbating already low enrolment rates.<sup>225</sup> Following the Chibok kidnapping, DFID has provided support to the Safe Schools Initiative, aimed at bolstering the security of schools in partnership with community groups and the Nigerian Government. In written evidence, International

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219 [Q98](#)

220 UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service, [Syrian Arab Republic - Civil Unrest 2015 Table B: Total funding per donor](#) (July 2016)

221 UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service, [Nigeria 2015 Table B: Total funding per donor](#) (July 2016)

222 UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service, [Humanitarian Response Plan\(s\): Nigeria 2015](#) (July 2016)

223 Human Rights Watch, [“They set the classrooms on fire”: Attacks on Education in Northeast Nigeria](#) (April 2016), p 18

224 International Alert ([NIG0025](#)) p 2

225 Human Rights Watch, [“They set the classrooms on fire”: Attacks on Education in Northeast Nigeria](#) (April 2016), p 59

Alert pointed out that President Buhari appointed an investigative committee to assess the vulnerability of education facilities, and recommended that DFID engage with that committee in implementing its findings.<sup>226</sup>

126. At the recent World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, the Education Cannot Wait fund for education in emergencies was launched, with an initial commitment of US\$90 million.<sup>227</sup> The UK is the largest donor to the fund with an initial contribution of £30 million. UN Special Envoy for Global Education Gordon Brown highlighted the importance of this fund when he said: “We should not have to wait more than a year for help to come when we have a plan and could act immediately. A child needs hope and education and a future.”<sup>228</sup>

**127. We commend DFID on its commitment to humanitarian support in the North East, but we are concerned about the gap between humanitarian needs and available funds. We are particularly troubled by the number of out of school children and the long term impacts this is likely to have on the region’s development, potentially further widening the gap between the North and South of Nigeria. Assuring parents of the safety and security of schools in Northern Nigeria should be a priority, and we welcome DFID’s support to the Safe Schools Initiative in this respect.**

*128. DFID must do all it can to ensure that the UN appeal for Nigeria in 2016 is fully funded. In line with commitments made to education in emergencies at the World Humanitarian Summit in May, DFID should use both its own resources and its influence over other donors to ensure that the Education Cannot Wait Fund is well supported and quickly operationalised so that interruptions to education caused by the conflict are minimised to no more than 30 days. We also recommend that DFID scale up its support for the Safe Schools Initiative, and engage with and support the special investigative committee appointed by President Buhari to assess the safety of schools in Nigeria. Finally, the recommendations of the research conducted by ESSPIN into the impact of conflict on education should be properly financed and implemented, and similar research should be conducted with the informal Quranic schools that DFID also works with.*

129. Unsurprisingly, there are significant challenges associated with operating in the North East. DFID has a responsibility to provide adequate duty of care to its staff, and as Adam Smith International highlighted, the further North East that DFID operates the higher this cost of ensuring staff security will be.<sup>229</sup> Adam Smith International also indicated that DFID’s programming objectives will be more difficult to achieve in such a fragile context, particularly with regard to economic development. It stated in written evidence:

“Security challenges currently impact the ability of DFID to achieve target outcomes in its northern programmes. A lack of security undermines domestic and foreign investor confidence and harms the investment environment. It

226 International Alert ([NIG0025](#)) p 3

227 World Humanitarian Summit, [Chair’s Summary](#) (May 2016), p 5

228 “[Gordon Brown Calls for Global Education Emergency Fund](#)”, The Office of the UN Special Envoy for Global Education, 26 January 2015

229 Adam Smith International ([NIG0009](#)) para 5.2

also disrupts commercial activity, limiting the ability of state governments to collect internally generated revenue through taxes, and limiting appetite for reform given the wish of voters that they concentrate on security.”<sup>230</sup>

130. Despite this acute insecurity, DFID has managed to maintain a foothold in the North East by remaining flexible and responsive to the changing security situation. As Palladium stated:

“DFID and its suppliers remain able to operate safely and effectively in the north by adopting a conflict sensitive approach, keeping programming flexible and exploratory, and adhering to a well designed security framework. This allows programmes to continue to operate while being able to recognise and respond quickly to changes in the security situation and reallocate resources when insecurity restricts operation in certain areas.”<sup>231</sup>

131. Palladium also highlighted several features of the DFID-funded Nigeria Maternal and Newborn Child Health (MNCH2) Programme which allow it to operate effectively in six Northern states. The programme largely works with and within government service delivery structures. It has a very low-visibility presence and uses a completely local team to deliver activities as well as working through a flexible delivery model that can be scaled up and down to respond to the current security situation.<sup>232</sup> Using well-trained and well-supported teams of local staff can be particularly effective. Health Partners International have found that a well-engaged team comprising indigenes of affected states: receives support and important information from the community; is able to maintain a low profile while still continuing to work; has a deep understanding of practical issues affecting implementation and local acceptance; and can keep programme activities going in safe areas despite terrorist attacks and the activities of security forces in others.<sup>233</sup>

132. Evidence also stressed the importance of DFID being well-placed to scale up its intervention in the North East as and when the security situation allows for it. As Plan International UK stated in written evidence: “DFID needs to be strategically placed in the recovery process to help rebuild institutions and support the required changes in the region.”<sup>234</sup>

**133. We commend DFID on its continued commitment to development in the North East of Nigeria despite the exceptionally challenging operational environment. DFID has demonstrated its ability to work flexibly and adapt to changing security conditions, whilst maintaining its efforts to fight poverty in a highly unstable region. The lessons learned in the North East of Nigeria will be invaluable in other parts of Nigeria and other DFID programmes globally, as the Department increases its focus on fragile states in line with the recent aid strategy.**

***134. We recommend DFID ensures that it has robust processes in place for learning and disseminating lessons on effectively operating in a fragile environment. It is essential that core staff and implementing partners engage with each other effectively through regular meetings, and that best practice is shared with other country teams globally.***

