DFID’s programme in Nigeria Contents

2Governance—processes and outcomes

“UK aid to Nigeria is not about resource transfer. None of our aid goes through government systems because of fiduciary risk and to avoid substituting for the Government’s own resources but rather it is about influencing how Nigeria uses its own resources: to reduce poverty—leaving no one behind, to create better livelihoods and to deliver improved services for its citizens.”—DFID Nigeria

8.Improving the structures and processes that determine the way in which Nigeria is governed is central to development progress.16 A strong and consistent theme that emerged in written and oral evidence from DFID Nigeria as well as during our country visit, was that the Department prioritises influence over resource transfer—it aims to assist the Nigerian government in delivering services to secure poverty reduction, as opposed to delivering these services itself. Since 1980, oil exports have brought in more than $1 trillion in cumulative revenue, yet despite pockets of wealth there has been a consistent failure by successive Nigerian governments to translate sizeable natural resource revenues into tangible socio-economic benefits for the majority of Nigerians.17

9.Despite operations in Nigeria being DFID’s third largest bilateral programme in 2016–17, it is one of its smallest relative to the size of the population, the size of the economy and the scale of poverty. Thus the influencing approach, if executed effectively, has the potential to deliver maximum impact for taxpayers’ money. In this sense, efforts to improve governance can be considered the key component of DFID Nigeria’s strategy that ties all of its programming together.

10.Nigeria was under military rule for most of the period between 1967 and 1999, and democracy was only re-established in 1999 with the election of President Olusegun Obasanjo. The current three-tier system of federal government—federal, state and local government area (LGA)—has “contributed to the survival of Nigeria as a cohesive nation”.18 However, it has been argued that “a federal structure, whose prime objective was to maintain security by curbing regional and ethnic influence, does not foster development.”19 The 1999 Constitution, Nigeria’s fourth since independence, transferred greater responsibility to states to provide infrastructure and social services including health and education. A report by the Africa Research Institute argues that state governments have consistently failed to deliver the services to improve the lives of many Nigerians, they are not accountable to their citizens and corruption is endemic,20 as it is through all tiers of the Nigerian Government.21 As Nick Hurd MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for DFID, told us, effectively deploying resources to the benefit of the poorest Nigerian citizens has been a “political failing” in the past.22 Put simply—in its current form, governance in Nigeria is not sufficiently effective to fight poverty in a meaningful and sustainable way.

11.The legacy of military rule has meant that institutions are weak and there is a lack of capacity at all levels of government. Despite their constitutional responsibility to deliver basic services, the recent Nigerian States Budget Transparency Survey 2015 found budgeting processes employed by state governments to be “deplorable” (although improving).23 Falling oil revenues mean that even more pressure is likely to be exerted on states to allocate resources efficiently in the near future. At present, Nigeria’s oil producing states in the South accrue 13% of federally collected revenues—this is based on what is known as the “derivation principle”, for states that generate revenue from their territorial resources. After this, the federal government keeps 52.68% of all revenues from oil exports, duties and corporation taxes. Nigeria’s 36 states then share 26.72% and its 774 local governments areas are allocated 20.60%.24 Figure 1 shows the varying capacities of states to generate their own revenue to cover monthly spending commitments. Those in red were unable to generate sufficient revenue to cover recurrent expenditure such as civil servant salaries, let alone service debts or invest in the public services that are crucial to reducing poverty.

Fig 3: Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) as a share of monthly recurrent expenditure commitments

Source: BudIT, The State of States

12.Despite the bleak picture associated with governance in Nigeria, the current situation must be placed in historical context. As Dr Leena Koni Hoffmann, Associate Research Fellow, Chatham House, told us:

“The broader picture or the broader context in which we should look at the improvements in governance should be the journey […] There was a very repressive military regime in place, there was very, very little press freedom and institutions of governance were severely weakened by corruption and patronage to networks tied to military power.”25

