Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction and definitions
1.A distinction between deliberate ‘CBRN’ incidents and accidental ‘Hazmat’ releases of the same materials may leave grey areas in between, which could lead to confusion or affect the mechanisms which planners can access. It is important that definitions do not stand in the way of organisations receiving science advice that is relevant to the emergency in question, however it is described. We recommend that the Government consult further with Local Resilience Forums regarding these definitions and explore how any ambiguities could be resolved—such as by referring simply to ‘malicious CBRN’ incidents and ‘non-malicious CBRN’ incidents where the distinction is of any significance. (Paragraph 10)
National mechanisms for science advice during CBRN and Hazmat incidents
2.ECOSA is a relatively new mechanism that has not yet had to react to an emergency. We recommend that future exercises and practice scenarios for CBRN and Hazmat incidents include ‘live’ unscheduled drills which test the speed and effectiveness of the provision of science advice at all levels and stages of the response, including ECOSA. Scenarios should also test how these mechanisms would function during emergencies that cross national borders within the UK. (Paragraph 21)
3.It is important that local resilience forums are clear about what scientific support is available to them to support planning and response to CBRN and Hazmat incidents, including how that might be different for each type of emergency. The Government should investigate whether there is sufficient clarity amongst all LRFs and how this could be improved—such as by assembling all of the relevant information in the Resilience Direct secure website. In particular, the Government should clarify whether the ECOSA mechanism should only be used for scenarios with suspected malicious intent (and consequently what routes are available for securing advice in relation to Hazmat incidents), or whether the service can be used more generally. (Paragraph 27)
Use of science in planning and responding
4.We heard some criticisms of the use of science in the Government’s updated response framework for CBRN events. However, it appears to us that in introducing changes the Government is making use of the evolving scientific evidence in a pragmatic way. (Paragraph 39)
5.Effective science advice for a CBRN or Hazmat emergency relies on the ongoing availability of such expertise within the UK. The Government Office for Science should review its list of experts that can be called upon during an emergency to check where gaps are likely to emerge as individuals retire, and determine whether suitable experts will be available in these fields to replace them. It should also consider whether the available expertise includes sufficient specialists with CBRN-relevant engineering and industrial experience and ensure that the need for this expertise is considered when determining the membership of a SAGE. (Paragraph 47)
Communicating science to the public during a CBRN or Hazmat emergency
6.We appreciate that this is an area of science in which providing ever more information to the public may not always be the best approach, because of the understandable desire to avoid unnecessary alarm. For the advice received during a CBRN or Hazmat emergency to be understood and interpreted by the public, however, it needs to build on a basic level of understanding of science topics such as radiation and its effects. There is more to be done to increase this level of understanding through public engagement. The Government should commission the Government Office for Science to produce clear and simple guidance for the public for dealing with different types of CBRN or Hazmat emergency; not just in terms of the actions they need to take but also the science that underpins that advice. (Paragraph 53)
7.Communicating accurate science to the public in the event of a CBRN or Hazmat incident is an essential part of the response. There are concerns that media access to informed government scientists is not always possible, and that there is a ‘cultural difference’ between agencies as to whether their experts should speak to the media. The Government should develop advice to its agencies to ensure that the media can be provided with informed science voices during an incident. The need to provide timely and accurate information to the public and the media could in itself be a prompt for setting up a SAGE. (Paragraph 66)
8.The Government’s existing SAGE guidelines include a provision for a press officer as a member of SAGE, but it appears that this has not been taken up when a SAGE has been activated. It is understandable that meeting the media’s demand for expert spokespeople may not naturally be the first priority for a SAGE in providing science advice to the Government, but it is clear that the media also need to be able to access good science during an incident. We have concluded previously—in our Ebola inquiry—that it is helpful for the public to be provided with the evidence behind the advice that it receives during an emergency. We endorse the recommendation made by the Science Media Centre that all future SAGEs should include a dedicated independent scientific press officer to ensure that the communication of science to the public is as good as it can be during an emergency. This member of SAGE could ensure, for instance, that other members engage with the media direct, and that information is quickly cascaded to other scientists to support their own engagement. (Paragraph 67)
27 March 2017