230 Adam Smith International (NIG0009) para 5.3

231 Palladium (NIG0012) para 5.1.1

232 Palladium (NIG0012) para 5.2.1

233 Health Partners International (NIG0018) para 14

234 Plan International UK (NIG0002) para 15

***DFID should continue to monitor the security situation as closely as possible, and ensure that it is in a position to expand both its humanitarian and development activities towards the North East as the situation stabilises.***

## Tackling the drivers of conflict

135. The causes of conflict in the North East, the 'Middle Belt' and the Niger Delta are complex and multifaceted. As Dr Caroline Varin, Lecturer in Security and International Organisations, Regent's University London, told us, the factors driving conflict include: "socioeconomic inequalities and political isolation, lack of education infrastructures, and the opportunities for charismatic preachers. This is compounded by Government failures, creating a perfect storm."<sup>235</sup> According to Professor Abiodun Alao, Professor of African Studies, King's College London, these Government failures are the product of: "the complete weakness or the selective efficiency of structures of governance."<sup>236</sup>

136. The pressures induced by climate change have raised challenges in keeping the peace, particularly with regards to the Fulani herdsmen in the 'Middle Belt'. In written evidence, Atta Barkindo stated:

"Climate change and environmental degradation is likely to be Nigeria's next 'Boko Haram'. With lack of investment, job opportunities and economic growth, many local people depend on the land for everything. At the moment, desertification caused by both natural and human factors have added to the level of drought, hunger, internal migration, cross-border mobility and competition over land and resources."<sup>237</sup>

Professor Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Associate Professor of African Politics, University of Oxford, suggested that this problem has been exacerbated by the breakdown of governance and security in rural areas.<sup>238</sup> Professor Alao emphasised land disputes as the central factor in the various conflicts across Nigeria, telling us that:

"In Nigeria, people do not fight over oil; they do not fight over gold or anything. They fight about the land accommodating these resources. This is very central, and any attempt to look at anything in Nigeria must take that into consideration."<sup>239</sup>

137. Conflict is also exacerbated by the lack of alternatives for youths. With respect to the Niger Delta, Dr Caroline Varin said: "what alternatives are there for the young people in the region, other than working in oil? Seeing the degradation of their land limits them, and sometimes picking up weapons is the easiest way to have a livelihood."<sup>240</sup> Yet skills training and employment opportunities must be carefully matched. As Dr Kate Meagher noted in written evidence, labour market saturation in the informal economy had led to: "mounting tensions between indigenes and non-indigenes over access to informal jobs".<sup>241</sup> In this way, training people in sectors where there is limited labour market capacity

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235 [Q88](#)

236 [Q93](#)

237 Atta Barkindo ([NIG0036](#)) p 2

238 [Q90](#)

239 [Q93](#)

240 [Q94](#)

241 Dr Kate Meagher ([NIG0032](#)) p 1

may actually increase tensions between groups. Ben Mellor, Head of Office and Country Representative, DFID Nigeria, told us that: “We are consulting with Nigerian youth about what they want to see as the priorities for DFID going forward, what they see as the future of their country, and how we can contribute to it.”<sup>242</sup>

138. Despite the complex overlap of various factors in driving conflict in Nigeria, DFID was praised in evidence to this inquiry on the effective approach of its Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) Dr Kate Meagher wrote:

“I think that DFID’s programmes conducted through the NSRP have been well conceived, appropriately focused and constructive. [...] DFID’s engagement with the NSRP on wider issues of governance and security have informed and supported better policy, and have delivered value for money.”

139. **The drivers of conflict in Nigeria are multifaceted and complex, demanding a deep level of understanding and careful engagement with relevant stakeholders. DFID’s approach through the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) has proved successful in supporting policy and delivering good value for money in addressing issues relating to employment and empowerment, management of land and water and environmental degradation due to oil spills. We were pleased to hear that DFID has engaged in a consultation process with Nigerian youth in planning its future priorities.**

140. *We recommend that DFID continues its support for work to address the drivers of conflict through the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP). Following the increase in violence in the Middle Belt and its association with the impacts of climate change, DFID should strengthen its approach to mitigating these impacts. Building climate change resilience, particularly in the Middle Belt, should be increasingly prioritised by the NSRP moving forward. It should also make youth consultations a key feature of its planning processes for future activities, particularly in fragile states.*

## Reconciliation and community cohesion

141. In December 2015, President Muhammadu Buhari announced that the Nigerian Government had “technically won the war” against Boko Haram.<sup>243</sup> The Nigerian authorities have begun the return process of urging refugees to go back to their homes by closing down IDP camps.<sup>244</sup> Surveys by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) suggest that, while the vast majority of IDPs want to return home, eight out of ten said they didn’t feel safe enough to return, and 17% said they would need more money to do so.<sup>245</sup> IDPs will undoubtedly need support if they are to return to their communities and thrive. As Tearfund highlighted in written evidence:

“Communities in rural areas of the northeast largely depend on farming for their livelihoods and sustenance. Even if security improves, most families will not be able to support themselves in the short term when they return.”<sup>246</sup>

242 Q107

243 “Nigeria Boko Haram: Militants ‘technically defeated’ - Buhari” BBC News, 2 December 2015

244 “NEMA shuts down 6 IDPs camps in Adamawa” Nigerian Daily Post, 12 May 2016

245 “Nigeria says ‘go home’, but is it safe from Boko Haram?”, IRIN News, 17 November 2015

246 Tearfund (NIG0024) para 2.12

UNDP suggested that this gap in livelihoods could be filled with the assistance of DFID:

“DFID could support large-scale temporary employment generation programmes and unconditional cash transfers which target households which will provide vital income to families that experienced major losses as a result of the conflict; in the same context, enterprise recovery schemes need to be supported in order to rapidly get microenterprises back in business through dedicated grants.”