While the challenge is substantial, there is reason for optimism. The election of Muhammadu Buhari as President has been widely regarded as “a significant step forward for the country”,26 and Buhari’s agenda of tackling corruption, ending the insurgency in the North East and generating inclusive economic growth has been hailed by DFID and others as prioritising the right areas.27 While frustrations have started to emerge with the new administration just over a year into its rule,28 Minister Hurd asserted that: “progress has been slow, but progress has been real”.29

Deepening Democracy

13.Nigeria is a large country whose modern history has been characterised by efforts to achieve a balance between ethnic, regional and religious groups that have a history of divisions and conflict.30 Managing resources in a way that satisfies these diverse interests poses a serious challenge to the state, and demands a strong and inclusive democracy. However, the opportunities for corruption and rent-seeking31 created by oil and the lack of effective democratic checks and balances represent state failures that must be addressed in supporting Nigeria’s development.

14.DFID is in the process of delivering a £35 million second phase of its Deepening Democracy in Nigeria programme (DDiN), designed to “strengthen the democratic character of Nigerian political processes and outcomes”.32 DDiN 2 aims to deliver on this through three determinants of change: promoting more meaningful elections; enabling citizens to hold the executive to account; and encouraging a better informed, broader and more engaged electorate.33 In written evidence, Plan International UK were highly complimentary of DFID’s efforts in democratic strengthening:

“DFID is arguably the most systematic and influential supporter of election programmes in Nigeria. Its support for elections has in the last 8 years contributed tremendously to transformation in Nigeria’s electoral processes, culminating in a successful transition after a relatively peaceful general election despite global apprehension.”34

15.The build-up to the 2015 Presidential Election was characterised by this ‘global apprehension’. Various factors including tensions between the two main political parties, the use of religious and regional rhetoric that increased a sense of suspicion and fragmentation, the Islamist Boko Haram insurgency in the North East and intercommunal violence in several middle-belt and northern states suggested that Nigeria was “heading toward a very volatile and vicious electoral contest.”35 However, the national elections were considered fair and relatively free of violence and have been hailed as the most credible presidential elections in Nigeria’s history, with US Secretary of State John Kerry referring to the election as “a decisive moment for democracy across Africa”.36 In oral evidence, Dr Leena Koni Hoffmann told us:

“As much as previous elections have not lived up to expectations of credibility, equality, etc., the last election in 2015 was a direct result of this journey of strengthening electoral management bodies and making them more efficient and supporting them in terms of funding and technical capacity.”37

Joseph Hurst-Croft of Stakeholder Democracy Network also stressed the value of DFID’s work in this area, and asserted that efforts should be maintained even outside the electoral cycle.38

16.In oral evidence, Ben Mellor, Head of Office and Country Representative, DFID Nigeria, emphasised the collaboration between DFID Nigeria and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in its democratic strengthening work.39 This was reiterated by Minister Hurd who told us that: “what DFID does needs to be seen in a broader context of HMG effort”.40 Lack of HMG-wide policy coherence for development was a key issue raised by our predecessor Committee.41 By bringing together heads of FCO and DFID on the board, DDiN provides a good model for cross-Government collaboration and learning in development programming.

17.Beyond support to free and fair elections, DDiN’s work in engaging the electorate is an important feature of Nigeria’s changing political landscape that can be used to promote accountability and the improved delivery of basic services. As Palladium wrote in evidence:

“Levels of citizen interest and engagement with political processes are at a high and a range of issues that were previously off the agenda, such as internally generated revenue and public sector human resource management, have gained increased political traction with both citizens and elites across regional and ethnic divides. Reforms on these issues could have powerful effects on service delivery, poverty outcomes and conflict reduction.”42

18.We commend DFID for its support to strengthening democratic processes and outcomes in Nigeria, and recognise the direct impact that this work has had in contributing to a credible, fair and peaceful presidential election in 2015.

