3Use of science in planning and responding
The National Risk Assessment
28.Under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, the Government has a duty “to assess, plan and advise” for emergencies. One way in which the Government exercises this duty is through its National Risk Assessment (NRA) process; a classified appraisal of the most significant emergencies (malicious and non-malicious) that people in the United Kingdom could face over the next five years. The public version of this is the National Risk Register,67 an unclassified version of the National Risk Assessment, which is published every two years68 to assist individuals, communities and local commercial organisations in their planning.
29.During our inquiry we learned that there is an even higher level of planning above the classified National Risk Assessment, which was also constructed with scientific advice. The Home Office told us that:
In addition to the NRA, the Home Office owns a document (marked at a higher classification) that contains a wider range of CBRN scenarios than depicted in the NRA. It draws upon scientific expertise across the CBRN community to generate a more comprehensive (covering more scenarios) source of scientifically evidenced data to support planning and exercising across the CBRN community.69
30.We were pleased to learn that a CBRN expert group exists to provide advice for the National Risk Assessment, including in relation to behavioural science.70 The group comprises named individuals from the ECOSA organisations (Public Health England, the Defence Science & Technology Laboratory, and the Atomic Weapons Establishment), alongside academics with relevant expertise.71 Understandably, the Government cannot publish details of the membership for security reasons.72
The use of science in the Government’s response framework
31.The Home Office told us that a new CBRN Response Framework had been produced in 2014, which was “firmly based on the scientific evidence available and the principle of value for money”.73 The Home Office explained that “updated scientific evidence” had led to a number of significant evidence-based changes to the approach, including:74
- Development of “evacuation and disrobe” as a response (i.e. removing outer layers of clothing) on the basis of evidence emphasising the importance of speed of decontamination;
- A move away from ‘wet decontamination’ (i.e. using water to wash away decontaminants), on the basis that “research has indicated that dry decontamination performed immediately (using any available absorbent material to wipe away the decontaminant) may be beneficial where the chemical is non-caustic”.75
- Changes in police use of personal protective equipment and the position of cordons—since “new modelling on expected contamination levels shows that in most circumstances by the time fully protected police in CBRN personal protective equipment could set up a cordon most contaminant would have dispersed or settled”.76
32.We were told that these changes were informed by research commissioned by the Department of Health and Public Health England, including the ORCHIDS project (Optimisation, through Research, of Chemical Incident Decontamination Systems) and EDICTAS (Emergency Decontamination In Clinical Treatment At Scene),77 as we discuss below.
Moving away from ‘wet decontamination’
33.The Institute of Physics and Engineering in Medicine told us that the new advice to use dry decontamination was “mainly based on chemical events and not radiological or biological. Common consensus would be that damp (wet wipes or wet sponge) or wet decontamination is better for radiological casualties, however this was not reflected in the updated [Initial Operational Response]”.78
34.Dr Nick Gent from Public Health England explained that “the absolute ideal” approach to decontamination was to “remove all clothing and wash people down using warm water, detergent and a washing aid like a flannel or a sponge”. However, he argued that this was “a counsel of perfection” and that waiting for full wet decontamination equipment could result in delays of one or two hours, which was “undesirable, particularly if people were injured”.79 He told us that research had been conducted to identify the relative importance of different contamination strategies:
For instance, how effective was just removing an outside layer of clothing? To be honest, that is very good and we tested it by putting simulants on to people—simulants they could not see, that only showed up in ultraviolet light—and asking them to do decontamination steps, such as simply removing clothing, then photographing them under ultraviolet light to determine quantitatively how much material had been removed. We looked at that and we looked at simply dry decontamination—removing things, brushing things down—and the use of absorbent materials to remove liquid contamination, how good and effective they were, and at simple showering, such as just hosing down without detergent being used. We quantified all these things. We now have what we call an Initial Operational Response, which is what needs doing quickly at the scene.80
35.Dr Gent also indicated that the full picture of what research showed to be the best approach was not necessarily publicly available due to security concerns:
There is a literature that is in part open, because there is a certain element about national resource and national capability that is of use to our first responders, but also to people who might want to perpetrate attacks. There is a certain amount of the literature and some of the science detail behind it that is not public, but I am privy to all of it and I am confident that we know as much about the methods of decontamination and their effectiveness as we can, but we are continuing to research.81
Reducing mass decontamination resources
36.The Home Office told us that “in line with value for money principles” there had been “reductions in Mass Decontamination resources and trained equipped police, without reducing the effectiveness of the response”. The Emergency Planning Society argued, however, that “the ORCHIDS Project never examined the decontamination of hair, so it was an insufficient evidence base to make decisions”.82
37.When we asked Dr Gent whether this was a significant criticism he told us that:
There is always a level of additional scientific research that you can do. In terms of hair, it is not something that I feel or find is a particular issue, because it is an area of the body that we can manage straightforwardly.83
He later added that “UK studies have not as yet looked at additional dry decontamination steps to specifically remove material from hair”, but further research is underway to examine “optimal sequencing of decontamination methods and additional dry and/or wet decontamination methods for head hair”.84 Andy Bell of the Chief Fire Officers’ Association told us that he was confident that the science behind the reduction in capability was sound, and that from the perspective of the fire service “what we have left is more than adequate to meet the type of incident addressed within the planning assumptions”.85
38.The Minister for Security, Ben Wallace MP, told us that there was a need to be pragmatic with the distribution of resources in this context:
We have to be honest with the public that we cannot cover every eventuality in every square centimetre of this United Kingdom. We are informed by intelligence and we are informed by risk, not just in the kind of chemical or biological scenario but in all other terror scenarios. It is my responsibility, the Home Secretary’s and the Prime Minister’s, to have to say, “Here but not here,” or, “This service here but not there.” That is what we have to do.86
39.We heard some criticisms of the use of science in the Government’s updated response framework for CBRN events. However, it appears to us that in introducing changes the Government is making use of the evolving scientific evidence in a pragmatic way.
Detection and modelling
40.We received information on the use of science in detecting CBRN materials and predicting how they are expected to spread during an incident. For instance, as our predecessor Committee noted during its inquiry into science in the Met Office, the Numerical Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment (NAME) is used in the context of CBRN and Hazmat incidents to predict how material will be dispersed in the atmosphere and on the ground.87 We heard that the Met Office also provided weather scenarios for training events, and could run dispersion models to inform them.88
41.We heard that “joint agency modelling” was connecting models such as NAME with those used by other agencies to improve understanding of how events might unfold.89 However we were also told that better use could be made of the expertise in the national laboratories—the National Nuclear Laboratory and the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) and others.90 We heard that it was important for these bodies to making working together routine in order to prepare for an event involving multiple types of dangerous materials.91
42.The NPL explained that a network of Geiger-Müller tubes known as ‘RIMNET’ (Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network) provided a radiation monitoring system for the UK.92 However, the NPL warned that currently RIMNET could only provide limited information in the form of count rates rather than identify the material or its origin, with a corresponding difficulty in determining what the response should be. The NPL is discussing with RIMNET how this system should be upgraded,93 and has recently developed a mobile “lab in a van” to aid with detection and analysis of radiological threats:
If there is a radiological incident, or something goes up on RIMNET that gives a signal and you do not know what the radiation is, rather than having to go up there, take samples and take them back to the laboratory, there is a fast response laboratory with spectrometric detectors and state-of-the-art radio chemical separation devices in it. The idea is that you drive it up there and it takes hours, not four weeks, to get radiological measurements and numbers from such an incident.94
Investment in R&D
43.We asked the Home Office to provide figures for its research and development expenditure in relation to CBRN. The data they provided showed a significant decline in spending in recent years (see Table 1). Alongside its direct investment in R&D, the Home Office highlighted its investment in a range of other programmes which provide scientific support for CBRN preparedness, including laboratories offering analytical capability and detection facilities.95 The Minister told us that the research programmes included “making sure that the fire and police services invest in the right kit and that we make sure that that kit is maintained, as well as DIM kit—detection, identification and monitoring equipment—and making sure that is up to speed, modern and capable of doing the job it is supposed to do”.96 Relevant research also takes place in other departments such as the Ministry of Defence, DEFRA and the Department of Health, which is “designed to support independent research programmes to develop capabilities or fill knowledge gaps relevant to their specific responsibilities within the overall Government response”.97
Table 1: Home Office Science and Technology R&D expenditure on CBRN
|
2013/14 |
2014/15 |
2015/16 |
2016/17 (expected) |
2017/18 (expected) |
2018/19 (expected) |
|
£1,456,056 |
£815,640 |
£560,683 |
£550,000 |
£550,000 |
£550,000 |
Source: Home Office (CBR 28) para 2
44.The Minister explained that Home Office research programmes were often demand-led, and could be triggered by gaps identified during one of the regular exercises to test response capability,98 or by a focused review:
For example, we constantly review the process in which we respond and the anticipated needs of people affected. When we look at decontamination times and limits, that will trigger us, effectively, to commission scientific advice.99
Maintaining expertise
45.Several of our witnesses thought that the future supply of people and expertise was currently a bigger issue than gaps in the relevant CBRN or Hazmat research. Phil Evans, the Government Services Director at the Met Office, told us that:
Although there is not a particular area of research that I would say is lacking […] there are some potential issues about the availability of people with the right skills and expertise. We have to do an awful lot of in-house training for people who work in [dispersion modelling]. It is a broader point about capability.