142. Supporting the livelihoods of the displaced is likely to prove difficult, and there are also significant challenges in rebuilding cohesive communities. As Dr Caroline Varin pointed out:

“Another problem they [the displaced] face is being integrated into the new communities. There is a lot of fear that they have been infiltrated by Boko Haram, so that can create a lot of tensions in that community, so it is perhaps about working on mediation or helping them integrate into this new environment.”<sup>247</sup>

The nature of the conflict may pose additional challenges. Dr Varin told us that:

“I do not think it is a religious conflict. It is a conflict over resources and power, and that is being emphasised through a rhetoric of religion, and trying to implement that fear, which is proving to be correct because there is violence. [...] I do not think the problem there is a religious problem, though it can become one.”<sup>248</sup>

Others argue that this has already become a religious problem.

143. A recent report by Open Doors UK, a charity that supports persecuted Christians, stated that: “This socio-economic conflict has adopted a distinctly religious undertone with local sources convinced that Christian communities face greater levels of attack than their Muslim neighbours.”<sup>249</sup> Regardless of whether the conflict is of a religious nature, faith-based organisations undoubtedly have a key role to play in integrating the displaced and working towards reconciliation and community cohesion. As Tearfund mentioned in written evidence:

“By drawing upon religious beliefs to promote peace and reconciliation while at the same time being able to work with communities in addressing the other underlying causes of poverty and marginalisation. DFID would be investing in an avenue which has potentially excellent value for money as the benefits of effective peacebuilding and conflict resolution can be achieved with relatively low funding and resource outlay.”<sup>250</sup>

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247 [Q105](#)

248 [Q92](#)

249 Open Doors UK, *Crushed but not defeated: The Impact of Persistent Violence on the Church in Northern Nigeria - Executive Summary* (April 2016) p 4

250 Tearfund ([NIG0024](#)) para 2.18

144. With territory being recaptured from Boko Haram and displaced persons being encouraged to return home, it is vital that these people are adequately supported in rebuilding their lives. There will be significant challenges in the near future in providing livelihoods for the displaced as well as integrating them into cohesive communities to build lasting peace.

145. *We urge DFID to prioritise livelihoods and peacebuilding in its programming in the North East. DFID should encourage the Nigerian Government to launch large-scale temporary employment generation programmes and cash transfers targeting the poorest households with DFID support. Reconciliation and community cohesion should also be considered a priority. The more effective peacebuilding elements of the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) should be scaled up and concentrated on the communities where they are most necessary. DFID should fund and make use of the experiences of faith-based organisations and other civil society groups, who are in a unique position to bridge divisions within and between communities.*

146. Professor Abiodun Alao told us: “The key thing is for DFID to formulate policies in conjunction with the community.”<sup>251</sup> Community level approaches to security and good governance can have significant impact, quickly. International Alert stated in written evidence:

“It is Alert’s observation that community-level governance efforts produce significant impact over shorter periods of time. [...] If DFID could focus more on the community level in approaches to community security and good governance, even in cross-border areas with Cameroon and Niger, we envisage that the dividends for peace and security would be significant.”<sup>252</sup>

147. A 2015 review of DFID’s work in security and justice by ICAI considered both the top-down institutional approach and the community-based approach. While ICAI considered both to be necessary, community-based work showed the most promise in terms of impact for the poor. The review concluded that: “DFID needs to rethink its approach to community security, working with a wider range of partners to develop tailored solutions to local problems.”<sup>253</sup> In written evidence, Diana Good commented on the apparent effectiveness of DFID’s community based work, particularly with respect to the Sexual Assault Referral Centres (SARCs) and the Community Accountability Forum (CAF), which form part of DFID’s Justice for All (J4A) programme.<sup>254</sup> Ms Good went on to say:

“The most promising work seems to be at community level where localised engagement shows signs of making a real difference and of establishing sustainable programming. More could be done to analyse the problems from the perspective of the intended beneficiaries of the development work, that is the poor including women, girls, and youth. Whilst top down work serves an important purpose, the intended beneficiaries are the poor and not the institutions of justice. For them, the institutions of justice may be very remote.”<sup>255</sup>

251 [Q105](#)

252 International Alert ([NIG0025](#)) p 3

253 Independent Commission for Aid Impact, [Review of UK Development Assistance for Security and Justice](#) (March 2015), para 6.24

254 Ms Diana Good ([NIG0030](#)) para 29

255 Ms Diana Good ([NIG0030](#)) para 38

148. Community level engagement should be inclusive and account for the needs of the most vulnerable. People with disabilities in Nigeria face a range of social and environmental barriers which prevent them from accessing education, livelihoods, healthcare, water and sanitation, a situation that is worsening for the many people affected by conflict. As CBM pointed out in written evidence: “Instability in the North of Nigeria is exacerbating the situation for people with disabilities, who due to their relative poverty and lack of access to humanitarian responses, are at a higher risk than people without disabilities.”<sup>256</sup> Despite this, there was no mention of prioritising disabled people in the project documentation for DFID’s now concluded Emergency Humanitarian Relief in Nigeria project.<sup>257</sup> There was only brief mention of disabilities, and no specifics in outputs or activities, in DFID’s ongoing Life Saving Humanitarian Support in Northeast Nigeria.<sup>258</sup> This is despite the emphasis on making humanitarian responses inclusive in DFID’s disability framework.<sup>259</sup>

**149. Community-based approaches to conflict recovery will be central to building lasting peace in conflict-affected parts of Nigeria. We commend DFID on some of the promising results emerging from its community level work, particularly with respect to the newer elements of the Justice for All programme such as the Sexual Assault Referral Centres (SARCs) and Community Accountability Forum (CAF). However, we have concerns about how inclusive its humanitarian response has been in serving the needs of the most vulnerable, particularly with respect to displaced people with disabilities.**

***150. We recommend DFID scale up its community-based work, which the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) has suggested can have a promising pro-poor impact. Specifically, DFID should aim to scale up its community-based efforts in the areas of justice and peace and security, with a particular focus on the communities worst affected by Boko Haram in the North East. In line with its disability framework, we urge DFID to adjust the focus of its ‘Life Saving Humanitarian Support in Northeast Nigeria’ programme to include specific targets to cater for the needs of people with disabilities affected by the conflict.***

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256 CBM ([NIG0013](#)) para 2.4