19.We urge DFID to maintain its support throughout the election cycle by strengthening systems and institutional management and civic education. DFID should ensure that a successor programme to its Deepening Democracy in Nigeria 2 (DDiN) programme—due to end in 2018—is established well in advance of the 2019 Presidential Election. Learning from DDiN, boards of DFID projects should include staff of other Government departments where possible, in accordance with the stated desire for DFID’s work to be “embedded in the broader HMG effort”.43 DFID should also use its comparative advantage in parliamentary strengthening to enhance scrutiny, foster transparency and support legislative oversight. When we met members of the Nigerian Senate and House of Representatives in Abuja, it was requested that DFID support capacity building among Nigerian Parliamentarians. This could be facilitated through support for the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD). The UK Government should review the lessons it has learned through extensive parliamentary strengthening efforts in Burma and consider how these can be applied to its work with the Nigerian Parliament.

Politically smart programming

“The prevailing political economy results in a systematic failure of the state to provide the public goods on which poverty reduction depends—quality public services, public infrastructure, a conducive environment for investment and growth, and personal security.”—Alex Duncan, The Policy Practice

20.Much of the evidence to this inquiry stressed that politics and development in Nigeria are inextricably linked. As Alex Duncan, Director, The Policy Practice, told us:

“[…] the fundamental problems of governance that impact on poverty are very, very profound in this society. […] Politics has to work differently in Nigeria ultimately if these problems are going to be addressed.”44

Despite the scale of this challenge, Dr Leena Koni Hoffmann asserted the need for the UK Government to engage with Nigeria’s politics without “being afraid or concerned about the connotations of challenging ideas and policies”.45

21.DFID is a leader in acknowledging that inclusive development is intrinsically linked to politics and inclusive institutions. A thorough understanding of the political constraints to, or opportunities for, change is key to delivering more effective aid.46 Thinking and acting politically requires a thorough understanding of the political context in which policy is formed, as well as the ability to respond to this information with intelligence and creativity.47 The benefits of spending on political economy analysis were discussed in evidence to this inquiry.48 DFID’s approach in Nigeria reflects the idea that an important component of its efforts relate to tackling the political challenges. As Ben Mellor stated in oral evidence:

“[…] if we are not aware of the politics when we get into these things, it will undermine what we are trying to do. It is about a better understanding, but also using what we are doing to inform a better political understanding in turn, so creating a virtuous circle.”49

22.As Adam Smith International pointed out in its written evidence: “It is also important for DFID to remain clear sighted about the limitations to reform driven from the outside—without government champions reform will fail.”50 Being politically smart thus requires DFID to work with reformers in the Nigerian Government. Minister Hurd expressed DFID’s will to “be smart in terms of how we work outside but alongside [Nigerian] Government systems”.51 This involves working with reformers in the various levels of the Nigerian Government but particularly at the state level. As Ben Mellor said:

“There we work with reforming governors, reforming individuals who we believe can make a difference, and make sure we are supporting them in their efforts, because that is where the sustainability comes from, and that is where the route out of aid comes from for Nigeria.”52

23.Evidence to this inquiry highlighted that in order for reforms to be sustainable and last beyond the life of DFID interventions, they need to be aligned with political priorities of Nigerian actors. DAI wrote: “there could be more appetite for improved financial management because of the fiscal crisis precipitated by the collapse of the oil price.”53 DFID should recognise and leverage such opportunities and ensure that reforms are truly embedded in Nigerian governance in two crucial ways:

(1)By broadening their scope beyond relatively small-scale projects that have been ‘islands of success’ and applying these successes elsewhere; and

(2)By deepening them to connect with service delivery issues on the ground to enable the poor to feel the benefits.54

24.While there are advantages to working with reformers in Government, there are also limitations, as Ojobo Ataluku, Country Director, ActionAid Nigeria, told us: “It is a systemic and institutional change that we are looking for, not just a one-on-one individual change.”55 In 2003, a DFID document investigating ‘drivers of change’ in Nigeria came to the conclusion that “a strategy built upon support to individuals and organisations alone will have limited impact, unless it begins to address the underlying institutional problems and structural constraints.”56 Working through political channels with reformers within the government systems should therefore be complemented by working closely with those outside of these systems, such as civil society organisations (CSOs). As Joseph Hurst-Croft stated: “Unless you begin to support civil society and other groups […] you are going to continue to have this elite group that extracts from the core and therefore undermines the resources Nigeria does have.”57