Witnesses from DSTL, AWE and PHE acknowledged that retention of expertise was an issue in their organisations,100 and Dr Gent described how these challenges affected Public Health England:
The problem is that we then have some very highly desirable people, and there are other organisations out there that will aggressively recruit them and can offer terms and conditions of service that we cannot match. It is a particular problem, for instance, with mathematical modellers, scientists and computer people; they are a very good example. We recruit some absolutely superb people, but retaining them against the offers they get from outside, with their knowledge, experience and ability, is difficult.101
Dr Dame Sue Ion, Chair of the Nuclear Innovation Research Advisory Board and a member of the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) set up for the Fukushima disaster in 2011 (see Box 1), warned us that:
The UK was only able to mount the excellent response it did in the aftermath of Fukushima because of expertise grown over 6 decades of continuous investment in applied research. Many of the subject matter experts involved have since retired and a pipeline of targeted applied research investment has yet to emerge following two decades of stagnation.102
46.Dame Sue explained that GO-Science maintained a register of experts who can be called upon to join a SAGE during an emergency.103 More broadly, she highlighted “the importance of nuclear engineering expertise and know-how, not just the scientific elements” in the context of providing advice during an emergency.104 She explained that:
In many instances, engineering is key to understanding how events might unfold in the case of a problem with a facility, and I suspect that would be true of chemical and biological facilities as well as nuclear facilities. It is not just about the science; it is about engineering barriers and general facility engineering and understanding the hazards and risks as events unfold. One of the benefits at Fukushima was having access to people who understood how those types of reactors in Japan worked and what the consequences were likely to be. Having access to industry in a SAGE environment, as well as academic expertise, is important and potentially could be improved.105
The Minister acknowledged similarly that “engineers are probably more in the capability solutions, I would probably say, than they are in assessing the scientific advice”.106
47.Effective science advice for a CBRN or Hazmat emergency relies on the ongoing availability of such expertise within the UK. The Government Office for Science should review its list of experts that can be called upon during an emergency to check where gaps are likely to emerge as individuals retire, and determine whether suitable experts will be available in these fields to replace them. It should also consider whether the available expertise includes sufficient specialists with CBRN-relevant engineering and industrial experience and ensure that the need for this expertise is considered when determining the membership of a SAGE.
67 Cabinet Office, National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies 2015 edition (March 2015)
68 Q201
70 Q206 [Paul McCloghrie]
71 Qq 207–8
77 Home Office (CBR 28) paras 17–20. See also Public Health England (CBR 29) for further description of these and other projects.
79 Q165
80 Q166. Quantification is provided in Public Health England (CBR 29): “the effectiveness of disrobing alone has been estimated to remove 90% of contamination”.
81 Q171
83 Q175
85 Q12
86 Q251
87 Science and Technology Committee, Thirteenth Report of Session 2010–12, Science in the Met Office, HC 1538, para 50
88 Q82 [Phil Evans]
89 Q84 [Dr Ion]
90 Q76 [Dr Ion]
91 See Dame Sue Ion (CBR 22). Preparation for events involving a combination of incidents was also highlighted by the Royal Society of Edinburgh as an area for further attention, see (CBR 19) para 6.
94 Q40 [Professor Regan]
96 Q190
98 Q197
99 Q196
100 Q183
101 Q182
103 Q73
104 Q78
105 Q78
106 Q230
27 March 2017