257 DFID, ‘[Emergency Humanitarian Relief in Nigeria](#),’ accessed 4 July 2016

258 DFID, ‘[Life Saving Humanitarian Support in Northeast Nigeria](#),’ accessed 4 July 2016

259 DFID, [Disability Framework – One Year On: Leaving No One Behind](#) (December 2015), p 10

## Conclusions and recommendations

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### Governance—process and outcomes

1. We commend DFID for its support to strengthening democratic processes and outcomes in Nigeria, and recognise the direct impact that this work has had in contributing to a credible, fair and peaceful presidential election in 2015. (Paragraph 18)
2. *We urge DFID to maintain its support throughout the election cycle by strengthening systems and institutional management and civic education. DFID should ensure that a successor programme to its Deepening Democracy in Nigeria 2 (DDiN) programme—due to end in 2018—is established well in advance of the 2019 Presidential Election. Learning from DDiN, boards of DFID projects should include staff of other Government departments where possible, in accordance with the stated desire for DFID's work to be “embedded in the broader HMG effort”. DFID should also use its comparative advantage in parliamentary strengthening to enhance scrutiny, foster transparency and support legislative oversight. When we met members of the Nigerian Senate and House of Representatives in Abuja, it was requested that DFID support capacity building among Nigerian Parliamentarians. This could be facilitated through support for the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD). The UK Government should review the lessons it has learned through extensive parliamentary strengthening efforts in Burma and consider how these can be applied to its work with the Nigerian Parliament.* (Paragraph 19)
3. DFID's approach to politically smart development programming is at the forefront of addressing the significant political barriers to development in Nigeria. We regard DFID-funded research into the political economy of Nigeria as an investment in more effective programming. (Paragraph 27)
4. *We encourage DFID to invest in research into the political economy of Nigeria, particularly on how to better align political and development priorities. It is important that governance inputs are not isolated, and form an integrated part of interventions in education, health, etc. We urge DFID to produce a review within the next year of how programming in its governance suite can better collaborate with its wider interventions and, ultimately, to try to integrate these fully to reduce the need for distinct governance programmes.* (Paragraph 28)
5. A central component of DFID's anti-corruption strategy in Nigeria is supporting enforcement agencies' capacity and ability to detect, investigate, prosecute and convict those who engage in corrupt behaviour. While DFID, the FCO and the NCA are delivering a cross-Government approach to strengthening judicial systems in Nigeria, we have heard that this approach is overlooking a valuable resource in the form of UK-trained advocates, including in the UK-based diaspora and practising in Nigeria. (Paragraph 36)

6. *We urge DFID to make use of the large number of UK-trained lawyers who may be motivated to help drive reform in the judicial system, including the UK-based Nigerian diaspora. The Vice President, with whom DFID works closely and who studied law in the UK, can serve as a key figure in rallying a powerful network of reformers, both in Nigeria and abroad. (Paragraph 37)*
7. The quality of governance at the state level varies significantly and it is vital that processes are in place to ensure that the lessons learned—both from DFID programming and more broadly—are spread across Nigeria. The emergence of platforms like BudgIT, which make public budgets available and accessible to citizens, are a key step towards greater transparency and accountability. (Paragraph 43)
8. *We encourage DFID to ensure that the States Peer Review Mechanism (SPRM) is implemented with the specific objective of delivering greater accountability from two perspectives:*
  - *Bottom-up: Ensure citizens are kept well-informed of the relative performance of their state government, generating calls for greater accountability; and*
  - *Top-down: bring pressure to bear on the poorer performing states from the Federal government.*

*DFID should play an active role in facilitating this peer-review process and ensuring that reviews take place regularly and are available and accessible to the public. They should be published immediately after completion to enable citizens to process and react to the information. DFID-funded projects such as SPARC have amassed significant amounts of data that should be summarised and made available to the media and civil society. This can provide an added push towards greater accountability at limited cost to DFID as the data is already being collected. (Paragraph 44)*

### Inclusive Economic Development

9. The economic and social potential of millions of Nigerians is severely constrained by lack of access to electricity. Therefore we welcome DFID's efforts to increase energy access in the country and recognise the importance of private sector investment in doing so. While there are likely to be benefits to all households of increased energy access in the long term, we share the concerns held by several witnesses to this inquiry that poverty reduction has not been given sufficient consideration and that the research base for the NIAF programme was inadequate. Tariff increases are hurting poor Nigerians in the short term, even if there is a net overall benefit to privatisation of the power sector in the long term. Despite the NIAF programme's supposed focus on the North, the dropping of targets for the region suggest that DFID is not delivering in this respect. (Paragraph 55)
10. *We suggest that DFID encourage the Nigerian Government to take measures to mitigate negative impacts of electricity price increases on the poorest households and consider both the short and long term impacts of its power sector programmes in terms of poverty reduction. While we recognise that the 'Lifeline' tariff aims to do this, its coverage is far too narrow. DFID should support the expansion of the 'Lifeline' tariff and should monitor the impact of price increases on poor households not covered*

*by this tariff. In preparing for any future infrastructure programmes in Nigeria or elsewhere, DFID should carry out more in-depth impact assessments to thoroughly consider the impacts of privatisation on the poor. (Paragraph 56)*