25.One way in which DFID has demonstrated the success of its politically smart approach is through programming targeted towards specific sectors. In particular, its work through the Facility for Oil Sector Transparency (FOSTER) programme (see Box 1). However, the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), identified as “critical” in evidence to our inquiry by Dr Hoffmann, has still not been approved by the Nigerian Parliament despite the contributions of FOSTER and despite being initiated almost a decade ago. With the FOSTER programme having ended in April 2016, it is of great importance that this Bill continues to receive the necessary technical and political support for it to be approved by Parliament and deliver much needed reforms to the sector.

Box 1: Politically smart development programming in Nigeria—FOSTER

The Facility for Oil Sector Transparency (FOSTER) is a £14 million DFID-funded programme designed to promote greater transparency and accountability within Nigeria’s oil and gas sector. It works in partnership with the Nigerian government, civil society and the private sector to reduce opportunities for corruption or revenue mismanagement by improving the understanding of oil and gas sector issues in Nigeria; strengthening the capacity of civil society to challenge government and industry; and working with reformers within government.

Delivering greater transparency and accountability in the sector requires working with entrenched vested interests among elites, as well as challenging those vested interests or pushing for them to be re-framed in less damaging ways. This involves a high level of risk, both for DFID and for the wider work of the UK government in Nigeria. FOSTER aims to understand the underlying political economy and incentive structures that can prevent the benefits of Nigeria’s natural resource wealth being shared more broadly. It tries to capitalise on and nurture appetite for reform, both within government and outside, by working opportunistically and strategically with government and civil society institutions and actors.

FOSTER has played an important role in supporting the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), first initiated in 2007, which seeks to achieve a much needed restructuring of the oil and gas sector. While the PIB is still awaiting approval by Parliament, it has made considerable progress. Other achievements by FOSTER include over £300 million of Nigeria’s public revenues identified and recouped though support for forensic audits of the petroleum sector and developing an evidence base for policymaking and advocacy on gas flaring.

Source: ODI, Politically smart support to economic development: DFID experiences (March 2016)

26.The DFID-funded State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI), an exemplar of politically smart, locally led development,58 has been said to be “delivering good results and illustrating a potential that could well be applied more widely”.59 A report by the Overseas Development Institute was positive about the contribution of SAVI, but it raised the issue of the division of labour between technical support to health, education and employment sectors, and the distinct programmes, run by different contractors, delivering complementary governance inputs. The report stated: “Collaboration among the programmes sometimes allows this to work well […] However, much of the time it does not, because the programmes have both different managers and different ways of working.”60

27.DFID’s approach to politically smart development programming is at the forefront of addressing the significant political barriers to development in Nigeria. We regard DFID-funded research into the political economy of Nigeria as an investment in more effective programming.

28.We encourage DFID to invest in research into the political economy of Nigeria, particularly on how to better align political and development priorities. It is important that governance inputs are not isolated, and form an integrated part of interventions in education, health, etc. We urge DFID to produce a review within the next year of how programming in its governance suite can better collaborate with its wider interventions and, ultimately, to try to integrate these fully to reduce the need for distinct governance programmes.

Anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria

29.Nigeria has the largest economy in Africa, the eighth largest known oil reserves in the world and is designated as a middle-income country by the World Bank. Yet, despite the resources and wealth it possesses, poverty is pervasive, with the numbers of poor actually increasing over the last 25 years. Only China and India have more people living in poverty and both have over six times the population of Nigeria.61 According to DFID’s written evidence:

“The failure to deliver social services, the endemic problem of power supply, the failure to defeat Boko Haram and the collapse of infrastructure are all linked to public sector corruption on a grand scale. An independent report by the Natural Resource Governance Initiative in August 2015 estimated as much as US $32 billion was lost to corruption during the 6 year administration of former President Jonathan.”62