11. *There is no mention of the Nigerian diaspora in DFID's latest Nigeria Operational Plan 2011–2016. We urge DFID Nigeria to conduct a review into its engagement with British Nigerian diaspora groups, particularly professional associations and those focussed on development, with the objective of ensuring that the substantial financial flows in the form of remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI) complement Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the benefit of the poorest Nigerians. (Paragraph 58)*
12. The private sector must play an essential role in successful economic development in Nigeria, and investments in commercially viable, job-creating industries will be key to unlocking growth potential. Various parts of the UK Government and associated bodies will play a role in this, including DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) and CDC Group. We, and our predecessor committee, have expressed concerns about a lack of a coherent, joined up strategy on how these various pieces will fit together. In particular, it is not clear to what extent poverty reduction and inclusive growth will be prioritised by the Prosperity Fund, and whether DFID will therefore take the lead in its delivery. (Paragraph 61)
13. *We recommend that in addition to its new Operational Plan, DFID publishes a strategic plan of how the UK Government's various approaches will be mobilised to make progress towards inclusive growth and poverty reduction. This should include how it coordinates with CDC Group with respect to its sectoral approach to economic development in Nigeria. (Paragraph 62)*
14. Employment is central to Nigeria's future development, and the successful creation of quality jobs has significant implications for both inclusive growth and social cohesion and stability. A growing private sector is essential to delivering the two million jobs needed for young people entering the labour market each year. Yet the evidence suggests that the selective nature of private sector processes can actually limit the inclusivity of growth if interventions are not carefully planned based on a strong body of evidence. Large-scale programmes should not be based on a body of evidence that is deemed to be 'weak'. Furthermore, an understanding of the dynamics of the informal sector, where the majority of Nigerians work, is key to delivering effective programming. (Paragraph 67)
15. *We urge DFID to invest in research to develop a better understanding of the processes underlying quality job creation in Nigeria. Future programmes designed to generate jobs should be built on a stronger evidence base, with a particular focus on capturing the dynamics of the informal sector to ensure decent, secure livelihoods for the millions of vulnerable people who rely on informal employment. (Paragraph 68)*
16. We commend DFID for its commitment to 'Making Markets Work for the Poor', and in particular the impressive achievements its approach has delivered for many women. DFID's economic development programmes in Nigeria have rightly

taken a substantial gender focus. We heard that it is not just market barriers but equally non-market barriers that can limit the economic empowerment of women. (Paragraph 71)

17. *DFID should build upon its current programmes aimed at generating jobs and increasing incomes by addressing the non-market barriers—such as unpaid childcare and family planning—that many women in Nigeria face. In researching these issues and building them into programme design, DFID could strengthen its gender inclusive approach to economic development.* (Paragraph 72)
18. One of the fundamental barriers to poverty reduction in Nigeria lies in the commitment at all levels of Government to delivering basic services. While the allocation of resources is of course the prerogative of the Nigerian Government, DFID has a key role to play in informing Nigerian policymakers on the importance of basic services in supporting a healthy, well-educated and productive population. We are particularly concerned about the prospects for Nigeria's achievement of SDG 4 on inclusive and quality education. An important part of making progress towards SDG 4 is understanding, and helping the Nigerian Government to understand, the scale of the task at hand. (Paragraph 80)
19. *DFID should support key Nigerian decision-makers to help them come to the best-informed decisions possible, with a specific emphasis on the value of basic public services. It should help the Nigerian Federal Government in developing a system to compare the performance of different states on delivering basic services. DFID should ensure that it has the resources to connect its programmes to key decision-makers at the state and federal levels, with a particular emphasis on health and education, and that memoranda of understanding reflect specific and firm commitments on the release of funds.* (Paragraph 81)
20. *DFID should also assist the Nigerian Government in performing an exercise to scope its trajectory towards SDG 4. It should develop a working model on education logistics (covering pupil numbers and distribution, teachers, classrooms, learning materials, etc) which will deepen understanding of what needs to change to get closer to achieving that Goal.* (Paragraph 82)
21. We are concerned that inadequate hospital management systems act as a key structural barrier to improved health outcomes in Nigeria—a problem that DFID in-country staff appeared to be aware of on our visit. In Kano state, Committee members visited Dambatta General Hospital which served as a teaching base for midwifery students participating in the £29m DFID-funded Women for Health (W4H) programme. Students were being trained in hospital surroundings that were unacceptably unhygienic, notably the birthing units. DFID staff informed us that there are clinical directors but no operational directors in such hospitals. Further pressure is added to the system by 'ghost' workers and poor management of those workers who do attend. (Paragraph 83)

22. *We recommend that DFID address the following issues when funding such projects in the future:*

- a) Ensuring immediate and urgent improvement of hospital hygiene standards; and*
- b) Ensuring that structural problems in hospital management systems are resolved before funding agreements for any specific programmes are finalised.*

*DFID should work with the Nigerian Government to ensure that memoranda of understanding include commitments to improve hospital management, operational systems and hygiene. (Paragraph 84)*

23. Due to the attraction of living and working in urban areas for teachers, we are concerned about worsening imbalances in the supply of qualified teachers between urban and rural areas. Unlike the Women for Health (W4H) programme which recruits health worker trainees from rural areas in an attempt to fill gaps in services in those areas, there appears to be no clear rural focus in the Teacher Development Programme to address this imbalance. (Paragraph 88)

24. We recognise that in parts of Nigeria, state governments are not equipped to provide schooling for all children, therefore supporting quality private sector provision is a necessary feature of DFID's approach. In Lagos we visited a Bridge International Academies school and were impressed by the quality of education provision. However, we are concerned about the affordability of private schooling for the poorest families, and that reliance on for-profit companies to deliver education is not easily reconciled with DFID's commitment to "leaving no one behind". One risk is that families who can only send some of their children to school may prioritise the education of boys over girls. Regardless of the public/private sector balance of provision, the responsibility of educating children lies with state governments. While DFID is supporting public sector education in Lagos and Kano through its Education Sector Support in Nigeria (ESSPIN) programme, the extent to which DFID is encouraging the expansion of the sector is unclear. (Paragraph 94)

25. *We urge DFID to ensure that its support to private sector provision of education aligns with its commitment to "leaving no one behind", and that the very furthest behind are prioritised. The furthest behind are not going to be served by for-profit companies, therefore DFID should deliver a focused strategy on how it is going to help the Nigerian authorities significantly expand public sector provision and deliver quality education to those who cannot afford school fees. If the DEEPEN approach is to be expanded to other parts of Nigeria, the model must pay due attention to regional variations in both the prevalence and depth of poverty. We also urge DFID to concentrate attention on educational outcomes across both the public and private sectors. DFID should ensure that the state governments it works with are equipped to effectively regulate both public and private schools, guaranteeing both quality and access for all. (Paragraph 95)*

26. While we commend DFID's commitment to closing the gap in primary school enrolment rates between girls and boys, with a specific focus on regions where girls are particularly disadvantaged, we are concerned about the continued failure of the Girls Education Project (GEP3) to perform satisfactorily. Despite the various phases since 2004, this UNICEF-managed project, awarded without competition, has consistently failed to meet targets and in a number of DFID reviews has been

given ratings to indicate that outputs “substantially did not meet expectation”. While there have been improvements, these are relative to an unacceptably low baseline. We are also disappointed to hear in the project’s latest annual review that the recommendations made by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) in 2012 have still not been successfully implemented. While we recognise the operational difficulties associated with this programme, we are concerned by DFID’s continued funding of a programme that has so consistently failed to meet expectations. (Paragraph 100)

27. *In its response to this Report, DFID should set out what steps it, and UNICEF, are taking to improve the effectiveness of the GEP project and address the specific concerns raised about enrolment, learning, effective financial management and resource planning. It should identify the criteria that improvements will be judged against and to what extent these fall short of the project’s original targets. DFID should also state over what timeframe it expects the project to be fully meeting expectations. This should include an indication of at what point continued underperformance will mean that DFID no longer deems the project viable, and will withdraw its support.* (Paragraph 101)
28. DFID’s SuNMaP (Support to National Malaria Programme) has been widely regarded as a success, both in tackling malaria itself and in strengthening health systems more broadly. We believe that a number of lessons have been learned from this programme that may apply across DFID’s health programming and wider interventions in Nigeria and elsewhere. (Paragraph 106)
29. *We urge DFID to apply lessons from SuNMaP on how catalytic investments, such as in building the capacity of the Nigerian Government’s National Malaria Elimination Programme (NMEP), can have wider benefits for the provision of basic services. DFID should also ensure that the length of programmes matches what research has shown to be most effective: we have heard evidence that this is not always the case at present. Implementing partners and stakeholders should also be kept up-to-date on strategic funding priorities so that they can plan their activities accordingly. We would also like to see DFID invest in building networks between research communities and relevant state and federal authorities in order to deliver effective partnerships and policies that have a strong evidence base.* (Paragraph 107)
30. *With costs per beneficiary expected to be as low as US\$0.12 per person treated by the end of the programme, DFID’s Tackling Neglected Tropical Diseases through an Integrated Approach has shown how cost effective life-saving health interventions can be. We urge DFID to actively use such examples as evidence to the public of how cost-effective UK aid can be in changing the lives of millions of Nigerians. We recommend that DFID scale up this programme as part of the effort to eliminate NTDs in Nigeria. Such a programme should also be replicated in other countries that DFID operates where NTDs are a problem.* (Paragraph 110)
31. DFID has shown strong commitment to reducing the disadvantages faced by women and girls in Nigeria across all of its programming, while also running targeted interventions aimed at transformative change. However, one of the concerns raised in evidence to this inquiry is the lack of support services to women and girls who have been victims of violence. While the Sexual Assault Referral Centres (SARCS) are a promising start, they are too few and need to be scaled up. (Paragraph 115)

32. *DFID should take immediate action to influence the Nigerian Government to scale up its support services to victims of sexual violence through SARCS, and extend this support to all women and girls subjected to violence. We urge DFID to act upon the recommendations in the recent Independent Commission on Aid Impact (ICAI) report on violence against women and girls, and build upon the 'strong start' it has made in tackling this issue by prioritising support services for affected women and girls in Nigeria. (Paragraph 116)*

### Conflict and fragility

33. We commend DFID on its commitment to humanitarian support in the North East, but we are concerned about the gap between humanitarian needs and available funds. We are particularly troubled by the number of out of school children and the long term impacts this is likely to have on the region's development, potentially further widening the gap between the North and South of Nigeria. Assuring parents of the safety and security of schools in Northern Nigeria should be a priority, and we welcome DFID's support to the Safe Schools Initiative in this respect. (Paragraph 127)
34. *DFID must do all it can to ensure that the UN appeal for Nigeria in 2016 is fully funded. In line with commitments made to education in emergencies at the World Humanitarian Summit in May, DFID should use both its own resources and its influence over other donors to ensure that the Education Cannot Wait Fund is well supported and quickly operationalised so that interruptions to education caused by the conflict are minimised to no more than 30 days. We also recommend that DFID scale up its support for the Safe Schools Initiative, and engage with and support the special investigative committee appointed by President Buhari to assess the safety of schools in Nigeria. Finally, the recommendations of the research conducted by ESSPIN into the impact of conflict on education should be properly financed and implemented, and similar research should be conducted with the informal Quranic schools that DFID also works with. (Paragraph 128)*
35. We commend DFID on its continued commitment to development in the North East of Nigeria despite the exceptionally challenging operational environment. DFID has demonstrated its ability to work flexibly and adapt to changing security conditions, whilst maintaining its efforts to fight poverty in a highly unstable region. The lessons learned in the North East of Nigeria will be invaluable in other parts of Nigeria and other DFID programmes globally, as the Department increases its focus on fragile states in line with the recent aid strategy. (Paragraph 133)
36. *We recommend DFID ensures that it has robust processes in place for learning and disseminating lessons on effectively operating in a fragile environment. It is essential that core staff and implementing partners engage with each other effectively through regular meetings, and that best practice is shared with other country teams globally. DFID should continue to monitor the security situation as closely as possible, and ensure that it is in a position to expand both its humanitarian and development activities towards the North East as the situation stabilises. (Paragraph 134)*
37. The drivers of conflict in Nigeria are multifaceted and complex, demanding a deep level of understanding and careful engagement with relevant stakeholders. DFID's approach through the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP)

has proved successful in supporting policy and delivering good value for money in addressing issues relating to employment and empowerment, management of land and water and environmental degradation due to oil spills. We were pleased to hear that DFID has engaged in a consultation process with Nigerian youth in planning its future priorities. (Paragraph 139)