30.This is a view shared by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), one of the anti-corruption bodies in Nigeria, who wrote in their 2012 Annual Report that: “The failure to deliver social services, the endemic problem of power supply and the collapse of infrastructure are all linked with corruption”.63 A study by PricewaterhouseCooper suggests that the cost of corruption in Nigeria equated to roughly $1,000 per person in 2014, and could be nearly double that by 2030 (up to 37% of GDP).64 This is a toll felt by Nigerians on the ground, with Nigeria ranking 136th of 168 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2015.65 The fight against corruption is therefore a crucial component of encouraging the Nigerian Government to make better use of its own resources to reduce poverty. As Minister Hurd told us: “this agenda is so important because it touches so much in terms of our desire to get resources applied where they are meant to be applied in terms of delivering basic services.”66

31.A commitment to fighting corruption was a central feature of President Buhari’s election campaign and is thus a key pillar of his mandate, so there is much room for optimism moving forwards. As Ben Mellor stated: “We cannot underestimate the importance of a President coming to power whose primary mandate is to tackle corruption in a country where corruption is endemic.”67 However, it is also important to note that in the 2009 Report by our predecessor Committee, the then President Yar’Adua had also identified the fight against corruption as one of his priorities.68 Despite this, Nigeria has made little progress in the fight against corruption since 2009, actually slipping down the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index from 130th in 2009 to 136th in 2015.69 Nigeria also fell from 35th out of 53 countries in 2009 to 39th out of 54 in 2014 in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance.70 This suggests that political will is a necessary but not sufficient condition for turning the tide against corruption in Nigeria.

32.Corruption is a particular problem in certain sectors. In the oil and gas sector, President Buhari has suggested that oil proceeds have been directly diverted into personal accounts in the past,71 highlighting the need for reforms to the sector. Dr Leena Hoffmann mentioned the importance of the passage of the Petroleum Industries Bill for these essential reforms, highlighting the role that DFID has played in providing technical assistance to this Bill.72 However, in other sectors DFID and other donors are failing. Transparency International highlighted the insufficient attention paid to corruption in the defence and security sector. In written evidence, Transparency International wrote:

“Corruption in the defence and security sector poses one of the main threats to Nigerian security. Alongside the threat of Boko Haram the army has dealt with soldiers deserting in unprecedented numbers as a result of their disillusion with the state and there were even reports that whole units are selling weapons, intelligence, and even their services to Boko Haram.”73

Supporting judicial reform in Nigeria

33.DFID’s approach to tackling corruption in Nigeria has three stated areas of focus: sanctions, systems and society:

This approach is executed through a range of programmes including the (£52m) Justice for All (J4A) programme, the (£29m) Federal Public Administration Reform (FEPAR) programme, the (£66m) State Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and Capability (SPARC) programme, the (£33m) State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI) and the (£14m) Facility for Oil Sector Transparency (FOSTER), as well as funding to the International Crime Unit of the National Crime Agency. While these programmes have recorded good results, they have “not yet delivered the needed transformation” due to the scale of the problem.75

34.In order to deliver an effective deterrent as part of the ‘sanctions’ pillar, it is vital that Nigerian judicial institutions are strengthened. Dr Leena Hoffmann told us that: “the Nigerian state itself—the President, the federal state and local government—should invest in strengthening these institutions and how they work, so you have a prevention process or strategy, as opposed to recovering and prosecuting corrupt officials.”76 Support to this process has been identified by DFID as a priority areas in an improved, HMG-wide approach to investigative activities.77 The FCO and the National Crime Agency (NCA) have provided technical support to the Nigerian judiciary to develop a system that optimises resources and delivers better case management, while DFID support has focused on legislative reform.

35.Evidence from Crown Agents identified a number of priority areas for judicial reform, with a need for a thorough research base and clearly defined goals and objectives in achieving them. These priorities include:

The evidence from Crown Agents also pointed out that Nigeria has a valuable resource in the form of Nigerian advocates (with or without dual English qualification) of which there are many in both the UK and Nigeria.