38. *We recommend that DFID continues its support for work to address the drivers of conflict through the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP). Following the increase in violence in the Middle Belt and its association with the impacts of climate change, DFID should strengthen its approach to mitigating these impacts. Building climate change resilience, particularly in the Middle Belt, should be increasingly prioritised by the NSRP moving forward. It should also make youth consultations a key feature of its planning processes for future activities, particularly in fragile states.* (Paragraph 140)
39. With territory being recaptured from Boko Haram and displaced persons being encouraged to return home, it is vital that these people are adequately supported in rebuilding their lives. There will be significant challenges in the near future in providing livelihoods for the displaced as well as integrating them into cohesive communities to build lasting peace. (Paragraph 144)
40. *We urge DFID to prioritise livelihoods and peacebuilding in its programming in the North East. DFID should encourage the Nigerian Government to launch large-scale temporary employment generation programmes and cash transfers targeting the poorest households with DFID support. Reconciliation and community cohesion should also be considered a priority. The more effective peacebuilding elements of the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) should be scaled up and concentrated on the communities where they are most necessary. DFID should fund and make use of the experiences of faith-based organisations and other civil society groups, who are in a unique position to bridge divisions within and between communities.* (Paragraph 145)
41. Community-based approaches to conflict recovery will be central to building lasting peace in conflict-affected parts of Nigeria. We commend DFID on some of the promising results emerging from its community level work, particularly with respect to the newer elements of the Justice for All programme such as the Sexual Assault Referral Centres (SARCs) and Community Accountability Forum (CAF). However, we have concerns about how inclusive its humanitarian response has been in serving the needs of the most vulnerable, particularly with respect to displaced people with disabilities. (Paragraph 149)
42. *We recommend DFID scale up its community-based work, which the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) has suggested can have a promising pro-poor impact. Specifically, DFID should aim to scale up its community-based efforts in the areas of justice and peace and security, with a particular focus on the communities worst affected by Boko Haram in the North East. In line with its disability framework, we urge DFID to adjust the focus of its 'Life Saving Humanitarian Support in Northeast Nigeria' programme to include specific targets to cater for the needs of people with disabilities affected by the conflict.* (Paragraph 150)

## Appendix: Programme from the Committee's visit to Nigeria

| Time         | Programme                          |                                    |
|--------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| <b>Day 1</b> |                                    |                                    |
|              | Group 1                            | Group 2                            |
| Evening      | Arrive Lagos International Airport | Arrive Abuja International Airport |

|              |  |   |
|--------------|--|---|
| <b>Day 2</b> |  |   |
|              | Group 1  | Group 2   |
| Morning      | Meeting with British Council Delegation  | Join DFID All Staff Meeting to introduce the Committee                    |
|              | Lagos Deep Offshore Logistics Base (LADOL)   | Briefing on HMG in Nigeria by the High Commissioner                       |
|              | Meeting with Senior executives and tour of big business in Lagos                                   | Briefing on Country Programme with Head of Office and Management team     |
| Afternoon    | Meeting with Enhancing Financial Innovation and Access and partners on improving access to finance | Conflict overview by Mission Officials and humanitarian programme         |
|              |  | See the situation in the Kuchingovo IDP Camp, Abuja, and hear from UNOCHA |
|              | Field visit with Growth and Employment in States (GEMS4), Mile 12 Market project                   | Fly to Kano   |
| Evening      | Evening event with business leaders hosted by Deputy High Commissioner                             | Safety Briefing   |

|              |   |   |
|--------------|---|---|
| <b>Day 3</b> |   |   |
|              | Group 1   | Group 2   |
| Morning      | Meeting with DFID officials on education                              | Meeting with DFID officials on the programme and operations in Kano |
|              | Field visit to an inclusive public school to meet pupils and teachers | Field visit to a DFID supported school to meet pupils and teachers  |

|           |  |  |
|-----------|--|--|
| Afternoon | Private School & Developing Effective Private Education (DEEPEN)   | Local Clinic & Hospital  |
|           | Field visit to low cost private school to meet pupils and teachers   | Field visit to DFID supported nursing and midwifery college and affiliated health clinic to meet staff and beneficiaries |
|           |  | Maternal Health Clinic including National Malaria Consortium   |
|           | Meeting with Lagos State Government representatives to discuss the development challenges facing Lagos State       | Meeting with Governor focused on conflict and governance   |
| Evening   | Meeting with International Citizen Service (ICS) Youth Parliament Volunteers and Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO) | Dinner discussion with young women/girls supported through DFID programmes   |

|              |  |                 |
|--------------|--|-----------------|
| <b>Day 4</b> |  |                 |
|              | Group 1  | Group 2         |
| Morning      | Flight to Abuja  | Flight to Abuja |
| Afternoon    | Working lunch with Girls' Education Project (GEP)  |                 |
|              | Field visit to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission to be briefed on anti-corruption measures and DFID's support |                 |
|              | Meeting with the Vice President  |                 |
|              | Meeting with Bring Back our Girls Campaigners  |                 |
|              | Meeting with Head of Office and Federal Ministers  |                 |
|              | Dinner with High Commissioner  |                 |

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| <b>Day 5</b> |  |
| Morning      | Round table with civil society and NGOs on DFID's work to improve the accountability of the Government   |
|              | Centre LSD, Christian Aid, Action Aid, Situation Room, Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC) and Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN) |
| Afternoon    | Meeting with Senate President and National Assembly House Speaker to discuss transparency, accountability and public affairs   |
|              | Meetings with Sight Savers and BBC Media Action  |
| Evening      | Depart Nigeria to London   |

# Formal Minutes

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**Tuesday 19 July 2016**

Members present:

Stephen Twigg, in the Chair

|                 |                    |
|-----------------|--------------------|
| Fiona Bruce     | Pauline Latham OBE |
| Dr Lisa Cameron | Jeremy Lefroy      |
| Mr Nigel Evans  | Wendy Morton       |
| Mrs Helen Grant | Mr Virenda Sharma  |

Draft Report (*DFID's programme in Nigeria*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

*Ordered*, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 150 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

A Paper was appended to the Report.