36.A central component of DFID’s anti-corruption strategy in Nigeria is supporting enforcement agencies’ capacity and ability to detect, investigate, prosecute and convict those who engage in corrupt behaviour. While DFID, the FCO and the NCA are delivering a cross-Government approach to strengthening judicial systems in Nigeria, we have heard that this approach is overlooking a valuable resource in the form of UK-trained advocates, including in the UK-based diaspora and practising in Nigeria.

37.We urge DFID to make use of the large number of UK-trained lawyers who may be motivated to help drive reform in the judicial system, including the UK-based Nigerian diaspora. The Vice President, with whom DFID works closely and who studied law in the UK, can serve as a key figure in rallying a powerful network of reformers, both in Nigeria and abroad.

From transparency to accountability

38.Much of DFID’s work in the area of corruption relates to promoting transparency and accountability in governance processes, particularly at the state level. Successes in delivering more transparent and effective budgeting processes have been noted. As Ben Mellor told us with regard to SPARC:

“We found that in the 10 states that we were working in over £1 billion of additional money was properly budgeted and therefore properly executed, and that led to better health and education outcomes. We hoped that showing that would have a replication effect across other states.”79

39.Yet as Alex Duncan told us: “The states vary enormously in the quality of governance and accountability from really some quite impressive reformers—Lagos is a lot discussed—to ones that are run by people who are highly corrupt and unaccountable.”80 DFID expressed a will to deliver “more transformational programmes which pave the way to an eventual exit from aid.”81 One way this could be done is by taking a more active role in ensuring that lessons learned from SPARC and SAVI are rolled out into other states.

40.The Nigeria Governor’s Forum (NGF) was set up as a body to facilitate coordination between the 36 elected state governors. In recent years, SPARC played a key role in the NGF’s establishment of the States Peer Review Mechanism (SPRM), designed to foster good governance through comparing periodic reviews of development policies, plans and programmes between states. However, the SPRM processes have either been slow to take hold or their documentation is not being published, with only two state reviews (from January 2013) published on the website. In order for government to be held accountable, it is essential that the citizens have access to information on the performance of their government. Yet as Paul Adams of the Africa Research Institute highlighted in written evidence: “the public find it difficult to know how their state government is performing.”82 Given that the extent of corruption at the level of the state governments is extremely high, this lack of information is a barrier to accountability.

41.The SAVI programme has had success in helping state houses of assembly, civil society, the media and citizens to demand better performance from government. SAVI documented 89 cases in the year preceding its most recent review where partners have played a role in influencing the design and delivery of public policy and programmes.83 However, Joseph Hurst-Croft, Stakeholder Democracy Network, highlighted weaknesses in the link between transparency and accountability, specifically in terms of the time-lag in information being published:

“[…] we have seen some good audits supported recently, particularly in the oil sector and other sectors, but they are very backward-looking and perhaps three or four years late, so that the people that have been involved in stealing that money are well gone. How we support those audit processes and add that accountability in a much more real-term political cycle is something that DFID’s resources could lead to a lot more accountability; if that threat is there and people know that the capacity there is coming, we could have a lot more accountability.”84

42.In oral evidence, Minister Hurd made reference to ‘BudgIT’—a civic organisation that aims to simplify state and federal budgets and make them more accessible and transparent to ordinary citizens.85 DFID could contribute to such transparency platforms through its own data. As Paul Adams of the Africa Research Institute pointed out in written evidence: “well-sourced data on state governments available to the public is very limited and would enhance the democratic process which, at state and local government area level, is evidently flawed […] the work done by SPARC could encourage these developments”.86

43.The quality of governance at the state level varies significantly and it is vital that processes are in place to ensure that the lessons learned—both from DFID programming and more broadly—are spread across Nigeria. The emergence of platforms like BudgIT, which make public budgets available and accessible to citizens, are a key step towards greater transparency and accountability.

44.We encourage DFID to ensure that the States Peer Review Mechanism (SPRM) is implemented with the specific objective of delivering greater accountability from two perspectives:

DFID should play an active role in facilitating this peer-review process and ensuring that reviews take place regularly and are available and accessible to the public. They should be published immediately after completion to enable citizens to process and react to the information. DFID-funded projects such as SPARC have amassed significant amounts of data that should be summarised and made available to the media and civil society. This can provide an added push towards greater accountability at limited cost to DFID as the data is already being collected.

16 DFID, Nigeria Operational Plan 2011–2016 (December 2014), p 5

17 International Energy Agency, Africa Energy Outlook 2014 (Feb 2014), p 138

18 DFID, Country Partnership Strategy 2005–09, para 31

19 Africa Research Institute, State(s) of crisis: Sub-national government in Nigeria (March 2016), p 1

20 Africa Research Institute, State(s) of crisis: Sub-national government in Nigeria (March 2016), p 1

21 ActionAid, Corruption and Poverty in Nigeria (June 2015), p 30

23 Civil Resource Development and Documentation Centre, Nigerian States Budget Transparency Survey 2015 (January 2016), p 10

24 Victor Lukpata, “Revenue Allocation Formulae in Nigeria: A Continuous Search” International Journal of Public Administration and Management Research, Vol 2(1), (October 2013), pp 32–38

26 DFID (NIG0011) p 1

27 DFID (NIG0011) p 1

28Nigeria’s new start is in danger of derailing”, Financial Times, 13 April 2016

30 DFID, Deepening Democracy in Nigeria Phase 2 Business Case and Summary (December 2014), para 17 (ODT 1.04MB)

31 Use of resources to obtain economic gain from others without reciprocating any benefits to society through wealth creation.

32 DFID, ‘Deepening Democracy in Nigeria 2,’ accessed 20 June 2016

33 DFID, Deepening Democracy in Nigeria Phase 2 Business Case and Summary (December 2014), p5–9 (ODT 1.04MB)

34 Plan International UK (NIG0002) para 10

35 International Crisis Group, “Nigeria’s Dangerous 2015 Elections: Limiting the Violence”(November 2014) p i

36Africa: Decisive Moment for Democracy”, US Embassy blog, 6 October 2015

41 International Development Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2014–15, The Future of UK Development Co–operation: Phase 2: Beyond Aid, HC 663, p 16–24

42 Palladium (NIG0012) para 4.3.1

47 Overseas Development Institute, Politically smart, locally led development (September 2014), p 3

50 Adam Smith International (NIG0009) para 4.1

53 DAI (NIG0007) para 7.6

54 DAI (NIG0007) para 3–4

58 House of Commons Library, Nigeria 2015: analysis of election issues and future prospects (January 2015) p 36

59Towards politically smart, locally led development in Africa”, David Booth, African Arguments, 23 October 2014

60 Overseas Development Institute, The SAVI programme in Nigeria: Towards politically smart, locally led development (October 2014), p vi

61 World Bank, ‘World Development Indicators: Nigeria,’ accessed 17 June 2016

62 DFID (NIG0011) p 5

63 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Annual Report 2012, cited in ActionAid, Corruption and Poverty in Nigeria (June 2015), p 6

64 PricewaterhouseCoopers, Impact of Corruption on Nigeria’s Economy (February 2016), p 3

65 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2015,’ accessed 26 June 2016

68 International Development Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2008–09, DFID’s Programme in Nigeria, HC 840–I, para 92

69 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2015,’ accessed 26 June 2016

70 Mo Ibrahim Foundation, ‘Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG),’ accessed 28 June 2016

73 Transparency International (NIG0026)

74 DFID (NIG0011) p 5–6

75 DFID (NIG0011) p 5

77 DFID (NIG0011) p 6

78 Crown Agents - Annex A (NIG0039) p 1

81 DFID (NIG0011) p 3

82 Africa Research Institute (NIG0038)

83 DFID, State Accountability and Voice Initiative Annual Review (February 2015), p 1 (ODT 482KB)

85 BudgiT, ‘About Us,’ accessed 30 June 2016

86 Africa Research Institute (NIG0038)

© Parliamentary copyright 2015

25 July 2016