*Resolved*, That the Report be the Second Report of the Committee to the House.

*Ordered*, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

*Ordered*, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134).

[Adjourned to a day and time to be fixed by the Chair.]

## Witnesses

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The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

### Tuesday 26 April 2016

*Question number*

**Dr Kate Meagher**, Associate Professor in Development Studies, London School of Economics, **Josephine Osikena**, Director, The Foreign Policy Centre, and **Dr Sola Kasim**, Research Fellow in Energy Economics, University of Aberdeen

[Q1–21](#)

**Dr Leena Koni Hoffman**, Associate Fellow, Chatham House, **Alex Duncan**, Director, The Policy Practice, and **Joseph Hurst-Croft**, Stakeholder Democracy Network

[Q22–42](#)

### Tuesday 10 May 2016

**Dr Joanna Härmä**, Research Fellow, Centre for International Education, and **Chris Horn**, Former Consultant, Independent Commission for Aid Impact

[Q43–61](#)

**Georgia Taylor**, Director, WISE Development, and **Ojobo Atuluku**, Country Director, ActionAid Nigeria

[Q62–77](#)

**Dr Titilola Banjoko**, Founder, Africa Recruit, and **Dr Prudence Hamade**, Technical Advisor, Malaria Consortium

[Q78–87](#)

### Tuesday 7 June 2016

**Professor Abdul Raufu Mustapha**, Associate Professor of African Politics, University of Oxford, **Dr Caroline Varin**, Lecturer in Security and International Organisations, Regent's University London, and **Professor Abiodun Alao**, Professor of African Studies, King's College London

[Q88–106](#)

**Mr Nick Hurd MP**, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for International Development, and **Ben Mellor**, Head of Office and Country Representative, DFID Nigeria

[Q107–158](#)

## Published written evidence

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The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

NIG numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 Adam Smith International ([NIG0009](#))
- 2 Adam Smith International Annex A ([NIG0029](#))
- 3 Africa Research Institute ([NIG0038](#))
- 4 Bridge International Academies ([NIG0031](#))
- 5 British Council ([NIG0014](#))
- 6 CBM ([NIG0013](#))
- 7 CDC Group ([NIG0016](#))
- 8 Chris Horn ([NIG0036](#))
- 9 Coffey International Development Ltd ([NIG0017](#))
- 10 Corner House ([NIG0020](#))
- 11 Crown Agents ([NIG0008](#))
- 12 Crown Agents (Annex A) ([NIG0039](#))
- 13 DAI ([NIG0007](#))
- 14 Department for International Development ([NIG0011](#))
- 15 Department for International Development (Annex A) ([NIG0035](#))
- 16 Dr Kate Meagher ([NIG0032](#))
- 17 Dr Olanrewaju Olaoye ([NIG0005](#))
- 18 Dr Olly Owen, ESRC Research Fellow, Oxford Department of International Development ([NIG0033](#))
- 19 Father Atta Barkindo, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London ([NIG0035](#))
- 20 Gary Foxcroft, CEO, Universal Learning Solutions ([NIG0034](#))
- 21 Global Justice Now ([NIG0003](#))
- 22 Health Partners International ([NIG0018](#))
- 23 International Alert ([NIG0025](#))
- 24 Malaria Consortium ([NIG0010](#))
- 25 Marie Stopes International ([NIG0004](#))
- 26 Mott MacDonald ([NIG0019](#))
- 27 Mr Justin Moore ([NIG0021](#))
- 28 Ms Diana Good ([NIG0030](#))
- 29 Overseas Development Institute ([NIG0027](#))
- 30 Palladium ([NIG0012](#))
- 31 Plan International UK ([NIG0002](#))
- 32 Population Matters ([NIG0006](#))
- 33 Sightsavers ([NIG0023](#))
- 34 Tearfund ([NIG0024](#))

- 35 The Leprosy Mission England & Wales ([NIG0001](#))
- 36 Transparency International ([NIG0026](#))
- 37 UNDP ([NIG0028](#))
- 38 VSO ([NIG0022](#))
- 39 WaterAid ([NIG0015](#))

## List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

### Session 2015–16

|                       |  |        |
|-----------------------|--|--------|
| First Report          | Syrian refugee crisis  | HC 339 |
| Second Report         | Ebola: Responses to a public health emergency  | HC 338 |
| Third Report          | UK aid: allocation of resources: interim report  | HC 927 |
| Fourth Report         | Crisis in Yemen  | HC 532 |
| Fifth Report          | The World Humanitarian Summit: priorities for reform   | HC 675 |
| First Special Report  | The Future of UK Development Co-operation: Phase 2: Beyond Aid: Government Response to the Committee's Tenth Report of Session 2014–15   | HC 339 |
| Second Special Report | Jobs and Livelihoods: Government Response to the Committee's Twelfth Report of Session 2014–15   | HC 421 |
| Third Special Report  | DFID's bilateral programme in Nepal: Government Response to the Committee's Fourteenth Report of Session 2014–15   | HC 422 |
| Fourth Special Report | Department for International Development's Performance in 2013–14: the Departmental Annual Report 2013–14: Government Response to the Committee's Fourteenth Report of Session 2014–15 | HC 420 |
| Fifth Special Report  | Syrian refugee crisis: Government Response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2015–16  | HC 902 |
| Sixth Special Report  | Ebola: Responses to a public health emergency: Government Response to the Committee's Second Report of Session 2015–16   | HC 946 |

### Session 2016–17

|                       |  |        |
|-----------------------|--|--------|
| First Report          | UK implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals   | HC 103 |
| First Special Report  | UK aid: allocation of resources: interim report: Government Response to the Committee's Third Report of Session 2015–16      | HC 256 |
| Second Special Report | Crisis in Yemen: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2015–16                                     | HC 557 |
| Third Special Report  | The World Humanitarian Summit: priorities for reform: Government Response to the Committee's Fifth Report of Session 2015–16 | HC 556 |